There seems to be a subtext of shock with the latest twist of events in Libya. Yet, there is nothing unexpected in the images of fleeing rebels totally unnerved, not to say unmanned, by a few shells from tanks and artillery fired by men loyal to Gaddafi. After all, the legions of media experts in military affairs had previously declared that only the "allied" air assault had allowed for the rebel successes, so why is there any surprise when a hiccup in that air support resulted in a speedy collapse of the rebel offensive?
The buzz from inside the Beltway, in large measure propelled by the Nice Young Man From Chicago, has centered around the possibility of the US and other outsiders providing arms to the rebels. This notion is absurd. The rebel forces have ample weapons of the individual and light crew served sorts. The dissidents even have some heavier equipment, armored personnel carriers and tanks abandoned by their Gaddafi loyalist crews but still serviceable.
What the anti-Gaddafi "fighters" need is not hardware. What they need is organization, leadership, and, most of all, training. The skill level of the rebels is pathetic at best. The imagery proliferating from Libya shows the anti-government individuals have utterly no knowledge of even the most rudimentary aspects of combat. The bozos of the desert do not even dig in. They do not use cover and concealment. They do not even bother to emplace their tank killing recoilless rifles.
They have no fire discipline. No small unit tactics. No coordination of effort. No recognized command and control system. In short, they have none of the requisites for effective war fighting. They are, therefore, doomed to lose.
In a way it is possible to take comfort in the sheer incompetence of the vast majority of the Libyan "freedom fighters." The all too obvious inadequacies of the rebels indicate the influence or at least the numbers of combat experienced advocates of violent political Islam, veterans of the anti-US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is sparse. There can be little doubt that the men who have survived combat against the US and its Western allies in either venue have gained the basic survival skills so desperately lacking with the majority of the Libyan amateurs.
While the greatest percentage of the opposition forces may be as are the majority of all Libyans, people who wear their Islam lightly, the existence of austere, Salafist derived advocates of violent political Islam has been documented in blood for a century. These were the men, men from Cyrenaica and from the city of Darnah who were the spine, muscle, and sinew of the bloody defensive insurgency against the Italians. These men have been the sharp point of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. These men sought out jihad against the Americans in Muslim lands far, far away from Libya. And, it is these men who are, right now, the only effective combatants in the struggle against Brother Leader.
In the event the US (or any other Western country) provided arms or other military equipment, it would be the same men, the Warriors of the Prophet, who would benefit the most. Any force multiplying equipment or services would propel the advocates of violent political Islam to the top of the local tree. This would not be in the best interests of the US, other civilized states, or the majority of the Libyan people. Should the jihadists be given the wherewithal to wage more effective war, the first and largest loser would not be Gaddafi and his forces but the Libyans who do not share the zeal of those committed to violent political Islam.
In this context it is useful to reflect on some melancholy realities of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The largest number of victims of violence were not foreign troops or indigenous troops loyal to the central government but combatants affiliated with groups not approved of by the advocates of violent political Islam. The other large group of victims were the non-combatants, civilians who were either in the wrong place at the wrong time or who were vocally opposed to the all encompassing goals of the jihadists.
Samantha Powers, Susan Rice, and Hilary Clinton pushed for the no-fly/civilian protection resolution for fear of "genocide." They focused on the most attractive target, the target with the very big mouth, Gaddafi. By so doing they overlooked completely the existence of a group--the advocates of violent political Islam--just as given to wholesale killing, just as prone to murder those who disagree or oppose as Gaddafi. To compound the blunder of the no-fly/civilian protection resolution with providing weapons or other useful military equipment or services would be to favor one murderer over another--not prevent murder period.
The totality of the Obama administration's behavior during the past few weeks demonstrates a bunch of situationally naive people who are adrift at the policy level. The Obama "team" was saved from the worst consequences of its lack of competence by the timely departure of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. The angels who had smiled protectively on the fools of the administration stopped doing so with the advent of the Libyan Question.
The air campaign if taken to the limit can assure the rebels are not destroyed quickly and totally. Beyond that the best efforts of airmen and missile launchers alike can do little. It is not possible to bomb the rebels into a position of winning at any acceptable political cost. It is not possible to bomb Gaddafi out of power in a speedy fashion. Nor can the rebels win in a matter of weeks--even with massive outside assistance in equipment, training, and organization.
In the longer term, Gaddafi cannot hang on indefinitely. In the longer term, the advocates of violent political Islam will come to dominate the rebel councils. When the down-the-tubes trajectory of Gaddafi intersects with the upward trending fortunes of the rebels, the real winners will be the advocates of violent political Islam. When that happens, the US, the West, and the Libyan people will have much to regret.
Showing posts with label Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
"People Power" Reaches Libya--Yawn
There has been a brief bit of hyperventilating in the global MSM over a microscopic demonstration in Libya's number two city, Benghazi, yesterday. The crowd was small. The response overwhelming. And, the body count seems impressive only in its nonexistence.
Far larger were the rent-a-supporter counterdemonstrations in Tripoli. The outpouring of "spontaneous" support and affection for The Leader (as aging one time drug user and full time humanitarian Gaddafi is now known) was predictable. At the same time The Leader has been making something of a show over his "concern" for the grievances of "his" people. The roster of complaints centers on housing and jobs with the notions of liberty and political reform being conspicuously absent. Be that as it may, the state media have been quick to portray the saggy jowled Leader looking both grave and concerned as he listened to the well-rehearsed litany of problems.
Whether anything will come of the meetings is, of course, debatable. There is no real need for The Leader to actually do anything. His hold on power is secure. In the main his status is predicated on a complex system of bought and paid for alliances between The Leader and the assorted tribes which constitute the majority of the Libyan population. The largess spread over the years from Libya's oil exports has gone a long way to securing the loyalty of the traditionally fractious tribes.
In addition, the regime is well served by a large, well trained, and equipped internal security force structure upon which any amount of money has been lavished. The internal security personnel are everywhere and keep a close eye on everyone--including each other. In addition, the army is loyal albeit somewhat irrelevant given its deterioration in recent years.
The personal security felt by The Leader has been underscored by his agreement to release some 110 convicted advocates of violent political Islam. The details of the release were worked out by The Leader's son, Saif. The former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group have all rejected violence and denounced al-Qaeda which was their one time role model. The hints of discontent, even the Benghazi demonstration, did nothing to derail the deal which purportedly was agreed to by The Leader a few weeks back.
A bit of anxiety must be touching the superannuated dictator however given his recent exhortations to Arabs generally to put aside mere domestic politics in favor of a mass march on Israel. This call for a non-violent challenge to the borders of Israel is redolent of the tried and true tactic of displacing internal unrest on an outside target. Still, the speech seems to have been a one off effort without any subsequent reinforcement either by The Leader or any in his regime or media.
Gaddafi is much perceived in the West as the epitome of pure zany. As a consequence he is often underrated in his primary task--keeping power in Libya. Even though his foreign policy has been marked by mounds of disastrous blunder, it has also shown shrewed moments of enlightened self-interest as in the decision to give up nuclear and other WMD oriented development projects. At home he has made few missteps even though his domestic presentations have been marked with the same exercises in grandiosity as his foreign escapades.
However, Gaddafi is aging and aging fast. A succession looms. Perhaps even a succession crisis. While the notion of a family dynasty is not unheard of in Arab societies, there will be problems should The Leader hope simply to pass the baton to his son. Chief among the problems is the economy of Libya. With the sole exception of primary resource extraction, there is no real base for the national economy. Nor has The Leader used any significant percentage of his sovereign wealth to provide any alternatives for the oil wells.
Reinforcing this problem is that Libya in common with all Arab and most Muslim countries has experienced a population boom which has skewed the demographics significantly. Thus, Libya shares the problem of a very large, very young population without sufficient employment opportunities. As was the case in neighboring Tunisia, this has been exacerbated by assuring useless advanced education for a high percentage of the young men. And, there is no more disquieting disaffected group than young men with too much education, too lofty ambitions, and too few real opportunities to pursue the ambitions and use the education.
Because so much of the contemporary order in Libya is predicated upon personal loyalties linking tribal chiefs and The Leader, there is no assurance these loyalties will transfer to the designated successor. At the same time, the lack of perceived functional legitimacy which pervades the urban, educated youth will go to undercut any peaceful transition of authority from father to son. Indeed, the talk of a family dynasty is already showing some of the same provocative effects in Tripoli and Benghazi which the same sort of chatter did weeks and months ago in Egypt.
This implies that The Leader had best focus on his own mortality. Unless he makes and executes meaningful changes in policy particularly as regards the economy and employment, there is a very high likelihood that any transition of power will be ugly at best and the starting gun of genuine revolution at worst. The Gaddafi regime may be able to dodge the bullet of regime change for now, but the day that Gaddafi's death appears imminent, all that will change, dramatically.
Alternately reading from his own Green Book and the Koran has worked well for Gaddafi over the past forty plus years. And continuing to do so is critical for keeping order in his declining years. But, if he actually harbors any idea of the "Libyan Revolution of 1969" surviving the death of its architect, The Leader has to address the fundamental problems of economic reform and employment generation right now and with the most serious of intent.
It behooves the West to work with the irritating Gaddafi in this direction. Even if there were no other consideration, it must be remembered the forces of violent political Islam are merely quiescent in Libya. The appeal of that ideology particularly for disaffected young men has not lessened. Whether any of us like the idea or not, the countries of the West--including the US--have an involuntary camel in the Gaddafi herd.
Far larger were the rent-a-supporter counterdemonstrations in Tripoli. The outpouring of "spontaneous" support and affection for The Leader (as aging one time drug user and full time humanitarian Gaddafi is now known) was predictable. At the same time The Leader has been making something of a show over his "concern" for the grievances of "his" people. The roster of complaints centers on housing and jobs with the notions of liberty and political reform being conspicuously absent. Be that as it may, the state media have been quick to portray the saggy jowled Leader looking both grave and concerned as he listened to the well-rehearsed litany of problems.
Whether anything will come of the meetings is, of course, debatable. There is no real need for The Leader to actually do anything. His hold on power is secure. In the main his status is predicated on a complex system of bought and paid for alliances between The Leader and the assorted tribes which constitute the majority of the Libyan population. The largess spread over the years from Libya's oil exports has gone a long way to securing the loyalty of the traditionally fractious tribes.
In addition, the regime is well served by a large, well trained, and equipped internal security force structure upon which any amount of money has been lavished. The internal security personnel are everywhere and keep a close eye on everyone--including each other. In addition, the army is loyal albeit somewhat irrelevant given its deterioration in recent years.
The personal security felt by The Leader has been underscored by his agreement to release some 110 convicted advocates of violent political Islam. The details of the release were worked out by The Leader's son, Saif. The former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group have all rejected violence and denounced al-Qaeda which was their one time role model. The hints of discontent, even the Benghazi demonstration, did nothing to derail the deal which purportedly was agreed to by The Leader a few weeks back.
A bit of anxiety must be touching the superannuated dictator however given his recent exhortations to Arabs generally to put aside mere domestic politics in favor of a mass march on Israel. This call for a non-violent challenge to the borders of Israel is redolent of the tried and true tactic of displacing internal unrest on an outside target. Still, the speech seems to have been a one off effort without any subsequent reinforcement either by The Leader or any in his regime or media.
Gaddafi is much perceived in the West as the epitome of pure zany. As a consequence he is often underrated in his primary task--keeping power in Libya. Even though his foreign policy has been marked by mounds of disastrous blunder, it has also shown shrewed moments of enlightened self-interest as in the decision to give up nuclear and other WMD oriented development projects. At home he has made few missteps even though his domestic presentations have been marked with the same exercises in grandiosity as his foreign escapades.
However, Gaddafi is aging and aging fast. A succession looms. Perhaps even a succession crisis. While the notion of a family dynasty is not unheard of in Arab societies, there will be problems should The Leader hope simply to pass the baton to his son. Chief among the problems is the economy of Libya. With the sole exception of primary resource extraction, there is no real base for the national economy. Nor has The Leader used any significant percentage of his sovereign wealth to provide any alternatives for the oil wells.
Reinforcing this problem is that Libya in common with all Arab and most Muslim countries has experienced a population boom which has skewed the demographics significantly. Thus, Libya shares the problem of a very large, very young population without sufficient employment opportunities. As was the case in neighboring Tunisia, this has been exacerbated by assuring useless advanced education for a high percentage of the young men. And, there is no more disquieting disaffected group than young men with too much education, too lofty ambitions, and too few real opportunities to pursue the ambitions and use the education.
Because so much of the contemporary order in Libya is predicated upon personal loyalties linking tribal chiefs and The Leader, there is no assurance these loyalties will transfer to the designated successor. At the same time, the lack of perceived functional legitimacy which pervades the urban, educated youth will go to undercut any peaceful transition of authority from father to son. Indeed, the talk of a family dynasty is already showing some of the same provocative effects in Tripoli and Benghazi which the same sort of chatter did weeks and months ago in Egypt.
This implies that The Leader had best focus on his own mortality. Unless he makes and executes meaningful changes in policy particularly as regards the economy and employment, there is a very high likelihood that any transition of power will be ugly at best and the starting gun of genuine revolution at worst. The Gaddafi regime may be able to dodge the bullet of regime change for now, but the day that Gaddafi's death appears imminent, all that will change, dramatically.
Alternately reading from his own Green Book and the Koran has worked well for Gaddafi over the past forty plus years. And continuing to do so is critical for keeping order in his declining years. But, if he actually harbors any idea of the "Libyan Revolution of 1969" surviving the death of its architect, The Leader has to address the fundamental problems of economic reform and employment generation right now and with the most serious of intent.
It behooves the West to work with the irritating Gaddafi in this direction. Even if there were no other consideration, it must be remembered the forces of violent political Islam are merely quiescent in Libya. The appeal of that ideology particularly for disaffected young men has not lessened. Whether any of us like the idea or not, the countries of the West--including the US--have an involuntary camel in the Gaddafi herd.
Saturday, November 3, 2007
Ayman al-Zawahiri Raises The Stakes
Physcian turned al-Qaeda strategist, al-Zawahiri comes on hot and heavy in his hot off the recorder tape today. While the linkage between al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is not exactly a recent development despite what many mainstream media reports indicate, the tape is interesting. Perhaps important. Perhaps even very important.
For good reason, Americans focus on the Mideast. Like a precision guided munition on steroids, we keep an unblinking eye on Iraq. A blinking eye on Afghanistan. An occasionally opened eye on Israel.
For Americans, the huge swath of North Africa doesn't exist.
For Islamists and Jihadists, North Africa is a wide open theater of operations not yet properly exploited. That is the real importance of the new al-Zawahiri tape.
In it the man in the shadows behind Supreme Icon bin Laden names the new targets: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. None of these are unimportant little geographic pimples on the map of Africa. None are without recent experience with Islamist threats.
Algeria came within a gnat's eyebrow of voting in an Islamist regime a few years ago. The coup-by-election was forestalled by the Algerian armed forces. Blood flowed fast and hard. While the flow has slackened to a comparative trickle, the combat continues in the souks and in the mountain villages alike.
Tunisia has not been a monument to stability either. The Islamists are alive, well, and killing someone nearly every day. The Tunisian government barely survived the turbulence brought by Arafat and company when they transferred from Lebanon to Tunisia twenty some years ago. Arafat and his coterie of gunslingers and bombthowers have long since departed but not the fissures they left behind.
Libya is not as stable as it once was. Gaddafi is getting on in years. His years of drug use have taken a toll on mind and body alike. The unifying pressure once conveniently supplied by American opposition has faded into the mists of the Cold War. His state security bureau is no where near as efficient as it was back when the East German Stazi provided necessary training and advice. Worst of all, Gaddafi blinked--hard--when we invaded Iraq, (The Colonel didn't need us bombing his tent again.)
Out in the Libyan desert, between the oil pumps and tanks, the Islamists mutter and the Jihadists plot.
Quite recently Morocco has been the scene of several dramatic, if relatively under covered by the mainstream media, acts of Jihadist terror. King Mohammed sits on a throne every bit as unstable as that occupied by King Abdullah of the House of Sand.
Al-Zawahiri is well aware of the weaknesses present in all of these countries. He seeks to exploit them for the benefit of the Islamist cause.
Let's listen in.
"Islamic nation of resistance and jihad in the Maghreb, see how your children are uniting under the banner of Islam and jihad against the United States, France and Spain."
Later the ex-doctor added, "Support... your children in fighting our enemies and cleansing our lands of their slaves (Moamer) Kadhafi, Zine El Abidine (Ben Ali), (President Abdelaziz) Bouteflika and (King) Mohammed VI." The quotes are from the French press agency's translation, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gwwodPc1iWAWogDHpT0pFoMr9bWw.
France, Italy, and Spain all have more directly threatened interests in the countries on al-Zawahiri's little list. Oil leads the list, of course. Beyond that, the European states have wider economic interests which gradate into strategic military and political concerns. All must also view with a fair degree of disquietude the prospect of absorbing a refugee flood if terror attacks rise to a critical level.
The question of economic destabilization as well as that of refugee generation must raise some alarm throughout the European Union. The issue of Muslim immigration is not exactly a below the radar scope matter in most EU members right now.
Islamists have a real need to spread Jihadism beyond its current venues. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been checked--severely. Taliban and its adherents are under increasing pressure in Afghanistan. Pushed by the recent upsurge in Islamist/Jihadist activities, the Pakistani strongman has taken the extreme action of declaring a State of Emergency. It is too early to see how this might play out.
The potential for Pakistani collapse may be high but no one can safely bet that the US would stand by merely wringing its hands. Whether or not the US finds itself deep in the Pakistani morass, the Islamist cause is best helped by horizontal escalation of its war on the West.
That consideration probably lies behind the al-Zawahiri call to Fatah to both overthrow the PA chieftain, Abbas, and join with al-Qaeda and LIFG in one big war.
Horizontal escalation is (or should be) the single greatest nightmare of the deep thinkers in the current administration and the war planners in the Pentagon. In the past, the potential of Soviet horizontal escalation served to inhibit US policy makers and executors alike. (It was one of those if-we-do-this-in-Asia, the Soviets can do something in Berlin considerations.)
So far, the current administration and its critics have been notably silent on the horizontal escalation potential in the "global war on terrorism." There seems to have been some sort of unjustified assumption that we and only we had the initiative in this war.
We made the same mistake in Vietnam. It was one of the main reasons we were shocked to the depths of our collective political will by the Tet Offensive in 1968.
There is no need to be shocked now. The brains of al-Qaeda, the only one of the leadership cadre who might deserve to be termed a political-military strategist, al-Zawahiri, has announced the intent to escalate the war horizontally at a place of the enemy's choosing.
Iran is not the only game in town. Neither is Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip.
The current administration and its neocon ninnie supporters need to get a grip on that.
Al-Zawahiri has made that clear. Whether we like it or not, the game will widen.
For good reason, Americans focus on the Mideast. Like a precision guided munition on steroids, we keep an unblinking eye on Iraq. A blinking eye on Afghanistan. An occasionally opened eye on Israel.
For Americans, the huge swath of North Africa doesn't exist.
For Islamists and Jihadists, North Africa is a wide open theater of operations not yet properly exploited. That is the real importance of the new al-Zawahiri tape.
In it the man in the shadows behind Supreme Icon bin Laden names the new targets: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. None of these are unimportant little geographic pimples on the map of Africa. None are without recent experience with Islamist threats.
Algeria came within a gnat's eyebrow of voting in an Islamist regime a few years ago. The coup-by-election was forestalled by the Algerian armed forces. Blood flowed fast and hard. While the flow has slackened to a comparative trickle, the combat continues in the souks and in the mountain villages alike.
Tunisia has not been a monument to stability either. The Islamists are alive, well, and killing someone nearly every day. The Tunisian government barely survived the turbulence brought by Arafat and company when they transferred from Lebanon to Tunisia twenty some years ago. Arafat and his coterie of gunslingers and bombthowers have long since departed but not the fissures they left behind.
Libya is not as stable as it once was. Gaddafi is getting on in years. His years of drug use have taken a toll on mind and body alike. The unifying pressure once conveniently supplied by American opposition has faded into the mists of the Cold War. His state security bureau is no where near as efficient as it was back when the East German Stazi provided necessary training and advice. Worst of all, Gaddafi blinked--hard--when we invaded Iraq, (The Colonel didn't need us bombing his tent again.)
Out in the Libyan desert, between the oil pumps and tanks, the Islamists mutter and the Jihadists plot.
Quite recently Morocco has been the scene of several dramatic, if relatively under covered by the mainstream media, acts of Jihadist terror. King Mohammed sits on a throne every bit as unstable as that occupied by King Abdullah of the House of Sand.
Al-Zawahiri is well aware of the weaknesses present in all of these countries. He seeks to exploit them for the benefit of the Islamist cause.
Let's listen in.
"Islamic nation of resistance and jihad in the Maghreb, see how your children are uniting under the banner of Islam and jihad against the United States, France and Spain."
Later the ex-doctor added, "Support... your children in fighting our enemies and cleansing our lands of their slaves (Moamer) Kadhafi, Zine El Abidine (Ben Ali), (President Abdelaziz) Bouteflika and (King) Mohammed VI." The quotes are from the French press agency's translation, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gwwodPc1iWAWogDHpT0pFoMr9bWw.
France, Italy, and Spain all have more directly threatened interests in the countries on al-Zawahiri's little list. Oil leads the list, of course. Beyond that, the European states have wider economic interests which gradate into strategic military and political concerns. All must also view with a fair degree of disquietude the prospect of absorbing a refugee flood if terror attacks rise to a critical level.
The question of economic destabilization as well as that of refugee generation must raise some alarm throughout the European Union. The issue of Muslim immigration is not exactly a below the radar scope matter in most EU members right now.
Islamists have a real need to spread Jihadism beyond its current venues. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been checked--severely. Taliban and its adherents are under increasing pressure in Afghanistan. Pushed by the recent upsurge in Islamist/Jihadist activities, the Pakistani strongman has taken the extreme action of declaring a State of Emergency. It is too early to see how this might play out.
The potential for Pakistani collapse may be high but no one can safely bet that the US would stand by merely wringing its hands. Whether or not the US finds itself deep in the Pakistani morass, the Islamist cause is best helped by horizontal escalation of its war on the West.
That consideration probably lies behind the al-Zawahiri call to Fatah to both overthrow the PA chieftain, Abbas, and join with al-Qaeda and LIFG in one big war.
Horizontal escalation is (or should be) the single greatest nightmare of the deep thinkers in the current administration and the war planners in the Pentagon. In the past, the potential of Soviet horizontal escalation served to inhibit US policy makers and executors alike. (It was one of those if-we-do-this-in-Asia, the Soviets can do something in Berlin considerations.)
So far, the current administration and its critics have been notably silent on the horizontal escalation potential in the "global war on terrorism." There seems to have been some sort of unjustified assumption that we and only we had the initiative in this war.
We made the same mistake in Vietnam. It was one of the main reasons we were shocked to the depths of our collective political will by the Tet Offensive in 1968.
There is no need to be shocked now. The brains of al-Qaeda, the only one of the leadership cadre who might deserve to be termed a political-military strategist, al-Zawahiri, has announced the intent to escalate the war horizontally at a place of the enemy's choosing.
Iran is not the only game in town. Neither is Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip.
The current administration and its neocon ninnie supporters need to get a grip on that.
Al-Zawahiri has made that clear. Whether we like it or not, the game will widen.
Labels:
al-Qaeda,
al-Zawahiri,
Algeria,
counterrorism,
Israel,
Libya,
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,
Morocco,
Tunisia
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