T.R,s Timeless Insight--Today More Than Ever

During the run up to American participation in World War I as Woodrow Wilson was trying  to frame a reason for our coming into this purely European civil war, former president Theodore Roosevelt--personally in favor of the US going to war--wrote to his fellow progressive Republican, Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts.  TR knew a thing or two about war.  He knew even more about the American people.  This shows in his words.

"In my experience," he wrote,"the American public is not disposed to overseas wars unless there is a great cause involved or the goal is plainly clear."  While the ex-president believed there was a "great cause" to be fought in the trenches of the Western Front, he properly concluded that it was not possible yet to convey this to the great mass of We the People in a way which would assure full-fledged support.  He was right.  Even later, after Wilson had put forth his vision of the "great cause" such as to gain nearly monolithic support, it was necessary in the estimate of the administration to put into place the most draconian laws restricting free speech and assembly in the Republic's history and back these laws with a shadow army of millions of hyper-patriotic snoops.

In the aftermath of the war when the noble vision of Wilson turned to foggy and nasty reality, the American public recoiled against any involvement in the affairs of Europe and Asia.  This, the era of isolationism, made both World War II and the ensuing Cold War the next thing to inevitable.

The lesson was and is clear.  "Great causes" must be real and not the artifacts of ideology or ideals.  A goal which is "plainly clear" is far more important than the purported greatness of the cause.

The lessons to be derived from TR's insight are applicable right now as the US considers when, how, and at what speed we should/must ramp down our war in Afghanistan.  The original intent, the goal, of the invasion of Afghanistan way back in the Dark Age, was twofold: Remove by killing or capture Osama bin Laden and his fellows of al-Qaeda; punish the Taliban regime for having harbored al-Qaeda even after 9/11 and repeated diplomatic efforts to accomplish the capture of the al-Qaeda heavyweights.

The goal was "plainly clear."  And, the motive did, in the estimate of most Americans, constitute a "great cause."  Not since 7 Decemember 41 had there been such uniformity of conviction regarding both the necessity and justice of going to war.  The TR dictum had been followed, well and truly.

Almost before the first American boot hit the ground in Afghanistan, the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld Neocon Ninny crowd betrayed the "plainly clear" goal and undercut the credibility of the "great cause."  This was accomplished by a surprising, even shocking, set of awesomely stupid decisions driven by skewed perceptions of the requirements of political opinion both domestic and foreign.

The administration came to the conclusion that the American public or at least the left-leaning elite would support the war if and only if the American goals were enlarged to encompass the creation of a modern Western style nation-state in all its full splendor.  It was the apparent belief of the decision makers that the war would be gutted of public support without the goal of nation-building replacing the narrow, "plainly clear" one of destroying al-Qaeda and administering condign punishment upon Mullah Omar and the Taliban.

That decision as well as its predicate were both as wrong as a cat barking.

Another decision, this one powered by diplomatic considerations, made the situation immeasurably worse.  In total spite of the reasonably well developed intelligence picture which showed the long standing relation between the Pakistani military and intelligence service with Taliban and its protectorate, al-Qaeda, the administration failed to put sufficient pressure on Islamabad to seal the border or arrest fleeing Talib and al-Qaeda personnel who flooded across the border with their Pakistani hand-holders.  Nor did the US provide adequate and properly positioned forces to do the job at the border itself.  (In this context it might be recalled that credible testimony exists as to American units receiving stop orders as they closed in on critical border crossing points.)

The Afghan situation was changed quickly into a protracted multi-party insurgency in which the foreign interventionary forces had neither the numbers nor the doctrine to convert defeat into victory at least in a reasonable amount of time.  The Iraq invasion--which also fails the TR test completely as regards "great cause" and, again by self-imposed mission-leap, fails the goal being "clearly plain"--supervened to assure the situation in Afghanistan would improve only from the perspective of Taliban, the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda and, of course, the Pakistanis.

Now, not quite two years into our belated effort to retrieve some semblance of success in the place, the combination of the killing of Osama bin Laden, the new focus on the deficit and government economy as well as an election only eighteen months in the offing, the debate has shifted from how-can-we-succeed to how-can-we-get-out.  There is no doubt but that We the People have lost any and all desire to keep on keeping on in Afghanistan.

The largest single reason for this widely held view is not the passage of time.  Nor is it the quite modest losses incurred by American forces.  Rather it is simply because our "cause" there is not "great" and our goal is most definitely not "plainly clear."

Rather than engage in a sterile and bitter controversy over how many troops should be withdrawn when and with what effect, the US would be better off to define what our goal is now that the icon of terror is sleeping with the fishes.  Is our goal now what it was in the beginning, the defense of the US and other civilized states by suppressing the offensive capacities of al-Qaeda along with convincing the adherents of Taliban to stop giving "Islamic hospitality" to groups which practice violent political Islam against Western targets?  Or is our goal the more expansive one of nation-building together with forceful counterinsurgency?

The first alternative is cheaper.  Counter-terrorist operations require a lower number of boots on the ground--albeit a highly skilled and specialist bunch in those boots.  The offense-defense of counter-terrorist operations allows us to ignore the nature and character of Afghan society, polity, culture, and economy.  As long as the Afghan government and its armed forces offer no hindrance to our efforts, we can overlook any and all objectionable features of the regime and its personalities.

The downside to this operational concept is the possible blowback from Americans offended by our having left the Afghan population at the "mercy" of political parties espousing political Islam.  As a number of Americans are offended deeply by the practices of some Muslim regimes, it is probable that there will be significant opposition to drawing back from the goal of seeing Afghanistan become a stable, democratic, multi-party, free enterprise state with an honest, transparent, and responsive government which includes an independent judiciary.

The other option is, quite simply, the pursuit of the totally impossible.  Even a successful counter insurgency campaign will end with negotiations, negotiations which will see Taliban and others as part of the government. The ultimate result will be women in burkas, and clerics in charge.  Perhaps not as absolutely as during the heyday of Taliban dot one, but bad by liberal Western norms and values.  But, no purely military effort can do more than kill the most highly motivated and least given to compromise among the insurgents while placing effective pressure on the others to join in the process of negotiation.  The military by itself cannot make the status quo government legitimate either functionally or existentially.  Nor can the military by itself create an atmosphere which draws the support of the uncommitted majority.  That is up to the indigenous government.

The time is here for the Obama administration to choose one of the two options.  Choose and then make the goal "plainly clear."  At the same time the administration would not be wrong to insist that there was a "great cause" underlying our efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  That cause is no less than the critical one of protecting the country against future attack by Muslims who are motivated by the goals of violent political Islam.

Even the smaller, less costly in both lives and money alternative will not see us totally out of Afghanistan for many years.  It will also necessitate putting the real screws on Islamabad to go into North Waziristan so as to put actual pressure on the black turban guys to put down the guns and stick to preaching and stoning women.

Years ago the Geek predicted that the conflict between the civilized states and proponents of violent political Islam will last so long as to render the Cold War a short lived blip in our history.  It will still be going on when President Obama is getting social security--that is if it still exists in twenty years.

Nine Years, Two Wars, Billions Of Bucks--Why Aren't We Safer?

About a week ago Foreign Policy published the results of a survey of acknowledged experts on countering terrorism, particularly terror practiced by advocates of violent political Islam, the greatest threat currently abroad in the world.  The consensus was the US and the West generally were only marginally safer today than on 9/11.  If anything, in the Geek's estimate, the consensus errs on the optimistic side.

While there is little doubt that the original Big Black Turban of violent political Islam, al-Qaeda, is weaker today than on 9/11, this in no way ensures enhanced security against the threats of the bigger beast, political Islam.  The proliferation of both Baby al-Qaedas and lone wolf actors underscores this dreary contention.

The FP collection of experts fingered Pakistan as the fountainhead of risk.  With this the Geek is in complete agreement.  Pakistan is well on the road to failed state status.  Unless the elite of government, army, and intelligence service take very swift and exceptionally determined action to suppress the growing wave of violent political Islam, it is quite probable that the country will achieve collapse within five years and possibly as few as two.  No amount of US bribe money will alter that trajectory absent an unprecedented upsurge of political will by government, army, ISI, and supporting elites.

The most dangerous short-term adversaries of the US and the West live and work in Pakistan.  Not simply in the FATA under the stare and menace of the CIA operated Predators but in much of the country.  These men, the planners, organizers and commanders of operations such as the Mumbai attack or the failed Times Square bombing are existing right under the eyes of Pakistani authorities without any perceptible hindrance.  This melancholy reality is indicative of the schizophrenic stasis of the Pakistani government.

Most of the FP expert panel pointed at the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iran as the single greatest mistake in the so-called global war on terror.  Regardless of any abstract merits, the overthrow of Saddam and the ensuing long and bloody war were a major diversion from the goal of suppressing violent political Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The Iraqi detour assured the US did not finish the task in Afghanistan or effectively lean on the Pakistanis back then to work with us in the FATA for joint benefit.

In addition to the direct military effects of the Iraqi detour, the Great Adventure in Regime Change served to cause splits in the ranks of NATO and the West generally.  In the US it gave rise to an alienated anti-war movement on the Left with consequences which have progressively sapped the political will of the American public to continue the present war of national survival.

The invasion of Iraq, the consequent war there, along with the necessary military emphasis in Afghanistan have not only provided both impetus and breathing room for the practitioners of violent political Islam to proliferate, recruit, co-opt, and escalate horizontally, they have caused a paucity of imagination in the counterterror elements of the Agency, the State Department, and Pentagon.  While some of the armed actions such as the UAV attacks in the FATA and the nocturnal raids in Afghanistan have been effective, they are effective but not sufficient as a French expert noted in the FP piece.

The ultimate defeat of violent political Islam will not come from military means--no matter how critical these may be in the short to mid-term.  Nor will it come from economic development and aid projects.  It will not come from futile exercises in nation-building as has been undertaken in Afghanistan.

The ultimate defeat of violent political Islam can only come from the ranks of Muslims.  It can come only when a school of Islam rises to counter effectively the Wahhibist inspired and rooted jihadis.  The wellspring of violent political Islam is in the Wahhibist or Salifist understandings of Islam even if that was not the intent of those who sponsored the exportation of these schools of belief to places far from their locales of birth.

An excellent candidate for an Islamic response to an Islamic threat is found in the Sufi interpretation of the common religion.  As noted in previous posts Sufism was predominant in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Punjab Pakistan until quite recently.  It is a view of Islam which is introspective, ecstatic, mystical, and totally disengaged from politics.  It focuses on the development of inner peace and harmony which in turn brings about community harmony in an atmosphere of respect and tolerance.  Beyond that Sufism is emotionally engaging and satisfying in its liturgies and rituals--at least as much so as shouting "Death to ..." in the streets or stoning women.

It is surprising that none of the behemoths of our national instruments of power have discovered Sufism as it exists today in the challenging theaters of current operations.  The seed exists everywhere the threat does currently.  It is only necessary to water and fertilize the Sufi seed so that a new, more peaceful Islamic majority can grow over time.

No special magic is needed to do this job.  The clandestine cultivation of indigenous Sufis can be conducted by the normal tradecraft means, the standard protocols which existed to the Geek's knowledge decades ago and presumably still exist.  All that is needed is the wit and will to look beyond the usual means of force and foreign aid, the wit and will to go outside of the box of conventional wisdom.

It may take a generation or more to see final success in this purely Muslim approach to a purely Muslim threat but it is a low risk, low cost, and high payoff strategy that merits serious consideration and rigorous undertaking.  We may be lucky and find a few really charismatic Sufi clerics who will survive the assassination attempts and prevail.  But, the alternative is stark.

The stark alternative is simply that within twenty years we in the West will have lost to the bomb wielding Thugs of the Koran.  The consensus of the FP experts is that the US or Europe will suffer a major terror attack before the year is out.  Their pessimistic view also foresees a Mumbai II operation in the not too distant future.  The Geek is equally dismal in his view.

Beyond the next year the correlation of forces favors the advocates of violent political Islam.  The Western and American elites have lost faith in themselves and their cultures.  The people of both the US and Western Europe are sick of the Long War.  The economic collapse lingers with no defining end in sight, which reduces morale and political will all the more.

Time is on the side of the Bad Guys.  The only alternative to defeat is to try something very new--set a Muslim to defeat a Muslim.  It is worth a try.  Better by far than defeat.

Are They Really That Smart?

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has released a special issue of its Inspire online magazine.  This "Extra-Extra!-Read-All-About-It! release is dedicated to a single topic.  The only matter considered is the "failed" parcel bomb plot.

To AQAP's chief propagandist, the one time North Carolina resident turned full time "traitor to America," Samir Khan, the operation was not a failure.  In his typically breezy not to say cocky way, this self-proclaimed "traitor" points out that the job cost AQAP a bit over four thousand dollars but will result in "billions" of bucks in enhanced security costs to the American air cargo industry.  In terms of cost accounting, ole "Sammy" is bang on.

The jihadist publication promised a continuation of low cost, high economic damage attacks.  AQAP avers that it has hit on a new formula for successfully bringing about the collapse of the US and the West, a sort of death by a thousand paper cuts way of waging war.

The special issue also repeated the AQAP claim of responsibility for the crash of a UPS flight in Dubai which killed the two man crew.  This claim has been rejected by the officials in Dubai, but the results of a review of the crash investigation has not yet substantiated the local view that the incident resulted from causes other than a terrorist attack.  However, there has been no evidence of an on-board explosion, so the cause remains an open question.

Leaving aside the matter of the Dubai incident, the Inspire narrative does pose an interesting question for analysts.  There is no arguing against the contention that the parcel bombs have resulted in greater attention being paid to air cargo.  This attention will both cost extra money and introduce additional frictions into a critical component of the international logistics system.  Over the longer term the delays occasioned by enhanced security will bring substantial indirect costs, but not such as to cripple the industry let alone bring the US to its financial knees.

It has been known since the Pliocene epoch of terrorism that every increment in increased security brings both additional direct costs and a slew of frictions both economic and political in its wake.  By responding to terrorist incidents, the target automatically hands the terrorist a small victory.  The inevitable combination of increased costs, increased frictions, increased apprehensions, and decreased belief in the capacity of the target government to provide a satisfactory level of security exacts political and social as well as economic costs.  The current contretemps over "strip or grope" is excellent evidence of the overall consequence of security driven frictions.

Those adherents of violent political Islam who have lived in the US or elsewhere in the West such as Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki would be well aware of the dynamic of terror-enhanced security-increased frictions.  Thus the question for analysts is this: Did AQAP intend and plan the parcel bomb attack in order to inflict economic damage or is the Inspire explanation one of an after-the-fact nature?

To put it more simply: Are the operatives of AQAP as smart as Khan alleges or did the talented propagandist invent his theory to meet the facts, including the irrefutable one of failure?  In support of the second interpretation is a critical fact absent in the glowing tribute to the brilliance of the Deep Thinkers and Master Strategists of AQAP.

The missing fact?

Well, bucko, how about the cause of the operation's failure?  The attack was betrayed to Saudi intelligence by a defector from AQAP.  Actually, the man was a multiple defector.  He had bounced from terror to Saudi "rehabilitation" and then back to AQAP and finally back to the waiting arms of the Saudis.  The unlikely series of bounces hints strongly that the informant had been targeted on AQAQ by the Saudis and he then performed his task with precision.  Since penetration of hostile entities is the first line of defense and the Saudis have more than one dog in the fight with AQAP, the use of an intentional penetration asset seems quite likely.

The fact that the operation, admittedly a very clever and cheap one, was compromised fatally by a Saudi penetration asset must be more than a tad galling to the heavyweights of AQAP.  The fertile imagination of Samir Khan provided a way of retrieving a measure of success from what is otherwise a failure tinted with the humiliation of betrayal from within.

Ole Sammy makes much of the insight and intelligence of his running buddies of AQAP.  That is the reason for the article detailing not only the infernal devices but also the security systems successfully evaded.  Of course, by giving these operational details the article would seem to be undercutting the value of its promises that the campaign would continue as it provides useful grist for the intelligence and security mills of the US and other countries.

Whether AQAP continues with a focus on parcel bombs or uses another approach one thing is sure--AQAP is not going to fade away, organizational bones bleaching in some sunwashed wadi deep in the mountains of Yemen.  A second unpleasant reality will remain as well: AQAP is aware of the greatest vulnerability in the US and most of the West.  That vulnerability is the demands for more security and the inevitable costs of providing such.

We the People--and the government--must carefully consider just how much security is enough.  We must keep in mind that every time the security wrench ratchets tighter, the costs and the frictions go up as well.  There is a crossover point where the negatives of security are such as to accomplish the goals of the terrorists without a single additional terrorist act.

How close are we right now to the crossover point?  That is the question the Inspire braggadocio demands we, all of us, answer.

A Small Man Has Just Gotten Smaller

One doubts that Bob Woodward intended to diminish President Obama in his latest exercise of "insta-history," but that is precisely what has occurred.  That is, assuming the snippets appearing in the Big Two of the MSM are accurate representatives of the book as a whole.

Most bothersome is the President's evident desire for the military to get him off the hook of making decisions by providing him with an exit strategy.  The refusal of the senior military command to take on a job properly resting with the Guy in the Oval is to their collective credit.

Whether Mr Obama likes the idea or not, the defining of the conditions under which American forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan or any other theater of war is a purely political one.  It is necessary under the American doctrine of civilian supremacy--a doctrine so beloved by the President that he fired General McChrystal for allegedly violating it--for the president to define both the political goal and the minimum necessary signs of accomplishing that goal.

It is the president who determines what constitutes the better state of peace for which the war is being fought and defines "victory."  The military command has the task of advising the president as to what its forces can be expected to accomplish, the cost associated with any given level of accomplishment as well as developing and implementing the "theory of victory" by which the goal and its associated concept of "victory" might be achieved.

This dynamic, a process sanctioned by generations of presidents and generals, required that Mr Obama lay out for the military just what constituted a better state of peace.  It also required that the president decide what costs would be acceptable.  Attempting to off-load these messy but central tasks on to the military command structure was both gutless and witless.

A year ago when the overly prolonged exercise in soul searching over Afghanistan was underway, the president and his "team" had a simple choice to make.  They had to decide which of two quite different options would provide the better state of peace in and around Afghanistan.

The choice was termed one between "counter-terrorism" and "counter-insurgency."  In actuality the choice was between a limited punitive and deterrent effort directed against the advocates of violent political Islam in al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the Haqqani network and the far more expansive, not to say, unlimited one of combining a defeat of Taliban et al with the building of an effectively Western style nation-state in Afghanistan.

While there existed a continuum of alternatives between the poles of limited counter-terrorism and unlimited counter-insurgency, the decision was or should have been one of focus, emphasis.  The debate within the ranks of presidential advisers was quite robust as Woodward underscores.  It was also, if Woodward is to be accepted, a debate which was colored heavily by the considerations of domestic politics.

There is, of course, nothing new nor wrongheaded in the involvement of domestic politics in the decision making process regardless of what some Republican critics may say now.  It is and always has been a necessary part of the process.  Arguably it is the single most important consideration when considering involvement in counterinsurgency as this type of war is a struggle between the political wills of the contesting polities, both indigenous and foreign.

The proposition is different when domestic politics becomes the major, perhaps the preeminent policy consideration.  This was the case in the Afghanistan decision.  Mr Obama made the worst of all choices and then made the results of a bad decision even worse.

In essence, the president opted for the counterinsurgency orientation without providing sufficient resources.  At the same time he failed to prepare the American public, particularly that segment most closely aligned with the Democratic Party, for the reality that counterinsurgency demanded extraordinary patience, a willingness to accept inconclusive measurements of progress, and an outcome which would not make everybody--perhaps anybody--happy.

In short, Mr Obama made the same basic errors as had the Bush/Cheney administration--too broad a goal, too few resources, and no proper preparation of the American public so political will would be sapped quickly.  To this recipe for failure, he added a new ingredient.

Mr Obama accompanied his announcement of a mini-surge with a date certain when US combat forces would commence withdrawal.  The justification offered in Mr Woodward's book is the one so obvious at the time--fear of alienating the Democratic Party's progressive base.

The imperatives of what passed for Presidential thinking were pathetically obvious at the time even without Woodward's insider quotes.  Mr Obama wished to protect his flank against attacks from the Right by appearing tough-minded and vigorous as a wartime leader dedicated to the defeat of "extremism" and the installation of democracy.  At the same time he sought to protect his Left flank from attacks on that vector by providing a "date certain" and limiting the number of new hostages to fortune deployed to the war zone.

The results of this politically driven decision were obvious at the time.  The chief beneficiary would be Taliban which now understood that US patience was officially limited.  Paradoxically the next beneficiary would be the government of Hamid Karzai, which would see it could afford to ignore the calls for Westernization and chat up Taliban in search of a middle ground.

There is no real doubt that Afghanistan, the US, and even Pakistan would have been better off had the Nice Young Man From Chicago opted for the limited counter-terrorism approach.  In effect, had Obama picked up the ball which had been dropped so badly by Bush/Cheney.  It is ironic, deliciously so, that had Obama gone for the punitive expedition option discarded by the ever-so-muscular dude from Texas, he would have had a very good chance of successfully achieving a better state of peace characterized by a greatly diminished threat from al-Qaeda, Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other advocates of violent political Islam in the region.

Of course, to expect Mr Obama to have made an intelligent decision about war is too expect the utterly impossible.  The idea of war offends his tidy, lawyerly mind.  It outrages his personal morality of progressivism.  It violates his belief in the pussiance of international institutions.  War is a subject about which Mr Obama knows so little he has no capacity to know what he does not know.  And, war is a subject which so deeply revolts the Obama sensibilities that he has no desire to rectify his abysmal ignorance nor to come to respect the knowledge and capacities of men in uniform who do know wars and how to fight them.

In this respect he exceeds even Bill Clinton.

Mr Clinton at the least had the vague understanding that defeat by an enemy such as al-Qaeda would have long lasting and very negative consequences for the US--and the rest of the civilized world.  In his distaste for war--and his acceptance of the tenets of the "blame American first" school of history and politics, Mr Obama lacks even this.

Mr Obama is quite evidently unbothered by the possibility of American defeat in Afghanistan.  He is not even overly concerned about the resumption of terror attacks against the continental United States as he has observed that the US could "absorb" more attacks.  This is correct if one restricts the use of the word "absorb" to the purely physical effects of an attack and puts to the side the impact upon national morale, self-confidence, and American standing in global politics.

If the tantalizing bits from Woodward's forthcoming book are accurate, he has performed a useful albeit unpleasant service to We the People.  He has shot another and well deserved arrow into the blimp of myth which is President Barack Obama.

A Primitive And Unconstructive People

It is small wonder that the Islamist jihadists (as well as the less violently inclined sympathizers and supporters who profess and practice politically oriented Islam) see the Arabian Peninsula of twelve hundred or so years ago as the desired paradigm of the human condition. These people and the societies which produce them are--like their desideratum--both primitive and unconstructive.

When the famed American diplomat and historian, George Kennan first used the term, "primitive and unconstructive," he was referring to a particular stance taken by the Soviet Union of Joe Stalin's day. As a man both knowledgeable of and sympathetic with Russian culture over its vast sweep of time, Kennan never would have applied the term to the entirety of the Russian population no matter how appropriate it might have been with respect to the Soviet strongman.

Faced with the actions and words of Islamist jihadists as well as the never ending paeans sung by the political Islamists to the glorious past of Islam during and after the life of the Perfect Man, Kennan would have been tempted to use the term to apply to an entire people. Or at least a significant component of that people.

Consider for a second the social and cultural nature of the assorted heartlands and havens of Islamist jihadism: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia. All of these geographical expressions (as well as others less closely associated with al-Qaeda or Taliban or al-Shabaab or any of the other multiplying forces of jihad) are essentially tribal. Rulership is based on what anthropologists formerly (in less sensitive times) termed "the mighty man" or the "strongman." Socially and culturally all are disconnected from the streams of change running elsewhere in the world except to exploit those technological developments of use to them from cell phones and laptops to liquid explosives and automatic weapons.

To put the matter bluntly, the places which have given birth and later succor to the jihadists and the political Islamists who cozen and control them are as primitive as the society and culture which existed on the Arabian Peninsula over a thousand years ago. The historical record shows that the legacy of the long dead Muslims of the Peninsula as well as their successors along the roads of war and conquest has been marked by a singular lack of a constructive orientation.

Despite the best efforts of Muslim apologists, the historical record demonstrates beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt that the world today owes very, very little to the creative minds, the productive imaginations of Muslims over the past millennium or so beyond providing sanctuary for Jewish intellects fleeing the mindless repression of the Catholics in Europe particularly Spain.

Developments which have marked the construction of the modern world emerged not from those standing in awe of the Perfect Man and the Companions but those who either bowed to the Cross, contemplated the Buddah, or eschewed religion all together. Europe, North America, and Asia were and are the founts of constructive developments in all fields of human discourse. This is what irks the adherents of the primitive and unconstructive views propounded by Islamist jihadists.

For more than a thousand years the tribally based Muslim religion throughout its great swath of territory from Morocco to Indonesia has done nothing to advance the human condition. And, the march of Islam from its cradle to its current extent has seen far more bloodshed, far more persecution, far more destruction than that inflicted by the long conflicts between varieties of European Christians or between Christians and Muslims.

Only in the colonial sphere can the record of Christians descend to the valleys of devastation which mark the course of Islamic conquest and exploitation. Even in this worst of all Christian campaigns it must be said with honesty that the Europeans did try to create, did try to repair damage, did try to improve in many ways the human condition in the regions they seized. Yes, often the attempts were futile, often they were misguided, occasionally the attempts were both cynical and self-serving. Nonetheless, the balance shows the Christian's did make a good faith effort to bring sophistication in politics, medicine, law, technology, education, social mores, and cultural customs.

The Muslims did none of these things. Societies and polities remained simple, primitive, under the sway of "mighty men" and backward looking clerics. Until challenged, dominated by the West, the lands and people of Islam existed in an eddy of time, motionless as the larger currents of change, innovation, discovery, accomplishment swirled by.

The Islamists and those in Islam who support them either openly or tacitly want to regain the safety of their little motionless warp in time. Worse, they want to stop the currents of change.

There is a deceptive appeal in the simple. The simple life, the closely ordered life, the life which runs according to timeless principles enshrined by both the sacred literature and tradition seems so attractive because it reduces the risks of life, the perils of existence, the messy uncertainties of change. A strong, pure faith backed by a strong "mighty man" has great seductive power--particularly to those who have never left the world of the personal, the tribal, the ever-so-simple.

Even to some living in far more politically, socially, culturally, and technologically sophisticated places than the FATA of Pakistan or the barren hills of Yemen find a sweet, sentimental appeal in the notion of a simplified life in which the never ending dislocations of "progress" are noted by their absence. The human brain molded by its emergence in a simple society of family and tribe, an existence which was as timeless as the rhythm of the seasons and the movements of game, still homes in on the "simple life" as a compass needle seeks True North.

The Islamists and their armed jihadist component want to bring back the Good Old Days by force, violence, and fear. They will continue their efforts unless killed to the last man--an option which is not practical in any sort of real world terms even if it could be ethically justified--from one tribal venue or another. The most rational option available for a long term defeat of the jihadists is the ending of tribalism in those places where it and Islam coexist.

That option looked at objectively is very, very difficult to achieve. It is so not because it would take great amounts of thought, effort, and money. The detribalization of the Muslim world is difficult, not to say impossible, to achieve because the simple life is "primitive and unconstructive." It is in that reality that the appeal resides.

A Whole Twenty-five Minutes?

Reportedly President Obama spent the best part of a half-hour in a face-to-face with General Stanley McChrystal while aboard Air Force One. It was truly generous of the Nice Young Man From Chicago to dedicate that much of his life to the man running the single most important, and potentially failed war, the US is involved in today.

After his strong statements at the International Institute For Strategic Studies in London the other day, there is no doubt where the general stands on either the nature of the desired strategy for Afghanistan or the number of combat troops needed to implement it with sufficient effectiveness. Now, there should be no doubt in the President's mind about what the General thinks is necessary if failure is to be prevented. (Video conferencing would not have allowed McChrystal's intensity to have emerged in full. You need to be up close and personal to experience that.)

The nitty-gritty of all the palaver over the re-assessment of our strategy and goals in Afghanistan boils down to a choice between one of three alternatives: a counter-insurgency such as the General desires, a pull back to counter-terrorism directed against al-Qaeda as proposed by Vice-President Biden, or a modified counter-insurgent approach which diminishes the focus on building a Western style nation-state in the country.

There is no need to base our appreciation on what happened to the British or the Soviets when they tried to occupy Afghanistan as some "experts" did in their appearances before Sen John Kerry's Foreign Affairs committee. Neither historical example has any relevance to what either General McChrystal has proposed or the lessened form represented as the third option above.

The repeated calls for a re-focusing of our efforts to the civilian side of the counter-insurgency approach with an emphasis on institutional make-overs, economic development, and the establishment of a rule of (presumably not over polluted by religion) law under an independent judiciary are wide of the mark. Indeed, they are not really relevant to either the removal of the Islamist jihadists of Afghanistan or the establishment of a stable internal regime.

Yes, everybody in Kabul--and elsewhere--would like to see a dollar torrent pouring over the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. Just as the Pakistanis want to see ever more of Uncle Sam's greenbacks greening their country. The reality is that while everybody wants money, the money is of no relevance to solving the basic political and social questions in either country.

This cold reality is quite evident in Pakistan where the increased US aid budget has been met both by howls of derision from politicians and complete apathy by the population which still distrusts the US as a partner in the local counter-terrorist campaign. In Afghanistan, money would be no more the root of all solutions than it has been in Pakistan.

The basic context of the human terrain in Afghanistan--the terrain on which the war will be won or lost to the degree that any interventionary operation "wins"--is deeply fragmented. Schisms exist in language, ethnic composition, tribal affiliation, and school of Islam followed. The role of a tribal leader, or a religious one for that matter, is to be the nexus of a self-organizing system at the local level. Even if a more or less secular form of "nationalism" were to emerge in Afghanistan as it has under Maliki's shrewd political sponsorship, it would be of an indigenous, self-organized sort.

Self-organizing systems can emerge in any context. However, the more peaceful the context, the safer people feel, the more likely it becomes that the self-organizing process will continue up from the local to the regional and finally to the national level. The most critical component of General McChrystal's strategic concept is its emphasis on insulating the civilian population from violence whether at the hands of the Islamist jihadists (as is most likely) or the Afghan national forces and their foreign colleagues.

With bodies, both foreign and domestic, interposed between the violence of the jihadists and the life of the uncommitted civilian majority, the process of self-organizing can begin and continue. The result after some time will be a stable Afghanistan--provided the foreign experts on nation-building stay out of the way. What eventually emerges from the self-organizing capacities of the Afghan civilian population--particularly tribal, religious and other leaders may not be to the delight of Western proponents of the 21st century liberal, pluralistic, secular nation-state--but it will be of Afghan manufacture and thus stable.

Perhaps it won't be noise free, but there has been no significant period of Afghan history in which internal violence has been totally absent--save during those years of foreign invasion and occupation. Even then there were internal conflicts which would have facilitated the foreign dominance had the outsiders shown the wit to use it effectively.

In so far as outside money and expertise are relevant to accomplishing either counter-insurgency or counter-insurgency lite (the third option above) it should, no, must, be provided at the local level according to the self-perceived needs of the local self-organized groups. It must not be "a gift from the American people" or a dictate from the remote and distrusted denizens of Kabul, but a tool needed by the self-organized local group(s) and put into their hands, and their hands alone.

Far more important than outside money or advice is the perceived willingness and ability of both foreign and Afghan national force personnel to stand between the black turbans of the jihadists and the soft targets of the civilian population. To establish the necessary trust and confidence which precedes effective self-organizing, it is utterly essential the security forces actually be there, be on the ground, up close and personal, effectively countering the jihadists and their violence. Beyond simply "being there," it is essential that the forces be there over time, time sufficient for both trust and self-organizing to reach the critical tipping point that turns non-commitment to commitment, if not to Kabul, at least to the idea of peace in every local valley.

A close study of Vietnam shows that where security forces were present and effective, and the outside assistance was provided strictly according to locally perceived needs without any attendant strings, the local valley became both peaceful and anti-Viet Cong, anti-North Vietnam. Admittedly these peaceful valleys were few and far between, but that should be no shock given the wrong-as-a-cat-barking American strategy and operational doctrine.

General McChrystal seems far more attuned to the realities on the ground than were the guys running the Vietnam War debacle. Providing that he receives the necessary troops and is able to evade too much emphasis on the centralized creation of a nation-state from the resistant human terrain of Afghanistan, there is a very real chance that the US and its allies will achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing" as we have in Iraq.

"Not losing" in Afghanistan will be a very serious (but not fatal) blow to the global Islamist jihadist movement--just as "not losing" has proven to be in Iraq. "Not losing" in Afghanistan would be the outcome of counter-insurgency lite (the third option above) as the similar approach has demonstrated in Iraq. Taken in conjunction with Iraq, "not-losing" in Afghanistan would not be the beginning of the end of the global conflict with Islamist jihadism, but it might prove to be the end of the beginning.

Anything less, as in the politically appealing Biden Option of enhanced counter-terrorism in the FATA of Pakistan, would constitute a defeat for us and a shot of steroids for the Islamist jihadist movement everywhere. Anything more than counter-insurgency lite such as unlimited nation building would also be a defeat. A defeat because it is a task beyond accomplishment in a timely nature.

Rarefied discussion of strategy accompanied by pouring over Burn-Before-Reading level secret intelligence assessments may be great fun for the Deep Thinkers around the White House, Foggy Bottom, and the Five Sided Wigwam By the Banks of the Po-to-mic, but it is not particularly useful. Or necessary. There are only three options. Only one has the chance of bringing the minimum (and maximum realistic) strategic result of "not-losing."

It is time for the gab fest to end. It is time to make it march, because the good guys in Afghanistan are quite minus on minutes. It is time for decisive leadership. It is time for the Nice Young Man From Chicago to realize that the war in Afghanistan is worth more than twenty-five minutes. It is more important than even the 2016 Summer Games.

Calling It Like It Is

The Geek has to confess that he had trepidations back in 1992 when Her Majesty's Government appointed Stella Rimington as Director of the Security Service (aka MI5.) Despite strong evidence to the contrary, he wondered if Ms Rimington (as she was known back then, she has since become Dame Rimington) had the sort of dark and devious mind needed for success in the grim and duplicitous world of counter-intelligence and counter-espionage.

The record of the next four years showed that she had all the necessary requisites to run an agency which was increasingly necessary and increasingly under a sort of siege from both external and internal political/social forces. She may not have been the most brilliant CI/CE chief ever, but she was up to the task--and more.

The "and more" part of Dame Rimington's mind and character have been more on display in the years since 9/11 and 7/7. She has been a vocal and trenchant critic of the assorted "security" practices and policies activated in both her native UK and elsewhere. The "and elsewhere" includes, even focuses, on the plethora of horribly wrong-headed actions undertaken by the administration of George W. Bush with the full support of a supine Congress.

In an interview with a Spanish outlet, Dame Rimington spoke the two essential truths concerning the overall impact of the spurious security measures introduced in the UK. The same applies to the US and other countries.

Here are her ground truths. The net effect of all the security programs, all the surveillance, all the data collection and archiving, all the new impediments to free movement, the casual erosion of human rights, is the laying of the foundation for a police state. The second of the Rimington Rules is that the result of the hyper-security has been to perpetuate a climate of fear--which is the goal of terrorists.

Unlike the eager exponents of more "security," Dame Rimington apparently remembers the famed aphorism of Lenin: The purpose of terror is to terrorise.

In a larger context, the measures of the Bush administration, most importantly the creation of the category "unlawful enemy combatants," the establishment of military commissions, the building of the Gitmo Kz lager, the use of allies to worm our way around restrictions on torture, have both eroded respect for the rights and dignities of the individual around the world and undercut the moral authority of the US in the ongoing struggle against authoritarian doctrines and regimes. If the US had sought to wound itself, no better job could have been accomplished than that constructed by Congress and President over the years since 9/11.

Ironically, none of these extraordinary measures were necessary. Had the US treated the people captured in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere as prisoners of war, we would have been able to hold them until the termination of hostilities. Given the nature of the war between the US and al-Qaeda and Taliban, that termination would have been determined by the US. In short, we could have held the captured combatants of whatsoever nationality until the infernal regions experienced glaciation.

As prisoners of war these individuals would still have been subject under the relevant international agreements to which the US is a party to trial for crimes which they may have committed. That includes the actions and conspiracies which fall under the rubric of "terrorism."

Further, the US would have been able to lawfully interrogate any and all prisoners of war. True, there would have been restrictions on the means employed during these interrogations, but the historical record shows that overly robust means of questioning produce results of dubious utility.

Gitmo, military commissions, black prisons, were not necessary. They are not justifiable in terms of either utility or the deterrence of future acts of terror. In short, they provide no real security to the US or other potential target nations. Dame Rimington recognises this and has been outspoken about it.

While she has been silent on the implication of this, it is nonetheless self-evident. The US and other Western nations are in a war without compromise with a totalitarian ideology which has limitless goals and aspirations. It is first and foremost a war of values, worldview and ethical imperatives. Insofar as the US or any other Western country takes actions which run counter to or undercut the long-standing core of Western principles, the cause is weakened. Ground is ceded to the enemy.

Chief among the traditions and values of the US and other countries including Dame Rimington's native land are the right of the individual citizen to be left alone by the government. Ranking along with this unstated but pervasive right to quiet enjoyment of life are such features as the right of movement, the freedom of expression, the right of voluntary assembly. Importantly, none of these specifics lives without the first right--that of being left alone by government and all its assorted minions of security.

As a person who ran a security service with responsibilities to protect the realm against secret attempts at espionage, improper influence of government, sabotage and terror, Dame Rimington well understands both the need for and the dangers of government surveillance and monitoring. She well understands that government databanks contain information which has no relevance to any legitimate security need.

More, she has the experience based cynicism which appreciates accurately that information held by a government will eventually be misused by that government. It will be used not to protect society but to suppress inconvenient individuals within that society. She knows that there are no guardrails on the slippery slope of government surveillance, monitoring and dossier collection.

Apologists both here and in the UK offer the "if you are doing nothing wrong, you have nothing to fear" defense of pervasive and intrusive government "security" activities. This is bunk.

In truth, as Dame Rimington implies, a person has everything to fear because he will never know when the government will decide that what he has been doing is now somehow "wrong." Blown by the winds of political fad and powered only by the need to hold and, if possible, expand authority, governments are unpredictable as to what will be defined as "wrong" at some future date.

One will never know when or if a particular political or social affiliation will be found "harmful" to the interests of government. One will never know if the words one has written or spoken today or the causes which one has supported yesterday will somehow, someway and for some hazy justification of "national security" be deemed injurious or even felonious at some tomorrow yet to come.

The US and other countries have been through this sort of phenomenon before. In the US frenzies of politically driven "national security" campaigns during World War I and in the decade following World War II saw individuals hauled before courts and other tribunals--including that of public opinion--for "offenses" of word, association or movement which occurred perhaps decades previously.

To suggest that the US or other states have learned from the mistakes of previous, pre-electronic age persecutions under the flag of "security" is to argue fantasy. Even more fantastic is the notion of trusting the government, the controllers of surveillance, the compilers of dossiers.

Of course, this is what HMG argued in response to Dame Rimington's critique. A Home Office spokesman using the bland tones to which all bureaucrats resort when placating the hoi polloi said, "The government has been clear that, where surveillance or data collection will impact on privacy, they should only be used where it is necessary and proportionate."

Right. For sure, Dude. Whatever those honey coated words might mean.

At least the polished faceless civil servant at the Home Office was not as offensively fear mongering as was former Vice-President Cheney in a recent interview. According to the ever-defiant, "What? Me Admit Error?" Cheney, without the Patriot Act, without Gitmo, absent waterboarding, lacking the other features of Security-American-Style, the US would have been nuked by al-Qaeda, bio-attacked by Taliban many times over. To Cheney and others like him who have never met an expansion of government power they did not love, the equation is simple: Repression equals security.

There can be and is perfect security for the individuals confined to a Federal "super-max" penitentiary. But, who among us wants to move there?

Terror? Call The Cops?

The Geek has always objected to the current administration's Great Global War on Terrorism. As the Geek and numerous others have pointed out ad nauseum, the idea of declaring war on a specific tactic of war is absurd at the least, and flat out counterproductive at worst.

Comes now the famed think tank by the sea in Santa Monica, Rand Corp, to say in a prolix and almost well based study that using military force against terror employing groups is not justified by historical experience. (Go to the following and click on through for the entire pdf document http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351/index1.html )

The conclusion of the political science types is simply that the majority of terror employing groups have ended their campaigns due to either political or police measures taken by their opponent. The researchers note pointedly that military action (narrowly defined adds the Geek) has been successful in defeating terror employing groups only seven per cent of the time,

None of this is either objectionable or surprising. Provided that the term "military action" is defined to include the use of special operations forces in tightly targeted missions, the employment of military units in a constabulary role and the use of military reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence assets to support both police and political actions.

The employment of heavy, conventional military units in a "counterterrorist" or "anti-terrorist" role is not justifiable on an historical basis. The Geek is tempted to go further than did the lads at Rand. He is willing to go to the extreme and assert that the batting average for conventional forces in either role is zero. Maggie's drawers. Zip. The big goose egg.

In making this assertion the Geek parses between the use of infantry units in a constabulary role emphasizing presence, limited killing and an orientation toward psychological enervation of the adversary and more traditional military operations. The pressure of constant harassing presence by security forces not only severs connections between a terror employing group and the surrounding population. The constabulary also introduces operation-impairing friction between the component cells of the blackhats.

Think of it as a cop-on-the-beat approach on steroids.

Realise also that it is a mission that can rarely--if ever--be effectively performed by US troops. Cops, regardless of what they are called, must be familiar with the geographic and human terrain of their area of responsibility. This means that US forces are inappropriate outside of the United States.

The inappropriateness of employing US military assets for this purpose within the US can pass by without comment as being self-evident except under exceedingly rare conditions unlikely to occur outside of a Dick Cheney nightmare.

The use by the United States of stand-off weapons such as Tomahawk missiles that were so beloved by the Clinton Administration is also unjustified by the historical experience. Even when target intelligence has been both timely and accurate, the reaction time has been too lengthy to provide for useful results.

While it is true that the reaction loop time can be diminished by the National Command Authority giving prior approval to forces in the area to launch and further reduced when the next generation of supersonic missiles comes on line, the use of such advanced technology is unlikely to prove successful in ending or even diminishing a terrorist oriented group's will or ability to continue.

"Get real, Geek!" You object.

"Get a grip on this," replies the Geekmo.

The cultural matrix which has been producing terror employing groups and is most likely to do so in the future is unimpressed by death per se. It is most unimpressed by death coming from a cowardly distance. So the use of stand-off weapons in and of itself is counterproductive.

(The Geek suggests to the deep thinkers out in Santa Monica that they take a close look at this hypothesis. The results might be useful albeit disturbing to the Air Force hand that feeds them.)

Even the Predator fired Hellfire missiles which have proven delightfully useful in killing assorted black turbans from Yemen to Pakistan suffers from the drawback of being seen down range as the weapon of a coward. The crux here is simple: To win it is necessary to out macho the opposition. To make them afraid of you--up close and personal.

Understanding this key feature of the human terrain points to a critical mission for military assets. This is the use of special operations personnel for targeted operations based on actionable intelligence against key members of the terror employing group. The goal is simply neutralization. (That term is employed to cover all the possibilities from arrest to killing to simply assuring that the target(s) disappear from human ken.)

Having said that the Geek is of the view that one of the best uses of American intelligence capacities is to support the efforts of friendly foreign governments in counter- and ant-terrorist operations. Only in the event that the foreign government proves unable or unwilling to act upon US provided intelligence in a timely and effective manner should US assets be employed operationally.

It should go without saying that the highest priority of US intelligence should be the detection of threats directed at the US or its citizens overseas. The connections between overseas and domestic intelligence as well as between the entire intelligence community and American domestic law enforcement have been improved since 9/11. They need to be improved more as is indicated in the sub-text of the Rand study.

At home we are only as safe from the actions of a terror employing group or individual as the local police. The Geek notes with interest a large number of terror oriented groups, individuals and actions that were not investigated by the Randies but which occurred within the United States. In the overwhelming majority of these--dating back to the 1880s--local police either thwarted the threat or detected and arrested the perpetrators.

Ultimately a terror act by a non-state actor is not an act of war. It is a violation of the law, a breach of the peace. Cops exist to prevent breaches of the peace and arrest law breakers. The Randies are correct in underscoring this. We should all do the same.

The boys by Santa Monica Bay might also have demonstrated from their study of nearly a thousand terror oriented groups and their actions one salient fact. It's a fact that should make all of us feel better about life.

History shows that most terrorists are even more stupid than most crooks. If we trust the cops to deal with the second groups, we can trust them to do more about the first.

Terror? It's a crime. Not a war.

Shakin' And Quakin' And Headin' For The Valium

The Geek just returned from a regular trip to the land of the occupationally paranoid. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, he didn't actually visit the place, simply read an industry travelogue. You can check it out yourself, http://hstoday.us/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=26.

Even this sort of exposure to the weird land of the vocationally fruitcake is enough to cause the Geek's knees to go weak, his stomach to churn and his flight/fight response go into overload. Then, he slaps his face and shouts to the canyon outside, "Get a grip!"

The reality is simple. In Year Seven of the Age of the Terrorist, we are not neck deep in anthrax. We are not dodging buildings brought down by bombs. We are not wearing Geiger counters as the latest fashion statement (and protection against the aftermath of a "dirty bomb.")

As Year Seven of the Age of the Terrorist comes near its end, shopping malls are not disappearing in clouds of debris. School buses are not being hijacked by Hamas. Aircraft are threatened only by bankruptcy courts.

What gives???

Is all this quiet the result of the fearless and effective efforts of Secretary Chertoff and the dedicated "warriors on the home front" of the Department of Homeland Security?

Or is it something simpler (and far cheaper)?

Such as reality. A reality that will not be found in the plethora of writing by counter terrorist "experts." The reality that the vast majority of wannabe terrorist, both foreign origin and "home grown" are inept even flat out stupid.

Consider the case of Timothy McVeigh. Yes, with the minimal assistance of Terry Nichols, the failed applicant for the Army Special Forces who lacked any specific training in improvised munitions was able to construct a large ammonium nitrate and diesel oil truck bomb and detonate it with a stolen fuse. The explosion did kill a large number of people in the Oklahoma City Federal Building.

But what happened next? The bomber got caught. Easily. Quickly. Why? Because, the ever-so-clever dude had taken the license plate off his pre-stashed get away car and had forgotten to replace it. That was like hanging a sign on the car saying, "Arrest me!" And, he was.

Or take a quick look back at the first attack on the World Trade Center. Yes, the VBIED went off in the garage. It killed a few. Injured a lot. Put a bloody big crater in the parking deck.

And then?

The master terrorists went back to the Ryder truck rental agency to reclaim their deposit. That was all it took to hook names with the VIN recovered from the truck's axle and other parts by the forensic technicians. The rest, as they say. is history.

Not enough proof?

The plotters and executors of the 7/07 attacks on the London transit system made bombs that went off. Bombs that maimed and killed. Then, two weeks later another attack was attempted. It had been in the planning and development stage since long before the 7/07 strike.

The boys (and, in an appropriately supporting roll, girls) went after the same target constellation, the London transit system. This time results were different. The bombs didn't explode. The detonating compound was too weak according to British experts.

Everyone went to jail. Most for a very long time.

Let's face it: it's easy to dream of being a world class terrorist. It's easy to make plans, to have ideas. It's darn tough to turn the ideas, the plans into reality.

Even the big league heavies of al-Qaeda have their problems. Just recall the little accident in a Manila apartment that ended the grand design of ten or more American airliners exploding over the Pacific.

The Geek could go on. He could look at the Liberty City Seven and all the others like that motley assembly including the Fort Dix gang but his fingers are getting tired.

The point of the exercise is simply that there are very few individuals who can, like Mohammad Atta, work effectively at the tactical level of terrorism. There are very few people with the right mix of skills, tradecraft and personality who can assemble a team, keep the team members focused on the mission and lead the mission personally.

Without the rare Mohammad Atta, Osama bin Ladin and his lieutenants are operational nullities. Without a Mohammad Atta, wannabe terrorists are far more likely to be a danger to themselves than to the rest of us.

A danger to themselves? You ask.

Yes. The record shows clearly that absent effective leadership such as that provided by Atta, groups planning an act of terror talk too much, too indiscriminately so that any half awake security or intelligence organisation will get the word fast and accurate. Experience over the past half century at the least show that terror oriented cells whether foreign origin or domestic lack necessary tradecraft--or even the mindset of good career criminals. It shows a consistent pattern of almost wilful exposure of that which should never be exposed to the outsider.

They are a danger to themselves because they set themselves up to be busted. Pure stupidity plus an overabundance of ego kills them figuratively, if not literally.

Of course they kill themselves literally. Making bombs is dangerous. Ask the bloody body parts strewn across the front yards of several Washington officials back in 1919. Or the fragments of the bomb making Weathermen in Greenwich Village in '69.

The Geek agrees that terror directed against the US is a real threat. But it is a threat that can be and has been managed effectively by the old standards of the American intelligence and law enforcement communities from CIA and NSA through the FBI to exemplar police forces such as the NYPD.

If Chertoff and his monstrous legion would focus on securing the border, protecting the gaps in our ports and provide some real as opposed to simply annoying and expensive aircraft security, our actual security at home would increase geometrically at least.

Better yet, Congress should simply redefine the DHS as the Department of border, airline and port security. It would also be a good idea for Congress to take away the porkish grants and awards that DHS has strewn across the landscape without consideration of real threats and genuine risks--to say nothing of actual terrorist capabilities.

It would also be a very good idea if the more monstrous brigade of terrorism "experts" took a good large dose of their favorite trank and went to sleep for a few months. The world would be much better off without their constant nattering.

Did Musharraf Have Another Choice? Do We?

The Geek has been waiting for General Musharraf to take the big step of imposing martial law ever since the contretemps between his regime and the Pakistani Supreme Court a few months back. The Geek can't say that he has been anticipating the inevitable with any degree of glee, 'cause that ain't the case.

Pakistan reminds the Geek of an incident he experienced some years back at an Air Force Base. The then brand new F-111 was being displayed on Armed Forces Day. It did a slow, dirty pass over the runway in front of the crowded bleachers. Suddenly the plane's nose pitched up. Diamond shaped shock waves hit the concrete below as the pilot hit throttle up.

In the stands every man who was a pilot stood up, fists clenched, mouths forming the words, "Oh, shit," as he willed the airplane to keep flying. All the non-pilots remained sitting, many applauding what they believed to be a fine piece of exhibition flying.

It was fine flying for sure as the pilot kept the bird balanced on its afterburners until it was past the stands. Then it pancaked in.

Pakistan has been like that F-111, nose up in a full stall but powered on by a combination of international will and the flying ability of General Musharraf. Experienced observers, like the flyers in that long ago crowd, knew that something was dreadfully wrong with the country, knew it would crash, but hoped the crash would be delayed--and survivable.

With the imposition of martial law under whatsoever term is like putting full emergency military power to the afterburners. It is a short-term, desperate attempt to avoid catastrophe. If it fails, the crash will be fast, hard and deadly.

Musharraf's action may be his only viable option. His indictment of the Supreme Court has merit. It should not be cast aside as political posturing by a power-hungry despot.

The Court has acted as if it were far more concerned in settling political scores with the military junta than in being an effective collaborator in the task of developing democratic stability in Pakistan. The position taken by the Court at the behest of opponents of Musharraf that the validity of the presidential election would be decided weeks after the election of Musharraf had taken place must rank as an act of judicial stupidity or sabotage far surpassing the akin act taken by the US Supreme Court in December 2000.

The General's references to the growth of terrorist and insurgent activity in recent months are the truth. If anything, they are an understated version of the reality within Pakistan,

Much of the dramatic upswing in Islamist/Jihadist activity must be laid directly at the feet of Musharraf and his military partners. Would you like an example?

OK, here it is, The Frontier Corps formed initially by the British generations ago to patrol the border between what are now Pakistan and Afghanistan is a paramilitary force. It lacks equipment, modern weapons, training, doctrine and good command and control. It's morale is shaky as exhibited by mass surrenders upon occasion. The loyalty to the government of many of its members is questionable.

Sounds good, right?

Now the best part. The Frontier Corps does the heavy lifting in the Tribal Agency territory where Taliban and al-Qaeda relocated following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Frontier Corps is the primary opponent of the rested, regrouped, refitted, resupplied and reinforced Islamist presence in North Waziristan and elsewhere in the Tribal Agencies.

And, now for the kicker.

The US has provided over ten billion dollars in aid to Pakistan since 9/11. Most of that money was for the purpose of military assistance so that Pakistan could be a more effective ally in the "global war on terrorism."

This must mean that the cash went to the Frontier Corps and other counterinsurgency oriented forces. Right?

Wrong!

In a fit of incredible stupidity on the part of Musharraf and the current American administration which allowed it to happen, most of the bucks went to better equip the conventional Pakistani military forces. To better prepare the Paks for another rematch with India, perhaps? Or maybe the deep thinking neocon ninnies of the current administration hopes that Pakistan might invade Iran and force a little regime change?

Phooey!

Musharraf and his coterie of appropriately bemedaled associates want a conventional army, want the prospect of yet another go-around in the Kashmir. Want to win (or at least not lose badly) the next time. If any American had shown the temerity to inquire as to the utility of high performance aircraft or heavy artillery to the hard but low tech realities of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, the Musharraf regime would have played the "necessity to keep the army happy card."

There is some truth to that. The army is the most stability oriented institution in Pakistan. It is the only truly "national" structure in an otherwise basically feudal, tribal country which might become a nation someday.

The army and police forces are the afterburners on Musharraf's jet now. He has no choice but to rely on them to keep him and Pakistan around him from a free fall to disaster.

That's bad. Even worse--we have little choice except to hope the afterburners keep flaming. That means we have to keep the fuel--the Geek means money--flowing.

The Geek feels frustration out the ying-yang over the current state of play in Pakistan! It's not like it couldn't be seen coming. We've been through it before.

We went through it in Vietnam. One damn stupid bunch of tunnel visioned bumblers after another whipsawed South Vietnam until it was ready to fall apart. Each time the Washington deep thinkers and pragmatic strategists decided we had no choice except keep on supporting the bunglers du jour in Saigon and hope for the best. (The one time we didn't. The time we decided on a little exercise in guided regime change, matters went from disastrous to catastrophic. The Geek refers to the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem.)

Heck! We've even been through it before in Pakistan. Twenty or so years ago, we turned responsibility for the endgame in Afghanistan over to the Paks. The result? Chaos followed by Taliban for Afghanistan. For us and the rest of the world the result was A.Q. Khan--and the increased power of the Islamists in the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence service.

Pakistan may hold a geographically critical position. The Pakistani government is not an ally. It cannot be given the fissures running through its society and polity alike. It can be a partner in an endeavor where Pakistani and American national interests are closely coinciding. That is if and only if the Pakistani regime and its use of our assistance is very closely and very coldly monitored and directed.

The current administration blew the requirement for close scrutiny and direction. In that way it became the equivalent of the hydraulic valve that failed and caused the F-111 to crash in front of the Geek and hundreds of others.

Back then the superb competence of a General Dynamics test pilot assured that no one died or was even seriously hurt when the plane smacked the ground. The Geek doubts that General Musharraf is so skilled.

Ayman al-Zawahiri Raises The Stakes

Physcian turned al-Qaeda strategist, al-Zawahiri comes on hot and heavy in his hot off the recorder tape today. While the linkage between al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is not exactly a recent development despite what many mainstream media reports indicate, the tape is interesting. Perhaps important. Perhaps even very important.

For good reason, Americans focus on the Mideast. Like a precision guided munition on steroids, we keep an unblinking eye on Iraq. A blinking eye on Afghanistan. An occasionally opened eye on Israel.

For Americans, the huge swath of North Africa doesn't exist.

For Islamists and Jihadists, North Africa is a wide open theater of operations not yet properly exploited. That is the real importance of the new al-Zawahiri tape.

In it the man in the shadows behind Supreme Icon bin Laden names the new targets: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. None of these are unimportant little geographic pimples on the map of Africa. None are without recent experience with Islamist threats.

Algeria came within a gnat's eyebrow of voting in an Islamist regime a few years ago. The coup-by-election was forestalled by the Algerian armed forces. Blood flowed fast and hard. While the flow has slackened to a comparative trickle, the combat continues in the souks and in the mountain villages alike.

Tunisia has not been a monument to stability either. The Islamists are alive, well, and killing someone nearly every day. The Tunisian government barely survived the turbulence brought by Arafat and company when they transferred from Lebanon to Tunisia twenty some years ago. Arafat and his coterie of gunslingers and bombthowers have long since departed but not the fissures they left behind.

Libya is not as stable as it once was. Gaddafi is getting on in years. His years of drug use have taken a toll on mind and body alike. The unifying pressure once conveniently supplied by American opposition has faded into the mists of the Cold War. His state security bureau is no where near as efficient as it was back when the East German Stazi provided necessary training and advice. Worst of all, Gaddafi blinked--hard--when we invaded Iraq, (The Colonel didn't need us bombing his tent again.)

Out in the Libyan desert, between the oil pumps and tanks, the Islamists mutter and the Jihadists plot.

Quite recently Morocco has been the scene of several dramatic, if relatively under covered by the mainstream media, acts of Jihadist terror. King Mohammed sits on a throne every bit as unstable as that occupied by King Abdullah of the House of Sand.

Al-Zawahiri is well aware of the weaknesses present in all of these countries. He seeks to exploit them for the benefit of the Islamist cause.

Let's listen in.

"Islamic nation of resistance and jihad in the Maghreb, see how your children are uniting under the banner of Islam and jihad against the United States, France and Spain."

Later the ex-doctor added, "Support... your children in fighting our enemies and cleansing our lands of their slaves (Moamer) Kadhafi, Zine El Abidine (Ben Ali), (President Abdelaziz) Bouteflika and (King) Mohammed VI." The quotes are from the French press agency's translation, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gwwodPc1iWAWogDHpT0pFoMr9bWw.

France, Italy, and Spain all have more directly threatened interests in the countries on al-Zawahiri's little list. Oil leads the list, of course. Beyond that, the European states have wider economic interests which gradate into strategic military and political concerns. All must also view with a fair degree of disquietude the prospect of absorbing a refugee flood if terror attacks rise to a critical level.

The question of economic destabilization as well as that of refugee generation must raise some alarm throughout the European Union. The issue of Muslim immigration is not exactly a below the radar scope matter in most EU members right now.

Islamists have a real need to spread Jihadism beyond its current venues. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been checked--severely. Taliban and its adherents are under increasing pressure in Afghanistan. Pushed by the recent upsurge in Islamist/Jihadist activities, the Pakistani strongman has taken the extreme action of declaring a State of Emergency. It is too early to see how this might play out.

The potential for Pakistani collapse may be high but no one can safely bet that the US would stand by merely wringing its hands. Whether or not the US finds itself deep in the Pakistani morass, the Islamist cause is best helped by horizontal escalation of its war on the West.

That consideration probably lies behind the al-Zawahiri call to Fatah to both overthrow the PA chieftain, Abbas, and join with al-Qaeda and LIFG in one big war.

Horizontal escalation is (or should be) the single greatest nightmare of the deep thinkers in the current administration and the war planners in the Pentagon. In the past, the potential of Soviet horizontal escalation served to inhibit US policy makers and executors alike. (It was one of those if-we-do-this-in-Asia, the Soviets can do something in Berlin considerations.)

So far, the current administration and its critics have been notably silent on the horizontal escalation potential in the "global war on terrorism." There seems to have been some sort of unjustified assumption that we and only we had the initiative in this war.

We made the same mistake in Vietnam. It was one of the main reasons we were shocked to the depths of our collective political will by the Tet Offensive in 1968.

There is no need to be shocked now. The brains of al-Qaeda, the only one of the leadership cadre who might deserve to be termed a political-military strategist, al-Zawahiri, has announced the intent to escalate the war horizontally at a place of the enemy's choosing.

Iran is not the only game in town. Neither is Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip.

The current administration and its neocon ninnie supporters need to get a grip on that.

Al-Zawahiri has made that clear. Whether we like it or not, the game will widen.

The Geek Makes A Fearless Forecast

In the near future, Pakistan will go Islamist. Not Islamic--that's what it is now--but Islamist. You know, like Iran. But, perhaps to an even greater extent.

There are a number of indicators in the open literature that show a continuation and even an increase in trends within Pakistan which extend back at least three decades. These include the recent poll showing limited support for fighting either al-Qaeda or Taliban. Take a look at the details in, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct07/PakAlQaeda_Oct07_quaire.pdf.

Another poll found strong support for the greater inclusion of Sharia (Islamic customary law) in the legal system of Pakistan. According to the poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, seveny-six percent of those questioned favored including Sharia. See the results of last month's poll at http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Pakistan%20Poll%20Report.pdf.

The same sources make it clear that any unilateral US effort at "hot pursuit" of Taliban or its foreign components into Pakistan would be rejected by the majority of the Pakistani population. Any effort by Musharraf or a Musharraf-Bhutto combination to allow US raids into the Tribal Agencies would be particularly fraught with political peril as only a small minority of borderland dwellers go so far as to approve of a purely Pakistani military effort against the guerrillas.

Ready for more unpleasant news from "our key ally" Pakistan?

OK. Here it is. Between a third and a half of the Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of the various groups ranging from al-Qaeda (at the low end of approval) through Taliban (in the middle of the range) to various indigenous Jihadist groups (at the high end.) Put together with the emphasis on customary Islamic law, which is a key component of Islamism's ideology, the approval of Jihadist groups makes clear that the Pakistanis are not inclined to support the American efforts against Islamism/Jihadism.

Regardless of the soothing mood music coming from our State Department (for a Pakistani report of the Muzak from State, see http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?193233), the reality is quite different. Neither the 150 megabucks per month expended by us on Pakistan since 2001 nor the current administration's call for an additional 60 megabucks to be focused at the Tribal Agencies, particularly North Waziristan, has made any measurable difference in the ani-US, pro-Islamist stance of the Pakistani population.

The search for "moderates" in Pakistan reminds the Geek of the similar chasing after mirages during the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-80. There may be "moderates" in Pakistan today as there may have been individuals of similar inclination in Iran twenty-eight years ago.

So what!

"Moderates" in Iran back then or in Pakistan today are utterly irrelevant. If they exist, they are so insignificant in numbers or so unimportant in political or military position that they might as well live on the back side of the moon.

The US State Department may actually believe what its spokesman said the other day that "Pakistan is undergoing a political transition... [including] moderate forces within the Pakistani political system working together for a moderate Pakistan". If the deep thinkers in Foggy Bottom actually think this is the truth, they aren't worth the money we're paying them.

Remember the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency were behind the creation and success of Taliban in Afghanistan. Remember, A.Q. Khan could not have engaged in his wholesale efforts at nuclear proliferation without the knowledge and agreement of the same two organisations. Remember, the performance of the Pakistani Army despite recent small scale successes has been somewhere between poor and inexcusably pathetic.

US pressure may have resulted in the deployment of nearly 100,000 military and para-military personnel into conflict areas. But this pressure cannot make the armed forces perform well nor maintain a will to combat over time. The Times of India reports in detail on some of the losses and difficulties encountered by the Pakistani forces as they reluctantly lumber into action. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Multiple_conflicts_bleed_Pak_army/articleshow/2503763.cms.

The Paks have promised an "all out" military effort to rid the Tribal Agency border region of Taliban and similar "militants." But, they have made the same promise in the past. Repeatedly. Considering the heavy losses and poor morale of the troops, this promise will not last long.

The current administration needs to get a grip on a fundamental reality.

We are not engaged in a "Global War on Terrorism" as it would have us believe. We are actually fighting a total war against Islamism and its armed component, Jihadism. This means simply that the real battlefield is not the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The real battlefield in Pakistan and elsewhere is the minds, the collective worldview of the people. The genuine strategic challenge is to find a way to convince a critical mass of the Pakistani population (as well as the populations of other Islamic countries) that the best future for them does not rest with the cramped Islamist notions but with the melding of Islamic and Western ideas and structures.

The development and application of that type of strategy will not be simple nor fast. All that can be said is that without acknowledgement of the actual enemy in the current struggle, there is no chance of doing it.

We had better do it now and well. Remember, Pakistan is a nuclear power.

We had better shift gears darn fast--Pakistan is like an eighteen wheeler balanced on the edge of a steep cliff. It may tumble tomorrow.

Who's King Abdullah Kidding?

The present head of the House on Sand, King Abdullah, told BBC (through an interpreter, so there's an escape hatch open if things get too hot) that his government(?) informed British intelligence and security organs of the upcoming attack on the London subway system on 7 July 05. His Royalness further averred that the British failed to act on the information.

Yeah. Right.

In the opposite corner is the British Parliament. Last year the House of Commons' Intelligence and Security Committee found no evidence that any specific information existed which could have led to a successful interdiction of the bombings.

Who do you think is more credible?

Parliament, rather like the US Congress in the wake of 9/11, was after scalps more than fixes. If there had been any gripless wallahs in any of the intelligence and security agencies, the Parliamentarians would have wasted no time lifting the offender's hair. The deaths of over fifty British civilians were enough to assure the low likelihood of a whitewash or cover up.

Then there is King Abdullah.

Admittedly, this Grand Panjandrum of the Dunes is seen as the most "liberal," "progressive" of the six Saudi chieftains of modern times. It has been widely reported that he, unlike his predecessors, is working night and day to curb the omnipresent influence of the Wahhabist clergy. It has also been bruited about that this king, again unlike all of those before him, has been really, really trying to bring Saudi Arabia beyond being a medieval patch of sand with oceans of oil below.

Sure. Yeah. Right.

In so far as the jihad promises to come home to roost on the oil, blood, and sand from which it sprang, the Good King is anxious to enlist the self-interested support of the Wahhabists. Stability is the goal as well in the few other "modernising, liberalising, progressive" changes in Saudi economic, political, and social life which Abdullah has sought.

The Geek would advise the King and his consorts to keep four words in mind: actions on the objective.

Actions, my dear kingness, as the cliche runs, speak louder than words.

The following actions seem to be in order. Shut down Saudi support for the oodles of mosques and madrassas in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere which preach the messages of Islamism and Jihadism. Cooperate completely (and as transparently as genuine security needs allow) with the the UK, the US, and others in stopping the flow of money to Islamist/Jihadist groups. Halt the flow of wannabe jihadists from Saudi Arabia.

Those actions would be a necessary beginning. If done, there would be reason to take King Abdullah seriously as a partner in the current confrontation with Islamism. Without actions, Abdullah's words are no more than a hot desert wind.