The Hardest Thing To Do--Nothing

The signs of ascendant, austere, political Islam are unmistakable in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.  The sharply Islamist party, the Renaissance Party, is expected to hold a plurality if not an outright majority in the new constituent assembly in Tunisia.  In Libya, the outgoing head of the National Transitional Council (NTC) announced changes in banking and family law to make Libya more Shariah compliant.  In Egypt, the Salifists who are the granddaddy of all the austere, politically oriented Muslim groups, are battling with the Muslim Brotherhood for the number one spot in the forthcoming government, with the inevitable result being the triumph of austere political Islam as the two entities share far more than not.

Throughout both Egypt and Libya, both Christian and Muslim communities are under direct, physical attack.  The Sufi shrines, venerated graves, and mosques in both countries have been vandalized, even destroyed by armed men bearing the symbols of Salifist affiliation.  As the world well knows, the Coptic Christians of Egypt have been brutalized, killed even, not only by mobs of the austere and violent but by security force personnel as well.  In Egypt as in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Christians have become a highly endangered species, occupying the same slot in the local social and political ecology formerly possessed by Jews.

There can be no doubt but the austere groups--the Salifists, the Wahhibists, the Deobandis--are well on their way to establishing operational dominance in the countries of the "Arab Spring" as they are in Pakistan and the Arab Peninsula.  The Shia equivalents have done the same in Iraq.  The outcome in the next few months will not meet the expectations of the Western leaders and governments which embraced the purportedly democratic fervor of the "Arab Spring."

In the context of looming disappointment, the opinion molders of the West would be well advised to consider a chain of events which hit the tipping point twenty years ago in Algeria.  Back in 1991, Algeria was experiencing the same basic problems as ignited the "Arab Spring."  There was very high unemployment, particularly among the educated youth.  The economy was stagnant despite oil riches.  Internal divisions of tribal and class origin split the nation.  The long running autocratic government was out of ideas, and, more importantly, out of perceived legitimacy.

The government decided to call for elections.  The campaign was loud, enthusiastic, energetic.  Algerians went to the polls with joy, believing a real future beckoned.  When the votes were counted, the government, its supporting elite, and the armed forces were shocked.  The parties of the austere, political Islamists had won.

The army nullified the elections.  Next it took power directly.  Then, quite predictably, violent unrest started.  By the time the shooting stopped, more than 150,000 Algerians were dead.  Scores of thousands more had been wounded.  Even more had been jailed.  Many of these had been tortured.

Even today, more than a decade after the internal war ended, the scars remain.  Despite the return of a semblance of democracy, a sort of "guided democracy," the echoes of the police state soldier on.  Voices are quiet and furtive.  After sunset, streets are weirdly quiet, a testament to the curfews of the period of military rule.  The government supported Gaddifi until the bitter and bloody end.  And, jobs are still scarce, the economy still in doldrums, regardless of the special relation with France.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

There is no real probability that rule by austere Muslims will see the end of the myriad economic and social problems which propelled the demonstrations which brought down ben-Ali, forced the military to toss Mubarak to the wolves, and led to the NATO enhanced violence in Libya.  Prayer, beards, and putting women in garbage sacks will not assure jobs--particularly for the over educated, Western oriented youth which served as the shock troops in Tunisia and Egypt or provided many of the trigger pullers of the revolt in Libya.

Islam and the Koran will not, pace the Muslim Brotherhood's two best known slogans, be the answer.  When the faces of disappointed revolutionaries are rubbed in the mud of reality, the most probable result will be another round of violence.  Also, topping the list of outcomes to be expected will be the charges levied by the austere Muslims running affairs.

The folks in charge will accuse a sinister conspiracy on the part of the "Zionists" and the US for any and all failures.  There will be calls for jihad to defend the new, faith based governments against the cabal of Jews and Americans.  The path blazed by Iran (and to a lesser extent, Pakistan) will be traveled by the incoming regimes of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.

The countries will either go the way of successfully focusing anger on the mythical enemies in Israel, the US, and Europe or dissolve in a welter of internal war and blood.  In the latter case, it is to be expected that the military will step in to restore order in a manner akin to the process which drew a bright blood red line through Algeria twenty years back.

Absent a miracle of Biblical proportions which will do the impossible--squaring the circle of austere Islam with the real requirements for success in the contemporary world--the picture which will be painted across much of the Mideast and North Africa over the coming months and years will be ugly as hell.  The challenge to opinion molders and senior governmental wallahs will be to watch.  To watch while doing nothing.

Given the past record of Western colonialism, neo-colonialism, or plain vanilla intervention and interference, the West, including the US, has no viable alternative.  Rightly or wrongly, many, perhaps most, citizens of the countries in the regions see the West, its governments, its institutions, its corporations, its policies, its militaries as the props and supporters of dictatorships, the adversaries of indigenous desires, internal perceptions of dignity, as both indirect and direct exploiters, and as "the Crusaders" bent on the destruction of Islam.  The truth or falsity of this belief set is irrelevant.  What is relevant is simply that the beliefs are widely and deeply held.

The only viable option for the West, for the US, is to keep out.  The people in the several countries must travel the very rough road alone.  We must not even seek to use "soft power" methods to shorten the journey or pave over the worst parts of the road.

All we can or should do is make it clear that internal affairs of any and every Muslim majority state is of no concern to us.  Beyond this, we must make it plain that any export of political Islam, most importantly, any export by violent means, will be met by robust, very robust means.  As long as the austere, politically motivated Muslim governments keep it at home, they will be left to their own devices, but should they cross their borders, we will stop them by means of our own choosing.

This posture will be difficult, very difficult for NGOs given to humanitarian goals to accept let alone support.  It is an unfortunate truth that any approach other than patient watching and vigilant guarding of our interests will make life worse both for us and the people who live under the sway of Salifists and others of their ilk.  This is a stinging nettle of the sharpest sort, but we all need to get a grip on it.

Going To Hell In (Allah's) Bucket

Due to cloudy weather, the demands of woodcutting (winter is a-coming on) and the debilities of age, the Geek has been kicking back reading the news from around the world and generally coming to the conclusion that a large segment of the globe and its attendant population is going to hell in a bucket.  And, the hand carrying the bucket is a collective one--the aggregate of the large and rapidly growing advocates of austere, political Islam.  Not to put too fine a point on the knife of reality, the single largest problem resident in the global political order is not the economy, nor is it "global warming," not even American "arrogance" and "unilateralism."

The problem confronting all of us today, whether or not we like the idea, is simply Islam.  Islam is the necessary and sufficient foundation of that most detestable phenomenon, austere political Islam.  In both its violent and non-violent forms, political Islam, particularly the most common sort, the variety growing from the austere roots of Salifism, Wahhibism, and Deobondism, constitutes the single largest threat to international and national stability, order, and peace.

In all the hosannas ringing out during the days of the "Arab Spring," a simple and critical fact was ignored by the political and opinion molding elites in the US and the rest of the West.  That seemingly willfully ignored ground truth was the power of austere political Islam to attract and mobilize adherents during periods of great political, social, and economic turbulence.  Also ignored by all the applause makers of the West was the companion fact: As uncertainty increased due to the many, often violent changes in all aspects of life, the appeal of austere political Islam would necessarily grow.

Humans are genetically programmed to fear uncertainty, to be risk averse, to seek security in the storms of change.  Islam, more than any other religion promises certainty, assures security--if only the rules of the faith are followed absolutely and completely.  Islam also provides a roster of acceptable scapegoats upon whom blame can be foisted and whose persecution onto death is given positive sanction.  The combination of rule based security and approved scapegoats affords a powerful appeal to austere Islam of the Salifist sort or of the Wahhibist variety.

The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt caught it perfectly in its slogan: Islam is the solution.

When fear or apprehension or anxiety or insecurity threaten, the bracing and strict requirements of austere Islam in its political expression do constitute the solution.  The irrefutable fact that life under the rigor of austere Islam is unlivable in practice is no bar to the inherent appeal of the promise given by the faith.  The equally irrefutable fact that Islam is inherently incompatible with modern economics, contemporary technology, or even the oft asserted "universal" rights of all humans is likewise no barrier to its attractiveness to people suddenly confronted with all enveloping upheaval.

We have seen the direct correlation between social and political tumult and the rise of austere political Islam in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, and, over the past nine months, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

It is worth noting that ten and more years ago, Pakistan was peaceful.  Back then, before George W. Bush presented the "with us or suffer the consequences" ultimatum to the government of Pakistan, sectarian violence was essentially unknown.  Also a stranger to Pakistani life was the horrid specter of "honor killings."  Also absent were suicide bombings.  Even the FATA was relatively quiet.  Karachi was not the political murder capital of Asia (or, to err on the side of accuracy, the world.)

The peace left never apparently to return with the influx of Taliban from Afghanistan.  The ISI undoubtedly believed it could continue to exercise full operational control over Taliban, the Haqqani network, and all the other entities predicated on violent political Islam.  ISI and the rest of the military and government committed an error in this belief.  In justification stands the reality that the destruction of critical elements of traditional society and its polity which occurred in the wake of the Afghan invasion promoted an unexpectedly rapid growth in fear and uncertainty which resulted in an ever widening recruit pool for the advocates of austere violent political Islam.  Events outpaced the capacity of ISI to control its monsters.

In the Big Three of the "Arab Spring," Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the organizations of austere political Islamists were not only the only groups ready to take advantage of the new situation.  That was reasonably widely understood even if belittled here in the US and elsewhere in the West.  What went by unnoticed was the automatic appeal of austere political Islam to the uprooted, the suddenly unmoored, the majority of the people living in all three countries.

Islam is the answer,  the solution for those who crave certainty, security, a firm mooring in the new, white waters of "democratic change."  Only austere political Islam pretends quick, easy, certain remedies for all the myriad ills resident in the gales of social, political, and economic change blowing through the high deserts and crowded cities of each and all of the Big Three.  Not surprisingly, the Salifists, the Wahhibists, have gained the most support in record time.

Equally unsurprising has been the fast boost increase in "honor killings," and overt persecution of Christians, which has been seen with particular drama in Egypt.  While most visible in the Land of the Pharaohs, these uniquely Islamic crimes have been occurring in Tunisia and Libya.  (It is worth noting that fear of the same happening in Syria has motivated Christians and other sectarian minorities to side with the Baathist regime regardless of other considerations.)

In Libya, the values and imperatives of austere political Islam have been demonstrated in the persecution of sub-Saharan Africans.  The rebels have averred repeatedly that the victims (if, indeed, there were any) had been Gaddafi "mercenaries."  This excuse is fantasy.  The vast majority of black Africans singled out for persecution were not fighters but simply guest workers, most of whom happened to be non-Muslim.  This second consideration is non-trivial when assessing the basis of rebel behavior.

The groups advocating austere political Islam will be the new ruling class in each and every of the Big Three.  The inevitable failure of the new regimes to address effectively the economic concerns of the citizenry will be met by charges of "infidel" or "Zionist" or "apostate" directed counter-revolutionary conspiracies.  Blood will flow in attempts to quash dissent or divert attention.  The afflicted countries will, like Pakistan, become less rather than more stable, less rather than more peaceful, less rather than more prosperous.  Dissent and repression will lock in a mutual and deadly embrace.

As the societies grow less stable and life less secure, there will be an accelerating move to more austere, more inclusive forms of political Islam.  Nothing else can be expected given that tumult and fear demand the anodyne of certainty--the only anodyne promised by Salfiism and the rest of the austere ilk.  The predictable failure of Salifism and the rest to provide an effective cure will (as in Iran) result in more and more repression.

The search for outside sponsors of failure along with the religiously sanctioned need for scapegoats will have a high probability of resulting in war.  War with Israel is highest on the list, but there can be other candidates as well--including Turkey which can be cast in the role of the model which failed or branded with interference in internal affairs given Ankara's search for Ottoman Empire 2.0.  The mere fact that the combined armed forces of the Big Three even if augmented by other Arab or Muslim states will be defeated will be of no moment should the austere Islamists running the show see war as the only way to stay in power.

Looking at the Mideast or North Africa or Northwest Asia or almost anywhere austere political Islam has and is making headway provides no pleasure.  Rather, it provokes a strong desire to engage in projectile vomiting.

Only ten years and a month ago, the world looked like a good place to enjoy life.  Thanks to advocates of austere violent political Islam, that all changed.  Worse, there is no way back to the good years before the Muslims of Osama bin Laden's world view forced the entire globe into Allah's bucket on the road to hell.

Going To Hell In A Bucket

To paraphrase a mantra of the early (1920s) self-help movement, the Mideast and coterminous regions appear "in every way and every day to be growing worse."  For those of us who are fans of collapse and chaos, these are the glory days for the benighted folk living in the vast arc from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf and beyond to the point where sand dunes meet the surf in Morocco.

Pakistan remains what it has been for some years now, a national definition of the old military term SNAFU.  You almost have to feel sorry for the Pakistanis.  In the rush to use Islam of the Wahhibist flavor to unify the nation, the result was not only to undercut whatever potential for unity might have existed but to assure the place would dissolve into a bloody froth of differing views of what sort of Islam held the total truth for the Pakistani national identity.

The crimson foam of theological disputation conceals but does not mitigate the other divisions which constitute the political and social terrain of Pakistan.  Corruption is an ever present "flavor of the day," providing the basic diet of politics and business.  The Baluch defensive insurgency refuses to simply go away despite the fervent desires of Islamabad.  The national judiciary would provide much comic relief were it not for the tragic results of its combination of lethargy and incompetence.  The national fisc is a disaster area such that the country depends upon international aid (aka protection money and bribes) so that the army can continue to prepare for the hoped for next round of war with India.

Arguably, the real world challenges of inefficiency, bankruptcy, insurgency, corruption, broken government, and general poverty would be solvable were it not for the more powerful threats presented by the aforementioned religious disputes.  Stripped to the politically incorrect essentials, Pakistan is rumbling dangerously close to the cliff of failed state status due to the Islamic tendency to stay stuck in a war of religions, or, more properly, a war of competing sects not all that unlike those which left the German states in utter ruin nearly four hundred years ago.

The same dynamic of warfare between conflicting interpretations of theology threaten to turn the "Arab Spring" into an endless winter of very violent discontent in Egypt and, perhaps, Libya, as well as other countries--here Syria comes to mind.  No matter the gloss applied by Western journalists, academics, and politicians, the ugly face of conflict between adherents of austere Islam, Salifists, Wahhibists, and others of similar ilk with adherents of less austere forms as well as "secularists" can be seen easily.

Bad ideas do not die.  It does not matter to the True Believers of austere Islam that the appeals of their form of Islam have been shown in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and elsewhere to have a short life in the real world.  The seeming exception of Iran can be explained easily by reference to the numerous and well equipped internal security forces.  The lesson of life remains the same.  Austere Islam is not acceptable to the vast majority of Muslims and can be imposed and maintained only by robust, eternal repression.

Taliban in Afghanistan had outworn its welcome before the Americans arrived a decade back.  Al-Qaeda in Iraq rapidly expired as a direct result of its dreadful behavior in Anbar province.  Even in Somalia, the "kids" of al-Shabaab have insured their own ultimate defeat by their efforts to forcefully impose an unacceptably harsh interpretation of Islam on a people who previously wore their Islam lightly.

These lessons are lost on the Salifists of Egypt, a group which has not garnered the attention in the West lavished on the better known Egyptian Brotherhood.  It might be noted that a self-proclaimed voice of Salifism in Egypt, a man named Ismaili, has a very good chance of becoming Egypt's first democratically elected president.  The Salifists are dead set against peaceful relations with Israel.  Rather they are fully committed to seeing an end to the Jewish state.  Even more than the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's Salifists are anti-West, anti-American.  They are also of the view that the current regimes in the region are apostate and must be overthrown.

The Salifists of Egypt are four square in favor of Shariah.  They are equally firm in their opposition to making any accommodation to the West (or Western tourists.)  Some would go so far as to treat the monuments of Egypt's long pre-Islam history as "unlawful" suitable to be treated as Taliban did the great statutes of the Buddha.  Others would allow them to exist--hidden behind protective screens.

The Salifists are not so evident in their presence in Libya.  The invisibility doesn't imply absence.  Rather, it is indicative of caution, the same sort of caution which impelled the Renaissance Party in Tunisia to deny its goals and interim agenda for weeks after the collapse of the old regime.  It is a caution bred of the hard experience of Salifists and kindred souls in the deadly war between them and the Algerian army twenty years ago.  While the old regime in Egypt suppressed Salifists as it did the Muslim Brotherhood, the Algerian armed forces obliterated these advocates of political Islam.

The Salifists, the Brotherhood members, the Wahhibists, all those who espouse austere and politically oriented forms of Islam learned the lesson and keep their heads well down until such time as they can be raised with impunity at the least and an expectation of victory at best.  Splits between "secularist" militias and those representing the advocates of austere, political Islam are already apparent in Libya.  There is not yet fighting between militiamen without beards and those whose faces are bearded (but lack mustaches--a clear sign of Salifist tendencies), but there is no reason that today's lack of inter-group trust will not degenerate into exchanges of fire in the not too distant future.

Egypt, Tunisia, Libya all face very large problems in the wake of their respective adventures in regime change.  Big as the problems might be, seemingly insurmountable as the challenges seem, there is no reason to believe that each state and its people would not be able to overcome them.  That is, there would be no reason were it not for the presence of religious disputes.  The dynamic pitting those of powerful austere beliefs against all others bodes well to assure that each case is more likely than not to fail in achieving the goal of a more or less open, more or less democratic, more or less free market society, polity, and economy.

Once again it may be politically incorrect but it is not inaccurate to observe that each of these states is likely to dissolve in a welter of sectarian violence not unlike that which occurred in Iraq.  This eventuality is not in the interests of regional or global stability--to engage in an exercise of belaboring the obvious.  It is also an eventuality which cannot be halted or mitigated by Western action or inaction.

The takeaway?  To paraphrase the campaign mantra of Clinton in 1992: "It's the religion, stupid!"

If You Like Pakistan, You'll Love The "Arab Summer"

Now that all the hyperbolic prattling about the wave of democracy rushing tsunami like over the sands of Arabia is fading away, perhaps overpowered by the sounds of exploding NATO delivered ordnance in Libya, it is possible to take a less biased look at the most likely course of events for the long hot Arab "summer" which is looming like the smoke of an Arizona wildfire.  While the details of the forthcoming "summer" are obscure, the broad outlines are coming more clear by the day.

It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months.  This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment.  It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military.  Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.

In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed.  This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism.  Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.  But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.

Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence.  There is a simple reason for this prediction.  Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam.  Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.

Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely.  At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade.  At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power.  Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979.  To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.

The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired.  As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood.  It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders.  Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast.  No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces.  At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.

The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam.  The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora.  This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.

Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination.  This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole.  Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.

The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states.  They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools.  There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan.  The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.

The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt.  The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk.  Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole.  The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased.  As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.

The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises.  This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists.  Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy.  Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign.  Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly.  The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.

The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies.  This disengagement will exclude Israel.  The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.

With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense.  The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems.  As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium.  In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.

If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM.  The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0.  With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.

The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building."  We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention.  This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.

The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible.  The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition.  The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest.  To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.

On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan.  All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring.  The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad.  The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training.  Damn good training."

One More Speech--One More Missed Opportunity

President Obama made his long anticipated "major" address regarding the Mideast and US policy in the region today over at Foggy Bottom.  It reads well and probably sounded even better.  Overall, the hot wash has to be a gigantic, "so what?"

The ever ready to cheer WaPo seems to be of that view in its instant report on reaction from the "Arab street."  If the account is accurate and representative of the larger understanding--and there is strong contextual reason to believe it is--Obama made the wrong speech, or the right speech many months too late.  Many of those quoted in the piece were disappointed that Obama did not get on his knees and grovel in apology for past American "sins."  Others were bitterly disappointed that the US still seemed to base policy on American national interest rather than the delusions, dreams, and dilemmas of (fill in one or another Arab nationality).  The majority though reflected a sentiment of American irrelevance to the events of the recent future, an irrelevance which will continue  into the future.

Of the various local takes on the Obama speech, the one which is both most trenchant and germane to US policy is the one of American irrelevance.  To a large extent the support or lack thereof for the demonstrators of Tunisia or Egypt was irrelevant to the participants--even if not to the outcome of the protests.  The Egyptians see themselves as having been solely responsible for the downfall of Mubarak.  There is no general willingness to see let alone accept the proposition that US pressure was the final cause of Mubarak's reluctant retirement to private life.  This is a classic case of not letting mere facts get in the way of creating and enjoying a pleasant exercise in national mythology.

The same dynamic albeit to a lesser degree was in play earlier in Tunisia.  When neither France nor the US was willing to do other than turn a back to the embattled dictatorship, the repressive fossil had no option but to board the next plane to Saudi Arabia.  Arguably, had the US taken a firmer, more public line with respect to the ouster of Gaddafi early in the protests, the matter would have been settled quickly and at far less cost in both lives and long term instability in the country.  Ditto on steroids as regards Yemen.

The blunt and painful truth is that the US was totally behind the curve in all the early manifestations of the "Arab Spring."  Whether this was the result of bad intelligence, bureaucratic inertia, lack of political vision and will, shootouts between the realpolikers and the idealists, or simple presidential indifference (or, most likely, some combination of the foregoing) is immaterial.  All that matters is the US was running far behind (to use one of Obama's favorite formulations,) "the arc of history."

As an old maxim of naval warfare dating back to the days of sail held, "a stern chase is a long chase."  The US is engaged in a stern chase right now with respect to Mideast policy.  The length (and success) of the chase is in no way helped by a rhetorical focus on democracy and the other desirable aspects of a modern, Western nation-state.  Nor is the chase made any less lengthy or more probably successful by a mere genuflection before the alter of economic development--the one billion dollar debt forgiveness and companion infrastructure development package promised to Cairo.

While Mr Obama made an appropriate bow to the young Tunisian man whose self-inflicted death by self-immolation served to ignite the demonstrations which escalated to the totality of the "Arab Spring," he failed to mention the man's motivation--poverty, lack of employment opportunity for himself, a college graduate, and harassment by the police over petty regulations.  The man did not die in pursuit of the vote.  He was not a sacrifice to the abstracts of democracy or transparent governance.  His life was not pledged to any cause beyond the base and degrading reality of impoverished, hopeless unemployment resulting from a badly performing economy.

The hopelessness of joblessness--particularly within the class of young people with post-secondary educations, a modicum of technological sophistication, an acquaintanceship with Western political, social, and cultural values--coupled with systems of polity and economy which were both inefficient and unresponsive caused the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt and beyond.  The change that was demanded was not so much political as economic.

The gloss of politics was an add-on.  It was added not only by the more sophisticated and Western oriented of the local protesters but also by the applauding Western observers.  Western media, Western academics, Western pundits, the Western molders of public opinion took the monolithic view that the demonstrators were eager democrats one and all.  The protesters were all seeking to gain a political and (implicitly at least) a social system based on those of the West.

While there were no doubt individuals in all the countries who held this goal, it is easily arguable that most simply wanted a better, more just, more efficient economy where jobs might be plentiful and remunerative, sufficient at least to provide for a standard of living such as to allow the raising of a family with a reasonable expectation that the children's future would be better than their parents' present.  That goal was sufficient as both motivation and goal for the vast majority of those who braved bullets and arrest.  Anything beyond would be nice, but not a requisite.

Many observers of the "Arab Spring" have confessed themselves to be reminded of the uprisings which scarred Europe in 1848.  Others call up the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.  In both analogies, the pundits and politicians have concurred the motive was the quest for democracy.

The Geek is reminded not of those two major periods of political tumult.  Being a guy of small mind and limited imagination, the Geek is put in mind of Poland.  Specifically the events of the "Arab Spring" have reminded him of the Poland of the days of Solidarity.  It will be remembered that this precursor of the far more sweeping and dramatic changes of a decade later emerged not from the suppressed desire of Polish shipyard workers for a meaningful vote, but rather from pervasive economic discontent.  The combination of inflation and stagnant or falling wages was the consequence of very poor decision making on the part of the authoritarian government.

The result of the economic pressures was a push back of labor along the lines of a classic sit down strike.  The intent of the strikers was economic reform which would benefit them directly and substantially.  The reaction of the government transmogrified the sit down strike to a semi-violent demand for broad gauge political reform.  When the government belatedly brought some reform to bear along with repressive action, then and only then did the movement fade to the underground where it waited for the shift in political winds which finally came at decade's end.

Even now with promises of elections having been made by the "temporary" and "transitional" regimes, the root causes of economic discontent wait to be addressed.  Elections without any change in the economy will bring only further tumult and may eventually result in the election of more extremest governments in both Tunisia and Egypt.  In short, democracy and elections in and of themselves are not a guarantee of stability.  Far more likely to bring this result is the development of a more open, more equitable economic system.

At the risk of belaboring the all-too-obvious, the Geek is constrained to point out that rigging elections and creating the illusion of democracy is far easier to accomplish than is the remaking of economies into some semblance of efficiency--particularly when the states involved lack the essentials for this.  The creation and support of democracies which are economically dependent upon international handouts is no service to either the people of the effected country or the stability of state and region.

By ignoring the economic aspects of the unrest in order to pander to the feel-good emotions of supporting democracy and its relatives, Mr Obama missed making a real mark on the region.  He missed the chance to get on the "arc of history."  He missed the opportunity to regain some of America's lost influence in the Mideast.  He made the stern chase both longer and less likely to produce an outcome beneficial to the locals and suiting our national and strategic interests there.

Of course, the nature and impact of the Obama speech should have been drearily predictable.  The current Guy in the Oval has botched every foreign policy challenge--and opportunity--to come his way to date.  Why should this hazy mass of mood music at Foggy Bottom have been any different?

The Darkness Of The Future

Some years the future is clear.  For example, the global political stage was highly visible and future developments easy to predict during much of the 1990s.   It was evident that the weak responses of the Clinton administration to the aggressive acts and "declaration of war" by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda would result in more, larger attacks.  It was not exactly difficult to predict that the "opening" of China to US trade would result in an ever growing torrent of money flowing to the Trolls of Beijing who would use the swag to power up their ambitions to have a global footprint.  Nor was it mentally taxing to conclude that the combination of hectoring and paternalism with which the US treated Russia would stoke the two primary characteristics of Russian policy--messianic zeal and galloping feelings of inferiority vis a vis the West coupled with a pervasive sense of insecurity.

In the background lurked the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the impact of which was growing across the Islamic world during the Nineties.  The growth of political Islam, particularly violent political Islam was evident not only with al-Qaeda but with the triumph of Taliban in Afghanistan, the presence of Iranian agents in the southern Philippines, the rise of political Islam in Pakistan, and the sectarian conflict in the rubble of Yugoslavia.  From that context prediction of the future trajectory was close to being a no-brainer.

It is not so easy today.  The rapid series of political disruptions in North Africa and the Mideast has introduced a set of complications which greatly complicates the prediction of future international trajectories.  If the current conflict in Libya continues and becomes a long duration (more than three months) internal war, the complications will be magnified.  

It is plain that Iran will continue to seek advantage in the Gulf region.  Its struggle with Saudi Arabia for regional hegemon status will both continue and grow.  Tehran will seek to exploit the Shiite disaffiliation in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  Similarly, it will use its agents of influence in the less than monolithic Iraqi government to fill the vacuum which will necessarily develop further as the American presence recedes.  At the same time there is no doubt Ayatollah Khamenei will keep on consolidating power in his hands.  The carefully orchestrated removal of Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani from his post as head of the important Assembly of Experts is the most recent gambit in Khamenei's march to total and unquestioned authority.  It can be expected that the handpicked tool, Ahmedinejad, will follow up on this with a move against the Larjani family.

The imponderable (at least as to timing) in Iran is when will the lash back take place.  The Rafsanjani family like that of the Larjanis is both wealthy and powerful.  The more moderate clerics of Qom are much enamored of Rafsanjani and not overly impressed with the theological credentials of Khamenei.  Nor are they thrilled with the progress of Iran socially and economically the past few years.  The Green Movement has demonstrated a degree of committed perseverance totally unexpected in the wake of the first protests nearly two years ago.  So, the big question is: When will the balloon go up?

There are some features of the future which are clear.  Russia will continue to be an obstruction to effective collective action in Libya.  So too will China.  Both countries will also act to impede the implementation of a solution to the North Korean nuclear question.  And, should the continued centralization of authority in Iran reach the point of provoking widespread and violent internal unrest, both will be an obstacle to finding a viable solution for that challenge.

Another clear future of the tomorrows to come is the increasing potency of political Islam oriented groups and individuals in the new governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries with governments under internal threat.  The presence of advocates of political Islam in governments of Egypt or Tunisia or Bahrain tends to scare the hell out of at least some Americans.  This degree of alarm is not necessarily justified as shown by the AKP in Turkey which is far more nationalist in its political philosophy than Islamist.  

The head of Tunisia's Renaissance Party has pointed to Erdogan and the AKP as a relevant role model.  So has Moussa, a leading candidate for the first post-Mubarak civilian president.  The historical experience tends to favor nationalism trumping Islam.  This does not mean there will be a total absence of Islam, a wall between mosque and state.  Rather it implies that while features of a country's internal and judicial policies will be tilted strongly in the direction of Islamic requirements and strictures, and public criticism or opposition to Muslim groups practicing violent political Islam will be muted in deference to the Islamic imperative on community solidarity, the governments will pursue national interest and not that of some mythical caliphate.

While there is some historically based reasoning to be calm in the face of governments dominated by political Islam, this does not imply that the future is secure or even that it can be seen so clearly that one has a high confidence in predictions at this point.  The assorted advocates of violent political Islam including those with the unlimited goal of a global caliphate will continue to exist.  They will also continue to be creative in their use of local grievances in the context of the "will of Allah" to recruit supporters and silence dissent from their goals.  But their potential growth will be limited if the US and other Western states pursue policies which give due regard to the very easily bruised nationalism which exists in all the countries experiencing unrest or its aftermath.

This suggests strongly that caution is the word to use when considering no-fly zones or any other intervention in Libya--or in some country yet to implode.  Interventions no matter how justified in terms of stopping massacres outrage national sentiments.  When the national sentiments are magnified by feelings of religious persecution, the result is very negative for the outsiders.  It is like domestic violence situations--ask any street cop what happens when the battling partners are faced by the well intentioned outsiders there to enforce the impartial law.  So it is with people  generally--unite against the outsider, particularly when that outsider represents another, maligned religious community.

The combination of prickly nationalism and religious imperatives also suggests that the US and other Western countries had best develop realistic and limited goals for their policies concerning new governments.  It is all well and good to play upbeat mood music about democracy, but that is not a policy, let alone a realistic and limited one.  The process of formulating appropriate policy goals starts with a coldly realistic assessment of just what national and strategic interests are in play in each country of the regions.

Here we encounter the real basis of why the future is dark.  The current administration has yet to demonstrate that it understands what national and strategic interests might be.  There is no general text covering national interest or its extension, strategic interest.  Rather there have been hazy almost bumper sticker mouthings such as "comprehensive Mideast peace" or "fostering democratic and transparent government without corruption" or "assuring women play their full role in the new system."  

Nice sound bites do not make policy, let alone realistic, achievable policy oriented toward the goal of achieving American national and strategic interests.  Nor are appeals to the "international community" and multilateral bodies a substitute for policy aimed at US interests.  

To say the Obama administration is adrift at the policy level is almost too kind.  Yet that is the ground truth at work today.  This means there is a real danger that Congress will interject itself into the making of foreign policy.  Congress may have its strengths, but the formulation and execution of foreign policy is not numbered among them.  Worse, absent definite policy a severe uptick in the level of violence in Libya or one of the other instable venues might excite the emotions of We the People to the point that political considerations compel action.  History records that such hasty, politically predicated excuses for reasoned policy are well described by a single word: failure.

The US has lurched from failure to failure under the forces of ideology and sheer naivety for most of the past eighteen years.  As a consequence, an avoidable one, the US has witnessed a progressive decline in its status and influence around the world.  If this sorry record continues through the current round of developments, the result will be a US which is irrelevant, a US which finally merits that Sixties vintage appellation, "a pitiful helpless giant."

Comes Now The Fallout

All political turmoil has fallout.  The more dramatic and seemingly revolutionary the turmoil, the more intense, long lasting, and unpredictable the fallout.  So it is with the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" events of Tunisia and Egypt.

The first signs of the spreading wave of destabilizing aftershocks of the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia have shown themselves most dramatically with waves of illegal immigrants hitting the rocky shores of the microscopic Italian island of Lampedusa.  The mass (more than five thousand and counting over the weekend) of economic refugees has panicked the Italian government.  With good reason.

Italy has already been the target of opportunity for refugees from much of Africa usually funneled through Libya and thence by small, overloaded boats to the outpost of Lampedusa.  The Italian government howled last year as the waves crested and beat down on the shores of the island.  Already facing high domestic unemployment, a yawning budget gap, threatened default on sovereign debt, the last thing the always rickety government needed was the burden of refugees in numbers almost beyond count.  Nor has it helped that most of the economic opportunity seekers are Muslim, which fact exacerbates the large and growing sense of alienation within their own country felt by Italians (and many other nationalities as well.)

The European Union has been generous in its initial offering of economic assistance to the transitional regime in Tunisia.  The organization has committed itself to a 347 million dollar gift between now and 2013 with an immediate tranche of 23 million underway.  Yet even this generous an offer to a country of eleven million is not sufficient to provide an instant economic boost sufficient to offset the unemployment and underemployment crisis which did so much to trigger the overthrow movement.  Even if the US comes through with an equivalent or greater amount, the aggregate will not be sufficient to meet the expectations of the successful practitioners of "people power."

The necessary inference is that more Tunisians will get on board more boats and hope to get to Europe.  Italy being the closest place, it is only expectable that the current flood (described by an Italian official as "Biblical") will continue and grow.  The Italian proposal to "assist" the Tunisian authorities in stemming the flow by stationing Italian police and other security forces in Tunisian territory was a rational albeit politically ill-considered response to the looming crisis.

It is not surprising that the transitional government rejected the Italian offer as an insult to Tunisian sovereignty and national dignity.  The Tunisians may need the assistance desperately, but there is no way foreign security forces can be accepted without fatal political consequences.  Revolutions, even those of the leaderless sort, are not known for rationality.

It is a bit harder to understand the thundering denunciation by the German ForMin of Italy's plea for a unified European Union stance on the migration crisis.  Herr Westerwelle undoubtedly understands that the EU is already threatened by losing control of its collective external border as has been underscored by the massive influx of Turks across the border into Greece and thence throughout the Union.  The addition of economically motivated masses from Tunisia--and quite probably Egypt as well--will have severe internal political consequences for both the EU and many of its member states.  The anxiety felt by many Europeans over the growing Islamization of the region is not baseless and is not going to go away soon.

The possibility of Egyptians joining the exodus should not be discounted hastily.  The removal of Mubarak will not create any new jobs.  Even a robustly prosecuted campaign to retrieve the billions allegedly stolen by the  Mubarak family and cronies will do nothing in the short term to address the very real economic problems confronting the Egyptians.  Given that the tourism industry has been damaged by the events of the past three weeks and that the extent of the damage is not yet known, there is a high probability that unemployment and its evil twin underemployment will continue upward.

The bitter truth has not yet spread through the enthusiastic "revolutionaries" of Tahiri Square:  Removal of a dictator, no matter how odious, does not in and of itself do a damned thing to enhance the economic quality of life generally.  When the realization does sink in, the consequences are not predictable in detail, but it is fair to posit that one result will be a flow of Egyptians from the Land of the Nile to anywhere north where jobs might be found.  Being a lot larger in population than Tunisia, it is safe to assume that even if the percentage of economic refugees is small, the aggregate number will be large.

The EU had best take note of what is happening in that small and distant rock of Lampedusa and pull together a common stance on the question of economic refugees generally--or simply surrender to the latest outbreak of Volkwanderung.  Economic grants alone will not do the job of keeping Egyptians home.  Considering the structural problems of the Egyptian economy, the size and characteristics of the Egyptian population, there simply is not enough free money floating around to reconstitute the Egyptian economy fast enough or completely enough to seduce the folks into staying where they are.

Refugees are only one of the fallout aspects attendant upon the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.  There is another, potentially far more damaging bit of unintended consequence at work here.  That is the status of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.  The Supreme Military Council could not bring itself to mention that treaty specifically.  Instead the assembled generals confined their commitment to maintaining all currently extant "international agreements."

It is known that the generals are not of a single mind regarding the treaty.  Some, like the current Minister of Defense and de facto chief-of-state, are in favor of keeping it intact.  Others are in favor of either scrapping it or seriously restructuring it.  A leading moderate, secular political leader, Ayman Nour, has opined that the the treaty is finished.  He is in favor of a total renegotiation of the historic agreement signed by Anwar Sadat over thirty years ago.

The treaty is the single greatest reason the US tied itself so closely to both Sadat and Mubarak.  We were willing to ignore the many ways in which Egypt violated the spirit of both the Treaty and the Camp David Accords as long as the peace held.  The government of Israel was willing to do the same.  Keeping a peace, even a very, very cold one, was much preferred over allowing the resumption of war either direct or via proxy.

Arguably, the Mubarak regime became less and less willing to avoid war by proxy given the greater flow of weapons to Gaza in the past few years.  Certainly, there is no love lost for Israel either at governmental or popular levels within Egypt.  Nor is the Muslim Brotherhood solely responsible for the monolithic hatred of Israel or the burgeoning industry in antisemitic film, written materials, or television programs which exists in Egypt.  It is fair to conclude that the Muslim Brotherhood is not the only group in Egypt endlessly hostile to both Israel and Jews.

While there is very little probability of the Egyptian military undertaking another war with Israel in the event the treaty is nullified, there is every probability that Egyptian support for proxies such as Hamas would increase.  This is likely to occur even if the Treaty is allowed to soldier on in formal existence.  Mubarak had been trending in that direction as a sop to public opinion if for no other reason, and it is most probable that both the transitional government and whatever successor finally comes to power will do the same--just more openly.

Democracy will do nothing to assure the peace continues.  No blathering about elections, people's will, transparency, and other nice sounding warm, fuzzy words will do one iota to keep the peace.  Nor will these words create jobs, fix broken economies, feed the hungry, or do anything else real and material.

The American administration as well as its European equivalents will be well advised to keep this in mind as they pull out the stops on promoting democracy.  It ain't a magic wand.  It neither keeps peace, assures prosperity, or ends hatred.

Yo! Mr O! There Is A Whole World Out There, You Know--Or Do You?

In last night's yawn producing set of stitched together rerun snippets from past speeches, the POTUS spent barely ten percent of his numerous words on foreign policy.  This continues and, arguably expands, his well-established record of undervaluing US foreign relations.

Either the Nice Young Man From Chicago is unaware that foreign governments and opinion molders parse the annual Ain't-My-Administration-Great festival or he knows and cares not at all.  In either event the absence of foreign affairs constituted a species of unilateral disavowal of American status as a Great Power.

The casting aside of foreign relations other than pro forma mention of our getting out of Iraq, our fine troops in Afghanistan, and ritualistic condemnation of the usual adversary, Iran, sends a clear signal to the world that it and its petty problems fly below our president's radar.  His evident disengagement from the affairs of the world indicates to friend, foe, and uncommitted alike that the US has only the most limited interest in pursuing its own national interests.

The denial of the world comes at a moment during which a volatile and critical region of the world--the Arab Mideast and North Africa--seems to be lurching toward a tipping point which has the potential of being world historical in importance.  The "Jasmine Revolution" may or may not prove to be a permanent success for democracy of the bottom up sort.  But, its having occurred, the mere fact that a firmly entrenched authoritarian regime supported by not only the former colonial power, France, but the West generally was overthrown by popular demonstrations and the unwillingness of the armed forces to gun down their fellow citizens has set (literal) fire to similar movements in other countries, most importantly Egypt.

The silence of Mr Obama last night serves to continue his rejection of the assertive support of democracy by the Bush/Cheney administration beyond the point of absurdity into the venue of the counterproductive.  Admittedly the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/neocon ninnie notion of using armed invasion as a tool to foster democracy was a world class blunder, but that in no way discredited the necessity of promoting democracy by other means, particularly the support of indigenous tendencies or groups.

The administration appears to be possessed by the view that any open support by the US of any pro-democracy effort in any Arab or Muslim majority country will doom the effort to failure.  The Deep Thinkers of the administration took this position openly in the wake of the demonstrations against the mullahocracy and the stolen presidential election.  More recently the same cover was employed implicitly to excuse the hands-off position of the US during the run-up to the "Jasmine Revolution."

This contention is ludicrous on the face.  Interviews and opinion surveys have shown repeatedly that people throughout the world look to the US for support of democracy and the other features customarily associated with that form of government.  The same sources document the severe disappointment felt by people when the government of the US either fails to support democratic aspirations, or, worse, openly supports authoritarian regimes for reasons of state.

The situation which developed rapidly in Egypt yesterday cried out for a statement by the American president.   The demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere not only were the largest anti-government action in many decades, it also constituted a direct challenge to the US president and the policies of his administration.  The challenge was simply: On which side does the US stand?

The president and his administration have supported the thirty year rule of Hosni Mubarak both publicly and privately in recent weeks and days.  There are reasons of state policy which would appear to compel our linkage with and support for the Mubarak regime.  However, these reasons--the moribund Mideast "peace process" and combating violent political Islam--can be both overstated and, more importantly, overtaken by events.

The US has nailed its flag to the Egyptian mast ever since Cairo kicked the Soviets out and realigned (sort of) with the US.  This in turn led to the Camp David Accords and the "normalization" of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel.  The substance of the post-Camp David years has been much less than the promise or the appearance.  The most substantial benefits of the Egyptian realignment were, no surprise here, awarded to Egypt.  The US has tied its aid to Egypt to the aid furnished to Israel with results which have been profitable for the Cairo regime, to put it mildly.

As a "partner" with the US in the "global war on terror," Egypt has proven to be less obstreperous than Pakistan but not by much.  The Egyptian government has done little if any cooperation beyond its own borders while serving as a pointman for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (along with Pakistan) on the various proposals to restrict freedom of speech by means of a UN resolution intended to protect Islam against any perceived attack--including the truth about the religion.

Domestically the Egyptian government has shown itself less than eager to protect the basic rights of its Coptic Christian population against outrages at the hands of the Muslims.  To say that Cairo has sat on its hands as Copts were murdered is only to tell it like it has been--and will be.

Simultaneously the Mubarak regime has shown its willingness to pervert the processes of democratic elections to assure its hold on power.  The recent parliamentary election gave clear indications of having been even more bogus than its predecessors.  The long arm and very heavy hand of the internal security organs have been evermore in evidence such that Egypt of recent months has a strong resemblance to the Iraq of Saddam Hussein.

In short, Egypt has become a heavier liability for American interests and influence in the region.  Bluntly, the costs of linking us to Egypt have far outweighed the benefits by any rational calculus.

The spread of anti-government demonstrations across Egypt in the aftermath of the "Jasmine Revolution" have given the US a perfect opportunity to get on the right side of the political dynamic in Egypt.  The moment is all the more propitious in that so far the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, all advocates of political Islam including the violent sort, have not been at the forefront of events.  Indeed, the Brotherhood shows signs of having been caught by the same surprise as the government.

Had Mr Obama made even brief mention of the anti-government demonstrations, it would have done much to embolden the reformers in the street.  A favorable reference, even if of the most attenuated sort, would have gone far to broadening the base of support for the pro-democracy movement.  It might even have assured that the working class and small merchant segment of society would have been motivated to get off the sidelines and join with the demonstrators.

The "Jasmine Revolution": succeeded in large part because the workers of Tunisia along with the lower middle class linked with the unemployed university graduates to oppose the autocracy.  The same would be the case in Egypt, but only if the cautious came to believe that success and not simply death or torture would be the most probable outcome.  This sea change could have occurred if Mr Obama had only said a few kind and accurate words concerning events in Cairo earlier that day.

Admittedly, the architects of foreign policy like to be slow, cautious, incremental.  Diplomats tend to be conservative, prone to being opposed to boat rocking.  But, in the real world of real people with real hopes, fears, frustrations, and aspirations, fortune often favors the bold.  Events by their very magnitude and pace may preclude the endless rounds of interagency working groups, endless processes of staffing papers, of seeking approval up a never ending chain of command.

This is what happened in Tunisia.  It is what may be happening in Egypt.  It is what could happen in Iran.  The US foreign policy community by virtue of its size, complexity, and attendant inertia is ill-equipped to take proper advantage of fleeting opportunities.  The president is not so limited.  As Richard Nixon demonstrated, it is possible for a president to act quickly and take advantage of a changing international dynamic.

The situations in Tunisia and Egypt as in numerous other countries in the Arab and Muslim world are essential in the definition of what the US stands for as well as what it opposes.  When the US president is silent he concedes the field to the adherents of violent political Islam.  Losing is bad enough. Losing by default is even worse.

So get a grip on this: By his ignoring the world, particularly the unfolding drama in the Mideast, President Obama is losing by default.  Arguably, he is throwing the match.

The State of the Union Address is a perfect opportunity to tell the world just where the US stands, what it stands for, and to what it stands in opposition.  This is necessary for the stability of the world.  Staking a position is what Great Powers are expected to do.  And, whether or not Mr Obama and his ideological soulmates like the idea or repudiate it, the US is a Great Power.

So, Mr Obama, the message is simple: Act like you are the chief executive of a Great Power, in point of fact, the best of the Great Powers.  Anything less is to duck your personal "Sputnik moment."

Tunisians Better Have Fun While They Can

The people of Tunisia are having a well merited time of fun, frolic, and freedom--freedom won after fifty years of more or less repressive autocratic regimes.  Unfortunately, the fun police are not only lurking in the wings but actually flowing back home with the intention of blowing the whistle on both fun and freedom in the country.

While the long exiled leader of Tunisia's largest Islamist oriented political party, Rashid Ghannouchi, states that he is no Ayatollah Khomeini and his Renaissance Party (Ennahdha) does not advocate political Islam, violent or otherwise, there are others in the field which are not so inclined.  Faced with competition from the "Left" of Islamism, there is a very real probability that Ghannouchi will trim his party's sails to better catch the prevailing winds.  As Crane Brinton pointed out in his classic treatment of revolutions, there is a built in trajectory to ever more extreme positions in revolutions, or, to use the correct term, offensive insurgencies.

Make no mistake about it, the so-called Jasmine Revolution was an offensive insurgency in that the goal has been the total replacement of the status quo government and its supporting elites.  The goal of the Tunisians in the streets constantly became more totalistic in nature, culminating in the demand that all vestiges of the old ruling party be removed from government and politics.  While this sort of political cleansing is expectable and perhaps beneficial in the longer term, it leaves a vacuum in its immediate wake.

The political movements espousing political Islam were a particular target not only of Ben Ali but his predecessor.  Ben Ali bent every effort to expunging these movements after the election of 1988 in which the Renaissance Party won at least seventeen percent of the votes in an election which resembled one conducted by the old Daley machine in Chicago for its honesty.  Many prominent figures in the movements disappeared into the maws of the internal security machine while even more sought safety in exile.  This did not mean that the movements were destroyed but rather that they were forced underground to wait a more propitious day.

That day has arrived.  It is now safe for the advocates of political Islam to emerge from the shadows, to return from foreign sanctuaries.  It is implicit in the situation extant today that the advocates of political Islam are better organized, more committed to their agendas and goals, better prepared in all respects to compete for power in the post-overthrow environment.  To think that they will be less than absolute in their pursuit of power is to deny reality.

On the surface Tunisia has been more secular, more "Western," more prosperous, than its North African neighbors--or the Arab and Muslim states generally.  Tunisians are better educated, seemingly more tolerant, apparently more oriented to "Western" norms and values than those living elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim states.  The appearances have always been seductively appealing to Western governments, Western elites, Western media.

Importantly, the appearances may be every bit as deceptive as was the facade of Ben Ali's government as an efficiently repressive one.  The ease with which the ancien regime was displaced showed dramatically just how great a gap existed between appearance and reality.  The danger now is the same gulf exists and will be demonstrated just as dramatically between the appearance of "Western" secularism, tolerance, educated sophistication, and the reality of Islamism.

The Tunisians are faced by a challenge far greater than electoral reforms or economic development.  They are faced by a fundamental choice between the message of political Islam and its alternatives including but not limited to one of secularism.

One need not be overly pessimistic to bet that the Tunisians will eventually opt for the Islamist vision of an "Islamic Republic" on the lines of Pakistan.  They will do this because Islam is central to the lives of many, perhaps most, Tunisians, even those with advanced "Western" style education.  The power of the message may rest on Islam qua Islam but gains its real power from the subtext of fear and hate.

In this regard it must never be overlooked that the basic theological content of Islam is fear--fear of displeasing the deity, fear of spending eternity in hell (no religion comes close to Islam in its pornographic treatment of the torments of the damned,) fear of not being a member in good standing of the community, the Ummah.

The religion offer antidotes for the pervasive message of fear.  One of these is explicit in the name of the religion: Islam.  The word means submission, submission to the will of the deity as interpreted by the clerics.  The other counter to pervasive fear is hate.  Muslims are called upon to hate the infidels, to hate the apostates, to hate the omnipresent "others."  The necessity of hate will exist until every last human being has submitted to the will of the deity, the dictates of the Prophet, and the will of the clerics.

Islam holds that not until every last person on Earth has pounded his forehead in the dirt and raised his posterior to the Deity will any Muslim be safe, secure, able to breathe free and easy, able to enjoy certainty.  Until that day Muslims must live in fear and counter that fear by submitting to the authority of the cleric as well as hating all who are branded apostates, infidels, or otherwise being "worthy of death."  It is against this background that the other, plentiful fears of quotidian life must be placed.

Advocates and practitioners of political Islam maintain that by embracing Islam, by following Shariah, by submitting to the will of the deity as put forth by clerics, the great fears of displeasing the deity and of going to hell can be addressed along with the lesser fears of daily life.  The full acceptance of the requirements of Islam will assure that every individual can feel merged with the community, that every individual will live in the dignity and respect of the community of believers, that every person will find economic and social security, that the equality of belief will render nugatory the bogus equality of both democracy and the rule of (man made) law.

The picture of life in a true Islamic republic is paradisaical.  The ideal Islamic republic as portrayed in, say, the writings of assorted Pakistani clerics, is one of equality, security, harmony, justice.  In all essential respects the Islamic republican ideal is akin to the Perfect World described by various Communist theoreticians.  And, again like the Workers' Paradises limned by Communist philosophers, the Paradise-on-Earth descriptions put forth by advocates of political Islam fail the test of application in the real world.

Tunisians would be well-advised to consider carefully just what centuries of Islam have produced.  To what extent has the great human treasury of knowledge been enhanced by contributions from Muslims living in Muslim majority states?  What great technological or scientific discoveries or innovations have been produced by Muslims living in Muslim majority states in recent centuries?  What new, useful, social or political or economic systems have emerged from the minds of Muslims living in Muslim majority countries?  What inventions?  What great works of creative genius?  How many ideas or words have come from Muslim tongues or pens to inspire people around the world regardless of religion?

It might be instructive for a Tunisian contemplating the promises of Islamists to ask whether or not Islam per se--with its emphasis on submission, on not thinking for oneself but rather following the cues of clerical leaders--can produce a creative, dynamic, innovative society?  Is not the groveling submission demanded by Islam generally and political Islam in particular antipodal to the needs of creativity and innovation?

Is it possible, a Tunisian might ask, for a religion or a political movement predicated on religion which has fear and hate as its stock in trade able to produce anything positive?  Is the combination of submission, fear, and hate the perfect mixture to result in killing, destruction, and failure?

These and other similar questions if honestly and objectively answered point in one direction.  The necessity, the absolute imperative, to reject political Islam quickly and finally.  The alternative, following the leaders of political Islam, will result in a future compared to which the recent past under Ben Ali will seem both free and enjoyable.

If Tunisians neglect closely questioning both the Islamists and the religion they purport to represent, the Jasmine Revolution will prove to have been an abject failure.  Worse, it will have been a foreseeable and thus preventable failure.

Is Tunisia The New Paradigm?

Many observers, particularly those who live in the Arab countries of the Mideast, see the overthrow of the aging authoritarian president, Ben Ali, as a sign of things to come in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, even the feudal oil kingdoms of the Gulf.  These optimistic folk revel in the apparent success of an unprecedented exercise in "people power."

There are striking but superficial similarities between the social, political, and economic dynamic which brought an end to the quarter century of Ben Ali's reign and those obtaining in other Mideast countries, particularly Egypt.  But, as history has so often shown, the differences are far more critical than the appealing similarities.

Ben Ali was only the second chief of state in the fifty plus years of Tunisian independence.  His predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, ushered in both independence and a rigid one party state rule.  Bourguiba was a realist in his domestic and foreign policy pursuing good relations with the ex-colonial power, France, while insisting on secularization, educational development, and economic progress domestically.  His thirty-one year regime provided a sound basis for Tunisia both socially and economically while stunting the country's political growth.

Ben Ali displaced Bourguiba in a non-violent coup in 1987.  His early terms in the office of president were distinguished only by his fealty to Bourguiba's visions.  However, by the end of his fifteenth year in power, Ben Ali had become increasingly repressive, given to nepotism and familial corruption and evermore remoteness from the people of Tunisia.  During terms number four and five, the general distaste for the regime grew apace, but manifestations of discontent were handled readily by the police.

As distaste for the regime grew so also did the wealth of the presidential family including the relatives of his second wife, a nearly illiterate one time beautician.  The situation would have remained in stasis had it not been for the impact of the global recession, particularly the hit taken by the large, educated, secularized, and European oriented youth of the country.

Bourguiba had emphasized the control of population growth with excellent results.  This insulated Tunisia against the early effects of too much education and too few suitable jobs.  However, the global recession upset the delicate balance with results which disproportionately hit the urban under thirty population.  In this context it should be mentioned that Tunisia is heavily urbanized with seven out of every ten people living in the cities.  Similarly Tunisia boasts an unusually large number of people with a post-secondary education.

In many but not all of these features--urbanization, a precarious balance between population growth and job growth, a significant number of young, educated, and under- or unemployed people, a rigid, one party political dynamic, inefficient, overbearing repression by police, corruption and nepotism at the highest level of government, maldistribution of wealth--Tunisia is closely resembled by Egypt, Algeria, and the Gulf states.  The same is true to a slightly lesser degree with respect to Jordan, Libya, and Syria.

None of this should be taken to imply that Hosni Mubarak is soon to go the way of Ben Ali.  The reason is to be found in the differences between Tunisia and the other Arab states.  Most of the critical differences are matters of degree rather than substance.  For example, Tunisia's population has a higher percentage of recipients of post-secondary education than the other countries in the region.  The average family size in Tunisia--an important consideration when evaluating the potential for political involvement by youth--is smaller than in the other Arab states.  The percentage of urbanites is larger.  The percentage of under-thirties with direct experience living in Europe is larger.  In short, the population of Tunisia is disproportionately educated, urban, technologically savvy, literate, and comes from a childhood of relative privilege.

Other differences are structural.  Tunisia has a small and non-politicized army.  While the police are more political than not, the army sat--and continues to sit--on the sidelines.  Its high command refused to suppress the escalating demonstrations/riots.  This was critical to the decision by the president to leave and the prime minister to step aside in favor of the legislative speaker.  Also structural is the matter of religion.  Tunisia is Muslim to be sure, but it is a country in which the seeds of violent political Islam or even the purportedly non-violent sort peddled by the Muslim Brotherhood have never been allowed to take root.

The act which triggered the final month of escalating unrest is quite atypical for an Arab/Muslim state and society but quite emblematic of Tunisia's uniqueness.  The event was the public self-immolation of a twenty-six year old university graduate who was forced to support himself as a fruit and vegetable peddler.  After being hassled by the police for having no license, Mohamad Bouazizi, took his own life in the same attention demanding way as did the famed Buddhist monks of South Vietnam fifty years ago--he doused himself with gasoline and struck a match.

Some Muslim clerics along with government spokesmen condemned Bouazizi's suicide as "non-Islamic."  This attempt at marginalization was unsuccessful to say the least.  It can be argued that the condemnation offered by Muslim clerics deligitimized any Islamist message.  Because of the widespread use of Internet, SMS, and other horizontal means of communication the death of Mr Bouazizi had an impact far from the small town of Sidi Bouzid.

Unemployed graduates were joined by urban workers and others in demonstrations and riots publicized by SMS and social networking sites in a manner redolent of raves and flash crowds.  The demonstrators were never effectively and efficiently repressed by the police.  It is important to note that the Tunisian organs of internal security were not and never have been efficiently repressive.  They could oppress but never gain the unchallenged upper hand which provides the necessary suppression of opposition.  In short, the police could repress enough to be counterproductive but not enough to be suppressive.  That has always been the worst case for an authoritarian regime.

In this very critical way then Tunisia is at a distance from countries such as Egypt.  Hosni Mubarak has a very efficient set of repressive instruments at his disposal including the army.  The same is true with other regimes which superficially resemble the old government in Tunisia.  Not to put too sharp a point on the matter, all the other potentially threatened governments have both the will and the ability to drown the opposition in blood.

It must never be forgotten that other countries from Algeria to Egypt and beyond have strong groups adhering to violent political Islam.  This means the usually more secular folks who would constitute a "people power" opposition would not have the field to themselves but would face Islamists as well as the status quo government and its supporting elites.

Putting together the similarities and differences leads to one conclusion: The events of the past month and days in Tunisia do not constitute a new paradigm for other societies and polities in the Arab Mideast.  While it would be very nice if the contrary were the case, the probability of any other authoritarian regime in the region being toppled in a manner akin to the downfall of Ben Ali is very slim to none.

Still there is a lesson here for the Deep Thinkers of the current administration.  It would behoove the US and other Western states including former colonial powers to take a long hard look at the possibilities for assisting "people power" movements in the region.  The neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney administration were right in pushing for democracy in the Arab states even if they were dead wrong in their belief that armed exercises in coerced regime change constituted the best means to foster democracy.  Working with nascent or incipient "people power" movements, even or especially those of the "leaderless" sort constitutes a far, far better way.

Ayman al-Zawahiri Raises The Stakes

Physcian turned al-Qaeda strategist, al-Zawahiri comes on hot and heavy in his hot off the recorder tape today. While the linkage between al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is not exactly a recent development despite what many mainstream media reports indicate, the tape is interesting. Perhaps important. Perhaps even very important.

For good reason, Americans focus on the Mideast. Like a precision guided munition on steroids, we keep an unblinking eye on Iraq. A blinking eye on Afghanistan. An occasionally opened eye on Israel.

For Americans, the huge swath of North Africa doesn't exist.

For Islamists and Jihadists, North Africa is a wide open theater of operations not yet properly exploited. That is the real importance of the new al-Zawahiri tape.

In it the man in the shadows behind Supreme Icon bin Laden names the new targets: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. None of these are unimportant little geographic pimples on the map of Africa. None are without recent experience with Islamist threats.

Algeria came within a gnat's eyebrow of voting in an Islamist regime a few years ago. The coup-by-election was forestalled by the Algerian armed forces. Blood flowed fast and hard. While the flow has slackened to a comparative trickle, the combat continues in the souks and in the mountain villages alike.

Tunisia has not been a monument to stability either. The Islamists are alive, well, and killing someone nearly every day. The Tunisian government barely survived the turbulence brought by Arafat and company when they transferred from Lebanon to Tunisia twenty some years ago. Arafat and his coterie of gunslingers and bombthowers have long since departed but not the fissures they left behind.

Libya is not as stable as it once was. Gaddafi is getting on in years. His years of drug use have taken a toll on mind and body alike. The unifying pressure once conveniently supplied by American opposition has faded into the mists of the Cold War. His state security bureau is no where near as efficient as it was back when the East German Stazi provided necessary training and advice. Worst of all, Gaddafi blinked--hard--when we invaded Iraq, (The Colonel didn't need us bombing his tent again.)

Out in the Libyan desert, between the oil pumps and tanks, the Islamists mutter and the Jihadists plot.

Quite recently Morocco has been the scene of several dramatic, if relatively under covered by the mainstream media, acts of Jihadist terror. King Mohammed sits on a throne every bit as unstable as that occupied by King Abdullah of the House of Sand.

Al-Zawahiri is well aware of the weaknesses present in all of these countries. He seeks to exploit them for the benefit of the Islamist cause.

Let's listen in.

"Islamic nation of resistance and jihad in the Maghreb, see how your children are uniting under the banner of Islam and jihad against the United States, France and Spain."

Later the ex-doctor added, "Support... your children in fighting our enemies and cleansing our lands of their slaves (Moamer) Kadhafi, Zine El Abidine (Ben Ali), (President Abdelaziz) Bouteflika and (King) Mohammed VI." The quotes are from the French press agency's translation, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gwwodPc1iWAWogDHpT0pFoMr9bWw.

France, Italy, and Spain all have more directly threatened interests in the countries on al-Zawahiri's little list. Oil leads the list, of course. Beyond that, the European states have wider economic interests which gradate into strategic military and political concerns. All must also view with a fair degree of disquietude the prospect of absorbing a refugee flood if terror attacks rise to a critical level.

The question of economic destabilization as well as that of refugee generation must raise some alarm throughout the European Union. The issue of Muslim immigration is not exactly a below the radar scope matter in most EU members right now.

Islamists have a real need to spread Jihadism beyond its current venues. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been checked--severely. Taliban and its adherents are under increasing pressure in Afghanistan. Pushed by the recent upsurge in Islamist/Jihadist activities, the Pakistani strongman has taken the extreme action of declaring a State of Emergency. It is too early to see how this might play out.

The potential for Pakistani collapse may be high but no one can safely bet that the US would stand by merely wringing its hands. Whether or not the US finds itself deep in the Pakistani morass, the Islamist cause is best helped by horizontal escalation of its war on the West.

That consideration probably lies behind the al-Zawahiri call to Fatah to both overthrow the PA chieftain, Abbas, and join with al-Qaeda and LIFG in one big war.

Horizontal escalation is (or should be) the single greatest nightmare of the deep thinkers in the current administration and the war planners in the Pentagon. In the past, the potential of Soviet horizontal escalation served to inhibit US policy makers and executors alike. (It was one of those if-we-do-this-in-Asia, the Soviets can do something in Berlin considerations.)

So far, the current administration and its critics have been notably silent on the horizontal escalation potential in the "global war on terrorism." There seems to have been some sort of unjustified assumption that we and only we had the initiative in this war.

We made the same mistake in Vietnam. It was one of the main reasons we were shocked to the depths of our collective political will by the Tet Offensive in 1968.

There is no need to be shocked now. The brains of al-Qaeda, the only one of the leadership cadre who might deserve to be termed a political-military strategist, al-Zawahiri, has announced the intent to escalate the war horizontally at a place of the enemy's choosing.

Iran is not the only game in town. Neither is Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip.

The current administration and its neocon ninnie supporters need to get a grip on that.

Al-Zawahiri has made that clear. Whether we like it or not, the game will widen.