Once Again It's Escalation Time In Bahrain

When the Saudi troops and armor moved down the causeway to Bahrain, any observer well oriented in time and place would have concluded that the countdown to a crackdown had commenced.  The observer might also have mused that the number of hours on the clock was not great.

The troops have moved.  The protest encampment in Pearl Square has been cleared.  People have been wounded.  Some have been killed.  The ante in this particular game of bluff has been raised.  So have the stakes for all players: the royal family and its Sunni minority supporters, the Shiite majority protesters, the backroom crowd from Tehran and, not least, the US for whom Bahrain is an important strategic outpost.

The Obama folks responded to the most recent clearing operation as they did the previous one.  All the right boilerplate phrases have been pulled out of the word processors, "urge restraint," "deplore violence," "need for dialogue" and all the other routine yabba, yabba, dabba, dabba, yadda, yadda.

On the other side of the hill, the side occupied by the royal family of Bahrain, matters are seen differently.  The Bahraini royals and their supporters see a strong probability that Obama is going to pull the plug on them as they believe was the case with Hosni Mubarak.  There is a strong perception not only in Bahrain but also in Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Coordination Council to the effect that President Obama either though inertia and indifference or under the pressure of personal ideology allowed the overthrow of Mubarak and is likely to do the same with the assorted royals of the Gulf states.

The same perception, or one so close as to be operationally identical, must run through the minds of the Mullahs and their frontmen in Iran, Syria, and within Hezbollah.  The vacillating stances of Obama and his secretary of state during the "Lotus Revolution" were seen not only in Egypt but elsewhere as the product of a weak person with no political will.  This would embolden the adversaries of the status quo (including Iran) and force the current governments under threat to take more robust actions more rapidly than might otherwise be necessary, let alone desirable.

This analytical stance must lead to the conclusion that the Obama administration and the president himself bear a direct responsibility for the deaths in Bahrain.  It also means the same applies with respect to the inevitable deterioration of political stability in Bahrain.

It doesn't matter that the authoritarian regimes have lasted so long in the region in largest measure due to American support.  The reasons for that support matter even less.  The reality that the US policy of supporting dictators and semi-dictators regardless of the rhetoric favoring democracy was fully justified considering American national and strategic interests as well as the threats presented to them matters least of all.

In Bahrain currently as in Egypt a couple of weeks ago, the US was caught between the two primary pillars of its foreign policy: the idealistic long term commitment to democracy and other political, social, and cultural values and norms on the one hand and the pragmatically sanctioned realistic need to defend and advance certain short term national and strategic interests against clear threats.  This dynamic of contradictory policy imperatives both hamstrings and brands as hypocritical whatever the US seeks to do when confronted by a sudden political change as rapid and devastating of the old order as a tsunami.

Worsening the situation has been the chronic administration focus upon splitting the difference and postponing decision making under the transparent cover of appearing to be deliberate and prudent.  A nice show which may play in Peoria, but one which falls on its flabby rear end in the streets and squares where the political battles are fought.

As a result no ruler in the Mideast can be sure the US will support him when doing such might require actions running contrary to the myth of constant American upholding of truth, democracy, and the American Way.  King Hamid cannot trust Obama to remain a consistent supporter even if the current regime does enter into legitimate negotiations with the dissident Shiites.  The same applies to King Abdullah next door in Saudi Arabia.  Ditto for all the other feudal rulers of the GCC states.

Can you blame them for concluding they are on their own?  Can they be blamed for taking robust action in the hope (perhaps forlorn) that by doing such enough order to allow minimal concessions might be achieved?  And, can anyone blame these endangered rulers facing not only domestic threats but the machinations of Iran for ignoring the fine words of the Obama folks?

The answer to each and all these questions is simple: Of course not.

The sorry record of the Obama administration compels the local rulers to ignore Washington completely.  The indecisive nature of the administration, its reliance on speeches and verbal lines in the sand never backed by actions which might be effective in the short term, the inability of Mr Obama and his "team" even to come to terms with the realities in Libya, all of these combine to reduce American influence in the region to zero.  Even if the local kings and sheiks had been so tone deaf as to miss the significance of Obama reversing decades of US policy toward Israel, they could scarcely overlook the lack of resolute or even visible policy in Egypt.

The King of Bahrain and his peers throughout the Gulf region have no one to look to except each other and themselves.  The US is worse than a mere nonentity.  It has become a distrusted player, a potential enemy who claims to be a friend.  So they act reflexively, violently, coercively in the hopes it might bring a time out during which some sort of internal deal might be brokered.

The reliance on coercion may well be misplaced, fatally so.  But in that event at the least the current governments will have been stabbed in the chest.  That, the rulers must believe, is better by far than waiting for Mr Obama to plunge the deadly knife into their backs.

Mr Obama and his adherents may convince themselves that the President is a perfect model of statesmanship: cool, deliberative, refusing to act precipitously.  This is an illusion.  In sharpest point of fact, the Obama "team" is assuring more unrest, longer unrest, and an ever growing mound of corpses.  In the final analysis the blood must be seen as staining the hands of the Deep Thinkers of Washington far more than it does the hands of the locals.

Pucker Factor Has To Be On The Rise In Saudi Arabia

Now that the government of Bahrain has reversed course on its treatment of the anti-government protests there, the House of Sand must be more worried than before.  There are two reasons for the probable uptick in uptightness in the Kingdom.

First, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is right across the narrow waterway from Bahrain.  The Eastern Province, like Bahrain, is majority Shiite in makeup.  Further, the Shiites of the EP echo their coreligionists in charges of discrimination at the hands of the Wahhibist regime and larger population.

Second, the House of Saud does not trust the current US administration.  The belief in Saudi Arabia is the Obama administration has gone wobbly with respect to the status quo in the Mideast.  The government at its highest levels is particularly torqued off over the administration having abandoned Hosni Mubarak with unseemly haste and without any eye on the future.  Of course, the future which Saudi Arabia worries about centers on any extension of Iranian influence in the region.

For several years now the primary concern of the House of Saud has been Iran not Israel.  The Saudis would be willing to sell out every Palestinian extant if that would help secure a future safe from Iranian ambitions.  The Saudis, as the WikiLeaks cables make clear, has lost no opportunity in conveying this position to the Obama administration as it did the Bush/Cheney team.  Any sign by Washington of decreasing interest in maintaining the status quo pushes the worry beads into hyperdrive all over the Kingdom.

Saudi Arabia has always been worried about being encircled.  In the old days of Pan-Arabism and the Soviet Union, the fear was the combination would create a Soviet controlled bloc running from Egypt to Iraq as well as from Egypt to Yemen.  Now the anxiety is that Iran will do something similar using proxies ranging from Hamas and Hezbollah to the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its "official" state ally, Syria.    The Saudi regime is now of the firm view that the US is not sensitive to this potential.

The House of Saud is not willing to believe its own propaganda.  The fear is the combination of gobs of money, Wahhibism, and a more or less popular royal house will not prove to be enough to defeat some full throated, Iranian assisted exercise in local "people power."  The first expression of this belief can be seen in the probable role being played by Saudi officials in the response by Bahrain to the pro-change demonstrators.

There is strong reason to believe (although no direct proof) that the very muscular response of the Bahraini security forces was orchestrated in Saudi Arabia.  The unexpected overnight shift to "dialogue" including the withdrawal of the army from Pearl Roundabout constituted a Bahraini act of regret.  Should the new, velvet glove approach not payoff and quickly, the fifteen mile causeway built by the Saudis exists for a reason far more military then providing a quick weekend getaway for Saudis in search of a drink.

The situation in Bahrain is far from settled.  The (perhaps temporary) back down by the government will probably prove insufficient to end the demonstrations permanently.  The blood of the martyrs will not allow such an easy out.  At the same time the House of Saud is not going to allow any move which smacks of regime change to occur.  While the Saudi army is probably not combat capable against the Iranians or any other real armed force, it is up to the task of squashing unarmed demonstrators.

The Obama administration will have to factor Saudi fears as well as probable Saudi actions into whatever passes as policy regarding Bahrain.  The Saudis will insist on order, the order of the status quo, being maintained against all comers and all American desires.  The Deep Thinkers of Team Obama will have to keep in mind the reality that the word "change" is an obscenity in the minds of the Saudi regime.

Recalling the rumors of Saudi campaign cash flowing into Obama coffers, one cannot help but wonder if the House of Saud believes now that it got value for its money.

The More Things Change--The More They Stay The Same

Both Veep Biden and the Nice Young Man From Chicago have lost themselves in the stratosphere of oratory today following the long anticipated departure of Hosni Mubarak.  That the old man would leave was never in doubt, only the details of timing, details which would be and were determined solely by the supreme command of the military.  The arrogance of the Obama/Biden duo in both proclaiming the end of the Mubarak era as being of world historical importance equal to the fall of the Berlin Wall (and, by heavy handed implication, the result of US policy) is both breathtaking and totally false.

The movement of Mubarak from the presidential palace to his private compound on the Red Sea is not even as dramatic as the events of 1952.  The overthrow of the Egyptian king in that year by a consortium of army officers was not only better theater than the street festivities of the past eighteen days, it was also a very real break from Egypt's past.  The retirement of Mubarak is no such gap between past and future.

It is important to understand something which has quite evidently eluded all the Deep Thinkers surrounding the Clueless Guy in the Oval.  The violent deposing of King Farouk by the Young Officers--a group which included future strongmen Nasser and Sadat--marked the end of Egypt's centuries as a colonial backwater exploited by European powers as well as the Ottoman Empire.  It was a reclamation of national dignity, national identity, national pride.  Nasser and Sadat rode this revolutionary camel for all it was worth over the next thirty years with the result that Egypt became a major player in the non-aligned movement as well as a skilled exploiter of cold war rivalries.

Egypt emerged from the coup as the aspiring leader of a united Arab mega-state.  The dream never became a reality for reasons inherent to nationalism and national egoism alike, but Egypt did become a good simulacrum of the regional hegemon, the go-to state whenever something needed to get done in the region.  Not a bad accomplishment for a state which did not have and still does not have a solid economic base, but does have a very large, often fractious population and no tradition of democracy.

Despite having been defeated in three of the four wars it fought with Israel, and nearly losing the fourth one after a brilliant beginning, the army has carried the luster of the 1952 revolution intact to the present day.  It is this which gives the military its special role in Egyptian politics.  It is the 1952 overthrow of the dissipated king coupled with the splendid success of the opening days of the Yom Kippur war which allows the army to smoothly assert control today regardless of the precise wording of the constitution.  The military has unique status, unique power, and unique responsibility.  It is exercising the first two in pursuit of achieving the third.

The responsibility of the army is to preserve the apparatus of state from subversion.  This means the armed forces have the task of preventing a takeover of the mechanisms of government and state by such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood.  Put in general terms, the armed forces have the sole responsibility of assuring order.

Note the word use was "order," not stability.  As laid out the other day, stability can emerge only over time in a way which is organic to the society and polity and only when citizens have sufficient personal liberty to engage in the never ending task of creating stability.  The best the army can do is provide (or impose) order on a day to day basis.

Of course it is the maintenance of order which has been at the root of every Egyptian government since 1952.  None of the several regimes have made the slightest attempt to foster conditions compatible with the slow and painful evolution of stability.  Nor is that reality going to change with the departure of Hosni Mubarak.  No matter how much Mr Obama or anyone else may clamor for democracy, for an "orderly" transformation, there will be no change in the basics of the Egyptian system of government.

The painful truth is that there is only one way in which the basics of the Egyptian system will change.  That one way involves the armed forces losing the will or ability to maintain order.  Should that happen, the way will be wide open for fundamental revolutionary change.  The least unlikely scenario in the event the armed forces bobble their job is a violent bid by the Muslim Brotherhood for power.  Should that happen, the Brotherhood will come out on top.

The same outcome is likely should the foreign advocates of "democracy" gain sufficient influence on the Egyptian military to force elections.  In the event of an election the Muslim Brotherhood will win power hands down.  The years of social, medical, educational, and economic services efforts by the Brotherhood have bought it great perceived legitimacy.  Nor are the majority of Egyptians opposed to the austere view of Islam held by the Brotherhood.  Quite the contrary, the majority of Egyptians support shariah in all its brutal aspects, are in favor of gender inequality, view Islam as the only true faith, oppose Christianity, and are hostile to Jews to the highest degree.  There is nothing in the Brotherhood's manifesto which is abhorrent to the typical Egyptian man in the street.

For the US, for Israel, for the civilized states generally, the best outcome of the recent events in Egypt will be a continuation of the "spirit of 1952."  That is simply a continuation of business as usual as it has been conducted for the past sixty years.  A few cosmetic changes would be nice, as would an emphasis on the creation of jobs for Egyptians, but there should be no rush, no pressure, no insensible demands for democracy.  There are times and places where order is the best which can be hoped for over the short to medium run.  Egypt today is both time and place where order must be promoted even at the cost of postponing the stimulus of stability for some more years.

The best advice for the hyperbole prone administration is this: Chill out.  The time for high blown and unsupportable oratory is most definitely not now.  Sure, a few genuflections before the totem of democracy are OK, but don't take it seriously--particularly in the back channel talks with the generals in charge of daily life.  You have to let those fellows know that you understand where they are coming from and support the goal of keeping order preferably without body counts.

Most of all, the denizens in and near the Oval would be well advised to not break their arms patting themselves on the back.  The US was massively irrelevant to most of the events of the past three weeks as can be seen by the absence of burning American flags or "Death to America" chants.  Heck, even the nervous money guys of the world overlooked US T notes and dollars as safe haven investments--and that sort of defines American irrelevance, doesn't it?

Different Clocks Are Running In Egypt

Political revolutions, even those which are (relatively) nonviolent, have clocks.  This has to be realized not only by the status quo regime--which, of course, has its own clock--but outsiders.  The outsiders have clocks as well, but their timepieces are the slowest running of all.

The people on the streets, the actual fomentors of revolution, the people who have the most direct emotional and physical investment in the process of change, run on clocks which tick very, very fast.  On the street, riding the waves of uncertainty, fear and hope, a standard hour is longer than Christmas Eve to a five year old; a week becomes an unimaginable extent of geological time and months, an unacceptable eternity.

The effect of the fast time mentality has been highly visible in Cairo's Tahir Square, the epicenter of seismic political shock in Egypt.  To the assembled demonstrators, and, in high probability, to others of similar mind connected to the square by television, cell phones, and the Internet, the idea of having Hosni Mubarak soldier on to the end of his current term as president is akin to waiting for the end of the universe.  It may be coming, but not in a time frame that any can accept.

The same dynamic was evident in Tunisia.  The fast clock phenomenon was at work each and every time the status quo offered some temporizing compromise.  No one in the midst of the emotional tsunami which crested in Tunisia could abide the idea of keeping on the crest of change without the orgasm of final relief--the exit of Ben Ali.  The same sort of ejaculatory inevitability has grabbed the minds and bodies of the footsoldiers of change in Egypt.

Leaders, whether of the opposition or the status quo, are but dimly aware of the driving imperative at work in the minds and glands of the thousands of disaffiliated people in or connected with Tahir Square.  Outsiders, the politicians and diplomats of countries ranging from the US to Europe, are also not truly appreciative of the fast time process as they call for an orderly transition and the time required for this to happen.

This implies that the most critical conflict unfolding in the Egyptian Crisis is that between the clocks of the protesters and the outsiders in search of effective influence on the unfolding of events.  At base this conflict is irreconcilable.

The position of the US is both easy to understand and defend.  The probability of a too rapid removal of Hosni Mubarak resulting in a species of chaos easily exploited by advocates of political Islam as well as national entities such as Iran which support these groups is high.  At the same time it is necessary to caution that the anxieties regarding the hijacking of revolution by the adherents of violent political Islam can be overstated with ease.  Mubarak has done so.  So has Benjamin Netanyahu.  Up until a couple of days ago so had President Obama.

Reinforcing the argument in favor of "deliberate speed" is the absence of a clearly acceptable consensual choice of leader by the assorted opposition elements.  Given that the powerhouse of the uprising has been the existence of self-organizing, predominantly youthful, assemblages of the discontented and the disaffected, the leadership problem is inherently pronounced.  The entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood to the open opposition has done nothing to clarify the leadership haze.  Nor has the direct participation of old line opposition political parties.

Mohamad ElBaradei offered himself as leader.  The offer was accepted by a broad assortment of opposition groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, but that did not make it so.  As any number of demonstrators quoted in the international media have made clear, ElBaradei is not their choice.  More, many of those quoted, have seen ElBaradei as part of the old guard or self-interested and remote from the Egyptian realities.  It is easy to get the impression that the several high profile meetings between ElBaradei and other "leaders" of the opposition groups are somehow not relevant to the dynamics in the Square.

One of the major problems of this leadership vacuum is the meetings, the declarations, the demands, the pre-conditions (such as Mubarak must leave before negotiations on the future commence) all combine to accelerate the already fast running clocks in the Square.  Meetings of opposition figures like the demands and dictates create an expectation of success--success being defined by the demonstrators as the sight of Hosni Mubarak getting on a plane.

When no success is seen, the almost inevitable result is an increase in both frustration and action predicated upon frustration.  This, unsurprisingly, means an escalation in violence and concomitant hardening in the positions of both demonstrators and status quo.  This, undoubtedly, is what the perpetual bad boys of the world in Tehran and their proxies in Egypt are hoping and working for.

A drastic increase in disorder will force the hand of the army.  Either the army will have to crack down and do so hard and fast, or its leaders will have to tell Hosni the time to leave has come while deciding who among the opposition the army will choose as transitional leader.

The army would risk very, very much should its leadership order the use of force against the demonstrators.  Not only would it risk its own junior officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel disobeying the order, it would put in hazard its treasured place as the ultimate guarantee of legitimacy for state and regime alike.

Of course, it is unlikely that repression would do more than buy some time at a very high price.  It would not put the incubus of radical political change back in some sealed bottle.  Rather, repression would assure the incubus would reemerge bigger and badder in not too many months--at the longest.  It is most likely that repression would do little other than make the clocks on the street run faster.

It is far safer, albeit harder emotionally, for the senior military leadership to tell Hosni that the game is over.  Should it do so and then offer a high visibility and evidently responsible position to a person well known in the ranks of the opposition as an honest and effective politician, the act would serve to slow the clocks in the Square by giving a very real, quite substantial success to the demonstrators and their supporters.  It would bode well to slow the clocks of Tahir Square to a point they mesh with the always slow watches of the West.

There is even a good choice for the position of politician as army partner.  That choice is not Mohamad ElBaredei.  He is neither well enough known nor trusted by the army--or many of the opposition.  The post of political partner can best be filled by one time foreign minister and more recently head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa.  Moussa has long been a relatively charismatic politician well known not to be a line hewing partisan of Mubara even though he was Hosni's ForMin for much of the Nineties.

Mubarak finally chaffed with Moussa's fits of independence as well as his growing popularity.  The dictator then shelved Moussa over at the Arab League.  His years as foreign minister as well as head of the League mean Moussa is a known and respected commodity internationally as well as in the region.  His appearance in the Square yesterday brought enough cheers to indicate he has not lost his luster with the street.

While the current vice-president, Omar Suleiman, is not acceptable to the fast clock folk in the Square, the addition of Amr Moussa to the ticket might be sufficient.  While the army may not be as happy with Moussa as they are with Suleiman who is, after all, one of their own, they may be persuaded to accept the duo.  At the least, Moussa is better than ElBaradei and, certainly no flaming Islamist.

If President Obama gets over his snit with the spooks for not having gotten Tunisia and Egypt perfectly right in their prognostications (who did?) and his pretense that he has gotten out in front of events in Cairo, he and his foreign policy "team" might take a close look at how the army can bring the opposition on board, smooth Hosni's (rapid) departure, and slow down the clocks in the Square.  As those clocks tick, they are counting down the seconds to genuine disaster and they will not slow by themselves.

Worrying By Analogy

Since even Hosni Mubarak has agreed that his days are numbered and that the number isn't a large one, it seems fair to consider the hypothetical "day after."  The fact that quite a few Egyptians do not agree with Hosni's estimate of seven more months in his political life gives the consideration a real impetus.

Humans have a tendency (lamentable much of the time) to reason by analogy.  Often the basis of analogy is historical with the inevitable consequence that the reasoning process is highly selective both as to the data used and the interpretative methods used.  In considering Egypt after Mubarak there is a great appeal to employing the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution as the analogy.

There are some seemingly compelling points of identity between Egypt today and Iran of thirty-two years ago.  Both countries belong to the species dictatorship.  Both dictators enjoyed very significant American support.  Both were seen by administrations of both Democratic and Republican nature as key allies in the region as well as islands of predictable stability.  In both countries the armed forces and internal security organs received massive US assistance and training.

Both Egypt and Iran are majority Muslim countries.  Egypt today like Iran thirty-two years ago fields a large, well organized, and militant advocate of violent political Islam.

At that point the identities end.  Even similarities fade.  The differences become all important--and, critically, make the process of reasoning by analogy suspect.

Chief among the differences is the brand of Islam prevalent in Egypt compared with that of Iran.  Egyptians are predominantly Sunni while ninety percent or more of the Muslims in Iran in 1979 were Shia.  There is a mound of distinction between the two "brands."  Shia is given to political expression, martyrdom, and centralization of religious doctrine.  Sunnis, while far from indifferent to politics per se, are not such eager seekers after martyrdom as their Shia cousins.  More importantly, religious doctrine and direction is decentralized, diffuse within the Sunni community.  There is no figure equivalent to the Grand Ayatollah, the Supreme Guardian of the faith.

Another critical distinction between Iran in 1979 and Egypt today (and one which is still subject to change) is the role of the army.  The army in Egypt is held in high repute due to its having administered a severe drubbing to the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War.  The Iranian army had no such cachet.  Beyond that, the Egyptian army to date has taken no suppressive actions against the demonstrators.

When the Iranian army made the fateful and fatal decision to execute the Shah's orders to open fire on demonstrators on 8 September 1978 (with the result that hundreds died in Tehran's Jaleh Square from tank and helicopter gunships), that spelled the end of any perceived legitimacy for the army as a transitional instrument.  So far the Egyptian army has not done the same.  Hopefully, it will not even should Mubarak be so ill-advised as to order a crackdown.

Another important consideration is the role of the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.  The Muslim Brotherhood has been a latecomer to the party, undoubtedly as a calculated decision later reversed when the demonstrators were not blown away in the first police actions.  In sharp contrast, the followers of Khomeini were good to go from the giddy-up moving swiftly to the forefront as the Shah's regime crumbled.

While the Geek in no way agrees with presidential advisor and former CIA officer, Bruce Reidel, to the effect that there ain't no reason to be scared of the Muslim Brotherhood as the group has long dropped its agenda of violent political Islam, there is no basis for the belief that the Brotherhood will take over the post-Mubarak environment.  The Brotherhood has a wide base of popular support within Egypt's most impoverished and politically marginalized citizens thanks more to its excellent network of social, education, and medical services than to its agenda, the assumption that this will translate into domination of any post-Mubarak government is poorly justified at best.

Egypt contains not only a large demographic segment of the impoverished and marginal, of former peasants forced to seek employment in the bursting urban centers, it also contains a larger portion of educated, more or less, Westernized youth who seek jobs, opportunity, a sense of personal dignity, personal future, who are not prone to accept the austere religious dictates of the harder line Muslim Brotherhood cadre.  The balance of power resides with the second group to a far greater extent than to the myrmidons of the Brotherhood.  This view is reinforced by the nature of the demonstrators as well as their creative use of Western developed horizontal communications methods as well as the absence of obvious Islamist slogans (either in Arabic or English) in the iconography surrounding the protests.

The most likely result of the tension between Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptians less given to political Islam is the formation of an Egyptian version of the Turkish AKP.  While the AKP has shown some disquieting signs of being a little too inclined to see the positive with respect to more violently inclined advocates of political Islam, it has not gone over--or even near--the edge of the abyss.  The AKP has shown itself to be more pragmatic than ideological, more success oriented than willing to risk all for the "cause."

Another key distinction which is all too often overlooked particularly by members of the American Right is simply that Barack Obama is not Jimmy Carter.  Even when it became obvious to all but the most intellectually challenged, Jimmy Carter dithered.  He did not put effective pressure on the Shah to step aside in a bid for "orderly transition."  Then he made the situation worse by not supporting the Shah when support would still have mattered.  Finally, he turned sentimental with his allowing the ailing fugitive Shah to find sanctuary for a time and of a sort in the US.  This demonized the US all the more in the eyes of the True Believers of the Ayatollah Khomeini.  Obama may have started late compared to events on the Egyptian street but has come up fast, perhaps claiming too much credit for Mubarak's I'm-leaving-in-September pledge.

The influence of the US on the Egyptian military should not be overlooked either.  That plus the personal relationship between Mubarak and Secretary of State Clinton have been of great assistance in assuring that Mubarak came to realize sooner rather than later that getting out of power skin intact requires speedy action.

This is not to imply that there is no cause for anxiety about the next few days and weeks to say nothing of the hypothetical "day after," but it does imply strongly that the Iranian analogy is not the best one to use in assessing Egypt or US policy toward that country.  It does imply that the probability of the Muslim Brotherhood establishing a Sunni counterpoise to the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran or the Egyptian army becoming the next Revolutionary Guards Corps is very low.

The looming regime change in Egypt should give Israel grounds for reconsidering its intransigence on the Two State Question.  This becomes more salient given the pressure being exerted by advocates of violent political Islam and others on the government of Jordan.  The specter of these countries both abrogating their peace agreements with Israel should focus Israeli attention sharply on the role of the Two State Solution in maintaining the less-than-perfect but still acceptable Mideast status quo.  A dramatic move by Israel to meet some of the demands of the Palestinian Authority would go a long way to pulling the propaganda fangs of the Muslim Brotherhood and others of the political Islam bent.  It would also bolster the PA against the potential of Hamas going more radical hoping to capitalize on the general dissatisfaction in the Arab populations.

It would behoove the US administration to play this card not only in its dealings with the political opposition in Egypt and Jordan but also with the Netanyahu government.  Right now intransigence is not in Israel's best interests, even at the cost of losing domestic political support.  Rocks may stand against the waves but will always be submerged by the tide.  At this time the tide of events in the Mideast is running in favor of change, even remarkable, unprecedented change.

Egypt can yet become the new century's Iran.  But, for that to happen will require stupidity in Cairo, in Washington or in Jerusalem of a very high order.  One way, perhaps the best, to assure stupidity reigns is to focus too narrowly on the Iranian analogy.

It has been mooted about that President Obama is a keen student of history as well as being a very unsentimental character.  The second proposition is no doubt correct.  The first can be proven only if Mr Obama really understands history rather than simplemindedly reasoning by (inapposite) historical analogy.

The Army Is Egypt's Last, Best Hope

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has upped the ante in the Egyptian Crisis.  She was all over Sunday morning talking heads shows with a clear message for Hosni Mubarak--and the opposition.  While she did not directly call for the aging dictator (with apologies to Joe Biden) to step down, she made it as plain as the pyramids that his days were numbered and the number isn't a big one.

In her statements Ms Clinton ran ahead of President Obama which is a good thing.  The president as is his wont has been too cautious, too ambiguous, too noncommittal, too, in a word, academic in his public statements.  And, get a grip on this, it is the public voice which matters most with the Egyptians in the street.  As has been reported all over the MSM of the English speaking world, the newly empowered Egyptian street has been demanding a loud, unmistakable message from the US.  Are we Americans on the side of the opposition or are we locked in a death embrace with the current regime?

From the statements oozing out of the Oval the answer is not clear.  The Clinton posture is more so, but, arguably not sufficient.  It would be most helpful both to the Egyptians and to American policy interests in the region if Ms Clinton received backup from Secretary of Defense Gates.  The US provides over a billion dollars a year in military assistance to Egypt and, as a result, has very good ties with the senior and mid-level officers of the Egyptian armed forces.  If Gates were to come out with a public statement backing the army as the necessary transitional presence, it would go a long way to assuring the army would do the right thing.

In this case, the right thing consists of impartially maintaining order.  So far all reports indicate that the army has been doing just this.  The forces deployed in Cairo and elsewhere have not taken robust (or any perceptible) action against the demonstrators but, rather, have shown sympathy with the cause of reform/regime change.  This means nothing has happened yet to impair the prestige which the army enjoys with the mass of the Egyptian people.  Quite unlike the massively despised police forces, the army enjoys a high measure of support and is viewed by many on the street as the ultimate guarantor of Egyptian identity and pride.

No observer can conclude that any outcome which does not feature the departure of Mubarak is conceivable.  There is no certainty about what will transpire after Hosni and company depart.  The possibilities include a reasonably fair, honest, and open election occurring on or about the date already scheduled.  They also include the nightmare outcome of chaos, chaos which tosses up the Muslim Brotherhood to power.

The best way of bending events closer to the first rather than the second outcome hinges on the Egyptian army.  As long as the men and officers of the army see that they and their organization are lionized by the mass of the citizenry for playing a fair game, the blandishments of the Muslim Brotherhood--which includes their adherents within the armed forces--will be lessened.  By acting as an impartial honest broker, by maintaining order, by not seeming to favor either the current regime or the radicals of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a better than even chance that a semblance of a fair presidential election can take place.

The problem with an election, of course, resides in the absence of a high profile non-Islamist candidate.  The former director of the IAEA, Mohamad ElBaradei, comes closest to filling this niche.  The unfortunate reality is he is much better known outside of Egypt than he is within.  Except for the percentage of the Egyptian population which is tied into international affairs, ElBaradei is very much an unknown quantity.  This translates into a strong chance that he could be defeated by a better known personality who is backed by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Again, it would be the army which would have to carry the freight of preventing a takeover by the Brotherhood.  The reality which must be understood by the army at all levels is simply that a Muslim Brotherhood run Egypt would become a danger not only to the region but the world.  As such, the group, as an advocate of armed political Islam, would be a very real danger to Egypt itself.  In its role as ultimate repository of Egyptian sovereignty and identity, the army would have to act to prevent this internal threat--or by failing to do so consign Egypt to the status of pariah.

The US and other Western countries have made one major mistake after another in dealing with Mubarak over the past couple of decades.  Out of a superabundance of concern for the sensitivities and cooperation of the regime, one American administration after another has refused to put any credible pressure on Mubarak to undertake real, albeit gradual reforms.  Rather, in pursuit of compelling but short-term policy interests, the US has made only the softest of noises, the most gentle of nudges.  Not surprisingly, all have been ignored in Cairo.

The best chance of recovering from this unblemished record of error resides with the leverage provided by the high level of US support for the army.  The time has come for the US to cash in on the mass of IOUs piled up over the years.  This requires not only the correct sort of public statements regarding the necessity of regime change but also blunt talk behind the scenes to the senior and mid-level officer corps.  Not only must these men be made aware of the consequences which would ensue should the Muslim Brotherhood come to power either directly or by proxy but also should be reminded that the bastion of national identity and sovereignty has been the army in Muslim majority countries ranging from Turkey to Algeria to, most recently, Tunisia.

Thirty plus years ago the Carter administration wrote the book on how not to deal with internally driven radical regime change.  Among the courses of action not taken by the feckless Carter and his team of foreign policy midgets was insisting that the Iranian army, a creation of American largess, play the role of stability maintainer.  There was no insistence, not even the mildest suggestion, that while the Shah may have to go, the primary responsibility of the armed forces was that of keeping the change within internationally acceptable limits.

The statements by Secretary Clinton a couple of weeks ago as well as today show that at least one member of the current administration is not given to the blindness of the Carter days.  One can only hope she is not alone in this.

Hardball In Egypt And Yemen Goes A Bit More Down The Tube

As expected, the anti-government demonstrators took to the streets in large numbers following Friday prayers.  In an important change the Muslim Brotherhood got off the sideline fence and came down on the side of the demonstrators.  This may mean the leadership cadre has concluded the anti-regime movement has a chance of winning.  Or it may indicate simply an unwillingness for the Brotherhood not to get its fair share of abuse during the protests and concomitant crackdown.

Also without surprise was the decision of the Mubarak regime to order the army into the fray with instructions to support the police.  This may mean a tipping point will shortly arrive.  While the army has been sent on riot control duty twice before during the Mubarak years--once to quell the bread riots and once to suppress a strike by police--it has not fired upon Egyptian civilians during the thirty years of Murbarak's rule nor during the terms of this two predecessors.

The big unknown is simply what will be the response of the senior army commanders--or the snuffies in the streets when--or if--the order to open fire is given.  The entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood into the contest complicates answering this question as the Brotherhood has significant support within both the enlisted men and junior officers of the Egyptian armed forces.  This reality implies that there may be a split between the senior leadership and those down the food chain should the Mubarak dictatorship order the use of live fire on demonstrators for any purpose other than immediate self-defense.

If the high command refuses the order or--as is more likely--the men with guns down on the streets say, "Hell, no!" the days of the Mubarak regime are numbered.  And the number will not be a large one.  The governing ground truth in this is that while the internal security police have a vested interest in the continuation in the status quo, the army below the most exalted levels has no such motivation.

In addition to dispatching the army "in aid of the civil power," the regime has taken other measures.  It is widely known that Egypt has ceased to exist in the world of internet.  It is equally well known that Egypt has blocked mobile phone service.  These moves will cripple the capacity of the anti-government demonstrators to enlist the understanding and support of foreigners.  To a lesser extent it impairs the ability of the demonstrators to organize their efforts.

Beyond the blocking of internet and mobile phone services, the government has mounted a wave of preventative arrests.  Among those either detained or put under house arrests are leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamad ElBaradei.  The former head of the IAEA and current presidential candidate was placed under house arrest only hours after he returned from Vienna with the announced intent of joining with the demonstrations and sharing the fate of the demonstrators.

The arrests and blocking orders are not fatal to the anti-government movement.  In fact the arrests may rebound against the interests of the Mubarak regime by granting status to both the Brotherhood and Mr AlBaradei.

While these events were taking place, the Obama administration continued its imitation of their Carter days predecessors during the fateful days of 1979.  The Secretary of State like the President have made all the usual boilerplate appeals for peace, non-violence, the universal rights of Egyptian citizens, the desirability of reform, of transparency, of democracy, of yadda-yadda.  This can be seen either as a statesmenlike detachment of the US from the internal affairs of a sensitive Arab state or the clueless act of an administration adrift at the policy level.

The demonstrators know the US is involved in the demonstrations as tear gas projectiles clearly marked "Made in the USA" are littering the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities.  This is the dismal consequence of the years of American military aid.  Unless the US administration undertakes some form of compensatory action, the narrative of a Mubarak-USA linkage will be developed from the fragments of tear gas canisters.  In the estimate of most people, physical evidence trumps distant, diplomatic verbiage.

President Obama has convened his ":foreign policy team" for discussions of the events on the streets of Egypt.  Well, ain't that something?  A question for the "team:"  Is Joe Biden representing your official view when he dissented from characterizing Mubarak as a "dictator?"

As soon as the "team" has decided if Biden was right, it must consider a very alarming situation: Right now the only factor separating the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt is the stance of the Egyptian army.  Specifically, what is the army likely to do if given the order to shoot on demonstrators--Shoot, don't shoot or shoot on the police?  That is the single most important subject for the "team" and president to consider. It is also the issue they must get right or pay the consequences should we get it wrong.

The administration must take a stance on the matter of the army pulling the trigger.  There is every probability that the Egyptian government either has or will shortly test American support for a use of force order.  Even if Mubarak does not order use of force, it is inevitable that should the army open fire, a narrative emphasizing US support for the status quo and therefore responsibility for any army inflicted bloodshed will explode across the Arab world.

Should the opposite happen--should for example, the army in the field oppose the police and take sides with the demonstrators, the administration best consider what, if anything, can be done to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power, either de facto or de jure.  The emergence of the Brotherhood to power would exceed the impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution as the Brotherhood has branches or subsidiaries around the world in Muslim and non-Muslim states as well as an outward looking stance infinitely broader than that possessed by the Iranian clerical establishment.

While the Deep Strategic Thinkers of the administration are meeting they might spend a few nanoseconds reviewing the situation in Yemen.  The "Jasmine Revolution" has inspired an offshoot movement in Yemen which has sponsored demonstrations in the capital of Yemen, Saana, the other day.  It is unclear at the moment if the demonstrators want to end the current regime or gain some reforms.  In either event, the demonstrations add one more facet to the deeply fractured and desperately poor country.  The divisions are so profound, the rivals for power so extreme, that any change in the status quo would be in the direction of making Yemen a failed state.

The strong possibility of Yemen going all the way to failed state status is not remote.  And, even though Yemen does not have the international sex appeal of Egypt, it remains a key venue in the Saudi Peninsula.  A failed Yemen would be a perfect launching point for both regional and global terror attacks by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and others of their ilk.  This is what makes Yemen important to the US--and even more so for states such as Saudi Arabia.

Before leaving for the day, it is only fair that a moment of silence be observed.  The moment of silence is on behalf of President Obama.  It has been terribly wrong for all these pro-reform, anti-status quo demonstrators dotting the Arab world to have raised their ugly heads and cause just now.  Mr Obama would much rather be focusing on his "Sputnik moment" and convincing Americans that they can have growth if and only if We the People "go green" en masse.  The poor clueless guy never expected this and wonders just what the hell he ever did to deserve this.

Hosni Mubarak, The Shah Of 2011?

Over the last couple of days as demonstrators, albeit in diminished numbers, took on the security forces of Egypt, the US has been issuing contradictory statements which are redolent of those made in 1979 in the weeks before the plug was pulled on the Shah of Iran.  Secretary of State Clinton, for example, has tacked between imploring the government of Hosni Mubarak to refrain from suppression and to seize the opportunity to meet the grievances of the demonstrators and averring that the Mubarak regime was "stable"--presumably even without granting ground on the demonstrators demands.

The "stability" of Mubarak's rule is identical to that of the late Shah's.  That is to say, it has the appearance of short term order being (mis)represented by Washington as the reality of long-term stability.  To err on the side of accuracy, it is not so much that the Deep Thinking Global Strategists of the current and prior administrations have simply represented the Egyptian government as stable over the long haul as they have inappropriately invested the regime with capacities it never has possessed.

During the Cold War this confusion of the autocrat's ability to impose and maintain public and political order on a day-to-day basis with the substance of long term stability based upon a perception of existential and functional legitimacy widely shared within the country's population drove most of the glaring errors of US foreign policy.  It was this confusion of the short and long term which joined the US shoulder and hip with the most distasteful dictators in the world.  When night fell as it must on each of these despicable creatures, a roster which includes the Shah, the legacy was one of profound anti-American sentiment which took firm hold not only on the new rulers but the population at large.

The long practice of supporting odious and repressive regimes simply because they assured Washington that the enemies of America were their enemies as well went on a (short) hiatus following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The rise of violent political Islam brought the Cold War golem out of the tomb and back into the policies of the US government.

Hosni Mubarak made the transition of Dictator Meriting American Support due to his anti-Soviet, anti-Communist stance to the new role of Dictator Meriting American Support because he was resolutely opposed to violent political Islam, at least the sort espoused by the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood.  Of course, ole Hosni had reinforced his position by carving a key if sometimes ambiguous role for himself in the Mideast Peace Process.  (You gotta admire professional competence even in the service of a rotten cause--the perpetuation of Rule By Hosni.)

It is necessary to recall that Mubarak came to power courtesy of a subscriber to violent political Islam having gunned down his predecessor Anwar Sadat thirty years ago.  Mubarak moved quickly and effectively to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood and other exponents of violent political Islam.  The jails, torture chambers, and graveyards were filled to capacity by Egyptians who either did or might have supported violent political Islam.  Since then Mubarak and his effective internal security organs have launched waves of repression separated by carefully calculated intervals of tolerance.

Many of the periodic tolerance festivals remind the observer of Mao's Let A Thousand Flowers Bloom campaign which encouraged dissent in order that all dissenters might expose themselves and subsequently be liquidated.  At the same time Mubarak did take measures which allowed followers of political Islam to engage in the allegedly semi-secular political life of Egypt.  This served to tie the Muslim Brotherhood to the government at least to a limited extent and gave the government some relief from public criticism as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood's highly effective social welfare programs.  (And, never forget, it gave additional opportunities for the several secret political police agencies to penetrate the Brotherhood and related entities with greater effect.)

All of this implies that Mubarak is a crafty and calculating political survivor.  His use of robust coercion, official terror as well as his willingness to rule by decree when such is either necessary or merely desirable show Hosni is one determined dude, determined to hold on to power by all means necessary be they fair or foul.  Taken together, these aspects of the Egyptian dictator's character indicate strongly that he is not going to exit the stage easily or gracefully despite his advanced years (he is on the wrong side of eighty) and less than splendid health.

There is no sign that the Egyptian army is likely to emulate its Tunisian equivalent.  Nor have the internal security police shown any suddenly developed sense of tender mercy or squeamishness.  Without defection by either or both of these instruments of state power, the probability of Mubarak acceding to the importuning of people power and getting on a jet plane to Saudi Arabia is very slim to none.

The dissidents are cranking up for another round of monster rallies on Friday following prayer services   These may be a real humdinger.  But, they will not mean the end of Hosni.

The anti-government movement is diffuse, lacking a national stature leader (although ElBaradie is headed back home from Vienna) and confined in the main to those meriting the loose sobriquet, "youth."  On the downside, Mohamad ElBaradei is lacking street cred due to his frequent and prolonged absences from Egypt since announcing his presidential candidacy, which impairs his status as a leader of the demonstrations and the movement of which they are the most dramatic sign.

Another very big unknown is the intention of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood has been on the sidelines.  Perhaps its leadership cadre has been taken by surprise but that seems unlikely.  Far more probable is the assessment that the Brotherhood is being cautious.  The leaders most probably do not expect the demonstrations to have any useful outcome beyond radicalizing an ever larger segment of the politically disaffiliated.  This means the Brotherhood will have a much larger potential recruitment pool in the months to come.

Another, less probable, motive for the Brotherhood's bystander posture is they are waiting for the main chance.  In the event that Mubarak does decide that a trip to Saudi Arabia is in his best interests, the Brotherhood will be in the catbird seat for a takeover bid.  The Brotherhood is very large, quite well organized, highly motivated, sufficiently financed, possesses tendrils nearly everywhere (including the armed forces), and can count on the support of the clerics and faculty of al-Azar university.  In short, it is the only entity in Egypt that can take control of the government.

The ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood to the seat of power in Egypt would be a very real nightmare for the Deep Thinkers of Global Strategy in Washington.  The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt could equal the mullahocracy of Iran as a sinister actor in the region and on the global stage.  From the perspective of either Israel or the US, the Muslim Brotherhood taking control of Egypt is a worst case scenario--on steroids.

There is not much the US government can do to directly influence events in Egypt in the short run.  And, there is not a whole lot more it can do in the longer term.  In a very real sense we chopped off our options when we climbed into bed with Mubarak back in the days following Camp David.  The perceived imperatives of the Cold War and the quest for Mideast peace pushed the US and Mubarak together in a marriage of mutual necessity.  When the Cold War ended, the continued search for the chimera of Arab-Israeli peace precluded ending the marriage.

The coming of Osama bin Laden and with him the challenge of violent political Islam prevented any sane and objective reassessment of the American support for the Egyptian autocrat.  We were stuck with him.  And, stuck with him today we remain.  Our least-worst option is to hope that (and in a low key way, assist) Mubarak remains in power.

Mubarak may be as unpalatable as cyanide but the Muslim Brotherhood would be much, much worse.  And, that, bucko, is all the choice we have.

Yo! Mr O! There Is A Whole World Out There, You Know--Or Do You?

In last night's yawn producing set of stitched together rerun snippets from past speeches, the POTUS spent barely ten percent of his numerous words on foreign policy.  This continues and, arguably expands, his well-established record of undervaluing US foreign relations.

Either the Nice Young Man From Chicago is unaware that foreign governments and opinion molders parse the annual Ain't-My-Administration-Great festival or he knows and cares not at all.  In either event the absence of foreign affairs constituted a species of unilateral disavowal of American status as a Great Power.

The casting aside of foreign relations other than pro forma mention of our getting out of Iraq, our fine troops in Afghanistan, and ritualistic condemnation of the usual adversary, Iran, sends a clear signal to the world that it and its petty problems fly below our president's radar.  His evident disengagement from the affairs of the world indicates to friend, foe, and uncommitted alike that the US has only the most limited interest in pursuing its own national interests.

The denial of the world comes at a moment during which a volatile and critical region of the world--the Arab Mideast and North Africa--seems to be lurching toward a tipping point which has the potential of being world historical in importance.  The "Jasmine Revolution" may or may not prove to be a permanent success for democracy of the bottom up sort.  But, its having occurred, the mere fact that a firmly entrenched authoritarian regime supported by not only the former colonial power, France, but the West generally was overthrown by popular demonstrations and the unwillingness of the armed forces to gun down their fellow citizens has set (literal) fire to similar movements in other countries, most importantly Egypt.

The silence of Mr Obama last night serves to continue his rejection of the assertive support of democracy by the Bush/Cheney administration beyond the point of absurdity into the venue of the counterproductive.  Admittedly the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/neocon ninnie notion of using armed invasion as a tool to foster democracy was a world class blunder, but that in no way discredited the necessity of promoting democracy by other means, particularly the support of indigenous tendencies or groups.

The administration appears to be possessed by the view that any open support by the US of any pro-democracy effort in any Arab or Muslim majority country will doom the effort to failure.  The Deep Thinkers of the administration took this position openly in the wake of the demonstrations against the mullahocracy and the stolen presidential election.  More recently the same cover was employed implicitly to excuse the hands-off position of the US during the run-up to the "Jasmine Revolution."

This contention is ludicrous on the face.  Interviews and opinion surveys have shown repeatedly that people throughout the world look to the US for support of democracy and the other features customarily associated with that form of government.  The same sources document the severe disappointment felt by people when the government of the US either fails to support democratic aspirations, or, worse, openly supports authoritarian regimes for reasons of state.

The situation which developed rapidly in Egypt yesterday cried out for a statement by the American president.   The demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere not only were the largest anti-government action in many decades, it also constituted a direct challenge to the US president and the policies of his administration.  The challenge was simply: On which side does the US stand?

The president and his administration have supported the thirty year rule of Hosni Mubarak both publicly and privately in recent weeks and days.  There are reasons of state policy which would appear to compel our linkage with and support for the Mubarak regime.  However, these reasons--the moribund Mideast "peace process" and combating violent political Islam--can be both overstated and, more importantly, overtaken by events.

The US has nailed its flag to the Egyptian mast ever since Cairo kicked the Soviets out and realigned (sort of) with the US.  This in turn led to the Camp David Accords and the "normalization" of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel.  The substance of the post-Camp David years has been much less than the promise or the appearance.  The most substantial benefits of the Egyptian realignment were, no surprise here, awarded to Egypt.  The US has tied its aid to Egypt to the aid furnished to Israel with results which have been profitable for the Cairo regime, to put it mildly.

As a "partner" with the US in the "global war on terror," Egypt has proven to be less obstreperous than Pakistan but not by much.  The Egyptian government has done little if any cooperation beyond its own borders while serving as a pointman for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (along with Pakistan) on the various proposals to restrict freedom of speech by means of a UN resolution intended to protect Islam against any perceived attack--including the truth about the religion.

Domestically the Egyptian government has shown itself less than eager to protect the basic rights of its Coptic Christian population against outrages at the hands of the Muslims.  To say that Cairo has sat on its hands as Copts were murdered is only to tell it like it has been--and will be.

Simultaneously the Mubarak regime has shown its willingness to pervert the processes of democratic elections to assure its hold on power.  The recent parliamentary election gave clear indications of having been even more bogus than its predecessors.  The long arm and very heavy hand of the internal security organs have been evermore in evidence such that Egypt of recent months has a strong resemblance to the Iraq of Saddam Hussein.

In short, Egypt has become a heavier liability for American interests and influence in the region.  Bluntly, the costs of linking us to Egypt have far outweighed the benefits by any rational calculus.

The spread of anti-government demonstrations across Egypt in the aftermath of the "Jasmine Revolution" have given the US a perfect opportunity to get on the right side of the political dynamic in Egypt.  The moment is all the more propitious in that so far the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, all advocates of political Islam including the violent sort, have not been at the forefront of events.  Indeed, the Brotherhood shows signs of having been caught by the same surprise as the government.

Had Mr Obama made even brief mention of the anti-government demonstrations, it would have done much to embolden the reformers in the street.  A favorable reference, even if of the most attenuated sort, would have gone far to broadening the base of support for the pro-democracy movement.  It might even have assured that the working class and small merchant segment of society would have been motivated to get off the sidelines and join with the demonstrators.

The "Jasmine Revolution": succeeded in large part because the workers of Tunisia along with the lower middle class linked with the unemployed university graduates to oppose the autocracy.  The same would be the case in Egypt, but only if the cautious came to believe that success and not simply death or torture would be the most probable outcome.  This sea change could have occurred if Mr Obama had only said a few kind and accurate words concerning events in Cairo earlier that day.

Admittedly, the architects of foreign policy like to be slow, cautious, incremental.  Diplomats tend to be conservative, prone to being opposed to boat rocking.  But, in the real world of real people with real hopes, fears, frustrations, and aspirations, fortune often favors the bold.  Events by their very magnitude and pace may preclude the endless rounds of interagency working groups, endless processes of staffing papers, of seeking approval up a never ending chain of command.

This is what happened in Tunisia.  It is what may be happening in Egypt.  It is what could happen in Iran.  The US foreign policy community by virtue of its size, complexity, and attendant inertia is ill-equipped to take proper advantage of fleeting opportunities.  The president is not so limited.  As Richard Nixon demonstrated, it is possible for a president to act quickly and take advantage of a changing international dynamic.

The situations in Tunisia and Egypt as in numerous other countries in the Arab and Muslim world are essential in the definition of what the US stands for as well as what it opposes.  When the US president is silent he concedes the field to the adherents of violent political Islam.  Losing is bad enough. Losing by default is even worse.

So get a grip on this: By his ignoring the world, particularly the unfolding drama in the Mideast, President Obama is losing by default.  Arguably, he is throwing the match.

The State of the Union Address is a perfect opportunity to tell the world just where the US stands, what it stands for, and to what it stands in opposition.  This is necessary for the stability of the world.  Staking a position is what Great Powers are expected to do.  And, whether or not Mr Obama and his ideological soulmates like the idea or repudiate it, the US is a Great Power.

So, Mr Obama, the message is simple: Act like you are the chief executive of a Great Power, in point of fact, the best of the Great Powers.  Anything less is to duck your personal "Sputnik moment."

Obama And Mubarak Bet On The Wrong Horse

While the reports on the meeting between Hosni Mubarak and President Obama are skimpy in the details department, one thing (other than the hyperbolic mutual congratulations) is apparent. Both men are wedded to the notion that a joint Hamas-Fatah run Palestinian Authority will be dominated by the older, larger group, Fatah. In this they are as wrong as a soup sandwich.

As laid out in a previous post, the most Islamist jihadist elements of both groups, particularly Hamas, are driving the political direction of the Palestinian movement generally and the PA in particular. The dynamic is well understood historically, and if not inevitable in the current situation, it is the next thing to that.

Further, there can be no doubt that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is a subsidiary of Iran. Neither the Iranians nor Hezbollah have made any bones about this. Nor, have either said that Hamas in independent of Tehran. Quite the contrary, Tehran has taken some credit for the success of Hamas. Thus the inference that Hamas is a tail being wagged by the Iranian dog is not the creation of Israeli paranoia or self-serving.

Egypt has much riding on the accomplishment of a Hamas-PA rapprochement, considering the time and political capital the Mubarak government has expended on the effort. While Egypt may benefit in some way by bringing the shotgun marriage of two unequal, unsuited for each other parties into existence, this does not mean the search for a comprehensive Mideast peace will benefit as well.

Even without the odious influence of the mullahocracy, the climate of loathing and religious justification for both the feeling and violent expressions based upon it do not bode well for any sort of peace. In a real sense too much blood has flowed over the dam during the past half century and more for hatred and the desire for revenge to be put on some faraway shelf in a back closet.

The Islamist jihadists within the Palestinian population as well as their similarly minded supporters elsewhere in the Mideast have shown the capacity to pile demand on top of demand until the Israelis have no choice beyond the stark one of rejection or accepting an existential risk. No government willingly has or will place its population at risk of attack, fear, and death (with the exception of Hamas which has a splendid record of doing just this.)

The road to peace, if there is any, does not run through Cairo. Nor does it run through Gaza. It doesn't even travel through the territories currently governed by the PA.

The route toward peace requires removing the outside support currently backing the Islamist jihadists of both Gaza and the West Bank. The Islamist jihadists must be isolated, marginalised, made trivial. This means their outside supporters--headed by Syria--have to be brought to the table.

As has been written here numerous times, Syria has the most to gain by making peace with Israel. Syria wants the Golan Heights. Period.

The US, the Obama administration, should immediately proceed to offer a deal to Syria: Drop your connections to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and we will put the Godzilla on Israel to hand back the Golan.

Then the Obama-ites have to do just that. Sure, the Israelis will scream like bloody murder as they want to keep the water and other resources of the Golan Heights. But, they have a lot to gain by giving up this particular segment of the Great Land Grab War of 1967--severing Syria from both Hezbollah and Hamas.

Without Syria the aid given by Iran to both terrorist groups will be rendered unimportant. The situation on the Lebanon front would be stabilized. (And, would be even more stable if US objections to Syrian "meddling" in Lebanon would be lowered.)

Without Syria the task of supplying and guiding Hamas would be made much more difficult for the mullahs of Iran. If Egypt were to get really, really serious about policing their side of the border with Hamastan, the flow of weapons and other deadly materials as well as much of Hamas' economic base would be reduced--greatly.

A further benefit could accrue to the US by brokering a deal with Syria and normalizing our relations with the country. Syria would respond by upping their efforts to control their side of the Syria-Iraq border which would put something of a crimp in the recent wave of (probable) Sunni executed bombing attacks in Baghdad and elsewhere.

Not bad, eh, bucko?

The fundamental problem of President Obama's current tactics in the Mideast is his propensity for putting pressure on Israel over the wrong "settlements"--and his willingness to back the wrong main man in the Arab states.

Hosni Mubarak is not the correct man right now. In a real sense his day is past.

Bashir al-Assad is the right man, right now. His day is on us. We need only to realize and act upon this fact. His role in the securing of Mideast peace is critical.

Of course, it is legitimate to wonder if the Obama administration has the wit to recognize this.