Political revolutions, even those which are (relatively) nonviolent, have clocks. This has to be realized not only by the status quo regime--which, of course, has its own clock--but outsiders. The outsiders have clocks as well, but their timepieces are the slowest running of all.
The people on the streets, the actual fomentors of revolution, the people who have the most direct emotional and physical investment in the process of change, run on clocks which tick very, very fast. On the street, riding the waves of uncertainty, fear and hope, a standard hour is longer than Christmas Eve to a five year old; a week becomes an unimaginable extent of geological time and months, an unacceptable eternity.
The effect of the fast time mentality has been highly visible in Cairo's Tahir Square, the epicenter of seismic political shock in Egypt. To the assembled demonstrators, and, in high probability, to others of similar mind connected to the square by television, cell phones, and the Internet, the idea of having Hosni Mubarak soldier on to the end of his current term as president is akin to waiting for the end of the universe. It may be coming, but not in a time frame that any can accept.
The same dynamic was evident in Tunisia. The fast clock phenomenon was at work each and every time the status quo offered some temporizing compromise. No one in the midst of the emotional tsunami which crested in Tunisia could abide the idea of keeping on the crest of change without the orgasm of final relief--the exit of Ben Ali. The same sort of ejaculatory inevitability has grabbed the minds and bodies of the footsoldiers of change in Egypt.
Leaders, whether of the opposition or the status quo, are but dimly aware of the driving imperative at work in the minds and glands of the thousands of disaffiliated people in or connected with Tahir Square. Outsiders, the politicians and diplomats of countries ranging from the US to Europe, are also not truly appreciative of the fast time process as they call for an orderly transition and the time required for this to happen.
This implies that the most critical conflict unfolding in the Egyptian Crisis is that between the clocks of the protesters and the outsiders in search of effective influence on the unfolding of events. At base this conflict is irreconcilable.
The position of the US is both easy to understand and defend. The probability of a too rapid removal of Hosni Mubarak resulting in a species of chaos easily exploited by advocates of political Islam as well as national entities such as Iran which support these groups is high. At the same time it is necessary to caution that the anxieties regarding the hijacking of revolution by the adherents of violent political Islam can be overstated with ease. Mubarak has done so. So has Benjamin Netanyahu. Up until a couple of days ago so had President Obama.
Reinforcing the argument in favor of "deliberate speed" is the absence of a clearly acceptable consensual choice of leader by the assorted opposition elements. Given that the powerhouse of the uprising has been the existence of self-organizing, predominantly youthful, assemblages of the discontented and the disaffected, the leadership problem is inherently pronounced. The entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood to the open opposition has done nothing to clarify the leadership haze. Nor has the direct participation of old line opposition political parties.
Mohamad ElBaradei offered himself as leader. The offer was accepted by a broad assortment of opposition groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, but that did not make it so. As any number of demonstrators quoted in the international media have made clear, ElBaradei is not their choice. More, many of those quoted, have seen ElBaradei as part of the old guard or self-interested and remote from the Egyptian realities. It is easy to get the impression that the several high profile meetings between ElBaradei and other "leaders" of the opposition groups are somehow not relevant to the dynamics in the Square.
One of the major problems of this leadership vacuum is the meetings, the declarations, the demands, the pre-conditions (such as Mubarak must leave before negotiations on the future commence) all combine to accelerate the already fast running clocks in the Square. Meetings of opposition figures like the demands and dictates create an expectation of success--success being defined by the demonstrators as the sight of Hosni Mubarak getting on a plane.
When no success is seen, the almost inevitable result is an increase in both frustration and action predicated upon frustration. This, unsurprisingly, means an escalation in violence and concomitant hardening in the positions of both demonstrators and status quo. This, undoubtedly, is what the perpetual bad boys of the world in Tehran and their proxies in Egypt are hoping and working for.
A drastic increase in disorder will force the hand of the army. Either the army will have to crack down and do so hard and fast, or its leaders will have to tell Hosni the time to leave has come while deciding who among the opposition the army will choose as transitional leader.
The army would risk very, very much should its leadership order the use of force against the demonstrators. Not only would it risk its own junior officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel disobeying the order, it would put in hazard its treasured place as the ultimate guarantee of legitimacy for state and regime alike.
Of course, it is unlikely that repression would do more than buy some time at a very high price. It would not put the incubus of radical political change back in some sealed bottle. Rather, repression would assure the incubus would reemerge bigger and badder in not too many months--at the longest. It is most likely that repression would do little other than make the clocks on the street run faster.
It is far safer, albeit harder emotionally, for the senior military leadership to tell Hosni that the game is over. Should it do so and then offer a high visibility and evidently responsible position to a person well known in the ranks of the opposition as an honest and effective politician, the act would serve to slow the clocks in the Square by giving a very real, quite substantial success to the demonstrators and their supporters. It would bode well to slow the clocks of Tahir Square to a point they mesh with the always slow watches of the West.
There is even a good choice for the position of politician as army partner. That choice is not Mohamad ElBaredei. He is neither well enough known nor trusted by the army--or many of the opposition. The post of political partner can best be filled by one time foreign minister and more recently head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. Moussa has long been a relatively charismatic politician well known not to be a line hewing partisan of Mubara even though he was Hosni's ForMin for much of the Nineties.
Mubarak finally chaffed with Moussa's fits of independence as well as his growing popularity. The dictator then shelved Moussa over at the Arab League. His years as foreign minister as well as head of the League mean Moussa is a known and respected commodity internationally as well as in the region. His appearance in the Square yesterday brought enough cheers to indicate he has not lost his luster with the street.
While the current vice-president, Omar Suleiman, is not acceptable to the fast clock folk in the Square, the addition of Amr Moussa to the ticket might be sufficient. While the army may not be as happy with Moussa as they are with Suleiman who is, after all, one of their own, they may be persuaded to accept the duo. At the least, Moussa is better than ElBaradei and, certainly no flaming Islamist.
If President Obama gets over his snit with the spooks for not having gotten Tunisia and Egypt perfectly right in their prognostications (who did?) and his pretense that he has gotten out in front of events in Cairo, he and his foreign policy "team" might take a close look at how the army can bring the opposition on board, smooth Hosni's (rapid) departure, and slow down the clocks in the Square. As those clocks tick, they are counting down the seconds to genuine disaster and they will not slow by themselves.
Showing posts with label Riots In Egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Riots In Egypt. Show all posts
Saturday, February 5, 2011
Sunday, January 30, 2011
The Army Is Egypt's Last, Best Hope
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has upped the ante in the Egyptian Crisis. She was all over Sunday morning talking heads shows with a clear message for Hosni Mubarak--and the opposition. While she did not directly call for the aging dictator (with apologies to Joe Biden) to step down, she made it as plain as the pyramids that his days were numbered and the number isn't a big one.
In her statements Ms Clinton ran ahead of President Obama which is a good thing. The president as is his wont has been too cautious, too ambiguous, too noncommittal, too, in a word, academic in his public statements. And, get a grip on this, it is the public voice which matters most with the Egyptians in the street. As has been reported all over the MSM of the English speaking world, the newly empowered Egyptian street has been demanding a loud, unmistakable message from the US. Are we Americans on the side of the opposition or are we locked in a death embrace with the current regime?
From the statements oozing out of the Oval the answer is not clear. The Clinton posture is more so, but, arguably not sufficient. It would be most helpful both to the Egyptians and to American policy interests in the region if Ms Clinton received backup from Secretary of Defense Gates. The US provides over a billion dollars a year in military assistance to Egypt and, as a result, has very good ties with the senior and mid-level officers of the Egyptian armed forces. If Gates were to come out with a public statement backing the army as the necessary transitional presence, it would go a long way to assuring the army would do the right thing.
In this case, the right thing consists of impartially maintaining order. So far all reports indicate that the army has been doing just this. The forces deployed in Cairo and elsewhere have not taken robust (or any perceptible) action against the demonstrators but, rather, have shown sympathy with the cause of reform/regime change. This means nothing has happened yet to impair the prestige which the army enjoys with the mass of the Egyptian people. Quite unlike the massively despised police forces, the army enjoys a high measure of support and is viewed by many on the street as the ultimate guarantor of Egyptian identity and pride.
No observer can conclude that any outcome which does not feature the departure of Mubarak is conceivable. There is no certainty about what will transpire after Hosni and company depart. The possibilities include a reasonably fair, honest, and open election occurring on or about the date already scheduled. They also include the nightmare outcome of chaos, chaos which tosses up the Muslim Brotherhood to power.
The best way of bending events closer to the first rather than the second outcome hinges on the Egyptian army. As long as the men and officers of the army see that they and their organization are lionized by the mass of the citizenry for playing a fair game, the blandishments of the Muslim Brotherhood--which includes their adherents within the armed forces--will be lessened. By acting as an impartial honest broker, by maintaining order, by not seeming to favor either the current regime or the radicals of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a better than even chance that a semblance of a fair presidential election can take place.
The problem with an election, of course, resides in the absence of a high profile non-Islamist candidate. The former director of the IAEA, Mohamad ElBaradei, comes closest to filling this niche. The unfortunate reality is he is much better known outside of Egypt than he is within. Except for the percentage of the Egyptian population which is tied into international affairs, ElBaradei is very much an unknown quantity. This translates into a strong chance that he could be defeated by a better known personality who is backed by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Again, it would be the army which would have to carry the freight of preventing a takeover by the Brotherhood. The reality which must be understood by the army at all levels is simply that a Muslim Brotherhood run Egypt would become a danger not only to the region but the world. As such, the group, as an advocate of armed political Islam, would be a very real danger to Egypt itself. In its role as ultimate repository of Egyptian sovereignty and identity, the army would have to act to prevent this internal threat--or by failing to do so consign Egypt to the status of pariah.
The US and other Western countries have made one major mistake after another in dealing with Mubarak over the past couple of decades. Out of a superabundance of concern for the sensitivities and cooperation of the regime, one American administration after another has refused to put any credible pressure on Mubarak to undertake real, albeit gradual reforms. Rather, in pursuit of compelling but short-term policy interests, the US has made only the softest of noises, the most gentle of nudges. Not surprisingly, all have been ignored in Cairo.
The best chance of recovering from this unblemished record of error resides with the leverage provided by the high level of US support for the army. The time has come for the US to cash in on the mass of IOUs piled up over the years. This requires not only the correct sort of public statements regarding the necessity of regime change but also blunt talk behind the scenes to the senior and mid-level officer corps. Not only must these men be made aware of the consequences which would ensue should the Muslim Brotherhood come to power either directly or by proxy but also should be reminded that the bastion of national identity and sovereignty has been the army in Muslim majority countries ranging from Turkey to Algeria to, most recently, Tunisia.
Thirty plus years ago the Carter administration wrote the book on how not to deal with internally driven radical regime change. Among the courses of action not taken by the feckless Carter and his team of foreign policy midgets was insisting that the Iranian army, a creation of American largess, play the role of stability maintainer. There was no insistence, not even the mildest suggestion, that while the Shah may have to go, the primary responsibility of the armed forces was that of keeping the change within internationally acceptable limits.
The statements by Secretary Clinton a couple of weeks ago as well as today show that at least one member of the current administration is not given to the blindness of the Carter days. One can only hope she is not alone in this.
In her statements Ms Clinton ran ahead of President Obama which is a good thing. The president as is his wont has been too cautious, too ambiguous, too noncommittal, too, in a word, academic in his public statements. And, get a grip on this, it is the public voice which matters most with the Egyptians in the street. As has been reported all over the MSM of the English speaking world, the newly empowered Egyptian street has been demanding a loud, unmistakable message from the US. Are we Americans on the side of the opposition or are we locked in a death embrace with the current regime?
From the statements oozing out of the Oval the answer is not clear. The Clinton posture is more so, but, arguably not sufficient. It would be most helpful both to the Egyptians and to American policy interests in the region if Ms Clinton received backup from Secretary of Defense Gates. The US provides over a billion dollars a year in military assistance to Egypt and, as a result, has very good ties with the senior and mid-level officers of the Egyptian armed forces. If Gates were to come out with a public statement backing the army as the necessary transitional presence, it would go a long way to assuring the army would do the right thing.
In this case, the right thing consists of impartially maintaining order. So far all reports indicate that the army has been doing just this. The forces deployed in Cairo and elsewhere have not taken robust (or any perceptible) action against the demonstrators but, rather, have shown sympathy with the cause of reform/regime change. This means nothing has happened yet to impair the prestige which the army enjoys with the mass of the Egyptian people. Quite unlike the massively despised police forces, the army enjoys a high measure of support and is viewed by many on the street as the ultimate guarantor of Egyptian identity and pride.
No observer can conclude that any outcome which does not feature the departure of Mubarak is conceivable. There is no certainty about what will transpire after Hosni and company depart. The possibilities include a reasonably fair, honest, and open election occurring on or about the date already scheduled. They also include the nightmare outcome of chaos, chaos which tosses up the Muslim Brotherhood to power.
The best way of bending events closer to the first rather than the second outcome hinges on the Egyptian army. As long as the men and officers of the army see that they and their organization are lionized by the mass of the citizenry for playing a fair game, the blandishments of the Muslim Brotherhood--which includes their adherents within the armed forces--will be lessened. By acting as an impartial honest broker, by maintaining order, by not seeming to favor either the current regime or the radicals of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a better than even chance that a semblance of a fair presidential election can take place.
The problem with an election, of course, resides in the absence of a high profile non-Islamist candidate. The former director of the IAEA, Mohamad ElBaradei, comes closest to filling this niche. The unfortunate reality is he is much better known outside of Egypt than he is within. Except for the percentage of the Egyptian population which is tied into international affairs, ElBaradei is very much an unknown quantity. This translates into a strong chance that he could be defeated by a better known personality who is backed by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Again, it would be the army which would have to carry the freight of preventing a takeover by the Brotherhood. The reality which must be understood by the army at all levels is simply that a Muslim Brotherhood run Egypt would become a danger not only to the region but the world. As such, the group, as an advocate of armed political Islam, would be a very real danger to Egypt itself. In its role as ultimate repository of Egyptian sovereignty and identity, the army would have to act to prevent this internal threat--or by failing to do so consign Egypt to the status of pariah.
The US and other Western countries have made one major mistake after another in dealing with Mubarak over the past couple of decades. Out of a superabundance of concern for the sensitivities and cooperation of the regime, one American administration after another has refused to put any credible pressure on Mubarak to undertake real, albeit gradual reforms. Rather, in pursuit of compelling but short-term policy interests, the US has made only the softest of noises, the most gentle of nudges. Not surprisingly, all have been ignored in Cairo.
The best chance of recovering from this unblemished record of error resides with the leverage provided by the high level of US support for the army. The time has come for the US to cash in on the mass of IOUs piled up over the years. This requires not only the correct sort of public statements regarding the necessity of regime change but also blunt talk behind the scenes to the senior and mid-level officer corps. Not only must these men be made aware of the consequences which would ensue should the Muslim Brotherhood come to power either directly or by proxy but also should be reminded that the bastion of national identity and sovereignty has been the army in Muslim majority countries ranging from Turkey to Algeria to, most recently, Tunisia.
Thirty plus years ago the Carter administration wrote the book on how not to deal with internally driven radical regime change. Among the courses of action not taken by the feckless Carter and his team of foreign policy midgets was insisting that the Iranian army, a creation of American largess, play the role of stability maintainer. There was no insistence, not even the mildest suggestion, that while the Shah may have to go, the primary responsibility of the armed forces was that of keeping the change within internationally acceptable limits.
The statements by Secretary Clinton a couple of weeks ago as well as today show that at least one member of the current administration is not given to the blindness of the Carter days. One can only hope she is not alone in this.
Friday, January 28, 2011
Hardball In Egypt And Yemen Goes A Bit More Down The Tube
As expected, the anti-government demonstrators took to the streets in large numbers following Friday prayers. In an important change the Muslim Brotherhood got off the sideline fence and came down on the side of the demonstrators. This may mean the leadership cadre has concluded the anti-regime movement has a chance of winning. Or it may indicate simply an unwillingness for the Brotherhood not to get its fair share of abuse during the protests and concomitant crackdown.
Also without surprise was the decision of the Mubarak regime to order the army into the fray with instructions to support the police. This may mean a tipping point will shortly arrive. While the army has been sent on riot control duty twice before during the Mubarak years--once to quell the bread riots and once to suppress a strike by police--it has not fired upon Egyptian civilians during the thirty years of Murbarak's rule nor during the terms of this two predecessors.
The big unknown is simply what will be the response of the senior army commanders--or the snuffies in the streets when--or if--the order to open fire is given. The entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood into the contest complicates answering this question as the Brotherhood has significant support within both the enlisted men and junior officers of the Egyptian armed forces. This reality implies that there may be a split between the senior leadership and those down the food chain should the Mubarak dictatorship order the use of live fire on demonstrators for any purpose other than immediate self-defense.
If the high command refuses the order or--as is more likely--the men with guns down on the streets say, "Hell, no!" the days of the Mubarak regime are numbered. And the number will not be a large one. The governing ground truth in this is that while the internal security police have a vested interest in the continuation in the status quo, the army below the most exalted levels has no such motivation.
In addition to dispatching the army "in aid of the civil power," the regime has taken other measures. It is widely known that Egypt has ceased to exist in the world of internet. It is equally well known that Egypt has blocked mobile phone service. These moves will cripple the capacity of the anti-government demonstrators to enlist the understanding and support of foreigners. To a lesser extent it impairs the ability of the demonstrators to organize their efforts.
Beyond the blocking of internet and mobile phone services, the government has mounted a wave of preventative arrests. Among those either detained or put under house arrests are leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamad ElBaradei. The former head of the IAEA and current presidential candidate was placed under house arrest only hours after he returned from Vienna with the announced intent of joining with the demonstrations and sharing the fate of the demonstrators.
The arrests and blocking orders are not fatal to the anti-government movement. In fact the arrests may rebound against the interests of the Mubarak regime by granting status to both the Brotherhood and Mr AlBaradei.
While these events were taking place, the Obama administration continued its imitation of their Carter days predecessors during the fateful days of 1979. The Secretary of State like the President have made all the usual boilerplate appeals for peace, non-violence, the universal rights of Egyptian citizens, the desirability of reform, of transparency, of democracy, of yadda-yadda. This can be seen either as a statesmenlike detachment of the US from the internal affairs of a sensitive Arab state or the clueless act of an administration adrift at the policy level.
The demonstrators know the US is involved in the demonstrations as tear gas projectiles clearly marked "Made in the USA" are littering the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities. This is the dismal consequence of the years of American military aid. Unless the US administration undertakes some form of compensatory action, the narrative of a Mubarak-USA linkage will be developed from the fragments of tear gas canisters. In the estimate of most people, physical evidence trumps distant, diplomatic verbiage.
President Obama has convened his ":foreign policy team" for discussions of the events on the streets of Egypt. Well, ain't that something? A question for the "team:" Is Joe Biden representing your official view when he dissented from characterizing Mubarak as a "dictator?"
As soon as the "team" has decided if Biden was right, it must consider a very alarming situation: Right now the only factor separating the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt is the stance of the Egyptian army. Specifically, what is the army likely to do if given the order to shoot on demonstrators--Shoot, don't shoot or shoot on the police? That is the single most important subject for the "team" and president to consider. It is also the issue they must get right or pay the consequences should we get it wrong.
The administration must take a stance on the matter of the army pulling the trigger. There is every probability that the Egyptian government either has or will shortly test American support for a use of force order. Even if Mubarak does not order use of force, it is inevitable that should the army open fire, a narrative emphasizing US support for the status quo and therefore responsibility for any army inflicted bloodshed will explode across the Arab world.
Should the opposite happen--should for example, the army in the field oppose the police and take sides with the demonstrators, the administration best consider what, if anything, can be done to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power, either de facto or de jure. The emergence of the Brotherhood to power would exceed the impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution as the Brotherhood has branches or subsidiaries around the world in Muslim and non-Muslim states as well as an outward looking stance infinitely broader than that possessed by the Iranian clerical establishment.
While the Deep Strategic Thinkers of the administration are meeting they might spend a few nanoseconds reviewing the situation in Yemen. The "Jasmine Revolution" has inspired an offshoot movement in Yemen which has sponsored demonstrations in the capital of Yemen, Saana, the other day. It is unclear at the moment if the demonstrators want to end the current regime or gain some reforms. In either event, the demonstrations add one more facet to the deeply fractured and desperately poor country. The divisions are so profound, the rivals for power so extreme, that any change in the status quo would be in the direction of making Yemen a failed state.
The strong possibility of Yemen going all the way to failed state status is not remote. And, even though Yemen does not have the international sex appeal of Egypt, it remains a key venue in the Saudi Peninsula. A failed Yemen would be a perfect launching point for both regional and global terror attacks by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and others of their ilk. This is what makes Yemen important to the US--and even more so for states such as Saudi Arabia.
Before leaving for the day, it is only fair that a moment of silence be observed. The moment of silence is on behalf of President Obama. It has been terribly wrong for all these pro-reform, anti-status quo demonstrators dotting the Arab world to have raised their ugly heads and cause just now. Mr Obama would much rather be focusing on his "Sputnik moment" and convincing Americans that they can have growth if and only if We the People "go green" en masse. The poor clueless guy never expected this and wonders just what the hell he ever did to deserve this.
Also without surprise was the decision of the Mubarak regime to order the army into the fray with instructions to support the police. This may mean a tipping point will shortly arrive. While the army has been sent on riot control duty twice before during the Mubarak years--once to quell the bread riots and once to suppress a strike by police--it has not fired upon Egyptian civilians during the thirty years of Murbarak's rule nor during the terms of this two predecessors.
The big unknown is simply what will be the response of the senior army commanders--or the snuffies in the streets when--or if--the order to open fire is given. The entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood into the contest complicates answering this question as the Brotherhood has significant support within both the enlisted men and junior officers of the Egyptian armed forces. This reality implies that there may be a split between the senior leadership and those down the food chain should the Mubarak dictatorship order the use of live fire on demonstrators for any purpose other than immediate self-defense.
If the high command refuses the order or--as is more likely--the men with guns down on the streets say, "Hell, no!" the days of the Mubarak regime are numbered. And the number will not be a large one. The governing ground truth in this is that while the internal security police have a vested interest in the continuation in the status quo, the army below the most exalted levels has no such motivation.
In addition to dispatching the army "in aid of the civil power," the regime has taken other measures. It is widely known that Egypt has ceased to exist in the world of internet. It is equally well known that Egypt has blocked mobile phone service. These moves will cripple the capacity of the anti-government demonstrators to enlist the understanding and support of foreigners. To a lesser extent it impairs the ability of the demonstrators to organize their efforts.
Beyond the blocking of internet and mobile phone services, the government has mounted a wave of preventative arrests. Among those either detained or put under house arrests are leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamad ElBaradei. The former head of the IAEA and current presidential candidate was placed under house arrest only hours after he returned from Vienna with the announced intent of joining with the demonstrations and sharing the fate of the demonstrators.
The arrests and blocking orders are not fatal to the anti-government movement. In fact the arrests may rebound against the interests of the Mubarak regime by granting status to both the Brotherhood and Mr AlBaradei.
While these events were taking place, the Obama administration continued its imitation of their Carter days predecessors during the fateful days of 1979. The Secretary of State like the President have made all the usual boilerplate appeals for peace, non-violence, the universal rights of Egyptian citizens, the desirability of reform, of transparency, of democracy, of yadda-yadda. This can be seen either as a statesmenlike detachment of the US from the internal affairs of a sensitive Arab state or the clueless act of an administration adrift at the policy level.
The demonstrators know the US is involved in the demonstrations as tear gas projectiles clearly marked "Made in the USA" are littering the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities. This is the dismal consequence of the years of American military aid. Unless the US administration undertakes some form of compensatory action, the narrative of a Mubarak-USA linkage will be developed from the fragments of tear gas canisters. In the estimate of most people, physical evidence trumps distant, diplomatic verbiage.
President Obama has convened his ":foreign policy team" for discussions of the events on the streets of Egypt. Well, ain't that something? A question for the "team:" Is Joe Biden representing your official view when he dissented from characterizing Mubarak as a "dictator?"
As soon as the "team" has decided if Biden was right, it must consider a very alarming situation: Right now the only factor separating the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt is the stance of the Egyptian army. Specifically, what is the army likely to do if given the order to shoot on demonstrators--Shoot, don't shoot or shoot on the police? That is the single most important subject for the "team" and president to consider. It is also the issue they must get right or pay the consequences should we get it wrong.
The administration must take a stance on the matter of the army pulling the trigger. There is every probability that the Egyptian government either has or will shortly test American support for a use of force order. Even if Mubarak does not order use of force, it is inevitable that should the army open fire, a narrative emphasizing US support for the status quo and therefore responsibility for any army inflicted bloodshed will explode across the Arab world.
Should the opposite happen--should for example, the army in the field oppose the police and take sides with the demonstrators, the administration best consider what, if anything, can be done to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power, either de facto or de jure. The emergence of the Brotherhood to power would exceed the impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution as the Brotherhood has branches or subsidiaries around the world in Muslim and non-Muslim states as well as an outward looking stance infinitely broader than that possessed by the Iranian clerical establishment.
While the Deep Strategic Thinkers of the administration are meeting they might spend a few nanoseconds reviewing the situation in Yemen. The "Jasmine Revolution" has inspired an offshoot movement in Yemen which has sponsored demonstrations in the capital of Yemen, Saana, the other day. It is unclear at the moment if the demonstrators want to end the current regime or gain some reforms. In either event, the demonstrations add one more facet to the deeply fractured and desperately poor country. The divisions are so profound, the rivals for power so extreme, that any change in the status quo would be in the direction of making Yemen a failed state.
The strong possibility of Yemen going all the way to failed state status is not remote. And, even though Yemen does not have the international sex appeal of Egypt, it remains a key venue in the Saudi Peninsula. A failed Yemen would be a perfect launching point for both regional and global terror attacks by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and others of their ilk. This is what makes Yemen important to the US--and even more so for states such as Saudi Arabia.
Before leaving for the day, it is only fair that a moment of silence be observed. The moment of silence is on behalf of President Obama. It has been terribly wrong for all these pro-reform, anti-status quo demonstrators dotting the Arab world to have raised their ugly heads and cause just now. Mr Obama would much rather be focusing on his "Sputnik moment" and convincing Americans that they can have growth if and only if We the People "go green" en masse. The poor clueless guy never expected this and wonders just what the hell he ever did to deserve this.
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Hosni Mubarak, The Shah Of 2011?
Over the last couple of days as demonstrators, albeit in diminished numbers, took on the security forces of Egypt, the US has been issuing contradictory statements which are redolent of those made in 1979 in the weeks before the plug was pulled on the Shah of Iran. Secretary of State Clinton, for example, has tacked between imploring the government of Hosni Mubarak to refrain from suppression and to seize the opportunity to meet the grievances of the demonstrators and averring that the Mubarak regime was "stable"--presumably even without granting ground on the demonstrators demands.
The "stability" of Mubarak's rule is identical to that of the late Shah's. That is to say, it has the appearance of short term order being (mis)represented by Washington as the reality of long-term stability. To err on the side of accuracy, it is not so much that the Deep Thinking Global Strategists of the current and prior administrations have simply represented the Egyptian government as stable over the long haul as they have inappropriately invested the regime with capacities it never has possessed.
During the Cold War this confusion of the autocrat's ability to impose and maintain public and political order on a day-to-day basis with the substance of long term stability based upon a perception of existential and functional legitimacy widely shared within the country's population drove most of the glaring errors of US foreign policy. It was this confusion of the short and long term which joined the US shoulder and hip with the most distasteful dictators in the world. When night fell as it must on each of these despicable creatures, a roster which includes the Shah, the legacy was one of profound anti-American sentiment which took firm hold not only on the new rulers but the population at large.
The long practice of supporting odious and repressive regimes simply because they assured Washington that the enemies of America were their enemies as well went on a (short) hiatus following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rise of violent political Islam brought the Cold War golem out of the tomb and back into the policies of the US government.
Hosni Mubarak made the transition of Dictator Meriting American Support due to his anti-Soviet, anti-Communist stance to the new role of Dictator Meriting American Support because he was resolutely opposed to violent political Islam, at least the sort espoused by the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood. Of course, ole Hosni had reinforced his position by carving a key if sometimes ambiguous role for himself in the Mideast Peace Process. (You gotta admire professional competence even in the service of a rotten cause--the perpetuation of Rule By Hosni.)
It is necessary to recall that Mubarak came to power courtesy of a subscriber to violent political Islam having gunned down his predecessor Anwar Sadat thirty years ago. Mubarak moved quickly and effectively to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood and other exponents of violent political Islam. The jails, torture chambers, and graveyards were filled to capacity by Egyptians who either did or might have supported violent political Islam. Since then Mubarak and his effective internal security organs have launched waves of repression separated by carefully calculated intervals of tolerance.
Many of the periodic tolerance festivals remind the observer of Mao's Let A Thousand Flowers Bloom campaign which encouraged dissent in order that all dissenters might expose themselves and subsequently be liquidated. At the same time Mubarak did take measures which allowed followers of political Islam to engage in the allegedly semi-secular political life of Egypt. This served to tie the Muslim Brotherhood to the government at least to a limited extent and gave the government some relief from public criticism as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood's highly effective social welfare programs. (And, never forget, it gave additional opportunities for the several secret political police agencies to penetrate the Brotherhood and related entities with greater effect.)
All of this implies that Mubarak is a crafty and calculating political survivor. His use of robust coercion, official terror as well as his willingness to rule by decree when such is either necessary or merely desirable show Hosni is one determined dude, determined to hold on to power by all means necessary be they fair or foul. Taken together, these aspects of the Egyptian dictator's character indicate strongly that he is not going to exit the stage easily or gracefully despite his advanced years (he is on the wrong side of eighty) and less than splendid health.
There is no sign that the Egyptian army is likely to emulate its Tunisian equivalent. Nor have the internal security police shown any suddenly developed sense of tender mercy or squeamishness. Without defection by either or both of these instruments of state power, the probability of Mubarak acceding to the importuning of people power and getting on a jet plane to Saudi Arabia is very slim to none.
The dissidents are cranking up for another round of monster rallies on Friday following prayer services These may be a real humdinger. But, they will not mean the end of Hosni.
The anti-government movement is diffuse, lacking a national stature leader (although ElBaradie is headed back home from Vienna) and confined in the main to those meriting the loose sobriquet, "youth." On the downside, Mohamad ElBaradei is lacking street cred due to his frequent and prolonged absences from Egypt since announcing his presidential candidacy, which impairs his status as a leader of the demonstrations and the movement of which they are the most dramatic sign.
Another very big unknown is the intention of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has been on the sidelines. Perhaps its leadership cadre has been taken by surprise but that seems unlikely. Far more probable is the assessment that the Brotherhood is being cautious. The leaders most probably do not expect the demonstrations to have any useful outcome beyond radicalizing an ever larger segment of the politically disaffiliated. This means the Brotherhood will have a much larger potential recruitment pool in the months to come.
Another, less probable, motive for the Brotherhood's bystander posture is they are waiting for the main chance. In the event that Mubarak does decide that a trip to Saudi Arabia is in his best interests, the Brotherhood will be in the catbird seat for a takeover bid. The Brotherhood is very large, quite well organized, highly motivated, sufficiently financed, possesses tendrils nearly everywhere (including the armed forces), and can count on the support of the clerics and faculty of al-Azar university. In short, it is the only entity in Egypt that can take control of the government.
The ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood to the seat of power in Egypt would be a very real nightmare for the Deep Thinkers of Global Strategy in Washington. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt could equal the mullahocracy of Iran as a sinister actor in the region and on the global stage. From the perspective of either Israel or the US, the Muslim Brotherhood taking control of Egypt is a worst case scenario--on steroids.
There is not much the US government can do to directly influence events in Egypt in the short run. And, there is not a whole lot more it can do in the longer term. In a very real sense we chopped off our options when we climbed into bed with Mubarak back in the days following Camp David. The perceived imperatives of the Cold War and the quest for Mideast peace pushed the US and Mubarak together in a marriage of mutual necessity. When the Cold War ended, the continued search for the chimera of Arab-Israeli peace precluded ending the marriage.
The coming of Osama bin Laden and with him the challenge of violent political Islam prevented any sane and objective reassessment of the American support for the Egyptian autocrat. We were stuck with him. And, stuck with him today we remain. Our least-worst option is to hope that (and in a low key way, assist) Mubarak remains in power.
Mubarak may be as unpalatable as cyanide but the Muslim Brotherhood would be much, much worse. And, that, bucko, is all the choice we have.
The "stability" of Mubarak's rule is identical to that of the late Shah's. That is to say, it has the appearance of short term order being (mis)represented by Washington as the reality of long-term stability. To err on the side of accuracy, it is not so much that the Deep Thinking Global Strategists of the current and prior administrations have simply represented the Egyptian government as stable over the long haul as they have inappropriately invested the regime with capacities it never has possessed.
During the Cold War this confusion of the autocrat's ability to impose and maintain public and political order on a day-to-day basis with the substance of long term stability based upon a perception of existential and functional legitimacy widely shared within the country's population drove most of the glaring errors of US foreign policy. It was this confusion of the short and long term which joined the US shoulder and hip with the most distasteful dictators in the world. When night fell as it must on each of these despicable creatures, a roster which includes the Shah, the legacy was one of profound anti-American sentiment which took firm hold not only on the new rulers but the population at large.
The long practice of supporting odious and repressive regimes simply because they assured Washington that the enemies of America were their enemies as well went on a (short) hiatus following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rise of violent political Islam brought the Cold War golem out of the tomb and back into the policies of the US government.
Hosni Mubarak made the transition of Dictator Meriting American Support due to his anti-Soviet, anti-Communist stance to the new role of Dictator Meriting American Support because he was resolutely opposed to violent political Islam, at least the sort espoused by the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood. Of course, ole Hosni had reinforced his position by carving a key if sometimes ambiguous role for himself in the Mideast Peace Process. (You gotta admire professional competence even in the service of a rotten cause--the perpetuation of Rule By Hosni.)
It is necessary to recall that Mubarak came to power courtesy of a subscriber to violent political Islam having gunned down his predecessor Anwar Sadat thirty years ago. Mubarak moved quickly and effectively to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood and other exponents of violent political Islam. The jails, torture chambers, and graveyards were filled to capacity by Egyptians who either did or might have supported violent political Islam. Since then Mubarak and his effective internal security organs have launched waves of repression separated by carefully calculated intervals of tolerance.
Many of the periodic tolerance festivals remind the observer of Mao's Let A Thousand Flowers Bloom campaign which encouraged dissent in order that all dissenters might expose themselves and subsequently be liquidated. At the same time Mubarak did take measures which allowed followers of political Islam to engage in the allegedly semi-secular political life of Egypt. This served to tie the Muslim Brotherhood to the government at least to a limited extent and gave the government some relief from public criticism as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood's highly effective social welfare programs. (And, never forget, it gave additional opportunities for the several secret political police agencies to penetrate the Brotherhood and related entities with greater effect.)
All of this implies that Mubarak is a crafty and calculating political survivor. His use of robust coercion, official terror as well as his willingness to rule by decree when such is either necessary or merely desirable show Hosni is one determined dude, determined to hold on to power by all means necessary be they fair or foul. Taken together, these aspects of the Egyptian dictator's character indicate strongly that he is not going to exit the stage easily or gracefully despite his advanced years (he is on the wrong side of eighty) and less than splendid health.
There is no sign that the Egyptian army is likely to emulate its Tunisian equivalent. Nor have the internal security police shown any suddenly developed sense of tender mercy or squeamishness. Without defection by either or both of these instruments of state power, the probability of Mubarak acceding to the importuning of people power and getting on a jet plane to Saudi Arabia is very slim to none.
The dissidents are cranking up for another round of monster rallies on Friday following prayer services These may be a real humdinger. But, they will not mean the end of Hosni.
The anti-government movement is diffuse, lacking a national stature leader (although ElBaradie is headed back home from Vienna) and confined in the main to those meriting the loose sobriquet, "youth." On the downside, Mohamad ElBaradei is lacking street cred due to his frequent and prolonged absences from Egypt since announcing his presidential candidacy, which impairs his status as a leader of the demonstrations and the movement of which they are the most dramatic sign.
Another very big unknown is the intention of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has been on the sidelines. Perhaps its leadership cadre has been taken by surprise but that seems unlikely. Far more probable is the assessment that the Brotherhood is being cautious. The leaders most probably do not expect the demonstrations to have any useful outcome beyond radicalizing an ever larger segment of the politically disaffiliated. This means the Brotherhood will have a much larger potential recruitment pool in the months to come.
Another, less probable, motive for the Brotherhood's bystander posture is they are waiting for the main chance. In the event that Mubarak does decide that a trip to Saudi Arabia is in his best interests, the Brotherhood will be in the catbird seat for a takeover bid. The Brotherhood is very large, quite well organized, highly motivated, sufficiently financed, possesses tendrils nearly everywhere (including the armed forces), and can count on the support of the clerics and faculty of al-Azar university. In short, it is the only entity in Egypt that can take control of the government.
The ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood to the seat of power in Egypt would be a very real nightmare for the Deep Thinkers of Global Strategy in Washington. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt could equal the mullahocracy of Iran as a sinister actor in the region and on the global stage. From the perspective of either Israel or the US, the Muslim Brotherhood taking control of Egypt is a worst case scenario--on steroids.
There is not much the US government can do to directly influence events in Egypt in the short run. And, there is not a whole lot more it can do in the longer term. In a very real sense we chopped off our options when we climbed into bed with Mubarak back in the days following Camp David. The perceived imperatives of the Cold War and the quest for Mideast peace pushed the US and Mubarak together in a marriage of mutual necessity. When the Cold War ended, the continued search for the chimera of Arab-Israeli peace precluded ending the marriage.
The coming of Osama bin Laden and with him the challenge of violent political Islam prevented any sane and objective reassessment of the American support for the Egyptian autocrat. We were stuck with him. And, stuck with him today we remain. Our least-worst option is to hope that (and in a low key way, assist) Mubarak remains in power.
Mubarak may be as unpalatable as cyanide but the Muslim Brotherhood would be much, much worse. And, that, bucko, is all the choice we have.
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