And Still The Blood Flows---

Yesterday the Syrian security forces killed more than one hundred anti-government protesters.  Today it was more of the same as snipers in civilian clothes were reported to be engaging funeral processions in suburbs of Damascus.  It is looking more and more like Bashir al-Assad is losing control of the situation as the old truism of the dead dictating policy is once again operative among the long repressed and fearful folks of Syria.

While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression.  His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple.  It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.

As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them.  The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge.  Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game.  As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)

It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen.  This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept.  How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?

In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway.  The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.

No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be.  The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime.  An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government.  It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support.  To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.

Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically.  Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance.  Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial.  Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region.  However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq.  That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs.  So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.

This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation.  The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions.  This is possible but meaningless in effect.  As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming.  Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.

In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company.  The imperatives to do the same now exist.  The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy.  Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.

Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea.  The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups.  As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.

As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements.  The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan.  The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.

The House Of Saud Is Getting Very, Very Worried

Perhaps the best sign of growing Saudi anxiety over the near future is the recall of the legendary Prince Bandar from the diplomatic/political purgatory he has inhabited for the past several years.  Bandar's record in the many jobs he has held including a lengthy and very productive stint as the Kingdom's ambassador to the US shows him to be a man of unusual boldness, resourcefulness, and determination.  Given the way in which regional affairs have been going rapidly and steadily south from the perspective of Riyadh, it was a certainty that Bandar would be brought back, the Kingdom's diplomatic cavalry in action.

The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf.  The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom.  Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam.  This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques.  In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.

That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."

In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring."  Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.

According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.

Enter Prince Bandar.  The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia.  Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief.  But it was not the only part.

Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US.  The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout.  Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.

The same is true with respect to Russia.  The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production.  And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US.  Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."

Now for Pakistan.  It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia.  Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.  Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."

While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.

An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran.  The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan.  And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques.  Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.

As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US.  The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.

Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions.  They make a person feel good just considering them.  But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy.  The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.

Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf.  The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point.  An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach.  Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.

Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria.  The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary.  There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.

The outlines of a deal are hinted here.  Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain.  From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.

Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.

Syrian Immune System Challenged--Or Compromised?

Not that many days ago the Syrian jefe grande y supremo, Bashir al-Assad, decreed that Syria was "immune" to the political unrest spreading contagion like across North Africa and the Mideast.  Most observers around the world quickly agreed, nodding heads solemnly as they commented on how Bashir's anti-Israel and pro-Iran stance enjoyed widespread support among the common folk of the country.

That crowd sourced opinion may be correct.  It is also irrelevant.  Few people on the Syrian street place foreign policy on the head of the list of things liked or otherwise about the Syrian status quo.  There are far more pressing issues confronting most people in Damascus or the parched former farmlands of the country's northeast.

At first, events--most notably the failure of the expat called and organized first day of "rage"-- seemed to confirm both Bashir's self-assessment and the views of the experts.  Even later protests in Damascus were far more fizzle than the fanfare of revolution.

But the situation changed in a town far from Damascus, Daraa.  While protests occurred yesterday in five cities including Damascus, Daraa was the spot where the game possibly changed.  For reasons not yet clear, the security forces opened fire with lethal results for five civilians.  The powers that be reacted quickly and, from initial reports, properly.  Investigations and prosecutions were promised.  Even if the guilty proved to be security officials, prosecution was guaranteed, "regardless of rank."

The situation in Daraa was not defused by the governmental actions.  Today, at the funerals for two of the men killed, the security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrators.  As is the case quite often with funerals, the one held today served as a platform for launching political protests.  More than a few of the ten thousand close personal friends of the deceased took to the streets with a vengeance.  In the customary point-counterpoint style of Mideast politics, the security forces pushed back with gas and mass arrests.

The new opposition group which has given itself the moniker of "The March 15 Revolution," has made the now obbligato move of establishing a Facebook page.  Not surprisingly, it has blamed the regime for the deaths.  Assorted human rights groups including the now ever present Human Rights Watch has backed the claims of the March 15 Revolution.  The outside world responded in a way completely compatible with the protocol which has been established in the wake of the "Jasmine Revolution" and its follow-ons.  The US and UN both jawboned away.  Ban Ki-Moon called the lethal suppression "unacceptable."  The White House condemned the use of force "strongly."

The government has sealed Daraa so confirmation of the events, body count, and number arrested is difficult or impossible.  The government undoubtedly sees the move as necessary not only to prevent outsiders viewing Syrian dirty laundry but also as a means of quarantining the fatal virus of political challenge and change.

The events in Daraa are noteworthy if for no other reason as having been the most deadly outbreak of political violence since the Kurds got uppity in 2004.  Back then security forces killed at least twenty-five in the northeastern city of Qwamishli and left another one hundred plus wounded.  Politics, particularly those of a dissenting sort, constitute a full contact sport in Syria.

Any protests of any sort do rattle the regime's cage.  It should be recalled that Syria has been under a "State of Emergency" since the Baath Party took control in 1963.  That is one whacking big emergency--fifty-seven years and counting.

Even the typically youthful (median age of population is 21.7 years according to the CIA World Factbook) Syrians remember the bloodletting in the city of Hama.  At that place Bashir's father, Hafiz, suppressed an uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood at a cost in lives which makes Gaddfi's efforts of late look like a festival of peace, love, and flower power.  The city was virtually destroyed by heavy artillery, air attacks, and tanks.  As many as one hundred thousand were buried in the rubble.

Syria's current problems must be set against the inhibitory effects of the Hama legacy.  Syria has been hit hard by the global recession of recent years.  Unemployment and its equally sickening twin underemployment are rampant--particularly among the critical segment, educated youth.  The governmental deficit is very large and not likely to do other than grow in the next few years.  A harsh and prolonged drought has worsened the already critical water shortage such as to severely cripple agriculture and turn large numbers of previously decently well off farmers into proprietors of dust bowls.

The combination of rapidly declining water supplies, shrinking oil production, a rapidly growing population, and a public economy skewed toward military procurement has place enormous pressure on the government to meet public demands.  It has already terminally derailed Bashir's ambitious schemes for reform and modernization.  The honeymoon with Bashir which started when he succeeded dear old dad proved to be short as the new kid found out what reality was all about.

Paradoxically, the inept response of the Bush/Cheney administration to the murder of Prime Minister Hariri served to rekindle the honeymoon.  The diplomatic mistreatment of Syria unified the population behind the Bashir government.  The American inspired isolation as well as the ongoing US stance of ignoring the Golan Heights in favor of the West Bank and Gaza not only reinforced public support for Bashir but gave the regime the impetus needed to cozy ever closer to Tehran.  (The old cliche about shooting oneself in the foot comes to mind.)

Bashir is not Hafiz.  This means that while the Syrian security and internal intelligence services are highly competent and omni-present, the government will not rely solely on the jackboot of repression.  In an important symbol of this, Bashir has stated he will go personally to Daraa not only to assure the investigation is undertaken as promised, but, more importantly, to offer his condolences to the families of the dead.  It is certain the meetings will receive first story coverage on Syrian state TV.

Bashir and his wife are both media savvy and understand the West better than the majority of Mideastern political figures.  Bashir also understands the ways and means by which perceptions can be manipulated effectively within Syria.  It is probable he will turn the deaths in Daraa to the regime's advantage.

Overall, the majority of the population continues to rally on Bashir's side.  It is probable this applies even to the spearbearers of the current unrest--educated young people.  Solidifying and expanding this support requires some major efforts to address the most critical problems, lack of jobs and lack of water.  One way this might be done (if the budget deficit allows or Iran is sufficiently generous) is a new public works program aimed at capturing and transporting more water to the dessicated farmlands.

The US might be well advised to take another look at the Golan Heights.  The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is more than simply moribund--it is stone cold stinking dead.  The only viable available option for reviving the corpse is that of the Golan Heights.  Israel can live very well without the Heights or even the ski resort and water in that area.  It has no legitimate reason to cling to the ground given the changes in military technology and the record of the past thirty years of border tranquility.

Movement on the Golan would help stabilize Bashir's government.  In this context it must be noted that he is not an odious dictator but rather a canny authoritarian who is operating a country which is a going concern, secular, possessed of a national identity, and capable of being an outpost of the civilized world against the advocates of violent political Islam.  Even Syria's stance regarding Lebanon is not unrealistic or overly ambitious.  Overall, Syria under Bashir is a Syria poised to incrementally enter the ranks of those states more democratic than not.

But, for any of this to happen, for Syria to turn its back on Iran, abandon any nuclear pretensions, drop Hezbollah and Hamas, inch toward real reform, requires a strong government, a stable government, a secure government.  For this, there can be no better outside aid than assistance in getting Syrian land back to Syrian control.

That is a project worthy of the Deep Thinkers most urgent and earnest attention.

They Are Getting Uptight In Lebanon--For Good Reason

One of these days, quite soon by all accounts, the special tribunal established by the UN to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 is to be released.  The history of this investigation is marked with false steps and false accusations, but now it appears the tribunal thinks they finally have achieved a firm grip on the event.  The tribunal's staff are convinced that they know who dunnit and why it was done.

The murder of Hariri was roundly condemned by the US.  That was a standard issue, off-the-shelf response.  Not so standard and certainly not well-advised was the precipitate action taken by the Bush/Cheney administration to false reports directly linking Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to the killing.

With a haste which was both unnecessary and unseemly, the neo-con ninnies suspended diplomatic relations with Syria, calling our ambassador home.  One result of this act and the charges underlying it was the sharp turn toward Iran made by an irate Bashir who felt that his country and himself personally had been insulted.  In addition the Syrian regime saw itself threatened by the suspension of normal diplomatic representation.

Syria has cleaved most tightly to Iran ever since.  This relationship is not in US interests any more than it is in the interests of Israel.  The Obama administration was well enough oriented toward reality to attempt damage limitation and repair.  This effort has proven fruitless as too much time had passed, too many connections made between the clerics of Iran and secularists of Syria, to allow any substantial or speedy change in the status quo.

The only action the US might have undertaken which would have resulted in Syria executing an about face was the return of the Golan Heights from Israel.  Since the administration decided to focus its efforts and attempts at pressure on levering Israel back to the negotiating table with the Palestinian Authority, it was impossible to do the same with Syria and the Golan.

The unwillingness or inability of the Obama administration to do anything useful on the Golan question assured that Bashir al-Assad saw nothing to be gained by dumping the mullahs and embracing the US.  An additional obstacle to changing Syrian affections from Tehran to Washington has been the repeated refusal by American administrations to acknowledge that Syria has both interests and a special position in Lebanon.  To us the notion of a "Greater Syria" incorporating Lebanon is a nul referent; to Syrians it is a reality demanding full recognition by the world including the US and its allies.

The real deal is Syria has a special position in Lebanon.  Whether Syrian troops are present in country or not, whether Syrian police patrol the streets of Beirut or not, whenever Syria decides to sneeze, Lebanon will catch pneumonia.  In short, to use the words of Winston Churchill, in Lebanon Syria has one hundred percent of "the say."

Since the US threw one hissy fit after another until all Syrian armed forces were withdrawn from Lebanon, the Boys in Damascus have employed the tried and true method of use-a-surrogate to exercise "the say" in Lebanon.  Hezbollah was a creation of Syria a quarter of a century ago and more.  Over the years the lads of Hezbollah have demonstrated a clear utility to Syria both in Lebanon and, when necessary, elsewhere.

However, the situation has become more complicated in recent years as a direct result of the tight and getting tighter linkage between Iran and Syria.  Particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the flow of money, material, and training from Iran to Hezbollah has strengthened the direct ties between the theocrats of Iran and the adherents of armed political Islam of Hezbollah.  (It's nice to remember that the name translates as the Party of God.)

The situation is such that Hezbollah is almost in a position to play off Syria against Iran should its best interests demand it.  At the moment, however, the best interests of Hezbollah are served by unity between its two patrons.  The problem comes in what that may mean for Lebanon overall as the UN tribunal cranks up to go public with its investigation.

The conclusions of the tribunal's investigation is, Hezbollah did it.  This prospect has Hezbollah worried.  It has the current Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, very worried.  It has the Lebanese political elite very, very worried.

Hezbollah's capo, Hassan Nasrallah, has the capacity to tumble the government.  In lieu of simply causing the chaos a forced collapse of the central government would bring in its wake, the very hardline Islamist group and its leader may simply demand a reformulation of the Taif Agreement which ended the simmering internal Lebanese war by bringing Hezbollah into the government.  Any reformulation would grant even more power to Hezbollah, a prospect which Israel, among others, finds alarming.

Three ago the politics of Lebanon as threatened by the UN tribunal report made for strange bedmates as Bashir al-Assad met one on one with the King of Saudi Arabia.  The two long standing foes had come together in the hope of making sure there would be no reawakening of the dormant civil war.  For a couple of months it appeared the two had succeeded in brokering some sort of undiscussed in public means of preventing a Lebanese collapse.

The rapprochement has proven short-lived.  The Kingdom of the Two Mosques and the Baathists of Syria have come to a parting of the ways on Lebanon as a direct result of the Syrian-Iranian alliance.  The Syrian government has come out in favor of the candidacy of Nouri al-Maliki.  Maliki is the favorite son of Iran for the office of Iraqi prime minister.  Being Iran's favorite means Maliki must be Syria's as well.

The opting for the Iranian Candidate has infuriated Sunni Saudi Arabia.  Even if it was not possible for Bashir and his government to come out in support of Allawi, who was acceptable to Saudi Arabia, the overt endorsement of Maliki was too much for the Keeper of the Two Mosques.  It was, as they say, a deal killer.

Bashir has also blasted the on-again and now once more, off-again Israeli-Palestinian Authority talks as existing only to "boost Obama."  That he delivered himself of this opinion with Ahmadinejad beaming away in the next chair was not lost on any observer--particularly those in Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian Orator-in-Chief is scheduled to return the call in a couple of weeks.  This means the internal politics of Lebanon will remain in stasis at least until the Man From Tehran heads home on 15 October.  After that date, all bets are off regarding the internal stability of the faction ridden state of Lebanon.

Ahmadinejad, accompanied by Nasrallah, is scheduled to dedicate a garden located not far from the Israel-Lebanon border.  At this time the Guy From Tehran is expected to toss a symbolic stone in the general direction of Israel.  This action close to what Ahmadinejad has called "Iran's border with Israel" raises a question.

No, bucko, not what shape is Ahmadinejad's arm.  Rather, will the Israelis go for a commando raid and snatch, bringing Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah back to Israel to stand trial for either war crimes (in Nasrallah's case) or exciting genocide in regard to Ahmadinejad's many calls for the destruction of Israel.  In a way it is too bad that this intriguing prospect (think glass booths, simultaneous translations, hordes of international observers all in the ala Eichmann manner) is a non-starter.  It would solve so many problems all at once as well as raise a number of other, more fascinating--or at least less repetitive--issues.

In any event watching Lebanon will be a whole lot more fun after the UN tribunal releases its report.  It will be one more episode in the long running and ever-so-bloody drama of Can Lebanon Survive?  In the worst realistic case, the Lebanese situation will be reality TV at its most compelling.

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Is Assad Stupid Or Simply Hacked Off?

The widely circulated, Israeli originated report that Syria has shipped Scud missiles to Hezbollah has been confirmed by the terrorist entity which moonlights as a partner in the Lebanese government. In a rather illogical addition to its confirmation Hezbollah averred it couldn't understand what the fuss was all about.

The Hezbollah spokesman, presumably with a straight face maintained the weapons were both old and unusable. Perhaps the speaker's words were lost in translation from Arabic to Arabic and thus appeared garbled in the Kuwaiti paper, Al-Rai. Or, with equal probability, Syria has designated South Lebanon as the approved dump for ancient, decrepit, and broken warlike stores.

Showing their usual propensity for either ambiguity or an inherent inability to keep the stories straight, the Syrian Foreign Ministry continued to deny the reports of a Scud transfer. Instead, the ForMin trotted out the usual counter-allegation: The Israelis are making it all up in order to roil the otherwise peaceful waters of the Mideast and justify their upcoming invasion of peace loving Hezbollahstan.

Showing the fundamentally peaceful inclination of Hezbollah, the Al-Rai piece went on to quote the Man From Hezbollah as saying, "Our organization has many surface-to-surface missiles spread all across Lebanon..." Ah, yes, the old just-in-case gambit.

While there may be individuals in the IDF and government of Israel who may be itching for a rematch to avenge the bloody nose given the Israelis by an unexpectedly competent and well handled Hezbollah force, it is not likely that Israel is in a search for more ways to complicate their already tenuous position. War may be forced upon the country as it was with Operation Cast Lead, but the Israelis aren't looking to provoke one.

It is quite true that Syria has not been showing a great desire to cooperate with either Israel or the US in a quest for a settlement of either regional or bilateral nature. The rejection by Syria of a bid by Israel to establish a trilateral mechanism in the Golan Heights in order to address points of friction is a very recent sign of Syria's harder version of its long standing hard line policy.

Given the rejectionist posture of Syria at the Arab League meeting last month, the rejection is no surprise. Neither is the shipment of Scuds to Hezbollah.

Both the US and Israel have made the customary statements of viewing-with-alarm and warning of the Grave Consequences. In the rhetorical exchanges both sides have played according to long established protocols. The script written so many years back has been followed with verisimilitude. So far, so good as even Hezbollah has sounded almost statesmanlike given its past oratory.

More important than the "who" and "what" in play here is the basic question of "why?"

There are three possibilities.

The first is Bashir al-Assad didn't know what the boys in the backroom were up to. That is possible but unlikely in the extreme. Assad, fils has a firm grasp on all the levers of power and rogue actions would be firmly squashed--as with a bomb under the underling's car when he leaves a party.

The second is Bashir has gone a little funny in the brain housing group. While not impossible a sudden loss of reason on the part of the tightly wrapped man is on the same order of probability as the arrival of a "death star" from the Oort Cloud.

The third alternative is Bashir is torqued off. He is royally hacked over being ignored in the Mideast "Peace Process." As a consequence, the Syrian leader ordered a typically Syrian exercise in subtlety. Sending a few Scuds to Hezbollahstan can be seen as a shouted, "Pay attention to me! I am a major player. The major player. I can make trouble. Or, I can make trouble go away."

Much, if not most of Syria's foreign policy including its "strategic relationship" with Iran can be seen as motivated by the strong desire of Assad, which is universally shared by his government and military, to regain the Golan Heights and, as a matter of slightly lesser importance, exercise operational dominance in Lebanon. These are the pillars of Syrian policy as they have been since the betrayal of Syria by Egypt during the Yom Kippur War twenty-seven years ago.

The most important lesson drawn by Assad, pere and passed on to Assad, fils was the unreliability of allies, even one as supposedly ideologically compatible as Egypt seemed to be in the days of Anwar Sadat. Allies may be useful but, when push comes to shove, any ally will look to its own fortune first.

The linkage between secularist Syria and the mullahocracy of Iran has little, if any, ideological or political foundation. It is an alliance of narrowly defined self-interest on the part of both countries. Services, cash, and support may flow between the mullahs and the Baathist, but there is no further basis than those pragmatic considerations. This implies the alliance is even more fragile than that which died on the battlefields of the Yom Kippur War.

The real goal of Syria in contracting its alliance with Iran was and is to get the US to take Syria seriously, to put an emphasis on pressing Israel to relinquish the Golan, on acknowledging the reality that Syria, not Egypt, not Saudi Arabia, and certainly not the "Palestinians" is the key player in the region. That the gambit has failed to achieve its end is not the fault of the Syrians.

Damascus has played its cards quite well, even putting their own soil at risk to benefit the Iranians. The failure has occurred because American policymakers under both the W. Bush and Obama administrations have been all too willing to be diverted by appearances or spurious events and not see through to the crux of affairs.

The W. Bush administration was unwilling to concede the fact that Lebanon is a geographic expression to a far, far greater degree than it is a functioning nation-state, let alone an authentic democracy. In the long, dark, and bloody years after "Black September," the only force which was able to impose a measure of stability on Lebanon was Syria. When Syria was either devalued in this role or prevented from playing it, chaos ensued.

Damascus considers Lebanon to be in its sole bailiwick. If possible Syria will exercise operational dominance directly but with a a relatively lowered visibility (but always heavy hand.) If prevented from direct intervention Damascus is willing and able to operate through a proxy. This is what is being done with Hezbollah. In point of fact, Hezbollah is the government of Lebanon in all but name.

The danger comes when the proxy becomes strong enough to ignore its patron. This tipping point is coming in Lebanon and Assad knows it. The Scud shipment is a means of postponing the day when Hezbollah tries an end run to Tehran directly.

More infuriating to Syria has been the focus on "Palestine" and the "Palestinians" exhibited by every administration from Clinton to Obama. Being both Arab and a one time sponsor of assorted "Palestinian" groups, the Syrian regime knows quite well that no deal can be made with the zanies of the Palestinian Authority let alone the flat out crazies of Hamas. If for no other reason than the combination of the weight of history and fear of the Islamist jihadists, no figure in the PA can make a deal with Israel on any terms which might prove acceptable to the Israelis and, quite literally, keep on breathing.

Syria knows itself to be a rational actor. In comparison to the PA and Hamas, this position is irrefutable. In Damascus there has been nothing but mystification over the resolute American refusal to see that by solving the Golan Heights question much progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement can be achieved. It is (correctly) thought in Damascus that the Israelis will need to be leaned on heavily if they are ever to disgorge the Golan to its rightful owners. Only the Americans could conceivably apply the requisite diplomatic muscle.

Having watched the Obama administration fruitlessly apply pressure to Israel over settlements in Jerusalem, the Assad regime must be asking itself just what it would take to get Washington to get off the "Palestinian" horse and try something real. If the Americans are going to use pressure, propose their own peace agreement, why shouldn't they focus on the doable? And, what will it take to get the Obama people to see that the Golan is the real center of gravity and not East Jerusalem?

The Scuds to Hezbollah can be seen in this light. The offensive missiles are simply an attention getting device. A way of waking the Obama administration to realities Mideast style. As with their earlier gambits like the Iranian connection any failure will be attributable solely to the blindness of the Americans. On the up side the Scud transfer is a low risk approach. It does nothing to perturb the balance of either military or political power in the region. At the same time it does grab the eye.

Are you watching, Mr Obama? Ms Clinton? Somebody? Anybody??

Lebanon, Hariri And The UN

Five years ago the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. The results were both dramatic and--at the time--seemed far reaching. The administration of George W. Bush was quick to condemn Syria as the architect of the killing and suspended diplomatic representation in Damascus.

The US was not alone in pinning the blame on Syria. The UN did so as well when it created a special investigative unit focusing on the killing. The first head of this creature of the Security Council was Detlev Mehlis, an experienced German prosecutor. Mehlis lost no time accusing the Syrian government of executing the assassination. Arrests were promised--and made.

Then the great crime fighting adventure petered out. Mehlis was replaced by a monument to doing nothing, Sergi Brammertz, a Belgian judge. When Brammertz slept his way out of office in late 2007, he was replaced by the more energetic Canadian, Daniel Bellemare.

Mr Bellemare's effort was upgraded by the UN in status but it was too late for anything real to come out of the investigation. Indeed, the four Lebanese security officers arrested by Mehlis had to be turned loose. The task of indicting low level operatives could not be accomplished. Of course this meant and means there is no chance of ever proving the initial contention that the Syrian government at the highest levels was directly responsible for Hariri's death.

While the UN creature floundered and frittered, events in the Mideast moved on. Hariri's son, Saad, became Prime Minister. The Iranian/Syrian proxy, Hezbollah, became an effective component of the government. And, Syria once again became a prime actor in Lebanon's political theater.

Sectarian conflict both real and artificial have declined markedly following the "Cedar Revolution" which occurred in the wake of the Hariri killing. Balancing this was the emergence of Hezbollah as a prime factor of Lebanese politics. So important is Hezbollah in the internal stability of Lebanon that the "tail" of Hezbollah is waving the "dog" of the Beirut government particularly when it comes to threats of war with Israel.

The strength of Hezbollah as well as its relations with Damascus could not have been far from Saad Hariri's consciousness when he met with Bashar Assad last December. Equally in the foreground of PM Hariri's thinking was the role of Lebanon as a battleground should push come to shove between Hezbollah and Israel.

The steady rapprochement between Hariri's portion of the Lebanese government and Syria renders the ongoing UN investigation into the murder of five years ago not only irrelevant but potentially dangerous. Present and future realities loom far larger than the solution of a cold case homicide.

The Obama administration has shown (thankfully) an awareness of this. The reestablishment of full diplomatic relations with Syria is not only overdue, it is critical to gaining some traction toward that ever-illusive goal of a Mideast peace settlement. As has been argued many times in this blog, Syria is a rational actor with a firm price for participation in a peace agreement with Israel. It is also a key player with respect to either letting loose the terrorist dogs of war--or restraining them.

After some early missteps Bashar al-Assad has shown himself to be his father's son. He has the same overarching goal of regime preservation. He is realistic regarding Syria's strengths and weaknesses. He has a keen appreciation of the necessity of balanced and conflicting sponsors or supporters. As his father played the Soviet card with skill so also does Bashar play the Iranian one today. In both cases the goal was the achievement of leverage with (and even over) US policy so as to keep the regime in place.

US interests are best served by a constricted Hezbollah, a stable Lebanon, a lessening of Iranian influence in the region and some movement toward a comprehensive Mideast peace. The achievement of these goals requires the willing cooperation of Syria.

Syria's price is not low. Damascus wants a free (even if disguised) hand in Lebanon. The Golan Heights must be returned to Syrian sovereignty. The US must show it is not so fickle as to cut and run whenever something unpleasant happens in the region.

The current Lebanese government is realistic enough to understand that Syria will play a role, a major role, in the country. It is Beirut's preference that the role be played directly albeit covertly by the Syrian government and not indirectly and openly by Hezbollah.

The Hariri ministry is also realistic enough to understand that should Hezbollah and Israel go to war the major loser will be Lebanon and its current government. Syria is a potent force against war--or at least a war which is not authorized by Damascus.

The Obama administration would be well-advised to follow-up on the normalization of diplomatic relations. A necessary and very small step in the right direction which would benefit both Lebanon and Syria is the use of our influence in the Security Council to pull the plug on the investigation of the Hariri assassination. The charade has no use, not now, not ever. The sooner it be allowed to die the better.

At least this move would be an easy one. No risk and high payoff. A good sort of warm-up for the far more daunting task of convincing Israel that the Great Golan Land Grab must come to a speedy and complete end.

That, bucko, is a very real toughie!

Obama And Mubarak Bet On The Wrong Horse

While the reports on the meeting between Hosni Mubarak and President Obama are skimpy in the details department, one thing (other than the hyperbolic mutual congratulations) is apparent. Both men are wedded to the notion that a joint Hamas-Fatah run Palestinian Authority will be dominated by the older, larger group, Fatah. In this they are as wrong as a soup sandwich.

As laid out in a previous post, the most Islamist jihadist elements of both groups, particularly Hamas, are driving the political direction of the Palestinian movement generally and the PA in particular. The dynamic is well understood historically, and if not inevitable in the current situation, it is the next thing to that.

Further, there can be no doubt that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is a subsidiary of Iran. Neither the Iranians nor Hezbollah have made any bones about this. Nor, have either said that Hamas in independent of Tehran. Quite the contrary, Tehran has taken some credit for the success of Hamas. Thus the inference that Hamas is a tail being wagged by the Iranian dog is not the creation of Israeli paranoia or self-serving.

Egypt has much riding on the accomplishment of a Hamas-PA rapprochement, considering the time and political capital the Mubarak government has expended on the effort. While Egypt may benefit in some way by bringing the shotgun marriage of two unequal, unsuited for each other parties into existence, this does not mean the search for a comprehensive Mideast peace will benefit as well.

Even without the odious influence of the mullahocracy, the climate of loathing and religious justification for both the feeling and violent expressions based upon it do not bode well for any sort of peace. In a real sense too much blood has flowed over the dam during the past half century and more for hatred and the desire for revenge to be put on some faraway shelf in a back closet.

The Islamist jihadists within the Palestinian population as well as their similarly minded supporters elsewhere in the Mideast have shown the capacity to pile demand on top of demand until the Israelis have no choice beyond the stark one of rejection or accepting an existential risk. No government willingly has or will place its population at risk of attack, fear, and death (with the exception of Hamas which has a splendid record of doing just this.)

The road to peace, if there is any, does not run through Cairo. Nor does it run through Gaza. It doesn't even travel through the territories currently governed by the PA.

The route toward peace requires removing the outside support currently backing the Islamist jihadists of both Gaza and the West Bank. The Islamist jihadists must be isolated, marginalised, made trivial. This means their outside supporters--headed by Syria--have to be brought to the table.

As has been written here numerous times, Syria has the most to gain by making peace with Israel. Syria wants the Golan Heights. Period.

The US, the Obama administration, should immediately proceed to offer a deal to Syria: Drop your connections to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and we will put the Godzilla on Israel to hand back the Golan.

Then the Obama-ites have to do just that. Sure, the Israelis will scream like bloody murder as they want to keep the water and other resources of the Golan Heights. But, they have a lot to gain by giving up this particular segment of the Great Land Grab War of 1967--severing Syria from both Hezbollah and Hamas.

Without Syria the aid given by Iran to both terrorist groups will be rendered unimportant. The situation on the Lebanon front would be stabilized. (And, would be even more stable if US objections to Syrian "meddling" in Lebanon would be lowered.)

Without Syria the task of supplying and guiding Hamas would be made much more difficult for the mullahs of Iran. If Egypt were to get really, really serious about policing their side of the border with Hamastan, the flow of weapons and other deadly materials as well as much of Hamas' economic base would be reduced--greatly.

A further benefit could accrue to the US by brokering a deal with Syria and normalizing our relations with the country. Syria would respond by upping their efforts to control their side of the Syria-Iraq border which would put something of a crimp in the recent wave of (probable) Sunni executed bombing attacks in Baghdad and elsewhere.

Not bad, eh, bucko?

The fundamental problem of President Obama's current tactics in the Mideast is his propensity for putting pressure on Israel over the wrong "settlements"--and his willingness to back the wrong main man in the Arab states.

Hosni Mubarak is not the correct man right now. In a real sense his day is past.

Bashir al-Assad is the right man, right now. His day is on us. We need only to realize and act upon this fact. His role in the securing of Mideast peace is critical.

Of course, it is legitimate to wonder if the Obama administration has the wit to recognize this.

ForMin Lieberman Sez "Go To Hell, Syria!"

The Geek has posted a number of times regarding the cruciality of the Golan Heights to a comprehensive Mideast peace. For Syria there is only one real requirement for peace with Israel. That is the return of the Golan to Syria.

Syrian president Bashar Assad made that requirement clear again last Friday in an Army Day Speech. He implied that other matters could be negotiated, but not the status of the Golan.

The embattled, very hardline Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, rejected the Syrian position with a strangely worded statement today. He said that Israel was willing to start negotiations with Syria "without preconditions." Then he went on to add, perversely, that in "any agreement," the Golan Heights "must remain under Israeli control."

Whether the Israeli ForMin was speaking in English or Hebrew, the Geek knowest not. But in either language, the second part of the statement renders the first part (in the words of Nixon's Press Secretary, Ron Zeigler) "inoperative." The overly muscular (in the cranium at least) Lieberman might just as well have said, "Give peace a chance? No way!"

If the Obama administration had the sense necessary to get out of the rain it would be putting pressure on Israel to abandon its Golan land grab rather than insist on a zero expansion in the "settlements" on the disputed West Bank territory. The Palestinians--and the Arabs generally--will not accept a settlement halt as a reason for reciprocal movements. No, they will simply have another set of requirements which must be fulfilled before responding in kind.

Bashar Assad and the Syrian government are, in comparison, rational. Get the Golan back and peace is just jake with them. It would probably be enough to convince the Syrian regime to go ahead with a real peace treaty rather than the Egyptian style "cold peace."

Lieberman has promised to resign if he is indicted for his various alleged mal- and mis-feasances. Those who want to see more of a semblance of peace in the Mideast must be hoping that the Israeli Attorney General will do so without delay. Then, perhaps, just maybe, the US can lean on the Netenyahu government to start working on a deal which sees the Golan back under Syrian control even if that implies some sort of dual authority to protect in the near- and mid-term the interests of both Arabs and Jews living in the region and an equitable sharing of the water resources of the place.

At the moment all that can be said of the Israeli ForMin is that his views on the Golan are (in the fine phrase of George Kennan,) "primitive and unconstructive." To put it mildly.

The Other Israeli Land Grab

Normally when the word "settlements" is employed in the context of an Israeli-Arab peace, the reference is to those "facts on the ground" created by the government of Israel (GOI) in the disputed territories of the West Bank. GOI maintains that these artifacts of consistent policy are necessary for the defense of Israel against any attacks coming across the Jordan River. Oh, and they are a nice place to live for roughly 300,000 Israelis.

Arabs (particularly those who have chosen to call themselves Palestinians in recent years) term the "settlements" a naked piece of plunder on the part of the land-hungry Israelis and their government.

Both sides are right. That is what makes the settlement issue so contentious, so unamenable to a mutually unsatisfactory compromise.

There is another piece of territory currently occupied by Israel which is even more a bone in the throat of peace. That territory is the Golan Heights.

The real estate in question is some 469 square miles of the Golan plateau which was captured from Syria during the Six Day War. It is a mixture of mountains and flatlands at the southern tip of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains which was used by Syria prior to June 1967 as a position from which to bombard Israeli territory near the Sea of Galilee.

Israel claims the right to keep the territory under the "secure and defensible borders" provision of UN Security Council Resolution 242. Syria demands the return of the Golan Heights under the "must withdraw from territories" clause of the same Resolution.

(A linguistic note: The English language version of the Resolution lacks a definite article modifying the word "territories" while the French version--which governs equally with the English--employs the definite article "the" as a modifier of "territories." Out of such differences are legal careers and wars made.)

The Israeli assertion that maintaining an occupation of the Golan is required by legitimate national defense requirements has been severely enervated by the success of the UN Disengagement Observer Forces along the present border between Syria and Israeli occupied Golan. Since 1974 the UNDOF has monitored the border area such that no significant breaches of the peace have occurred. It would seem rational that thirty-five years of successful international peace keeping should have calmed Israeli fears of Syrian aggression through the Golan.

While Israel did return a small slice of the occupied territory to Syria, GOI did pass an enactment in 1981 applying Israeli law and government to the Golan. This condition has not altered despite repeated demands by the UN for the retraction of the enactment and, most recently in 2005, a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.

The actual reasons for the Israeli intransigence on the Golan which have been expressed both repeatedly and recently are two. They are water and settlements.

Hidden behind GOI's protestations that Syria cannot expect the Golan Heights to be handed back "on a silver platter" as long as that country snuggles up with Iran and Iran's proxy Hezbollah and crouching behind defiant statements to the effect that Israel will never allow the Golan to be a launching pad for Islamist jihadist rockets, is the ground truth.

The hills of the Golan provide runoff to a number of rivers all of which run into Israel. And, Israel needs the water badly. Water is the T. rex at the dining table. It is the ultimate limiter to Israeli expansion be it residential, industrial or, most of all, agricultural. Even though Israel leads the world in the efficient exploitation of limited water resources for agrarian and other uses, there are very real limits to efficient exploitation and an ethic of conservation.

To put a number on reality, the Golan Heights watershed provides Israel with at least fifteen percent of its water. As one bred and born in the arid lands of New Mexico, the Geek well understands that he who controls the water controls the range. In this case the range in question is the future of Israel.

Israel has been quietly nailing down its claim to the Golan with settlements. Presently there are approximately 18,000 Israelis living in the Golan. Their new towns and villages are laid out with an eye on military defense needs as well as the necessity of controlling the 17,000 Druze Arabs still residing in the occupied territory. It deserves mentioning that most of the Druze have retained their Syrian citizenship even though the option of becoming Israeli citizens has been open to them for years.

Showing the skill, inventiveness, and dedication which brought the Negev to blossom, GOI and Israelis have developed the economic opportunities in the Golan. The once under-utilized hills and valleys are now home to a prosperous winemaking industry. (It isn't a half bad wine, certainly better than the local products of the Geek's home state.) Tourism, including Israel's one and only ski resort, has been developed to the point that the Golan is a favorite destination for Israelis on a budget.

Reportedly the previous Israeli administration, the Olmert ministry, sought a deal with Syria on the basis of land-for-peace. Specifically Syria would get the Golan back (or at least most of it) for a comprehensive peace agreement including articles dealing with water allocation (as in the treaty with Jordan) as well as the status of Israeli residents and appropriate security guarantees. Syria would also have to jettison its relations with Iran and Hezbollah.

It is questionable that this offer would have been accepted by Bashar al-Assad. It was rendered nugatory by the ascension of Benjamin Netenyahu and his hard right tilting ministry. It has been clear since last May that the current GOI would not give an inch of the Golan back to Syria no matter what Bashar might decide.

No reversion of the Golan Heights to Syria means no peace with Syria. This equation will prevail no matter how much President Obama may chum his Syrian counterpart. Absent Syrian participation, the notion of a comprehensive peace settlement will remain an ever-receding mirage fading further and further into the desert of Mideast politics.

This, in turn, implies that the Obama administration will have an ever more difficult time recruiting non-frontline Arab states to support any exchange of symbolic concessions between the Arab states and Israel. In the escalating Cold War between Sunni Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and Shia-Persian Iran, Syria is a critical swing player. The feudal autocrats of the oil kingdoms, emirates, and sheikdoms cannot afford to allow Syria to remain in the embrace of the Iranian enemy. None will cooperate with the US unless Damascus signals its full approval of the move.

In this particular game of nations, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas are major non-participants. Save in one way. The two pseudo-governments of the "Palestinian people," are free to be as uncooperative, as demanding, and as intransigent as they wish without an agreement between Syria and the Arab states generally. This implies that GOI will have justification to continue its pursuit of keeping the status quo in stasis.

Nor does the US have a number of options in the matter. The US needs the cooperation of Syria in stabilizing Iraq. At a minimum we need Damascus to block the flow of jihadists and other insurgents to and from Iraq.

It is also in the better interests of the US to see Syria decoupled from Iran. The reasons for this transcend the Iraqi requirement. Stability in Lebanon as well as the prevention of Iranian horizontal escalation of terror and other forms of asymmetrical conflict both demand full Syrian cooperation with the US and its Western allies.

To pretend that Bashar and his coterie are not aware of these requirements and constraints is an exercise in self-defeating futility. They well understand that the US, the West, and the Arab states need Syria a lot more than Syria needs them, at least right now and in the near-term.

Bashar and Syria want--and need--the Golan Heights. They want and need the Golan free and unencumbered even if they are willing to continue the UN presence. This means that GOI will have to retrim its sails. Further, it means that the critical place for American pressure is not the "settlements" on the West Bank.

The critical place for US pressure is the location of the other "settlements," the Golan Heights.

Bashar Hedges His Bets--Finally

Bashar al-Assad has not played the game of balancing alliances nearly as well as did his father. Neither has the son come close to the father in his ability to use proxies rather than to be used by them. Perhaps he has been learning in recent weeks. Certainly there are indications to that effect.

While there is little or no probability that Syria will abandon its Iranian connection and opt instead for one with the US, the events since 12 June in Tehran and elsewhere have raised doubts in Bashar's mind regarding the long term prospects of the Mullahocracy. Also probably factoring into the recent shift in Bashar's position is the decision by the Obama administration to send an ambassador back to Damascus ending the several years of rupture resulting from a (typically wrongheaded) Bush-Cheney decision to "punish" Syria for its alleged participation in the assassination of a Lebanese political figure.

Simultaneously Bashar has been edging Syria back to the Arab fold. This midcourse correction has been warmly welcomed by the Saudis among others. Prying Syria from the Iranian embrace has been an important aspect of the ongoing Cold War between Shia Iran and the Sunni majority of the Arab states.

Syria sent a typically indirect signal of the impending change by changing the law on so-called "honor killings." The government repealed Article 548 of the penal code which had limited the prison sentences given to men convicted of killing women suspected of "immoral" sexual conduct. The move had been sought for many years by women's rights groups within the country and will be welcomed by Western governments.

By the change the Syrian government demonstrated to hardline Islamists within Syria that the influence of extreme positions on Islam are no longer fashionable. It also alerted the West that there was no longer any perceived need to placate either the domestic Islamists or the mullahs of Qom. It was the sort of move that Assad, pere, used from time to time.

The most dramatic indication of change came with Bashar's offering of an informal invitation to President Obama to drop on by Damascus. The invitation was offered in the context of a relaxed interview on Britain's Sky News TV. With his British born wife alongside, Bashar presented a very human face which effectively rebutted George W. Bush's implied characterisation of Bashar as a leader equivalent with Kim il Sung and Saddam Hussein.

Bashar is anything but the moral or policy equivalent of the leaders of the other two countries included in Bush's (in)famous "Axis of Evil" speech. Assad, fils, is not a hardline, ambitious, oppressive dictator. He is head of state by accident. As his education as an opthamologist shows, he was never expected to follow his father in the family business. That role was to be filled by the elder brother who managed to kill himself in an automobile accident.

Bashar's western training brought with it an orientation to embracing new technologies, particularly those of information handling as well as a set of liberal orientations which were (and are) at a variance with those of his father and the close circle of elder Baathists who surrounded dad--and the son. His early efforts to broaden the political culture of Syria in the so-called Damascus Spring brought him into conflict with the Old Guard, and he had to retract his ambitions and inclinations significantly.

The political and religious conflict in Lebanon--a country often seen in Damascus as a part of Greater Syria--served to end the early experiments with liberalisation. The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 2006 further strengthened the belief that Syria must seek reinsurance with Iran.

Bashar moved on this perception both quickly and unadvisedly. Syria did benefit from the largess of the mullahs. Weapons and other warlike stores flooded into Syria both for its own army and on consignment to the Iranian (and Syrian) proxies Hezbollah and Hamas. Iranian money also underwrote the modest infrastructure improvements undertaken in the past few years.

In return Syria provided Iran with both a forward basing capacity in the same way that Hafez Assad furnished the Soviet navy with force projection abilities during the late Seventies and Eighties. Syria also provided the real estate upon which the Iranian purchased and North Korean built plutonium production reactor was constructed.

The Israelis responded by air strikes on the reactor as well as portions of the Syrian chemical weapons facility. The one was leveled and the other badly damaged as a result.

As the attacks showed, Syria ran very real risks in its alliance with Iran. Nonetheless the alliance continued and, at least rhetorically, strengthened until very recently. The consequences of the 12 June presidential election in Iran as well as the continued invitation of increased international isolation by the mullahs and their stooges waved, if not the red flag of danger, at least the yellow caution flag.

At the same time the continued presence of the United States in the Mideast must have weighed on Bashar's contemplations. With all of its deficiencies President Obama's Cairo Address did convey the clear and unmistakable reality of continued American involvement in the region, including the search for peace between Israel and its neighbors among which Syria is a critical presence.

No matter how Bashar and his associates parsed the matter, the involvement of the US in ending the sixty years of war between the Jewish state and the Arabs was far more likely to see the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control than was any action by Tehran. The return of the Golan has been the heart and soul of Syrian foreign policy for the past forty-two years.

Accomplishment of this end required that Syria not be the odd country out among the Arabs. It also demands the sympathetic assistance of the US. Those are the ground truths of the matter.

Putting it all together, Bashar had no real option. He had to emulate his father. Do not get too close to one country at the expense of opportunities which may present themselves by having acceptable, even if not great, relations with others. This implies a corollary: Do not allow proxies to control the sponsor.

Since President Obama made the first move, the appointment of an ambassador to Syria, it became proper, even necessary for Bashar to respond. He has. Alone among the Arab states Syria has made a move which can be construed properly as a favorable reaction not only to the Cairo Address and the ambassadorial appointment but also as a hint of movement toward a peace with Israel.

The Obama administration would be well advised to have a first task the turning of the informal invitation into a formal status. The presentation of credentials by the new ambassador might be the favorable first moment to do this. In the meanwhile some mood music from the Oval might be appropriate. Some sort of reaction to the TV interview would not be out of order.

Neither would be some words to the effect that the current administration does not share the view of Syria as "evil" laid forth by the previous incumbents. Bashar needs--and deserves--to be jollied along, encouraged, have his tentative move responded to with alacrity and vigor.

The Syrian government will not--cannot--reverse course quickly nor completely. Policy has inertia. It is akin to changing direction with a fully loaded tanker, changes come slowly almost imperceptibly, but they come.

Syria is a test case of this reality. We have to hope that the Obama administration doesn't flunk the test.

Syria Flexes Its (Troublemaking) Muscles Again

One of the really fun aspects of assessing developments in Mideast politics is Syria. For a long time now it has been near or at the top of the troublemaking heap. It doesn't seem to matter if the actions taken by Damascus in Lebanon, Iraq or in facilitating Hamas are in Syria's best interests or not. Bashar al-Assad is playing a game even more devious than did his father.

Getting a fix on the possible strategic goals of the younger Assad and his cohorts sure ain't easy. Some of the imperatives seem to be quite obvious.

Syria wants the Golan Heights back in toto without any genuine constraints upon its free exercise of complete sovereignty. That has to be on the top of Bashar's list as it was his father's.

Syria has never left its ambitions to exercise complete hegemony over Lebanon. While the old dream of physically incorporating Lebanon into some sort of Greater Syria may have faded, the same can't be said of the desire to exercise a reasonable simulacrum of sovereignty over the place.

Finally one must not overlook Bashar's desire that Syria be taken every bit as seriously as a major regional actor by the US and other Great Powers as it was back in the days of his father's long rule. It is important that the Ego of Bashar not be underestimated when considering the factors entering Syrian diplomacy and foreign policy. It is critical to recall that the younger son was never expected (nor did he himself expect) to succeed his father. It is equally critical to bear in mind that Bashar has had to fight, and fight hard, in order to establish himself as the national leader and not a puppet in the hands of his dad's Old Guard.

North Korea, and, even more, Iran, have shown that the way to be taken seriously is to be an obstacle to American objectives. Even better, to show the capacity to dial up and down the interference with the realization of US goals.

It is this last factor which makes the recent reports credible of the old pipeline for martyrdom seekers, which had been valved down by Syria last fall, being back and running. The ramping up of foreign origin martyrdom seekers has been exhibited dramatically in the recent upsurge of suicide bombings in Baghdad and Mosul.

The tension between the recognised reality that Islamist jihadists are again moving into Iraq from Syria and the announced policy of the Syrian government came into sharp relief on May Day when the Syrian ambassador contended that his government supported a stable Iraq and wished to assure the US could leave the country pursuant to the timetable established in last year's agreement. It is a tough circle to square.

But, not impossible.

Another circle desperately in need of squaring is the relationship between Iran and Syria. This diplomatic tie was tightened recently when President Ahmedinejad visited Syria. While there he purportedly spent time with assorted terrorist leaders as well as Bashar al-Assad. Admedinejad had enough time in between gabbing with the capos of Hamas and other "hardline" Islamist groups to gnosh and talk with the Syrian president. Bashar al-Assad was pleased enough with the meeting to characterise the Syrian-Iran alliance to be "strategic" in nature.

In comparison the meeting between two mid-level Americans with the Syrian president passed by without any official or media attention in that country. As a response to the Obama administration's attempt to repair the relations between the US and Syria, this comparison must have been a tad disheartening. And, a very real warning.

The trick to squaring the circle is twofold. The first is scarcely a surprise: Israel or, to err on the side of accuracy, a settlement with Israel which gives complete and unencumbered sovereignty over the Golan Heights back to Damascus.

The second is a bit more surprising. The US must convince Syria that it is not going to abandon its role in the Mideast. That the US is not going to surrender the field to Iran. Particularly a nuclear armed Iran.

Bashar al-Assad, no more than any other Arab state leader, loses no sleep over the "plight of the Palestinians per se. They are Hecuba to Bashar and he is Hecuba to them--unless cranking up Hamas or some other Islamist jihadist bunch serves Syrian strategic interests. The Palestinians can rot as long as Syria gets the Golan back. Get a grip on that. And, take it to, if not the bank, at least the bargaining table.

Nor is Basar al-Assad any more enamored of the Tehran mullahocracy than is the House of Saud. The Iranian bi-lateral relationship is "strategic" as long, and only as long as it appears that the US might turn its back on the Mideast. Syria is coppering its bets to cover this not-implausible possibility.

The hidden irony in the so called "fifty-seven state solution" which, according to Jordan's King Abdullah II he worked out with President Obama and will be publicly put on the table by Mr Obama during his speech from Cairo to the "Arab and Muslim world," is that a comprehensive settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum would seem to allow the US to gracefully withdraw from the Mideast scene. This would leave Iran as the regional Big Guy.

However the US plays the game of the "fifty-seven state solution," it must at the same time reassure Syria of its ongoing presence in the Mideast. Making the job more difficult is the need for the US to at least match the Iranian offer of a free hand to Syria in Lebanon.

The fact that the highly efficient and lethal Syrian clandestine services have made no move in Lebanon against the rapidly blooming Hezbollah hints at an understanding between that Iranian puppet and the boys in Damascus. The US must match, and, if possible, better that offer if the Syrian policy circle is to be squared. Whether the US is in favor of the idea or not Syria will play an ever larger role in Lebanon's internal affairs under whatsoever convenient guise.

Syria is a very critical player in the region. It is a player that was alienated and mistreated by the policy makers of the Bush-Cheney administration. We continue to undervalue the importance of Syria to a balance of power stabilized Mideast only at our peril. Even if the Israeli-Palestinian problem is settled, the Mideast will be most stable if there is an internal balance of power between the several major powers, including Syria.

Get a grip on it.

While you are at it, President Obama, you might get a grip on history. Particularly the history of sanctions. You might note that it was a sanctions regime which drove Cuba into the Bear's arms.

Sanctions are not going to have a positive effect in Syria either. They are an affront to the nation's dignity--and Bashar's ego. Far from reducing the will or ability of Syria to "support" terrorism, they will do the opposite.

Oh, well, "When will they ever learn?" is the constant refrain of American foreign policy.