The Fiction Writers Of The Lebanese Government Start A New Chapter

In recent years Lebanon has been a proving ground for the contention that a country can survive and even do well in the absence of an effective government.  Before that, the often crisis torn place had proved that armed anarchy was a very poor concept.

Now, it would seem the Lebanese are bound on recapitulating the lessons of the period of warring clans, factions, religious confessions, and assorted proxies of foreign powers.  Indeed, it is hard to see how the long suffering people of Lebanon can avoid this dreary future.  The country has been damned by leaders who place the interests of faction, religious confession, or external sponsors ahead of the needs of the population or the interests of the state.

The cause of the impending descent into the abyss is Hezbollah, the long extant Party of God.  Presumably, the deity referred to in the name is Allah, but the record of the group strongly suggests that the actual god of which they are the party is Mars or, perhaps Chaos.  For it is war and chaos which most strongly beckon Hezbollah and result from its acts, policies, and beliefs.

The emergence of Hezbollah as the government of Lebanon rather than as merely the dominant component would have not been possible without the presence of a facilitator.  This critical role has been played by Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze minority.  Jumblatt, who initiated a flirtatious relationship with the US and the West generally, has reversed his field, reverting to the traditional Jumblatt family tradition of supporting hard Left and pan-Arab entities.  He demonstrated his new stance dramatically by withdrawing his eleven members from the Hariri government and pledging their support to Hezbollah.

In effect, Walid Jumblatt pulled the plug on Hariri's future.  At the same time he pulled the plug on future cooperation between the Lebanese government and the International Tribunal for Lebanon.  It is this tribunal and the investigation report recently sent to the pre-trial judge for review and action which prompted Hezbollah to make its play for unquestioned authority a few weeks ago.

Jumblatt justified his action by saying his earlier assessment of Hezbollah had been wrong.  Now, he has seen the light and come to realize that it was not a terrorist group operating as a proxy of Iran and Syria but rather a legitimate resistance movement seeking justice for the Palestinians and against Israel.  He also averred that a recent commitment by Hassan Nasrallah, the jefe grande y supreme of Hezbollah, that his group would "respect" the Lebanese constitution, institutions, and traditions which fixed the allocation of offices among the several religious groups had reassured him regarding the group's lofty intentions.

If Jumblatt really believes Nasrallah's assurances, the Druze chieftain has way too much faith in his fellow men.  Hezbollah has made a career out of creative manipulation of perceptions through its extreme economy with the truth.  It is not necessary to be a member of Mossad to know that.

The de jure takeover of the government by Hezbollah will bring it into direct conflict with the US.  At stake are the millions of dollars promised to the government and Lebanese National Forces meant to assure the full implementation of UN Resolution 1701.  Given that Hezbollah has been declared a terrorist entity by the US government, there is no chance that the largess of Uncle Sam will continue--or that it should.  Even if the Obama administration is inclined to keep the cash flowing, the power of appropriation rests with the Republican controlled House which is less prone to flights of international fancy than the Guy in the Oval.

The stopping of the money flow will, of course, have no impact on Hezbollah or its government frontmen.  There is no doubt but Iran will step into the breech with alacrity and generosity.  It is well worth a few hundred million dollars for Tehran to bind Hezbollah closer to the foreign policy requirements of the mullahs.  As the example of Cuba shows clearly, the stopping of American aid simply gives the field over to an adverse power.

The full enforcement of Resolution 1701 was an illusion in the first place.  Hezbollah has been too strongly entrenched in Southern Lebanon for too long.  No matter who rules in Beirut, Hezbollah has the juice once the Litani river is crossed.  When Israel fully withdrew from Southern Lebanon and ended its support for the Christian South Lebanese Army, the resultant vacuum invited Hezbollah.  And, that group has never been noted for being slow on the uptake.

From the perspective of both the US and Israel the least-worst answer for the conundrum called Lebanon was allowing the Syrians to run the show.  While there were some major drawbacks to the Syrian operational dominance, the upside was Syria is a relatively risk-averse state whose army and intelligence services acted to keep the lid on any precipitant actions being mounted from Lebanon.  Quite simply were the Syrians still running the show, there is no chance that Hezbollah would have been allowed to stockpile the formidable arsenal of short and mid-range missiles it currently has in the south of Lebanon.  Or, if the missiles were there, so would be responsible Syrian officers.

The impending Hezbollah putsch will not only destabilize the country, perhaps to the point of another bloody sectarian internal war, but will do the same for the region.  Iran is a mixer and troublemaker.  Hezbollah is of the same stripe.  Syria, being the junior partner in the alliance, has lost the juice it once had to keep Hezbollah on the sanity reservation.  This implies the chance for war on Israel's northern front will grow significantly in the weeks and months following the emergence of Hezbollah to official prominence.

When developments in Lebanon are taken in conjunction with the stasis in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, the problem for the Obama administration becomes an order of magnitude greater.  One of the major impacts of the failure of the Obama sponsored peace talks is that the relation between the administration and the Netanyahu ministry are at a record low.  This, in turn, implies that the US cannot deliver on the only subject which would alter Syria's stance vis a vis Iran and Lebanon--the return of the Golan Heights.

The solution to the Lebanese mess has always resided in major part in Damascus.  This should have been obvious to every American administration in the past thirty years.  Whether evident or not, the brute fact remains that no US administration has trusted Syria sufficiently to allow it the free hand in Lebanon which Syria has long believed it is entitled to.  Nor has any administration taken Syria at its word that the Golan Heights was the one and only problem which needed to be solved before Damascus could and would emulate Cairo and sign a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel.

Now it may be a day too late to get on the right track.  But, this will not be known if it isn't attempted.  Sovereignty over the Golan will and must be a part of any overall Mideast peace, and, considering that it is the defining question in the mind of Assad and those around him, it is well worth making the effort.  Even Israeli intransigence need not be considered--Netanyahu knows that Israel must show some signs of seeking real peace with somebody if the international deligitimization campaign is to be arrested.

In short, the only hope for us and Lebanon is for the US to make an offer to Syria which it will not refuse and make a demand on Israel which it cannot refuse.  This way the only losers will be the genuine bad guys--Iran and Hezbollah.

Looks Like Lebanon Is Setting Up For A Down The Tube Ride

Pity the Lebanon--and those who live in that unfortunate geographic expression.  No country equals Lebanon's sorry record of recurrent fits of energetic disassembly.  Part of the reason for the Lebanese proclivity is attributable to its religious demographics--split between Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and smaller sects.  Another part of the package is its relationship with Syria, which has never gotten over the idea that Lebanon is a sort of lost province of something called "Greater Syria."  And, in recent years, great responsibility for Lebanon's fits of falling apart can be assigned to non-Lebanese actors ranging from the PLO in the days following the terrorist group being ejected from Jordan to the tool of Tehran, Hezbollah.

During the period of the French Mandate, the government of Lebanon was distributed among the three major religious confessions on the basis of membership numbers as determined by the snapshot of a census.  The distribution remained unchanged for decades regardless of the demographic changes which occurred.  The result was a dangerous combination of alienation and resentment.  The explosive mix would have detonated in 1957 had it not been for a very well executed American intervention, which served to keep the lid on the pot for another fifteen years.

In the wake of the salutary and short-lived American presence, Lebanon enjoyed a prolonged period of internal peace and economic development.  In the late Sixties Beirut was an island of Western style high life and sophistication in the otherwise dreary Arab Mideast.  It well merited the sobriquet, Paris of the Levant.  The city was glitzy and the nearby countryside beautiful.  It was a safe and fun place for tourists, businessmen, and spies alike.

The Lebanese party came to an end when Jordan got its military and political acts together so as to expel the gunslingers of Fatah and others of the PLO combine.  As these troublemakers and their rabble rousing chairman, Yassar Arafat, were PNG in Syria and Iraq, the only alternative was Lebanon.  Unfortunately, both the army and government of Lebanon were too weak to resist the demands for "Islamic" hospitality which were issued by Fatah and the rest.

In a manner both quick and bloody the trigger pulling thugs of the PLO, who enjoyed the diplomatic and financial support of distant Arab states, established their own state inside a state within Lebanon.  From these enclaves, the Arafat terrorists (and others of those long gone days, the days when terror was secular in goal and motive conducted by groups hiding behind a bewildering welter of alphabet soup initials) launched attacks against Israel and Israelis.  As is their custom the Israelis struck back.

One thing led to another with the result that Lebanon toppled along the edge of the cliff, finally falling into the vast and deep crevice of internal, multi-party war.  The years of war invited outsiders.  Israel invaded.  The US, France, and the UK intervened.  Finally, the Syrians moved in.  Alone among the outsiders, the Syrians remained.

Even though the waves of war and intervention served to eject much of the Fatah/PLO apparatus from Lebanon, and Syria in pursuit of its own interests brought others of the terror networks firmly to heel, this did not mean that Lebanon was cleansed of all who sought to use terror for political purposes.  A new organization, the Party of God or Hezbollah, had formed in the chaos called Lebanon.  It may have started small but it would grow as its leadership brought religion self-consciously into the terror racket.

It does not do disservice to Hezbollah to say it successfully combined the secular nationalism of previous terrorist entities such as Fatah with the violent political Islam which had propelled the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  Protected by the Syrian government whose bidding it did--most of the time--Hezbollah had the time necessary to develop its message, methods, and organization.  With Syrian assistance Hezbollah demonstrated it had the ability and will not only to attack Israeli targets but to provide a reasonable facsimile of effective government in portions of Lebanon.

Israeli hostility, particularly during the debacle of 2006, was second only to Syrian patronage in establishing the political legitimacy and military capacity of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The relative failure of the Israeli Defense Forces in that campaign validated the decisions made in Tehran and Damascus a year or two earlier to make Hezbollah a full fledged proxy of the new strategic axis connecting Iran and Syria.

The killing of Lebanese former prime minister Saad al-Hariri in 2005 proved to be a fulcrum event.  At the time the massive VBIED killed al-Hariri, it was no doubt believed in both Tehran and Damascus that the assassination would pass unmarked by the larger world.  In this both governments were wrong but neither could be blamed for having assumed that one more noisy killing of an anti-Syrian politician in the blood soaked Levant would raise no eyebrows.

In the event the Lebanese government not only howled, it went to the UN.  Specifically, the government requested that the busy bodies on the Hudson launch an independent international investigation and determine who was culpable.  Almost simultaneously the Bush/Cheney administration in a fit of rushing to premature judgement unilaterally determined that the Syrian government was responsible and recalled its ambassador.

The UN tribunal started off with a credible imitation of Inspector Clouseau and ran off sniffing Syrians under every bed and behind every bomb.  The investigation belatedly got on a less inaccurate track two years ago.  With the grudging cooperation of the Syrian government in which Hezbollah now had a major presence, the investigators apparently focused on the Iranian-Hezbollah linkage with a nod to some peripheral Syrian involvement.

With this the situation in Lebanon took a severe and negative turn.  Reduced to its essentials Hezbollah demanded that the government headed by Hariri's son withdraw its cooperation and support from the tribunal and its investigators.  To his credit Hariri fils declined the demand.  Then Hezbollah sought to bring the government down by withdrawing its ministers from the cabinet.

New elections are scheduled for March.  Hariri has declared his candidacy much to the displeasure of Hezbollah which denounced the action as unacceptable.  Reinforcing their displeasure, Hezbollah has conducted a "drill" preparing it would appear for a coup.  This has done nothing to enhance the tranquility of the Lebanese population.

The sealed report of the investigators is now in the hands of the pre-trial judge who will announce his decision on whether or not to proceed with arrest warrants in the next six to ten weeks.  Assuming the pre-trial judge does not wimp out, there is a high probability that high ranking members of both Hezbollah and the Iranian government, including the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution himself, will find their names on international arrest orders.

In effect this would constitute a declaration of war on both Hezbollah and its Iranian masters.  Certainly the position of Hezbollah that the tribunal is a tool of the American-Israeli conspiracy hints broadly at this conclusion.  At the least Hezbollah will stage the expected coup.  Given the relative weakness of the Lebanese National Forces, there is no probability of a determined resistance to any Hezbollah takeover.

Should the UN tribunal (or at least the pre-trial judge) be so bold as to aver Iranian complicity, particularly that of the Ayatollah Khemenei, Tehran will go ballistic (metaphorically at least.)  As the pre-trial judge is no doubt cognisant of this eventuality it is probable that he will demand more investigation before putting the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution on the Interpol arrest list.  Indeed, a gentle regard for the probable violent reaction of Hezbollah to any accusation of involvement may stay the man's hand completely.

Should the pre-trial judge show the white feather this will mean that Hezbollah has won.  It will take over the government without the messy necessity of a coup and its undoubtedly bloody aftermath.  A demonstration of international cowardice will also give Iran a free pass to engage in further acts of proxy conducted assassination.

Whichever way it goes, the UN tribunal is in a no-win situation.  If the indictments go forward, Lebanon will dissolve into one more internal multi-party war which will not end until either Syria alone or Hezbollah with Syrian support imposes a simulacrum of peace.  If the indictments do not happen, if more investigation is demanded, the result will be a loss of credibility for the UN, a peaceful takeover of Lebanon by Hezbollah, and a boost to Iranian clandestine and proxy efforts.

Whichever way the situation progresses the US will not be able to keep the hands-off policy set forth by Secretary Clinton today.  In either event Israel will be put at greater hazard.  In either event the Mideast "peace process" will be derailed even more than is currently the case.  In either event Iran will become more rather than less intransigent in its dealings with the US and the West generally.

The Lebanon crisis is deep and will get much deeper.  The prospect for the long suffering Lebanese population is poor at best and disastrous at its realistic worst.  And, lost somewhere in the shuffle of political agendas, is the notion of justice.  There will be no justice.  Not for Saad al-Hariri.  Not for his son.  Not for the region.  And, certainly not for the people of Lebanon.

They Are Getting Uptight In Lebanon--For Good Reason

One of these days, quite soon by all accounts, the special tribunal established by the UN to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 is to be released.  The history of this investigation is marked with false steps and false accusations, but now it appears the tribunal thinks they finally have achieved a firm grip on the event.  The tribunal's staff are convinced that they know who dunnit and why it was done.

The murder of Hariri was roundly condemned by the US.  That was a standard issue, off-the-shelf response.  Not so standard and certainly not well-advised was the precipitate action taken by the Bush/Cheney administration to false reports directly linking Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to the killing.

With a haste which was both unnecessary and unseemly, the neo-con ninnies suspended diplomatic relations with Syria, calling our ambassador home.  One result of this act and the charges underlying it was the sharp turn toward Iran made by an irate Bashir who felt that his country and himself personally had been insulted.  In addition the Syrian regime saw itself threatened by the suspension of normal diplomatic representation.

Syria has cleaved most tightly to Iran ever since.  This relationship is not in US interests any more than it is in the interests of Israel.  The Obama administration was well enough oriented toward reality to attempt damage limitation and repair.  This effort has proven fruitless as too much time had passed, too many connections made between the clerics of Iran and secularists of Syria, to allow any substantial or speedy change in the status quo.

The only action the US might have undertaken which would have resulted in Syria executing an about face was the return of the Golan Heights from Israel.  Since the administration decided to focus its efforts and attempts at pressure on levering Israel back to the negotiating table with the Palestinian Authority, it was impossible to do the same with Syria and the Golan.

The unwillingness or inability of the Obama administration to do anything useful on the Golan question assured that Bashir al-Assad saw nothing to be gained by dumping the mullahs and embracing the US.  An additional obstacle to changing Syrian affections from Tehran to Washington has been the repeated refusal by American administrations to acknowledge that Syria has both interests and a special position in Lebanon.  To us the notion of a "Greater Syria" incorporating Lebanon is a nul referent; to Syrians it is a reality demanding full recognition by the world including the US and its allies.

The real deal is Syria has a special position in Lebanon.  Whether Syrian troops are present in country or not, whether Syrian police patrol the streets of Beirut or not, whenever Syria decides to sneeze, Lebanon will catch pneumonia.  In short, to use the words of Winston Churchill, in Lebanon Syria has one hundred percent of "the say."

Since the US threw one hissy fit after another until all Syrian armed forces were withdrawn from Lebanon, the Boys in Damascus have employed the tried and true method of use-a-surrogate to exercise "the say" in Lebanon.  Hezbollah was a creation of Syria a quarter of a century ago and more.  Over the years the lads of Hezbollah have demonstrated a clear utility to Syria both in Lebanon and, when necessary, elsewhere.

However, the situation has become more complicated in recent years as a direct result of the tight and getting tighter linkage between Iran and Syria.  Particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the flow of money, material, and training from Iran to Hezbollah has strengthened the direct ties between the theocrats of Iran and the adherents of armed political Islam of Hezbollah.  (It's nice to remember that the name translates as the Party of God.)

The situation is such that Hezbollah is almost in a position to play off Syria against Iran should its best interests demand it.  At the moment, however, the best interests of Hezbollah are served by unity between its two patrons.  The problem comes in what that may mean for Lebanon overall as the UN tribunal cranks up to go public with its investigation.

The conclusions of the tribunal's investigation is, Hezbollah did it.  This prospect has Hezbollah worried.  It has the current Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, very worried.  It has the Lebanese political elite very, very worried.

Hezbollah's capo, Hassan Nasrallah, has the capacity to tumble the government.  In lieu of simply causing the chaos a forced collapse of the central government would bring in its wake, the very hardline Islamist group and its leader may simply demand a reformulation of the Taif Agreement which ended the simmering internal Lebanese war by bringing Hezbollah into the government.  Any reformulation would grant even more power to Hezbollah, a prospect which Israel, among others, finds alarming.

Three ago the politics of Lebanon as threatened by the UN tribunal report made for strange bedmates as Bashir al-Assad met one on one with the King of Saudi Arabia.  The two long standing foes had come together in the hope of making sure there would be no reawakening of the dormant civil war.  For a couple of months it appeared the two had succeeded in brokering some sort of undiscussed in public means of preventing a Lebanese collapse.

The rapprochement has proven short-lived.  The Kingdom of the Two Mosques and the Baathists of Syria have come to a parting of the ways on Lebanon as a direct result of the Syrian-Iranian alliance.  The Syrian government has come out in favor of the candidacy of Nouri al-Maliki.  Maliki is the favorite son of Iran for the office of Iraqi prime minister.  Being Iran's favorite means Maliki must be Syria's as well.

The opting for the Iranian Candidate has infuriated Sunni Saudi Arabia.  Even if it was not possible for Bashir and his government to come out in support of Allawi, who was acceptable to Saudi Arabia, the overt endorsement of Maliki was too much for the Keeper of the Two Mosques.  It was, as they say, a deal killer.

Bashir has also blasted the on-again and now once more, off-again Israeli-Palestinian Authority talks as existing only to "boost Obama."  That he delivered himself of this opinion with Ahmadinejad beaming away in the next chair was not lost on any observer--particularly those in Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian Orator-in-Chief is scheduled to return the call in a couple of weeks.  This means the internal politics of Lebanon will remain in stasis at least until the Man From Tehran heads home on 15 October.  After that date, all bets are off regarding the internal stability of the faction ridden state of Lebanon.

Ahmadinejad, accompanied by Nasrallah, is scheduled to dedicate a garden located not far from the Israel-Lebanon border.  At this time the Guy From Tehran is expected to toss a symbolic stone in the general direction of Israel.  This action close to what Ahmadinejad has called "Iran's border with Israel" raises a question.

No, bucko, not what shape is Ahmadinejad's arm.  Rather, will the Israelis go for a commando raid and snatch, bringing Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah back to Israel to stand trial for either war crimes (in Nasrallah's case) or exciting genocide in regard to Ahmadinejad's many calls for the destruction of Israel.  In a way it is too bad that this intriguing prospect (think glass booths, simultaneous translations, hordes of international observers all in the ala Eichmann manner) is a non-starter.  It would solve so many problems all at once as well as raise a number of other, more fascinating--or at least less repetitive--issues.

In any event watching Lebanon will be a whole lot more fun after the UN tribunal releases its report.  It will be one more episode in the long running and ever-so-bloody drama of Can Lebanon Survive?  In the worst realistic case, the Lebanese situation will be reality TV at its most compelling.

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Iran Turns Lebanon's Crank Some More

A while back the Geek posted on the advantage Iran would enjoy by embroiling Israel in a shooting war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Doing such would involve diplomatic repercussions which would limit Israel's capacity to take direct action against the emerging existential threat of the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

In the past few days the Lebanese crank has been turned not once, but several times. The most dramatic of these actions was the fatal shooting of an IDF reserve colonel overseeing a brush clearing operation on Israel's side of the border. In the resulting firefight another Israeli officer was wounded and a Lebanese troop or two killed, as was a reporter for Hezbollah's television station on hand to document the fun and games.

The presence of the journalist and an accompanying cameraman suggests the Lebanese forces had planned the action. Given the close--dare one write, "intimate?"--ties between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah as well as the fact that Hezbollah is a fully functioning component of the government of Lebanon (GOL), it is highly probable that not only was the outrage planned but also approved at a high level in both the LAF and GOL.

One result of the unprovoked, unjustified sniper fire has been a (temporary perhaps) cessation of American military assistance to the LAF. The initial move to halt the flow of already programmed assistance was taken by the chairs of the relevant subcommittee and full House Foreign Affairs committee. But, there is support in Congress for a more extensive block on aid.

The State Department is, unsurprisingly, pushing back on the hold. State has grounds for concern. GOL has taken the expectable position of rejecting any US aid that comes with any appended conditions. In a move equally devoid of drama or shock value, the Iranian government has offered any and all necessary assistance to assure Lebanon's territorial integrity against "Zionist" aggression.

It is the second factor which rubs State's fur the wrong way, of course. The folks in Foggy Bottom and, presumably, the Pentagon hold some faith in the proposition that US aid to LAF will bring some influence upon the Lebanese military and government in its train.

Duh!

These people must be either off their meds or know a dealer handling truly righteous stuff actually to believe that a few hundred million bucks worth of obsolescent gear will somehow, someway, offset the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon or the capacity of Iran to wag the Lebanese dog's tail whenever and to whatever degree Tehran believes indicated. Hezbollah has an effective veto power over GOL even without resorting to force. It controls vital ministries including the one dealing with foreign affairs.

Need more be known?

The potency of Hezbollah as well as GOL's subservience was highlighted in a speech by Hezbollah capo, Hassan Nasrallah, in which the cleric accused Israel of being behind the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, whose son is the current incumbent. The "evidence" offered by Nasrallah was a risible pastiche of intercepted non-encrypted imagery transmissions from Israel UAVs of a decade ago and allegations of sinister Israeli spies littering the Lebanese landscape.

The Lebanese government, which should have been insulted by Nasrallah's speech, said nothing. The current prime minister was seemingly in agreement, if not with the speech, then with the goal toward which Nasrallah's speech was directed--the ending of the UN investigation which was aimed evermore closely at Hezbollah.

After a disastrous false start lamentably supported by the George W. Bush administration in which the UN created tribunal sought to pin the tail of blame on Syria, the investigation finally got back on course. This course led directly to Hezbollah as the agent of death. This, in turn, implies Tehran knew and at least tacitly approved of the killing.

The takeaway is simple: Neither Hezbollah nor Lebanon, nor, for that matter, Iran, can tolerate any imputation of responsibility for the death of Hariri, senior, a very popular and effective politician who had a unique ability to straddle the several competing religious communities which comprise Lebanon. Any odor of culpability would fracture the tenuous stability which has taken root in the past couple of years.

Fracturing Lebanon would immediately and drastically reduce the value of both Hezbollah and Lebanon as the means and venue for diverting Israel from going after the Iranian nuke plants. That would be a major no-no from the perspective of Tehran.

The need to preclude Israel from using its military muscle has become more critical to the mullahs and their stooges. This fact has been bought front and center in an article in the Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg. In this apparently well researched and evidently well reasoned piece, the writer comes to a stark conclusion--Israel will go it alone if necessary by next July at the latest to abate the Iranian nuclear threat. That is, of course, barring the success of other, less robust means.

Iran is long, very long in bluster, threats and photo-op weapons. Its actual capacity to defend against advanced air and missile delivered munitions is far more questionable. Against an American attack Iran is virtually defenseless. Against an Israeli attack the same may well be the case.

While Tehran is secure against any American threat given the tone and character of the current president, the mullahs cannot be so sanguine regarding Israel. The latter country perceives correctly that a nuclear armed Iran is not simply a game changer but a very real threat to the lives of thousands of its citizens.

As a consequence, the imperative to deter Israel through a diversionary effort looms large in the calculations of the Iranian leadership. The best opportunity for doing this given the current state of global affairs and perceptions within the elites of the West is by way of Lebanon. One more round of warfare between Israel and Lebanon (read Hezbollah) would defang Israel for months, perhaps years.

That would be the equivalent of victory for the mullahs. It would be the same for the legions of people in the Arab street who see Iran as no threat and Israel as the biggest bully in the world.

The upshot of this concatenation of considerations is simply that the ball is back in Obama's court. Unfortunately, it is most probable that the b-ball playing president will muff his shot.

Time Is On The Side Of War

In the years before World War I large sections of the British politically articulate classes became increasingly convinced that British power, particularly naval power, had peaked and would soon decline in relation to Germany. The idea of war became increasingly thinkable as there was a pervasive belief that time was on the side of the Kaiser and not Britannia.

Today the same situation exists but now it holds forth on both sides of the great divide and not just one. There is good reason for Iranians and Israelis both to have the idea that time is working to the disadvantage of each.

It is arguably true that Iranian power is peaking in comparison to Israel's. When Iran gains even a rudimentary nuclear capacity, the Jewish state is under real and immediate threat.

It is arguably true that Iran is facing potentially fatal internal opposition now that the merchants of the bazaars in Tehran and other large cities have been expressing not only anti-tax but anti-government sentiments. The Iranian government's stability is in no way assisted by the effects of the new sanctions imposed by the European Union and the US. There will be more shortages, more unemployment, more unrest, more repression.

In a very real sense then the rulers of Iran may be expected to conclude that now represents their last, best chance to go to (indirect) war for purposes of regime maintenance and diplomatic diversion. The availability of competent proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas provide the needed avenue for indirect war.

On the Israeli side of the hill it is to be expected that the country's strategists have seen all the alternatives available to the mullahs in the proxy war category--and will not be diverted from their main enemy, Iran. The awareness that being distracted, tied down both militarily and diplomatically in a proxy war in Lebanon would provide advantage only to Iran must pervade the corridors of Israeli political and military command.

In a quirky way the situation resembles not only that before August 1914 but the contest over who would invade Norway first in 1940, Germany or England. For Iran, it is critical to let the Hezbollah dogs of war loose before Israel makes the go decision to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. For Israel the necessity is hitting Iran before the proxy war, the Hezbollah threat, puts the diplomatic kibosh on any hope of a direct attack on Iran.

Both Iran and Israel have good reasons to resort to war. At the moment the conventional advantage rests with Israel. However, Iran has demonstrated great skill at offsetting conventional advantage with creative use of proxies and terror.

And, at the moment, Iran has the initiative. Iran can decide when and to what initial extent Hezbollah is to be cranked up. After that, of course, Iran will not be able to control either the extent or the intensity of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, which includes the potential that Israel will be able to ignore diplomatic strictures and go for the master behind the puppet.

Israel's freedom of action as well as its ability to ignore any diplomatic repercussions resulting from retaliating to Hezbollah provocations is enhanced by the general perception within the Arab states that the world is much better off if Iran does not get the Big Bomb than would be the case if it did. While only the UN representative of the UAE has made this explicit, there can be no doubt but he was speaking publicly what all others have been saying in private.

Other than Syria there are no Iran fans to be found in the Arab states. The depth of Syrian commitment to the Iranian cause would be tested severely if Israeli retaliation to Hezbollah spilled over into Syria. It would be tested even more severely should Israel seek to buy its peace on the Syrian front by giving the Golan Heights back. That option would have more appeal when taken in conjunction with an ongoing confrontation with Hezbollah and the need for a hard strike on the main enemy, Iran.

Iran has allies on the wider stage but only one, China, is a Great Power. Others, including Russia and Germany, may have interests, primarily economic, in play in Iran but are not or are no longer willing to go to the mat to protect Iran's right to join the Nuclear Club. Words may fly like automatic weapons fire at the UN and other fora but without real conviction and without backing on the action front.

The American administration may, in contemporary jargon, "be deeply conflicted" over any Israeli retaliation to Hezbollah provocation as well as a go-it-alone Israel strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities but will be unable to do anything about it. The political realities of America assure that the Obama administration would be unable to do more than rhetorically hand-wring and counsel "restraint" without expecting the Israeli government to heed the exhortations.

No one will be happy should push come to shove in Lebanon and Iran. Any attack on Iran will derail the fragile global economic recovery as oil prices spike. The noise of terrorist bombs and the body parts of suicide bombers will shatter the quiet and litter the landscape as political Islamists seek their opportunity in the window of chaos opened by any Israeli attack on Iran--or occurring as a sideline to the Hezbollah proxy war.

When the war comes, when Iran unleashes Hezbollah or when Israel preempts by hitting Iran's nuclear constellation, it will be in large measure the result of failed US diplomacy. Two successive American administrations--W. Bush and Obama--have faltered before the challenge of Iranian ambitions. Tough--overly tough--words were backed by weak and vacillating actions to the ultimate advantage of the Iranian regime. Lines were drawn on ever-shifting sand, again to the ultimate advantage of the Iranians.

It must be recalled that whatever benefits Iran acts to the disadvantage not only of Israel and the Mideast but the totality of the world. That is the most discouraging implication of the dismal record of two administrations. The US failed completely in its paramount goal of acting to preserve the global balance of power which acts not so much to the advantage of the US as to the peace of the world.

With every passing day Israel is in more of a get-or-get-got position. Every day the choice for Israel narrows: Fight the war of our choice or fight one of Iran's choice and timing.

Any reasonably able strategist knows the answer to that problem.

Looking At Life From The Other Side Of The Hill

There was a time when the Geek hated above all else receiving a tasking memo containing the words, "estimate probable reactions to a proposed course of US action." Filling the order always required looking deeply into a very cloudy crystal ball. It also required rejecting the American mindset, a difficult task at best for someone who is profoundly American.

However, there are times when the lads on the other side of the hill do the equivalent of sending a fax outlining their intentions. Events of recent weeks in Lebanon combine with other Iranian demarches to give a clear hint as to what the mullahs fear might be about to happen--and what they and their political stooges hope to do as a preventative.

The Iranian Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, must be getting a bit anxious about the potential of an attack against the country's nuclear facilities, and, quite possibly, other very high value point targets. The anxiety felt by Allah's Voice In the Islamic Republic may focus on the Israelis, but might include the remote possibility that the US would join in the festival of air delivered destruction. And, just as feces is impelled downhill by the force of gravity, so also is the Ayatollah's anxiety.

The challenge for the strategists of the Islamic Republic is that of preventing any strike by Israel alone or the (highly) hypothetical joint US-Israel attack. The goal must be the absolute prevention of any attack and not simply the mitigation of an attack's effectiveness or adequate retaliation for the attack. Anything less than a total prevention of any attack of any weight would constitute a significant defeat for the Iranians.

There are two reinforcing avenues by which the strategic goal might be reached. The first, the self-evident, consists of diplomatic gambits meant to cause divisions within the P5+1 states and the larger "international community." The second would be the more robust mechanism of forestalling Israel by means of a proxy preventative war.

The diplomatic axis is already in play. Most recently, the Iranians have brought the rejected Turkey-Brazil brokered exchange deal back into play. The Tehran regime has hinted it will stop its twenty percent enrichment program if the requisite higher quality uranium is furnished according to the deal first proposed by the US and its allies last Fall. Not surprisingly, Ankara has praised the proposal. Similar hosannas may be expected shortly from Brazil. And, in all probability, Beijing will join the chorus of "Give Peace (and diplomacy) A Chance."

The new sanctions regime, including the tougher measures adopted by both the US and EU, will be less than effective, to say nothing of not being the "crippling" measures promised by SecState Clinton months ago. Both Turkey and Pakistan have made it clear that neither feels bound by the UN Security Council measures, nor, it appears the stance of the US. Most recently the government of Pakistan rejected American pressures (and inducements) to sign an agreement running a natural gas pipeline from Iran into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The unhelpful positions taken by two key American "allies" in the region taken in conjunction with Iran's well demonstrated capacity to evade sanctions in major part will serve to nullify the isolation. This reality when seen as a reinforcement for the delay and division producing charm offensive embodied in the "we will stop enriching, if you do what we want" campaign gives Iran breathing room while enhancing the chance that Israel will undertake a go-it-alone air strike against the Iranian nuclear constellation.

And, that brings us to the second, more critical part of what might be underway on the other side of the hill--preventing Israel from exercising its aerial option.

The key to this is Lebanon. More precisely it is found in the capacity of Hezbollah to provoke Israel into a rematch of the 2006 Second Lebanese War.

The most important aspect of the Hezbollah Option is found not in 2006 but in the aftermath of last year's Operation Cast Lead against Hamas. The highest profile "lesson learned" by enemies of Israel in the wreckage of Gaza is the degree of international condemnation focused on Israel.

Given that this lesson of Cast Lead has been powerfully reinforced by the consequences of the IDF boarding of the Marmara, the potential of the Hezbollah Option to stymie Israel in undertaking any air attack on Iran is self-evident. The ease with which Israel can be rendered harmless has been enhanced by the posture adopted and actions taken regarding Israel by the Obama administration.

Now, let's take a dekko at southern Lebanon, specifically the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River. This area of Lebanon was the focus of Israeli military operations during the Carter and Reagan administrations. At that time and later, the region was the area of operations assigned to the United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon (UNIFIL.) Following the 2006 Second Lebanese War, UNIFIL was enlarged and charged with the responsibility of enforcing all the assorted provisions governing the region and the larger Israeli-Lebanese conflict.

In theory, UNIFIL is supposed to assure that only the official Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have an armed presence in the region. The patrols and mere presence of UNIFIL was presumed by the UN to guard against a renewal of Hezbollah's armed component using the area as a base of attacks against Israel.

In practice, matters have not worked out as the international "statesmen" at the UN had intended. Hezbollah has not only joined the Lebanese government, it has taken effective control of the region where UNIFIL holds forth. By providing essential services and using tried and true methods of intimidation, Hezbollah has gained unquestioned dominance over the numerous villages of south Lebanon.

Nonetheless, UNIFIL has impeded the efforts of Hezbollah to prepare the border area as an effective base of offensive operations. Hezbollah has not been stopped in stockpiling weapons including short range unguided missiles but it has been slowed, made less effective, inhibited in many ways by the embarrassing existence of the UNIFIL troops.

Until recently this has not been a major problem. However, recent events show that Hezbollah is feeling some pressure to prepare more effectively, more rapidly. Enter the villagers.

In the past few weeks "outraged" villagers have engaged in "spontaneous" actions against UNIFL patrols and installations. This escalating campaign of harassment culminated during regularly scheduled UNIFIL practice operations with an attack on a French contingent which included the temporary blockade of vehicles, seizure of weapons, and detention of personnel. In this case as in the previous ones, UNIFIL had to wait until "rescued" by units of the LAF. Even the UN Secretary General became officially "concerned" over the ability of UNFIL to operate free of impediment.

The Secretary General is also given to fretting over the continued "violation" of Lebanese air space by reconnaissance assets of the Israeli Air Force. Of course, the Israelis have no alternative given that the continued and escalating interference with UNIFIL enhances the ability of Hezbollah to emplace weapons and munitions, undertake field exercises, and otherwise improve the group's capacity at both offensive and defensive operations.

It is most likely that Hezbollah has been responding to the directions of Tehran to prepare for attacks against Israel as well as the inevitable Israeli response. This would be a time sensitive matter as Tehran must be aware that Israeli patience with the US led effort to block the quest for a nuclear weapon is running short.

There is a high probability that Hezbollah will be fully ready to undertake offensive operations against Israel within the next thirty to sixty days. This implies a commensurate readiness to resist and counter the Israeli retaliation--including ground operations.

No matter how Israel may respond to Hezbollah attacks and without regard to the success of the response, the critical reality from Tehran's perspective is that Israel will be tied up in an international firestorm of criticism and diplomatic condemnation. Even if Israel is delayed in its response by pressure from the US to "show restraint," the major effect will be to severely, perhaps fatally, inhibit Israel's potential use of its military option against Iran.

In short, the most attractive alternative for Iran in its search for a sovereign remedy against the power of the IDF is the use of Hezbollah. Hezbollah's leadership does not fear any Israeli attack including a major ground offensive of the 2006 sort. There is high confidence within the organization that it is better prepared today than four years ago to handle the IDF roughly.

This confidence extends to Damascus. Not only have the Syrians done much to facilitate improvements in Hezbollah's war fighting capacities, it is prepared to ostensibly distance itself from whatever provocations Hezbollah may exercise. It is sufficient, the Syrian government believes, to have plausible deniability in its involvement. This attitude is based upon its assessment of the lack of American political will to provide support to Israel as well as the way in which the tide of international opinion (at least among the political elites) has run increasingly against Israel.

Should this scenario play out, the loudest sounds will not be from exploding missiles or bombs but rather from the sighs of relief and chortles of triumph coming from Tehran. No matter what happens on the killing grounds of Lebanon and Israel, the winner will be Iran.

That means the largest losers will be the US--and the rest of the civilized world.

Is Assad Stupid Or Simply Hacked Off?

The widely circulated, Israeli originated report that Syria has shipped Scud missiles to Hezbollah has been confirmed by the terrorist entity which moonlights as a partner in the Lebanese government. In a rather illogical addition to its confirmation Hezbollah averred it couldn't understand what the fuss was all about.

The Hezbollah spokesman, presumably with a straight face maintained the weapons were both old and unusable. Perhaps the speaker's words were lost in translation from Arabic to Arabic and thus appeared garbled in the Kuwaiti paper, Al-Rai. Or, with equal probability, Syria has designated South Lebanon as the approved dump for ancient, decrepit, and broken warlike stores.

Showing their usual propensity for either ambiguity or an inherent inability to keep the stories straight, the Syrian Foreign Ministry continued to deny the reports of a Scud transfer. Instead, the ForMin trotted out the usual counter-allegation: The Israelis are making it all up in order to roil the otherwise peaceful waters of the Mideast and justify their upcoming invasion of peace loving Hezbollahstan.

Showing the fundamentally peaceful inclination of Hezbollah, the Al-Rai piece went on to quote the Man From Hezbollah as saying, "Our organization has many surface-to-surface missiles spread all across Lebanon..." Ah, yes, the old just-in-case gambit.

While there may be individuals in the IDF and government of Israel who may be itching for a rematch to avenge the bloody nose given the Israelis by an unexpectedly competent and well handled Hezbollah force, it is not likely that Israel is in a search for more ways to complicate their already tenuous position. War may be forced upon the country as it was with Operation Cast Lead, but the Israelis aren't looking to provoke one.

It is quite true that Syria has not been showing a great desire to cooperate with either Israel or the US in a quest for a settlement of either regional or bilateral nature. The rejection by Syria of a bid by Israel to establish a trilateral mechanism in the Golan Heights in order to address points of friction is a very recent sign of Syria's harder version of its long standing hard line policy.

Given the rejectionist posture of Syria at the Arab League meeting last month, the rejection is no surprise. Neither is the shipment of Scuds to Hezbollah.

Both the US and Israel have made the customary statements of viewing-with-alarm and warning of the Grave Consequences. In the rhetorical exchanges both sides have played according to long established protocols. The script written so many years back has been followed with verisimilitude. So far, so good as even Hezbollah has sounded almost statesmanlike given its past oratory.

More important than the "who" and "what" in play here is the basic question of "why?"

There are three possibilities.

The first is Bashir al-Assad didn't know what the boys in the backroom were up to. That is possible but unlikely in the extreme. Assad, fils has a firm grasp on all the levers of power and rogue actions would be firmly squashed--as with a bomb under the underling's car when he leaves a party.

The second is Bashir has gone a little funny in the brain housing group. While not impossible a sudden loss of reason on the part of the tightly wrapped man is on the same order of probability as the arrival of a "death star" from the Oort Cloud.

The third alternative is Bashir is torqued off. He is royally hacked over being ignored in the Mideast "Peace Process." As a consequence, the Syrian leader ordered a typically Syrian exercise in subtlety. Sending a few Scuds to Hezbollahstan can be seen as a shouted, "Pay attention to me! I am a major player. The major player. I can make trouble. Or, I can make trouble go away."

Much, if not most of Syria's foreign policy including its "strategic relationship" with Iran can be seen as motivated by the strong desire of Assad, which is universally shared by his government and military, to regain the Golan Heights and, as a matter of slightly lesser importance, exercise operational dominance in Lebanon. These are the pillars of Syrian policy as they have been since the betrayal of Syria by Egypt during the Yom Kippur War twenty-seven years ago.

The most important lesson drawn by Assad, pere and passed on to Assad, fils was the unreliability of allies, even one as supposedly ideologically compatible as Egypt seemed to be in the days of Anwar Sadat. Allies may be useful but, when push comes to shove, any ally will look to its own fortune first.

The linkage between secularist Syria and the mullahocracy of Iran has little, if any, ideological or political foundation. It is an alliance of narrowly defined self-interest on the part of both countries. Services, cash, and support may flow between the mullahs and the Baathist, but there is no further basis than those pragmatic considerations. This implies the alliance is even more fragile than that which died on the battlefields of the Yom Kippur War.

The real goal of Syria in contracting its alliance with Iran was and is to get the US to take Syria seriously, to put an emphasis on pressing Israel to relinquish the Golan, on acknowledging the reality that Syria, not Egypt, not Saudi Arabia, and certainly not the "Palestinians" is the key player in the region. That the gambit has failed to achieve its end is not the fault of the Syrians.

Damascus has played its cards quite well, even putting their own soil at risk to benefit the Iranians. The failure has occurred because American policymakers under both the W. Bush and Obama administrations have been all too willing to be diverted by appearances or spurious events and not see through to the crux of affairs.

The W. Bush administration was unwilling to concede the fact that Lebanon is a geographic expression to a far, far greater degree than it is a functioning nation-state, let alone an authentic democracy. In the long, dark, and bloody years after "Black September," the only force which was able to impose a measure of stability on Lebanon was Syria. When Syria was either devalued in this role or prevented from playing it, chaos ensued.

Damascus considers Lebanon to be in its sole bailiwick. If possible Syria will exercise operational dominance directly but with a a relatively lowered visibility (but always heavy hand.) If prevented from direct intervention Damascus is willing and able to operate through a proxy. This is what is being done with Hezbollah. In point of fact, Hezbollah is the government of Lebanon in all but name.

The danger comes when the proxy becomes strong enough to ignore its patron. This tipping point is coming in Lebanon and Assad knows it. The Scud shipment is a means of postponing the day when Hezbollah tries an end run to Tehran directly.

More infuriating to Syria has been the focus on "Palestine" and the "Palestinians" exhibited by every administration from Clinton to Obama. Being both Arab and a one time sponsor of assorted "Palestinian" groups, the Syrian regime knows quite well that no deal can be made with the zanies of the Palestinian Authority let alone the flat out crazies of Hamas. If for no other reason than the combination of the weight of history and fear of the Islamist jihadists, no figure in the PA can make a deal with Israel on any terms which might prove acceptable to the Israelis and, quite literally, keep on breathing.

Syria knows itself to be a rational actor. In comparison to the PA and Hamas, this position is irrefutable. In Damascus there has been nothing but mystification over the resolute American refusal to see that by solving the Golan Heights question much progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement can be achieved. It is (correctly) thought in Damascus that the Israelis will need to be leaned on heavily if they are ever to disgorge the Golan to its rightful owners. Only the Americans could conceivably apply the requisite diplomatic muscle.

Having watched the Obama administration fruitlessly apply pressure to Israel over settlements in Jerusalem, the Assad regime must be asking itself just what it would take to get Washington to get off the "Palestinian" horse and try something real. If the Americans are going to use pressure, propose their own peace agreement, why shouldn't they focus on the doable? And, what will it take to get the Obama people to see that the Golan is the real center of gravity and not East Jerusalem?

The Scuds to Hezbollah can be seen in this light. The offensive missiles are simply an attention getting device. A way of waking the Obama administration to realities Mideast style. As with their earlier gambits like the Iranian connection any failure will be attributable solely to the blindness of the Americans. On the up side the Scud transfer is a low risk approach. It does nothing to perturb the balance of either military or political power in the region. At the same time it does grab the eye.

Are you watching, Mr Obama? Ms Clinton? Somebody? Anybody??

Lebanon, Hariri And The UN

Five years ago the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. The results were both dramatic and--at the time--seemed far reaching. The administration of George W. Bush was quick to condemn Syria as the architect of the killing and suspended diplomatic representation in Damascus.

The US was not alone in pinning the blame on Syria. The UN did so as well when it created a special investigative unit focusing on the killing. The first head of this creature of the Security Council was Detlev Mehlis, an experienced German prosecutor. Mehlis lost no time accusing the Syrian government of executing the assassination. Arrests were promised--and made.

Then the great crime fighting adventure petered out. Mehlis was replaced by a monument to doing nothing, Sergi Brammertz, a Belgian judge. When Brammertz slept his way out of office in late 2007, he was replaced by the more energetic Canadian, Daniel Bellemare.

Mr Bellemare's effort was upgraded by the UN in status but it was too late for anything real to come out of the investigation. Indeed, the four Lebanese security officers arrested by Mehlis had to be turned loose. The task of indicting low level operatives could not be accomplished. Of course this meant and means there is no chance of ever proving the initial contention that the Syrian government at the highest levels was directly responsible for Hariri's death.

While the UN creature floundered and frittered, events in the Mideast moved on. Hariri's son, Saad, became Prime Minister. The Iranian/Syrian proxy, Hezbollah, became an effective component of the government. And, Syria once again became a prime actor in Lebanon's political theater.

Sectarian conflict both real and artificial have declined markedly following the "Cedar Revolution" which occurred in the wake of the Hariri killing. Balancing this was the emergence of Hezbollah as a prime factor of Lebanese politics. So important is Hezbollah in the internal stability of Lebanon that the "tail" of Hezbollah is waving the "dog" of the Beirut government particularly when it comes to threats of war with Israel.

The strength of Hezbollah as well as its relations with Damascus could not have been far from Saad Hariri's consciousness when he met with Bashar Assad last December. Equally in the foreground of PM Hariri's thinking was the role of Lebanon as a battleground should push come to shove between Hezbollah and Israel.

The steady rapprochement between Hariri's portion of the Lebanese government and Syria renders the ongoing UN investigation into the murder of five years ago not only irrelevant but potentially dangerous. Present and future realities loom far larger than the solution of a cold case homicide.

The Obama administration has shown (thankfully) an awareness of this. The reestablishment of full diplomatic relations with Syria is not only overdue, it is critical to gaining some traction toward that ever-illusive goal of a Mideast peace settlement. As has been argued many times in this blog, Syria is a rational actor with a firm price for participation in a peace agreement with Israel. It is also a key player with respect to either letting loose the terrorist dogs of war--or restraining them.

After some early missteps Bashar al-Assad has shown himself to be his father's son. He has the same overarching goal of regime preservation. He is realistic regarding Syria's strengths and weaknesses. He has a keen appreciation of the necessity of balanced and conflicting sponsors or supporters. As his father played the Soviet card with skill so also does Bashar play the Iranian one today. In both cases the goal was the achievement of leverage with (and even over) US policy so as to keep the regime in place.

US interests are best served by a constricted Hezbollah, a stable Lebanon, a lessening of Iranian influence in the region and some movement toward a comprehensive Mideast peace. The achievement of these goals requires the willing cooperation of Syria.

Syria's price is not low. Damascus wants a free (even if disguised) hand in Lebanon. The Golan Heights must be returned to Syrian sovereignty. The US must show it is not so fickle as to cut and run whenever something unpleasant happens in the region.

The current Lebanese government is realistic enough to understand that Syria will play a role, a major role, in the country. It is Beirut's preference that the role be played directly albeit covertly by the Syrian government and not indirectly and openly by Hezbollah.

The Hariri ministry is also realistic enough to understand that should Hezbollah and Israel go to war the major loser will be Lebanon and its current government. Syria is a potent force against war--or at least a war which is not authorized by Damascus.

The Obama administration would be well-advised to follow-up on the normalization of diplomatic relations. A necessary and very small step in the right direction which would benefit both Lebanon and Syria is the use of our influence in the Security Council to pull the plug on the investigation of the Hariri assassination. The charade has no use, not now, not ever. The sooner it be allowed to die the better.

At least this move would be an easy one. No risk and high payoff. A good sort of warm-up for the far more daunting task of convincing Israel that the Great Golan Land Grab must come to a speedy and complete end.

That, bucko, is a very real toughie!

Hamas (And Iran) Slap Obama Around

It is quite improbable--no--make that impossible that Hamas did not know about and sign off on the horse powered terrorist attack out of Gaza. The raid came not only hot on the heels of the Great Obama Cairo Tour but on the eve of yet one more visit from former senator George Mitchell, now the Great Mideast Diplomatic Hope of the administration.

While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack near the Nahel Oz crossing point, the precise identity of the horse-tugging trigger pullers and their purported organisational affiliation is unimportant. What counts is simply that the de facto government of the Gaza Strip, Hamas, must have known about the forthcoming attack. More, it is totally non-credible that the attack took place without Hamas' authorization.

This fact means in turn that the attack originated with the Iranian mullahocracy. Hamas has once more shown its status as a mere puppet of the apocalyptic crew in Tehran, which is no way worthy of its purported status as a government.

Presumably President Obama was aware of the actual nature and character of Hamas before he delivered his soaring oratory in Cairo the other day. Presumably he chose to ignore the realities of Hamas in order to pretend that Hamas would some how, some way fold its violence filled tent and join with the less lethal government-by-pretense, the Palestinian Authority, in a legitimate quest for a settlement with Israel.

Now, let's call it as it is. All together now. "Tehran orders. Hamas delivers." It is that simple. Even a hick historian in the backwoods of the New Mexican mountains can get it.

It is not wide of the mark to presume that the attempt to get bomb toting livestock into Israel into close proximity of an IDF patrol was a partial but indicative reply by Tehran and its clients to the Obama Outreach to Islam Program. It may be the first reply; it most assuredly will not be the last.

Honey flavored demarches will get nowhere with the Iranians. Rosy views of the (hypothetical) potentials of diplomatic exchanges to modify obnoxious behavior on the part of the mullahs do not change the reality.

The Iranian top dogs are engaged in a high stakes, high payoff game. They are employing a shrewd combination of the two primary motivators--Persian pride filled nationalism and Islamist dogma--to gain the goals of regional hegemony and a front rank place on the world's stage. The mullahs and their political frontmen are willing to run fairly large risks, quite ready to further impoverish the Iranian public and employ the ambitions of others to achieve their ends.

The Supreme Ayatollah, his ruling circle of identically minded clerics and the chief frontman, Ahmedinejad (who will in highest probability be re-elected despite the strong challenge provided by Mousavi and his energetic supporters among the Iranian youth and political "elite") have made their policy of "intransigence, more intransigence and even more intransigence" quite apparent. To date this policy coupled with the almost brilliant use of proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah and the inherently divided nature of the several Great Powers has paid off--and paid off handsomely.

Sure, Ahmedinejad and the clerics above and behind him often talk like a collection of warp minded buffoons. But, that is no reason to assume that they are not capable of profoundly perturbing the current state of global politics. Or, that through a concatenation of mis-calculation and over-reach, plunging all of us in a war we do not want.

There is ample precedent for this cautionary note. A century and more ago the German ruler, Kaiser Wilhelm, often appeared to be a strutting fool, thumping the war drum, waving his saber, posturing and bragging. Statesmen in the US and Europe vacillated between dismissing him as an irritating poseur and waving sabers in return.

Two things are dead certain about Kaiser Bill (as Americans called him during the Great War): He was utterly serious about gaining for Germany what he called, "Its place in the sun." And, through a combination of over-reach and miscalculation, he assured the giant slaughter of World War I (and, indirectly, the second half of the European Civil War between 1939 and 1945.)

The Kaiser was allowed and encouraged to over-reach in his ambitions and mis-read the intention and will of France, Russia and Great Britain because these countries did not draw a firm line in the metaphorical sand and enforce it in a consistent manner. In this historical example resides the most important lesson for today, for the US and all the others members of the P5 +1. A firm policy, consistently imposed and backed by a clear will and ability to resort to force, prevents "accidental" war by miscalculation and over-reach.

The Iranians have stated their intentions both in word and in action with remarkable coherence and constancy over the past twenty-five and more years. The mullahocracy has been far more open in its long term goals and determined in the prosecution of these goals than has the US or the West generally.

That is to their credit. And, to our discredit.

Iran has received a seeming setback. It is, however, a setback which the US should not see as being particularly meaningful or important in the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The results of the election in Lebanon did see the American backed March 14 coalition soundly and unexpectedly trounce Hezbollah. But, that is not cause for Uncle Sam to give forth a great sigh of relief.

Far more important than the overall election result was the simple fact that Hezbollah and its close ally, Amal, swept the area between the Litani river and the Israeli border. This is the area which most concerns Israel. It is the region where the IDF was very roughly handled by the fighters of Hezbollah in 2006. It is the area where Hezbollah and Amal have stockpiled thousands of rockets capable of reaching to an uncomfortable depth in Israel.

Now, all together now, "Tehran orders. Hezbollah delivers." That's where it's at, Jack.

Whenever the mullahs want to administer another slap to the ever smiling Nice Young Man From Chicago and his quest to lever Israel into making compromises without return, Hezbollah can slap a heck of a lot harder than the Gaza based horse-holding trigger pullers of Hamas. That is not a pleasant possibility to consider.

But, it exists. It is evidence of Tehran's inherent capacity to escalate or de-escalate as is required by the exigencies of Iranian policy.

Recently, words drifting from the general area of the Oval have linked peace between Israel and the Arabs with the success of efforts to preclude Iran from getting the "Mahdi Bomb." This linkage is not correct even when espoused by King Abdullah II of Jordan or King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.

The real deal is far simpler. Tehran is the one and only point of linkage between the Mahdi Bomb and the search for a reasonable facsimile of peace between Israel and its neighbors. The focus of diplomacy, the focus of pressure for both peace and the preclusion of undesired nuclear proliferation is Tehran. And only Tehran.

If President Obama and his crew don't get that right they can expect more slaps in the face. If the slaps don't work, there will be kicks in the butt. Remember the magic words, "Tehran orders. (Fill in the blank) delivers."

Hezbollah Defines The Latest Threat--Or Not

Two and a half years ago Hezbollah opened a can of Whupass on the IDF. The Israelis entered Lebanon in an ill-considered operation which may have been intended to serve as a re-heated version of the less-than-spectacularly-successful Operation Peace for Galilee a quarter century earlier.

The IDF was in for a big surprise, perhaps because the Government of Israel and the military high command had a very bad case of overconfidence. In any event, the much despised, so-called "terrorist" gang, Hezbollah, fought the Israelis to a stop, inflicting high casualties in the process.

Apologists for the GOI and IDF have argued that Hezbollah did not fight fair. That the Party of God trigger pullers and mortar humpers concealed themselves in the midst of civilian populations so the Israelis had to pull their punch. Many of the same commentators aver that the international media so wrongly portrayed the IDF that Hezbollah had a public relations victory even though the IDF had defeated the terrorists in the field.

There is no doubt that Hezbollah fought very well. For the first time since Jordan's Arab Legion back in the days of Glubb Pasha has an Arab force fought so well in conventional combat. The Party of God fighters inflicted more casualties for the losses sustained than any of the conventional Arab armies in any of the many wars they have waged against Israel.

In their use of terrain, use of supporting and indirect fires as well as their willingness to stand, fight, and hold territory Hezbollah troops showed themselves to be better than the Iraqis in either 1991 or 2003. Overall, except in a few areas such as maneuvering separate forces over distance, the much maligned terrorists of Allah performed at least as well as the conventional Arab armies over the past half century.

Comes now a pair of Deep Thinkers at the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute with a lengthy paper dissecting the 2006 IDF debacle with a particular focus on the skills, strengths, and weaknesses of Hezbollah. The study contains no surprises for anyone who followed the exercise two plus years ago with a close and critical eye.

The intention of the authors seems to be that of giving comfort to those in the American defense community who oppose proposals to reconfigure US ground combat forces for maximum effectiveness in asymmetrical conflicts, those of interventionary operations including counter insurgency and peace keeping. The writers of this analysis seem to be of the view that the Army and Marine Corps have taken the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan too much to heart and as a result they will not be able to fight opponents of greater conventional warfare abilities including non-state actors such as Hezbollah.

There is no argument concerning the initial poor performance of our ground combat forces following the misleadingly successful invasion of Iraq. The same might be said of Afghanistan except for the reality that failure following seeming victory was assured by the "mission leap" and insufficient manpower dictated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his superiors in the neocon ninnie riddled administration.

The Army in particular, but the Marine Corps as well, had been drinking too long of the mythic waters of conventional war. Wide sweeping armored maneuvers and amphibious operations such as those undertaken or planned in the 1991 Gulf War were the standard not simply the Ideal. Even without the Crimson Tide pawing the ground eager to race through the Fulda Gap, the wet dreams of senior American commanders were those of conventional firepower, movement, and logistics heavy war.

The unspoken mantra of most in senior billets was, "No More Vietnams!"

This is the height of irony since the ground combat forces of the United States demonstrated very high competence in fighting the "mixed state" war which developed in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1967. While the American doctrine of "shoot, move, communicate" so as "to find, fix, and destroy the enemy" was not sufficient to assure victory in the overall conflict of political wills, it was necessary to defeat the enemy in the field.

Defeating the enemy in the field was precisely what the US forces did. Time after bloody time. If the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) or Viet Cong main force units stood and fought in place, the Americans won. That this was irrelevant ultimately is not important in the present context.

What is relevant is that the PAVN and VC main force units were better in conventional and semi-conventional operations than Hezbollah during the 2006 operation. In all respects PAVN and VC main force formations were very, very good. However, the firepower, movement, and logistics heavy US forces were better--much, much better. At the conventional end of the mixed state spectrum in Vietnam, the US was the ass kicker of the century.

It was at the other end of the mixed state spectrum, the end where psyops, civil affairs, presence oriented patrolling, stability enhancement operations, and assorted not-very-nice special operations rule, that the US forces were not as good. It was at this end of the spectrum, the end where politics, psychology, and constrained lethality military operations come together that the most and the greatest deficiencies of American doctrine, tactics, and operational skill can be found.

The authors of this Strategic Studies Institute study, like senior American commanders over the past several years, chose to ignore the body of experience, successful experience racked up by the US Army and Marine Corps in order to make the case that Hezbollah's competence in semi-conventional war means the US should not bias itself to the low end of asymmetrical conflict. While it is interesting to see how good Hezbollah has become at conventional operations, there is nothing new or very instructive to be gained by the exercise.

No one has proposed that US interests will be best served by turning the Army and Marine Corps into a collection of barely armed social workers and door-to-door salesmen of democracy. Rather, the suggestion has been made that wars of the next decade or two will be either totally asymmetrical or of the mixed state variety combining conventional, semi-conventional, and unconventional aspects.

The US defense establishment is already very good at breaking things and killing people. If the enemy chooses to stand and fight, they will be killed. If the enemy concentrates, it will be obliterated.

What we and our forces have only recently begun to master are the arts of unconventional war. Only recently have we relearned the lessons relevant to what must be done when the opponent does not stand and fight or concentrate in order to fight. Only recently has our doctrine rediscovered lessons learned and re-learned during our less-than-war wars of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries--including Vietnam.

While our forces have been re-mastering the requirements of successful asymmetrical warfare, the American people and government have not yet learned the single most important lesson of all asymmetrical conflicts no matter by what name they are fought. It is the same lesson which was ignored or never learned by the people and government of Israel in 2006.

The lesson?

Simple to state and hard to get a lasting grip on. All asymmetrical wars, those of peace keeping, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, humanitarian intervention, are at their root contests of political will. The political will of the two peoples involved is tested and re-tested until one or the other cracks, breaks, and evaporates.

Killing and being killed is only the means by which political will is tested. In this area the US has come up short time and time again over the past fifty plus years. It was in this area as well that the Israeli public and government came up short in 2006.

Unless and until the American people and government take a firm grip on the nature of asymmetrical warfare, the capacity of our military to fight is of little relevance.

How It Goes--Good, Bad And Worse

Iraq has gotten a lot of msm coverage the past few days as the all-but-defeated insurgents sent the usual crew of martyrdom seekers with exploding belts and vehicles after the usual targets in the hopes of proving something.

"What?" You ask/exclaim.

One of the historical realities with on-the-ropes insurgent groups is the need to prove several things. All at once. Via high visibility attacks.

The first is the most obvious. The insurgents need to demonstrate that they still exist as credible forces with real bite left. This is the only way in which they can continue the absolutely central strategic task of demonstrating political will along with necessary collaterals including goosing up the flagging will of weakening supporters and hoping to strengthen the hand of those within the opposition who oppose a continuation of the counterinsurgency.

The second links closely with the first. By staging high profile attacks against predominantly non-military targets the blackhats hope to stir further war weariness among the uncommitted majority of the population which in turn will cause pressure on the government to end the fighting and dying.

The third is less a reason than a motive. By breaking things and killing people the insurgent leadership hopes to convince its own fighters that the fight is not lost. In short, to rebuild morale.

The recent spike in soft-target attacks by the Martyr Brigade reinforces the positive trajectories of other indicators regarding Iraq. The number of internal refugees is decreasing. Economic activity (of the legal sort) is increasing. Hostile initiated actions are decreasing. Baghdad's sway is growing.

The war isn't over by a long way and as commanders on the ground have noted, the increases of stability are tentative and fragile. This is what the insurgents hope to prove with the latest round of attacks: the stability is too fragile to continue.

Given that some of the insurgent leadership is anything but unaware of American domestic politics and considering that the external sponsor of at least some of the blackturbans (Iran, for those of you that like it spelled out) is quite au courant on US politics and politicians, it is not out of the question that there is some (realistic) hope that Iraq and the "failure" of the US in that country will resurface on the political scene. That reasoning is almost self-evident.

The question is not so much "if" but "when." When will enough coverage of enough suicide bombings stimulate the usual suspects in Congress and elsewhere to pronounce that the war has once more come a cropper and the only thing left for the US to do is put the troops on homeward bound flights.

Until at least some of the customary hand-wringers start the wail of "out now" the Geek is willing to bet hair that the bombings will continue. Ironically, Iraq is an example of a place and time where "news" is a powerful indicator of good policy results.

The msm have been unaccountably silent on a place where bad policy results are evident. The place is Syria. Well, to err on the side of accuracy the place is Lebanon-Syria.

Iran has been playing a crafty game with respect to its junior partner, Syria, as well as its more-or-less client, Hezbollah. Syria acting on both its own account and in tandem with Iran has maintained its military presence within Lebanon, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

There can be no disagreement with the contention that Syria has maintained and reinforced its ground combat units in Lebanon. Janes, the defense oriented British publisher, has the pictures to prove it. This link is to the Mideast Times which is free. Janes is pricey. http://www.metimes.com/International/2008/06/27/special_report_satellite_imagery_confirms_syrian_troops_in_lebanon/5047/1355~1214586002~1/

(It would be worth taking a walk around GoogleEarth to see if you can get the Janes' results. That's too much effort for the Geek.)

If Janes, using commercial satellite imagery, is able to find the Syrian Army facility, it is safe to assume that the US, Israel and other operators of advanced overhead systems are also aware that Damascus has been much less than forthcoming concerning its presence in and ambitions toward Lebanon.

It is an exercise in futility to debate whether the Syrians are in Lebanon as a counterweight to or a reinforcement of Hezbollah. Either way Syria stands ready, and in a good position, to pick up the chips if the once-upon-a-long-ago-time prosperous little region called Lebanon again dissolves into sectarian/political exsanguination.

It also gives Bashir Assad a nice bargaining chip in the off-chance that the US and/or Israel gets an attack of the serious regarding peace and prying Syria away from the Tehran orbit. There are several good reasons for the US to get off the neocon ninny deadstick of pretending Syria is too foul to talk with openly and candidly.

One reason is Iran. Is it in the better long-term interests of either the US or Israel or the region as a whole to allow, let alone invite, the unpleasant mullahocracy to establish a presence in Syria? A presence that once fully established will be harder to uproot than was that of the Soviet Union in Egypt.

It should be remembered that the building blown up first by the IAF and then by Syrian engineers was not a large indoor tennis court facility. Neither was it built with North Korean money. Follow the money. It leads to Tehran. Follow the interests in play. They lead to Tehran.

The second reason is Hezbollah. With outside backing from Tehran, Hezbollah has effectively taken over the government of Lebanon. It has also become the Iranian proxy director for another outpost of the mullahocracy. Hamas.

Hamas is a fact. An odious fact. It will not become less so unless and until its tie with Iran through Hezbollah is broken.

That is not the only reason that Hezbollah must be reduced in potency. It is a regional threat. Not simply a threat to Israel, but to Arab states. It should be noted that the Hezbollah Wallah In Charge of Foreign Affairs recently and not at all subtly threatened the life of the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon. Stop and consider the total lack of love lost between Iran and the House of Saud.

US policy toward Syria has been, charitably, bad. It may be too late for the current administration to mend its ways, but the next one had better take a long hard look at it.

Finally there is the matter of "worse." The name of the game is Afghanistan. Not to overstate the matter, Taliban is on a roll. A roll up victory hill.

It's not simply a matter of the friendly body count hitting a post-invasion peak. The problem is greater. Taliban is expanding its reach of operations into the eastern part of the country even as US, NATO and Afghan National Forces have penetrated successfully into southern and western regions previously dominated by Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The reasons for the great resurgence of Taliban are two. The first has been apparent since the failure of US forces in Tora Bora back in March 2002. Not enough boots on the ground.

The second reason has a name. Pakistan. As SecDef Gates noted pointedly yesterday, Pakistan has been (to put it as kindly as possible) deficient in its efforts to control the border areas--the FATA-- which provide ready hospitality and sanctuary to Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Of course there is a motive for the dilatory conduct of the Pakistani government both past and present. Islamists run the show. Not only are Islamists politically potent and willing to kill in pursuit of their political goals, the Army and intelligence service are riddled with them.

As there is no chance that the Pakistani government will take effective action to either control FATA or purge the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Islamists, there is little chance that Taliban and al-Qaeda will be looking for new quarters in the near future.

US policy with Pakistan has failed. The course of the "good" war in Afghanistan is not looking favorable. Since it is impossible to raise the bridge, we will have to lower the water.

This means that the current and next administration, with or without the help of NATO, will have to find the will and the means to put more boots on the ground. We will have to take the same risk of increasing the number of US personnel in body bags that we did in Iraq if we are going to retrieve the situation in Afghanistan.

Not pleasant. Not pleasant at all. But, as in Iraq, defeat is much, much worse.

What Great Democratic Buddies We Have!

The neocon ninnies stage managed our invasion of Iraq in order to promote and foster democracy throughout the Mideast. That's a given. At least the majority of rightwingers agree that our adventure in regime change was a well intended move to oust an obnoxious dictator and install liberal, pluralistic democracy in his place.

There is no denying that the Mideast is a place long on violence and violent rhetoric but very short on either democracy or human rights.

The same can be said of many Muslim inhabited countries regardless of the region. A recent study tempts the reader to conclude that Islam and democracy or human rights are incompatible, even mutually exclusive.

The same study shows that most of our "key" Islamic "allies" in the Global War on Terrorism are not only undemocratic, but less democratic than our current bete noir, Iran.

Take a good, long look at http://www.meforum.org/article/1921. The authors, like the publisher, have no evident political agenda. They give every methodological and analytical appearance of seeking a reasonable approximation of an accurate description.

The study examines forty-eight members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for which adequate, uniform data were available covering the years 2006-2007. Comparisons of per capita GDP/GNP with military expenditures and the several factors comprising the Status of Democracy Index (SDI) were made. This exercise allowed the grouping of countries into one of several categories such as "high GDP-high military expenditure," "high GDP-low military expenditure."

In addition the study ranked the forty-eight countries in terms of their ratings according to the SDI. Now to cut to the chase--get a grip on it.

Coming in at number forty-eight, dead last, was our good ally and drinking (coffee only, remember they're Muslims) buddy--Saudi Arabia.

That's right, the feudal autocracy of the sands quite unshockingly brought up the rear. Equally unsurprising was its inclusion in the group of "high GDP-high military expenditures" states.

Saudi Arabia achieved a percentile score on the SDI of 13.8. Coming in next to The Kingdom of the Two Mosques in a tie for forty-sixth were Chad and (drum roll, please) Pakistan, both with an index rating of 19.4 percent.

Chad is a desolate expanse of desert undergoing significant civil strife. Pakistan is our most critical "ally" in the efforts against both al-Qaeda and Taliban. Although Pakistan's rating would be improved by the recent parliamentary elections, it still would rank near the bottom among the OIC Forty-eight.

In comparison consider Iran. The Tehran mullahocracy is rated in the study to occupy slot number forty-two with an Index percentage of twenty-five. That stinks on an absolute scale, but looks good next to Saudi Arabia or Pakistan.

(Kind of makes one wonder.)

Overall in the Mideast and North Africa only four countries rank above fifty percent on the SDI and one of those, Lebanon, meets more the appearance than the reality of democracy given the rapidity and effectiveness by which an armed band, Hezbollah, could control the processes of government.

Like Lebanon, both Algeria and Egypt rank above the half way point. And, again like Lebanon, the appearance is more than the substance.

Among other key US "allies" in the region the portrait of democracy is not much more encouraging than that given by Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates ranks at thirty-seven. Bahrain comes in at number thirty-three. Oman and Qatar are tied at the thirty slot. Only Kuwait comes in near the midpoint. That country, which owes its existence as an independent state to the US, is ranked at number twenty-five with a SDI of 44.4%.

All of these oligarchies spend a good chunk of their not insubstantial GDP's on their military forces. This leads to another unshocking conclusion: non-democratic states regardless of GDP spend money preferentially on weapons and those who use them.

The same may be said for countries which are not members of the OIC, but the fact remains that few nations within the OIC ambit exhibit any meaningful, real aspect of democracy with its inherent respect for human rights such as speech, religion, and the vote.

From this, it is tempting to speculate that the ideology contained within Islam is incompatible with democracy, an open society or the panoply of human rights.

The Geek, given to keeping in mind the history of Islamic societies and polities, has a damn tough time not giving in to that temptation.

Wow! Is Hezbollah Amped Or What?

The Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, did a fine imitation of a rooster in full flush on al-Manar TV in Beruit last week. Of course, the man did have something to crow about--victory.

While the Lebanese Army stood around with its collective thumb up an anatomically improbable location, its commander waited the call---

No. He wasn't waiting for a call to arms. That came. He declined.

Michel Sleiman, the reluctant general became Michel Sleiman, eager president. That was the call he wanted. He got it.

From Hezbollah. Nasrallah characterised Sleiman as "our ally" in his speech and further declared (no doubt accurately) that the Lebanese National Army "will never be used to disarm us."

Between that statement and the fact that the agreement worked out in Doha gives Hezbollah the effective veto in the new government, Nasrallah has the strings of the puppets in his hands. Not a bad few days light work for a militia which no doubt had some kind of fun killing Sunnis and Druze or for negotiators who labored in the upscale surroundings of Qutar with the full support of both Syria and Iran.

From the reaction of George W. Bush (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aNbQ4atY9pn8&refer=africa) one would get the idea that somehow democracy had triumphed in Lebanon. If the current Decider Guy really believes that, Nasrallah doesn't agree.

In his speech, the Hezbollah jefe maintained that his organisation had defeated the democracy movement in Lebanon and the government it had produced. He extended that undoubtedly accurate observation with another. By the success of the armed (can we say, "terrorist?") action and the Munich Conference in Doha, Nasrallah decreed Hezbollah had shown Washington that it could not move ahead with its "freedom and democracy" strategy anywhere in the Mideast and particularly in Lebanon.

The Geek ain't going to argue with that proposition.

Of course, the Geek has long held that the neocon ninny notion of imposing democracy in the frightfully infertile soils of the Mideast was a non-starter since assorted neos first muttered about the need for doing such nearly twenty years ago. History shows that efforts to impose democracy are exercises in futility compared to which masturbation with steel wool is both productive and enjoyable.

Nasrallah offered an alternative model to the "peace and democracy" strategy. It is one that he is certain will prove to be as successful elsewhere in the Mideast as it has just been in Lebanon.

He urged Hamas and Islamic Jihad to continue using "terror operations" on the Hezbollah model against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. He also stated flatly that Hezbollah will support armed action against what he termed the "political process" in Iraq.

The phrasing "political process" is vague but implies to the Geek that Nasrallah means supporting actions directed against the current regime in Baghdad as well as the US and Allied forces. This could make for some interesting complications concerning Hezbollah's relations with Iran as both Iran and the current Iraqi government are Shia in affiliation.

Perhaps that is why the General Secretary moved quickly to add that Hezbollah was proud to be under the Vilayet e-Faqih of Iran. Nothing like a strong declaration of loyalty to the Khomeinist version of Islamism/jihadism to pour preemptive oil on the waves.

The affirmation of faith must be taken in conjunction with the challenge Nasrallah heaved to the West generally and both the US and Israel in particular when he stated that Hezbollah would fight any external intervention and that it had showed the way of successful "confrontationism."

The Geek has seen too much both directly as a practitioner and vicariously as a historian to be of an alarmist nature. Nonetheless, he is of the view that Hezbollah is a greater threat over the near- or mid-term than al-Qaeda.

If nothing else, the Hezbollah victory in Lebanon makes the possibility of an Israeli-Syrian rapprochement move from the "slim" category to the "essentially no-chance-in-hell" level. It also may serve to embolden the mullahocracy in Iran at a critical time when the mullahs are running out of viable options to deal with the combination of economic collapse, social unrest and external pressure.

Hezbollah saw its opportunity and took it. Successfully. One can only hope that Tehran (or Qom) doesn't see the Lebanese model as a guide for for Iran.