Looks Like Lebanon Is Setting Up For A Down The Tube Ride

Pity the Lebanon--and those who live in that unfortunate geographic expression.  No country equals Lebanon's sorry record of recurrent fits of energetic disassembly.  Part of the reason for the Lebanese proclivity is attributable to its religious demographics--split between Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and smaller sects.  Another part of the package is its relationship with Syria, which has never gotten over the idea that Lebanon is a sort of lost province of something called "Greater Syria."  And, in recent years, great responsibility for Lebanon's fits of falling apart can be assigned to non-Lebanese actors ranging from the PLO in the days following the terrorist group being ejected from Jordan to the tool of Tehran, Hezbollah.

During the period of the French Mandate, the government of Lebanon was distributed among the three major religious confessions on the basis of membership numbers as determined by the snapshot of a census.  The distribution remained unchanged for decades regardless of the demographic changes which occurred.  The result was a dangerous combination of alienation and resentment.  The explosive mix would have detonated in 1957 had it not been for a very well executed American intervention, which served to keep the lid on the pot for another fifteen years.

In the wake of the salutary and short-lived American presence, Lebanon enjoyed a prolonged period of internal peace and economic development.  In the late Sixties Beirut was an island of Western style high life and sophistication in the otherwise dreary Arab Mideast.  It well merited the sobriquet, Paris of the Levant.  The city was glitzy and the nearby countryside beautiful.  It was a safe and fun place for tourists, businessmen, and spies alike.

The Lebanese party came to an end when Jordan got its military and political acts together so as to expel the gunslingers of Fatah and others of the PLO combine.  As these troublemakers and their rabble rousing chairman, Yassar Arafat, were PNG in Syria and Iraq, the only alternative was Lebanon.  Unfortunately, both the army and government of Lebanon were too weak to resist the demands for "Islamic" hospitality which were issued by Fatah and the rest.

In a manner both quick and bloody the trigger pulling thugs of the PLO, who enjoyed the diplomatic and financial support of distant Arab states, established their own state inside a state within Lebanon.  From these enclaves, the Arafat terrorists (and others of those long gone days, the days when terror was secular in goal and motive conducted by groups hiding behind a bewildering welter of alphabet soup initials) launched attacks against Israel and Israelis.  As is their custom the Israelis struck back.

One thing led to another with the result that Lebanon toppled along the edge of the cliff, finally falling into the vast and deep crevice of internal, multi-party war.  The years of war invited outsiders.  Israel invaded.  The US, France, and the UK intervened.  Finally, the Syrians moved in.  Alone among the outsiders, the Syrians remained.

Even though the waves of war and intervention served to eject much of the Fatah/PLO apparatus from Lebanon, and Syria in pursuit of its own interests brought others of the terror networks firmly to heel, this did not mean that Lebanon was cleansed of all who sought to use terror for political purposes.  A new organization, the Party of God or Hezbollah, had formed in the chaos called Lebanon.  It may have started small but it would grow as its leadership brought religion self-consciously into the terror racket.

It does not do disservice to Hezbollah to say it successfully combined the secular nationalism of previous terrorist entities such as Fatah with the violent political Islam which had propelled the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  Protected by the Syrian government whose bidding it did--most of the time--Hezbollah had the time necessary to develop its message, methods, and organization.  With Syrian assistance Hezbollah demonstrated it had the ability and will not only to attack Israeli targets but to provide a reasonable facsimile of effective government in portions of Lebanon.

Israeli hostility, particularly during the debacle of 2006, was second only to Syrian patronage in establishing the political legitimacy and military capacity of Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The relative failure of the Israeli Defense Forces in that campaign validated the decisions made in Tehran and Damascus a year or two earlier to make Hezbollah a full fledged proxy of the new strategic axis connecting Iran and Syria.

The killing of Lebanese former prime minister Saad al-Hariri in 2005 proved to be a fulcrum event.  At the time the massive VBIED killed al-Hariri, it was no doubt believed in both Tehran and Damascus that the assassination would pass unmarked by the larger world.  In this both governments were wrong but neither could be blamed for having assumed that one more noisy killing of an anti-Syrian politician in the blood soaked Levant would raise no eyebrows.

In the event the Lebanese government not only howled, it went to the UN.  Specifically, the government requested that the busy bodies on the Hudson launch an independent international investigation and determine who was culpable.  Almost simultaneously the Bush/Cheney administration in a fit of rushing to premature judgement unilaterally determined that the Syrian government was responsible and recalled its ambassador.

The UN tribunal started off with a credible imitation of Inspector Clouseau and ran off sniffing Syrians under every bed and behind every bomb.  The investigation belatedly got on a less inaccurate track two years ago.  With the grudging cooperation of the Syrian government in which Hezbollah now had a major presence, the investigators apparently focused on the Iranian-Hezbollah linkage with a nod to some peripheral Syrian involvement.

With this the situation in Lebanon took a severe and negative turn.  Reduced to its essentials Hezbollah demanded that the government headed by Hariri's son withdraw its cooperation and support from the tribunal and its investigators.  To his credit Hariri fils declined the demand.  Then Hezbollah sought to bring the government down by withdrawing its ministers from the cabinet.

New elections are scheduled for March.  Hariri has declared his candidacy much to the displeasure of Hezbollah which denounced the action as unacceptable.  Reinforcing their displeasure, Hezbollah has conducted a "drill" preparing it would appear for a coup.  This has done nothing to enhance the tranquility of the Lebanese population.

The sealed report of the investigators is now in the hands of the pre-trial judge who will announce his decision on whether or not to proceed with arrest warrants in the next six to ten weeks.  Assuming the pre-trial judge does not wimp out, there is a high probability that high ranking members of both Hezbollah and the Iranian government, including the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution himself, will find their names on international arrest orders.

In effect this would constitute a declaration of war on both Hezbollah and its Iranian masters.  Certainly the position of Hezbollah that the tribunal is a tool of the American-Israeli conspiracy hints broadly at this conclusion.  At the least Hezbollah will stage the expected coup.  Given the relative weakness of the Lebanese National Forces, there is no probability of a determined resistance to any Hezbollah takeover.

Should the UN tribunal (or at least the pre-trial judge) be so bold as to aver Iranian complicity, particularly that of the Ayatollah Khemenei, Tehran will go ballistic (metaphorically at least.)  As the pre-trial judge is no doubt cognisant of this eventuality it is probable that he will demand more investigation before putting the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution on the Interpol arrest list.  Indeed, a gentle regard for the probable violent reaction of Hezbollah to any accusation of involvement may stay the man's hand completely.

Should the pre-trial judge show the white feather this will mean that Hezbollah has won.  It will take over the government without the messy necessity of a coup and its undoubtedly bloody aftermath.  A demonstration of international cowardice will also give Iran a free pass to engage in further acts of proxy conducted assassination.

Whichever way it goes, the UN tribunal is in a no-win situation.  If the indictments go forward, Lebanon will dissolve into one more internal multi-party war which will not end until either Syria alone or Hezbollah with Syrian support imposes a simulacrum of peace.  If the indictments do not happen, if more investigation is demanded, the result will be a loss of credibility for the UN, a peaceful takeover of Lebanon by Hezbollah, and a boost to Iranian clandestine and proxy efforts.

Whichever way the situation progresses the US will not be able to keep the hands-off policy set forth by Secretary Clinton today.  In either event Israel will be put at greater hazard.  In either event the Mideast "peace process" will be derailed even more than is currently the case.  In either event Iran will become more rather than less intransigent in its dealings with the US and the West generally.

The Lebanon crisis is deep and will get much deeper.  The prospect for the long suffering Lebanese population is poor at best and disastrous at its realistic worst.  And, lost somewhere in the shuffle of political agendas, is the notion of justice.  There will be no justice.  Not for Saad al-Hariri.  Not for his son.  Not for the region.  And, certainly not for the people of Lebanon.

They Are Getting Uptight In Lebanon--For Good Reason

One of these days, quite soon by all accounts, the special tribunal established by the UN to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 is to be released.  The history of this investigation is marked with false steps and false accusations, but now it appears the tribunal thinks they finally have achieved a firm grip on the event.  The tribunal's staff are convinced that they know who dunnit and why it was done.

The murder of Hariri was roundly condemned by the US.  That was a standard issue, off-the-shelf response.  Not so standard and certainly not well-advised was the precipitate action taken by the Bush/Cheney administration to false reports directly linking Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to the killing.

With a haste which was both unnecessary and unseemly, the neo-con ninnies suspended diplomatic relations with Syria, calling our ambassador home.  One result of this act and the charges underlying it was the sharp turn toward Iran made by an irate Bashir who felt that his country and himself personally had been insulted.  In addition the Syrian regime saw itself threatened by the suspension of normal diplomatic representation.

Syria has cleaved most tightly to Iran ever since.  This relationship is not in US interests any more than it is in the interests of Israel.  The Obama administration was well enough oriented toward reality to attempt damage limitation and repair.  This effort has proven fruitless as too much time had passed, too many connections made between the clerics of Iran and secularists of Syria, to allow any substantial or speedy change in the status quo.

The only action the US might have undertaken which would have resulted in Syria executing an about face was the return of the Golan Heights from Israel.  Since the administration decided to focus its efforts and attempts at pressure on levering Israel back to the negotiating table with the Palestinian Authority, it was impossible to do the same with Syria and the Golan.

The unwillingness or inability of the Obama administration to do anything useful on the Golan question assured that Bashir al-Assad saw nothing to be gained by dumping the mullahs and embracing the US.  An additional obstacle to changing Syrian affections from Tehran to Washington has been the repeated refusal by American administrations to acknowledge that Syria has both interests and a special position in Lebanon.  To us the notion of a "Greater Syria" incorporating Lebanon is a nul referent; to Syrians it is a reality demanding full recognition by the world including the US and its allies.

The real deal is Syria has a special position in Lebanon.  Whether Syrian troops are present in country or not, whether Syrian police patrol the streets of Beirut or not, whenever Syria decides to sneeze, Lebanon will catch pneumonia.  In short, to use the words of Winston Churchill, in Lebanon Syria has one hundred percent of "the say."

Since the US threw one hissy fit after another until all Syrian armed forces were withdrawn from Lebanon, the Boys in Damascus have employed the tried and true method of use-a-surrogate to exercise "the say" in Lebanon.  Hezbollah was a creation of Syria a quarter of a century ago and more.  Over the years the lads of Hezbollah have demonstrated a clear utility to Syria both in Lebanon and, when necessary, elsewhere.

However, the situation has become more complicated in recent years as a direct result of the tight and getting tighter linkage between Iran and Syria.  Particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the flow of money, material, and training from Iran to Hezbollah has strengthened the direct ties between the theocrats of Iran and the adherents of armed political Islam of Hezbollah.  (It's nice to remember that the name translates as the Party of God.)

The situation is such that Hezbollah is almost in a position to play off Syria against Iran should its best interests demand it.  At the moment, however, the best interests of Hezbollah are served by unity between its two patrons.  The problem comes in what that may mean for Lebanon overall as the UN tribunal cranks up to go public with its investigation.

The conclusions of the tribunal's investigation is, Hezbollah did it.  This prospect has Hezbollah worried.  It has the current Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, very worried.  It has the Lebanese political elite very, very worried.

Hezbollah's capo, Hassan Nasrallah, has the capacity to tumble the government.  In lieu of simply causing the chaos a forced collapse of the central government would bring in its wake, the very hardline Islamist group and its leader may simply demand a reformulation of the Taif Agreement which ended the simmering internal Lebanese war by bringing Hezbollah into the government.  Any reformulation would grant even more power to Hezbollah, a prospect which Israel, among others, finds alarming.

Three ago the politics of Lebanon as threatened by the UN tribunal report made for strange bedmates as Bashir al-Assad met one on one with the King of Saudi Arabia.  The two long standing foes had come together in the hope of making sure there would be no reawakening of the dormant civil war.  For a couple of months it appeared the two had succeeded in brokering some sort of undiscussed in public means of preventing a Lebanese collapse.

The rapprochement has proven short-lived.  The Kingdom of the Two Mosques and the Baathists of Syria have come to a parting of the ways on Lebanon as a direct result of the Syrian-Iranian alliance.  The Syrian government has come out in favor of the candidacy of Nouri al-Maliki.  Maliki is the favorite son of Iran for the office of Iraqi prime minister.  Being Iran's favorite means Maliki must be Syria's as well.

The opting for the Iranian Candidate has infuriated Sunni Saudi Arabia.  Even if it was not possible for Bashir and his government to come out in support of Allawi, who was acceptable to Saudi Arabia, the overt endorsement of Maliki was too much for the Keeper of the Two Mosques.  It was, as they say, a deal killer.

Bashir has also blasted the on-again and now once more, off-again Israeli-Palestinian Authority talks as existing only to "boost Obama."  That he delivered himself of this opinion with Ahmadinejad beaming away in the next chair was not lost on any observer--particularly those in Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian Orator-in-Chief is scheduled to return the call in a couple of weeks.  This means the internal politics of Lebanon will remain in stasis at least until the Man From Tehran heads home on 15 October.  After that date, all bets are off regarding the internal stability of the faction ridden state of Lebanon.

Ahmadinejad, accompanied by Nasrallah, is scheduled to dedicate a garden located not far from the Israel-Lebanon border.  At this time the Guy From Tehran is expected to toss a symbolic stone in the general direction of Israel.  This action close to what Ahmadinejad has called "Iran's border with Israel" raises a question.

No, bucko, not what shape is Ahmadinejad's arm.  Rather, will the Israelis go for a commando raid and snatch, bringing Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah back to Israel to stand trial for either war crimes (in Nasrallah's case) or exciting genocide in regard to Ahmadinejad's many calls for the destruction of Israel.  In a way it is too bad that this intriguing prospect (think glass booths, simultaneous translations, hordes of international observers all in the ala Eichmann manner) is a non-starter.  It would solve so many problems all at once as well as raise a number of other, more fascinating--or at least less repetitive--issues.

In any event watching Lebanon will be a whole lot more fun after the UN tribunal releases its report.  It will be one more episode in the long running and ever-so-bloody drama of Can Lebanon Survive?  In the worst realistic case, the Lebanese situation will be reality TV at its most compelling.

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