Be Careful What You Wish For--Particularly From The UN

The Palestinian Authority has been making noises about going to the UN General Assembly and demanding that body create an independent Palestine with the borders extant before the Six Day War of 1967.  This move may seem appropriate given that it is widely believed the UN General Assembly created an independent Israel with Resolution 181on 29 November 1947,  What the UN did once, it is argued, the UN can do again.

There is only one problem with this contention.  It is wrong.  The General Assembly did not create Israel with Resolution 181.

The resolution accepted the recommendations of the UN Special Committee On Palestine (UNSCOP) including a partition of the old British Mandate of Palestine into two states: one Arab, the other Jewish.  Overlooking the actual population differential in the Mandate which favored the Arabs by better than two to one or the land ownership pattern which showed Arabs owned over three quarters of the land with Jews holding less than ten percent, the UNSCOP report assigned fifty-five percent of the total area to the proposed Jewish state.  The Resolution kicked the details of creating the two states to the Security Council.

The UNSCOP report and the General Assembly action did violate the long standing and often invoked principle of self-determination which had been a hallmark of US policy put forth by Woodrow Wilson as part of the armistice and peace treaty ending World War I.  This troubled a number of observers both overseas and in the US but was overshadowed by the horrors of Nazi policy which had become a staple of the news during the preceding year.

The debate over the UNSCOP report and Resolution 181 did not focus on self-determination so much as it did the legality under the UN Charter of the Security Council or General Assembly creating countries by fiat.  The Soviet Union protested that action such as that proposed for Palestine violated the Charter.  This posture was adopted by Syria as well.  Other countries saw matters the same way.  Many of the ten abstentions and thirteen negative votes were predicated upon the concern that the resolution as well as any consequent Security Council actions would violate the charter, would confer upon the UN the undesirable status of "world government."

The US position as stated rather forcibly by Ambassador Warren Austin was that the Charter did not empower the Security Council to use force to implement a political settlement--even one instituted by the Security Council.  In point of fact the American position was an accurate reading of the Charter.  The coincidence that the US interpretation paralleled the view of the Arab Higher Council (as the several Arab states called their coordinating body) was unintended.  The US had no political ax to grind in the Palestinian question.  That would come later.

The Security Council was apprised repeatedly that any attempt to impose a partition on Palestine would result in a "breech of the peace."  There is a large dose of irony in this: The Security Council had as its primary task the prevention of breeches of the international peace, but in any attempt to partition Palestine, it would be causing the breech.  Delegations from Latin America, Europe, and the Arab Higher Council all warned that violence would be inevitable.

Given the warnings it would have been prudential to say the least if the Security Council moved first to create an international peace keeping force before even considering a change in the status of Palestine.  An alternative which was urged by several states was a referral of the matter to the International Court.  Neither of these courses of action were followed.  Instead the Security Council kicked the can down the road on 5 March 1948.

By this time Resolution 181 had been rendered nugatory by the realities on the ground.  War had broken out. The UN shifted its emphasis from create-a-state to find-a-truce.  The US supported armistice efforts provided they were "without prejudice" to the claims of either Jews or Arabs.  This was the most realistic position even though it almost guaranteed the war would continue until at least one if not both sides reached exhaustion.  Then, and only then, could the process of creating states be undertaken.

And, that is how it played out.  The ill-advised, emotionally driven acts of UNSCOP, and the General Assembly joined with the week-kneed position of the Security Council and the sheer ineptitude of the Arabs to hand over the Palestine Question to the gods of war.  When the shooting finally stopped at the end of the second round of fighting, the new state of Israel had even more land than provided by the generous UNSCOP plan, and the Arabs had nothing.

Ever since then the Arab states as well as the Palestinians have tried to reverse the verdict rendered on the battlefield.  Finally, after years of self-defeating war, terrorism, and diplomacy now worthy of the name, the PA has hit on a new paradigm.  The new approach relies upon delegitimizing Israel in the eyes, not of the world, not even of the majority of the world's people, but of the elites of Western Europe and the US.  In this context, the PA hoped that the new American president would carry the heavy freight of pressuring Israel into accepting a settlement far less than the best.

The American gambit has not paid off yet.  As a result the PA has brought the new arrow from the quiver.  The new arrow has a multi-bladed point, but each blade depends upon an international organization for its lethal sharpness.

One blade consists of the International Criminal Court where the PA is seeking de jure recognition as a state, ostensibly so that it might prefer war crimes charges against Israeli officials and military personnel but substantially so that it might claim to be a sovereign state already in existence.  This would power up its demands for UN recognition of statehood.

Another, even sharper blade, is the UN General Assembly itself.  The PA may well seek an new version of Resolution 181 which creates Palestine qua Palestine.  The UN Charter has not changed since 1947 but the passage of Resolution 181 provides that commodity most highly treasured by lawyers--precedent.  The PA can (and no doubt will) argue that the act in 1947 both justifies and demands correction with the issuance of an updated version.  The PA will have the support of the Arab/Muslim majority states, most of the so-called non-aligned movement and some others.  In aggregate more than enough to secure passage.

The PA will do whatever it can to assure any create-a-Palestine motion stays away from the Security Council.  Not only will the US (probably but not certainly given the Obama predilections) oppose any such measure but so also will Russia and (perhaps) China.  Neither of these states could feel comfortable with the idea that the UN can go around creating states in the interest of preserving international peace given the unrest and separatist movements which exist within their borders.

In the real world, any UN action will not be accepted by Israel.  As was the case back in 1947 when the Arabs were the party of "no," a deal needs two parties at a minimum.  In 1947 or 2011 there cannot be an agreement unless both Jew and Arab say, "yes."  One can safely bet one's booty on the proposition that Israel will not accept a UN diktat.

A PA gambit involving the UN General Assembly is not difficult for Israel to counter.  All that is needed is the political will to move the IDF into the "settlements" and coterminous areas and, with hands on hips say to the PA and its Arab/Muslim supporters  in an imitation of George W. Bush, "Bring it on!"

Far harder to counter effectively is the international demonization of Israel, the campaign of deligitimazation which has worked so splendidly in recent years.  Israeli defiance of the "will of the international community" will boost the efforts of the demonizers by orders of magnitude.  It would enhance the appeal of the peddlers of violent political Islam greatly.  More bombs will detonate.  More people in and outside Israel will die as a consequence.

It doesn't take a Nostradamus to predict that any increase in the lethal operations of groups practicing violent political Islam will bring a push back from the civilized states.  The political and opinion leaders of these states will have no genuine choice when the bombs go off killing their own citizens.  Not even the boasting Iranians can or will deter the inevitable response of the West to an increase in terrorist operations.  That, Jack, is a fact.

The UN muffed the play back in 1947.  It exceeded its brief.  Its reach far exceeded its grasp either as provided in the Charter or as existed in the political will of its membership.  Nothing has changed subsequently.  The UN has an excessive view of its mission and its capacity to undertake its sole genuine mission--preserving international peace.

The irony of 1947 would be repeated--on steroids--should the UN seek to impose a solution upon the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  As was the case in 1947, the body created to preserve and protect peace would, once again, be the cause of war.  This time around the war would bode well to be far more extensive and far more bloody than those of sixty-two years ago.

The takeaway for the PA and its supporters is simple: Be careful what you wish for--you just might get it.

Israel & Palestine And Hamas & Iran

Expectations concerning the direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority reputedly range from low to non-existent. The main reasons given for a pessimism are (1) the Israeli government will not make sufficient concessions and (2) even if all the concessions sought by the PA are given by Israel, they won't be enough as the PA wants a "one state solution."

In addition it can be and has been argued repeatedly that Benjamin Netanyahu is not given to making dramatic give aways. Or, even if the PM was given to a move such as, say, abandoning East Jerusalem to the PA, his right wing coalition partners would pull the plug on his government.

Observers focusing on the PA have noted recurrently that Abbas' government is relatively weak and under constant threat by the gun and Koran wielding folks of Hamas. The reach of the Hamas terror oriented killers was demonstrated vividly with the murder of four Israeli civilians in territory under PA control.

While there is no reason to have a sudden attack of optimism, the pessimistic assessments of the probable outcome of the direct talks do overlook a key consideration or two. The first is that Israel and the PA are faced by a common set of enemies--Iran and Hamas. The second is that the possibility of Iran gaining nuclear weapons constitutes a threat far, far greater than any which might accompany the two state solution, even one which grotesquely favors the PA.

The potential of Iran having its very own "Mahdi Bomb" within the next year or two focused minds in both Israel and the US with a wonderful power. The palpable failure of Mr Obama's much loved outreach program went hand in hand with the equally self-evident inability of the "international community" to halt the spinning centrifuges.

This set of interlocking failures has served to limit the cone of options available to either or both the US and Israel to two: Accommodate themselves to a new global reality; employ force either with or without continued covert interference with the nuclear program and assistance to the political opposition within Iran.

While no one could describe the stance taken by Mr Obama toward Israel and PM Netanyahu in recent weeks as smacking of a love fest, it is a great distance from the flatly hostile attitude exhibited by the Nice Young Man From Chicago a few months back. It is not unsafe to assume that senior members of his administration have finally broken through his hard shell so he can hear and act on the truth regarding Israel and its view of the Iranian bomb.

Somebody (the Geek's money is on Secretaries Clinton and Gates) convinced Mr Obama that Israel cannot for very good reason rely upon the UN or even the US for security in the face of an Iranian existential threat. The president must have been convinced as well of the ground truth that Israel will strike on its own at a time of its choosing with or without US approval or even understanding when the Iranian menace stands ready to attack.

Since the US is Israel's primary source of advanced weapons systems, it is necessary and effective for Israel to maintain high quality relations with the US--as long as doing so does not open Israel to an enhanced probability of becoming "one with Nineveh and Tyre." This dynamic the president must have understood finally gave the US high quality leverage to employ on Israel in support of a primary US policy goal.

Obama wants (desperately needs, is more like it) to bring a peace settlement between Israel and the PA even if this is not synonymous with the oft referenced "comprehensive Mideast peace." Achieving this goal requires Israel marching to American music, and, as both Israelis and their American interlocutors well know, this can be very unpleasant for the marchers. Only the Israeli need for American support--and action--in the event force must be employed to stop the Iranian bomb makers can serve to make the music easier for Israelis to listen to.

In short conditions were ripe for a trade. The US would agree to take all necessary measures to stop the Iranian bomb. Israel would agree to make major concessions in a genuine search for a peace with the PA.

The PA at this point should be dancing in the streets. Events seem to have given the Abbas' coterie the whip hand. That would be true were it not for Hamas.

Hamas and the PA are locked in an existential struggle. Only one will be the sure enough, bona fide, genuine government of Palestine. The increasing totality of the struggle for ultimate power has gone too far to allow compromise. Even if Hamas suddenly dropped its demands for supremacy, ended its increasingly passionate embrace of Islamist purity and political Islam, there is no chance that Israel or the US or even the majority of the EU would go along with the apparent changing of the tiger's stripes.

The PA needs the understanding, support, and assistance of Israel, the US and the EU if it is to survive the challenge being offered by Hamas and its sponsor, Iran. The enemy of my enemy may not be my friend, but he is my vital supporter. Or, so a majority of PA supporters would agree.

This governing imperative implies that the PA will not seek the maximum concessions from Israel--at least not for real or for long. No one in the PA is really comfortable with the two state solution; most or all would prefer a one state approach--one state where Jews would be a minority from the start-up. This attitude is even more pronounced within the ranks of Hamas.

Abbas and others at the peak of the PA have long learned the limits of ideological extremism. All have found out the hard way--by experience--that being extreme may make for great TV but pays off very little when the klieg lights are switched off.

Being born again pragmatists of a sort, Abbas and the rest want to come away with a state, with their jobs intact, and with a reasonable prospect for a long life. Coming to terms with Israel in a way acceptable to the Israelis is the way to go. If necessary (and it will be), the US can sweeten the deal and soften any adverse impact with the cushioning of choice in much of the world--cash.

Right now the "correlation of forces" (to use that maximum fine old Soviet term) favors "let's make a deal." The interlocking bogymen of Iran and Hamas add the necessary fear. The needs of President Obama open the floodgates of American largess. The Israelis need a green light (and, in the best case, a cooperative US attack) to abate the Iranian menace--or at least delay it until internal events can result in regime change. The PA needs a future without Hamas bomb throwers.

Maybe a soupcon of optimism is not completely unjustified. Well, maybe, but don't bet the ranch.

ADMIN NOTE: The Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments. Spam commentary has resulted in defensive measures being put in place. The Geek apologizes for any consequent frustration.

Is Assad Stupid Or Simply Hacked Off?

The widely circulated, Israeli originated report that Syria has shipped Scud missiles to Hezbollah has been confirmed by the terrorist entity which moonlights as a partner in the Lebanese government. In a rather illogical addition to its confirmation Hezbollah averred it couldn't understand what the fuss was all about.

The Hezbollah spokesman, presumably with a straight face maintained the weapons were both old and unusable. Perhaps the speaker's words were lost in translation from Arabic to Arabic and thus appeared garbled in the Kuwaiti paper, Al-Rai. Or, with equal probability, Syria has designated South Lebanon as the approved dump for ancient, decrepit, and broken warlike stores.

Showing their usual propensity for either ambiguity or an inherent inability to keep the stories straight, the Syrian Foreign Ministry continued to deny the reports of a Scud transfer. Instead, the ForMin trotted out the usual counter-allegation: The Israelis are making it all up in order to roil the otherwise peaceful waters of the Mideast and justify their upcoming invasion of peace loving Hezbollahstan.

Showing the fundamentally peaceful inclination of Hezbollah, the Al-Rai piece went on to quote the Man From Hezbollah as saying, "Our organization has many surface-to-surface missiles spread all across Lebanon..." Ah, yes, the old just-in-case gambit.

While there may be individuals in the IDF and government of Israel who may be itching for a rematch to avenge the bloody nose given the Israelis by an unexpectedly competent and well handled Hezbollah force, it is not likely that Israel is in a search for more ways to complicate their already tenuous position. War may be forced upon the country as it was with Operation Cast Lead, but the Israelis aren't looking to provoke one.

It is quite true that Syria has not been showing a great desire to cooperate with either Israel or the US in a quest for a settlement of either regional or bilateral nature. The rejection by Syria of a bid by Israel to establish a trilateral mechanism in the Golan Heights in order to address points of friction is a very recent sign of Syria's harder version of its long standing hard line policy.

Given the rejectionist posture of Syria at the Arab League meeting last month, the rejection is no surprise. Neither is the shipment of Scuds to Hezbollah.

Both the US and Israel have made the customary statements of viewing-with-alarm and warning of the Grave Consequences. In the rhetorical exchanges both sides have played according to long established protocols. The script written so many years back has been followed with verisimilitude. So far, so good as even Hezbollah has sounded almost statesmanlike given its past oratory.

More important than the "who" and "what" in play here is the basic question of "why?"

There are three possibilities.

The first is Bashir al-Assad didn't know what the boys in the backroom were up to. That is possible but unlikely in the extreme. Assad, fils has a firm grasp on all the levers of power and rogue actions would be firmly squashed--as with a bomb under the underling's car when he leaves a party.

The second is Bashir has gone a little funny in the brain housing group. While not impossible a sudden loss of reason on the part of the tightly wrapped man is on the same order of probability as the arrival of a "death star" from the Oort Cloud.

The third alternative is Bashir is torqued off. He is royally hacked over being ignored in the Mideast "Peace Process." As a consequence, the Syrian leader ordered a typically Syrian exercise in subtlety. Sending a few Scuds to Hezbollahstan can be seen as a shouted, "Pay attention to me! I am a major player. The major player. I can make trouble. Or, I can make trouble go away."

Much, if not most of Syria's foreign policy including its "strategic relationship" with Iran can be seen as motivated by the strong desire of Assad, which is universally shared by his government and military, to regain the Golan Heights and, as a matter of slightly lesser importance, exercise operational dominance in Lebanon. These are the pillars of Syrian policy as they have been since the betrayal of Syria by Egypt during the Yom Kippur War twenty-seven years ago.

The most important lesson drawn by Assad, pere and passed on to Assad, fils was the unreliability of allies, even one as supposedly ideologically compatible as Egypt seemed to be in the days of Anwar Sadat. Allies may be useful but, when push comes to shove, any ally will look to its own fortune first.

The linkage between secularist Syria and the mullahocracy of Iran has little, if any, ideological or political foundation. It is an alliance of narrowly defined self-interest on the part of both countries. Services, cash, and support may flow between the mullahs and the Baathist, but there is no further basis than those pragmatic considerations. This implies the alliance is even more fragile than that which died on the battlefields of the Yom Kippur War.

The real goal of Syria in contracting its alliance with Iran was and is to get the US to take Syria seriously, to put an emphasis on pressing Israel to relinquish the Golan, on acknowledging the reality that Syria, not Egypt, not Saudi Arabia, and certainly not the "Palestinians" is the key player in the region. That the gambit has failed to achieve its end is not the fault of the Syrians.

Damascus has played its cards quite well, even putting their own soil at risk to benefit the Iranians. The failure has occurred because American policymakers under both the W. Bush and Obama administrations have been all too willing to be diverted by appearances or spurious events and not see through to the crux of affairs.

The W. Bush administration was unwilling to concede the fact that Lebanon is a geographic expression to a far, far greater degree than it is a functioning nation-state, let alone an authentic democracy. In the long, dark, and bloody years after "Black September," the only force which was able to impose a measure of stability on Lebanon was Syria. When Syria was either devalued in this role or prevented from playing it, chaos ensued.

Damascus considers Lebanon to be in its sole bailiwick. If possible Syria will exercise operational dominance directly but with a a relatively lowered visibility (but always heavy hand.) If prevented from direct intervention Damascus is willing and able to operate through a proxy. This is what is being done with Hezbollah. In point of fact, Hezbollah is the government of Lebanon in all but name.

The danger comes when the proxy becomes strong enough to ignore its patron. This tipping point is coming in Lebanon and Assad knows it. The Scud shipment is a means of postponing the day when Hezbollah tries an end run to Tehran directly.

More infuriating to Syria has been the focus on "Palestine" and the "Palestinians" exhibited by every administration from Clinton to Obama. Being both Arab and a one time sponsor of assorted "Palestinian" groups, the Syrian regime knows quite well that no deal can be made with the zanies of the Palestinian Authority let alone the flat out crazies of Hamas. If for no other reason than the combination of the weight of history and fear of the Islamist jihadists, no figure in the PA can make a deal with Israel on any terms which might prove acceptable to the Israelis and, quite literally, keep on breathing.

Syria knows itself to be a rational actor. In comparison to the PA and Hamas, this position is irrefutable. In Damascus there has been nothing but mystification over the resolute American refusal to see that by solving the Golan Heights question much progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement can be achieved. It is (correctly) thought in Damascus that the Israelis will need to be leaned on heavily if they are ever to disgorge the Golan to its rightful owners. Only the Americans could conceivably apply the requisite diplomatic muscle.

Having watched the Obama administration fruitlessly apply pressure to Israel over settlements in Jerusalem, the Assad regime must be asking itself just what it would take to get Washington to get off the "Palestinian" horse and try something real. If the Americans are going to use pressure, propose their own peace agreement, why shouldn't they focus on the doable? And, what will it take to get the Obama people to see that the Golan is the real center of gravity and not East Jerusalem?

The Scuds to Hezbollah can be seen in this light. The offensive missiles are simply an attention getting device. A way of waking the Obama administration to realities Mideast style. As with their earlier gambits like the Iranian connection any failure will be attributable solely to the blindness of the Americans. On the up side the Scud transfer is a low risk approach. It does nothing to perturb the balance of either military or political power in the region. At the same time it does grab the eye.

Are you watching, Mr Obama? Ms Clinton? Somebody? Anybody??

So, Dudes, What's Your Alternative?

The superb collection of disinterested statesmen known as the Arab League is wrapping up their annual Moan, Groan, Bitch, Whine, and Threaten conference. This year the fractious bunch convened in Libya whose leader, the Greatest Islamic Thinker in Modern Times, Muammar Ghadaffi (or however his name is spelled in English today), presided.

As usual quite a few heads of state including the kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as the aging, ill Egyptian president gave the gabfest a pass. Their absence was barely noticed as the assembled Deep Thinkers of Arabia considered two matters of grave importance. These were, quite unsurprisingly, the (posited) impending failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace "process," and what-are-we-going-to-do about Iran?

The Arab League capo, Amr Moussa, opined that the Arab states have to get their act together and consider the "alternative" when (not if) the current peace "process" comes a total cropper. He represented a consensus to the effect that the "process" is doomed by Israeli obstinacy which in turn had been facilitated by a previous Arab failure. That failure, he averred, resulted from the Arabs, more specifically, the Palestinians under Yassir Arafat, having given the Israelis an open ended process years ago at Oslo.

The diplomatic blunders of the past gave the Israelis time to bulldoze and build in the "Palestinian" portions of Jerusalem. The resultant creation of "facts on the ground" stiffened Israeli political will so that now only the complete halting of construction followed by a total Israeli withdrawal from the purportedly illegally seized "Palestinian" territories would allow the peace "process" to continue.

What made Moussa's views worthy of consideration is his nearly unprecedented willingness to admit that Arabs could or have made any errors in diplomatic judgement. Of course, a less subjective view of the Arabs and diplomacy looking back over the past seventy-five years of talks regarding Jews in the Mideast and their relationship with their Arab neighbors would conclude that the Arabs have an unsurpassed record of diplomatic failure mainly through self-inflicted wounds.

Now, Moussa apparently is convinced that the Obama administration is so eager for a peace settlement that it will do the heavy lifting required for the Arabs to achieve their minimum politically acceptable goal, rolling Israel back to the line of demarcation which existed with the armistice ending the active hostilities of 1948-49. This line of demarcation, which was drawn along the line of military force contact was not an international border, nor was it intended to be such by the UN negotiators. The line, famously drawn on a map in green ink, became known as the "Green Line."

When the Israelis rolled over the Green Line in the Six Day War of 1967, the resultant UN Security Council resolutions did not alter the established nature of the Line as a purely temporary, de facto feature identical to the armistice line drawn at the end of the shooting phase of the Korean War. Neither the Green Line nor the later line of contact in Korea was intended to be a de jure international border.

Thus it takes a highly selective reading of the historical record to conclude that the territory in and around the Old City of Jerusalem was unlawfully seized by the IDF from the sovereign state of Jordan. It takes an equally selective and biased reading to transform the relevant UNSC resolutions following the Six Day War into documents creating an international border where none existed before.

The government of Israel moved rapidly to incorporate the territory in and around the Old City of Jerusalem into the State of Israel. The US government understood and, at the very least, tacitly approved the action even though it refused to move its embassy from Tel Aviv. While it can be argued with accuracy that the Johnson administration approval was motivated by domestic political considerations, that is as irrelevant as stating that President Truman moved with haste almost unseemly in recognizing the new state of Israel for identical reasons.

The annexation of Jerusalem is both a fact on the ground and a fact in law. This twin consideration renders the no-settlement demand nugatory. It does the same with respect to the Saudi Arabian 2002 plan which is the preferred diplomatic fall back position of the Arab League. In fact and in law Jerusalem is a part of Israel. This means that the Israelis may choose to give some or all of it away to the Palestinians but they are not under any duty to do so. They may decide to give away some or all of those portions of Jerusalem which are on the "Jordanian side" of the old Green Line to buy their peace, but there is no objective requirement that they do so.

In the messy real world there is no possibility that the Israelis will evacuate their "settlements" on the east side of the Green Line. Least of all is there any probability that Israel will relinquish the Old City. History and its far more potent cousin, myth, militate against that with irresistible force.

Nor is there much likelihood that the government of Israel will accept the other key provision of the 2002 Saudi plan, the acceptance of a Palestinian "right of return" to property they or their ancestors owned and occupied prior to the 1948-49 wars. There is no right of return, nor is Israel under any affirmative duty to "compensate" either those who fled or their descendants for alleged losses. In this regard it must be remembered that most of those who fled did so at the urgings of the sundry Arab governments whose armed forces were attacking the infant state filled with the certainty of impending victory. (This does not relieve the Israelis of their moral culpability for the several atrocities committed against Palestinians by elements of their armed forces.)

The first take away is simple. All parties, Arab as well as American, best get a grip on the inconvenient fact that Jerusalem is part and parcel of Israel, and it is going to remain such unless and until the Israeli public allows a government to purchase peace with some or all of the Old City and environs.

The second take away is equally simple albeit more unpleasant. The only alternative to continuing the peace "process" as currently conceived and structured is war.

While the current process is slow, painful, and, for the Arabs in particular, unlikely to produce a result which is palatable, it is far less messy, infinitely less painful, and not quite as likely to produce a completely unacceptable result than is war. And, no mistake should be made here, the only alternative is war.

That subtext resided quite clearly in the words of Moussa and others at the Monster Rally in Sirte. The war may be open, conventional, or semi-covert, asymmetrical in nature. In either event the highest probability is that the Arab/Palestinian side will come up short. They will lose as their predecessors have lost so often in the past.

It is not improbable that the realization of this dismal possibility undergirds the call for "engagement" of Iran by the Arab League as a collective polity. True the call for collective engagement was couched in terms of concern over the Iranian nuclear program and apprehension regarding the growing influence of Iran in the region.

At the same time the call acknowledges implicitly that only Iran possesses the actual and potential means to defeat Israel in either open or proxy war. The realization that the Shia Persians have capacities lacking in the Arab League members individually or collectively must be bitter in Arab mouths. Nonetheless that is the reality today and into the foreseeable future.

If the only alternative to the current peace "process" recognizable to the Arab states is war then it follows that the only way in which the Arabs can hope to do other than lose is with the enlistment of Iran on their side. In this context the Arab League would do well to recall the hoary proverb about riding tigers: It is far easier to mount the beast than to get off without being eaten in the process.

Sarkozy Storms The Golan--But Will He Take It?

Nicholas Sarkozy is a take-charge-and-move-out sort of man. Since the French "Elect-A-King" form of government wisely places foreign policy and military matters firmly in the hands of the president, Sarkozy is able to work on his own policy imperatives as such are seen solely by him and his cabinet to further French national and strategic interests.

With this as context and taken in conjunction with M. Sarkozy's firm disdain for aspects of Islamic life and politics, it is neither surprising nor out of character for him to have jumped in what is potentially the most profitable direction for Mideast peace. During a recent Paris meeting between himself and Bashir Assad, the French president offered his assistance in gaining Israeli agreement to the return of the Golan to Syria.

By focusing on Syria and ignoring the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and the other diversions so beloved by the Obama administration, M. Sarkozy is being both realistic and willing to take a risk. He made no flights of glittering (and historically wrong) rhetoric praising Arabs and Islam. Nor did he demand the Israelis do something dramatic--and self-destructive.

All M. Sarkozy did was to build upon his good personal relations with both Assad and Israeli PM Netanyahu as well as his correct understanding that Syria was the key player in the Mideast. He called upon both countries to start direct negotiations without preconditions.

Of course, Sarko knows that there is one precondition resident in any talks between Israel and Syria. That, of course, is the Golan Heights. Israel must commit to rapidly and completely leave the Golan in order for any Israeli-Syrian peace talks to have meaning.

Assad knows this. Netanyahu knows this. Presumably any individual with any interest in and knowledge of the dynamics of the Mideast knows it as well.

Syria regains full control and exercise of sovereignty over the Golan Heights and a peace treaty comes quick and complete. Syria does not regain full control and exercise of sovereignty over the Golan Heights and there will be no Mideast peace regardless of any papers signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The Golan Heights represents the purist and most difficult test of Israel's desire for peace. If the government of Mr Netanyahu does not take up M. Sarkozy's offer promptly and effectively, the only legitimate conclusion is that Israel does not genuinely want permanent peace in the region regardless of what it might say.

The Golan Heights issue is clear, constrained, well defined, and free of the complications resident in the other disputed territories. Israel has no legitimate security concerns involved in the Golan. It has had no real-world military anxieties regarding the Golan region for at least thirty years. Not only has the UN monitoring mission worked completely, the changes in military technology which have occurred over the past three and more decades obviate the slight justification for the initial Israeli occupation forty-two years ago.

A refusal by Israel under whatsoever coloration to pick up the Sarkozy offer cannot help but put the lie to all that country's allegations of "security" issues being the fatal obstacle to regional peace. A refusal to work out the details of quickly returning the Golan Heights to Syria proves to even a very Israelophilic observer that the June War of 1967 was a land (and water) grab pure and simple. It would demonstrate to even an Arabophobic observer that the oft repeated Arab allegations that Israel is an aggressive, expansionist state have a strong seed of truth.

The Obama administration should be strongly backing the French offer. It is not enough simply to undo a bit of the damage in US-Syrian relations inflicted by the Bush/Cheney bunch. It is necessary to accept that Assad is a very, very important player in the region. More important than Mubarak or Abdullah II or even the Saudi monarch.

The administration should be doing all it can in support of the French move since the Golan is the clearest, purest, and most readily achievable test of both Israeli and Arab willingness to make peace. Best of all, dealing with Assad does not require either bowing to the Saudis, kissing the hem of Muslim skirts, or making any demands upon the Israelis which would be politically onerous.

Yes, there is one demand that must be laid on Israel. It is simple. Easy to understand. Hard to evade with honor and veracity intact.

Here it is: Put up or shut up. If you want peace, make it march. If you don't, just go ahead and stall, wiggle around, play word games, pull out the Israel Lobby, but the fact remains that you won't have peace and you have been exposed as a land (and water) snatching miniature imperialist. That would make continued American support very difficult.

The administration and President Obama must understand that the Sarkozy gambit has the potential to break open the stalemated game of peace making in the Mideast. Sure, it must bruise your ego(s) a bit to have the upstart Frenchman, who reputedly remarked to his cabinet apropos the US president, "Beam up, Barrak," accomplish a feat which has eluded your blandishments and threats alike.

But, Mr Obama, Ms Clinton, and the rest of you: If you really, really want peace in the Mideast, the time has come to take second place to the French and back them to the fullest.

Saudi Arabia Goes To War (Sort Of)

The Saudis have a very fine record of buying weapons systems, the more expensive the better. The House of Sand also has a good history of talking tough, at least regarding Israel. However, the armed forces of the Kingdom usually have been either absent or very late arriving whenever and wherever there are real bullets being fired with genuinely hostile intent.

This has changed of late. The Houthi insurgents of Yemen had the temerity to cross the border into the Land of the Two Mosques with unpleasant results for the local Saudi outpost. The Saudis responded with air attacks on villages in Yemen suspected of supporting or hiding the Houthi fighters. Along with the fast mover hits on the adobe and rock hooches of Yemen, the Saudi ground forces moved back into the border area after the Houthis had withdrawn either with or without prisoners. (Reports on that vary and an assessment as to which might be more likely is a bit risky since the Houthi are not noted for their propensity to take prisoners, but balancing this is the potential for propaganda.)

The background of this border operation is murky. The Houthis maintain that they had a deal with the Kingdom to use a piece of border terrain. They aver the Saudis had promised not to allow the Yemeni forces to cross this area in order to attack the Houthis but reneged on the deal. The border raid was in revenge for this Saudi sell-out.

The air strikes conducted by the Saudis were complemented by artillery fire from the Yemeni army. Most of those downrange were probably civilians as the fighters normally disperse to the rugged, cave pocked terrain outside of the mountain villages when under threat. Whatever the reality on the ground, the Saudis have claimed success in killing "infiltrators."

The operations against the Houthi will be time limited and involve few, if any, ground forces. The Kingdom is not at all willing to find itself drawn more deeply into the affairs of Yemen despite the threat presented by Yemen based al-Qaeda assets. The assertions by the Saudi military and government that only territory on the Saudi side of the border was attacked is credible if one limits consideration to ground force actions only. It is not credible with respect to air strikes.

It will be hard for the Saudis to maintain their hands-off approach if the Houthi insurgency continues much longer. The Kingdom and other Sunni members of the Gulf Coordination Council have already made repeated references to the role Iran is playing in the Houthi war.

There is little doubt Iran has provided some assistance to the Houthi even though the nature and amount of that assistance is a matter for debate. At the same time the Kingdom has provided military materiel as well as financial assistance to the Yemeni government. So far the Saudi aid has been a matter of too little even if not really too late.

The Kingdom has also responded to the out-of-Yemen threat with a high-tech Maginot fence which is both much longer and orders of magnitude more expensive than the American Great Fence of the Southwest. The Saudi excursion into fence building will probably prove to be a great expenditure for nothing. Even Saudi officials have admitted the fence will not stop infiltrators. (They hope it might deter vehicles.)

The US, not surprisingly, has expressed "concern" over the recent escalation in fighting. It would be in the overall American (and Western) interest to be more than merely concerned.

There is more at stake in this particular armpit of the globe than either the rights and immunities of civilians or the sanctity of the Saudi border. Armpits come in pairs. Yemen is one. Conveniently right across the Gulf of Aden is the other. Somalia.

As al-Shabaab gains both sway and momentum in Somalia, it has been joined by an ever increasing number of fugitive Islamist jihadists from Iraq and even Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unless a hostilities termination and conflict resolution formula can be found for Yemen, there is little doubt that Islamist jihadists will find a supportive environment in the rocks and deserts of that monument to Muslim instability.

The presence of profoundly anti-Western, anti-American Islamist jihadists in full flourish on both sides of the Gulf of Aden would put a severe crimp in the maritime commerce through the Suez Canal. The repercussions of this would not be beneficial to either the West or the feudal sheikdoms of the Mideast. It would be surprising in the extreme if the mullahs and their stooges in Tehran are unaware of this.

The Saudis will continue to try to bribe their way out of the unpleasant situation developing on their border. The House of Sand will probably try to induce the Americans (or other infidels from, say, the EU) to do the heavy lifting so that stability might be imposed in Yemen before the noise of exploding VBIEDs disturbs the Kingdom's tranquility unduly.

The operative word for the Obama administration to be considering in this venue is "leverage." The question is which country has the longer, greater lever: The US or Saudi Arabia and its cohorts in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Obama team had best consider the matter seriously and quickly. More depends upon the use of leverage than the fly rich rocks and sand of Yemen. Can we say, "Comprehensive Mideast peace?"

You betcha, bubba, there is a lot of potential in the Yemen-Houthi affray. It all depends on how it is viewed--and used.

Whatever Happened To "Comprehensive Peace?"

After all the hoopla, all the hype, all the No More Settlements! declarations, after all the pressure, what is going on with the Obama administration's quest for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Mideast? The short answer is, nothing.

The President and his foreign policy crew have shown remarkable naivete regarding the relations of Israel, the "Palestinians," and the rest of the Arab states. Perhaps it is unfair to characterize the Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Not So Nice Older Woman From New York as "naive." It would be more apropos to describe them as having accepted the post-Intifada new narrative of Israel-as-bully.

Admittedly, the new narrative crafted by an interesting assortment of liberals and cultural relativists has more than a small grain of truth. The grain grows to almost boulder size when considering the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 Six Day War.

It is important to recall two important facts regarding the Six Day War and its aftermath. They are critical in understanding both the old narrative, Israel-as-victim and the new one, Israel-as-bully.

The administration of Lyndon Johnson knew the war was coming months, even years before the Israeli government took advantage of the precipitant actions of Egyptian dictator Nasser to justify a "defensive" preemptive war. The Johnson administration had been warned within the context of the Israeli request for long-range fighter/bombers and main battle tanks in 1964 by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA that the Israeli Defense Forces would launch an attack against the Arab "frontline" states as soon as the equipment was fully integrated.

(The JCS recommended substituting shorter range jets and tanks which would have met Israeli defense needs but lacked the ranges necessary for offensive operations. The administration ignored the suggestion.)

The Johnson administration also knew (or should have known) from CIA and State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports that the government of Israel was of the habit of creating "facts on the ground" which served to render negotiations nugatory. The implication was simple: If sufficient time elapsed between the taking of land and the end stage of negotiations, the government of Israel would assure the creation of facts on the ground which had the effect of nullifying the results of diplomacy.

There was no legitimate reason for the Johnson administration to have been taken by surprise by the commencement of the Six Day War or by the unwillingness of the government of Israel to respond positively to either UN resolutions or the importuning of the administration that land be exchanged for peace. The IDF acted as predicted during the war. The government of Israel acted as predicted during both the runup to the war and its aftermath.

The Israeli position regarding the West Bank and the Golan Heights at the time and for all the weary talk-filled decades subsequently was that the territory taken and occupied was utterly essential for the physical security of Israel. The military technology of the time certainly provided a plausible justification for the Israeli refusal to surrender the land in exchange for anything other than an enforceable comprehensive peace.

All the while, particularly after the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli government created facts on the ground in both the West Bank and Golan Heights. The "settlements" as these new urban centers were charmingly entitled as if they were small, temporary frontier shantytowns, were crafted with both military and diplomatic imperatives in mind.

Militarily, they provided means of both local defense and canalization of presumed armored thrusts from Jordan into pre-arranged killing zones. Diplomatically, the investment in the "settlements" provided a means of assuring that negotiations would never provide for the return of the previously sparsely or unoccupied real estate to either Jordan or some hypothetical "Palestinian" state.

Yitzhak Shamir made his long career as Israeli Prime Minister on the basis of talking-while-building. Benjamin Netanyahu studied at the master's feet. Talk, talk and build. Build worked then--and now, as the Obama administration has found out to its discomfort and dismay.

The brutal reality is that Israel contemplated expansionist war, prepared for it, and, when a proper, plausible pretext arrived, waged it. The Six Day War was a land grabbing deal. Period.

Had the US been in a position to back the UN resolutions with pressure of its own before facts were planted all over the occupied territories, there is reason to believe that a comprehensive Mideast peace might have been worked out. Not a lot of reasons, to be sure, but some.

Domestic political considerations including the wavering support for the already seemingly endless Vietnam War nudged the Johnson administration and its follow-on, the Nixon Gang, to lean only very, very lightly on Israel. Encouraged by the constant US support, the government of Israel stopped talking in a meaningful way about retreating from the occupied territories and kept on building.

The same combination of domestic political considerations and Israeli genius for talking only to undercut any potential benefit from the talks by building operated throughout the next two decades. Sure, Israel did return the Sinai in return for the cold peace it has had with Egypt, but the notion of keeping the Sinai in perpetuity never crossed the Israeli governments' collective minds. And, it gave a nice gloss to the notion that Israel really wanted peace with its neighbors.

Throughout these years the American (and to a major extent, European) liberal constituency accepted the Israel-as-victim narrative. The sea change in view started with the dramatic imagery coming from the First Intifada. Coming as they did after the controversial Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its concomitants including the refugee camp massacres and the exposure of American troops to terrorist bombs, the visuals from the First Intifada made thinking of Israel as the Seven Hundred Pound Gorilla permissible.

Had Arafat and his fellow Fatahmen been at all competent at the negotiation game in Oslo and elsewhere, they would have been able to get a better deal at the table--even offset some, but certainly not all, of the advantages gained by the Israeli "settlement" policy. They weren't. Indeed, Arafat and company set a record for sheer incompetence in negotiation which has never been equaled by the Bozos of the current Abbas directed Palestinian Authority.

Despite the sheer lack of Arab skills in the assorted rounds of talks from Madrid to Annapolis and regardless of the degree of external support offered by foreign interlocutors, the Arabs have been the continued beneficiaries of the new, post-First Intifada narrative, Israel-as-(intransigent) bully.

The Obama administration entered the fray with whoops and hollars, most notably the demand that Israel end the "settlement" construction. Worse, there has been a set of mixed messages coming from the mouth of the President personally, including ones delivered at the UN over the past twenty-four or so hours.

Is the US demanding a (temporary or permanent) end to "settlement" construction? Is it requiring a rollback of the several hundred thousand Israelis from the "settlements" erected on the (arguably) illegally occupied territory of the West Bank? If so, is the US taking the position that the buildings, the infrastructure, be turned over to the Palestinian Authority as a turn key proposition? With compensation or without? The hazy, even contradictory language used by Mr Obama and others in his administration leave all interpretations equally open--which is fatal to meaningful negotiations.

Hard cases--those where equal amounts of justice sit on both sides--make not only for bad law, they make for very bad policy. Forty years ago, even thirty, the idea of an Israeli rollback would have been both just and logical. Today, the concept of rollback is neither just nor logical. And, it is not practicable in that Israel is not about to either (forcibly) evacuate several hundred thousand of its citizens from the "settlements" or turn the physical plant over to the Palestinian Authority.

This means any sort of "return to the pre-1967 borders" is as likely as whales flying. It also implies that stopping the admittedly highly elastic "natural growth" of these "settlements" is not probable. The Obama administration was pursuing a red herring in this context.

A contiguous Palestinian Authority state can be created using the current "facts on the ground." It will not be all that the Palestinian Authority and its citizens might want, or even, from the perspective of abstract justice, they might deserve. But it would be better than the current situation of turbulence.

In return, the government of Israel might have to drop its demand that the Palestinian Authority recognize Israel as a "Jewish State." It might even imply that the government of Israel drop its not illegitimate requirement that the new Palestinian Authority state be de-militarized, although that proviso is well justified by the reality seen in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. It is not a perfect exchange, but it seems to be one which is good enough. In diplomacy more than most areas of human endeavor, the perfect is always the enemy of the good--or good enough.

In any event if the Obama administration is to have more effect than its predecessors on the endless "Mideast peace process," it must abandon both the old and new narratives. Israel--and the Palestinians--are neither bullies nor victims. One is a sovereign state. The other is a pretender to that status. This means that neither can be seen in stereotyped human terms.

Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have a single coinciding national interest. Both would live a lot better if they both lived in peace. Trading land for peace is the only way to get to that national interest in the real world. The Palestinian Authority will have to accept the "settlements" as facts on the ground and make the best territorial deal it can. Israel will have to drop the peripheral issues such as "Jewish state" and even de-militarization.

The Obama administration will have to stop pressuring Israel. And, not pressure the Abbas crowd. This is a time and place--unlike Burma--where engagement rather than coercion, where inducements, even bribery, is preferable if results are wanted rather than threats, sanctions, boycotts, or the other impedimenta of pressure.

And, the President should remember--and remind his people--this is a normal part of dealings in diplomacy, particularly diplomacy in the Mideast where the clocks sometimes seem to run in reverse.

Obama And Mubarak Bet On The Wrong Horse

While the reports on the meeting between Hosni Mubarak and President Obama are skimpy in the details department, one thing (other than the hyperbolic mutual congratulations) is apparent. Both men are wedded to the notion that a joint Hamas-Fatah run Palestinian Authority will be dominated by the older, larger group, Fatah. In this they are as wrong as a soup sandwich.

As laid out in a previous post, the most Islamist jihadist elements of both groups, particularly Hamas, are driving the political direction of the Palestinian movement generally and the PA in particular. The dynamic is well understood historically, and if not inevitable in the current situation, it is the next thing to that.

Further, there can be no doubt that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is a subsidiary of Iran. Neither the Iranians nor Hezbollah have made any bones about this. Nor, have either said that Hamas in independent of Tehran. Quite the contrary, Tehran has taken some credit for the success of Hamas. Thus the inference that Hamas is a tail being wagged by the Iranian dog is not the creation of Israeli paranoia or self-serving.

Egypt has much riding on the accomplishment of a Hamas-PA rapprochement, considering the time and political capital the Mubarak government has expended on the effort. While Egypt may benefit in some way by bringing the shotgun marriage of two unequal, unsuited for each other parties into existence, this does not mean the search for a comprehensive Mideast peace will benefit as well.

Even without the odious influence of the mullahocracy, the climate of loathing and religious justification for both the feeling and violent expressions based upon it do not bode well for any sort of peace. In a real sense too much blood has flowed over the dam during the past half century and more for hatred and the desire for revenge to be put on some faraway shelf in a back closet.

The Islamist jihadists within the Palestinian population as well as their similarly minded supporters elsewhere in the Mideast have shown the capacity to pile demand on top of demand until the Israelis have no choice beyond the stark one of rejection or accepting an existential risk. No government willingly has or will place its population at risk of attack, fear, and death (with the exception of Hamas which has a splendid record of doing just this.)

The road to peace, if there is any, does not run through Cairo. Nor does it run through Gaza. It doesn't even travel through the territories currently governed by the PA.

The route toward peace requires removing the outside support currently backing the Islamist jihadists of both Gaza and the West Bank. The Islamist jihadists must be isolated, marginalised, made trivial. This means their outside supporters--headed by Syria--have to be brought to the table.

As has been written here numerous times, Syria has the most to gain by making peace with Israel. Syria wants the Golan Heights. Period.

The US, the Obama administration, should immediately proceed to offer a deal to Syria: Drop your connections to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and we will put the Godzilla on Israel to hand back the Golan.

Then the Obama-ites have to do just that. Sure, the Israelis will scream like bloody murder as they want to keep the water and other resources of the Golan Heights. But, they have a lot to gain by giving up this particular segment of the Great Land Grab War of 1967--severing Syria from both Hezbollah and Hamas.

Without Syria the aid given by Iran to both terrorist groups will be rendered unimportant. The situation on the Lebanon front would be stabilized. (And, would be even more stable if US objections to Syrian "meddling" in Lebanon would be lowered.)

Without Syria the task of supplying and guiding Hamas would be made much more difficult for the mullahs of Iran. If Egypt were to get really, really serious about policing their side of the border with Hamastan, the flow of weapons and other deadly materials as well as much of Hamas' economic base would be reduced--greatly.

A further benefit could accrue to the US by brokering a deal with Syria and normalizing our relations with the country. Syria would respond by upping their efforts to control their side of the Syria-Iraq border which would put something of a crimp in the recent wave of (probable) Sunni executed bombing attacks in Baghdad and elsewhere.

Not bad, eh, bucko?

The fundamental problem of President Obama's current tactics in the Mideast is his propensity for putting pressure on Israel over the wrong "settlements"--and his willingness to back the wrong main man in the Arab states.

Hosni Mubarak is not the correct man right now. In a real sense his day is past.

Bashir al-Assad is the right man, right now. His day is on us. We need only to realize and act upon this fact. His role in the securing of Mideast peace is critical.

Of course, it is legitimate to wonder if the Obama administration has the wit to recognize this.

Hamas Goes Islamist

Hamas has always been rhetorically inclined toward the Islamist and Islamist jihadist line. But, until quite recently the Islamism of Hamas has been far more oratorical than practical. That has changed.

Hamas has always been seen (and seen itself) as a primarily nationalistic entity oriented toward seizing power in all the territory currently under Arab control as a preliminary to the destruction of Israel. The violent takeover of the Gaza Strip was merely stage one in the process.

It was not long after the Hamas triumph in Gaza that the organization came under increasing pressure from the more totalistic Islamists in their midst. Over the past eighteen months the challenge from the "left," that is the Salifist rooted, al-Qaeda leaning Islamist jihadists, has grown more rapidly than even the extensive instruments of repression at Hamas' disposal could counter.

Belatedly Hamas attempted to get ahead of the Islamist jihadist curve by moving to impose a more austere Shariah predicated view on the population of Gaza. The first sign of this co-option was the requirement for "modest" dress at the beaches of Gaza. This put-the-women-back-in-garbage-sacks effort was quickly followed by other gambits ranging from the banning of mixed gender social events to the closing of coffee houses and Internet cafes and a prohibition against chewing gum.

The efforts failed. Spectacularly.

The extent of the failure was shown dramatically by the Great Mosque Shoot-Out a few days ago. Abdel-Latif Moussa, the jefe grande of the Salifist based group, Jund Ansar Allah (Warriors of God), preached a sermon of direct defiance to the Hamas regime. Hamas responded literally within minutes with an armed attack on the mosque.

The consequent firefight lasted several hours. More than a few of Allah's Warriors and some Hamas gun slingers were sent to Paradise (or its antipodes.) Abdel-Latif reportedly blew himself up as Hamas' gunsels closed in on his house.

End of firefight. But not end of story.

The Jund Ansar Allah drew its membership from the younger components of the Gaza population. These men are and have been bitterly frustrated by the failure of Hamas to establish a properly Islamist polity and society as well as its apparent lack of a will-to-combat against Israel.

The tipping point came with Operation Cast Lead. The ease with which the IDF penetrated the Hamas "defenses" as well as the utter lack of any response by Hamas in the weeks following the IDF withdrawal moved more and more young (and youngish) men into the ranks of JAA and other, smaller, but no less Islamist jihadist groups in the Strip.

Hamas has no choice now but to move further and faster along the road to the most extreme form of Islamist jihadism. In this, their sponsor, Iran, will no doubt be both supportive and gratified.

The continued refocusing by Hamas on Islamist jihadism has a number of implications. None of them are positive from the perspective of forming a Mideast peace deal.

As Hamas goes so also must Fatah and its larger cousin, the Palestinian Authority. While the West Bank areas under the control of the PA are both tranquil and prosperous in comparison to "Hamastan," the PA must contend with its own growing body of Islamist jihadist leaning young men. As the recently concluded Fatah party congress demonstrated, there is an appreciable generation gap in its ranks. At the moment the old men of Fatah hold power but they have been forced to admit representatives of the younger, more militant, far more Islamist jihadist oriented men into the leadership circle.

As in many, if not most, "revolutionary" dynamics there has been, is, and will be a thrust to the "left," the more extreme, more passionate, more simplistic, more totalistic position. While much of Crane Britton's model of revolution has been disproved, this steady move to the extreme remains unchallenged.

The Islamist jihadist worldview is simple, easy to understand. Its goals are firm, well-defined, utterly totalistic in nature. Its dynamic takes advantage not only of a firm base well established in the Muslim faith and its practice over centuries, it also fully taps into the passions driven by frustration, fear, and bitterness. It, like other ideologies including Marxism-Leninism and National Socialism, promises victory. Unlike these other, purely secular faiths, Islamist jihadism promises a win-win: Victory in death by instant passage to Paradise.

No mistake must be made about it: Islamist jihadism has an appeal and a power almost impossible to underestimate. This is equally true whether one accepts the sociological/economic explanation of jihadism or one which focuses on the linkage between personal identity and personal religious belief.

As Islamist jihadism becomes an every increasing driver of the agendas and actions of Hamas and, inevitably, the PA, the quest for the ever elusive goal of a comprehensive peace in the Mideast will become ever more difficult. Not simply because both Hamas and the PA will be more resistant to any form of compromise. Nor because Arab states generally will back the fulminating irredentism in order to protect themselves from Islamist jihadist attack.

While these two factors in and of themselves would be sufficient to put a speed bump of Mount Everest proportions on the road to peace, they will be joined by a third. Israel will match the Arabs intransigence for intransigence.

This tit-for-tat dynamic will ensue not because the current Israeli government is more obstinate than most (although it sure can seem that way) but because any violent action taken by the Arabs must result eventually in an even more violent Israeli response. The Israeli government is not any more loath to defend its people, territory, and interests than is the government of the US or any other country.

As was demonstrated in the long months of constant Hamas attacks, the government of Israel can be very, very patient. It matters not that the patience is required by purely tactical considerations such as assuring minimal world and, more importantly, US disapproval of the IDF counter blow. The critical fact is that all patience comes to an end. The record shows convincingly that when it does, it is the Arabs who suffer the most death, the greater destruction.

The historical record also demonstrates that every time the Arab "tit" is followed by the Israeli "TAT," peace hopes and plans vanish like a desert mirage. This brutal reality is, of course, central to the Islamist jihadist agenda.

The prohibition of chewing gum may seem humorous. The stick-women-back-in-garbage-sacks regulations may be disgusting. In and of themselves these things don't matter--except to those directly involved. Even though the more revolting (to most Westerners at least) aspects of Shariah may violate human rights, the moves by Hamas are no more repugnant than practices already long established in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan.

What is most important, what must be firmly gripped by policy makers in the US, is that the imposition of Shariah is not the end of the Islamist jihadist agenda. No. It is merely the beginning. The next stage is the ramping up of violence, of terror, of attacks on Israeli (and other) civilians. The real deal, the nitty-gritty of the Islamist jihadist game plan, is the total blockage of any Mideast peace.

The initiative rests not with the diplomats or the Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration. The power of decision and action does not reside with genuflections before the totems of Islam. Nor does it lie with those who posit a sociological or economic or educational response to the power of Islamist jihadism.

No. The initiative, the capacity to control the nature and direction of affairs in the Arab-Israeli conflict rests solely with those willing to kill and die in keeping with their True Belief. It rests with the trigger pullers and suicide bombers. More, it lives with those ambitious, driven men who control the pullers of triggers and pushers of clickers.

Whether anyone likes the idea or not, the ground truth is that the game is being run as it has been for some years now by the Islamists, the jihadists, the men of evil. Get a grip on it.

Israel--More Of A Symbol Than A Reality

The Geek just read an excellent post by Robert Fulford in the National Post regarding the nature of Israel qua Israel as the new universal recipient of hatred. Israel is not simply a target of criticism for its policies, practices, and actions. Not anymore. Now, Israel has been transmogrified into the vessel for the ancient and reprehensible vice of anti-Semitism.

In a very real sense Fulford's views bring the thesis of a recent book, Israel Is Real: An Obsessive Quest For The Jewish Nation And Its History, by journalist Richard Cohen, into a sharp focus. Cohen's work is predicated on the idea that the creation of Israel has made Jews far less safe than they have been throughout the centuries of the diaspora. There is much to commend this counter-intuitive understanding as Fulford's rendition of the growth of Israel-bashing as an industry in much of the West--including the US--demonstrates.

Fifty and more years ago in the Geek's teenage years, there was a sense of universal approbation for Israel within the American public, particularly the American elite, the chattering class, the academics, the opinion molders. The Israelis were applauded almost without exception for their industry, their battlefield valor, their willingness to sacrifice, their ability to "make the desert bloom." The Sabras, the kibbutz, and the kibbutzniks were held up as examples worthy of emulation by the kids of suburban Chicago (and, presumably, elsewhere.)

Even the Suez War of 1956, which was both opposed and brought to an end by the efforts of President Eisenhower, was not particularly disapproved of by We the People. The mere fact that the effort of France, the UK, and Israel to topple Nasser, regain the Suez Canal for "civilization," and seize the Sinai constituted a criminal conspiracy eluded American opinion including that possessed by individuals well sited to know the reality.

Israel's star remained on the ascendant though the Sixties. The increased use of terror attacks by the "Palestinian resistance" led by Fatah brought increased sympathy toward and support of Israel among the elites of Western Europe and the US. The Six Day War of 1967 brought universal acclaim within the US--and most of Europe.

Jokes concerning the back-up lights on Egyptian tanks flew across TV. Invidious comparisons between the success of the IDF and the (perceived) failure of American forces in South Vietnam were commonplace both here and in Europe. Once again no one seemed aware of the calculated way in which Israel both planned and executed the war so that an act of real estate acquisition could be plausibly disguised as a "defensive" effort against a coalition of forces which greatly outnumbered and outgunned poor, little Israel.

The Arab response of terror, more terror, and even more terror could not have been better planned to secure support for Israel had that been the goal of Arafat and his ilk. Airline hijackings, aircraft bombings, suicide attacks on soft, civilian targets and, ultimately, the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, all worked to Israel's advantage in the collective mind of the West, of the US.

Arafat's swaggering bluster and pistol wearing at the UN General Assembly worked to Israel's advantage as well. To put it simply and bluntly, the Arabs were not, are not and probably never will be, masters of public relations. Certainly the war for the approbation and approval of the West was won by Israel through the Sixties and Seventies.

When the Egyptians staged their surprising breakthrough of the Bar Lev Line at the outset of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, it rocked the American and European elites and publics alike. The Nixon administration rushed assistance to Israel with the full support of We the People. The American people cheered almost as lustily as the Israelis when the IDF crossed the Suez Canal cutting off the majority of the Egyptian Army.

The Arab oil embargo orchestrated and led by Saudi Arabia in the wake of the IDF triumph did more than anything to assure a firm support for Israel among We the People. Far more even than the awesome capacities of the Israel Lobby, the oil embargo and the all-too-obvious intransigence of the Arabs generally made certain that We the People would keep firmly in the Israeli camp.

The Arabs, their culture and religion particularly, became their own worst enemies in the battle for understanding and support in the West generally and the US in particular. From its foundation in the late Forties through the late Seventies, Israel was rooted culturally in the Western tradition. The Arabs were not at all Western in norms, values, belief systems, or institutions of society and polity. They were the "other" in all essential respects while the Israelis were one of us.

Unnoticed in the US until the Eighties was the demographic shift in the Israeli population. As the decades had rolled by, the originally European tint of Israel had been slowly replaced by the increased and increasingly obvious hue of Mideast origin Jews who had flooded Israel as they were pogromed out of their home countries in the region. In tandem the Orthodox Jews had become an ever more important political and social force in Israel, which further diminished the somewhat secularist orientation of the socialist, European founders of the country.

The combination of Orthodox and Mideast origin Israelis made the expansionist orientation of the country ever more evident. While never absent, the emergence of Likud as the dominant political party assured the new hardline would be unmistakable.

The IDF response to the First Intifada brought to the TV screens of the West a very disturbing picture of the Israeli Goliath mashing the Palestinian David into the mudholes of Gaza and the West Bank. For the first time Israel was liable to criticism--severe criticism. The government and apologists for Israel lashed back with not-so-well veiled descriptions of the criticism as being anti-Semitic diatribes.

The government of Israel and its supporters, particularly in the US were so used to having a free ride in the public opinion department that neither had a clue as to how to respond both properly and effectively to those who saw the IDF and Shin Bet treatment of rock throwing kids as a blotch on the nation's ethical stature. The denunciation of well-founded complaints of Israeli human rights violations as being anti-Semitism was both wrong and ill-advised.

Worse, it was a blunder.

Had the assorted "Palestinian liberation" groups been able to refrain from terrorism they would have won the changed public opinion battleground quickly and definitely. Had Arafat and company been able and willing to exhibit the slightest skill at compromise, at genuine negotiation, at forswearing totalistic goals such as the eradication of Israel, the establishment of a genuine two state solution was within the realm of the doable in the wake of the First Intifada.

With the Likud dominated government of Israel and the Arabs locked in a tie for the title of Most Intransigent, the advantage went to Israel, which possessed not only the formidable capacities of the Israel Lobby but a strong residuum of good will within the American public. While Americans were (and are) likely to hold Israel to higher ethical standards than they do the Arabs, We the People are willing to cut the Israelis some slack given the reprehensible tactics of terror and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

In short, Israelis have occasional lapses in behavior, but the Arabs always act worse.

Still, within the opinion molding elites of both Europe and the US, the balance had started to shift. The shift continued in the course of the Second Intifada and its aftermath. Increasingly, the government of Israel was perceived as unreasonably wedded to its "facts on the ground" as well as having been entirely too shrewd in how it carved up the territory reserved to the new Palestinian Authority. For the first time it became respectable to doubt, to question the genuineness of any Israeli commitment to a comprehensive peace treaty.

In the wake of 9/11 and ensuing events, the notion that if only Israel would evacuate the (to use the current Israeli term) "disputed territories" the Islamist jihadists would go away and the climate of apprehension as well as the costs of wars would end. This (arguably specious) belief constituted a tipping point. The onus was placed on Israel.

At some point in the past few years the onus placed on Israel to make peace joined insensibly with the ancient horror of genuine anti-Semitism. It became possible, even desirable, for the decrying of Israel as an "apartheid" power, a Jewish form of Nazism to take firm root within the European and North American chattering classes, particularly academia. The bashing of Israel became good form within self-consciously "liberal" constituencies.

In short form, Israel became the "other." Those people just aren't like us, don't you know. And, those people meant, not simply Israelis, but all Jews. Anti-Semitism donned the respectable cloak of opposition to Israeli policies and practices. Fulford makes this point both simply and powerfully.

The shambling golem of anti-Semitism gains strength from its new clothes. It is for this reason that Cohen's thesis has a particular saliency as well as a particular irony.

At the same time the success of the same "liberals" in ruling the use of accurate terms regarding the nature and character of the enemy in the current wars between the US and the rest of the West and the Islamist jihadists as politically incorrect and socially unacceptable has provided a great advantage to the enemy. This is an unintended but real consequence of the multi-cultural demand for "sensitivity."

It must never be forgotten that by ruling words either acceptable or not, the nature--and the outcome--of a debate over policy is determined. The not so subtle shift of recent years has given an unearned advantage to the Islamists, the jihadists, the irredentist Arabs, such as those who recently met at the Fatah congress.

This advantage may well be demonstrated in the widely anticipated "Obama Plan" for peace in the Mideast. It would be both ironic and tragic if Israel, which was in large measure the creation of Western and American guilt feelings in the wake of World War II, would now become a sacrifice on the alter of Western and American guilt over the "plight of the Palestinians."

History is filled with such ironies. And, such tragedies.

ForMin Lieberman Sez "Go To Hell, Syria!"

The Geek has posted a number of times regarding the cruciality of the Golan Heights to a comprehensive Mideast peace. For Syria there is only one real requirement for peace with Israel. That is the return of the Golan to Syria.

Syrian president Bashar Assad made that requirement clear again last Friday in an Army Day Speech. He implied that other matters could be negotiated, but not the status of the Golan.

The embattled, very hardline Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, rejected the Syrian position with a strangely worded statement today. He said that Israel was willing to start negotiations with Syria "without preconditions." Then he went on to add, perversely, that in "any agreement," the Golan Heights "must remain under Israeli control."

Whether the Israeli ForMin was speaking in English or Hebrew, the Geek knowest not. But in either language, the second part of the statement renders the first part (in the words of Nixon's Press Secretary, Ron Zeigler) "inoperative." The overly muscular (in the cranium at least) Lieberman might just as well have said, "Give peace a chance? No way!"

If the Obama administration had the sense necessary to get out of the rain it would be putting pressure on Israel to abandon its Golan land grab rather than insist on a zero expansion in the "settlements" on the disputed West Bank territory. The Palestinians--and the Arabs generally--will not accept a settlement halt as a reason for reciprocal movements. No, they will simply have another set of requirements which must be fulfilled before responding in kind.

Bashar Assad and the Syrian government are, in comparison, rational. Get the Golan back and peace is just jake with them. It would probably be enough to convince the Syrian regime to go ahead with a real peace treaty rather than the Egyptian style "cold peace."

Lieberman has promised to resign if he is indicted for his various alleged mal- and mis-feasances. Those who want to see more of a semblance of peace in the Mideast must be hoping that the Israeli Attorney General will do so without delay. Then, perhaps, just maybe, the US can lean on the Netenyahu government to start working on a deal which sees the Golan back under Syrian control even if that implies some sort of dual authority to protect in the near- and mid-term the interests of both Arabs and Jews living in the region and an equitable sharing of the water resources of the place.

At the moment all that can be said of the Israeli ForMin is that his views on the Golan are (in the fine phrase of George Kennan,) "primitive and unconstructive." To put it mildly.

SecState Clinton Says, "We're Doing Great!"

One would have to have a resident alien visa in Fantasyland to think a politician would ever assess his/her own performance and that of the party they serve as anything other than "perfect and getting better by the minute." As the Geek has been condemned to stay in the gritty world of reality, the self-serving puffery of Ms Clinton on NBC is no big shokku.

In her view the Obama administration has succeeded in the last six months in achieving a condition in Iraq which allows the withdrawal of American forces. Apparently the "surge" which was opposed by then Senator Obama and many others of the Progressive Caucus had nothing to do with the improved security condition in Iraq. Of course not, that would give credit to the icky-poo Republican administration, and we all know how dastardly that bunch was.

Nor could she bring herself to acknowledge that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which provided for the scheduled withdrawal was negotiated by a team which did not include either her or President Obama. Of course not, to do that would allow reality to intrude on the dream world of Ms Clinton and her associates in the administration.

She bragged at some length on just how well the Obama administration--and herself, of course, had created a mighty diplomatic coalition against Iran and its pursuit of the bomb. Leaving aside such unpleasant holes in the Mighty Diplomatic Coalition as China, Russia, and the assorted European members of the Billion Dollar Club, she is right.

Heck, she did not even bother to point out that the administration of which she is a prime member has not even pushed the Refined Petroleum Products Sanction bill recently introduced in the House. She must be aware that pressing hard on the lack of refined petroleum in Iran is the single greatest harm we can inflict in the short term. Still, not a word about the necessity of seeing this bill become law so we have a big stick to wave in the direction of Tehran.

Instead of addressing such centralities as just what real coercion might be exerted on the mullahs, the Secretary danced around the floor about negotiating with a government whose legitimacy is more presumed than real. Of course, Madam Secretary, diplomacy is all about dealing with those who are in power whether they are there via honest elections or pure force. Why belabor the obvious except to escape talking about the problems of talking without any credible set of inducements and constraints.

Among the constraints (and inducements) you did not bother to touch upon is the availability of a domestic opposition in Iran which we can support in a discrete manner. By not touching upon this open nerve in the mouths of the mullahs, you made the same mistake that the Bush/Cheney neocons did back in the period 2001-2003 when they did not bother to deal with the reformers while this group under Khatami was at its peak of success and the reactionary mullahs in a fever of fear.

True, the reformers are not in power right now, but they might be shortly. That is why the mullahs and their equally reactionary secular adherents are having serious attacks of anxiety.

Is there any wonder that the Israelis are having Xanax moments of their own? They are looking at an administration which seems bootless about the realities of what Secretary Clinton calls "intensive diplomacy" aimed at convincing the Iranians to mend their ways. They are hearing repeated calls to be "patient" and not go for the military option as the centrifuges spin and the Great Leader continues to demand that Israel cease to exist.

Is it surprising that Secretary Clinton was reluctant to wave her "defensive umbrella" in the faces of the NBC crew? When push comes to shove there is not a great desire in Washington at the present to enter into guarantees of territorial integrity and governmental sovereignty which would cover the entire Mideast against the Iranian threat.

Discussion on the potential ramifications and implications of the "defensive umbrella" would be a distraction and a diversion from the administration's "Agenda of Transformation." Right now, they and the Progressive Caucus cannot afford any side jaunts which might delay further the passage of the ambitious set of bills before them.

Ms Clinton had many, many kind words for China's cooperation on North Korea. The truth here does not matter. She and the Treasury Secretary will be meeting with senior mandarins next week. Considering the Chinese hold 800 million bucks of US treasury paper, it behooves the Secretary to genuflect (kow tow?) to the Boys From Beijing.

In any event it is easy and convenient for China and Russia to be cooperative about North Korea. As long as there is nothing at risk to either country, they will go through all the necessary motions. By doing so they pile up credits to cash later with the US over issues which do matter to them. Come on, Madam Secretary, you bloody well know that diplomacy involves trades and deals. Some deals are far more apparent than real.

The SecState skipped over much during her voyage of self-congratulation. For example, she was silent on Honduras where support for the ousted leftist Chavez clone Zelaya is slipping. It would have been embarrassing to admit that the Hondurans played by their own rules and we didn't like the outcome.

The reason we didn't smile at the result was that the administration is headed by a post-modern progressive who knows as much about foreign affairs as a gnat does of quantum mechanics but "feels" that democracy is somehow off the tracks if a fellow progressive is booted out for not playing by the rules. And, every good post-modern American believes that "feeling" is much more real and important than mere objective knowledge and understanding.

Nor was Secretary Clinton particularly effusive over the foreign policy successes so far enjoyed by the US in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yes, the Pakistanis have taken the field against Taliban in Swat and elsewhere with some slight degree of genuine success. However, the substance has been far eclipsed by the shadow.

With respect to Afghanistan the Geek would invite the Secretary to rebut the contentions and arguments in yesterday's post on our forthcoming (self-inflicted) defeat in that country. Certainly your appraisal today did nothing to change the Geek's mind on the subject.

The Secretary attempted to rehabilitate the administration's policy regarding Russia following Joe (The Ever Expansive Mouth) Biden's assault yesterday. Her convoluted explanation may play in Peoria where it is not relevant but will fall flat in the Kremlin.

Overall, Ms Clinton, had your interview on NBC been a web post it would merit one star or less. The Geek wonders if you were attempting to delude the American public or are you simply living in delusion yourself.

Israelis Ain't Perfect, But Arabs Are OTL

In 1951 a king was killed. Arguably it was the most important act of ideological assassination in the recent history of the Mideast. In the wake of the murder of King Abdullah I in the foyer of the al-Aqsa mosque by a Palestinian who had heeded the Arab call to flee until the troops of the Arab League defeated the Jews, David ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister and guiding hand of the new state, decided that peace with the Arabs was impossible.

He ordered an end to the sub-rosa talks which had been underway with Jordan. Instead of diplomacy, ben Gurion decided, there would be a policy of deterrence, defeat, and intimidation directed against the Arab state until they finally sued for peace--on Israeli terms.

And that is precisely what Israel did. For the next sixteen years (with time out for an offensive war waged as part of what can accurately be termed an international criminal conspiracy to make aggressive war with Britain and France in 1956) Israel conducted a "war of the borders," which the Israeli historian Benny Morris determined on the basis of both interviews and the use of Israeli and captured Jordanian government documents was completely unjustifiable.

The "war of the borders" can be best epitomised by the criminal raid and slaughter of civilians conducted by Detachment 101 under the command of a man who later was Israel's prime minister, "Arik" Sharon. Women and children of this Jordanian border village were pinned in their homes by heavy automatic weapons fire as incendiary grenades were hurled into the structures. Later the government of Israel compounded the felony by lying as to who or what was actually culpable for the atrocity.

In 1967 Israel upped the ante by waging a land grab war just as had been predicted by the staff of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA three years earlier when the Johnson administration first contemplated and then concluded the sale of long range fighter-bombers and main battle tanks rather than the more defensively oriented short-range equipment recommended by the JCS.

Brushing off American counsel and advice as well as UN resolutions, the Israeli government did not seek to trade land for peace. Instead, under a succession of ministries the state went about creating what were publicly termed, "facts on the ground." These "facts" were large scale completely modern "settlements" (eg towns and cities) complete with all the features and amenities of modern life in an industrialised economy and Western society. The "facts" were also created with the view of providing significant military obstacles to any attack across the river Jordan and into the West Bank.

These "settlements," these "facts on the ground," are central to the disputes raging around how peace might be given a chance today. The "two state solution" first offered by Saudi Arabia and later revived without more than cosmetic changes by the Arab League and, most recently, by King Abdullah II of Jordan, demand an Israeli withdrawal from the "settlements" as well as all the territory taken in the 1967 war.

Apparently the Arab League members (and now the member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) expect that to achieve peace the Israelis will resettle a few hundred thousand of their citizens and hand over the developed property lock, stock and barrel as a turn-key project to the Arabs "displaced" by the War of Independence and the Six Day War. This seems to be embedded in the proposal's wording as well as by statements from King Abdullah as well as the OIC.

From the Israeli perspective this logic and the rhetoric in which it is typically expressed would give credence to the correctness of David ben Gurion's formulation. The Israelis, or at least a significant portion of them, are evidently quite willing and able to overlook the way in which the ben Gurion policy has bred a legacy of hatred and incited nationalistic aspirations thus putting the leaders of even the more 'moderate" Arab states in a position that is quite harmful to their health if they are seen as treating on a realistic basis with the "Zionist entity."

In short, the decision taken by the irrascable ben Gurion fifty-eight years ago as well as the overly muscular and prolonged way in which it has been put into action for all these long years gives Arab leaders few, if any, options beyond that of seeking the impossible. Or giving war and terror more turns at bat.

Then there is Jerusalem. Way back when, near the start of the second phase, the interstate phase of the two part Israeli War of Independance, the subject of Jerusalem was put to one side in the undercover discussions between King Abdullah I and the Israelis. They could quickly agree that the Jewish forces would not fight the Jordanian Arab Legion as long as it operated only in those areas assigned to the Arabs by the UN. Jordan agreed not to send its forces into the areas assigned by the UN partition plan to the Jewish state. Since the UN had made Jerusalem a corpus separatum, the gods of battle would determine which side would hold what part of the city. The Jordanians took the Old City and the Israelis took the new parts of the place.

In 1967 the gods of war smiled completely on the IDF and a new, unpleasant, controversial "fact on the ground" was created. Now, both Israel and the advocates of a Palestinian state claim an undivided Jerusalem as their capital. Religion and history conspire to make the fate of Jerusalem even less susceptible to adjustment through negotiation than the matters of the "settlements" and the alleged Arab "right of return."

Then there is the seemingly trivial matter of whether or not Israel will be acknowledged as a "Jewish state" by Israel's Arab interlocutors. Israel was established as a Jewish state. It has always been described as such. That is what it always has been. But, the Arabs cannot bring themselves to admit this reality or other features of reality.

The reality is brutal. The Arab negotiating stance (if that term is accurate considering the record for intransigence) does nothing but encourage an Israeli continuation of the ben Gurion formula. This implies that the "roadmap" to peace or the orchestrations of the "Quartet" are most likely to continue as exercises in futility. The same may be said of the Obama administration's focus on pressuring Israel into concessions which are substantial in return for the promise of nothing much from the other side.

The Gods of War (and terror) must be wetting their lips in anticipation of what is to come.