"The Europeans Wanted The No-Fly Zone---"

There is a historically based truism about war--even a very small war hiding behind an euphemistic moniker and a poetic code name.  The truism can be summed accurately in a single word: unity.  There must be a unity between political goal and military goal.  There must be a unity between the goal and what can be termed the "definition of victory."  There must be a unity--or at least a tight cohesion--between the definition of victory and the "theory of victory," which is the specific mix of military and non-military means intended to result in victory.  Finally, there must be a unity of command so as to assure that all forces employed are marching to the same band.

Unity in all the forms mentioned is critical to war waged by a single power.  It is even more critical when the war is undertaken by a coalition.

To date Operation Odyssey Dawn (as the Americans term the effort in Libya) or Operation Ellamy (as the Brits have dubbed it) fails in most of the ways listed above.  There is no unity of political goals as between the several coalition members.  There is no unity between political and military goal as regards the US.  There is no unified definition of victory.  Thus, there can be no definition of victory.  Nor can there be a unified theory of victory.  And, looking forward, the unity of command and common effort is nowhere to be seen.

Operation Odyssey Dawn has been through yesterday a predominately American effort.  Nearly two thirds of all sorties have been flown by US aircraft.  American planes flew 212 sorties while the British and French as well as other NATO states contributed 124.  This trend continued during the past twenty-four hours with the Americans flying 113 sorties and the other twelve coalition partners contributing 63.  This is an improvement on the 85 percent Made in America record of a couple of days earlier.  The overwhelming majority of the 162 Tomahawk missiles fired were American (the British have fired a dozen or so from a submarine which represents a goodly chunk of the 64 Tomahawks in the British inventory.)

In this respect the operation represents business as usual.  Way back when during the days of H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton the no-fly zone was primarily an American effort.  The US flew five sorties for every one undertaken by the UK.  (The French were not involved at all.)  The situation was much the same during the Bosnian affray.

All this "joint" effort has put a lot of hours on the airframes of American aircraft.  It would be interesting to know how many hours had accumulated where and when on the F-15E Strike Eagle which crashed in Libya as the result of an "equipment malfunction."  The use--perhaps bordering on overuse--may be one reason the US military seems anxious to pass the baton to someone else in Libya.

It is not the only nor even the primary reason the US is looking so eagerly for an early exit from its current leadership role.  Leaving aside the motives and their worthiness, the most important consideration is whether or not the American bowing out will help or hinder the gaining of unity in all the forms mentioned.

The primary requirement, the requirement from which all subordinate forms of unity descend, is that of political goal.  With respect to Libya this seems to be quite elusive.  The French seem to be wedded to an endstate which sees Gaddifi gone.  The British have acknowledged they have no exit plan, which implies the absence of a final political goal.  The American president has drawn a line between an expansive political goal and a very, very narrow military one.  The Germans are opposed to everything which may bring with it the possibility of someone shooting someone.  The Turks are likewise inclined.  The Arab League is adrift in a sea of confusion bordering on despair.

The upshot of this sorry state of affairs is there is little if any probability of a unified political goal emerging regardless of who or what finally takes over the political direction of the war.  With this reality in place at the most foundational level, it almost doesn't matter who runs the actual conduct of daily operations.  But, politics guides that as well.  The UK with phlegmatic realism understands that NATO has the command and control capacity to run a coalition war.  The French and others are against this for the frankly political reason that NATO is Western and as such will alienate the Arab states whose political cover is essential for the effort.

The internal political contradictions and tensions which afflict not only the AL but many of the member states as well prevents the League from adopting and keeping to a unified political goal or even collaborating with non-Arab states in formulating one for the Libyan Question.  This reality makes an imitation of the ISAF in Afghanistan a fiction.  (Not that the ISAF is a model of unity--consider the risk averse nature of many contributor countries such as Germany whose ROE's virtually prevent firing an angry round.)

When night falls there will be a cobbled together simulacrum of a central political directorate.  Command and control of daily, routine operations will devolve to someone, perhaps the French or a joint Anglo-French body, or, just maybe, NATO.  The political directorate will not make the hard choices of the what-do-we-do-next? sort of decisions which will be popping up in a very unpretty way shortly.  These matters will be kicked back to the national leaders.  The notion that the assorted leaders of the main players (which will continue to include the US as only the US has many critical capacities such as enough aircraft) will achieve a consensus on the questions of what-now? is hallucinatory at best.

The yawning gap between President Obama's declaratory policy--"Gaddafi must go"--and the no-American-boots-on-the-ground pledge underscores the impossibility of coming to effective terms with the what-now? genre of questions.  The vast differences in motivation among the assorted NATO states which have contributed aircraft of basing facilities further exacerbates the question.

The American stance toward the effort in Libya is epitomized in the quote giving this post its title.  Of course this view ignores the vast differences in motives and intents within the "Europeans."  Frankly, the effort is the brainchild of France and the UK.  This allows the inference that these two should be the political directorate, but such is totally unacceptable to all others.

So the necessary unities will not exist.  This redounds to Gaddafi's advantage.  The greatest irony in this is simply that should Brother Leader come out of the current fracas still in power, the states with the most to worry about are those of the Arab League.  Given Gaddafi's past love affairs with terror groups and the current political tumult in most Arab states, his capacity for mischief is unlimited.

A line from an old Jefferson Airplane song is relevant: "Go away or go all the way in."  This is the fundamental dilemma facing the mock coalition in the sky over Libya.  The states with the most dogs in the fight are those of the Arab League.  The collective and individual unwillingness of these states to address the ground truth in play in Libya right now constitutes a major failure of political will and acumen.  In time this failure may well lead to more failed states where Arabic is the language.

Gaddafi Stays On Message While The US Doesn't Have One

It would be easy to admire Gaddafi's tenacity if, indeed, he had any other option.  With an International Criminal Court indictment hanging over his head and very few safe havens to contemplate, Gaddafi has little choice other than to fight on.  As a result it is a no-brainer to see why Brother Leader has stayed on message.

The brain sweat comes in with a question.  Why is it necessary for the US, the assorted European states, the members of the Arab League, and African Union to make it so much easier for the Colonel to keep on keeping on?  Why do all these players seem to have an agenda calculated to assure that not only will Gaddafi maintain power, he will be around to cause enormous amounts of trouble until and unless the indirect pressures of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation take effect?

The Arab League has walked back from its walk back concerning the imposition of the no-fly zone--"What!  You mean you have to fire missiles and drop bombs?"  Apparently working under the assumption that Muslims wouldn't lie about such a matter, the Arab League took Gaddafi's word for appalling civilian casualties but then were convinced just possibly the Gaddfi noise machine was exaggerating the body count.

But the Arab League trepidations found a quick echo in the foreign ministers of both the EU and NATO.  For the last couple of days, the loudest sound in Europe has been that made by knees knocking with fear.  Given that few of the countries represented in either group is noted for resolution in the face of the uncertainties which come with every use of military means, this is no surprise.  It is so unsurprising that it would be a very real shock if the Gaddafi family--some of whose members are very well acquainted with Western ways--had not counted upon this sort of division and worked assiduously to provoke it.

The opposition which has come from one of the Boys in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing is also no shock.  Again it was so expectable that it bends the mind to believe that once again the Gaddafi family was not counting upon it.  The offers by the Gaddafi family to cancel the current oil and natural gas leases and offer them to other countries including China, Russia, and India show some base cunning at work.  The pursuit of divide and conquer particularly with assemblages which are already divided needs no deep thinking.  The payoff has been handsome with India, Brazil, and South Africa joining Russia and China in a chorus of very loud denunciation.

Public support within the US and UK for the current ill and perhaps mis-defined military mission runs around one in three.  It may be higher in France as its citizens seem to be willing to take pride in their country doing something which is compatible with both national interests and national values.  However, the low support in the US has shown itself in the opposition presented to "Obama's War" from the left, right, and center of both parties.

Much of the opposition is predicated upon the all too obvious dichotomy between the goals of the current air operations and the Obama declaratory policy which holds, "Gaddafi must go."  The lack of congruence between the stated goals and the declaratory policy is guaranteed to undercut public confidence and, thus, support for the effort.  President Obama has either been very economical with the truth or quite hallucinatory regarding the endgame in Libya.

Other very obvious disconnects between US actions and policy in Libya with its actions and policies elsewhere in the Arab states also undercuts both understanding and support.  We are in an active shooting war with the announced aim of protecting civilians from an arbitrary and brutal regime in Libya while being merely "concerned" when the same is taking place in Yemen albeit on a arguably lesser scale.  The Obama administration has not even worked itself up to the level of being concerned when it comes to the situation in Bahrain, which leads to the conclusion that oil is thicker than blood given the close cooperation between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

The lack of coherent goals couples with distaste for the war against Gaddafi and the fear of upsetting the always sensitive Muslims to provide the interesting lack of eagerness on the part of everyone to take over the lead in Libya.  The Obama administration is quite keen on passing the baton to someone else.  But there is a palpable lack of takers.  Even if NATO showed willingness to do the job, the Arab League has opposed the idea as have NATO members Turkey and France.  Given the need for all decisions to be made by consensus, Turkish and French opposition kills the concept.

Perhaps France is angling for the job.  Assuming the command and control resident with French forces is up to the job, there is no objection to this.  Even the subordination of American combat units to such a command has precedent.  In this context it might be recalled that the US handed over command during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965 to Brazil.  American combat forces including ground units served as a part of an Organization of American States task group with the complete approval of the US Congress and media of the day.

Perhaps the muscular and ambitious Nicholas Sarkozy, who has done more than any other single person to push for the current intervention without a salient goal, is or will have second thoughts as the gravity of the "what next?" question sinks in.  There can not be a single observer well oriented in time and place who believes the no-fly zone even with the add-on of strikes against Gaddifi's forces will provide for a stable, secure outcome.  The current operation will not and can not remove Gaddafi and without this there is no possibility of an outcome even tangentially favorable to Western interests and values.

In the best case the current operation will end with Libya divided into two zones.  The eastern one will remain under Gaddafi.  The western one will eventually fall under the sway of advocates of violent political Islam.  All must remember that the west, Cyrenaica, was not only the fountainhead of insurgency against Italy but also the homeland of a very austere form of Islam derived from the old Salifist doctrine.  This is a connection which is as true today as it was a century ago.  We must not forget or overlook this ground truth.

The policies and actions of the West are riddled with internal contradictions.  They are laden with ambiguities. They are freighted with uncertainties to a degree surpassing previous "optional" wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It is no surprise that support for the effort is narrow and very shallow.

All that can be written with certainty is that the world will be a nastier and more fearful place should Gaddafi remain in power even over a truncated form of Libya.  It is equally certain that in war unlike other forms of human endeavor, a full loaf is infinitely preferable to a half loaf.  And, what is being done right now is a half loaf approach at best.

Bring On The Clowns

The Libyan Affray has a magnetic appeal.  The confrontation between a dictator seemingly unmoored from the consensually agreed upon objective reality and a large, growing group of terminally fed up people has the elements of drama and tragedy which attracts interest and seemingly demands engagement by governments great and small.

One of the more intriguing, not to say potentially amusing, gambits of late has come from the Arab League.  The League, whose director, an Egyptian politician named Moussa, who is seeking the office of president in that country, has stated it is willing to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya.  The Arab League added it would do this in conjunction with the African Union.

The idea originated with Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi expat who was briefly "our man in Baghdad" before the Great Adventure in Regime Change.  He argued the League could do what the US and its allies did in Iraq after the Kuwait War.  The Arab League picked up on the idea as both the UN and NATO showed a profound lack of interest in ordering or enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya.

There is no doubt but some politicians including UK prime minister David Cameron have exhibited a zeal for imposing a no-fly zone which is not widely shared by the respective military forces and their chiefs.  Leading the opposition in public has been Robert Gates.

Dr Gates correctly points out that the imposition of a no-fly zone is both complex and resource intensive.  He is also correct when he warns that establishing a no-fly zone requires waging war, admittedly war of a severely limited sort.  The starting gun announcing the beginning of a no-fly zone is an attack upon the air defense system of the target country.  Missiles would be launched.  Bombs would be dropped.  Men would die down range.  That, bucko, is war no matter what name is put upon it.

He is being disingenuous when he emphasizes the size of Libya and implies that its geographic extent would render the imposition and maintenance of a no-fly zone more complex and resource demanding than the earlier efforts in Bosnia and Iraq.  The critical regions of Libya, the areas where fighting is occurring and where people live and air bases are located are found in a narrow band along the coast.  While there are bases deep in the desert wastes, these can be kept under surveillance by long endurance UAVs or satellites with manned platforms being deployed only as required.

There is one good reason why the US and Western European countries will not establish a no-fly zone.  In the current political climate there is a requirement for UN Security Council authorization.  No such authorization will occur.  Period.  China stated categorically that it would veto any resolution which included the establishment of a no-fly zone.  Russia did the same albeit in less blunt wording.  Both states have held a policy opposing any UN intervention in any matter which can be defined as "internal" for many, many years now and will not make an exception for Libya.

The Arab League and the African Union would not be restricted by the political considerations which make UN sanction so necessary for any Western nation to take action.  For reasons intrinsic to regional politics, either organization can go the no-fly zone route without UN permission.  As the Arab League has resolutely opposed any "foreign" intervention, the stage has been set politically for the League to go ahead with an intervention of its own, presumably including or starting with the imposition of a no-fly zone.

The question is can the members of the League pull it off with or without the aid of states from the African Union.  This is a fascinating matter.  As has been noted in many fora, the conduct of a no-fly zone is complex, resource intensive, and constitutes genuine war.

Neutralizing Libyan air defenses is not a trivial consideration.  The air defenses of Libya are predicated upon Soviet systems delivered and installed over a quarter century ago.  In the US strike back in 1986, the defense was able to shoot down an American aircraft.  Since then there have been upgrades and modifications.  There has also been a degree of system degradation.  Excluding the remaining Soviet and French fighters, the net capacities of the ground based missile and tube defenses would be rated minimal against US or other NATO assets.  The same cannot be said when considering attacks made by forces of either the League or the AU.

The probability of attacker losses is much higher when factoring the capabilities of equipment and personnel of League or Union forces.  This implies that the attacker must have additional assets for flack suppression and combat search and rescue.  It is worth noting that none of the League states have a dedicated combat SAR capability.  Also it is questionable if the League even with AU support has a large enough inventory of requisite aircraft to accept the virtual attrition imposed by the existence of a moderately competent air defense system.

It is worth mentioning that the US and other air forces which imposed the no-fly zones in Iraq and Kosovo had combat experience of recent vintage.  This experience was essential in translating the theory of training into the realities of the field.  In sharp contrast, no Arab League and no African Union member state's air force has combat experience in recent years.  Looking back, the experiences of some League members such as Syria and Egypt in operations against Israel are not such as to engender confidence.

Even giving the most generous assumptions, there is no reason to conclude that the combination of Arab League and African Union assets in fact could establish and maintain a no-fly zone.  Rather, it is probable that the initial losses would provoke escalation terminating in the introduction of ground combat forces.  Of course, such an introduction would require time, probably significant time given the difficulties of establishing a consensus and the complications introduced by the ongoing nature of internal political factionalization afflicting so many of the member states of both organizations.

Time passing would assure an increase in two aspects of the internal war in Libya.  The political will of the regime would be enhanced by the external threat.  The body count would grow as both sides sought a conclusion before outside forces arrived to complicate the situation.

The ground truth is simple.  The Arab League may be long on rhetoric but it is very short on the capability to back words with effective action.  The African Union is, fortunately, more economical with words.  This implies that there is little if any chance of a combined League-Union move on Libya.  This means that the League's threat is empty.

This means the League has to resort to the diplomatic option which originated with Hugo Chavez, who has been a long time associate of Brother Leader.  He has supported the Colonel without reservation since the start of the protests in Libya  He has strongly urged the Arab League to "mediate" the crisis.  And, the League's director has accepted the idea.  So has the incumbent regime.  The anti-government group has rejected the move.

There is nothing to "mediate."  The gap between the Gaddafi family enterprise and the insurrectionists is too vast and deep to bridge by any conceivable effort at mediation.  The years of repression and corruption and the alienation of the majority of the population from the current government admit of no compromise now that the battle has been joined.  Every rebel who is killed and every non-combatant who is caught in the crossfire serve to assure that nothing less than total victory will be acceptable to the insurgents.

What Sr Chavez, Director General Moussa, and Brother Leader do not understand is that the dead are dictating policy.  The corpses of those killed by the government forces along with those who died over the years at the hands of the Gaddifi security forces demand nothing less than a total restructuring of Libyan polity and society.  It is offensive insurgency of the most classic sort.

The Arab League, the African Union, the UN would be well advised to limit their involvement in Libya to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict.  The same applies to the EU and US.  Unless the Gaddafi forces resort to their stockpile of mustard agent which, while not in weaponized form, is not unusable, the West should restrain itself from any action beyond the humanitarian.  The Libyans started this affray for and from reasons which are organic to the country.  They will have to finish it.  Anything else will distort the process probably with consequences which will prove even more bloody and prolonged.

It is hard to write that.  The emotionally satisfying approach is that of a quick invasion by competent Western forces with the result that Brother Leader and company would be laid out by the heels rapidly and decisively. But, emotions don't count.  The reality is that the mess was made by Libyans.  It can only be cleaned and rectified by Libyans.  Only the Libyans can build a nation--if they want to.

This means that the professionals and clowns alike must restrain themselves.  They must do the hardest of hard jobs--standing by and limiting the human suffering to the greatest extent possible without seeking to impose a fast track solution on the situation.

So, Dudes, What's Your Alternative?

The superb collection of disinterested statesmen known as the Arab League is wrapping up their annual Moan, Groan, Bitch, Whine, and Threaten conference. This year the fractious bunch convened in Libya whose leader, the Greatest Islamic Thinker in Modern Times, Muammar Ghadaffi (or however his name is spelled in English today), presided.

As usual quite a few heads of state including the kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as the aging, ill Egyptian president gave the gabfest a pass. Their absence was barely noticed as the assembled Deep Thinkers of Arabia considered two matters of grave importance. These were, quite unsurprisingly, the (posited) impending failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace "process," and what-are-we-going-to-do about Iran?

The Arab League capo, Amr Moussa, opined that the Arab states have to get their act together and consider the "alternative" when (not if) the current peace "process" comes a total cropper. He represented a consensus to the effect that the "process" is doomed by Israeli obstinacy which in turn had been facilitated by a previous Arab failure. That failure, he averred, resulted from the Arabs, more specifically, the Palestinians under Yassir Arafat, having given the Israelis an open ended process years ago at Oslo.

The diplomatic blunders of the past gave the Israelis time to bulldoze and build in the "Palestinian" portions of Jerusalem. The resultant creation of "facts on the ground" stiffened Israeli political will so that now only the complete halting of construction followed by a total Israeli withdrawal from the purportedly illegally seized "Palestinian" territories would allow the peace "process" to continue.

What made Moussa's views worthy of consideration is his nearly unprecedented willingness to admit that Arabs could or have made any errors in diplomatic judgement. Of course, a less subjective view of the Arabs and diplomacy looking back over the past seventy-five years of talks regarding Jews in the Mideast and their relationship with their Arab neighbors would conclude that the Arabs have an unsurpassed record of diplomatic failure mainly through self-inflicted wounds.

Now, Moussa apparently is convinced that the Obama administration is so eager for a peace settlement that it will do the heavy lifting required for the Arabs to achieve their minimum politically acceptable goal, rolling Israel back to the line of demarcation which existed with the armistice ending the active hostilities of 1948-49. This line of demarcation, which was drawn along the line of military force contact was not an international border, nor was it intended to be such by the UN negotiators. The line, famously drawn on a map in green ink, became known as the "Green Line."

When the Israelis rolled over the Green Line in the Six Day War of 1967, the resultant UN Security Council resolutions did not alter the established nature of the Line as a purely temporary, de facto feature identical to the armistice line drawn at the end of the shooting phase of the Korean War. Neither the Green Line nor the later line of contact in Korea was intended to be a de jure international border.

Thus it takes a highly selective reading of the historical record to conclude that the territory in and around the Old City of Jerusalem was unlawfully seized by the IDF from the sovereign state of Jordan. It takes an equally selective and biased reading to transform the relevant UNSC resolutions following the Six Day War into documents creating an international border where none existed before.

The government of Israel moved rapidly to incorporate the territory in and around the Old City of Jerusalem into the State of Israel. The US government understood and, at the very least, tacitly approved the action even though it refused to move its embassy from Tel Aviv. While it can be argued with accuracy that the Johnson administration approval was motivated by domestic political considerations, that is as irrelevant as stating that President Truman moved with haste almost unseemly in recognizing the new state of Israel for identical reasons.

The annexation of Jerusalem is both a fact on the ground and a fact in law. This twin consideration renders the no-settlement demand nugatory. It does the same with respect to the Saudi Arabian 2002 plan which is the preferred diplomatic fall back position of the Arab League. In fact and in law Jerusalem is a part of Israel. This means that the Israelis may choose to give some or all of it away to the Palestinians but they are not under any duty to do so. They may decide to give away some or all of those portions of Jerusalem which are on the "Jordanian side" of the old Green Line to buy their peace, but there is no objective requirement that they do so.

In the messy real world there is no possibility that the Israelis will evacuate their "settlements" on the east side of the Green Line. Least of all is there any probability that Israel will relinquish the Old City. History and its far more potent cousin, myth, militate against that with irresistible force.

Nor is there much likelihood that the government of Israel will accept the other key provision of the 2002 Saudi plan, the acceptance of a Palestinian "right of return" to property they or their ancestors owned and occupied prior to the 1948-49 wars. There is no right of return, nor is Israel under any affirmative duty to "compensate" either those who fled or their descendants for alleged losses. In this regard it must be remembered that most of those who fled did so at the urgings of the sundry Arab governments whose armed forces were attacking the infant state filled with the certainty of impending victory. (This does not relieve the Israelis of their moral culpability for the several atrocities committed against Palestinians by elements of their armed forces.)

The first take away is simple. All parties, Arab as well as American, best get a grip on the inconvenient fact that Jerusalem is part and parcel of Israel, and it is going to remain such unless and until the Israeli public allows a government to purchase peace with some or all of the Old City and environs.

The second take away is equally simple albeit more unpleasant. The only alternative to continuing the peace "process" as currently conceived and structured is war.

While the current process is slow, painful, and, for the Arabs in particular, unlikely to produce a result which is palatable, it is far less messy, infinitely less painful, and not quite as likely to produce a completely unacceptable result than is war. And, no mistake should be made here, the only alternative is war.

That subtext resided quite clearly in the words of Moussa and others at the Monster Rally in Sirte. The war may be open, conventional, or semi-covert, asymmetrical in nature. In either event the highest probability is that the Arab/Palestinian side will come up short. They will lose as their predecessors have lost so often in the past.

It is not improbable that the realization of this dismal possibility undergirds the call for "engagement" of Iran by the Arab League as a collective polity. True the call for collective engagement was couched in terms of concern over the Iranian nuclear program and apprehension regarding the growing influence of Iran in the region.

At the same time the call acknowledges implicitly that only Iran possesses the actual and potential means to defeat Israel in either open or proxy war. The realization that the Shia Persians have capacities lacking in the Arab League members individually or collectively must be bitter in Arab mouths. Nonetheless that is the reality today and into the foreseeable future.

If the only alternative to the current peace "process" recognizable to the Arab states is war then it follows that the only way in which the Arabs can hope to do other than lose is with the enlistment of Iran on their side. In this context the Arab League would do well to recall the hoary proverb about riding tigers: It is far easier to mount the beast than to get off without being eaten in the process.

Doing The "Heavy Lifting"

Jordan's King Abdullah II has delivered the same message to the White House and Congress. The other intended recipients of the King's views were the congeries referred to as the "Arab and Muslim" states.

The message came in four major parts. (1) The Two State Solution is the best (read "only") game in town. (2) The US is the Player-Who-Matters-Most. (3) That being said, Israel is still the country which must make a choice. It must choose between living in a friendly 'neighborhood" or continuing to exist as Fortress Israel caught in the stasis of hostility. (4) The "Arab and Muslim states" must assist the US in the heavy lifting of bringing the seemingly eternal "peace process" to an end with the implementation of the two state solution.

King Abdullah's final point puts a large onus on the Mideast's "frontline" states as well as other, more distant governments to take a firm hold on the short, dirty end of the reality stick. It includes the states of the region which have found it comfortable to both hide behind and exploit the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the sake of their own national and domestic political purposes. The Jordanian fourth point demands that the regional governments face the rage of the Islamists who will go fast boost exo-atmospheric in fury over any substantial moves to assure peace with Israel.

The Obama administration is quite obviously ready, willing and eager to do all it can to bring the Two State Solution into existence. It is quite probable that the president is willing (although certainly not eager) to brave the resistance of the Israel Lobby, which has shown quite often that it is more strident and extreme in its positions than is the government of Israel.

Obama and his close senior advisers may well view the ending of the festering, running ulcer of the Mideast as an absolute essential as a precondition for pursuing its larger, domestic agenda. To them, the risks involved with ramming a Two State Solution through are well worth running.

It is possible that Bibi's recent hairy-chested oratory regarding the Israeli readiness to abate the Iranian nuclear menace with or without US approval and support is the sort of reassuring tough talk such as he engaged in often during his last period as PM. Israelis may be a passionate people for whom politics is nearly a full-contact sport, but the government has (usually) had a good eye for the military and diplomatic realities of the day.

By all rational calculations the ball now rests well and truly in the Arabs' court. What the several governments and quasi-governmental entities do in the next few weeks will determine whether or not they are willing to meet King Abdullah's challenge or not. History gives a mixed message regarding the probability of the Arabs rising to the occasion.

It must be recalled that the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as those whose homes once were located in Israel but who are now scattered around the world are in their present situation because of repeated Arab intransigence and incompetence. For the past eighty years, back to the days far preceding the Partition and the Israeli War of Independence, the Arabs have a splendid record of blowing every opportunity for a negotiated end to their confrontation with, first, the Jewish immigrants to the Mandate, second with the UN teams charged with establishing peacefully an early version of the Two State Solution, and, finally, with the UN mission headed by Ralph Bunche who sought an end to the 1948 war on terms which were highly favorable to the Arabs.

Continuing their successful effort to prove that they were the Chicago Cubs of diplomacy, the Palestinian (as they renamed themselves) screwed their collective pooch in the negotiations which occurred under the Oslo and Madrid processes. To quote a line from an old Air Force ditty, "I'd tell you more but it make me sick."

Showing a haughty disregard for the mundane matters of changed realities on the ground, the Arab League's proposal for peace, which was brought back from the graveyard of diplomatic fatalities by Saudi Arabia, focused on demanding the clearly unacceptable by Israel. With an arrogance which must come from sitting on too much overpriced oil and listening too often to Islamist clerics, the Arab League/Saudi proposals required Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders abandoning countless billions of dollars worth of post-1967 urban development and housing expansion as if this would be of no more moment than pulling out of those miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles called Sinai.

As if that deal killer were not enough, the diplomatic oafs wanted the government and people of Israel to accept a perversion of the Israeli Right of Return granted to Jews. Specifically, the proposal would have the Jewish state accept back all those who left their homes in 1948 (or their descendants) in response to the stimulus of Israeli ethnic cleansing and Arab appeals to have faith in the soldiers of Islam. That requirement was clearly no-go considering both the financial and demographic impact it would have on Israel.

Unless and until the Arab states can see the folly of their past demarches, they will continue to be a heavy drag, not heavy lifters. Of course, the Sunni states of the Mideast do have one rather pressing reason to gain a greater appreciation of reality. That reason is Iran.

By meeting the challenge of Abdullah's point four, the "conservative" states of the Gulf as well as Egypt and even North Africa can form a "neighborhood" (to use the King's term) which is at peace internally and can form a united front against the the troublesome mullahs of resurgent Persia. (After all, even the most dedicated, observant Muslim can see the Israelis have a lot more military capacity up to and including the nuclear than do the devotees of the Mahdi in Iran.)

Then there is Hamas. Hamas, like Hezbollah, is a dependency of Iran. Unlike Hezbollah which can be controlled by Syrian and other national forces if allowed to by the US, Hamas is not susceptible to normal pressures--including the threat of armed attack. Unless and until Hamas genuinely abandons its position of denying Israel the right to exist, the US will not participate in any conversations with any hypothetical "unity" government which may emerge from the Egyptian brokered talks between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.

The probability of Hamas actually abandoning its The-Zionist-Entity-Must-Be-Destroyed line as opposed to invoking the Islam sanctioned doctrine of tactical deception for the benefit of Islam or the equally approved doctrine of agreeing to a temporary truce in order to gain an advantage for the Koran-wavers, is about as high as Nancy Pelosi genuinely welcoming Newt Gingrich back to the House. The words, "forget it!" come to mind.

In principle, the Arab states of the Mideast have the leverage to deal with Hamas. It certainly is in the interests of these states to abate the political and social nuisance represented by Hamas. It is questionable, however, whether or not the Arab states, including Jordan, have the political will and foresightedness to accurately assess the risk/benefit ratio of dealing robustly with Hamas. Even more debatable is the question of these states having the courage to take the risks of taking on Hamas even though the benefits would be vast in potential.

Peace, like war, has costs. The price of peace may be lower in blood and even treasure, but it can be higher, much higher in political and social consequences. A change in the long established pattern in the Mideast brings automatic uncertainties in its wake. No government which is inherently comfortable with the well-established and well-known readily embraces a change, a new order of affairs.

Since World War II, the Mideast, the Arab states generally, have experienced a plethora of wars, coups, countercoups and other political tumult. None of these have brought any fundamental change in either politics or social structure.

Peace in the "neighborhood" would bring real change in regional economics, politics, social structures, cultural values and norms of behavior. The real question which underlies King Abdullah's fourth point is this: Can Arabs and Muslims accept, even eagerly embrace change?

The sweep of history over the past thousand years suggests the answer to the question is a resounding, "No."