"The Europeans Wanted The No-Fly Zone---"

There is a historically based truism about war--even a very small war hiding behind an euphemistic moniker and a poetic code name.  The truism can be summed accurately in a single word: unity.  There must be a unity between political goal and military goal.  There must be a unity between the goal and what can be termed the "definition of victory."  There must be a unity--or at least a tight cohesion--between the definition of victory and the "theory of victory," which is the specific mix of military and non-military means intended to result in victory.  Finally, there must be a unity of command so as to assure that all forces employed are marching to the same band.

Unity in all the forms mentioned is critical to war waged by a single power.  It is even more critical when the war is undertaken by a coalition.

To date Operation Odyssey Dawn (as the Americans term the effort in Libya) or Operation Ellamy (as the Brits have dubbed it) fails in most of the ways listed above.  There is no unity of political goals as between the several coalition members.  There is no unity between political and military goal as regards the US.  There is no unified definition of victory.  Thus, there can be no definition of victory.  Nor can there be a unified theory of victory.  And, looking forward, the unity of command and common effort is nowhere to be seen.

Operation Odyssey Dawn has been through yesterday a predominately American effort.  Nearly two thirds of all sorties have been flown by US aircraft.  American planes flew 212 sorties while the British and French as well as other NATO states contributed 124.  This trend continued during the past twenty-four hours with the Americans flying 113 sorties and the other twelve coalition partners contributing 63.  This is an improvement on the 85 percent Made in America record of a couple of days earlier.  The overwhelming majority of the 162 Tomahawk missiles fired were American (the British have fired a dozen or so from a submarine which represents a goodly chunk of the 64 Tomahawks in the British inventory.)

In this respect the operation represents business as usual.  Way back when during the days of H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton the no-fly zone was primarily an American effort.  The US flew five sorties for every one undertaken by the UK.  (The French were not involved at all.)  The situation was much the same during the Bosnian affray.

All this "joint" effort has put a lot of hours on the airframes of American aircraft.  It would be interesting to know how many hours had accumulated where and when on the F-15E Strike Eagle which crashed in Libya as the result of an "equipment malfunction."  The use--perhaps bordering on overuse--may be one reason the US military seems anxious to pass the baton to someone else in Libya.

It is not the only nor even the primary reason the US is looking so eagerly for an early exit from its current leadership role.  Leaving aside the motives and their worthiness, the most important consideration is whether or not the American bowing out will help or hinder the gaining of unity in all the forms mentioned.

The primary requirement, the requirement from which all subordinate forms of unity descend, is that of political goal.  With respect to Libya this seems to be quite elusive.  The French seem to be wedded to an endstate which sees Gaddifi gone.  The British have acknowledged they have no exit plan, which implies the absence of a final political goal.  The American president has drawn a line between an expansive political goal and a very, very narrow military one.  The Germans are opposed to everything which may bring with it the possibility of someone shooting someone.  The Turks are likewise inclined.  The Arab League is adrift in a sea of confusion bordering on despair.

The upshot of this sorry state of affairs is there is little if any probability of a unified political goal emerging regardless of who or what finally takes over the political direction of the war.  With this reality in place at the most foundational level, it almost doesn't matter who runs the actual conduct of daily operations.  But, politics guides that as well.  The UK with phlegmatic realism understands that NATO has the command and control capacity to run a coalition war.  The French and others are against this for the frankly political reason that NATO is Western and as such will alienate the Arab states whose political cover is essential for the effort.

The internal political contradictions and tensions which afflict not only the AL but many of the member states as well prevents the League from adopting and keeping to a unified political goal or even collaborating with non-Arab states in formulating one for the Libyan Question.  This reality makes an imitation of the ISAF in Afghanistan a fiction.  (Not that the ISAF is a model of unity--consider the risk averse nature of many contributor countries such as Germany whose ROE's virtually prevent firing an angry round.)

When night falls there will be a cobbled together simulacrum of a central political directorate.  Command and control of daily, routine operations will devolve to someone, perhaps the French or a joint Anglo-French body, or, just maybe, NATO.  The political directorate will not make the hard choices of the what-do-we-do-next? sort of decisions which will be popping up in a very unpretty way shortly.  These matters will be kicked back to the national leaders.  The notion that the assorted leaders of the main players (which will continue to include the US as only the US has many critical capacities such as enough aircraft) will achieve a consensus on the questions of what-now? is hallucinatory at best.

The yawning gap between President Obama's declaratory policy--"Gaddafi must go"--and the no-American-boots-on-the-ground pledge underscores the impossibility of coming to effective terms with the what-now? genre of questions.  The vast differences in motivation among the assorted NATO states which have contributed aircraft of basing facilities further exacerbates the question.

The American stance toward the effort in Libya is epitomized in the quote giving this post its title.  Of course this view ignores the vast differences in motives and intents within the "Europeans."  Frankly, the effort is the brainchild of France and the UK.  This allows the inference that these two should be the political directorate, but such is totally unacceptable to all others.

So the necessary unities will not exist.  This redounds to Gaddafi's advantage.  The greatest irony in this is simply that should Brother Leader come out of the current fracas still in power, the states with the most to worry about are those of the Arab League.  Given Gaddafi's past love affairs with terror groups and the current political tumult in most Arab states, his capacity for mischief is unlimited.

A line from an old Jefferson Airplane song is relevant: "Go away or go all the way in."  This is the fundamental dilemma facing the mock coalition in the sky over Libya.  The states with the most dogs in the fight are those of the Arab League.  The collective and individual unwillingness of these states to address the ground truth in play in Libya right now constitutes a major failure of political will and acumen.  In time this failure may well lead to more failed states where Arabic is the language.

Well, Now We're In--Why Should We Not Lead?

Yesterday Secretary of State Clinton warranted to the world's media that the US was not playing a leading role in the aerial intervention in Libya.  She assured all who would listen that American forces were playing only a supporting role in the complex operation of establishing a no-fly zone and, to follow the wording of Admiral Mike Mullen, get Gaddafi's forces to move back to garrison.

It seemed passingly strange that Ms Clinton would sound that particular note considering the widespread reports that it was her pressure which finally carried the day against the opposition of Robert Gates and Admiral Mullen. The most charitable characterization of her comment is that it carried Obama's water.  There is no doubt but Mr Obama would have been far, far happier to sit this particular fracas out while letting more robust governments such as those of Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron do the heavy lifting.

As the Obama administration's handling of most of the political unrest in the Mideast and North Africa has shown clearly, the president and his "team" seek a world in which the US is not a leader but rather a dutiful follower of consensus achieved elsewhere by others.  There may be many reasons lurking in the intellectual shadows surrounding this strange course of action, but two overt mechanisms are evident.  The president fears being equated with George W. Bush and his "Freedom agenda."  The president and at least some of his closest adherents eschew the crude realities of nationalism and national interest as well as the necessary concomitant, the US as a Great Power.

It was not statesmanship which forced the president and his people to cower behind a berm of contradictory messages regarding Libya ranging from the overly bellicose--Khadafi must go!--to the humbly pacifistic--this is a matter for the Libyan people.  It was not statesmanship which compelled Mr Obama to stand in the darkness downstage as David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy marched upstage, grabbing the spotlight as they did so.  It was not statesmanship, carefully calculated and deliberately decided policy which caused the POTUS to hide the US military lamp in the bushel of military nothingness which is the current British defense establishment or allow the French to jump in first, grabbing attention and credit as their zoomies occupied the safe sky over Benghazi.

Mr Obama's motives were far more mundane, not to say base than the requirements of global diplomacy.  He was afraid.  Fearful of looking like George W. Bush.  Affighted of having to make the very tough decisions which must be made in the next few days and weeks.  Frightened of losing his base and of alienating further the independents of the American electorate--a non-trivial consideration in that the Obama 2012 campaign is already well underway.

Then, of course, there is the hovering cloud of apprehension caused by uncertainty as to just what Arab and Muslim states and populations will say and do as the missiles and bombs fall on Libyan soil and heads.  Mr Obama--and a good many others--is quite scared of the unpredictable consequences of Muslim sensibilities being outraged by the realities of warfare--even of imposing the no-fly zone demanded by the Arab League.

There are two reasons why the US and other civilized states should be involved in Libya.  One is severely pragmatic--preventing Gaddafi from staying in power and presenting an ongoing threat to the civilized world, perhaps a much worse one than previously.  The other is not at all practical; rather it is one of ideals, of principles, of values and norms.  Gaddafi's conduct in recent days is repugnant to even the most loosely defined standards of acceptable governmental conduct.

The reality right now is that the air strikes and no fly zone may well leave Gaddafi in power.  This possibility has been acknowledged by Admiral Mullen.  This eventuality would render nugatory all the efforts made by the present coalition.  Yes, it would be nice if someone close to Gaddafi would be so kind as to grease him.  But that is what George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both hoped would be the fate of Saddam Hussein.  The providential assassination is not a firm base for policy.

The necessary inference is a ground operation may prove necessary.  Such need not be an army which would remain in occupation, a military force providing security during an exercise in nation-building.  British ForMin Hague has left the door more than ajar for an invasion.  If the actual goal of the current operation is--as it should or must be--the removal of Gaddafi and the prevention of a bifurcation of Libya, it is hard to see how that may be accomplished without the introduction of ground forces.

The prospect of a replay of the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq can be nullified by careful limitation of the ground force mission to the defeat of Gaddafi's troops and the removal of Gaddafi.  There would then be no responsibility for long term presence in a stability role while the do-gooders practice nation-building.  While some sort of nation-building is no doubt required, this should be undertaken by the Arab League or the UN with "stability" forces being provided by the former under the auspices of the latter.  This would allow Western combat forces to be withdrawn without the horrid endgame seen in Iraq and without the never ending counterinsurgency of Afghanistan.

It the US wants stability in Libya it must bend every effort to assure that Gaddafi is removed, Libya not partitioned, and any ground commitment be short and focused.  We cannot do this by playing support to a coalition headed by France and the UK.  We can only obtain the goals we want by exercising the leadership role the world--including Cameron and Sarkozy--want.

Everyone has had a brief glimpse of a world political order without the US front and center.  No one found it to be as happy a place as they may have imagined or wished.