Records of both history and climate data show recurrent droughts have hit the horn of Africa generally and Somalia in particular with regularity. It was a drought induced famine which invited the US humanitarian intervention in the dismal geographic expression called Somalia during the waning days of the George H.W. Bush administration. This adventure in feeding the starving brought with it a bout of mission creep and finally the humiliating withdrawal of US personnel following the ill-advised, poorly planned, and hastily executed failed raid on a chief warlord.
Since then the US has provided aid, humanitarian as well as military, to the Somalian people and their most recent experiment in government, the Transitional Federal Government. The aid has been cut substantially in recent years due to well founded concerns that it might have been benefiting the al-Shabaab gunslingers more than the civilians for whom it was intended. When the Mighty Warriors of the Koran ordered an end to the activities of international aid organizations including the UN, American aid functionally ended along with that provided by other civilized states.
The situation in al-Shabaab dominated portions of the country has grown ever worse. Partially, this is the effect of the drought. But more it has been the result of the combination of ineptitude and brutality which is the hallmark of al-Shabaab's notion of proper governance according to the finer points of Islam. The joining of hunger beyond description and fear of the thugs of Islamic purity has resulted in a flood of refugees pouring into vastly overcrowded camps in Kenya and new rather informal facilities in Ethiopia--a country where famine also stalks the land.
The UN and international organizations such as Oxfam have declared that an official famine exists in large portions of Somalia. Oxfam has pointed the great finger of blame at the US and the European Union, alleging that both entities have been slow and inadequate in their response to the emergency despite ample warnings and importuning.
The Flying Finger of Guilt is misplaced to say the least. The US has increased its food aid to the region, including an additional twenty-eight million bucks worth of food for Somalis. The EU has done likewise. At the center of affairs the UN believes it can successfully negotiate a mode of existence with al-Shabaab which will allow the food and accompanying aid workers to work in the regions they dominate. But this remains an open question.
Dark hints have been made to the effect that the ongoing US effort to counter both al-Shabaab and its close affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, are complicating the business of making a deal with the gunsels of al-Shabaab. The necessary inference is that the US should stop its semi-clandestine war with both advocates of violent political Islam. Ironically, Oxfam, the same group which deplores the US drone attacks on al-Shabaab fighters has also mentioned the need to invoke Responsibility to Protect in order to meet the current crisis. Of course, R2P would require a massive military campaign including ground combat forces, but that seems to have eluded the Lofty Minded of Oxfam.
In their orgy of finger pointing at the West, the folks at Oxfam and other NGOs seem to have overlooked a couple of salient facts.
Fact the first: The states of the African Union have contributed not even penny number one to famine relief in the Horn.
Sure, Kenya is taking a hit with the refugee camp, the largest on Earth, but that does not make up for the utter lack of interest in helping on the part of the AU generally. This reinforces the perception that while the AU likes to talk about African solutions to African problems, they are unable or unwilling to do more than talk. Let the West do the heavy lifting seems to be the unstated motto of the Union.
Fact the second: The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference) has provided no money, no food, no logistics, no nothing. Perhaps the OIC has forgotten that Somalia is a majority Muslim state--a member of the organization. Perhaps the OIC and its over fifty members have forgotten the many strictures regarding the Muslim obligation for charity. Perhaps the OIC is simply too worried about something they call "Islamophobia" and cartoons of the Prophet to notice a few hundred thousand starving Muslim women and children. Or, perhaps the OIC and all its members--some of whom have most of the money in the known universe--simply believe it is the Will of Allah that so many perish so wretchedly, and thus it would be blasphemous at best to intervene with food aid.
The West ought to propose to the OIC the following deal. You pay and we will feed. You fork over some of your petrodollars and we, particularly we Americans, will provide food at fair market price to be distributed in Somalia or the refugee camps. You pay for transportation and distribution. And, if we need to use force to get the food past your fellow Muslims in al-Shabaab, you pay for the bullets necessary.
Of course the money heavy governments of the OIC will not accept this deal, fair as it is. This means the taxpayers of the US and the other civilized states will have to carry the freight for some generations to come. It is both a curse and a blessing that the West has learned through past experience that some things, like mass starvation, are simply unacceptable. So, Westerners will do the heavy lifting while the AU and OIC sit by with folded hands and indifferent expressions.
Frankly, the idea in and of itself flatly rankles the Geek's rear end. Famine should be equally unacceptable to the governments of the AU and, even more, the OIC. The fact that both seem totally unconcerned about the bitter reality of life and death in the Somalia of al-Shabaab stands as stark accusation against not only the two organizations but the religious faith which purportedly provides the foundation of one.
Showing posts with label African Union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label African Union. Show all posts
Thursday, July 21, 2011
Thursday, May 26, 2011
The African Union Is Off Its Meds Again
There are some real problems in Africa. Problems which well deserve the full attention of the African Union's Peace and Security Committee. This crew is chaired by Ramtane Lamamra, who should be a very busy man.
Insofar as Mr Lamamra is busy it is not with the war in Somalia. Nor is it with the invasion and occupation of Abyei by Sudan. No, these are mere bagatelles in the estimate of Mr Lamamra and his colleagues on the Peace and Security Committee--or so it appears.
The African Union and its Peace and Security Committee are meeting in Addas Abba with only one pressing item on their agenda. That issue is Libya. To err on the side of accuracy, the issue is not so much Libya per se but rather the AU's perception that it has been shunted to the sidelines as "an observer in this calamity." Jean Ping, another AU heavyweight, echoes the plaint of African irrelevancy.
The AU is desperately keen on ending the NATO program of air strikes. Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra are of the expressed view that it is terribly, terribly necessary that the NATO planes sit silent and bereft of bombs on the runway if a political solution is to be found for Libya. The AU is also quite sure that it has a plan, a road map to use their term, which will lead to a peaceful and successful outcome in Libya.
The problem in the estimate of the AU is the noise of the exploding bombs is so loud that no one will listen to their plan. The minor detail that the AU plan allows Brother Leader to remain in power while the details of change are worked out and this is quite, quite unacceptable to the rebels seems to be unimportant--at least in the estimate of Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra. The unpleasant matter of the rebels having rejected the AU approach is not seen by the AU as important.
The rebels are suspicious of the AU. They have taken the uncharitable view that the strong financial ties between the AU and Gaddafi renders the organization a less than neutral party in the present matter. Of course, the rebels are simply giving due recognition to reality--Gaddafi has been a major money man behind not only the AU but a wide selection of African politicians including not a few current heads of state.
The AU blithely overlooks the realistic position of the rebels. The organization also ignores its own record of complete incompetence in dealing effectively with the armed chaos of assorted collapsing African states over the past couple of decades. The body even manages to focus a blind eye on its lack of substantial let alone effective actions in the morasses of Somalia or Sudan.
No more than the Arab League is the African Union capable of brokering a peace in the context of an internal war. Libya is no more susceptible to the good offices of the AU than was the situation in Yemen amenable to the efforts of the Gulf Coordinating Council. In both states there was finally no room for even the slightest compromise between the rivals for power. Gaddafi no more than Saleh is willing to give up and go into that good night without a fight to the edge of death--and perhaps beyond.
The Arab League was sensible enough to realize it could play no useful role in Yemen. The members recognized that the political differences between the various regimes precluded a single political will and without that the AL had no credible capacity to coerce and thus no way of influencing the outcome in Yemen. Rather than expose this to global view, the AL simply looked the other way. The GCC was willing to give it a shot having more to lose by not trying than by trying and losing.
The AU has the political and military potency of a steer. It normally accepts this condition by ignoring unpleasant situations such as those in Sudan or Somalia. Normally, the AU tries to keep its sheer impotency out of public view. The ill-advised peace mediation effort in Libya is an anomaly understandable only in terms of the organization having a sense of loyalty to a man who wrote some very large checks to it.
Libya is a tough nut to crack as NATO has been discovering. It is a tough nut because the slyly nutty man who has run Libya for two generations is personally tough. He is not going to surrender or accept a humiliating defeat which would see him in jail, on trial, or facing the hangman. Negotiation is a means of buying time and only that. The solution to the Libyan problem will be found only in the death of Gaddafi.
Even that may not be enough. The rebels are poorly organized with no common agreement beyond the proposition that Gaddafi must go--preferably feet first. The rebels are no more amenable to negotiations than is Gaddafi. What might or will happen the day after Gaddafi's body is buried remains very much up in the air. There is no rebel consensus. Nor is there a Western concept--other than sweet mood music about democracy and the like.
The AU has been so blind to the real dynamics in play in Libya--or owe such a debt to Gaddafi--that it ignored the non-negotiable foundations of both sides. This diplomatic tone deafness is in no way covered up by a campaign of whining about the noise of NATO bombs. The AU should stop its bitching and simply accept that it is an entity without any real reason to exist other than the egos of the respective members.
Insofar as Mr Lamamra is busy it is not with the war in Somalia. Nor is it with the invasion and occupation of Abyei by Sudan. No, these are mere bagatelles in the estimate of Mr Lamamra and his colleagues on the Peace and Security Committee--or so it appears.
The African Union and its Peace and Security Committee are meeting in Addas Abba with only one pressing item on their agenda. That issue is Libya. To err on the side of accuracy, the issue is not so much Libya per se but rather the AU's perception that it has been shunted to the sidelines as "an observer in this calamity." Jean Ping, another AU heavyweight, echoes the plaint of African irrelevancy.
The AU is desperately keen on ending the NATO program of air strikes. Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra are of the expressed view that it is terribly, terribly necessary that the NATO planes sit silent and bereft of bombs on the runway if a political solution is to be found for Libya. The AU is also quite sure that it has a plan, a road map to use their term, which will lead to a peaceful and successful outcome in Libya.
The problem in the estimate of the AU is the noise of the exploding bombs is so loud that no one will listen to their plan. The minor detail that the AU plan allows Brother Leader to remain in power while the details of change are worked out and this is quite, quite unacceptable to the rebels seems to be unimportant--at least in the estimate of Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra. The unpleasant matter of the rebels having rejected the AU approach is not seen by the AU as important.
The rebels are suspicious of the AU. They have taken the uncharitable view that the strong financial ties between the AU and Gaddafi renders the organization a less than neutral party in the present matter. Of course, the rebels are simply giving due recognition to reality--Gaddafi has been a major money man behind not only the AU but a wide selection of African politicians including not a few current heads of state.
The AU blithely overlooks the realistic position of the rebels. The organization also ignores its own record of complete incompetence in dealing effectively with the armed chaos of assorted collapsing African states over the past couple of decades. The body even manages to focus a blind eye on its lack of substantial let alone effective actions in the morasses of Somalia or Sudan.
No more than the Arab League is the African Union capable of brokering a peace in the context of an internal war. Libya is no more susceptible to the good offices of the AU than was the situation in Yemen amenable to the efforts of the Gulf Coordinating Council. In both states there was finally no room for even the slightest compromise between the rivals for power. Gaddafi no more than Saleh is willing to give up and go into that good night without a fight to the edge of death--and perhaps beyond.
The Arab League was sensible enough to realize it could play no useful role in Yemen. The members recognized that the political differences between the various regimes precluded a single political will and without that the AL had no credible capacity to coerce and thus no way of influencing the outcome in Yemen. Rather than expose this to global view, the AL simply looked the other way. The GCC was willing to give it a shot having more to lose by not trying than by trying and losing.
The AU has the political and military potency of a steer. It normally accepts this condition by ignoring unpleasant situations such as those in Sudan or Somalia. Normally, the AU tries to keep its sheer impotency out of public view. The ill-advised peace mediation effort in Libya is an anomaly understandable only in terms of the organization having a sense of loyalty to a man who wrote some very large checks to it.
Libya is a tough nut to crack as NATO has been discovering. It is a tough nut because the slyly nutty man who has run Libya for two generations is personally tough. He is not going to surrender or accept a humiliating defeat which would see him in jail, on trial, or facing the hangman. Negotiation is a means of buying time and only that. The solution to the Libyan problem will be found only in the death of Gaddafi.
Even that may not be enough. The rebels are poorly organized with no common agreement beyond the proposition that Gaddafi must go--preferably feet first. The rebels are no more amenable to negotiations than is Gaddafi. What might or will happen the day after Gaddafi's body is buried remains very much up in the air. There is no rebel consensus. Nor is there a Western concept--other than sweet mood music about democracy and the like.
The AU has been so blind to the real dynamics in play in Libya--or owe such a debt to Gaddafi--that it ignored the non-negotiable foundations of both sides. This diplomatic tone deafness is in no way covered up by a campaign of whining about the noise of NATO bombs. The AU should stop its bitching and simply accept that it is an entity without any real reason to exist other than the egos of the respective members.
Monday, May 9, 2011
Russia And China Get It Together
The state of play in Russo-Chinese relations shows the two behemoths moving closer together on a couple of key fronts. One is economic. The other is diplomatic.
In economic matters it is clear that the two are close to a pricing agreement on the sale of thirty billion cubic meters of natural gas annually starting in 2015. The deal is good for both. There is no doubt but China needs the energy and Russia would very much like to diversify its hydrocarbon market--and pocket a good deal of cash in the process.
While the natural gas agreement is important, it must take a backseat to the increasing harmony between Moscow and Beijing in international matters. It is clear that both are using the Libyan adventure of NATO (and, at least indirectly, the US) as the catalyst for what the Russians have termed "tight cooperation" on such key questions as the UN, R2P and interventions generally.
Both states have guarded the rights of states to be free of UN interference for decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the stance of both in this area has become, if anything, more and more hardline. Both countries have more than a bit of self-interest at stake in their guarding of national sovereignty as each faces recurrent political unrest. While both signed the convention on responsibility to protect there is no doubt but each saw the document as being one of those feel-good productions like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which everybody signs but not everyone takes seriously.
The doubts held by the Lads in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing regarding the interventionary ambitions of the US and the West were given a shot of growth hormone by the passage of the Security Council resolution authorizing the no-fly zone in Libya and further calling upon member states to take actions such as to protect the civilian population of that country. While delicately (and misleadingly) worded so as to avoid a veto, the resolution was troubling to Russia and China as well as other countries such as India and Brazil because its loose wording could be generously interpreted by Western states.
That a generous interpretation was intended from the beginning was obvious in the statements of assorted leaders including President Obama which declared goals far more expansive than simply assuring the safety and humanitarian relief of endangered civilians. As the bombs fell in ever widening patterns, the Russians took the lead in stentorian denunciations of the NATO effort. In the past few days they have been joined in the chorus by China.
When Chinese president Hu goes to St Petersburg on 16 June to attend the "Russian Davos," it is highly probable that the opportunity will be used to further orchestrate joint Sino-Russian opposition to an extension of the no-fly mandate as well as any introduction of NATO ground forces under any guise. The fear is the US and its NATO partners, France and England, will arm twist Secretary General Ban into requesting NATO protection for UN humanitarian operations with the result the troops will land in regime changing force.
While there is a whiff of the conspiratorial in this Russian (and Chinese) apprehension, it is not baseless. The air campaign is not only obviously biased in favor of the rebels, it is also not working rapidly or all that well. Despite the attrition inflicted on loyalist arsenals, the pro-Gaddafi forces still have a robust combat power, effective tactics, and political will. Even if the rebels are no longer losing dramatically, neither are they winning in any meaningful sense of the word.
To the Russian and Chinese observer, it seems only natural that the West would seek to retrieve victory nearly lost by the introduction of ground forces. Should this move occur before the mid-June sidebar summit, one can anticipate very vigorous resistance from both states. They will be joined by others. Brazil, India, South Africa, various Central Asian republics--and the members of the Arab League.
The Arab League has repented of its early enthusiasm for internationalization of the Libyan internal conflict. This is seen by the monolithic opposition from both the AL and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to any robust action being taken against Syria. The AL, having tossed one Arab leader off the troika, is now covering itself with self-protecting protection of Bashir al-Assad. To circle the Arab and Muslim wagons under the protective banner of two Great Powers is comforting to the Arabs and the OIC alike.
It will be comforting as well to the African Union (AU), which has been consigned by events to the further shores of irrelevance not only in Libya but deep in the heart of the continent with the way in which the UN and France dealt with events in the Ivory Coast. This has allowed the Russian and Chinese diplomats to pull out and play the fear of neo-colonialism card with effect. To many in Africa as in the Arab and Muslim majority states, the specter of Western neo-colonial acts has risen from the grave (if indeed it was ever really buried, which is debatable at best).
All of this implies that push-comes-to-shove time is arriving rapidly in Libya. Unless the NATO/rebel combine can pull a rabbit (or better yet, a dead Gaddafi) out of their collective hat, there will be very rough diplomatic waters ahead. Renewing the no-fly zone mandate (due by 24 June) or the use of ground forces will produce a diplomatic contretemps at Turtle Bay of major proportions. Even absent that, the opposition to future application of R2P by China and Russia backed by an impressive number of lesser states will be massive and monolithic.
Even though the current administration has been staying deep in the shadows, the US still has a bull in the herd. Our declaratory policy is still one of Gaddafi must go. We are still more or less committed to R2P--at least when it is convenient and doable. We are still trying to sort out just what direction we will take with the fast and sharp changes in Egyptian foreign relations.
All of this implies the US must carve out a defensible and credible stance vis a vis both Russia and China in their current mood of totally distrusting NATO and the force they perceive to be motivating the alliance--the US. This may mean concessions to the Russians on the ABM basing issue as well as current plans to base US aircraft in former Warsaw Pact states. It may mean backing down a bit in Asia to mollify Chinese fears.
Both of these would be quite negative for American national and strategic interests. Yet the temptation to offer appeasing gestures of some substance may prove all too appealing to members of the Obama administration who would like to see foreign policy concerns recede to the back burner. After all they have an election to win in only slightly less than eighteen months, an election which will hinge far more on economic issues than foreign policy concerns.
Or, of course, Mr Obama might want to see if Boat Six can take a whack at Brother Leader.
In economic matters it is clear that the two are close to a pricing agreement on the sale of thirty billion cubic meters of natural gas annually starting in 2015. The deal is good for both. There is no doubt but China needs the energy and Russia would very much like to diversify its hydrocarbon market--and pocket a good deal of cash in the process.
While the natural gas agreement is important, it must take a backseat to the increasing harmony between Moscow and Beijing in international matters. It is clear that both are using the Libyan adventure of NATO (and, at least indirectly, the US) as the catalyst for what the Russians have termed "tight cooperation" on such key questions as the UN, R2P and interventions generally.
Both states have guarded the rights of states to be free of UN interference for decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the stance of both in this area has become, if anything, more and more hardline. Both countries have more than a bit of self-interest at stake in their guarding of national sovereignty as each faces recurrent political unrest. While both signed the convention on responsibility to protect there is no doubt but each saw the document as being one of those feel-good productions like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which everybody signs but not everyone takes seriously.
The doubts held by the Lads in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing regarding the interventionary ambitions of the US and the West were given a shot of growth hormone by the passage of the Security Council resolution authorizing the no-fly zone in Libya and further calling upon member states to take actions such as to protect the civilian population of that country. While delicately (and misleadingly) worded so as to avoid a veto, the resolution was troubling to Russia and China as well as other countries such as India and Brazil because its loose wording could be generously interpreted by Western states.
That a generous interpretation was intended from the beginning was obvious in the statements of assorted leaders including President Obama which declared goals far more expansive than simply assuring the safety and humanitarian relief of endangered civilians. As the bombs fell in ever widening patterns, the Russians took the lead in stentorian denunciations of the NATO effort. In the past few days they have been joined in the chorus by China.
When Chinese president Hu goes to St Petersburg on 16 June to attend the "Russian Davos," it is highly probable that the opportunity will be used to further orchestrate joint Sino-Russian opposition to an extension of the no-fly mandate as well as any introduction of NATO ground forces under any guise. The fear is the US and its NATO partners, France and England, will arm twist Secretary General Ban into requesting NATO protection for UN humanitarian operations with the result the troops will land in regime changing force.
While there is a whiff of the conspiratorial in this Russian (and Chinese) apprehension, it is not baseless. The air campaign is not only obviously biased in favor of the rebels, it is also not working rapidly or all that well. Despite the attrition inflicted on loyalist arsenals, the pro-Gaddafi forces still have a robust combat power, effective tactics, and political will. Even if the rebels are no longer losing dramatically, neither are they winning in any meaningful sense of the word.
To the Russian and Chinese observer, it seems only natural that the West would seek to retrieve victory nearly lost by the introduction of ground forces. Should this move occur before the mid-June sidebar summit, one can anticipate very vigorous resistance from both states. They will be joined by others. Brazil, India, South Africa, various Central Asian republics--and the members of the Arab League.
The Arab League has repented of its early enthusiasm for internationalization of the Libyan internal conflict. This is seen by the monolithic opposition from both the AL and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to any robust action being taken against Syria. The AL, having tossed one Arab leader off the troika, is now covering itself with self-protecting protection of Bashir al-Assad. To circle the Arab and Muslim wagons under the protective banner of two Great Powers is comforting to the Arabs and the OIC alike.
It will be comforting as well to the African Union (AU), which has been consigned by events to the further shores of irrelevance not only in Libya but deep in the heart of the continent with the way in which the UN and France dealt with events in the Ivory Coast. This has allowed the Russian and Chinese diplomats to pull out and play the fear of neo-colonialism card with effect. To many in Africa as in the Arab and Muslim majority states, the specter of Western neo-colonial acts has risen from the grave (if indeed it was ever really buried, which is debatable at best).
All of this implies that push-comes-to-shove time is arriving rapidly in Libya. Unless the NATO/rebel combine can pull a rabbit (or better yet, a dead Gaddafi) out of their collective hat, there will be very rough diplomatic waters ahead. Renewing the no-fly zone mandate (due by 24 June) or the use of ground forces will produce a diplomatic contretemps at Turtle Bay of major proportions. Even absent that, the opposition to future application of R2P by China and Russia backed by an impressive number of lesser states will be massive and monolithic.
Even though the current administration has been staying deep in the shadows, the US still has a bull in the herd. Our declaratory policy is still one of Gaddafi must go. We are still more or less committed to R2P--at least when it is convenient and doable. We are still trying to sort out just what direction we will take with the fast and sharp changes in Egyptian foreign relations.
All of this implies the US must carve out a defensible and credible stance vis a vis both Russia and China in their current mood of totally distrusting NATO and the force they perceive to be motivating the alliance--the US. This may mean concessions to the Russians on the ABM basing issue as well as current plans to base US aircraft in former Warsaw Pact states. It may mean backing down a bit in Asia to mollify Chinese fears.
Both of these would be quite negative for American national and strategic interests. Yet the temptation to offer appeasing gestures of some substance may prove all too appealing to members of the Obama administration who would like to see foreign policy concerns recede to the back burner. After all they have an election to win in only slightly less than eighteen months, an election which will hinge far more on economic issues than foreign policy concerns.
Or, of course, Mr Obama might want to see if Boat Six can take a whack at Brother Leader.
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Bring On The Clowns
The Libyan Affray has a magnetic appeal. The confrontation between a dictator seemingly unmoored from the consensually agreed upon objective reality and a large, growing group of terminally fed up people has the elements of drama and tragedy which attracts interest and seemingly demands engagement by governments great and small.
One of the more intriguing, not to say potentially amusing, gambits of late has come from the Arab League. The League, whose director, an Egyptian politician named Moussa, who is seeking the office of president in that country, has stated it is willing to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya. The Arab League added it would do this in conjunction with the African Union.
The idea originated with Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi expat who was briefly "our man in Baghdad" before the Great Adventure in Regime Change. He argued the League could do what the US and its allies did in Iraq after the Kuwait War. The Arab League picked up on the idea as both the UN and NATO showed a profound lack of interest in ordering or enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya.
There is no doubt but some politicians including UK prime minister David Cameron have exhibited a zeal for imposing a no-fly zone which is not widely shared by the respective military forces and their chiefs. Leading the opposition in public has been Robert Gates.
Dr Gates correctly points out that the imposition of a no-fly zone is both complex and resource intensive. He is also correct when he warns that establishing a no-fly zone requires waging war, admittedly war of a severely limited sort. The starting gun announcing the beginning of a no-fly zone is an attack upon the air defense system of the target country. Missiles would be launched. Bombs would be dropped. Men would die down range. That, bucko, is war no matter what name is put upon it.
He is being disingenuous when he emphasizes the size of Libya and implies that its geographic extent would render the imposition and maintenance of a no-fly zone more complex and resource demanding than the earlier efforts in Bosnia and Iraq. The critical regions of Libya, the areas where fighting is occurring and where people live and air bases are located are found in a narrow band along the coast. While there are bases deep in the desert wastes, these can be kept under surveillance by long endurance UAVs or satellites with manned platforms being deployed only as required.
There is one good reason why the US and Western European countries will not establish a no-fly zone. In the current political climate there is a requirement for UN Security Council authorization. No such authorization will occur. Period. China stated categorically that it would veto any resolution which included the establishment of a no-fly zone. Russia did the same albeit in less blunt wording. Both states have held a policy opposing any UN intervention in any matter which can be defined as "internal" for many, many years now and will not make an exception for Libya.
The Arab League and the African Union would not be restricted by the political considerations which make UN sanction so necessary for any Western nation to take action. For reasons intrinsic to regional politics, either organization can go the no-fly zone route without UN permission. As the Arab League has resolutely opposed any "foreign" intervention, the stage has been set politically for the League to go ahead with an intervention of its own, presumably including or starting with the imposition of a no-fly zone.
The question is can the members of the League pull it off with or without the aid of states from the African Union. This is a fascinating matter. As has been noted in many fora, the conduct of a no-fly zone is complex, resource intensive, and constitutes genuine war.
Neutralizing Libyan air defenses is not a trivial consideration. The air defenses of Libya are predicated upon Soviet systems delivered and installed over a quarter century ago. In the US strike back in 1986, the defense was able to shoot down an American aircraft. Since then there have been upgrades and modifications. There has also been a degree of system degradation. Excluding the remaining Soviet and French fighters, the net capacities of the ground based missile and tube defenses would be rated minimal against US or other NATO assets. The same cannot be said when considering attacks made by forces of either the League or the AU.
The probability of attacker losses is much higher when factoring the capabilities of equipment and personnel of League or Union forces. This implies that the attacker must have additional assets for flack suppression and combat search and rescue. It is worth noting that none of the League states have a dedicated combat SAR capability. Also it is questionable if the League even with AU support has a large enough inventory of requisite aircraft to accept the virtual attrition imposed by the existence of a moderately competent air defense system.
It is worth mentioning that the US and other air forces which imposed the no-fly zones in Iraq and Kosovo had combat experience of recent vintage. This experience was essential in translating the theory of training into the realities of the field. In sharp contrast, no Arab League and no African Union member state's air force has combat experience in recent years. Looking back, the experiences of some League members such as Syria and Egypt in operations against Israel are not such as to engender confidence.
Even giving the most generous assumptions, there is no reason to conclude that the combination of Arab League and African Union assets in fact could establish and maintain a no-fly zone. Rather, it is probable that the initial losses would provoke escalation terminating in the introduction of ground combat forces. Of course, such an introduction would require time, probably significant time given the difficulties of establishing a consensus and the complications introduced by the ongoing nature of internal political factionalization afflicting so many of the member states of both organizations.
Time passing would assure an increase in two aspects of the internal war in Libya. The political will of the regime would be enhanced by the external threat. The body count would grow as both sides sought a conclusion before outside forces arrived to complicate the situation.
The ground truth is simple. The Arab League may be long on rhetoric but it is very short on the capability to back words with effective action. The African Union is, fortunately, more economical with words. This implies that there is little if any chance of a combined League-Union move on Libya. This means that the League's threat is empty.
This means the League has to resort to the diplomatic option which originated with Hugo Chavez, who has been a long time associate of Brother Leader. He has supported the Colonel without reservation since the start of the protests in Libya He has strongly urged the Arab League to "mediate" the crisis. And, the League's director has accepted the idea. So has the incumbent regime. The anti-government group has rejected the move.
There is nothing to "mediate." The gap between the Gaddafi family enterprise and the insurrectionists is too vast and deep to bridge by any conceivable effort at mediation. The years of repression and corruption and the alienation of the majority of the population from the current government admit of no compromise now that the battle has been joined. Every rebel who is killed and every non-combatant who is caught in the crossfire serve to assure that nothing less than total victory will be acceptable to the insurgents.
What Sr Chavez, Director General Moussa, and Brother Leader do not understand is that the dead are dictating policy. The corpses of those killed by the government forces along with those who died over the years at the hands of the Gaddifi security forces demand nothing less than a total restructuring of Libyan polity and society. It is offensive insurgency of the most classic sort.
The Arab League, the African Union, the UN would be well advised to limit their involvement in Libya to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. The same applies to the EU and US. Unless the Gaddafi forces resort to their stockpile of mustard agent which, while not in weaponized form, is not unusable, the West should restrain itself from any action beyond the humanitarian. The Libyans started this affray for and from reasons which are organic to the country. They will have to finish it. Anything else will distort the process probably with consequences which will prove even more bloody and prolonged.
It is hard to write that. The emotionally satisfying approach is that of a quick invasion by competent Western forces with the result that Brother Leader and company would be laid out by the heels rapidly and decisively. But, emotions don't count. The reality is that the mess was made by Libyans. It can only be cleaned and rectified by Libyans. Only the Libyans can build a nation--if they want to.
This means that the professionals and clowns alike must restrain themselves. They must do the hardest of hard jobs--standing by and limiting the human suffering to the greatest extent possible without seeking to impose a fast track solution on the situation.
One of the more intriguing, not to say potentially amusing, gambits of late has come from the Arab League. The League, whose director, an Egyptian politician named Moussa, who is seeking the office of president in that country, has stated it is willing to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya. The Arab League added it would do this in conjunction with the African Union.
The idea originated with Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi expat who was briefly "our man in Baghdad" before the Great Adventure in Regime Change. He argued the League could do what the US and its allies did in Iraq after the Kuwait War. The Arab League picked up on the idea as both the UN and NATO showed a profound lack of interest in ordering or enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya.
There is no doubt but some politicians including UK prime minister David Cameron have exhibited a zeal for imposing a no-fly zone which is not widely shared by the respective military forces and their chiefs. Leading the opposition in public has been Robert Gates.
Dr Gates correctly points out that the imposition of a no-fly zone is both complex and resource intensive. He is also correct when he warns that establishing a no-fly zone requires waging war, admittedly war of a severely limited sort. The starting gun announcing the beginning of a no-fly zone is an attack upon the air defense system of the target country. Missiles would be launched. Bombs would be dropped. Men would die down range. That, bucko, is war no matter what name is put upon it.
He is being disingenuous when he emphasizes the size of Libya and implies that its geographic extent would render the imposition and maintenance of a no-fly zone more complex and resource demanding than the earlier efforts in Bosnia and Iraq. The critical regions of Libya, the areas where fighting is occurring and where people live and air bases are located are found in a narrow band along the coast. While there are bases deep in the desert wastes, these can be kept under surveillance by long endurance UAVs or satellites with manned platforms being deployed only as required.
There is one good reason why the US and Western European countries will not establish a no-fly zone. In the current political climate there is a requirement for UN Security Council authorization. No such authorization will occur. Period. China stated categorically that it would veto any resolution which included the establishment of a no-fly zone. Russia did the same albeit in less blunt wording. Both states have held a policy opposing any UN intervention in any matter which can be defined as "internal" for many, many years now and will not make an exception for Libya.
The Arab League and the African Union would not be restricted by the political considerations which make UN sanction so necessary for any Western nation to take action. For reasons intrinsic to regional politics, either organization can go the no-fly zone route without UN permission. As the Arab League has resolutely opposed any "foreign" intervention, the stage has been set politically for the League to go ahead with an intervention of its own, presumably including or starting with the imposition of a no-fly zone.
The question is can the members of the League pull it off with or without the aid of states from the African Union. This is a fascinating matter. As has been noted in many fora, the conduct of a no-fly zone is complex, resource intensive, and constitutes genuine war.
Neutralizing Libyan air defenses is not a trivial consideration. The air defenses of Libya are predicated upon Soviet systems delivered and installed over a quarter century ago. In the US strike back in 1986, the defense was able to shoot down an American aircraft. Since then there have been upgrades and modifications. There has also been a degree of system degradation. Excluding the remaining Soviet and French fighters, the net capacities of the ground based missile and tube defenses would be rated minimal against US or other NATO assets. The same cannot be said when considering attacks made by forces of either the League or the AU.
The probability of attacker losses is much higher when factoring the capabilities of equipment and personnel of League or Union forces. This implies that the attacker must have additional assets for flack suppression and combat search and rescue. It is worth noting that none of the League states have a dedicated combat SAR capability. Also it is questionable if the League even with AU support has a large enough inventory of requisite aircraft to accept the virtual attrition imposed by the existence of a moderately competent air defense system.
It is worth mentioning that the US and other air forces which imposed the no-fly zones in Iraq and Kosovo had combat experience of recent vintage. This experience was essential in translating the theory of training into the realities of the field. In sharp contrast, no Arab League and no African Union member state's air force has combat experience in recent years. Looking back, the experiences of some League members such as Syria and Egypt in operations against Israel are not such as to engender confidence.
Even giving the most generous assumptions, there is no reason to conclude that the combination of Arab League and African Union assets in fact could establish and maintain a no-fly zone. Rather, it is probable that the initial losses would provoke escalation terminating in the introduction of ground combat forces. Of course, such an introduction would require time, probably significant time given the difficulties of establishing a consensus and the complications introduced by the ongoing nature of internal political factionalization afflicting so many of the member states of both organizations.
Time passing would assure an increase in two aspects of the internal war in Libya. The political will of the regime would be enhanced by the external threat. The body count would grow as both sides sought a conclusion before outside forces arrived to complicate the situation.
The ground truth is simple. The Arab League may be long on rhetoric but it is very short on the capability to back words with effective action. The African Union is, fortunately, more economical with words. This implies that there is little if any chance of a combined League-Union move on Libya. This means that the League's threat is empty.
This means the League has to resort to the diplomatic option which originated with Hugo Chavez, who has been a long time associate of Brother Leader. He has supported the Colonel without reservation since the start of the protests in Libya He has strongly urged the Arab League to "mediate" the crisis. And, the League's director has accepted the idea. So has the incumbent regime. The anti-government group has rejected the move.
There is nothing to "mediate." The gap between the Gaddafi family enterprise and the insurrectionists is too vast and deep to bridge by any conceivable effort at mediation. The years of repression and corruption and the alienation of the majority of the population from the current government admit of no compromise now that the battle has been joined. Every rebel who is killed and every non-combatant who is caught in the crossfire serve to assure that nothing less than total victory will be acceptable to the insurgents.
What Sr Chavez, Director General Moussa, and Brother Leader do not understand is that the dead are dictating policy. The corpses of those killed by the government forces along with those who died over the years at the hands of the Gaddifi security forces demand nothing less than a total restructuring of Libyan polity and society. It is offensive insurgency of the most classic sort.
The Arab League, the African Union, the UN would be well advised to limit their involvement in Libya to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. The same applies to the EU and US. Unless the Gaddafi forces resort to their stockpile of mustard agent which, while not in weaponized form, is not unusable, the West should restrain itself from any action beyond the humanitarian. The Libyans started this affray for and from reasons which are organic to the country. They will have to finish it. Anything else will distort the process probably with consequences which will prove even more bloody and prolonged.
It is hard to write that. The emotionally satisfying approach is that of a quick invasion by competent Western forces with the result that Brother Leader and company would be laid out by the heels rapidly and decisively. But, emotions don't count. The reality is that the mess was made by Libyans. It can only be cleaned and rectified by Libyans. Only the Libyans can build a nation--if they want to.
This means that the professionals and clowns alike must restrain themselves. They must do the hardest of hard jobs--standing by and limiting the human suffering to the greatest extent possible without seeking to impose a fast track solution on the situation.
Sunday, January 23, 2011
Another Case Where Hanging Tough Pays Off
The Big Two of Successful Defiance Of The International Community, Iran and North Korea, have been joined by another practitioner of cocking a snoot at Great Powers and international organizations, the Ivory Coast. To err on the side of accuracy it is not the country which is flipping the bird at the assorted powers and both the UN and African Union but rather an aging dictator who maintains he did not lose the election which all the others insist he did. Laurent Gbagbo has been the Man In Charge for a decade or so and intends to keep on doing so no matter what the AU, UN, or assorted others might say.
The situation in the Ivory Coast with Gbagbo, his army, and his militias holding on to power while confining the properly elected new president, Alassane Ouattara, prisoner in a luxury beachfront hotel and forcibly searching the vehicles of the UN peacekeeping force should be a form of comic relief, theater of the absurd. It is not. The standoff in Abidjan is no laughing matter because of its possible even probable impact on the twenty countries in Africa which have elections scheduled for this year.
Africa has never shown itself to be overly hospitable to democracy, at least any form of the often altered beast which would be generally recognizable as an open expression of popular will in the choosing of governmental leaders. The combination of historical, demographic, social, and economic features which typify much of the continent provide very thin soil for democracy of the sort common in Europe or North America. Rather the environment has proven nourishing to the ambitions and agendas of autocrats, strongmen, the makers of coups and thieves of elections.
If Gbagbo is allowed to get away with his effort to hold on to power, the probability is that democracy will become even more of an endangered species than it has been. The US, France, the UK, the EU, and the UN have all imposed sanctions and flexed diplomatic jaw muscles. The regional organization, ECOWAS, as well as the African Union have also imposed financial and economic sanctions in addition to sending diplomatic missions almost by the score.
So far all the diplomatic palaver and sanctions have had no useful effect. Even the cutting off of governmental access to governmental funds on deposit with the regional central bank did not claw Gbagbo's grasping fingers from the levers of power, If anything, all the talk, all the sanctions, all the implied threats, all the offered inducements have done nothing but enhance Gbagbo's intransigence. In connection with this it might be recalled that Gbagbo did something even Vladimir Putin or Hu Jintao would not contemplate--he refused to accept phone calls from President Obama.
When the UN Security Council sent a message by authorizing an increase in the UN peacekeeping force in the Ivory Coast by two thousand men, Gbagbo demonstrated just how scared he was by ordering his troops to stop and inspect UN vehicles. In a quick and unmistakable way, the incumbent ex-president showed his contempt for the "international community" as he had some weeks earlier blown off Mr Obama. With the nerve of a World Series of Poker champion, Gbagbo has called every bluff.
The Western countries, even France whose flag once flew over the Ivory Coast, have washed their collective hands of the situation. After all, chocolate is nice but it is hardly a strategic material. The UN has made all the right motions but lacks both the capacity and political will to actually do something. ECIWAS has shot its wad.
This means the decision making and execution ball is firmly in the African Union's court. This is as it should be. The fifty-three member bloc has the most at stake in the Affair Of The Tenacious President. It also has the capacity to employ effective coercion to achieve its policy goals--should such be defined with a degree of specificity.
Many of the AU's member states are functioning but fragile democracies. It would seem as a result that the AU should operate without delay using all appropriate means to assure that democracy is not put in further peril by Gbagbo's refusal to accept the verdict of the polls. Anyone who has followed the developing situation in the Ivory Coast must have long realized that this is a case where only the credible threat of force would serve to reinforce less robust mechanisms of coercive diplomacy.
Unfortunately, the AU is badly divided on how to accomplish a broadly accepted aim--the removal of Gbagbo. Nigeria has called for the use of military force. South Africa favors more mediation. Anglola has beat the drum for new elections. Other member states have aligned behind one or another of these countries.
If there is a consensus, it is against the use of the "military option." Although arguments against an AU adventure in regime change are usually couched in terms of humanitarian considerations, the subtext is far more realistic. Many Africa states are of the view that their military forces are not up to the task. Others fear the unmentionable: Deployment of the army or any sizable contingent would open the domestic door to coup plotters or self-styled revolutionaries.
There is a great deal of rationality to each of these considerations. Most AU member states possess armies which are internal security oriented. Few AU national forces assigned to UN peacekeeping missions have demonstrated the necessary levels of professional competence to mount an invasion which is carefully constrained in lethality and destructiveness. Taking out a regime which enjoys rightly or not a sizable degree of support without leaving behind a failed state would be very difficult for even the best trained and officered military.
A mission of this degree of difficulty is lightyears beyond the competence of any AU member state's military. This means the AU does not have the credible capacity to coerce Gbagbo from office. Importantly, both the AU leadership and Gbagbo know this.
The dreary conclusion of this is simple. Absent a diplomatic miracle which would tax the devious skills of a Talleyrand, Gbagbo will stay in the presidential palace and his rival will remain penned up in the hotel. This, in turn, implies that democracy in Africa takes one more bullet in the back of the neck.
Let's hear it one more time for the triumphant march of democracy. Well, it does sound nice, doesn't it? If it weren't for reality...
The situation in the Ivory Coast with Gbagbo, his army, and his militias holding on to power while confining the properly elected new president, Alassane Ouattara, prisoner in a luxury beachfront hotel and forcibly searching the vehicles of the UN peacekeeping force should be a form of comic relief, theater of the absurd. It is not. The standoff in Abidjan is no laughing matter because of its possible even probable impact on the twenty countries in Africa which have elections scheduled for this year.
Africa has never shown itself to be overly hospitable to democracy, at least any form of the often altered beast which would be generally recognizable as an open expression of popular will in the choosing of governmental leaders. The combination of historical, demographic, social, and economic features which typify much of the continent provide very thin soil for democracy of the sort common in Europe or North America. Rather the environment has proven nourishing to the ambitions and agendas of autocrats, strongmen, the makers of coups and thieves of elections.
If Gbagbo is allowed to get away with his effort to hold on to power, the probability is that democracy will become even more of an endangered species than it has been. The US, France, the UK, the EU, and the UN have all imposed sanctions and flexed diplomatic jaw muscles. The regional organization, ECOWAS, as well as the African Union have also imposed financial and economic sanctions in addition to sending diplomatic missions almost by the score.
So far all the diplomatic palaver and sanctions have had no useful effect. Even the cutting off of governmental access to governmental funds on deposit with the regional central bank did not claw Gbagbo's grasping fingers from the levers of power, If anything, all the talk, all the sanctions, all the implied threats, all the offered inducements have done nothing but enhance Gbagbo's intransigence. In connection with this it might be recalled that Gbagbo did something even Vladimir Putin or Hu Jintao would not contemplate--he refused to accept phone calls from President Obama.
When the UN Security Council sent a message by authorizing an increase in the UN peacekeeping force in the Ivory Coast by two thousand men, Gbagbo demonstrated just how scared he was by ordering his troops to stop and inspect UN vehicles. In a quick and unmistakable way, the incumbent ex-president showed his contempt for the "international community" as he had some weeks earlier blown off Mr Obama. With the nerve of a World Series of Poker champion, Gbagbo has called every bluff.
The Western countries, even France whose flag once flew over the Ivory Coast, have washed their collective hands of the situation. After all, chocolate is nice but it is hardly a strategic material. The UN has made all the right motions but lacks both the capacity and political will to actually do something. ECIWAS has shot its wad.
This means the decision making and execution ball is firmly in the African Union's court. This is as it should be. The fifty-three member bloc has the most at stake in the Affair Of The Tenacious President. It also has the capacity to employ effective coercion to achieve its policy goals--should such be defined with a degree of specificity.
Many of the AU's member states are functioning but fragile democracies. It would seem as a result that the AU should operate without delay using all appropriate means to assure that democracy is not put in further peril by Gbagbo's refusal to accept the verdict of the polls. Anyone who has followed the developing situation in the Ivory Coast must have long realized that this is a case where only the credible threat of force would serve to reinforce less robust mechanisms of coercive diplomacy.
Unfortunately, the AU is badly divided on how to accomplish a broadly accepted aim--the removal of Gbagbo. Nigeria has called for the use of military force. South Africa favors more mediation. Anglola has beat the drum for new elections. Other member states have aligned behind one or another of these countries.
If there is a consensus, it is against the use of the "military option." Although arguments against an AU adventure in regime change are usually couched in terms of humanitarian considerations, the subtext is far more realistic. Many Africa states are of the view that their military forces are not up to the task. Others fear the unmentionable: Deployment of the army or any sizable contingent would open the domestic door to coup plotters or self-styled revolutionaries.
There is a great deal of rationality to each of these considerations. Most AU member states possess armies which are internal security oriented. Few AU national forces assigned to UN peacekeeping missions have demonstrated the necessary levels of professional competence to mount an invasion which is carefully constrained in lethality and destructiveness. Taking out a regime which enjoys rightly or not a sizable degree of support without leaving behind a failed state would be very difficult for even the best trained and officered military.
A mission of this degree of difficulty is lightyears beyond the competence of any AU member state's military. This means the AU does not have the credible capacity to coerce Gbagbo from office. Importantly, both the AU leadership and Gbagbo know this.
The dreary conclusion of this is simple. Absent a diplomatic miracle which would tax the devious skills of a Talleyrand, Gbagbo will stay in the presidential palace and his rival will remain penned up in the hotel. This, in turn, implies that democracy in Africa takes one more bullet in the back of the neck.
Let's hear it one more time for the triumphant march of democracy. Well, it does sound nice, doesn't it? If it weren't for reality...
Friday, July 24, 2009
R2P Or Not R2P
At one time the United Nations had a simple, straightforward major mission. Protect the international peace. That was the one issue focused upon by the architects of the UN during the bloody years of World War II as it had been on the part of Woodrow Wilson and other visionaries during an earlier hectatomb.
The prevention or, at worst, the punishment of aggressive war waged in the face of international disapproval was the centerpiece at the launching of the UN in San Francisco more than a half century ago. While there were other items on the UN's plate--including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--these were seen as clearly secondary. They were conceived of as means of limiting the excuses used by nations to go to war.
That simple, unitary focus became increasingly fuzzy in the waning days of the Cold War particularly after President Jimmy Carter elevated the concept of "human rights" to the top priority of American foreign policy. While there is no doubt that President Carter was both sincere and somewhat pragmatically minded in his dedication to human rights, the Law of Unintended Consequences stood by ready to invoke itself.
The UN pushed its camel's nose into an entirely new area a few years ago when the congeries of diplomats meeting on the banks of the Hudson determined that a potential threat to international peace and stability was posed automatically when a government's policies or weakness resulted in refugee streams crossing international borders. The existence of a flow of refugees became de facto proof that some sort of international intervention was required not only to meet "humanitarian" needs but also to stave off any potential breach of the international peace.
This diplomatic artifice constructed a very steep slope paved with glare ice. It allowed, no, encouraged, the Security Council to determine when and if an internal matter had reached such a pitch of refugee generation (and high visibility flowing of blood and gore) that international intervention was required. If the five Permanent Members could agree on the necessity or desirability of invoking the presumed UN mandate to protect the citizens of the target county, the Boys in Blue Helmets could be deployed.
If and when (as was far from atypical) the Security Council could not agree on intervention, the fall back position was the invocation of a similar "responsibility to protect" (called in diplomatic and journalistic shorthand, "R2P") on the part of the UN or regional organisations. The European Union, the Organisation of American States, the African Union, even NATO, could determine that they had a "responsibility to protect" within their geographic bailiwicks.
Stripped to its essentials the "responsibility to protect" means that some external entity, a state, a regional organisation, the UN, determines on some basis or another that a country has reached such a sorry state of internal depravity and wretchedness that intervention is the necessary course of action. Since the intervention is not sought nor welcomed by the target country or its government, this means the incoming forces are armed and ready to use force to impose their will on the target.
In short, the "responsibility to protect" means making war.
Ironically, the UN, an entity created to keep the international peace, can invoke the "responsibility to protect" in order to wage war. Normally the use of the "R2P" is either by or at the behest of a Great Power against some country which is not a client of another Great Power.
Back in 2005 the "international community" visited the subject of "R2P" at some length. At the end of the visit some 150 world leaders endorsed the concept. Now, four years later, the UN General Assembly is back in the trenches of "R2P."
The NYT suggests that getting the member nations to agree on how and when to intervene so as to stop genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing should not "be much of a stretch." The mere fact that the weight of historical experience underscores the difficulty with agreeing on anything beyond muttering platitudes, the gaining of widespread agreement on the necessity of invading a country due to its internal difficulties is nearly impossible.
Not surprisingly the panjandrums of the UN bureaucracy are overwhelmingly in favor of an "R2P" protocol with real bite. The High Commissioner For Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has called for a "credible capacity for rapid responses." Madam Pillay, like UN SecGen Ban Ki-moon, referenced the massacres in Rwanda during which the world stood by and watched horrified as at least 800,000 were slaughtered.
There is an old cliche in jurisprudence, "Hard cases make bad law." In international politics there is (or should be) a similar saying, "Extreme examples make bad precedent."
To put it simply, there is no firebreak in mere numbers. Nor is there a bright and shining line contained in the swiftness of the slaughter. Once the precedent is enshrined there can be no meaningful distinctions between the fast mass murder of a Rwanda and the slow killing fields of a Zimbabwe or a Somalia. There can be no proper, policy related distinctions drawn between massive and bloody efforts at ethnic cleansing as in former Yugoslavia and the slow-motion ejection of Christians from Iraq.
Regardless of speed, efficiency, or numbers each is an example of abuse of human rights on a large scale. Each occurred because of either government action or government inaction. Each generated refugees. Each outraged (or should have) global sensibilities. Each was (or is) a candidate for "R2P."
The same may be said (and has been) regarding Chinese actions in Tibet or, more recently, in Xianjiang. The same may be said (and has been) regarding Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
The same was said in (partial) justification of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saddam Hussein's regime did engage in internal actions which resulted in massive death, dislocation, and refugee generation. Silent at the time Saddam's men used toxic gas against civilian Kurds, the US waved the bloody shirt of human rights violations nearly two decades later. ("Well," the administration might have said, "better late than never.")
The question of when--if ever--external actors have a "right" or a "responsibility" to intervene at bayonet point to "protect" civilian populations from harm at the hands of their own government or from non-governmental bodies not inhibited by the government is neither easy to parse nor simple to judge. This is the point behind the recent objections to "R2P" raised by General Assembly President Miguel d'Escoto and others including the renowned left-leaning American linguistic and general purpose critic, Noam Chomsky.
D'Escoto circulated a "Concept Note" in which he characterised the "R2P" idea as just one more form of neocolonialism. He has been joined in this position by Dr Chomsky who (correctly) pointed out that "R2P" has been used by Western advanced nations to impose their vision on countries in the non-Western world.
There is an uncomfortable degree of truth in these arguments, much as the Geek personally dislikes finding himself in agreement with d'Escoto, let alone Chomsky. The Great Powers have the influence, resources, and agendas necessary to support interventions under an appropriate color. The most appropriate cover in today's Era of Sensitivity is the protection of one or another of the numerous "lesser breeds without the law" (in Kipling's phrase.) "R2P" is in keeping with a long standing American tradition of couching armed interventions in lofty, humanitarian terms such as Wilson's famed idea of "teaching Mexicans to elect good men."
Another, less publicised danger of using "R2P" as a justification for military operations is the potential for frankly cynical abuse. Russia draped "R2P" over its tanks and jets during the incursion and occupation of disputed territory then under Georgian sovereignty. The Kremlin claimed with a straight face and in the most solemn terms that their army was simply protecting the human rights of the locals faced with genocide at the hands of the aggressive Georgian government.
The Chinese have made similar statements regarding their suppression of demonstrations in Tibet and Xianjiang. The army and police were simply protecting the human rights of the Han Chinese from abuse at the hands of ethnic minorities.
And, so it has gone. As it will continue to go. "Human rights" and the closely linked "R2P" will be exploited by governments to cover naked land grabs and regime maintenance actions.
At the same time governments will continue to be very, very cautious, reluctant really, to involve their forces in the vast majority of situations which might fall legitimately under the rubric, "R2P." That overarching reality is in high evidence today.
Somalia is and has been for years the very definition of human depravity and consequent misery. Ban Ki-moon has once more called upon the "international community" for "armed support" for the tottering artifact created by the same international community, the Transitional Federal Government. The African Union peace keeping force is so undermanned, so poorly equipped, and so lacking in motivation that its troops can barely protect their own base, let alone the TFG.
The members of the African Union show little stomach for further involvement in the Somali cesspit. There are very real reasons given for this. Lack of money. Deficient logistics. No transport. There are also other, equally valid and more compelling unstated reasons.
Chief among these silent justifications is this: What is in it for us? What national interest is served by seeing our troops killed in Somalia?
Abstracts are very poor reasons for getting killed. And, let's be honest about it. Human rights is an abstract. Each and every point referenced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is itself an abstract. They are the creations of a particular historical and philosophical tradition--Western Christianity and its precursors in Greece and Ancient Israel.
They are not real, organic, and emotive concepts in other traditions. They are not good reasons for a government, particularly one faced by its own problems at home to send off men to kill and die. Not even when the blood filled cesspit is right next door and the refugees are flooding your country.
Kenya is a major non-participant in Somalia. Similarly South Africa set back and watched Mugabe's thugs create a swamp of violence, death, poverty, and disease in Zimbabwe. The governments of these nations were not blind to what was happening. Nor were they morally indifferent.
There was simply no compelling national interest at stake. Lacking that, there was no justification for bearing the expenses in lives, treasure, and potential internal complications exercising some sort of abstract "R2P."
The weight of both history and practical realities is against "R2P." This may bother the high minded such as our UN Ambassador, Susan Rice, and the assorted capos of the UN. It may bother the editors of the NYT as the tone of their coverage makes clear.
But, it is a fact. A brute ground truth.
We the People may like to forget or overlook this truth. Just as we like to overlook the reality that when faced by a man with a gun we, each and every one of us, has the "human right" of life only if we can shoot faster and straighter than the other guy.
Monday, July 20, 2009
If Only It Weren't So Tragic
Somalia would be world beating comedy series were it not for the blood, destruction, fear, flight, and misery the antics of the Islamist jihadist thugs of al-Shabab have caused. And continue to cause. Even the name of the gang is funny--"the youth" or, more informally, "the kids," if it did not apply to a group that makes Taliban seem almost civilized.
In their latest act the "Kids" have declared three UN agencies to be "enemies of Islam," to say nothing of being "enemies of the Somali people." Presumably the "Kids" Department of Political Affairs and Regional Administration wore a collective straight face as the statement was issued.
Backing the expulsion of the UN agencies by the forthright diplomacy of violence, the Kids sacked the compounds occupied by the UN Development Agency in the south of Somalia stealing the vehicles and equipment in the process. This approach indicates that the Kids have taken lessons in the practice of international relations from the Iranians.
Of course, lessons in diplomatic protocol are not the only support the Kids have sought and received from the outside world. As Ahmedou Ouid-Abdallah, the UN Special Representative for Somalia makes clear in an op-ed piece in today's WaPo, the Kids are no longer some sort of homegrown collection of exuberant young practitioners of Salifist/Wahhibist Islam. They may have started as a ramshackle array of homeboys in search of excitement, power, and a sense of mission, but those days are long behind them.
The "Kids" are the sharp edge of the Islamist jihadist movement. Their trigger pullers and bomb wearers come from areas far removed from the sand and blood of Somalia. The money--and much of the agenda--comes from Islamist leaning governments and NGOs which share both a given interpretation of the Koran and a deep seated hatred for the US and its allies. Both of these contentions have become so commonplace that they need no further documentation.
Also not requiring either documentation or riffling through files of classified information is the fact that jihadists who have found Iraq and Afghanistan a little too hot for their personal comfort have been heading for the more salubrious clime of Somalia. There they will meet other like minded folks from both Europe and the US, folk drawn from the mission or sensation seeking younger members of Somali expatriate communities. United in faith and hate, the jihadists, old and new, can cross-pollinate and reinforce each other's views of Islamism and the Global Caliphate.
The critical consideration is not the movement of Somalia from the Third Circle to the Second in Hell but rather what, if anything, can the "international community" do about it. Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah argues passionately that the "international community" has a (his word) "duty" to Somalia. By this he clearly means a responsibility to intervene in force to squash the "Kids" and support the Transitional Federal Government.
In principle he is correct. Given the length of the Somali coast, the volume of trade which passes that coast, and the fragility of the global economy, there is a very real measure of self-interest involved in the stability of the geographic expression called Somalia. The potentially destabilizing impact of the refugee flood upon Kenya and other countries in the region also makes a serious and realistic claim upon the consideration and action of the larger world community.
The gulf between principle and practice is huge. And, in highest probability, unbridgeable. Just who is going to do the heavy lifting in Somalia?
Not the US. As SecDef Robert Gates warned over the weekend, the American population will not support an unending effort in Afghanistan. The war there must, in his view, turn the corner within the next year or eighteen months or the political will of We the People will be exhausted with predictable consequences.
While Iraq may be winding down as Afghanistan ramps up, one thing is sure. The American public, to say nothing of the economy, cannot and will not support another expedition into a land of inhospitable human terrain and little probability of rapid, low cost success.
The same is true in the UK. Only more so. The British Parliament, press and public, is torqued off over the recent high body count in Afghanistan as a result of the new offensive strategy taking the war to the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. While the number of combat fatalities is low in both absolute and historical terms, it is becoming too much for the British political will. The stakes and goal are equally incomprehensible to the majority of the British public. The same would be true on steroids were Her Majesty's Government to send the lads to Somalia.
The days when the Empire could calmly accept the bones of their troops bleaching in the sun in some far away place for obscure reasons are long gone. The Brits, like their Yank cousins, want a clear cut success in short order at a low cost for easily understood and emotionally compelling reasons.
The rest of the governments of Europe are even more adversely inclined to sending troops to some nasty little pimple on the planet for reasons which might be understood by geopoliticians but not by the man and woman on the street. The Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, are all in the same category. Russians and Chinese support direct national interest only. The Japanese are too canny to get involved, and, anyway, their constitution forbids military employment in any endeavor which is not clearly self-defense.
So, what about Africa? That is the region with the most direct interest in containing both instability and refugees which carry the germ of instability.
The African Union has been long on paper commitments to Somalia. It has been equally short on performance. The long-on-pledges and short-on-deployment AU peacekeeping force is hard pressed keeping a mini-Green Zone around the presidential compound and the air and sea port facilities in Mogadishu. There is no real probability the situation will change.
The AU has always fielded peacekeeping forces which are notably risk averse. Assorted national contingents deployed on sundry UN sponsored peackeeping missions around the world have repeatedly demonstrated a reluctance to engage in combat which has been equalled only by the speed and eagerness with which some have sought plunder, extortion, and forced sexual favors.
The constant excuse presented by the AU as well as its member states is the lack of money and equipment. There is much to the excuse. AU forces are poorly equipped. They are also poorly paid. In addition they are poorly trained, poorly officered, and generally ill-prepared to take on an opponent that has guns and the willingness to use them.
Generally the history of the armed forces of the AU nations shows them to be very good at coups. Reasonably proficient at pushing unarmed civilians around. Better than average at looking good on a parade. And, somewhere between pathetic and mediocre at actually fighting.
The exception to this general statement is the old army of South Africa. Since the political transformation of that country, there has been no occasion for the South Africans to show whether or not their combat proficiency has declined and, if so, as is likely, how much.
The US and other countries could (and, perhaps should) pour money, equipment, and training into the AU contingents. While an exercise in upgrading the capacity of the AU member states in peacekeeping operations might have a very real benefit in the future, any positive effects would take too long to be practically applicable in Somalia. The "Kids" will have taken over the place long before a training and equipping effort would have measurable impact.
Casting around for alternatives some decision maker or another might have the bright idea of asking the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to call upon its members to hammer together an all-Islamic peacekeeping force. What an idea!
It has been argued more than a few times that Muslims understand Muslims. That Muslims would treat Muslims with greater sensitivity and thus greater effect than non-Muslims. That argument may or may not have a substructure of truth. It is also irrelevant.
Just which Muslim country or countries could be expected to volunteer forces for Somalia? And for what reason?
In principle Saudi Arabia has the capacity to send a few thousand reasonably well armed, trained, and led troops to Somalia. The Kingdom might also be persuaded that its national interests would be served by so doing. After all, Saudi clerics have long been involved in transforming the Somali version of Islam from a rather laid back sort to the austere Wahhibist version. Saudi is concerned with the stability of Yemen and the free transit of the Red Sea and adjacent waters.
However a Saudi presence, even if it were to slap the "Kids" into line would also assure the continuation of an Islamist leaning government. This might be the best of all possible outcomes from the Western perspective.
Militating against any hypothetical Saudi peacekeeping force is the fear of Iran. Iran has not given up its ambitions to be the regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf. Any decrement in the Saudi military presence at home would be to Iran's political advantage. The House of Saud is aware of this. The House is also aware that its army is the necessary final support of the House in the event of internal unrest such as is continually sponsored by Tehran.
"No thanks, we will stay right where we are," has to be the most likely reply to any call for peacekeeping assistance.
What is true with Saudi Arabia is true in spades for the rest of the Gulf states. None of these oil sheikdoms have the spare troops standing around itching for a chance to engage in real combat against real people with real guns.
Egypt might be cozened (bribed) into furnishing a few brigades, but Mubarak would be very cautious about such an exercise. The regime faces many internal threats. These will grow as Hosni grows older. A succession crisis is possible. This means the army and the government alike will want to keep all their cards in the deck, not spread some in a rather no win situation far from home.
There is a dearth of candidates for the task of putting the kibosh on the "Kids." The risks are real. The costs are potentially high. The benefits are nil or at least obscure. There is no inducements and a lot of constraints.
In short, there is no one willing in the real world to exercise the "duty" proposed by Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah. He is right in principle. Unfortunately in the gritty real world, principle is always trumped by the practical, the pragmatic weighing of risks and benefits, costs and gains.
So the tragedy produced by the "Kids" will continue. Eventually the leaders of the US and other countries may well regret not having dealt with the "Kids"now rather than the consequences later just as the US learned to regret the spineless response of the Clinton administration to the terrorist acts of al-Qaeda or our unseemly retreat from Somalia after "Blackhawk down." The real deal is that governments live in the here-and-now, the present, not the future.
"Take care of today and the future can look out for itself," seems to be the watchword of governments no matter how often it has been proven to be a destructive short-sighted way to make and execute policy. That's the way it goes--unfortunately.
Friday, December 19, 2008
Time For South Africa To Play Up!
Zimbabwe's Kleptocrat-in-Chief, Robert Mugabe, is at it again! He is now on record saying that "Zimbabwe is mine."
Hey! At least the dude is honest. Not since Louis the Whatever who famously declared of France, "I am the state," has a boss of all the bosses been so up front and blunt.
Of course, who in their right mind would want Zimbabwe? Not only is the economy beyond mere disaster, the place has become Cholera Central. Malnutrition is standard (unless a person is in the army or one of the Kleptocrat's Thug Squads.)
Mugabe appended a challenge to his Declaration of Sole Ownership. He averred that no African country had courage enough to topple him.
His estimate of the situation seems bang on. With the exception of Botswana, which is a military Pygmy, none of the South African Development Conference states has made peep one about the necessity of ridding the world of Mugabe.
In part, Mugabe is depending upon his long tarnished reputation as the premier "Freedom Fighter" in southern Africa. He is willing to bet that no other African leader will risk the consequences of seeking his overthrow by force of arms.
There is another, more realistic, explanation for the unwillingness of South Africa and other countries to enter the cockpit of Zimbabwe. The place is such a mess that an involvement (read occupation) would be a very lengthy and expensive effort. The probability of failure would be high. So would the possibility of blowback.
The reluctance of South Africa (and the African Union) to rise to the challenge of imposing stability on Zimbabwe may be overtaken by events. Cholera is not noted for respecting international borders. The stream of refugees from pestilence, poverty, and murder is going to grow in the days and weeks to come.
The combination of a folk migration and disease against the backdrop of a global economic crisis will give neighboring countries few choices. Self-interest will compel intervention regardless of longer term risks.
It is not improbable that Mugabe and the SADC countries are playing a game of chicken. Each is betting that external actors either will or will not take on the burden of intervention under the color of "humanitarian crisis." The humanitarian crisis is real.
That reality does not imply that external entities such as the UN, the EU, or the US are or will be willing to send (in the words of Warren Zevon) "lawyers, guns, and money." The proof of reluctance is found in the Congo, Darfur, and Somalia.
The UN "peacekeeping" effort in Congo is less than noteworthy in its effectiveness. The EU has jawed about sending troops but has taken no action. Nor is it likely to. The US is overstretched militarily, and the public appears to be disinclined to take on more "nation building" missionary efforts. Current global economic realities also serve as a strong disincentive for adventures in healing the sick, feeding the hungry, and planting democracy in foreign, hostile soil.
What this all means is simple. South Africa has to take the lead. It has to, in cricket terms, "play up."
The alternative is for that country to accept the refugees, the spread of disease, and other unfortunate consequences of the further collapse of Zimbabwe. The leaders of that country (and the rest of Zimbabwe's neighbors) have to get a grip on a basic fact.
Zimbabwe is not the "White Man's Burden." This time around, the load has to be carried by the Africans themselves, even if they carry it alone, uncompensated, and unappreciated.
It's time for South Africa and other countries to call Mugabe's bluff. They, and only they, can save the people of Zimbabwe.
Hey! At least the dude is honest. Not since Louis the Whatever who famously declared of France, "I am the state," has a boss of all the bosses been so up front and blunt.
Of course, who in their right mind would want Zimbabwe? Not only is the economy beyond mere disaster, the place has become Cholera Central. Malnutrition is standard (unless a person is in the army or one of the Kleptocrat's Thug Squads.)
Mugabe appended a challenge to his Declaration of Sole Ownership. He averred that no African country had courage enough to topple him.
His estimate of the situation seems bang on. With the exception of Botswana, which is a military Pygmy, none of the South African Development Conference states has made peep one about the necessity of ridding the world of Mugabe.
In part, Mugabe is depending upon his long tarnished reputation as the premier "Freedom Fighter" in southern Africa. He is willing to bet that no other African leader will risk the consequences of seeking his overthrow by force of arms.
There is another, more realistic, explanation for the unwillingness of South Africa and other countries to enter the cockpit of Zimbabwe. The place is such a mess that an involvement (read occupation) would be a very lengthy and expensive effort. The probability of failure would be high. So would the possibility of blowback.
The reluctance of South Africa (and the African Union) to rise to the challenge of imposing stability on Zimbabwe may be overtaken by events. Cholera is not noted for respecting international borders. The stream of refugees from pestilence, poverty, and murder is going to grow in the days and weeks to come.
The combination of a folk migration and disease against the backdrop of a global economic crisis will give neighboring countries few choices. Self-interest will compel intervention regardless of longer term risks.
It is not improbable that Mugabe and the SADC countries are playing a game of chicken. Each is betting that external actors either will or will not take on the burden of intervention under the color of "humanitarian crisis." The humanitarian crisis is real.
That reality does not imply that external entities such as the UN, the EU, or the US are or will be willing to send (in the words of Warren Zevon) "lawyers, guns, and money." The proof of reluctance is found in the Congo, Darfur, and Somalia.
The UN "peacekeeping" effort in Congo is less than noteworthy in its effectiveness. The EU has jawed about sending troops but has taken no action. Nor is it likely to. The US is overstretched militarily, and the public appears to be disinclined to take on more "nation building" missionary efforts. Current global economic realities also serve as a strong disincentive for adventures in healing the sick, feeding the hungry, and planting democracy in foreign, hostile soil.
What this all means is simple. South Africa has to take the lead. It has to, in cricket terms, "play up."
The alternative is for that country to accept the refugees, the spread of disease, and other unfortunate consequences of the further collapse of Zimbabwe. The leaders of that country (and the rest of Zimbabwe's neighbors) have to get a grip on a basic fact.
Zimbabwe is not the "White Man's Burden." This time around, the load has to be carried by the Africans themselves, even if they carry it alone, uncompensated, and unappreciated.
It's time for South Africa and other countries to call Mugabe's bluff. They, and only they, can save the people of Zimbabwe.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Time For A Change--Pirates And Somalia
The US has floated a new proposal at the UN Security Council. Under its provisions foreign forces would be allowed rights of hot pursuit right past the high tide line and onto Somalian territory. Such rights would, of course, be attendant upon the permission of the UN sponsored Transitional National Government. (No mention was made of the fact that the Somalian central regime is highly transient, not at all national and a government only by courtesy.)
The effrontery of the American proposal apparently rankled the African Union, which made any number of unkind comments regarding the "wealthy" nations being ready to use force against a handful of hardscrabble fishermen trying to eek out a living through seizing ships while being "indifferent" to the fate of Somalia and the Somali people. There was a subtext of implication. An implication that the same"wealthy" nations had promoted the collapse of Somalia nearly twenty years ago.
The fine folks at the African Union might want to refresh their acquaintance with history. The history of their own continent. Specifically, the history of Somalia during the last couple of decades. The US undertook to protect the humanitarian operations of the UN in the early Nineties. The mission was well intended but failed as a result of High Minded aspirations of "nation building." The US effort was ably backed and humanitarian aid offered by any number of the so-called "wealthy" nations.
(It might be recalled as well that during the time of the US intervention in Somalia, the African Union as well as the governments and media of several member states including Kenya severely reamed out the US for practicing both "neocolonialism" and "genocide." Say what!)
The ultimate failure of this first effort at nation building was the responsibility of Somalian leaders. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts was also a product marked "Made in Somalia."
The overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts occurred, not because the US wanted it to (although no tears were shed over the corpse of an Islamist/jihadist entity in Washington,) but because exiled Somalis and assorted member states of the African Union wanted this eventuality to occur. They did it through the agency of the Ethiopian Army which, while receiving a certain level of gratuity from the US for the effort, represents a government which is a member in good standing of the African Union.
The subsequent failure of the Transitional National Government is the responsibility of the Somalis and the African Union. The AU has an up close and personal interest in Somalian stability. This is a far more direct interest than the US has with regard to the place. Our anxiety, which is well-rooted, revolves around the viability of Somalia as a terrorist training and basing site.
The states bordering that geographical expression called Somalia should exercise the most direct involvement. Kenya along with Ethiopia have the greatest interest in providing stability in Somalia. Kenya perhaps more than Ethiopia since the majority of refugees find heading south to join the already large Somalian population in Kenya both easier and more attractive than crossing the wastes of the Ogaden to find sanctuary in Ethiopia.
The African Union along with any number of High Minded but evidently gripless groups and individuals seem to think that the pirate problem in the waters off Somalia can not be abated unless and until the simple fisherfolk turned pirate can return to steady jobs at a good income in a peaceful pursuit.
Get a grip!
Some of the pirates early on in the game might have been unemployed fishermen in search of a (dis)honest couple of bucks. But those days, if they ever existed, are long in the past. Piracy is a big money maker for all concerned. The parties include not only the trigger pullers in the skiffs or the crews of the motherships, they include Somali clans and tribes scattered throughout the refugee communities of Europe. The parties include as well terrorist groups. Given the profits from this year alone--in excess of 100 million dollars of ransom, there is money enough for all and then some.
The US and other maritime nations, wealthy or not, have a direct national interest at stake in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy drives up the costs of shipping. Piracy delays cargos. Piracy costs, in short, both time and money. This means countries heavily involved in maritime commerce have national interests in play.
Here is a ground truth which the AU might not find palatable. Right now the US and other maritime nations have no national interests in play in Somalia. Somalia is not worth anyone's effort because no one has a vital national interest at risk there. Nobody that is except Kenya and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.
So far (with the laudable exception of the French and British) the nations represented in the waters off Somalia have been long on speeches, advice, and having pretty boats drive around the blue waters but have been very short on direct action against the pirates. Many fine words have been expended upon the need of an appropriate court in which to try "alleged" pirates. Somber faces have propounded questions regarding international law, its limits and exceptions.
Speeches, advice, and questions of international law are fine--in their place and time. Noble and High Minded expressions of sentiment regarding the need for a stable government in Somalia and well-paying jobs for Somali fishermen are good for filling space in the media both old and new--but massively irrelevant to the needs of the real world.
It is time for a change. The change must have two components.
The first is short, simple, and unpleasant. Start killing pirates. Accept the inevitable errors and the equally predictable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the High Minded over the terrible catastrophe of pirates becoming fish food. Over the vast sweep of history from the expeditions of a young Julius Cesar to the closing days of the Nineteenth Century, the only way in which piracy has been stopped is through the shedding of large quantities of pirate blood.
The second choice is not simple or short. It is unpleasant. The African Union and the UN have two choices. Here they are.
One is to allow the Transitional National Pseudo-government to walk the plank when the Ethiopians withdraw their forces. The most militant of the tripartite Islamist/jihadist movement, the Shahab, constantly state that during the period of the Union of Islamic Courts there was no piracy. OK. Put them to the test. They are going to take over Somalia if and when the Ethiopians leave. No doubt about that. Somalia will become, as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warns, a center for jihadist activities. The US will have to do something robust when that happens. It will be in our national interest.
The second choice is to insist that the African Union clean up the mess in Somalia. This will not be easy. It will be expensive in lives, money, and time. Taking military action will carry with it the risk of blow back to those countries with a sizable Islamic population. The outcome may well be ambiguous enough to assure the long-term probability of an Islamist/jihadist threat remaining in Somalia for years and years to come.
The African Union will demand the assistance and support of the UN and the "wealthy" nations of the world. This support and assistance should be forthcoming. It will be in the collective interest of the world.
The problem(s) presented by the failed state of Somalia are difficult to settle and impossible to predict as to final outcome. This is not a reason to resist making the tough choices.
The time for dithering, talking, excusing, justifying, and ignoring the pirates of Somalia or the land which gave them birth and gives them sanctuary is past. It is time for a change.
The incoming Obama Administration has to get a grip on the reality and take a leadership role in at least the matter of killing pirates so the sealanes will be safe. That is the minimum necessary strategic interest of this country.
As the old Nike ad put it, "Just do it!"
The effrontery of the American proposal apparently rankled the African Union, which made any number of unkind comments regarding the "wealthy" nations being ready to use force against a handful of hardscrabble fishermen trying to eek out a living through seizing ships while being "indifferent" to the fate of Somalia and the Somali people. There was a subtext of implication. An implication that the same"wealthy" nations had promoted the collapse of Somalia nearly twenty years ago.
The fine folks at the African Union might want to refresh their acquaintance with history. The history of their own continent. Specifically, the history of Somalia during the last couple of decades. The US undertook to protect the humanitarian operations of the UN in the early Nineties. The mission was well intended but failed as a result of High Minded aspirations of "nation building." The US effort was ably backed and humanitarian aid offered by any number of the so-called "wealthy" nations.
(It might be recalled as well that during the time of the US intervention in Somalia, the African Union as well as the governments and media of several member states including Kenya severely reamed out the US for practicing both "neocolonialism" and "genocide." Say what!)
The ultimate failure of this first effort at nation building was the responsibility of Somalian leaders. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts was also a product marked "Made in Somalia."
The overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts occurred, not because the US wanted it to (although no tears were shed over the corpse of an Islamist/jihadist entity in Washington,) but because exiled Somalis and assorted member states of the African Union wanted this eventuality to occur. They did it through the agency of the Ethiopian Army which, while receiving a certain level of gratuity from the US for the effort, represents a government which is a member in good standing of the African Union.
The subsequent failure of the Transitional National Government is the responsibility of the Somalis and the African Union. The AU has an up close and personal interest in Somalian stability. This is a far more direct interest than the US has with regard to the place. Our anxiety, which is well-rooted, revolves around the viability of Somalia as a terrorist training and basing site.
The states bordering that geographical expression called Somalia should exercise the most direct involvement. Kenya along with Ethiopia have the greatest interest in providing stability in Somalia. Kenya perhaps more than Ethiopia since the majority of refugees find heading south to join the already large Somalian population in Kenya both easier and more attractive than crossing the wastes of the Ogaden to find sanctuary in Ethiopia.
The African Union along with any number of High Minded but evidently gripless groups and individuals seem to think that the pirate problem in the waters off Somalia can not be abated unless and until the simple fisherfolk turned pirate can return to steady jobs at a good income in a peaceful pursuit.
Get a grip!
Some of the pirates early on in the game might have been unemployed fishermen in search of a (dis)honest couple of bucks. But those days, if they ever existed, are long in the past. Piracy is a big money maker for all concerned. The parties include not only the trigger pullers in the skiffs or the crews of the motherships, they include Somali clans and tribes scattered throughout the refugee communities of Europe. The parties include as well terrorist groups. Given the profits from this year alone--in excess of 100 million dollars of ransom, there is money enough for all and then some.
The US and other maritime nations, wealthy or not, have a direct national interest at stake in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy drives up the costs of shipping. Piracy delays cargos. Piracy costs, in short, both time and money. This means countries heavily involved in maritime commerce have national interests in play.
Here is a ground truth which the AU might not find palatable. Right now the US and other maritime nations have no national interests in play in Somalia. Somalia is not worth anyone's effort because no one has a vital national interest at risk there. Nobody that is except Kenya and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.
So far (with the laudable exception of the French and British) the nations represented in the waters off Somalia have been long on speeches, advice, and having pretty boats drive around the blue waters but have been very short on direct action against the pirates. Many fine words have been expended upon the need of an appropriate court in which to try "alleged" pirates. Somber faces have propounded questions regarding international law, its limits and exceptions.
Speeches, advice, and questions of international law are fine--in their place and time. Noble and High Minded expressions of sentiment regarding the need for a stable government in Somalia and well-paying jobs for Somali fishermen are good for filling space in the media both old and new--but massively irrelevant to the needs of the real world.
It is time for a change. The change must have two components.
The first is short, simple, and unpleasant. Start killing pirates. Accept the inevitable errors and the equally predictable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the High Minded over the terrible catastrophe of pirates becoming fish food. Over the vast sweep of history from the expeditions of a young Julius Cesar to the closing days of the Nineteenth Century, the only way in which piracy has been stopped is through the shedding of large quantities of pirate blood.
The second choice is not simple or short. It is unpleasant. The African Union and the UN have two choices. Here they are.
One is to allow the Transitional National Pseudo-government to walk the plank when the Ethiopians withdraw their forces. The most militant of the tripartite Islamist/jihadist movement, the Shahab, constantly state that during the period of the Union of Islamic Courts there was no piracy. OK. Put them to the test. They are going to take over Somalia if and when the Ethiopians leave. No doubt about that. Somalia will become, as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warns, a center for jihadist activities. The US will have to do something robust when that happens. It will be in our national interest.
The second choice is to insist that the African Union clean up the mess in Somalia. This will not be easy. It will be expensive in lives, money, and time. Taking military action will carry with it the risk of blow back to those countries with a sizable Islamic population. The outcome may well be ambiguous enough to assure the long-term probability of an Islamist/jihadist threat remaining in Somalia for years and years to come.
The African Union will demand the assistance and support of the UN and the "wealthy" nations of the world. This support and assistance should be forthcoming. It will be in the collective interest of the world.
The problem(s) presented by the failed state of Somalia are difficult to settle and impossible to predict as to final outcome. This is not a reason to resist making the tough choices.
The time for dithering, talking, excusing, justifying, and ignoring the pirates of Somalia or the land which gave them birth and gives them sanctuary is past. It is time for a change.
The incoming Obama Administration has to get a grip on the reality and take a leadership role in at least the matter of killing pirates so the sealanes will be safe. That is the minimum necessary strategic interest of this country.
As the old Nike ad put it, "Just do it!"
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Rumble In The Jungle
Thirty-four years ago Mohammed Ali regained his heavyweight title with a massively hyped fight held in what was then called Zaire. The name was part of dictator Joseph Mobutu's equally massive piece of hype--the Africanization of the former Belgian Congo.
Unlike the overwhelming majority of fights in the Congo, the original Rumble in the Jungle was decisive. There was a winner (well paid) and a loser (very well paid.)
Also, running against the current of typical Congo battles, no one was killed. No rapes were reported. There wasn't any obvious looting.
The present Rumble in the Jungle runs to type. It is so far indecisive as to outcome. It is bloody. And, in the usual way of things in the Congo, the Congolese Army has shown itself very proficient at talking tough, running fast, looting with alacrity and raping with zeal. Congolese troops also continue to demonstrate a genuine talent for killing civilians during or immediately after the raping and looting phase of the exercise has been completed.
Comes now the European Union, or at least France, with a swagger and a stated desire to enter the Congo Rumble. Apparently heeding the cry of the High Minded and the UN, France is mooting the idea of sending an elite reaction force of somewhere between 1,500 and 3,000 men to back the 6,000 members of the 17,000 UN peacekeeping force present in the combat area around the provincial center of Goma.
"Wait one, Geek, where are the other 11,000 lads with blue helmets?" You ask.
Simple, they are spread around the rest of the Congo. It seems there is anti-government sentiment lurking everywhere in that jungle.
Noting that the majority of the peacekeeping force come from African Union members a South African defense and security analyst with a greater grip on reality than the requirements of political correctness, Henri Boshoff, maintains that a highly trained and capable force must be deployed to the land around Goma within five or six days. Longer would mean too late.
Only the EU has the capacity for such rapid deployment. (The US would as well were it not that Uncle Sam has two wars and an election on his hands.) Boshoff seems to think that an EU contingent would arrive ready, able and willing to use the weapons at its disposal.
The Europeans don't see it that way. French ForMin Koucher avers that any battlegroup sent to the Congo wouldn't be going there to fight but rather to assist in humanitarian operations.
Yeah. Right. Sure they will, Bernie. Or maybe you are of the belief that the men under General Nkunda will simply fold in panic and run like they were Congolese special forces when they see white dudes with guns get off the planes?
That may be the case. Nkunda has shown a willingness to turn peaceful before when the correlation of forces was not favorable. In any event the Congo way of war allows for time-outs. Even unlimited time-outs.
Should the threat of EU intervention or the efforts of UN and other negotiators and envoys prove successful in extending and broadening the ceasefire ordered by Nkunda, it would only signify one more destabilising, bloody and quite inconclusive military essay. The history of the Congo over its forty-eight years of independent existence is filled with such events.
Nkunda has an agenda. For the record he wants the immediate disarmament of the Hutu militia which he maintains is fighting alongside the Congolese National Runaway, Loot, Rape and Murder Force as well as preying on the Tutsi population along the Congo-Rwanda border. Also for the record is his objection to the deal between China and the Congolese central government which is valued at nine billion dollars. The deal exchanges rights to exploit mineral resources over a vast swath of the Congo in exchange for the building of a railroad and a highway.
Laurent Nkunda may well have a point there. The deal seems to be in line with the standard issue business transaction which has marked the Congo since Leopold I, King of the Belgians scarfed up the territory for his personal benefit. And, at the expense of generations of Congolese.
Leopold should have patented his business model since any number of foreign firms, usually backed by their governments have made similar "deals." Outsiders have exploited the natural resources of the mineral rich territory and the human resources of the people who live there for the benefit of the outsiders--and, of course, the insiders, the governing elite that make sure the deal goes down.
China has never been noted for making bargains that benefit the other party--beyond the local elite that made things happen and the security forces which protect the elite and the Chinese alike. Chinese involvement in the "development" of a country's resources will have no benefits for the people on the ground. Quite the opposite. After the Chinese and their local clients get up and running, the folks on the ground will look back at the bad old days of colonialism with fondness.
Don't believe the Geek? Ask the Burmese then. That is if you can get through to anyone who is not on the government's approved to talk to outsiders list. If that's too tough, try the Sudan.
The Geek has argued that the Congo is a geographic expression. A failing state that never really was. Well intentioned intervention by the UN, the EU or the US would only prolong the agony. Unnecessarily lengthen the time until the inevitable collapse of the Congo occurs.
Laurent Nkunda and his (highly probable) backers in Rwanda may be another passel of dictators and exploiters in the making. Then again they may not be of that mold. Nkunda has done something almost unprecedented in the dreary history of Congolese internal war. He called and enforced a ceasefire while the enemy and the UN peacekeepers were on the run.
Perhaps Nkunda and his backers want only a small portion of the vast territory called (for the moment at least) the Congo. Breaking away a piece of the geographic expression might be the necessary first step in creating a less bloody, more stable artifact--a collection of states based on population, on primary linguistic and cultural affiliations.
Sure it is unfashionable to argue that the dismantlement of larger entities into their several natural components is the best way to go. The Congo today like an artifact called Yugoslavia a decade and more ago points in that direction.
No man-made artifact lasts forever. Why should the Congo, the creation of one man's ambition, greed and skill be an exception?
If the locals want a unitary Congo it would be self-evident. It's not. What the folks who live there, love there and, all too often die violently there seem to want is an end to the Rumble in the Jungle and that means an end of the Congo.
Unlike the overwhelming majority of fights in the Congo, the original Rumble in the Jungle was decisive. There was a winner (well paid) and a loser (very well paid.)
Also, running against the current of typical Congo battles, no one was killed. No rapes were reported. There wasn't any obvious looting.
The present Rumble in the Jungle runs to type. It is so far indecisive as to outcome. It is bloody. And, in the usual way of things in the Congo, the Congolese Army has shown itself very proficient at talking tough, running fast, looting with alacrity and raping with zeal. Congolese troops also continue to demonstrate a genuine talent for killing civilians during or immediately after the raping and looting phase of the exercise has been completed.
Comes now the European Union, or at least France, with a swagger and a stated desire to enter the Congo Rumble. Apparently heeding the cry of the High Minded and the UN, France is mooting the idea of sending an elite reaction force of somewhere between 1,500 and 3,000 men to back the 6,000 members of the 17,000 UN peacekeeping force present in the combat area around the provincial center of Goma.
"Wait one, Geek, where are the other 11,000 lads with blue helmets?" You ask.
Simple, they are spread around the rest of the Congo. It seems there is anti-government sentiment lurking everywhere in that jungle.
Noting that the majority of the peacekeeping force come from African Union members a South African defense and security analyst with a greater grip on reality than the requirements of political correctness, Henri Boshoff, maintains that a highly trained and capable force must be deployed to the land around Goma within five or six days. Longer would mean too late.
Only the EU has the capacity for such rapid deployment. (The US would as well were it not that Uncle Sam has two wars and an election on his hands.) Boshoff seems to think that an EU contingent would arrive ready, able and willing to use the weapons at its disposal.
The Europeans don't see it that way. French ForMin Koucher avers that any battlegroup sent to the Congo wouldn't be going there to fight but rather to assist in humanitarian operations.
Yeah. Right. Sure they will, Bernie. Or maybe you are of the belief that the men under General Nkunda will simply fold in panic and run like they were Congolese special forces when they see white dudes with guns get off the planes?
That may be the case. Nkunda has shown a willingness to turn peaceful before when the correlation of forces was not favorable. In any event the Congo way of war allows for time-outs. Even unlimited time-outs.
Should the threat of EU intervention or the efforts of UN and other negotiators and envoys prove successful in extending and broadening the ceasefire ordered by Nkunda, it would only signify one more destabilising, bloody and quite inconclusive military essay. The history of the Congo over its forty-eight years of independent existence is filled with such events.
Nkunda has an agenda. For the record he wants the immediate disarmament of the Hutu militia which he maintains is fighting alongside the Congolese National Runaway, Loot, Rape and Murder Force as well as preying on the Tutsi population along the Congo-Rwanda border. Also for the record is his objection to the deal between China and the Congolese central government which is valued at nine billion dollars. The deal exchanges rights to exploit mineral resources over a vast swath of the Congo in exchange for the building of a railroad and a highway.
Laurent Nkunda may well have a point there. The deal seems to be in line with the standard issue business transaction which has marked the Congo since Leopold I, King of the Belgians scarfed up the territory for his personal benefit. And, at the expense of generations of Congolese.
Leopold should have patented his business model since any number of foreign firms, usually backed by their governments have made similar "deals." Outsiders have exploited the natural resources of the mineral rich territory and the human resources of the people who live there for the benefit of the outsiders--and, of course, the insiders, the governing elite that make sure the deal goes down.
China has never been noted for making bargains that benefit the other party--beyond the local elite that made things happen and the security forces which protect the elite and the Chinese alike. Chinese involvement in the "development" of a country's resources will have no benefits for the people on the ground. Quite the opposite. After the Chinese and their local clients get up and running, the folks on the ground will look back at the bad old days of colonialism with fondness.
Don't believe the Geek? Ask the Burmese then. That is if you can get through to anyone who is not on the government's approved to talk to outsiders list. If that's too tough, try the Sudan.
The Geek has argued that the Congo is a geographic expression. A failing state that never really was. Well intentioned intervention by the UN, the EU or the US would only prolong the agony. Unnecessarily lengthen the time until the inevitable collapse of the Congo occurs.
Laurent Nkunda and his (highly probable) backers in Rwanda may be another passel of dictators and exploiters in the making. Then again they may not be of that mold. Nkunda has done something almost unprecedented in the dreary history of Congolese internal war. He called and enforced a ceasefire while the enemy and the UN peacekeepers were on the run.
Perhaps Nkunda and his backers want only a small portion of the vast territory called (for the moment at least) the Congo. Breaking away a piece of the geographic expression might be the necessary first step in creating a less bloody, more stable artifact--a collection of states based on population, on primary linguistic and cultural affiliations.
Sure it is unfashionable to argue that the dismantlement of larger entities into their several natural components is the best way to go. The Congo today like an artifact called Yugoslavia a decade and more ago points in that direction.
No man-made artifact lasts forever. Why should the Congo, the creation of one man's ambition, greed and skill be an exception?
If the locals want a unitary Congo it would be self-evident. It's not. What the folks who live there, love there and, all too often die violently there seem to want is an end to the Rumble in the Jungle and that means an end of the Congo.
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
The Congo Goes To Hell--What Else Is New?
History is alive and well in the Democratic Republic of the Congo! For the umpteenth time in the Congo's less than fifty years of independence, refuges flee and "rebels" advance.
This time around, the "renegade" is General Laurent Nkunda. With him are approximately five thousand well equipped, well trained fighters. Behind Nkunda and his five thousand apparently very effective trigger-pullers is a political entity called the National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP.)
The people being defended, like the gun-toters of Nkunda' force are Tutsi. Many of these Tutsis are left overs from the refugee camps in the eastern Congo formed nearly fifteen years ago in the wake of the Rwanda genocide. Others, probably most, are natives of the Congo.
The national identity of the troops and "protected people" gives good reason to believe reports that behind the CNDP and Nkunda's force is the small but very well trained, equipped and motivated army of Rwanda.
The prize in play is not the territorial capital of Rutshuru or even the major center of Goma with its refugee inflated population of 600,000. These are unimportant.
The prize is the mineral rich eastern section of the Congo. The east, centering on Katanga province, is the economic heart of the Western Europe sized country. It has always been the focus of the coups, counter-coups, uprisings, take-overs and the like which have marked the history of the Congo since June 1960.
While Nkunda recently proclaimed his intention to "liberate" all of the Congo, the real aims of the General and those behind him are far more limited in geographic scope. Katanga will do just fine, thank you.
This is not to say that Nkunda and the CNDP are not expansive in their ambitions. Both the General and his political peers started operations with the stated goal of protecting the Tutsi from the depredations of the Hutu militia, which crossed into the Congo to avoid the consequences of their genocidal acts.
Wars between various parties have been the hallmark of the Katanga region since 1997. The most recent ceasefire brokered by the UN between Nkunda and the government lasted from January to August of this year. This means it lasted a little longer than most ceasefires brought about by international agencies over the past forty-eight years.
The UN deployed a 17,000 member peacekeeping force in support of the ceasefire. It is a typical UN collection, mixing a few good units with assorted rabble. It could keep the peace as long as Nkunda and company allowed it to.
Time to get a grip.
There are two realities underlying the current stream of refugees to say nothing of such ancillaries as the UN helicopters firing without demonstrable effect upon the advancing "rebels" and the locals heaving rocks at the ineffectual "peacekeepers."
The first, most important reality is simply that the Congo is not and never has been a nation-state. Like other failed or failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, it is a mere geographical expression.
The Congo came into existence a century and a quarter ago as the result of the personal ambition, greed and diplomatic skill of one man. King Leopold of the Belgians saw that exploiting the resources, human and otherwise, of a large and unclaimed area of Africa would lead to great personal wealth and status. His lengthy and often brilliant campaign of duplicity and taking advantage of rivalries between several of the European Great Powers resulted in the birth of Leopold's personal preserve--the Congo.
Over the next half century and more the raping of the Congo was looked upon with favor by the Great Powers including the US because its resources ranging from rubber to uranium were critical to economic growth or even victory in at least one war. Independence came more quickly and completely than any, repeat, any outside observer whether Belgian or otherwise thought either wise or possible.
Independence ignited a seemingly endless series of internal wars including genocidal violence directed against the small number of Belgians who stayed behind for reasons both selfish and altruistic. Stability, the stability of efficient repression, finally emerged under the dictatorship of a one time clerk for the Colonial Police, Joseph Mobutu. The US supported Mobutu through most of his less than gentle ruling period as a consequence of Cold War imperatives.
Mobutu's megalomaniac reign came to an end not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union rendered his version of law and order nugatory. Then, once again, it was let-the-killing-begin.
The wars both official and informal of the past decade and a half along with the underlying fractionation of any sort of body politic in the Congo has left the place both without a viable central regime, any sense of pervasive loyalty to a national entity on the part of most inhabitants and a long series of scores demanding settlement now and into the future.
The Congo is a failing if not yet a completely failed state. Any attempt by the African Union, the UN or the US to pretend the contrary is simply to perpetuate the bloodshed and attendant horrors. Period.
If outside agencies such as the AU and UN want to pretend the Congo is a viable nation-state, if the High Minded in Western Europe and the US want to wish the Congo would become a progressive model of enlightened liberal democracy, there is only one option. And, it ain't peacekeeping.
No.
The option is peace imposition. Imposing even a semblance of peace on the Congo will require a very major effort. Increasing the current 17,000 member UN force twenty fold would scarcely be enough.
Imposing peace will require combat. Combat requires death. Death will not be limited to combatants in or out of uniform.
Combat generates refugees in enormous numbers. As recent years have shown conclusively massive numbers of refugees have two consequences: Humanitarian crisis and future generations of gunslingers.
Absent both the political will and material resources for a major, prolonged military operation including years of occupation, the choices for dealing with the wreckage of the geographical expression called the Congo are few.
Essentially there are two. Keep on with the charade of peacekeeping in the hopes that some diplomatic/political miracle will occur and peace will break out. Accept that Nkunda and his merry band will take Goma and then Katanga with the hope that then peace will break out.
The Geek won't bet on either bringing a new era of fellowhip and love to the place.
History is powerful, too powerful for a Disney-type ending.
This time around, the "renegade" is General Laurent Nkunda. With him are approximately five thousand well equipped, well trained fighters. Behind Nkunda and his five thousand apparently very effective trigger-pullers is a political entity called the National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP.)
The people being defended, like the gun-toters of Nkunda' force are Tutsi. Many of these Tutsis are left overs from the refugee camps in the eastern Congo formed nearly fifteen years ago in the wake of the Rwanda genocide. Others, probably most, are natives of the Congo.
The national identity of the troops and "protected people" gives good reason to believe reports that behind the CNDP and Nkunda's force is the small but very well trained, equipped and motivated army of Rwanda.
The prize in play is not the territorial capital of Rutshuru or even the major center of Goma with its refugee inflated population of 600,000. These are unimportant.
The prize is the mineral rich eastern section of the Congo. The east, centering on Katanga province, is the economic heart of the Western Europe sized country. It has always been the focus of the coups, counter-coups, uprisings, take-overs and the like which have marked the history of the Congo since June 1960.
While Nkunda recently proclaimed his intention to "liberate" all of the Congo, the real aims of the General and those behind him are far more limited in geographic scope. Katanga will do just fine, thank you.
This is not to say that Nkunda and the CNDP are not expansive in their ambitions. Both the General and his political peers started operations with the stated goal of protecting the Tutsi from the depredations of the Hutu militia, which crossed into the Congo to avoid the consequences of their genocidal acts.
Wars between various parties have been the hallmark of the Katanga region since 1997. The most recent ceasefire brokered by the UN between Nkunda and the government lasted from January to August of this year. This means it lasted a little longer than most ceasefires brought about by international agencies over the past forty-eight years.
The UN deployed a 17,000 member peacekeeping force in support of the ceasefire. It is a typical UN collection, mixing a few good units with assorted rabble. It could keep the peace as long as Nkunda and company allowed it to.
Time to get a grip.
There are two realities underlying the current stream of refugees to say nothing of such ancillaries as the UN helicopters firing without demonstrable effect upon the advancing "rebels" and the locals heaving rocks at the ineffectual "peacekeepers."
The first, most important reality is simply that the Congo is not and never has been a nation-state. Like other failed or failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, it is a mere geographical expression.
The Congo came into existence a century and a quarter ago as the result of the personal ambition, greed and diplomatic skill of one man. King Leopold of the Belgians saw that exploiting the resources, human and otherwise, of a large and unclaimed area of Africa would lead to great personal wealth and status. His lengthy and often brilliant campaign of duplicity and taking advantage of rivalries between several of the European Great Powers resulted in the birth of Leopold's personal preserve--the Congo.
Over the next half century and more the raping of the Congo was looked upon with favor by the Great Powers including the US because its resources ranging from rubber to uranium were critical to economic growth or even victory in at least one war. Independence came more quickly and completely than any, repeat, any outside observer whether Belgian or otherwise thought either wise or possible.
Independence ignited a seemingly endless series of internal wars including genocidal violence directed against the small number of Belgians who stayed behind for reasons both selfish and altruistic. Stability, the stability of efficient repression, finally emerged under the dictatorship of a one time clerk for the Colonial Police, Joseph Mobutu. The US supported Mobutu through most of his less than gentle ruling period as a consequence of Cold War imperatives.
Mobutu's megalomaniac reign came to an end not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union rendered his version of law and order nugatory. Then, once again, it was let-the-killing-begin.
The wars both official and informal of the past decade and a half along with the underlying fractionation of any sort of body politic in the Congo has left the place both without a viable central regime, any sense of pervasive loyalty to a national entity on the part of most inhabitants and a long series of scores demanding settlement now and into the future.
The Congo is a failing if not yet a completely failed state. Any attempt by the African Union, the UN or the US to pretend the contrary is simply to perpetuate the bloodshed and attendant horrors. Period.
If outside agencies such as the AU and UN want to pretend the Congo is a viable nation-state, if the High Minded in Western Europe and the US want to wish the Congo would become a progressive model of enlightened liberal democracy, there is only one option. And, it ain't peacekeeping.
No.
The option is peace imposition. Imposing even a semblance of peace on the Congo will require a very major effort. Increasing the current 17,000 member UN force twenty fold would scarcely be enough.
Imposing peace will require combat. Combat requires death. Death will not be limited to combatants in or out of uniform.
Combat generates refugees in enormous numbers. As recent years have shown conclusively massive numbers of refugees have two consequences: Humanitarian crisis and future generations of gunslingers.
Absent both the political will and material resources for a major, prolonged military operation including years of occupation, the choices for dealing with the wreckage of the geographical expression called the Congo are few.
Essentially there are two. Keep on with the charade of peacekeeping in the hopes that some diplomatic/political miracle will occur and peace will break out. Accept that Nkunda and his merry band will take Goma and then Katanga with the hope that then peace will break out.
The Geek won't bet on either bringing a new era of fellowhip and love to the place.
History is powerful, too powerful for a Disney-type ending.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Poverty, Foreign Aid--and Slavery
Last Friday marked the UN decreed international day for the eradication of poverty. How did you commemorate the great event?
The Geek marked the moment by reading. He read on both the history of US foreign aid and the internal economic and social impact of the international slave trade on Africa.
He was struck by the similarities.
The international traffic in human beings conducted by Europeans and Americans as well as by Arabs had the effect of severely distorting the long standing organic African economic and social/political institutions. The distortions came as the direct and predictable introduction of foreign products ranging from horses to alcohol, guns to cheap textiles.
The ready market created in Africa assured a profitable "dumping" ground for goods that were unwanted in domestic markets due to their obsolescence, shoddiness or general undesirability. At the same time the ending of the slave trade required Africans to develop alternative means of purchase.
As a result indigenous agricultural practices were bent to the task of producing commodities desired by the outsiders. This, in turn, demanded an increase in domestic slavery to provide the labor necessary to meet the new requirements of export oriented production.
Agricultural products were joined by the output of extractive industries such as gold, diamonds, wild rubber and forest products. Colonial regimes encouraged and protected the already extant coercive labor practices instituted by the native elites.
The economic, political and social effects of these distortions last until the present day.
Even the most cursory appreciation of the overall effects of foreign aid as granted by the US and other countries in the post-World War II period leads to the conclusion that this well-intentioned(?) aid had the same impact on the recipients as slavery did upon Africa.
Foreign aid in a large measure ties the recipient country to the economy of the donor. The vast majority of grants require the recipient to purchase the output of the donor country. Loans require repayment. Repayment requires foreign exchange. Foreign exchange requires the production of something that is marketable.
Lets see. I give (or loan) you money. You have to spend all or most of the money on things I make. Then, to repay loans you have to produce something that I want to buy. At prices I want to pay.
That sounds good to me. Even if it doesn't to you.
Globalization has exacerbated the problem for recipient nations. The World Bank, the IMF and other multi-lateral "lenders" have demanded ever greater control over the economic and political decision making of recipient nations. Sometimes that control crosses the border into a flat-out dictatorial regime conducted by and for outsiders.
The creating of demand within a society is a deadly weapon. Market demands which do not arise organically but rather are created artificially from outside a society have the historically demonstrated capacity to transmogrify that society, its economy and its polity.
The binding of a society to the "global" economy for whatsoever reason, even the High Minded one of "eradicating poverty," is inherently dangerous.
Yes, the binding may work. It may improve the well-being of people beyond the elite of a particular nation. It may allow for more people to buy more seeming essentials, the 21st century equivalents of the cheap textiles, shoddy ironmongery and weapons of the African experience in the 16th to 19th centuries.
Whether that sort of increased purchasing power is a good thing for people is an open and arguable question. But, it does constitute the least-worst outcome of both globalization and foreign aid.
The historical record as well as contemporary developments demonstrate that the roster of outcomes can get far worse. The bondage of a society to either the interests of a generous donor country or a multi-lateral institution such as the World Bank and IMF can result in the political, cultural and environmental impoverishment of the majority of the society's members no matter how much the elite may benefit. This, in turn, has the strong, (the Geek is tempted to write "inevitable") potential of leading to armed political dissent.
Then there is the question of just what constitutes "poverty?"
The Geek is congniscent of the purchasing power parity metric which is commonly employed to define poverty. He is also well aware of standard pap of equating a daily expenditure level of so many US dollars per day and the accompanying allegation that too few bucks per day spent by the average inhabitant of Lower Slobovia or Eastern Fartistan constitutes "poverty."
The Geek has personally witnessed severe deprivation by more valid standards than those thrown about by advocates of the Millenium Development Goals beloved by the UN and its legion of High Minded supporters. He has seen misery far more basic than any which can be expressed by purchasing power parity artifacts.
He has seen some of the worst of the wretchedness and life threatening deprivation in countries spread from Africa to Latin America which have been the "beneficiaries" of foreign aid largess and globalization oriented investment programs.
The Geek has seen the effects of misplaced faith in the elevating potential of foreign aid and foreign investment. He has seen them in the disruption of communities, value and ways of living that have successfully withstood generations, centuries of the normal stresses, common uncertainties and accustomed viscisitudes of life.
The more one acquaints himself with the effects of the slave trade and its aftermath on Africa the more one sees the similarities--the identies--with the impact of foreign aid and globalization.
What this suggests is simple.
It is wrong headed to the maximum for the US or any wealthy nation to be stampeded into signing on to ambitious High Minded efforts to eradicate poverty thoughout the world. The road to hell is not so much paved by good intentions as it is mandated by the Law of Unintended Consequences.
Get a firm grip on history. What happened centuries ago in Africa; what has been happening in much of the world including Africa over the past half century shows what will happen--on steroids--in the future under the impetus of the Global Poverty Act currently pending before the US Senate and similar proposals of expanded financial redistribution.
The Geek marked the moment by reading. He read on both the history of US foreign aid and the internal economic and social impact of the international slave trade on Africa.
He was struck by the similarities.
The international traffic in human beings conducted by Europeans and Americans as well as by Arabs had the effect of severely distorting the long standing organic African economic and social/political institutions. The distortions came as the direct and predictable introduction of foreign products ranging from horses to alcohol, guns to cheap textiles.
The ready market created in Africa assured a profitable "dumping" ground for goods that were unwanted in domestic markets due to their obsolescence, shoddiness or general undesirability. At the same time the ending of the slave trade required Africans to develop alternative means of purchase.
As a result indigenous agricultural practices were bent to the task of producing commodities desired by the outsiders. This, in turn, demanded an increase in domestic slavery to provide the labor necessary to meet the new requirements of export oriented production.
Agricultural products were joined by the output of extractive industries such as gold, diamonds, wild rubber and forest products. Colonial regimes encouraged and protected the already extant coercive labor practices instituted by the native elites.
The economic, political and social effects of these distortions last until the present day.
Even the most cursory appreciation of the overall effects of foreign aid as granted by the US and other countries in the post-World War II period leads to the conclusion that this well-intentioned(?) aid had the same impact on the recipients as slavery did upon Africa.
Foreign aid in a large measure ties the recipient country to the economy of the donor. The vast majority of grants require the recipient to purchase the output of the donor country. Loans require repayment. Repayment requires foreign exchange. Foreign exchange requires the production of something that is marketable.
Lets see. I give (or loan) you money. You have to spend all or most of the money on things I make. Then, to repay loans you have to produce something that I want to buy. At prices I want to pay.
That sounds good to me. Even if it doesn't to you.
Globalization has exacerbated the problem for recipient nations. The World Bank, the IMF and other multi-lateral "lenders" have demanded ever greater control over the economic and political decision making of recipient nations. Sometimes that control crosses the border into a flat-out dictatorial regime conducted by and for outsiders.
The creating of demand within a society is a deadly weapon. Market demands which do not arise organically but rather are created artificially from outside a society have the historically demonstrated capacity to transmogrify that society, its economy and its polity.
The binding of a society to the "global" economy for whatsoever reason, even the High Minded one of "eradicating poverty," is inherently dangerous.
Yes, the binding may work. It may improve the well-being of people beyond the elite of a particular nation. It may allow for more people to buy more seeming essentials, the 21st century equivalents of the cheap textiles, shoddy ironmongery and weapons of the African experience in the 16th to 19th centuries.
Whether that sort of increased purchasing power is a good thing for people is an open and arguable question. But, it does constitute the least-worst outcome of both globalization and foreign aid.
The historical record as well as contemporary developments demonstrate that the roster of outcomes can get far worse. The bondage of a society to either the interests of a generous donor country or a multi-lateral institution such as the World Bank and IMF can result in the political, cultural and environmental impoverishment of the majority of the society's members no matter how much the elite may benefit. This, in turn, has the strong, (the Geek is tempted to write "inevitable") potential of leading to armed political dissent.
Then there is the question of just what constitutes "poverty?"
The Geek is congniscent of the purchasing power parity metric which is commonly employed to define poverty. He is also well aware of standard pap of equating a daily expenditure level of so many US dollars per day and the accompanying allegation that too few bucks per day spent by the average inhabitant of Lower Slobovia or Eastern Fartistan constitutes "poverty."
The Geek has personally witnessed severe deprivation by more valid standards than those thrown about by advocates of the Millenium Development Goals beloved by the UN and its legion of High Minded supporters. He has seen misery far more basic than any which can be expressed by purchasing power parity artifacts.
He has seen some of the worst of the wretchedness and life threatening deprivation in countries spread from Africa to Latin America which have been the "beneficiaries" of foreign aid largess and globalization oriented investment programs.
The Geek has seen the effects of misplaced faith in the elevating potential of foreign aid and foreign investment. He has seen them in the disruption of communities, value and ways of living that have successfully withstood generations, centuries of the normal stresses, common uncertainties and accustomed viscisitudes of life.
The more one acquaints himself with the effects of the slave trade and its aftermath on Africa the more one sees the similarities--the identies--with the impact of foreign aid and globalization.
What this suggests is simple.
It is wrong headed to the maximum for the US or any wealthy nation to be stampeded into signing on to ambitious High Minded efforts to eradicate poverty thoughout the world. The road to hell is not so much paved by good intentions as it is mandated by the Law of Unintended Consequences.
Get a firm grip on history. What happened centuries ago in Africa; what has been happening in much of the world including Africa over the past half century shows what will happen--on steroids--in the future under the impetus of the Global Poverty Act currently pending before the US Senate and similar proposals of expanded financial redistribution.
Sunday, June 22, 2008
The Democracy Fetish Takes One More Hit
This time in Zimbabwe. The Geek always expected one of two outcomes for the practice of democracy in the former British colony of South Rhodesia. One would be the death of any challenger to the one man rule of the post-colonial regime, Robert Mugabe. The other would be the prudent withdrawal of the challenger before the bullet hit the back of his neck.
Events went the second way as Morgan Tsvangirai showed discretion is better than heroism.
More importantly, the course of the past two months in Zimbabwe demonstrated once again that democracy is more, much more than the mere casting of ballots. To be real, a democratic country must be under a regime that is willing to accept the peaceful transition of power from the incumbent to the opposition.
As in other nations, African included, the obscene behavior of Robert Mugabe shows that the country he has driven to bankruptcy, starvation, mass emigration and episodic violence is not one which meets the single, basic criterion for democracy. Mugabe states that "God" placed him in power and only the deity can remove him.
Kind of a strange perversion of the ancient Latin cliche, "Vox populi. Vox dei."
The collapse of even the thin charade of democracy in Zimbabwe under the boots of Mugabe's Patriotic League of Thugs and Terrorists raises another question. One that is of supreme import for the countries bordering Zimbabwe. All of which at least pretend to be democratic republics.
What are they going to do about the dictator in their midst?
Admittedly, Mugabe has long enjoyed a high level of prestige among the sub-Saharan African population for his leadership of the long insurgency against the White minority regime of Rhodesia following Ian Smith's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The resulting war was very long, very nasty and ultimately won by the insurgents through the progressive reduction of the White population and government's political will and material capacity to continue the war.
Importantly, the Black majority forces did not win because of any particular political or military brilliance on the part of Mugabe. He was a factor in the Black success, but only one among many. Other factors including the economic sanctions imposed by the Commonwealth, European and North American nations were more important. Also more important than Mugabe was the constant and ready support offered by surrounding states.
Mugabe was a hero by convention only. His personal contribution to the toppling of the White minority government was (and is) greatly magnified.
Mugabe's actions of recent years have been minimalised by the very same people and governments which have boosted his reputation as the Hero of the Liberation. Starting with the politically popular but economically and nationally self-destructive act of "redistributing" land owned and operated to the national advantage by White farmers, and continuing through the years of systematic repression of any emergent opposition or even criticism, Mugabe seemed to have been bent upon two interlocking goals: maintaining his personal power and status, destroying Zimbabwe.
He has succeeded in both as of today. He is in power. He is the paramount chief. And, Zimbabwe is a complete wreck. A collapsing state filled with corpses, starvation and hopelessness.
Some hero.
When are the other folks in the neighborhood going to notice? When will the governments of South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana individually or collectively say, "Enough is enough!"
Zambia had "free and fair" elections two years ago. Or so says the CIA which the Geek has found generally reliable on such matters. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html
South Africa, which has borne much of the violence and economic meltdown refugee flood, is widely hailed as a pillar of democracy. It's chief of state, Thabo Mbeki, has been heavily and ineffectually involved in trying to broker an end to the chaos in Zimbabwe. Is it not time for South Africa to take the gloves off and let the aged autocrat next door know that the time for graceful retirement is now?
Mozambique underwent what CIA terms "a delicate transition" in December 2004 which allowed the country to continue sound economic policies and keep on rebuilding a nation shattered by decades of insurgency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html President Guebuza should think long and hard about the impact of a continuation of the refugee flow from Zimbabwe as well as his country's diplomatic leverage.
As much as South Africa and much more than Zambia, Mozambique has the leverage necessary to put a convincing argument before Mugabe that he should step down. Move out of the way before the turbulence in Zimbabwe endangers the neighbors even more than it has already.
It would be naive in the extreme to expect the African Union to exercise a constructive role in the Zimbabwe chaos considering that organisation's record to date with failing states across the continent. The African Union, not unlike its nomenclatural predecessor the Organisation of African States, is long on slogans, demands against the West and glitzy top-dollar diplomatic extravaganzas.
The AU, like the OAS, is very short on positive results for all its rhetoric, demands and heads-of-state meeting in upscale conflabs.
What about the United Nations? Secretary of State Rice has stated the US intends to put the implosion of Zimbabwe on the UN Security Council Agenda next week. Her demarche has already been overtaken by events. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/7601194
Mugabe has already spent weeks (well, years actually) blaming all of his country's problems on the "colonial" powers in which he (no surprise here) includes the United States along with the United Kingdom. It's no stretch to add France to the list of offenders.
It must be remembered that both Russia and China tend to oppose the Security Council mixing itself up in what might be seen as the domestic political problems of any member state. The reasons are obvious. Russia and China face violent internal political unrest.
South Africa also opposes the Security Council move. Rightly. The neighbors, members of the SADC, have been complicit in the collapse of Zimbabwe. The same neighbors have the duty--and the self-interest involvement--to end the chaos and restore at least a semblance of democratic order.
Starvation is a part of life for millions of people in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has made that fact come into existence. Starving people are desperate people.
You don't need a PhD to figure that one out.
The borders of the neighborhood are porous. At best. In order to protect themselves, their less than robust governments, economies, societies, neighboring countries--South Africa and Mozambique in particular--have to intervene with diplomacy, aid and, if all else fails, force.
Mugabe has said that only God will remove him from power. He might consider that God can have many faces and take many forms.
Events went the second way as Morgan Tsvangirai showed discretion is better than heroism.
More importantly, the course of the past two months in Zimbabwe demonstrated once again that democracy is more, much more than the mere casting of ballots. To be real, a democratic country must be under a regime that is willing to accept the peaceful transition of power from the incumbent to the opposition.
As in other nations, African included, the obscene behavior of Robert Mugabe shows that the country he has driven to bankruptcy, starvation, mass emigration and episodic violence is not one which meets the single, basic criterion for democracy. Mugabe states that "God" placed him in power and only the deity can remove him.
Kind of a strange perversion of the ancient Latin cliche, "Vox populi. Vox dei."
The collapse of even the thin charade of democracy in Zimbabwe under the boots of Mugabe's Patriotic League of Thugs and Terrorists raises another question. One that is of supreme import for the countries bordering Zimbabwe. All of which at least pretend to be democratic republics.
What are they going to do about the dictator in their midst?
Admittedly, Mugabe has long enjoyed a high level of prestige among the sub-Saharan African population for his leadership of the long insurgency against the White minority regime of Rhodesia following Ian Smith's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The resulting war was very long, very nasty and ultimately won by the insurgents through the progressive reduction of the White population and government's political will and material capacity to continue the war.
Importantly, the Black majority forces did not win because of any particular political or military brilliance on the part of Mugabe. He was a factor in the Black success, but only one among many. Other factors including the economic sanctions imposed by the Commonwealth, European and North American nations were more important. Also more important than Mugabe was the constant and ready support offered by surrounding states.
Mugabe was a hero by convention only. His personal contribution to the toppling of the White minority government was (and is) greatly magnified.
Mugabe's actions of recent years have been minimalised by the very same people and governments which have boosted his reputation as the Hero of the Liberation. Starting with the politically popular but economically and nationally self-destructive act of "redistributing" land owned and operated to the national advantage by White farmers, and continuing through the years of systematic repression of any emergent opposition or even criticism, Mugabe seemed to have been bent upon two interlocking goals: maintaining his personal power and status, destroying Zimbabwe.
He has succeeded in both as of today. He is in power. He is the paramount chief. And, Zimbabwe is a complete wreck. A collapsing state filled with corpses, starvation and hopelessness.
Some hero.
When are the other folks in the neighborhood going to notice? When will the governments of South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana individually or collectively say, "Enough is enough!"
Zambia had "free and fair" elections two years ago. Or so says the CIA which the Geek has found generally reliable on such matters. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html
South Africa, which has borne much of the violence and economic meltdown refugee flood, is widely hailed as a pillar of democracy. It's chief of state, Thabo Mbeki, has been heavily and ineffectually involved in trying to broker an end to the chaos in Zimbabwe. Is it not time for South Africa to take the gloves off and let the aged autocrat next door know that the time for graceful retirement is now?
Mozambique underwent what CIA terms "a delicate transition" in December 2004 which allowed the country to continue sound economic policies and keep on rebuilding a nation shattered by decades of insurgency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html President Guebuza should think long and hard about the impact of a continuation of the refugee flow from Zimbabwe as well as his country's diplomatic leverage.
As much as South Africa and much more than Zambia, Mozambique has the leverage necessary to put a convincing argument before Mugabe that he should step down. Move out of the way before the turbulence in Zimbabwe endangers the neighbors even more than it has already.
It would be naive in the extreme to expect the African Union to exercise a constructive role in the Zimbabwe chaos considering that organisation's record to date with failing states across the continent. The African Union, not unlike its nomenclatural predecessor the Organisation of African States, is long on slogans, demands against the West and glitzy top-dollar diplomatic extravaganzas.
The AU, like the OAS, is very short on positive results for all its rhetoric, demands and heads-of-state meeting in upscale conflabs.
What about the United Nations? Secretary of State Rice has stated the US intends to put the implosion of Zimbabwe on the UN Security Council Agenda next week. Her demarche has already been overtaken by events. http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/7601194
United States, which is this month's president of the Security Council, has accused Mugabe of turning Zimbabwe into a failed state that threatens its residents and the stability of southern Africa.
When asked whether she thought the United Nations was prepared to go beyond passing a resolution on Zimbabwe, Rice said, "We believe that unless the Security Council acts, it stands to lose credibility."
Mugabe has already spent weeks (well, years actually) blaming all of his country's problems on the "colonial" powers in which he (no surprise here) includes the United States along with the United Kingdom. It's no stretch to add France to the list of offenders.
It must be remembered that both Russia and China tend to oppose the Security Council mixing itself up in what might be seen as the domestic political problems of any member state. The reasons are obvious. Russia and China face violent internal political unrest.
South Africa also opposes the Security Council move. Rightly. The neighbors, members of the SADC, have been complicit in the collapse of Zimbabwe. The same neighbors have the duty--and the self-interest involvement--to end the chaos and restore at least a semblance of democratic order.
Starvation is a part of life for millions of people in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has made that fact come into existence. Starving people are desperate people.
You don't need a PhD to figure that one out.
The borders of the neighborhood are porous. At best. In order to protect themselves, their less than robust governments, economies, societies, neighboring countries--South Africa and Mozambique in particular--have to intervene with diplomacy, aid and, if all else fails, force.
Mugabe has said that only God will remove him from power. He might consider that God can have many faces and take many forms.
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