Minarets Are Political Not Religious Symbols

A week ago nearly fifty-eight percent of the Swiss electorate defied the wishes of their government, their parliament, and voted to ban future construction of minarets. The vote was open, transparent, and in keeping with the long standing democratic practices of the multi-lingual, multi-religious federated republic.

Not surprisingly the solid nitrogenous waste product landed on the air impeller. Not simply in Muslim states ranging from Algeria to Malaysia but within the multi-cultural, ever-so-sensitive-and-tolerant elites of the US and Western Europe.

The Iranian foreign minister made dark and unspecified warnings of "consequences" to his Swiss counterpart. Not to be outdone, a leading Muslim cleric in Egypt, the Grand Mufti Ali Goma, declared the ban of new construction minarets constituted "an attempt to insult the feelings of the Muslim community in and outside Switzerland."

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, joined the chorus of condemnation. This bureaucrat, who seems never to be bothered by such bagatelles as the prohibition against the construction of any church or synagogue, or, for that matter, Buddhist temple, extant in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim states, weighed in with a statement deploring the Swiss voters' action.

In the US the denunciations from the political Left were every bit as robust as those emanating from the Muslim press overseas. In the HuffPost Cameron Sinclair characterized the Swiss exercise in vox populi, vox dei as "misguided at best, at worst downright racism." (Emphasis in original.) Ironically Mr Sinclair also states, "architecture is political."

How right he is! Architecture is political--and never more so than in the case of minarets. As much or more than the steeples on Christian churches, the towering minaret is today what it was centuries ago--a symbol of Muslim political presence. And, a visible sign of Muslim political domination.

Although typically described as being necessary for the summons to prayers which issues from mosques worldwide five times a day, the minaret was not only a late comer to Muslim religious practice it was also a product of the successful wars of conquest waged by Muslim armies following the death of Mohammad. The minaret was not a convenient elevated platform for the muezzin's summons. No. It was the phallic symbol of conquest, of the subjugation of the non-Muslim population.

Arguably, the spires crowning the cathedrals of Europe were designed to point to heaven or to summon the aspirations of the believers to the highest, most noble callings. This explanation has been given over the generations by historians and others seeking to explain the significance of the steeple which has so long been a visual signature of Christian communities. True or not a more fundamental reality exists: The steeple was never intended to be a mark of conquest or of subjugation.

The minaret is a different beast all together. Before Islam exploded out of the Arabian Peninsula carried on the scimitars of legions of highly motivated believers, the mosque was unadorned. No minarets were to be seen (nor have any foundations for such been excavated in recent years.) It was only after Islam came, saw, conquered new territory, new people, that the minaret came into existence. Even so, the progress from the low slung mosque to the towering minaret equipped version was slow and spotty.

Indeed, the historical and archaeological record points to an interesting correlation. Minarets proliferated most in those areas where the battles of conquest were most hard won and where the Muslims constituted a distinct minority, a thin ruling crust over a large and restive population of infidels. The minaret like the assorted regulations covering the second class folks of the Christian and Jewish communities was intended to impress, overawe, to remind all the non-Muslim "people of the book" of their humiliated position in the new Islamic order.

Yes, Mr Sinclair, architecture is political. In this case the politics were those of dominance and submission, of rulership and being ruled, of giving the orders and taking them. The minaret was the tallest building admissible. No church could surpass it just as no Christian, no Jew could speak to a Muslim while on horseback while the Muslim could sit on his animal and glare down at the inferior non-Muslim.

There is no justification for the minaret today. The hoary justification that its lofty heights were necessary so that the faithful would hear the calls to prayer has been set aside by the use of sound amplification systems. The minaret has only one utility--as a symbol of Muslim presence.

The Swiss vote expressed the desire, perhaps the need, to reclaim the skyline as Swiss, as European. There was no explicit threat to the practice of Islam, to the building of new mosques. There is not even an implicit threat to either. Nor does the vote indicate a desire let alone a need on the part of the Swiss hoi polloi to limit the rights of Muslims in any way let alone force the Muslims to return to Kosovo and other places of origin.

The Swiss merely said by their vote that they wanted their skyline, their traditional skyline. At worst it may be alleged that the Swiss are more comfortable with their traditional skyline as they are with their cultural and social traditions. It may be alleged that the Swiss "feelings" have been, if not insulted, at least discomfited by the intrusion of the alien minaret.

This means quite simply that the Swiss people as distinguished from their government, parliament, and the elite of Europe generally are like most people most everywhere--happiest, most comfortable, most at home as it were with the cultural and social traditions and features long known and accepted, even loved. It is ironic that the multi-cultural crew cannot or will not recognize this and accept it.

The multi-culti crowd with its celebration of "cultural relativism" holds that all cultures, all manifestations of cultural features are equally valid. They accept that it is OK for Muslims to have cultural features such as Shariah mandated punishments, the veiling of women, and the use of minarets. Why is it impossible for the high priests of multi-culti political correctness to accept that the Swiss hoi polloi to have their own shibboleths including a skyline free of minarets?

Well, the answer to that is simple. The vote reflected the views, the desires, and, yes, the fears of the common herd. This fact is enough in and of itself to outrage the self-defined "elites" of both Europe and the US. The basis of the outrage is equally simple: The damn fool lesser folks did not heed the "guidance" of their "betters" in the Swiss parliament and government.

That attitude can be understood, if not forgiven. It is, after all, no fun to be a member of the self-elected elite if the man and woman in the street can ignore your "guidance" and demands with impunity.

The Swiss electorate made two political statements in their vote. The first was the reclamation of their skyline--Islam is not dominant here! The second was equally blunt albeit implicit: The elite can take a hike.

Right on, Switzers!

R2P Or Not R2P

At one time the United Nations had a simple, straightforward major mission. Protect the international peace. That was the one issue focused upon by the architects of the UN during the bloody years of World War II as it had been on the part of Woodrow Wilson and other visionaries during an earlier hectatomb.

The prevention or, at worst, the punishment of aggressive war waged in the face of international disapproval was the centerpiece at the launching of the UN in San Francisco more than a half century ago. While there were other items on the UN's plate--including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--these were seen as clearly secondary. They were conceived of as means of limiting the excuses used by nations to go to war.

That simple, unitary focus became increasingly fuzzy in the waning days of the Cold War particularly after President Jimmy Carter elevated the concept of "human rights" to the top priority of American foreign policy. While there is no doubt that President Carter was both sincere and somewhat pragmatically minded in his dedication to human rights, the Law of Unintended Consequences stood by ready to invoke itself.

The UN pushed its camel's nose into an entirely new area a few years ago when the congeries of diplomats meeting on the banks of the Hudson determined that a potential threat to international peace and stability was posed automatically when a government's policies or weakness resulted in refugee streams crossing international borders. The existence of a flow of refugees became de facto proof that some sort of international intervention was required not only to meet "humanitarian" needs but also to stave off any potential breach of the international peace.

This diplomatic artifice constructed a very steep slope paved with glare ice. It allowed, no, encouraged, the Security Council to determine when and if an internal matter had reached such a pitch of refugee generation (and high visibility flowing of blood and gore) that international intervention was required. If the five Permanent Members could agree on the necessity or desirability of invoking the presumed UN mandate to protect the citizens of the target county, the Boys in Blue Helmets could be deployed.

If and when (as was far from atypical) the Security Council could not agree on intervention, the fall back position was the invocation of a similar "responsibility to protect" (called in diplomatic and journalistic shorthand, "R2P") on the part of the UN or regional organisations. The European Union, the Organisation of American States, the African Union, even NATO, could determine that they had a "responsibility to protect" within their geographic bailiwicks.

Stripped to its essentials the "responsibility to protect" means that some external entity, a state, a regional organisation, the UN, determines on some basis or another that a country has reached such a sorry state of internal depravity and wretchedness that intervention is the necessary course of action. Since the intervention is not sought nor welcomed by the target country or its government, this means the incoming forces are armed and ready to use force to impose their will on the target.

In short, the "responsibility to protect" means making war.

Ironically, the UN, an entity created to keep the international peace, can invoke the "responsibility to protect" in order to wage war. Normally the use of the "R2P" is either by or at the behest of a Great Power against some country which is not a client of another Great Power.

Back in 2005 the "international community" visited the subject of "R2P" at some length. At the end of the visit some 150 world leaders endorsed the concept. Now, four years later, the UN General Assembly is back in the trenches of "R2P."

The NYT suggests that getting the member nations to agree on how and when to intervene so as to stop genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing should not "be much of a stretch." The mere fact that the weight of historical experience underscores the difficulty with agreeing on anything beyond muttering platitudes, the gaining of widespread agreement on the necessity of invading a country due to its internal difficulties is nearly impossible.

Not surprisingly the panjandrums of the UN bureaucracy are overwhelmingly in favor of an "R2P" protocol with real bite. The High Commissioner For Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has called for a "credible capacity for rapid responses." Madam Pillay, like UN SecGen Ban Ki-moon, referenced the massacres in Rwanda during which the world stood by and watched horrified as at least 800,000 were slaughtered.

There is an old cliche in jurisprudence, "Hard cases make bad law." In international politics there is (or should be) a similar saying, "Extreme examples make bad precedent."

To put it simply, there is no firebreak in mere numbers. Nor is there a bright and shining line contained in the swiftness of the slaughter. Once the precedent is enshrined there can be no meaningful distinctions between the fast mass murder of a Rwanda and the slow killing fields of a Zimbabwe or a Somalia. There can be no proper, policy related distinctions drawn between massive and bloody efforts at ethnic cleansing as in former Yugoslavia and the slow-motion ejection of Christians from Iraq.

Regardless of speed, efficiency, or numbers each is an example of abuse of human rights on a large scale. Each occurred because of either government action or government inaction. Each generated refugees. Each outraged (or should have) global sensibilities. Each was (or is) a candidate for "R2P."

The same may be said (and has been) regarding Chinese actions in Tibet or, more recently, in Xianjiang. The same may be said (and has been) regarding Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

The same was said in (partial) justification of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saddam Hussein's regime did engage in internal actions which resulted in massive death, dislocation, and refugee generation. Silent at the time Saddam's men used toxic gas against civilian Kurds, the US waved the bloody shirt of human rights violations nearly two decades later. ("Well," the administration might have said, "better late than never.")

The question of when--if ever--external actors have a "right" or a "responsibility" to intervene at bayonet point to "protect" civilian populations from harm at the hands of their own government or from non-governmental bodies not inhibited by the government is neither easy to parse nor simple to judge. This is the point behind the recent objections to "R2P" raised by General Assembly President Miguel d'Escoto and others including the renowned left-leaning American linguistic and general purpose critic, Noam Chomsky.

D'Escoto circulated a "Concept Note" in which he characterised the "R2P" idea as just one more form of neocolonialism. He has been joined in this position by Dr Chomsky who (correctly) pointed out that "R2P" has been used by Western advanced nations to impose their vision on countries in the non-Western world.

There is an uncomfortable degree of truth in these arguments, much as the Geek personally dislikes finding himself in agreement with d'Escoto, let alone Chomsky. The Great Powers have the influence, resources, and agendas necessary to support interventions under an appropriate color. The most appropriate cover in today's Era of Sensitivity is the protection of one or another of the numerous "lesser breeds without the law" (in Kipling's phrase.) "R2P" is in keeping with a long standing American tradition of couching armed interventions in lofty, humanitarian terms such as Wilson's famed idea of "teaching Mexicans to elect good men."

Another, less publicised danger of using "R2P" as a justification for military operations is the potential for frankly cynical abuse. Russia draped "R2P" over its tanks and jets during the incursion and occupation of disputed territory then under Georgian sovereignty. The Kremlin claimed with a straight face and in the most solemn terms that their army was simply protecting the human rights of the locals faced with genocide at the hands of the aggressive Georgian government.

The Chinese have made similar statements regarding their suppression of demonstrations in Tibet and Xianjiang. The army and police were simply protecting the human rights of the Han Chinese from abuse at the hands of ethnic minorities.

And, so it has gone. As it will continue to go. "Human rights" and the closely linked "R2P" will be exploited by governments to cover naked land grabs and regime maintenance actions.

At the same time governments will continue to be very, very cautious, reluctant really, to involve their forces in the vast majority of situations which might fall legitimately under the rubric, "R2P." That overarching reality is in high evidence today.

Somalia is and has been for years the very definition of human depravity and consequent misery. Ban Ki-moon has once more called upon the "international community" for "armed support" for the tottering artifact created by the same international community, the Transitional Federal Government. The African Union peace keeping force is so undermanned, so poorly equipped, and so lacking in motivation that its troops can barely protect their own base, let alone the TFG.

The members of the African Union show little stomach for further involvement in the Somali cesspit. There are very real reasons given for this. Lack of money. Deficient logistics. No transport. There are also other, equally valid and more compelling unstated reasons.

Chief among these silent justifications is this: What is in it for us? What national interest is served by seeing our troops killed in Somalia?

Abstracts are very poor reasons for getting killed. And, let's be honest about it. Human rights is an abstract. Each and every point referenced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is itself an abstract. They are the creations of a particular historical and philosophical tradition--Western Christianity and its precursors in Greece and Ancient Israel.

They are not real, organic, and emotive concepts in other traditions. They are not good reasons for a government, particularly one faced by its own problems at home to send off men to kill and die. Not even when the blood filled cesspit is right next door and the refugees are flooding your country.

Kenya is a major non-participant in Somalia. Similarly South Africa set back and watched Mugabe's thugs create a swamp of violence, death, poverty, and disease in Zimbabwe. The governments of these nations were not blind to what was happening. Nor were they morally indifferent.

There was simply no compelling national interest at stake. Lacking that, there was no justification for bearing the expenses in lives, treasure, and potential internal complications exercising some sort of abstract "R2P."

The weight of both history and practical realities is against "R2P." This may bother the high minded such as our UN Ambassador, Susan Rice, and the assorted capos of the UN. It may bother the editors of the NYT as the tone of their coverage makes clear.

But, it is a fact. A brute ground truth.

We the People may like to forget or overlook this truth. Just as we like to overlook the reality that when faced by a man with a gun we, each and every one of us, has the "human right" of life only if we can shoot faster and straighter than the other guy.

Who Should Protect Civilians?

War used to be a simple business. Armies fought each other. The ideal, as expressed by Frederick the Great, was to fight so that "the merchant in his counting house and the farmer in his field didn't know the war was in progress."

"Them were the Good Old Days," the Geek sighs. The long ago, long gone days of limited war.

The American War Between the States pointed at the future. Specifically, Sherman's March to the Sea targeted the civilian population in order to sap the political will of Confederate forces and government alike to continue the war. While the "atrocities" committed by Billy's Bummers were exaggerated at the time as well as by later generations of historians, the fact remains that his strategic concept worked.

Bill Sherman apparently had, in the words of Lincoln Steffens, "been over to the future--and it works."

Appearances can be quite misleading. Therein lies the rub.

Technological changes made the waging of war directly on civilian populations more attractive. It did not, as the results of the "round-the-clock" and "worker dehousing" efforts of the US and British air forces demonstrated, make civilian targeting more effective.

It can be fairly argued from the experiences of both World Wars that in the case of total war of national survival, attacks on civilian populations do not undercut the political will of the targeted country sufficiently to bring victory in their wake. The best avenue to victory is the progressive reduction of the enemy's material capacity to wage war.

A close examination of inter-state war between opponents of equal levels of military technology and parity in social and economic organisational complexity shows that the way to victory is the combination of destroying the enemy's forces in the field and his infrastructure's capacity to maintain the war. Kill his soldiers and ruin his industry.

Since civilians have the annoying habit of littering the potential battlefield with farms, villages and cities, it is hard to avoid killing them in the process of going after gun toters and the factories which make the guns and bullets. As a result several approaches have been undertaken over the years to limit civilian damage and death.

The most commonly invoked of these is the doctrine of proportionality. Much beloved by the tender-minded adherents of "just war" philosophy, this doctrine requires that the level and scope of violence employed must not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought. Of course, this is an exceptionally subjective matter requiring judgments as to the appropriateness of the violence and the nature and value of the military advantage.

Another, far less commonly employed but far more pragmatic approach is that of placing responsibility for the defense and protection of civilians upon the government and military force of the target country. At the very least this requires that a government or an entity seeking to act as a government not emplace its military forces or equipment in a civilian context.

When the North Vietnamese government placed critical military facilities such as air defense missile batteries next to hospitals or deep in civilian population centers, the US government responded with a self-defeating action. LBJ ordered that US forces not attack these facilities. In short, the US took on the responsibility of protecting the civilian population of an enemy country. This wrong headed move allowed the North Vietnamese government to enjoy a significant military advantage by having willfully and deliberately placed its citizens at risk.

The problems associated with limiting civilian fatalities become even more complex in internal warfare (insurgency and its partner, counterinsurgency,) interventionary operations and the general category "asymmetrical warfare." The complications all arise from the fact that in this type of war the critical terrain is that comprised by the collective mind of the civilian population of the target area.

Internal wars, interventionary operations and asymmetrical conflicts can be distinguished from conventional inter-state wars by one critical factor. While conventional wars can be seen as real-estate deals, the internal war and its close relatives cannot. The internal war type is best understood as being a contest for the support--or at least the passive acceptance--of one contestant but not the other.

The key to success (or victory if you prefer the more robust term)is the attitude of the uncommitted majority of the target area's population. Each contender in the war wants to assure at the least that the uncommitted majority does not migrate to the other side. At the most each side wants to mobilize a greater percentage of the uncommitted majority to his side.

Far more than conventional inter-state wars, the internal war and its relatives constitutes a fight over human terrain. The civilian is the target. Even when one is busy killing enemy trigger pullers, the overarching goal is to rally support to one's side, or, at the necessary very least, prevent the enemy from gaining greater sympathy and active support from the people in the middle.

As a result of this fundamental reality both sides in an internal war will intentionally target civilians with lethal intent. Insurgents use terror. Counterinsurgents use it as well. Interventionary forces may not go after the folks in the middle with intent, but bombs, shells, bullets hit flesh without distinction.

It is (or should be) no big shock that civilians are at great risk. A very close look at civilian deaths resulting as a direct consequence of military actions in World War II shows that somewhat more died than did soldiers.

The disparity between military and civilian deaths resulting from either military actions or the lethal consequences of deliberate policy is orders of magnitude greater in the internal war. The historical record of internal and interventionary warfare in the 20th and (so far) in the 21st centuries demonstrates that one is far safer to be a shooter in the field than a civilian in the local market, a gunship pilot than an elementary school teacher.

In short, the doctrine of proportionality is as dead as Fredrick the Great's formulation.

There are two reasons for this conclusion. The first has already been laid out. The second is just as important and nearly never formally recognised. In every internal war and in many, if not most interventionary operations, the war is existential.

At the end of the war, only one side will still be standing in somewhat recognisable form. Unless and until a climate of pervasive war weariness sets in, the belligerents wil pursue total victory. Insurgent and counterinsurgent are joined at the hip in that each holds the same idea: victory or death. Internal war is total war.

With stakes this high and the collective mind of the uncommitted civilian majority being the crucial battleground, it should be not at all surprising that civilians are killed in job lots. That's the nature of this kind of war whether anyone likes the idea or not.

Here's the wrinkle. It's one which will tickle the innards of anyone who delights in irony.

Civilians do not like to get killed whether its in the crossfire or by deliberate intent. Also, civilians hate (that term is used advisedly) the side which kills them and not the government or governmental wannabe which fails to protect them.

(This not hard to understand dynamic explains why German and Japanese political will and dedication to the government increased as the weight of Allied bombs increased.)

This fact suggests two important strategic and tactical considerations. The first is that one's chances of victory increase if the responsibility for civilian deaths and general misery can be foisted off on the other side. The second is that few, if any, of the many, many belligerents in the many, many internal wars of the past century have recognised this.

Sherman's brilliant (and it was that, brilliant) strategic concept arose organically from the nature and character of social and familial dynamics in the Confederate states. It was brilliant in that time and place. It was not a universally applicable sovereign recipe for victory.

Ironically, the side which kills the fewest is the side which is most likely to gain support from the uncommitted majority. It is the side most likely to win.

This implies two tactical considerations must be observed. The first is to limit the killing be it advertant or accidental of civilians. That is self-evident. The second consideration is less obvious. It is important that the enemy be frustrated to the extent that he starts killing civilians in an attempt to terrorise his way to greater support and therefore victory.

In Iraq the insurgents of all stripes were forced by the results of the American escalation of ground troops to resort to terror tactics with a very large and highly visible body count. The more the insurgents killed the more actual and potential support they lost. Conversely, when the Americans got better at using their overwhelming firepower in a discriminating way, the more the uncommitted drifted to the government side.

The same dynamic has been evident in Afghanistan. A couple of years ago Taliban shifted from failed attacks on hard targets to a series of very high-vis soft target suicide bombings which caused significant civilian casualties. This was a misguided attempt to undercut the perceived legitimacy of the Karzai government.

As a consequence (clearly unintended by Taliban but quite predictable from the historical experience) civilians rushed to the Karzai government and its foreign supporters. Unfortunately, the US ended the campaign by killing its director.

Following this, a series of American airstrikes created a number of civilian corpses. The consequence (unintended by the American commanders but again drearily predictable from the historically informed) was a swell of hostility directed at Karzai and his foreign supporters.

In Sri Lanka the process is again at work. For at least the fifth time the government seems on the verge of victory against the remarkably persistent and come-back-from-the-grave Tamil Tiger insurgency. The Tigers are confined to a very small portion of Sri Lanka. The Tigers have resorted to forcing civilians to stay in harm's way as a species of human shield.

The government has decreed the existence of a "safety zone" in which fugitive Tamils can seek sanctuary. The Tigers have responded by killing civilians who attempt to reach the sanctuary area.

While the Sri Lankan government and its military on a few occasions shelled the "safety zone," the primary onus for responsibility has been correctly placed on the Tigers. The current trajectory bodes well to produce peace in Sri Lanka for the first time in more than twenty years.

Unless...

Unless outsiders huff and puff too much. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay is bloviating at length alleging that the Sri Lankan government as well as the Tigers are possibly guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The government has vigorously denied this accusation. The Tigers remain silent.

Perhaps the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights feels underemployed given that there are so few governments and non-governmental actors currently abusing human rights today. In any event the war in Sri Lanka will come to an end sooner if the government is allowed to continue its (at long last) successful campaign against the Tigers. It will come to an end sooner if the tail of civilian deaths is pinned on the Tiger.

If Ms Pillay doesn't get over her snit with counterinsurgency Sri Lankan style, a bad potential comes into view. The UN and its High Minded Lofty Thinking cohorts may come to believe that it is their exclusive mission to "protect" civilians wherever an internal war exists.

By its very nature internal war requires civilian death and wretchedness. The limiting factor to this unfortunate reality is defined by the ending of the war. Period. The faster the war comes to an end the fewer civilians will die. The quicker the war ends the fewer will be the number of displaced persons, refugees huddling in miserable camps operated and maintained by the High Minded.

An internal war will end most quickly when one side recognises that it is necessary to intentionally limit death and misery. It will end most quickly when one side understands the necessity of maneuvering its opposition into having responsibility for death and displacement among the uncommitted majority.

Outsiders including the UN have a role to play in limiting civilian deaths. It is incumbent upon the international community generally and any intervenors in the war more particularly to insist that the governmental entities have sole responsibility for protecting civilians under its sway.

The test case for this contention is the Gaza Strip. So far the outsiders of the world have failed the test. The responsibility for protecting the civilian population of the Strip resides solely with Hamas.

Hamas is the de facto government of Gaza. It has a minimal obligation to protect its population. At the absolute least Hamas must refrain from co-locating offensive weaponry with mosques, schools and hospitals. As the imagery demonstrates beyond any rational, reasonable doubt, Hamas has failed completely in this duty.

Hamas gun thugs and rocket shooters placed themselves and their lethal equipment in the midst of civilian heavy locations. They employed human shields in the most crass and cynical manner. Hamas was even worse than the Tamil Tigers in that regard.

Now the ever-so-indignant-and-concerned High Commissioner and her human rights coterie seem hell-bent on performing a replay in Sri Lanka. When will the ambitious High Commissioner seek to do the same in Afghanistan? Iraq?

One hopes the answer is "never." The alternative, the involvement, the threats of prosecution in the International Criminal Court will be counterproductive. Ironically, (and the Geek loves the taste of irony almost as much as chocolate) the consequence of any High Minded involvement will be to prolong the war and increase the net amount of human misery and death.

Internal war has its own logic--a grim and terrible logic to be sure--and we must all get a grip on that. That requires that we accept the necessity of civilian death and seek to limit the number of corpses using the logic of internal war itself. That implies we must both recognise and use the right tactics. Not kill civilians. Place the onus for civilian deaths on the opposition. Insist that governments and insurgent entities with de facto control of an area take the sole responsibility for protecting the population.

The logic of internal war correctly fought and not the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights or the International Criminal Court or the High Minded generally are the last, best hope of the people caught in the middle.