Ethno-Religious Democracy And The Next Mideast War

Turkey has declared rhetorical war on Israel.  To err on the side of accuracy, the Islamist leaning government in Ankara has been escalating words to almost the this-means-war level over the past few days.  Behind this development resides not only an ambition of regional power status but the explosive growth of a new Turkish nationalism based on the merging of ethnic and religious identities, which has substantially replaced the strongly secularist predicated sense of national self inaugurated by Kemal Attaturk.

The target of Turkey's ever more intemperate attacks has likewise reinvented its sense of national identity on the merging of religion and nationalism.  When founded, Israel was both a Jewish state and an outpost of European socialist thought which centered upon secularism.

The seismic shift in Turkey's national identity came only in the past decade when the long ignored peasant population of the Anatolian highlands moved to the urban centers of Ankara and Istanbul in large enough numbers to form an effective political base for the AKP, a party whose roots ran deeply into the rich soil of political Islam.  When the internal migrants, searchers for a better life, joined with the equally ignored Muslim clerical establishment, it became possible to organize the discontented and marginalized new arrivals into a potent political base.  This, in turn, brought the AKP to power--a power it has developed further by defanging the military and the secular elites of the cities.

The shift of Israeli politics from the secular left to the ethno-religious right started back in 1977 when Likud tapped the pool of resentment felt within significant segments of the Israeli population.  By melding a new coalition of expansive hyper-nationalists, new immigrants, and the more religiously minded, Likud was able to gain power.  As the years went by, the nationalist and religiously observant right was strengthened in numbers by arrivals from the Soviet Union, and, after the collapse of that state, its ruins.

The movement to the right was accelerated by the First Intifada and the consequent bloodletting imposed by the Palestinian terrorists.  This reaction on the part of the Israeli public was to be expected.  Terror is normally counterproductive.  With every suicide bomber, every rocket, every new outrage, the median of Israeli politics moved more and more into the right hand lane.

The external pressure joined with the Second Intifada to push Israelis even more into the harsh and uncompromising position of national identity based on the juncture of Jewishness and Israeli-ness.  This dynamic was fully predictable as pressure consolidates political will long, long before it fractures it.  In this context, it is easy to see why the ill-advised efforts by the Obama administration to put the screws to Israel generally and the Netanyahu government in particular were counterproductive failures.

The result is the current loggerheads relation between mirror image politicians--Erdogan and Netanyahu--along with the daggers drawn nature of Turkish-Israeli relations.  A larger consequence of national identities based on the merger of ethnic and religious definitions is looming as the "Arab Spring" rolls into Fall, a Fall which will be marked with a very early freeze.

Democracy is dangerous.  The power of this truth informed the thinking of the authors of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights.  Democracy is nothing more or less than the popular expression of whatever fad, fancy, or fantasy can be employed effectively to move voters to mark one person's name preferentially.

Among the many fads, fancies, and fantasies which can be employed to this end, none are more powerful than nationalism and religion.  The advocates of political Islam in Egypt, in Libya, in Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Arab Muslim states know this perfectly.  Knowledge need only to be put into action.

In the classic treatment of revolution, Anatomy of Revolution, the author makes a key point.  Although only ancient offensive insurgencies were considered in this book, the power of this one observation has been enhanced by each and every revolution which has succeeded in the post-World War II years.

The point?

Revolutions move to the extreme.  That is to say, the group with the most radical agenda for change following the overthrow of the old regime will win.  The reasons for this inevitable move to the extreme are few and simple.  The more extreme the group, the more sweeping will be the changes contained in its agenda.  In addition, the more extreme groups are tightly organized, their action plan is simple, easy to understand, and addresses fundamental fears and aspirations held by the majority of the public.

The Muslim Brotherhood, the Salifists, and others advocating political Islam are all tightly organized.  All have agendas which are virtually interchangeable, making group merger thinkable.  And, most importantly, all have action plans which are predicated on the strictures and requirements of Islam as well as the notions of dignity and pride resident in nationalism.

In all the countries involved in the dramatic events of the past nine months, the advocates of political Islam enjoy great advantage over their secular opponents.  Not only are the assorted groups well organized and possessed of a radical agenda, all make profound appeals to both Islam and national pride.  "Stand tall, you are Egyptian" is a chant virtually identical to the more recent, "Stand tall, you are Muslim."

The necessary inference from what has been observed and reported throughout the Mideast and North Africa  is simply that Egypt, Libya, and perhaps others will move to the totalistic national sense of self which has been in play in Turkey and Israel.  One implication of this trajectory is that Turkey will fail to reestablish the Ottoman Empire.  Another, far more disturbing one considering all that has been at work in the Israeli political system is that war will become far more likely in the near to mid-term.


The next war will sneak up on the West.  This is to be expected.  The elites of the West generally discount nationalism as a spent force, a ancient relic which has outlived whatever usefulness it once may have possessed.  At the same time, the Western elites of politics, the media, and academia pretend that religion does not exist as a real force in the lives of people and the policies of governments.

In the US, in the West, the leaders of state and molders of opinion alike will not see what is happening on the Arab streets and states alike.  What will not be seen, cannot be prevented.

Pleasant thought, eh?

Don't Veto The Palestinian State

Palestinian Authority jefe grande Abbas has tossed down the gauntlet to Barack Obama and the rest of his "foreign policy team."  The PA will seek full membership in the UN as a sovereign state Abbas declared in a highly reported speech to his fellow countrymen.

This move seems to be a very severe defeat for both Israel and the Obama administration.  The Netanyahu ministry has done everything short of declaring war on the PA.  The Obama "team" including the president has not been much more restrained, threatening (or promising, if you prefer) to veto the move when it comes before the Security Council for action.

A veto would not be looked at with favor in the Arab states generally as was made palpably clear in a recent op-ed piece in the WaPo by one of those interminable Saudi princes and diplomatic heavyweights.  Participants in outdoor sports favored by the "Arab Street" such as riots and suicide bombings will be much less restrained in their disapprobation.

Advocates of realpolitik have noted that even admission to the UN either as a state or a state observer will change nothing for the better on the ground.  There is much to justify this view.  Likewise there is much to support the dystopian notions that the Palestinians will  use either state observer or state status to cause a world of hurt for Israel in the assorted UN sub-agencies and the International Criminal Court.

The pessimistic interpretations do not, however, merit the US using its veto power in the Security Council.  Doing such would only assure the PA would take its petition to the General Assembly in search of the consolation prize of state observer status, which would give it all the trouble making possibilities along with assuring a very large can would be tied to Uncle Sam's tail.

A far better course of action for the Obama administration to take is that of delay.  The process established for seeking recognition as a state by the UN provides an almost infinite mechanism of creative stalling.  The formal request must first go to the Secretary General.  The Secretary General does not have to handle the matter instantly but can request further information before forwarding the request to the Security Council.  Doing this can take weeks--or months.

The Security Council can also demand more information as well as proof that the proposed Palestinian state meets all the diplomatic requirements for state status.  This means the Council can find itself caught in a set of hearings and debates over the degree to which the Palestinian Authority and the territory under its purported control does in fact constitute a fully functioning state.  Given the deep and growing divide between the West Bank based Palestinian Authority and its rival in the Gaza Strip, Hamas, and the fiction that Palestine constitutes a single entity, this could lead to a number of second thoughts within chanceries seemingly committed to the idea of Palestinian statehood.

A full fledged inquiry and debate within the Security Council could even have the potential to undercut any move in the General Assembly for state observer status.  This is not a nontrivial benefit given the uncertainty and ambiguity extant within the European Union for this gambit.  The US might even enlist the cooperation of Russia in seeking a complete airing of whether or not the Palestinian state really exists by quietly noting that any approval by either the Security Council or the General Assembly would constitute a bad precedent from the Kremlin's point of view considering the current ethnic and religious unrest in the Northern Caucasus.  The name, "Tibet," whispered in certain ears might elicit a reasonably favorable response from Beijing.

The point is the US could lobby effectively for a prolonged inquiry by the Security Council, which would buy that most precious of commodities--time--for bilateral diplomacy to make another run at the moribund "peace process" between Israel and the PA.  Abbas would have his political posterior covered enough to keep him in his tenuous position for some while since he would have delivered on his promises and cannot be held personally responsible for UN protocol.

Sure there would still be some riots, some bombings, some threats of worse from the "Arab Street" and other usual Muslim suspects such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but what else is to be expected?  The US would be spared the major problems which exercise of the veto would bring.

The Israelis, or at least some of them, would not be thrilled but, again, what else would you expect?  A delay might allow calmer heads (assuming there are any) around Netanyahu to provide sound counsel respecting the recommencement of talks with Abbas and company.  There is even the faint prospect that the Obama administration might find the right magic to convince Netanyahu to wake up to the new and alarming political realities in his neighborhood, realities which cannot be addressed by simple words and the implied threat of Israeli military displeasure.

A delay would benefit all interested parties.  A veto would not.  It looks like a no-brainer.  Of course, being the simplest and safest way to go means it is not acceptable to either the Deep Thinkers or the ideologues who populate too much of the foreign policy world, not only here but everywhere.

Yes, Bibi, Great States Do Apologize

The apparent center of gravity in the current degradation of relations between Turkey and Israel is the failure of the latter to offer an acceptable, formal apology for the nine deaths which occurred at the hands of IDF personnel during the encounter between Israel and the utterly bogus "relief" flotilla headed by the Mavi Marmora.  The Palmer Report concluded that while Israel had international law and custom on its side as regarded the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, the enforcement of the blockade as well as the resultant deaths constituted an egregious act of overreach.

The incident on board the ship handed anti-Israeli elements, including the Islamist leaning AKP government of Turkey a heaven sent opportunity to make much propaganda at the expense of the Jewish state.  In this context the Turks have demanded repeatedly that Israel not only provide compensation for those wounded and killed by IDF members but also provide an acceptable apology.  Israel has agreed to compensation but has balked over the idea of an apology.  Prime minister Netanyahu has maintained that doing so would damage Israeli public morale among other sinister things.  In this he has been backed (or exceeded) by the always ready to breath fire foreign minister, Lieberman.  The far right of the Israeli political spectrum has been monolithic in the rejectionist stance adopted by Netanyahu.

It seems that the Netanyahu government believes that an apology for an action seen as being defensive in nature and not overdone in view of the provocations offered by activists on board the Mavi Marmora who were armed with bludgeons and similar weapons would somehow lessen Israel in the eyes of its citizens and the world generally.  This is an utterly specious notion.

The first reason for declaring the Netanyahu stance specious is simply that the raid was poorly conceived and even more poorly executed.  It seems preposterously arrogant that the raid's planners and commanders did not anticipate any armed resistance to the IDF boarding party.  Did these experienced military officers really, really believe the activists sponsored by a group with a long record of hostility to Israel would not seek a confrontation?  Or, were they of the view that the simple arrival of the dreaded IDF would cause an instant collapse of will on the part of the activists?  Either flies in the face of both experience and realistic military planning.

To put it bluntly, the boarding was as badly botched as, for example, the special operations force attempt in Somalia twenty years back which resulted in Blackhawk down.  The IDF blew it pure and simple when they mounted the assault.  This is not a mark against the troops who fast roped down to decks filled with men ready and eager for a violent confrontation, men who were willing to court and accept death at the hands of the IDF, men willing to be martyrs for the faith and the cause.

Apologizing for your own side's errors is no shame--only a transient embarrassment for those in charge.  Admitting that better thinking, better planning, better timing, better methods and tactics would have resulted in a death free takeover of the ship is no sin,  no humiliation, but rather an expression of a willingness and capacity to learn from mistakes.

The second reason the Netanyahu posture is specious not to say vacuous is simply that great nations can and do apologize.  By this the Geek does not mean the bogus exercises of mea culpa engaged in by President Obama for American "transgressions" both real and imagined but in all cases resident in the far distant past.  No, the Geek means such examples as that provided by General Stanley McChrystal, sitting, legs crossed, feet bootless, on the rug covered floor of an Afghan stone hut apologizing for fatalities inflicted by forces under his command upon civilians, upon members of the family in whose house he sat.

The humble, human gesture of offering apologies for lives cut short in no way humiliated the general, nor the forces in his command, nor the nation in whose service he and his people fought.  Rather, it demonstrated that a great and powerful country disposing military force of nearly unlimited power could admit it did inadvertent wrong, wreaked unintended havoc and death--and, most importantly, could acknowledge and apologize for it.

Unlike General McChrystal, there will be no need for Mr Netanyahu to face the kin of those who died at the hands of the IDF.  Mr Netanyhu will not have to take off his shoes, sit on the floor, and personally say, "I am truly sorry for the deaths my men caused and the pain inflicted upon you by our actions.  Mr Netanahu can do the job by written words, words carefully crafted by diplomats and vetted by politicians, words which can be totally insincere provided they do not read as such.  It can be an antiseptic charade without any requirement for the direct person-to-person dynamic which involved McChrystal.

True, the Turks will crow over an apology.  The Erdogan government will distort it, use it to advance Turkey's status in its ambitious plan of a neo-Ottoman Empire.  That will be to the shame of Ankara not Israel.  And, it is debatable that the resultant propaganda will be any more destructive of Israel's interests than is the ongoing festering crisis of diplomacy and trade.

Best of all, the issuance of an apology puts the ball back in the Turk's court.  The apology would place the onus on Ankara to put up or shut up, to restore the status quo ante or admit the whole issue was false, a gambit intended to put Israel on the unending defensive, a way to back out of the previous policy of cooperation between the two countries.  This manner of clarification is in Israel's interest, is it not?

Get a grip, Mr Netanyahu!  An apology is in your interests.  It is in the better interests of your country.  Offering one will not diminish Israel; it will buff the country's image and status around the world and in the US.  It will not even bruise your ego.  It might even enhance your sense of self.  It will have been you who called the Erdogan bluff.

More "Followership" From The Hindmost

Coming late and out of breath from the unusual bout of exertion, the US today decided that the rebels, The Transitional Government" is the only legitimate game in Libya.  The US has extended full diplomatic recognition to the far less than coherent bunch in Benghazi.  The practical effect of this move is the freeing of the billions of Gaddafi bucks languishing in American custody, impounded under UN sanctions.

The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition.  The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.

Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government.  Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid.  It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists.  There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.

There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi.  The US has no direct stake in the country.  Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play.  That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company.  It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.

There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya.  It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.

The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy.  The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy.  While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.

One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions.  An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia.  The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.

The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft.  In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US.  Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.

If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests?  Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.

No, bucko, not oil.  The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran.  It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq.  These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure.  But there is a far more important audience.

That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran.  In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges.  More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.

Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort.  It is focused on getting the bomb.  Period.  There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.

Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US.  In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so.  As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.

"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat.  A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved.  The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.

Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge.  This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour.  We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy.  In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.

Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force.  They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant.  The mullahs are right in this.  Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.

The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation.  The Israeli government shares it.  Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat.  They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world.  A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.

The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant.  There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in.  If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.

Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational.  It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US.  Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.

The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure.  The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset.  As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.

A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event.  But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well.  This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.

To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer.  To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut.  However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader.  In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.

The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!"  The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."

As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact.  By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu.  That is not a failure of policy.  It is not even a simple error of judgement.  It is a world class blunder.

Becoming A State Isn't Enough To Bring Peace

There is no doubt that the Palestinian Authority (PA) can usher a state called "Palestine" into existence.  There is nothing magical nor even particularly difficult about achieving the status of "state."  Even the longest standing, most broadly accepted basic definition of statehood, The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which dates back to 1933, establishes rather minimal requirements for state status.

The Montevideo Convention provides only four prerequisites.  (1) A permanent population, (2) A defined territory, (3) A government, and (4) The capacity to enter into relations with other states.  In practice these requirements have been further reduced.  As a practical matter, a state can be said to exist when other states say it does.

Even when territorial limits are hazy, poorly defined or still in the process of being determined, an established state has the sovereign right to declare another entity has achieved the same status.  This is also the case when a government is not fully formed, fledged, or functioning.  All that is necessary is that other states recognize the new kid on the block.  The recognition need not be universal.  Nor does the new state need the recognition of any or all of the Great Powers to come into full, legal form.

History is full of examples of states being recognized long before they had achieved either defined borders or a fully functional government.  (Recall that the US falls into this category.)  History is also replete with examples of states and governments which were widely but not universally recognized or lacked recognition and acceptance by one or more of the contemporary Great Powers.  (The US non-recognition of the Bolshevik regime in Russia or that of Mao in China did not make these two states sudden nonentities.)

A state need not be contiguous (pace Constitutional law professor and president Barack Obama) to be both recognized and viable.  At its creation Pakistan consisted of two parts separated by more than a thousand kilometers of India.  It was both recognized and (until the fruits of Punjabi racism and Islamabad's inefficiency matured) viable.  Pakistan existed with its two disparate components because enough other states said it did.

To make it simple but without undue simplification: States come into existence when enough other states recognize its existence and enter into relations with it.  That's all, folks.  There is no need for UN action.  While the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council can extend membership to a new state, this is not required for the state to exist as both independent and sovereign.

All of this brings us back to Palestine.  An increasing number of countries ranging from Brazil to Russia have extended some form of diplomatic recognition to the territory of Palestine as governed by the PA.  As this tide gains force, it can be expected that most of the current membership of the UN will do likewise regardless of the well-intended but quite irrelevant counsel of President Obama.

By the old standards of diplomacy, this should mean that Palestine would come into existence as an independent and sovereign state.  But, the old norms do not apply.  There are two constraints which taken together render the old way inapplicable in this case.  One of these is the Oslo Accords, which formed an agreement between Fatah and Israel.  The PA is not mentioned.  It couldn't be--it did not exist at the time.  Nor was Hamas referenced.  Only Fatah and Israel.

The sundry agreements which fall under the appellation of the frosty Norwegian capital sharply limit the ability of the PA to exercise jurisdiction over territory and persons alike.  The Oslo agreements served to place the Palestinian territory under an ongoing form of Israeli suzerainty.  To a major extent, the effect of the Oslo agreements was to put a diplomatic and political gloss on an underlying brute fact.

The brute fact was (and is) the Israeli occupation.  Even if the territorial extent of full Israeli occupation has been reduced over the years, it still exists as the rock upon which the independence and sovereignty of the PA must founder.

The combination of the Oslo agreement and the fact of ongoing Israeli occupation renders the past experience with the process by which states come into existence nugatory.  This dreary reality is well understood and publicly accepted by PA officials.  They know that even if every country on the face of the globe extends diplomatic recognition, this will not change realities on the ground--as long as the US does not do the same.

Israel's stance in comparison is not central.  There are precedents of states and governments receiving full diplomatic recognition even though they were under full or partial military occupation.  Indeed, that was a key principle underlying the political integrity of governments-in-exile during World War II.  It can be argued that by failing to end its long condemned occupation, Israel has created a Palestinian version of a government-in-exile which has a legitimate claim on the international community for aid in regaining its (temporarily) lost land.

The PA (particularly if Hamas is left out of the picture somehow) has a good case for UN intervention based on both the government-in-exile precedents and international law generally.  Assuming the UN General Assembly took some sort of action equivalent to extending full membership to the PA controlled Palestine, so as to duck any US veto in the Security Council, would it really matter with respect to the larger and more important question--peace?

The short answer is no.  An independent Palestine would still have to deal directly with Israel regarding all the critical matters such as borders, land swaps, an Israeli military presence in the Jordan valley, the status of Jerusalem, and the return of Arab refugees.  These matters would be no less contentious and vexing should Palestine become an independent state than they are right now.

The best which could be asserted about potential benefits to the PA is it would have some additional diplomatic leverage.  As an independent state Palestine could be more effective in opposing additional growth in the Israeli "settlements."  As an independent state Palestine could sign on to the Statute of Rome giving it the right to seek prosecution of purported Israeli war criminals before the International Criminal Court.  This threat would have great leverage in and of itself.

A well coordinated use of mass mobilization of Palestinians in a move on the Israeli Wall and checkpoints along with diplomacy could bring about the desired UN action without US support.  Indeed, it is hard to see how the combination of non-violent mass action and diplomacy could be openly opposed by the Obama administration given the coming of the next election.

The reconciliation between the PA and Hamas has shored up the political base of Abbas.  Now if he and his fellows can show a modicum of smarts in orchestrating global opinion and the photogenic appeal of a series of totally non-violent marches on the Great Wall of (specious) Security behind which Israel cowers, he can pull off the coup of the decade--and mousetrap the Obama "team."

The record of the Palestinians in the theater of global politics and the realities of international diplomacy has more often than not been one of dismal incompetence and self-inflicted defeats.  But, sometimes all it takes is one successful attempt at swinging for the fence.  This time Abbas may do it with the result that Palestine will come into existence.

But, this may well not lead to peace.  And, one cannot expect the Palestinians to make it two-for-two.  That would take Elohim and Allah working in perfect harmony.  Anyone want to make a bet?

And, Always There Is Israel

The most commented upon section of President Obama's "major" address on US policy in the Mideast has been the reference to peace being based upon the pre Six Day War borders with negotiated land swaps to accommodate Israeli "realities on the ground."  The formulation in and of itself is not outrageous--necessarily.

But an evaluation of the pre-1967 border requires an appreciation of the oft repeated Israeli demand for "secure and defensible borders."  It also demands an understanding of the Israeli insistence upon maintaining a residual force along the Jordan river.  Mr Obama's words seem to ignore the first and totally disallow the second.  Rather the president appeared to rely upon the Palestinian state being "demilitarized."

The concept of "demilitarization" may be useful, but only if the mechanism by which this status would be assured over time is defined and agreed to by Israeli and Palestinian alike.  The record of Egyptian actions in the weeks leading up to the Six Day War, in particular the ejection of the UN truce monitoring unit, shows that even international guarantees of "demilitarization" may not prove reliable.

Prior to the Six Day War, the narrow waist of Israel was less than ten miles in width.  High speed aircraft could not turn 180 degrees and stay in Israeli air space.  More to the point today, ten miles is well within the range of the crude home made rockets so loved by Hamas.  The takeaway is simple: The pre-1967 borders would be neither secure nor defensible now and into the future.

This reality requires that a prudent Israeli government continue a military presence in the valley of the Jordan river.  This would be necessary even if some hypothetical future Palestinian government were to be so dedicated to peace that its territory was truly "demilitarized."  Without the forward basing of high mobility, high firepower IDF units, it would be easy for hostile forces to be concentrated in Jordan, in positions well suited for a quick bounce into Israel.

Presumably, someone in Obama's foreign policy and national security "team" had the knowledge necessary to advise the president regarding the defensive importance of an IDF presence along the banks of the Jordan.  If that were the case, Mr Obama deserves a severe down check for having ignored the reality.  If no such counsel was available, then the administration must be down checked for failing to give the president the information he needed.

Even the Netanyahu ministry is not dedicated to keeping the totality of the potential Palestinian territory occupied.  Doing so would be too expensive in resources and global status to maintain in perpetuity.  At the same time, no Israeli ministry, even the most dovish, would sleep soundly absent forward basing in the Jordan valley.  To withdraw completely to the pre-1967 borders would require a level of trust and confidence in both the pacifistic nature of the Palestinian government and its ability to police its territory effectively that does not and cannot exist yet.  Nor will such exist for many years, perhaps generations, to come.

Mr Obama called upon the Netanyahu government to be "bold."  The government of Israel has shown an ability to be "bold" as in the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.  The "international community" including the US promised Israel that this act of bold statesmanship would not result in violence--and, if it did, the "community" would respond with effective aid to Israel.  The record written by blood on the sands of Gaza and Israel alike is one of shabby betrayal by the guarantors of Israeli peace and base hatred on the part of Hamas and other practitioners of violent political Islam.

Considering this history of boldness and its consequences, is there any wonder that Prime Minister Netanyahu  and many others both in and out of government in Israel rejected the Obama formulation as soon as it left his lips?  Undoubtedly, Mr Obama expected this reaction.  He courted it on the eve of Netanyahu's arrival in Washington.  He used it to feather his own political nest without risk.

This cynical ploy was made possible by the simple fact that the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority cut its own throat by signing the reconciliation agreement with Hamas.  Mr Obama knew and knows that Israel will not negotiate with the two headed hydra as long as Hamas does not embrace the Quartet requirements.  Mr Obama knows as well that the US will not and cannot deal with Hamas even indirectly as long as it remains a "terrorist organization," a status it will not lose unless it does the impossible and surrenders its fundamental identity.

Mr Obama was thus able to present himself as a "friend" of the Palestinian people as well as their myriad of supporters throughout the Arab states.  The inevitable rejection of the Obama formulation by the Israelis could be offloaded on Netanyahu.  From the perspective of the reelection oriented White House, the result would be win-win.  From the ground level view of the Mideast, the appearance would be more of the lose-lose sort.

It is to be expected that Mr Obama and his team will put pressure on the Israelis.  The president made an allusion during his speech to the vulnerable point.  That solar plexus of diplomacy is the Palestinian threat to take the matter to the UN, to demand that the body do for the Palestinians now what it did for the Zionists sixty plus years ago--create a country.  The US has been called upon by Israel to block this move by using its influence on European and other states at the least and its Security Council veto if necessary.  This gives the US a very great degree of leverage on Israel.

However much leverage the Obama administration has or believe it possesses, the amount is not sufficient to induce Israel to place itself in a suicidal position.  This is precisely where the Jewish state would be if it did not have a military presence along the Jordan river.

Any realistic negotiations for a final comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must start with the pre-Six Day War borders.  But it cannot end there.  Not only must there be negotiated real estate swaps to protect the Israeli "settlements" or at least those that are largest and closest to Israeli territory, there must be an effective addressing of Israel's very legitimate security concerns regarding the Jordan valley.  Until such time as both Muslim Arabs and Israelis have had sufficient time and experience to justify the latter's confidence in the will and ability of the former to maintain peace, the Israelis must be allowed to keep a force of sufficient size and capability to deter or defeat any ground attack originating from beyond Palestinian controlled land.

At best Mr Obama was being disingenuous when he called for the complete ending of the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank territory.  At worst he was being dishonestly manipulative for personal political reasons.

In either case the tension between rhetoric and reality resident in yesterday's Foggy Bottom oration calls Mr Obama's intellectual honesty into question.  The US is facing a plethora of foreign policy and national security challenges the meeting of which requires the highest possible intellectual and moral courage on the part of the president and his senior advisers.  If his performance yesterday is any guide, Mr Obama has set a very low standard.  Should that low standard continue to prevail with respect to the other matters on the overfilled plate, the republic is in for some very, very bad times.

Perhaps even bad enough for one to have wished Harold Camping had counted the days correctly.

There Are Some Loose Screws In The Israeli Government

The Geek often has a favorable view of Israel in comparison to its Arab neighbors, particularly those paragons of intransigence in the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Killers running Gaza.  There are occasions, however, when the Geek becomes convinced that the political leadership of Israel has lost all grip on reality.

This is one of those times.  Before continuing, the Geek has to express frustration.  Frustration with the utterly asinine acts of the Netanyahu administration as well as other, lesser elements of the government.  Frustration at the implications of their actions which necessitate comment at the expense of considering other, lesser known and fascinating subjects such as the continued downward trajectory in the North Caucasus or the slow motion disintegration of Tajikistan under the weight of armed political Islam.

Or the stupidity of the Royal Navy's high command which is reportedly willing to cut its "fleet" to as few as a dozen surface combatants so that the new aircraft carriers might be afforded.  This sort of decision making boggles the mind, particularly considering that Argentina is feeling its oats once more over the Falkland Islands.

And so to Israel.  The most shocking of the self-destructive acts of the Netanyahu crew is the new loyalty bill which would require all new, non-Jewish citizens to swear loyalty to "the Jewish and democratic state of Israel."  This measure has been a pet of the ultra-ultra right Yisrael Beiteinu party--the party headed by the Israeli version of Joe Biden, ForMin Avigador Lieberman.

Adoption of this measure by the Knesset would destroy the final vestige of the liberal, democratic, and socialist vision of Israel which gained the country so much sympathy and support among the goyim of the US a half century and more ago.  The Israel of those days was seen widely by Americans as being an outpost of the best of European or Western culture, values, norms, and institutions taking root in the hostile soil of authoritarian, often feudal, and occasionally communist Mideast.  In a real sense many of We the People saw the Israelis as being "just like us," open, tolerant, expressive, even boisterous.  Being "like us" it was easy to support the embattled country even when American national interests would have been better served by doing otherwise.

Loyalty oaths are a feature of both authoritarian regimes and societies under stress from forces abroad and hidden in the domestic population.  In the US during the Fifties and Sixties, during the era of the Great Anti-Communist Crusade, loyalty oaths for public employees and others were all the rage.  (Even the Geek as a fifteen year old swimming instructor in a Saturday morning program at the local high school had to sign a loyalty oath before he could get his paycheck, minuscule as it was.)

Israel is under stress to say the least.  The stress has an internal dimension given that a fifth of the population is non-Jewish, primarily Muslim Arabs.  It has not helped that the PA and its Arab supporters have refused to acknowledge officially a fact that is all too self-evident in reality--Israel was established to be and exists as a Jewish state.  Even though a congress of three Jews might provide at least five differing definitions of what the term "Jewish state" means, the foundational reality remains that Israel is precisely what it was founded to be--a nation-state for Jews.

Admittedly the Israelis have made attempts to render their land free of all non-Jews.  The Wars of Independence were ethically scarred by the forced removal of Arab populations--both Muslim and Christian. True, the major responsibility for the ethnic cleansing rests with the Arab states whose leaders promised the temporarily displaced locals would come back home in triumph riding Arab tanks.  That does not relieve the Israelis of that far gone day from their culpability which extended to murder.

So too were Arabs displaced forcibly during and in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War.  Israelis got a bad case of the "victory disease," showing its worst symptoms in their treatment of the occupied territory and its residents.  Muscular expansionism, a sort of Old Testament based "manifest destiny" ruled the public mood with results which fester to the present.  To put it not unkindly but accurately, it was the attitude exhibited by the Israeli public which started the corrosive process of myth destruction which has also continued to the present with the deligitimatization campaign so odiously evident in the West generally.

The climate of stress and concomitant fear helps explain the strong need by the nationalists in government and public alike to embrace the loyalty oath.  Be that as it may, the global impact of the oath will be negative.  It will reinforce the notion which has taken a pernicious hold on many in Europe and the US that Israel is a "racist" society and polity.  It will strengthen the hand of those who argue "Israel equals Apartheid."  It will also make the Arabs both inside and without Israel more irredentist.  It will feed the needs of the extremes on both sides.

There have been some other recent actions by lesser components of the government which serve to potentate the evil effects of the oath bill.  In one the Israeli Defense Ministry has blocked the construction of an ambitious middle class oriented planned community on land which has been granted to the PA.  At issue is a stretch of two miles needed to build an access road for the town.  Two miles is in question.  The Defense Ministry with the full-throated support of "settlers" in a nearby new Israeli town has dragged its feet to the point the entire project is threatened.

This is stupidity on the level of pointing a pistol at ones own gonads--and pulling the trigger.  The PA needs a vibrant middle class and the economic consequences of having one in order to have even a faint chance of stability over time.  It needs sound stakeholders to counter the ever advancing potency of the advocates of violent political Islam.  Israel should be bending backwards to facilitate the construction of this new Arab town and not dragging up sham issues (like sewage and trash handling plans) in order to slow, perhaps stop it.  Even the "settlers" should have brains enough to realize that an increased prosperity along with the inherently more conservative mood of those who "have arrived" is their best protection against terror attacks, the drive by shootings they allege will occur if the road and town are built.

Then there is the matter of breaching the wall around the Old City of Jerusalem.  Reportedly the municipal council (Israeli of course) has floated a plan to build a new gate in the old wall so as to provide entrance to a parking lot and multi-purpose building near the Western Wall.  It has been 112 years since the wall was last breached so that Kaiser Willem II could ride in style into the Old City.  The new breach has outraged Palestinian opinion and given the PA another excuse (as if it needed one more) to postpone, stall, or stop the on-and-off talks.

Even though the Western Wall will remain under Israeli control in any final settlement, there is no reason to bring up even a remote possibility of taking down more bricks in the wall.  The Old City is a running sore of animosity as has been demonstrated when even a tunnel near the West Wall resulted in riots and killing just over a decade ago.  One has to wonder if the Jerusalem municipal council was off its collective meds at the time of making this decision or simply indifferent to reality.

The Israelis may be convinced that the threat of the UN Security Council creating a Palestinian state is unlikely to happen, but recent statements by the French ForMin bring that conviction into question.  Similarly the Israeli government is certain the PA will make no request of the Security Council to short circuit the negotiation process.  It is true that a similar proposal by the then foreign affairs chief of the European Union gained no traction either in Europe or in Washington, but a lot has happened since then--none of it to the advantage of Israel.

The opinion molding elites of Western Europe and the US have not become any more tolerant of Israeli practices or more doubting of the sin-free nature of the PA.  The current administration has not only invested all too much diplomatic capital in the present talks, it has been given an ultimatum by the Arab League.  The previous unforced errors of Mr Obama--most notably the demand for a total halt to settlement construction of an open ended nature--have provided the PA with the belief the US will do the heavy lifting on its behalf.  The Arab League ultimatum--the US has one month, no more, to get the talks back on track or something unspecified but horrid will happen--greatly increases the pressure on Obama to put pressure on Israel.

The oath bill and the lesser damaging measures show the Israeli push back on the pressures to date.  This implies that there is little more in the way of coercion available to the administration.  At the same time the inducements offered in the alleged Obama letter have no value as they are inherently non-credible given the administration's previous refusal to honor commitments made in a letter from George W. Bush.

The oath bill and the rest have hardened the PA and its supporters in demanding that the US cut the knot and bring Palestine into existence.  The questioned measures have also given fuel to the let-the-Security-Council-do-it movement currently orchestrated by the French ForMin.  Finally, they have demonstrated the limits of American coercion.

The oath bill in particular demonstrates the political will of the nationalistic right in Israel.  Even when the self-destructive potential of the bill is so evident, the force of nationalism under attack--even from presumed and previous allies--cannot be denied.  Reasoned considerations of national interest, stability, and international repute are no match for the forces of fear.

Our Way Or There Ain't No Way

That is the negotiating stance of the Palestinian Authority (PA.)  The PA capo, Mahmoud Abbas, has made that abundantly clear.  The centerpiece of the PA's current exercise in brinkmanship is the expiration of the temporary freeze on new construction in the Israeli "settlements."  Abbas has stated categorically that if a single brick is laid or a single shovel of dirt moved, the talks are off.  O-F-F.

The "settlers" are lined up, ready and willing, eager for the clock to run out.  Bulldozers and builders are fired up, good for go.  Feet are pawing the ground as fiery rhetoric fills the air over disputed land.

Facing a political crisis of major magnitude, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for "calm and restraint" on the part of the "settlers" as well as their supporters throughout Israel.  The latter are predominantly members of Netanyahu's Likud Party or its rightwing coalition partners.  Israelis of the Right have never been noted for their propensity for calmness and restraint.

On the other side of the hill, Abbas is seeking an "urgent" meeting of the Arab League so that a coordinated approach can be formulated assuming the moratorium will not be extended.  This call came as the PA sent conflicting messages about its own stance on continuing the talks with Israel.  A spokesman for the PA president averred that the PA would not pull out of the ongoing talks but warned that key members of the Fatah dominated group might do so.  What that vague language might mean in the real world is unclear but at least one group, the Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), has announced it was suspending its participation in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the PA was known in bygone days.

Further muddying the already turbid waters of Mideast diplomacy, the PA has suggested that Israel might release some seven thousand terrorists (Israeli view) or political prisoners (according to the PA) presently languishing in the custody of the Israel Prison Service.  According to the PA, such a release would constitute a "good will gesture" serving to facilitate the peace talks.

Golly, is the mass release to serve as a surrogate for a continuation of the freeze?  Or is this good will gesture to be in addition to the extension of the moratorium?  Either way, the reintroduction of this ancient ploy will serve as a platform justifying further foot dragging by the rejectionists of the PA.

Abbas is probably sitting back with his hands folded across his Buddha-like belly, a suitably inscrutable smile on his face as he waits for the US to do the heavy lifting on his behalf.  The Obama administration is apparently giving itself a rupture as it strains to do just that.  Various spokespersons, including those of the exalted rank of presidential intimate such as David Axelrod, have made it clear that the administration owns the problem and is using all means at its disposal to do Abbas' bidding.

While the PA is making non-negotiable demands, it has shown a total unwillingness to consider compromises.  There is a compromise available which would allow the speedy ending of the current impasse. The compromise would permit construction to resume at those "settlements" which will be on the Israeli side of the final border while prohibiting any in areas which will revert to PA rule.

To date Abbas has refused this approach.  The PA insists that the final border, including all necessary land swaps, be achieved first.  This is an unnecessary stipulation.  The pattern of settlement is clear.  Agreement was reached some time back on which blocks would go to Israel and which would remain in Palestine along with what land would be granted by Israel in compensation for the acreage occupied by the "settlements" incorporated into Israel.  No skill at precognition was or is required to see, literally, the lay of the land.

The "borders first" requirement of the PA is simply one more exercise in obscurantist delay.  Refusing the quite obvious and eminently logical compromise serves no useful purpose other than placating the slavering red meat eaters of the Palestinian extreme.  The contention that this placatory stance is necessary to Abbas' political survival is arguable.

Perhaps as a reward for the intense American efforts on his behalf, Abbas has given some hint that there is some chance the talks will not be cancelled instantly in the event the freeze is not extended.  Abbas has alluded to the necessity or at least the desirability of consulting with all stakeholders in the complicated PA structure as well as determining the will of the Arab League states.  This is not much but it does provide a basis for holding some cautious optimism.

Then there is Netanyahu.  He has very real political problems in play.  His coalition is not all that tightly knit.  His foreign minister represents a large strain of opinion which sees the slightest compromise on territory as an act of near treason.  There is no support on the Right of Israeli politics for giving in to PA pressures, even when those pressures are applied by the US.

Nor does the behavior of the assorted extremists within the PA and its constituent factions give any assistance to Netanyahu.  It is all well and good for Abbas to assert as he did yesterday that the Palestinian people will not respond with violence should the talks collapse.  It is another matter when a pregnant Israeli is shot while driving on a highway near an Arab village in the West Bank.

earthmoving equipment and wreaking havoc somewhere in Israel.

Israelis have not been allowed to forget at any time since they evacuated the Gaza Strip that the threat of violent death is a constant companion.  No country in modern history has been forced to live so long under such a high and pervasive level of fear.  No sane Israeli would be given to place much reliance on either the words or the capacities of Abbas when it comes to matters of violent politics.

Nor can any Israeli ignore for a microsecond the primary reason he lives under a constant threat.  It is because he is Jewish.  The Jewish basis of Israel is the basis of the fear, loathing, and hatred which colors all aspects of Arab-Israeli relations, at least at the collective, the state level.

It is for this reason as well as the historical reality of the Holocaust which propels the Netanyahu requirement that the PA recognize Israel as a Jewish state.  This is another issue on which Mr Abbas and the PA refuse to compromise.  Their refusal is not trivial.

The PA president and his supporters such as Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak have claimed that the international recognition of Israel as a Jewish state would compromise the rights of non-Jews residing in Israel.  Abbas has gone so far as to assert--contrary to fact--that the only reason Netanyahu has made his demand is as a preparatory move to the forced removal of all Arabs from Israel.

Some twenty percent of Israel's population is Arab in ancestry and language.  It is a matter of easily available fact that these people have the same civil and political rights as their Jewish compatriots.  This is not to imply that Arabs do not suffer discrimination and prejudice, they do.  But it demonstrates that Israel is not cranking up some sort of genocide machine which will be running full blast the instant the PA formally recognizes that Israel is a Jewish state.

It is of more than passing interest that public opinion poll after public opinion poll has shown a marked reluctance of Israeli Arabs to move to the PA administered territory.  It is equally worthy of note to acknowledge that the Arabs of Israel enjoy not simply a better standard of material existence than those resident in other countries, but they also possess political and civil rights which surpass by orders of magnitude those of other Arabs in other states.

These contextual matters demonstrate that the tender concern evidenced by Abbas and other Arab leaders for the present and future condition of Israeli Arabs is misplaced.  The real deal is that Abbas and company hope that by refusing to grant this quite reasonable Israeli condition they will be able to derail the talks without taking any direct responsibility.

It would behoove the American (and European Union) efforts to bolster and facilitate the talks if the Israeli position on the "Jewish state question" would receive full-throated support.  The identification of Israel as the Jewish state is historically justified.  The need for a Jewish state was recognized universally in the wake of World War II.  All non-biased observers agreed in those far gone days that the existence of a "Jewish state" would have gone far to prevent the Holocaust by providing both a refuge and a protector to the Jews threatened by Nazi policies.

It is not unreasonable nor counter-factual to contend that Jews in much of the world are under a threat as great today as was the case seventy-five years ago.  The existence of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state is essential.  The Obama administration must acknowledge this in the context of the current talks.

Coercive diplomacy is OK.  It can be quite useful.  But, as in the matter of the Israeli-PA talks, the coercion must be evenhanded.  If it is appropriate to pressure Israel to limit the "settlement" construction, it is also proper to pressure the PA to accept the compromise outlined above.  And, it is both apposite and necessary to lean on the PA to accept that Israel is a Jewish state, the Jewish state.  This recognition must be clear, unambiguous and formal.  Anything less is an ethical and realpolitik malfeasance.

Most of all, Mr Abbas must be brought to realize that negotiation is a two way street.  It must be all of "our" ways or nothing good will result.

Will Hilary Win Her Bones?

Hilary Clinton is a person with great determination, resilience and, never to be underestimated, a capacity for steep learning curves. She will need all of these and more as she takes on the most intractable problem in international politics these past thirty years--trapping the seemingly mythical beast known as Mideast Peace.

An important caveat is needed here. Even if the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority come to an agreement, that is only the first step of constructing a comprehensive Mideast peace.

If the president has decided to leave the negotiations, the making of deals which are both acceptable to parties long estranged by the forces of blood and ambition and enforcible over time to others in his administration and will limit his participation both on and off camera to ceremonial occasions, Ms Clinton has a slight chance of succeeding where so many of her predecessors have failed, some miserably. Admittedly the "if" is a very big "if."

Ms Clinton has established a mixed record as Secretary of State. Her stewardship at Foggy Bottom is seen with a liberal degree of cynical hope in Israel. The cynicism results from her role in executing the Obama dictated program of coercion. The hope springs from the realization that Ms Clinton has invested a great deal in the "peace process" and doesn't want it to go bust as if it were one more Whitewater but writ much larger.

Having faithfully complied with Mr Obama's blundering of reaching out to the unreachable while stomping on a government long noted for stomping back, it is to be hoped (and reasonably expected) that the Secretary of State will be allowed to play a free hand in her personal diplomacy over the next days, and, perhaps, weeks or even months as the direct bilateral talks lurch along. The Nice Young Man From Chicago should realize by now that as a statesman he is a fine tuba player.

The Israeli government knows that Ms Clinton had no realistic alternative to carrying the president's water in the past months. The prime movers in Jerusalem, most importantly PM Netanyhu, will cut her an appropriate amount of slack, will see her as offering genuine good offices as a facilitator and mediator. If not undercut by the Arabists in her own department, the role of woman-in-the-middle suits her well given her political and diplomatic skills.

As Secretary of State she has performed well, better than might have been expected twenty months ago. While she has been on the wrong side of some issues--Honduras, the Falkland Islands dispute, the decision to rejoin the UN Human Rights Cabal (to say nothing of the Universal Periodic Review)--other policy actions, most importantly the calling of China out despite Beijing's huffing and puffing over the disputed islands in the South China Sea, have been impressive.

The context in which she will be operating while being woman-in-the-middle has several favorable features. Iran looms largest in the fears of Israel with the security threats posed by a Palestinian state on the West Bank trailing as a distant second. Indeed the potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons has so sobered the Arab states to the degree that they can throw significant weight behind a treaty between the PA and Israel which does not meet the ambitious level of the Arab League proposal (aka the Abdullah Plan.)

The real game changer in the Mideast over the past two years has been Iran. More specifically, it has been the combination of Iran's quest for the "Mahdi Bomb" coupled with the all too obvious Iranian backing of regime change throughout the region.

Ms Clinton will be able to take advantage of the fears generated by Tehran's way too lofty ambitions. She will also be able to leverage the increasingly anti-Israel sentiments and behaviors of Europe into a useful tool to assure a degree of realism in the government of Israel.

The Palestinian Authority, most particularly the Fatah dominated government of Mahmoud Abbas, needs the support and assistance of the West led by the US if it is going to survive let alone prosper. A viable state on the West Bank needs, no, requires, investment by and trade with the West as well as direct assistance. Abbas understands this and his understanding is no doubt shared by the non-zany senior leadership of the PA. This gives Ms Clinton a potent way of gaining genuine PA cooperation.

The context also includes several important and very negative features. Some are sufficient kill-the-peace conversations before the month is over.

Topping the list is the continuation of the moratorium on "settlement" construction. The ten month halt will end on 26 September. This means the balloon can go up on the 27th.

The PA has made the settlement freeze the Absolute Line In The Sand. When Abbas and his cohorts say "no" on this matter they mean "NO." No expansions. No "natural increases." Not a single brick, a single plank, a single drop of concrete. Or else the PA is out of the talks. End of discussion.

The Netanyahu government imposed the total stoppage under great pressure from Washington and has resented every second the stop work order has been in effect. This resentment has been shared by a large and growing segment of the Israeli population generally. With the exception of the most pro-peace elements of society, the majority of Israelis have supported construction to meet the needs of natural increases.

No one in Israel has resented the halt more than Avigdor Lieberman, who is foreign minister and capo of the Yisrael Beitenu party. The YB is both very right wing and crucial to the continuation of the Netanyahu government. Leiberman has stated without any ambiguity that his party will pull out of the governing coalition if the moratorium is extended. YB is the second largest party in the Knesset following Netanyahu's Likud party, so the threat is both real and credible.

Even if the political crisis over settlement construction is avoided, Lieberman will remain a very tall speed bump in the "peace process." To put it bluntly--as Lieberman always does--the ForMin does not believe there is any possibility of a genuine peace agreement arising this year or even in the current generation. This world view has a pronounced tendency to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Another deal breaker is the requirement by Israel that any final (or interim) agreement explicitly characterize Israel as a "Jewish State." Netanyahu along with the majority of Israelis support this requirement without reservation. The Arabs oppose it. Whenever asked about this refusal, Abbas weasel words around something fierce. His non-answer answers are carefully crafted to deny the reality that Israel is--and was established as--a Jewish state.

The position of the PA is echoed (without any resort to the rhetoric of weasels) by Arab states generally. The Egyptian ForMin Aboul Gheit took the standard line for rejecting the proposition that Israel should be termed a "Jewish state." Gheit averred deep concern for the status of Arab citizens of Israel implying that they would be deprived of human and civil rights should Israel be considered a Jewish state. The touchingly tender regard for Arab civil and human rights expressed by Gheit and his peers throughout the region ignores completely that Arabs are and have been citizens of Israel for generations. Arabs have the same rights as Jews in Israel including the right to elect members of the Knesset.

The irony of Arab Muslim states which proudly define themselves as "Islamic" suddenly being frightened by the notion of a Jewish as opposed to secular Israel is easily explained. It is the hope (or expectation) that Arabs will win the "breeding war" between themselves and the Jewish population of Israel at some date in the future. The possibility of ending the "Zionist entity" in this way would, they fear, be ended should Israel be defined as a specifically "Jewish state."

These basic contextual matters must be addressed before the myriad of "details." Some of these "details" rise almost to the level of contextual. Among these is the question of what would constitute sufficient guarantees that the Palestinian state would not become the Gaza Strip on steroids? Certainly any guarantees must be more than those of the paper sort as the horrible experience of post-withdrawal Gaza has made clear.

Ms Clinton has a record of believing the UN is real. She would incline to turn the matter of credible guarantees, particularly those backed by a force on the ground, to the UN. She could (and probably will) point to UNIFIL as an example of efficient and effective UN peacekeeping.

The Israelis would see the matter in a completely different light. Their experience with the UN has been less than positive. More importantly, the growth of anti-Israel sentiments (which they fear with reason would not be lessened by any agreement between Israel and the PA) render the UN a less and less legitimate body.

The PA or at least its president reputedly insinuated that any US or other foreign force stationed on its soil could not include any Jewish troops. Perhaps President Abbas really does believe that an American, or British or whatever other soldier who happened to be Jewish would cheerfully betray his obligation to his country to somehow further some presumably dark Israeli design. Or, perhaps he is simply being more or less honestly antisemitic.

The religious/cultural prejudice shoe can fit on the Israeli foot. How comfortable would the government or citizens of Israel be if a peacekeeping force on the border with the PA territory included troops from Pakistan, Iran, or any member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference? Would this be mere "Islamophobia" or a legitimate apprehension based on the nature and character of both faith and culture?

The list of contextual and near contextual quality conundrums facing Hilary Clinton could be lengthened but that isn't necessary to establish the degree of difficulty facing her. Neither is the multi-page roster of lesser political or merely technical problems.

Our Secretary of State is taking on a diplomatic challenge before which even Talleyrand, Metternich, or Bismarck would have quailed. Even if she succeeds where so many others have either failed or failed to try, the irony remains. It is nothing but ironical that the signing of an agreement between the PA and Israel will not mean peace in the Mideast or even, necessarily the beginnings of comprehensive peace, but only the ending of one, politically irritating skirmish.

Once More With Feeling--Let's Talk About Peace

Once more the air is filled with the sound of the cuckoo. That bird is crowing, "Peace! Peace! Give peace a chance." It's calls are echoing around Washington. Reverberating through Israel. The bird's cheerful noise is bouncing through the wadis and souks of Palestine. Resounding across the capitals of at least some Mideast states. And, throbbing amidst the gunfire and IED blasts of Afghanistan.

Fer sure, dudes.

The world has been through the cycle of unwarranted optimism and unmerited depression too often to exhibit the slightest joy over the recent announcement by the Obama administration that it is investing whatever might still linger of its diplomatic and political prestige and influence on hosting the opening round of the latest bout between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The chances of success were in no way enhanced by the belief expressed by senior members of Team Obama that within a year a comprehensive settlement on substantial issues will be achieved.

That rhetoric of faith is akin to the "peace in our time" piety expressed by Neville Chamberlin on his return from the Munich Conference. If the Secretary of State or any one else in the administration really, really believes that, there is a desperate need for a change in medications.

Even if the hard right coalition headed by Prime Minister Netanyahu is ready, willing, and, most importantly, politically able to achieve peace at the cost of pulling thousands of "settlers" out of the disputed territories, there is no reason to conclude the weak, fractured, Palestinian Authority government of Mahmoud Abbas can agree to any formula which settles for less than their maximum demands.

Netanyahu has promised to take any deal reached over the next months to both the Knesset and the Israeli people. Not that he would have any choice. Any agreement will be both at Israel's expense and risk. As the Israelis learned to their sorrow in the wake of evacuating the Gaza Strip, the rest of the world cheers the withdrawal but is terribly unconcerned if the aftermath includes the loss of Israeli lives to the "liberating" rockets and mortar bombs of Palestinian "freedom fighters" and Islamist killers.

The Palestinian Authority is a government in name rather than substance even in the territory which it purportedly rules. Its legitimacy is questionable in the minds of many Palestinians. Of course the PA is under direct, continual, quotidian threats from the very hard line Islamist regime of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Any sign of purported "weakness" on the part of the PA will be seized upon by Hamas and its allies, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as one more lever with which to pry the Palestinian territory further into the irredentist camp.

The PA has a record of rejecting far better offers than any which can or will be made by the Netanyahu government. In the previous acts of pure rejectionism, the PA has continued the splendid record of diplomatic failure established back in the Thirties by the Arabs of the region and enhanced by the sorry and totally avoidable blunders of Fatah during and after the First and Second Intifadas.

As diplomats the Arabs of Palestine have a history which shows a level of sheer incompetence rivaled only by their success in military operations. The government of Israel is perfectly well aware of the Palestinian capacity for self-inflicted diplomatic defeat and will be prepared to take full advantage of it.

Of course, the PA is counting on the US and the European Union to do the necessary diplomatic heavy lifting. In this the PA is showing a shrewd understanding of the stance of both the Obama administration and the political and opinion molding elites of the EU.

The EU is clearly, if not pro-Palestinian, at least, quite anti-Israel. There is no doubt but the EU elites are fed up with the situation in the Mideast and hold the Israelis solely culpable for the current situation. There is equally little doubt but the EU will lean on Israel in every way possible regardless of reality or even without regard for the interests of the EU member states.

The Europeans have convinced themselves that a two state solution will not only bring in a permanent era of peace, love, and flower power between Israel and its Arab/Muslim neighbors, but will also end the global threat of terrorism and their domestic problems of creeping Islamism. This unicausal model is attractive because it is simple. It is wrong nonetheless.

The Obama administration will undoubtedly put the muscle on Israel. That is all it can do. It--and the US--have no measurable leverage on the governments of the Arab/Muslim states and no genuine credibility with the Arab/Muslim street. All the famed Obama "outreach" program has done is raise and quickly dash expectations among the many who are so ill-informed as to believe the hoary trope, "if the US can put a man on the moon, it can (fill in the blank.")

However there are very real limits on the amount of coercion the Obama administration can use on Israel. These limits are imposed by domestic political considerations which far transcend the purported power of the Israel Lobby or the alleged importance of the "Jewish vote," although neither of these are trivial matters. Poll after poll demonstrates that an overwhelming majority of We the People, particularly those who meet the Rasmussen poll definition of "mainstream," not only support Israel but pin the tail of blame on the Palestinian donkey.

Further limiting the capacity of Mr Obama or his administration to play an effective role in the upcoming direct negotiations is the absence of credibility. If LBJ had a "credibility gap" during the Vietnam War, Obama has a yawning credibility canyon. His word simply cannot be trusted by the government of Israel. To say this limits his capacity to influence affairs is to state the overly obvious.

Over in Afghanistan the Karzai government has acknowledged the self-evident. Karzai personally allowed as how his government is engaged in ongoing conversations of an informal nature with members of Taliban. That admission is scarcely stop-the-presses news.

The Karzai government and the president himself would be criminally negligent as well as suicidally out-to-lunch not to have been talking with representatives of both Taliban and the Haqqani network. Conflict resolution, even hostilities termination, depend upon the achievement of a working agreement with the insurgents. When the shooting stops--or even to facilitate the stopping of the shooting--a power sharing arrangement must be achieved.

Unless an insurgency is focused solely upon the ejection of what is perceived as a foreign political and military presence, the two contestants will have to live together at war's end. Thus it is essential to redefine the conflict in a way that assures neither combatant sees the war as existential in nature.

It is clear that this has been Karzai's goal for some years now. He is a very able politician in the Afghan context. He understands perfectly that the greater the body count, the more inflexible the dividing lines between insurgent and government, the more war weary the uncommitted majority population becomes, the more difficult, even impossible it will be to end the war without one side or the other existentially eliminating the other.

Being both a realist and a powerful nationalist, Karzai has laid down only one key condition regarding who from Taliban and the Haqqani is an acceptable interlocutor. He demands that only those who are not aligned with or dominated by al-Qaeda or other "foreign" entities come to the table--even for the informal conversations which have been underway.

To his credit Mr Karzai has made no grandiose promises. He has put forth no timetable. He sees no specific result eventually coming from the conversations. Once again he is showing both realism and a keen grasp of the potentials of Afghan politics.

Best of all Mr Karzai has kept the Obama White House and administration basically out of the loop. Keeping the current administration at a very long arm's length is probably the best way to assure something positive emerges from the shadows of informal conversations, the talks which happen but never are given more than tacit, offhand mention.

If only the Israelis and Palestinians could do the same--success might crown their efforts.

You Did The Right Thing, Israel!

The lengthy drivel filled UN conference regarding updating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has labored and brought forth not a mouse but the fecal product of a mouse. At its conclusion the conference delivered the demand for a conflab intended to bring about a nuclear weapons free zone in the Mideast. The conclave is to occur two years hence.

Israel, the only current and presumptive holder of a nuclear arsenal immediately and flatly declared that it would be a major non-participant in the festivities. In explanation of its move, the government of Israel (GOI) pointed to the biased and prejudicial nature of the UN declaration.

The characterization given by the GOI is dead on. Israel and Israel alone is named in the document. The naming of Israel was, as no doubt intended, pejorative and defamatory. Neither India nor Pakistan, both of which are in possession of nuclear weapons and non-members of the NPT, were named, even though Pakistan can be seen as an honorary member of the Mideast Club.

Nor is any mention made of the non-compliant Iranian elephant in the room. Indeed, it is the status of Iran as a signer of the NPT which has brought it into its current semi-pariah status.

The failure of the conferees to make a definite reference to Iran is particularly reprehensible and underscores the accuracy of GOI's description and the correctness of its decision regarding the demanded conference. The glaring omission of Iran is the basis for the remarkably strong defense of Israel's position offered by National Security Advisor James Jones. Jones is quoted as saying the US "deplores" the wording of the UN document.

Israel's overall position on the question of a nuclear free Middle East has been long established and is well known--even by the Arab and Muslim states which required both the conference and the naming of names, or, at least, one name. GOI is of the view that any agreement to remove nuclear weapons from the region (which implies Israel signing the NPT) must come after two other agreements.

One of the necessary precursor undertakings would eliminate all categories of weapons of mass destruction from the region. The other, the vastly more important and infinitely harder to achieve agreement, would be one which establishes a verifiable and enforceable comprehensive Mideast peace.

Given the ongoing superiority in manpower and potential conventional armed force in the possession of the several Arab "frontline" states and the even greater reserves within other Arab and Muslim countries, Israel must retain its nuclear option. It is the great equalizer as well as the best peacekeeper in the area. By rejecting membership in the NPT and adopting the policy of nuclear ambiguity GOI has kept the region free of conventional, high intensity war since the ending of the Yom Kippur War thirty-seven years ago.

True, this has not meant peace broke out or that hostilities have been absent, but it has meant that the severity and duration of war has been constrained significantly. For this, the Arab states should be as happy as the Israelis. Except for the poorly planned and worse executed adventure into Lebanon a few years back, the killing has been on the retail level rather than the wholesale bloodletting which would have occurred had Israel not possessed its ambiguous deterrent.

The problem, the ultimate challenge to a comprehensive peace treaty which,in the estimate not only of GOI but any objective observer, must precede any agreement to denuclearize the Mideast is the matter of how a comprehensive peace treaty would be both verified and enforced. If the years 1933-1945 taught Jews anything, it is simply this: When push comes to shove there is no one we can count on for our defense other than ourselves.

This reality, a reality which cannot be erased by the reassurances of an American president or his minions, governs all Israeli calculations as it must. Can any sane, prudent Israeli trust some other country, some international institution, when the existence of the Jewish state is threatened?

Considering the historical record right on down to the present day, the answer is both blunt and obvious: No. A hundred times, a thousand times, no!

The Jews of Germany and German dominated Europe were left out in the international cold in the years prior to the outbreak of war. To put it simply, no country--including the US--wanted to take in the threatened Jews. Not even the children.

In more recent times, the UN has been singularly insensitive to the unique position of Israel as a country threatened repeatedly with both attack and potential oblivion. The Arab states, with the cooperation of some Great Powers, have repeatedly hijacked the UN to serve their purposes and place Israel under one disadvantage after another.

Even though no country has been a more consistent supporter of Israel than the US following the Eisenhower administration, all US policy is subject to the winds of political change. The change in the direction and force of the political winds in the US has been made quite apparent to GOI in the past year and a half. So there is no good basis for a realistic belief within Israel that come what may Uncle Sam is there to help and protect.

The long and the short of reality is there is no mechanism for enforcing a comprehensive Mideast peace treaty, and, without such a credible mechanism, any hypothetical treaty is just so much ink on paper bound between fancy covers. Without the accomplishment of both comprehensive treaty and credible enforcement guarantees, there is no reason to think any GOI would be so eager for risk, so willing to embrace potential national suicide as to either join the NPT or abandon its nuclear arsenal.

(One caveat: It would be possible in principle but unlikely in practice given the current state of global political play for Israel to sign the NPT under terms and conditions identical to those agreed to by the original declared nuclear powers: the US, the USSR, the UK, Britain, France, and China. This would leave Israel with its bombs and bomb fabricating capability but commit it to the eventual removal of these.)

Israel may need to join the NPT so that it can acquire electrical power producing nuclear reactors, perhaps in conjunction with Jordan or Egypt. The need for more electricity without using more expensive fossil fuels may provide an impetus to accede to the treaty but only under terms such as those extended to the initial Big Six.

As a result, the only conclusion which can be offered regarding this latest UN exercise in the appealingly absurd call for a Make-the-Mideast-Nukeless in 2012 is that it is a call for way too much, way too soon. The Arab countries showing their usual maladroit practice of diplomacy made the decision to make propaganda hay while laying salt in the fields of true progress toward a desirable goal.

Mr Netanyahu, you are doing OK this time around. Even better, it looks as if for once President Obama is as well.

Immovable Object Meets Immovable Object

As predicted the Fatah convention, the first in twenty years, saw the oldest and at one time largest of the Palestinian "resistance" groups trying to outdo Hamas in the militant irredentist category. All that was missing was the physical presence of Arafat complete with checked table cloth on his head and pistol on his hip. His spirit hung heavy in the air of Bethlehem as delegates, old and young, militant and more so, haggled, bargained, and spouted expletives against the Zionist entity.

As the votes were counted in the uncontested re-election of Mahmoud Abbas, the fire breathing folks declared that Fatah would continue resistance to Israel unless its conditions for peace were fully met. The major requirement for Palestinian peace in our time was the full evacuation of the 300,000 or so Israelis from the "settlements" built on land taken from Jordan in the Six Day War including East Jerusalem.

As a conference paper put it with typical Palestinian delicacy, "Fatah will continue to sacrifice victims until Jerusalem is returned clean of settlements and settlers." That seems rather definite, doesn't it?

The Israeli government response was not long in coming. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu was blunt. His government would not repeat the "mistake" of "evacuating" settlers from the disputed territories of the West Bank. He would not do what former prime minister Sharon did in the Gaza Strip--remove Jewish settlers at bayonet point.

PM Netanyahu pointedly noted that the Israeli withdrawal did not bring peace and security for either the Israelis or the Arabs of the Gaza. No one oriented as to time and place could argue with him on that point. Even before Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip, Islamist jihadists used the place as a launching point for attacks of all sorts. Since Hamas took over, life has been nasty, brutish, and often short for the citizens of Gaza as Israel was compelled to defend its people and territory against indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire.

The majority of the Israeli public supports Netanyahu's defiant stand. This is particularly true with respect to the "settlements" in and around East Jerusalem. There is no conceivable way that the Israelis will continence a retreat from East Jerusalem. Period.

Israel long ago annexed the entirety of Jerusalem. While the US and other countries do not recognise the annexation, this is quite irrelevant. Even if some miracle provided for the Israelis to agree to move out of the other "settlements" and retreat back across the fossil of the 1949 armistice, the Green Line, there is no possibility that East Jerusalem and its environs would be abandoned to the Arabs.

The Palestinians (along with the Arabs generally) will never accept a peace agreement which leaves East Jerusalem in Jewish hands. The Israelis will never accept a peace treaty which surrenders the Old City and new "settlements" to the Arabs.

Immovable object meets immovable object. There is not any wiggle room for diplomacy to work. For each side, peace without Jerusalem is not worth the price. There is no coinciding interest or set of interests which diplomats can use to lever either party into a less intransigent posture.

The lads of Fatah recognise this. That is why the group with a more than a half century of terrorism behind it is quite willing to grease the skids to compromise (read Israeli surrender) with the blood of "victims."

Fatah has long been indifferent to killing and being killed. As long as the leadership can exhibit the bravery of being out of range, Fatah is quite willing to dispatch suicide bombers, gun-toting commandos, and others filled with murderous rage in the hope that sufficient killing will either undercut Israeli political will or force the tender hearted of the "international community" to pressure Israel into surrender.

Fatah has been every bit as willing as Hamas to use murder and the bodies of its own people as weapons in the never ending war against Israel. Whether called "intafada" or something else, the brutal truth remains that Fatah is ready, willing, able, and eager to use the lives of civilians as its preferred tool of war.

The Fatah tiger has been willing to cover its stripes in recent years with the whitewash of the Palestinian Authority. The stripes have come back during the convention in Bethlehem. The essential difference between Fatah and Hamas is that the latter is much more honest, open, and transparent about its nature, character, and goals than the former.

There is a bit of delightful irony in that Hamas has been undertaking a tendentious charm and smile offensive directed at the Obama administration at the same time as Fatah has been showing its true colors. Of course, the Hamas public relations campaign is undermined by its continued hate Israel rhetoric and actions aimed at the population under its control, which are easily accessed by outsiders on the Internet.

Presumably, the Obama administration has the capacity to understand what is at work with both Fatah and Hamas. Presumably, it is aware that both Hamas and Fatah share the goals of removing Israel from the map. Presumably it is aware that the immovable object dilemma posed by East Jerusalem, the nature of borders, and the Palestinian "right of return," all stand as obstacles to a comprehensive peace treaty which are not reducible by either pressure on Israel or the normal tools of diplomacy.

If President Obama and his plethora of foreign policy "experts" can get a grip on reality, the administration will back off from pressuring Israel. It will re-focus its efforts on Syria, which has the advantage of being a rational actor with one firm requirement for peace with Israel--return of the Golan Heights.

Levering Israel and Syria to the bargaining table and shepherding a treaty between the two will further isolate the Palestinians. It will put another potential wedge in the Arab bloc. It will deprive Hamas of the necessary intermediary between itself and its prime sponsor, Iran.

None of these are inconsiderable goals. Their achievement will not be easy, but the rewards would be worth the effort. The Syrian gambit has a greater probability of success than continuing the present course of attempting to pretend that either Fatah or Hamas contains a single rational brain cell in their collective skulls.

Or, as a second, and viable alternative, the Obama administration can just walk away from the mess. There is little to win and much to lose in continuing the game when the sheer intransigence of all parties is considered.

Yeah, presidents hate to admit they are not all-powerful, but sometimes the truth, painful as it is, hurts less than keeping up the pretense of being able to do the impossible.