More "Followership" From The Hindmost

Coming late and out of breath from the unusual bout of exertion, the US today decided that the rebels, The Transitional Government" is the only legitimate game in Libya.  The US has extended full diplomatic recognition to the far less than coherent bunch in Benghazi.  The practical effect of this move is the freeing of the billions of Gaddafi bucks languishing in American custody, impounded under UN sanctions.

The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition.  The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.

Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government.  Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid.  It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists.  There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.

There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi.  The US has no direct stake in the country.  Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play.  That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company.  It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.

There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya.  It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.

The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy.  The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy.  While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.

One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions.  An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia.  The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.

The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft.  In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US.  Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.

If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests?  Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.

No, bucko, not oil.  The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran.  It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq.  These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure.  But there is a far more important audience.

That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran.  In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges.  More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.

Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort.  It is focused on getting the bomb.  Period.  There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.

Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US.  In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so.  As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.

"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat.  A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved.  The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.

Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge.  This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour.  We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy.  In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.

Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force.  They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant.  The mullahs are right in this.  Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.

The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation.  The Israeli government shares it.  Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat.  They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world.  A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.

The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant.  There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in.  If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.

Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational.  It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US.  Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.

The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure.  The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset.  As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.

A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event.  But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well.  This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.

To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer.  To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut.  However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader.  In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.

The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!"  The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."

As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact.  By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu.  That is not a failure of policy.  It is not even a simple error of judgement.  It is a world class blunder.

"Engagement" Or Sanctions? The No Choice Choice

The European Union is finally ready to back stronger sanctions against Iran. Presented by a choice between more, tougher sanctions and the "military option," the EU is all for sanctions.

Wow! What a shock! Also why bother?

The nature of diplomacy is simple. The goal of all diplomacy is to gain advantage for a country and its national interests as subjectively defined. Like all political operations diplomacy is a search for power, its maintenance, expansion, or, at the very least, protection. The practice of diplomacy comes in two forms: The use of coinciding national interests as a base for furthering mutual self-interest or the employment of coercion.

Most of the time diplomacy proceeds by the embellishment and expansion of mutual self-interest. Even bitter rivals such as the US and the Soviet Union could find and expand upon mutual self-interest. During the most frigid periods of the Cold War both governments shared the self-interest of survival, so conflicts were tacitly limited well below the nuclear threshold. From that minimum basis engagement, seeking an expansion of mutual interest was often profitable--even if getting there was frustrating to say the least.

Coercion has often been counterproductive. An excellent example of this nasty reality is found in the record of US-Cuban relations particularly during the immediate aftermath of the Castroite takeover. For a series of reasons which no doubt seemed rational at the time, the US embarked on a series of escalating coercive measures.

The result was Cuba ran to the Russian Bear. Another consequence was the ability of the Castro regime to use the US hostility as an excuse for every economic failure which afflicted the nation. Still another easily foreseen outcome was the Castroite exportation of its ideology to other parts of Latin America. The list could go on almost without end. Suffice to say that the American efforts at coercing Castro into compliance with our policy demands led to such critical events as the Bay of Pigs and, far more importantly, the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Further back in our history, coercive diplomacy directed against Imperial Japan resulted in a rather important consequence: Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific. Coercion, even the relatively mild sort of economic sanctions, can lead to foreseeable and unfortunate results such as World War II.

On many other occasions coercion has simply been ineffective. Cast your memory back to the use of the US military as the globe's largest SWAT force in Operation Just Cause. The run up to that adventure in regime change was marked by escalating economic sanctions. The H.W. Bush administration was certain that economic pressure would have to work given that Panama used the Yankee dollar as its circulating medium. It didn't. The only alternative to a humiliating admission of failure was the "military option."

This brings us to Iran.

Non-coercive diplomatic engagement depends upon the pre-existence of coinciding national interests. Without some matrix of prior mutual national interests there is little, if any, cause to believe that engagement will have a positive result.

To put it bluntly: There is no coinciding national interest between the US and Iran. This is not the case with regard to many of the EU countries. Germany, France and Italy all have substantial trade interests with Iran. But, the trade is arguably more important to the entrepreneurs of these countries than it is to Iran.

The Iranians, particularly that state within a state, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, have shown both creativity and persistence in evading the impact of the sanctions already in place. Further sanctions would bring more creativity and more persistence in its wake. Given the willingness of China and Russia to turn the Nelsonian Eye on the sanctions as well as the new avenue opened by the close relationship between Iran and Venezuela, there is no doubt that Iran will not be fatally injured by any conceivable set of additional sanctions.

Absent a base of coinciding national interests and given a relative immunity to economic pressures, there is little reason to conclude that either engagement or another round of sanctions will produce any movement on the key issue of Iran's nuclear program. That is a critical predicate.

A second critical predicate that reinforces the first is the power of nationalism in the Iranian collective mind. In so far as the regime can place responsibility for internal pain on the external actors led by the mullahs' two main enemies--the US and Israel--it plays to nationalism and thus furthers regime consolidation and support. As the historical record shows clearly (again think Cuba), external pressure is the best friend a government can have.

Remember the key rule of international politics including war--pressure consolidates long before it fragments.

Admittedly, the Obama administration must go through the motions of seeking to resolve the challenge presented by the Iranian nuclear program through the mechanisms of engagement and non-violent coercion. The administration--and the rest of us--should have no expectations of success emerging from this process. Anything else is pure delusion.

This implies that there are only two options available in the real world. One is accepting the Iranian nuclear capacity. The other is war. (Let's call it what it is.)

To say the least, neither option is palatable. Accepting Iran as a de facto nuclear power implies that non-proliferation is a dead duck. If Iran can get the bomb--or at a minimum--a breakout capacity, why not other countries? It is necessary to consider a world in which Burma, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and a host of other countries with ambitions and fears have the ability to plant radioactive mushrooms.

Not pleasant is it?

(Of course, it is always possible to entertain delusions of a nuclear weapons free world, but the more countries that have the Big Bomb the more will think they must have one too simply for survival if no other reason.)

Air and missile strikes carried out on the Iranian nuclear complex as well as necessary associated targets ranging from air defense installations to government facilities could, probably would, halt the nuclear program for at least some years. However, the cost could outweigh the benefits. Since it is never possible to calculate the cost-benefit ratio until long after the war has ended, the prudent government must base its pre-war appraisal on the worst realistic case.

Anyway the question is examined, the costs of a strike or strikes against Iran are greater than the benefits. While the US (or in high probability the Israelis) have the physical capacity to abate the Iranian nuclear nuisance, the metaphorical fallout would be quite significant.

If there is no base for engagement from the existence of coinciding national interest and no real potential for coercive diplomacy (including the war option) having a good outcome, where does that leave the US and the rest of the world?

Well, if one is of the High Minded persuasion, that is if one really, really believes that we exist in a post-nationalist world, it is possible to dream of a UN sponsored removal of nuclear weapons from the globe. Outside of academic and similar elite circles in the US and Western Europe, the notion of a post-nationalistic international political dynamic is without traction, or even the least appeal.

The alternative is to accept the existence of a nuclear armed Iran and all that implies. Regional political dynamics will be altered--profoundly. The potential of nuclear proliferation will be augmented, perhaps exponentially.

If the reality of a nuclear capable Iran is accepted, the time has come to contemplate how the US can conduct its international relations in order to minimize the damage to its national and strategic interests. The time has come to look for ways in which the US can employ the new reality to its advantage--difficult or even impossible as that may seem.

Certainly, the US and the other parties of the P5+1 must go through the motions. They must do the diplomatic yada-yada which will ensue in Turkey and elsewhere. If the expectations are low enough, it might be a useful exercise--at least as far as clearing the decks is concerned.

But, there can be no doubt that as the palaver spins so do the centrifuges. Iran will not be deterred nor diverted this late in the game. Whether any nation likes it or not, Iran will join the nuclear club shortly.

The conclusion?

Simple, but unpleasant. The real foreign policy challenge for President Obama and Company is crafting a way to exploit to our advantage the altered balance in the region--and the world. This will require a degree of thought and realpolitik orientation not seen since George Kennan, Dean Acheson, and Harry Truman developed and implemented the ultimately successful Doctrine of Containment over a half century ago.

Can the current administration match the brain power and realism demonstrated by these long dead giants? That is the key question.

The Geek has his doubts. Lots of them.

Sanctions Feel Good--But Do They Work?

Americans and (at least some of the time) Europeans have a love affair with economic sanctions. There seems to be some sort of deep rooted genetic belief that somehow economic sanctions will prove to be the sovereign remedy for all sorts of international contretemps. It's as if we are all a passel of Marxists, certain that economic man will prevail.

The Geek would like to think that, regardless of reality and wilfully ignoring historical experience, this time sanctions will prove effective. When that happens he has to slap his face and shout, "Get a grip!"

Sanctions can inflict economic discomfort on a state. They can hurt people. They can make life for a government marginally more difficult.

At the same time sanctions serve as a propaganda focus assuring popular discontent is aimed at the Outsider instead of being directed at the government and its offensive conduct. Sanctions can increase the political will and drive of the government to continue the actions which have led to sanctions. Sanctions can make a government and society more creative in finding effective means of neutralising the sanctions and continuing the decried behavior.

To have even the slightest chance of success several realities have to exist. The target government must be effectively isolated globally. The target society must have a politically significant middle class. The target government must be ineffectively repressive. The target government must lack a significant internal propaganda capacity. Smuggling and other sanction evading mechanisms must be susceptible to total and prolonged interdiction.

Ask yourself, "How often are these criteria met?" (Met, that is, in the real world, not some fantasyland of policy makers or the High Minded.)

Yeah, that's right. Zero percent of the time.

Now, ask yourself, "When was the last time in US history that economic sanctions accomplished a positive policy outcome?"

That will take you awhile. And, you've got to remember that the operative word is "positive."

(Sound of the Geek drumming his fingers as he waits for an answer.)

Try the Stamp Act Crisis. The Colonies did gain a retraction of the Stamp Act after embargoing all trade with England. The embargo wasn't leak proof but it was complete enough to inflict real distress on the merchant interests of England which in turn put the right screws on Parliament. Of course the seeming victory was undercut by Parliament's simultaneous declaration that it could pass any law any time binding on the Colonies. It was a way station on the road to war.

If you're old enough you might remember Operation Just Cause conducted by George H.W. Bush. This operation turned the US military into the world's largest SWAT team kicking in the doors of Panama to arrest Manuel Noriega.

The invasion was quick, low cost and eventually saw the crater faced dictator hauled off in handcuffs, shackles, and disgrace to a US slammer. But, why was it necessary?

Because sanctions failed. Even though Panama had a large and vocal, pan-banging middle class and even used the Yankee dollar as its circulating mechanism, the sanctions were not leak proof enough to put sufficient pressure on the Panamanian National Guard to evict the jefe grande.

If you're a bit younger you no doubt recall the decade of sanctions imposed by the UN on Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War. These sanctions hurt the Iraqi population quite a bit, crippled the country's infrastructure and did other undesirable things to the people and nation alike.

They also introduced corruption on a massive scale. Made a great deal of money for smugglers, financial thaumaturges and relatives of the then UN Secretary General.

The sanctions did not cause the Iraqi army to rise up and cast out the demons of the Saddam Hussein regime. That took a war--and its years of aftermath. And, a lot of dead bodies both Iraqi and foreign.

More often than not sanctions have been what they were back in the days of the Stamp Act. A way station to war.

Sanctions are the means of choice right now with respect to Zimbabwe and Iran. In either case sanctions have not and will not bring about a positive policy outcome.

Zimbabwe's Thug-in-Chief For Life, Robert Mugabe knows all about sanctions. Sanctions applied in the wake of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence were widely supposed to have the power to bring the White minority regime to its knees--quickly and bloodlessly.

The global sanctions did have some effect over the next twenty years. They were a minor factor in the final collapse of political will on the part of Ian Smith and his government. But, the sanctions never undercut the Rhodesian economy. Never ruined the White middle class. Never drove the export oriented White farmers from their large and profitable holdings.

Never destroyed the Rhodesian economy.

No. Robert Mugabe did that all on his own little lonesome in a fit of political-economic stupidity that ranks high on the list of all time blunders.

Today, Zimbabwe has no export oriented agriculture, no middle class and no economy. (It does have an inflation rate that threatens to top that of Wiemar Germany at its worst.)

What's left to hurt? What's left to sanction? Putting pressure on Mugabe and his supporters by sanctions ranks with the egotism of a dog thinking he can raise sea level by lifting his leg.

Then there is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The sanctions have been in place for quite awhile now. They have been "toughened." They have failed in the intent of ending the presumed Iranian nuclear weapons program even though the effect of the economic squeeze has hurt the Iranian economy, hurt many Iranians and made life ever so slightly more difficult for the Iranian government.

Why?

Easy. The sanction regime has been leakier than the Titanic after kissing the iceberg. Not just the usual Global Bad Boy, China, but presumed allies in the cause led by Germany and Italy have busted the sanctions time and time again. All the soothing mood music from Berlin, Rome or, for that matter, Paris doesn't change the reality.

On top of that smuggling, remittances and financial legerdemain have abounded with great benefit for the mullahocracy and its visions of nuclear backed potency. Human ingenuity knows no limits when self-interest and state interest (to say nothing of religious interest) coincide.

"But wait," you object, "one of our guys is going to meet face-to-face with their chief nuclear negotiator."

"So bloody what?" replies the Geek.

There is always time for one more round of diplomacy before the bombs start falling. The Iranians have already--well before the scheduled meeting date--made their position clear. The centrifuges will keep spinning.

Given the vast quantity of political investment the mullahocracy has made so publicly regarding the nuclear project over the past months, backing down now would take the direct, open intervention of the Hidden Imam himself. This is unlikely. The mullahocracy has invested the totality of its Revolutionary Islamic legitimacy in keeping the centrifuges spinning.

We can always hope for a peaceful solution to the problem. We can even pray for one if we are of such an inclination. We can hope for some time buying exercise that will push the final decision into the haze of the future.

But, we have to remember that, more often than not, economic sanctions have been but a way station on the road to war.

Administration Makes A Smart Move--At Last.

The imposition of new economic sanctions against the Iranian Ministry of Defense as well as the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Aerospace Industries Organisation is a well-timed, intelligent, and major foreign policy move. In and of itself, the new sanction package shows the analysis of University of Michigan professor Juan Cole misses the point.

Professor Cole writes in today's Salon.com that the current administration's foreign policy is in chaos. See, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/10/24/kurds/index.html?source=newsletter. The professor contends that US policy in the Mideast and Northwest Asia has become a morass of ad hoc gimmicks since the start of our Adventures in Regime Change.

The Geek takes a different perspective. The Geek maintains that six years ago with both the declaration of Global War On Terrorism and the invasions first of Afghanistan and then Iraq, US policy lacked both realistic purpose and achievable goals. Forced in recent months to accept the dictates of reality by events in the two regions, US policy has been changing from its initial formless mass into something that begins to approximate a purpose and goal.

The inchoate Global War On Terrorism is being replaced (at long last!) by a focus on achieving a measure of stability in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan while reducing the potential potentency and appeal of Islamism/Jihadism. There seems to have been a small, but critical, shift in the worldview within the current administration.

"What's that?" You ask.

While defensive efforts conducted by FBI, CIA ,and other organs focus on detecting and interdicting terrorist operations aimed at the US at home and US personnel or facilities overseas, offensive American operations have been more narrowly focused on the challenges of bringing stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and defanging Islamist supporting states such as Iran and Syria.

That's not much. But it is a beginning. An important beginning.

Iran is and will continue to be a major troublemaker. The mullahocracy likes ever so much to play the role of, "Let's you and him fight!" The technical term for this sort of foreign policy gambit is proxy war.

The idea is to cause endless difficulty for your actual adversary at little or no risk to yourself. The old Soviet Union played the game. They played it long and almost well in southern and eastern Africa during the Seventies.

The US has played the proxy war game too. We played it long and reasonably well during the Reagan Administration in Afghanistan. Our game fell apart only when we handed operational responsibility over to the Pakistani regime of General al-Huq. The Paks had their own proxies in mind. (Can we say, "Taliban?")

The Iranians and Syrians have been playing proxy war for decades now. These national actors prefer to use stateless groups as their pawns. But, whether a lesser state or a non-state agent, proxy war has numerous benefits for the sponsor and very few risks.

Using the Revolutionary Guard Corps foreign operating division, the al-Quds Force, as agent, the mullahocracy has been able to provide support, training, intelligence, and other services to The Party of God in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, among others. Closer to home and more recent in time, the same Iranian agency has provided the same services to anti-US, anti-regime groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is true that the Iranian footprint has often been light on the ground, but one does not need to be an Australian aboriginal tracker to see it.

(To those ideologues who are in a state of denial about the Iranian proxy war efforts, the Geek would like to point out that the whole purpose of proxy war is to lessen risk through plausible deniability. Just because American covert and clandestine efforts are often as well concealed as a hippopotamus in a phone booth is no reason to think that all countries are equally as inept at keeping secrets.)

While maintaining proxy operations the mullahs in Tehran have been trying to cast the largest possible shadow on the world stage. By so doing they not only divert internal attention from internal problems, they also gain influence with both Islamist entities and potentially threatened states. It is important to remember that the mullahocracy has the goal of a global caliphate--a global Shiite caliphate.

The current torrent of over-the-edge rhetoric flowing from both Tehran and Washington over Iranian nuclear ambitions is a very good way of enlarging the Iranian shadow. It is also riskier than low level proxy war.

In large measure due to Russian protection (extended for reasons to be further laid forth in a future post) as well as Chinese (see previous parenthetical expression) the mullahs have been able to follow their game plan without real pain and with real (internal political) benefit. At the same time the mullahocracy has enjoyed a collateral benefit.

The Geek hears you muttering, "Don't keep me waiting."

As a spin-off of the Iranian intransigence over matters nuclear, the neocon ninnies of the current administration have been eager to introduce unnecessary complications into American foreign policy generally. Among these are two of particular noteworthiness.

The present US-Russian standoff over the basing of a limited anti-missile system in Eastern Europe is one.

The other is the Turkey-PKK affair. As mentioned in a post yesterday, the US has been smiling on one arm of the Kurdish insurgency--the one directed against Iran--while frowning mightily on the other--the one directed against Turkey. As a result, the US has not been able or, (to err on the side of probable accuracy) willing to effectively assist in the reduction of the PKK threat with the result that Ankara is ready, willing, and able to mount destabilizing incursions into Iraq.
The prime beneficiary of these collaterals is, unsurprisingly, Iran.

The Iranian shadow must be reduced. It must be reduced so that the US can afford to pull back from the unnecessary complications. It must be reduced so that modulated diplomatic discourse might prove effective in gaining the desired end of preventing Tehran from acquiring atomic weapons in either the near- or mid-term.

It is equally necessary that Tehran feel real, even exquisite, pain to slow or stop its proxy war operations. The UN imposed sanctions have hurt. But, not enough.

The new sanctions, if imposed on foreign companies or financial institutions or governments who do business with the targeted entities as well as in the US, will add pain, perhaps intolerable amounts.

Think of it as the foreign policy equivalent of what police call a "compliance hold." The goal is to coerce compliance with dictated behavior by imposing increasing amounts of physical discomfort.

These sanctions may not prove to be sufficiently intense to force a modification on the mullah's actions and policies. They may be sufficiently unpleasant in application to force a limited change for a limited time. They may not work at all.

Those are questions that can only be answered in the next few weeks and months. The sanctions are nonetheless a strong indication that the US has today what it did not have six years ago--an actual policy that is more realistic than not as well as one more likely to achieve positive results than not.

If nothing else, these long overdue new sanctions delay the date of our next Adventure in Regime Change. For that, the Geek is grateful. So should all of us be.

The Limits (and Power) of US Economic Warfare

This post is motivated by a thoughtful comment entered on a previous post by Watcher in the Center. Watcher's comment is linked to Geek Demands a New Historical Analogy.

Economic sanctions up to and including total trade embargoes have a long standing historical appeal to US policy makers and We the People. While having a strong appeal, the success record of economic sanctions is not so sterling.

The closest to a complete success in pursuit of a major policy goal ever achieved by a trade embargo was the repeal of the highly obnoxious Stamp Act by the British Parliament in the 1760s. Since then the win/loss ratio has not been impressive.

In the years before the War of 1812, the US government tried to influence both British and French policy. The goal was limited. The US wanted its "rights" as a neutral to be respected by both belligerents. Not only did the embargo acts fail in their purpose, they served to nearly impoverish New England with its heavy dependence upon overseas commerce. (Oh, the embargo act and its successor, Macon's Bill Number Two, almost got the US embroiled in a war with both Great Britain and Napoleon's France.)

Jumping forward a century and a quarter, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt employed a campaign of escalating sanctions against Imperial Japan. The sanction program was gradual, well considered, and ultimately--when the US froze Japanese funds thus preventing the sale of petroleum, aviation gasoline, and scrap steel--left Tokyo with two choices: A humiliating capitulation to US policy requirements regarding China or war.

We know which they chose.

Not quite forty years later, US trade sanctions did not induce the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. Nor, a few years later did a virtual embargo on Panama (which used the dollar as its circulating medium) induce the country to disgorge Manuel Noriega. We had to send the US military as the world's largest SWAT team to arrest the man. (Sometimes regime change is harder than initially expected.)

With all that as background, let's push on to get a grip on Cuba and Iran once again.

During the years 1959-1961, the US diplomatic and economic embargo on Cuba had a disastrous effect upon the country's economy, which had been very heavily dependent upon selling its sugar and tobacco crops to the US. Cuba had also received significant national income from US tourism.

All of that came to a screeching stop with the embargo.

After Fidel declared Cuba to be a "socialist" nation, he was able to arrange increasing assistance from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact regimes. Even with the flow of money from Moscow and its satellites, the Cuban economy remained enfeebled.

The enfeeblement worsened as a result of badly bungled efforts by the Fidelistas to create a model economy. The ineptitude of some Cuban economic development schemes was sufficiently impressive to make the Geek wonder whether or not there had ever been any real need for the US economic sanctions in the first place.

Subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Cuba has been forced to compete on the international commodities export market. For some time, Havana benefited from a special relationship between itself and an ideological soulmate, Hanoi. But, that tie has weakened in recent years. The Fidelistas have opened tourism facilities to appeal to the Northern European market with some success. Balancing this is the Cuban government's uncanny ability to annoy trading partners at critical moments (with the exception, of course, of the Neo-Castroite regime in Venezuela.)

Still, the bottom line reads that Cuba soldiers on despite or because of the original and continuing US economic sanctions....

"Wait one, Geek." you shout. "What do you mean, 'because of'?"

That's the critical point. Every time the Castroistas had to announce another painful tug inwards on the collective Cuban belt, the blame could be foisted off on the Norteamericanos. The distress felt by a person and the anger that distress produced would be directed, not at Havana, but at Washington.

Take a good grip on a reality the Geek has mentioned many times before. Pressure consolidates long before it fractures.

Whether the pressure is economic, political, psychological, or military, pressure from an outside regime on the government and people of a nation will consolidate political will and support of the government. Eventually the pressure may cause political fractures. However, that eventually can be a bloody long time in coming.

The economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the US gave the inept Fidelistas a perfect out every time one or another of their pet economic schemes came a cropper. Point a finger (the Geek won't say which one) to the north. Scream loudly, "Parado, Uncle Sam!"

Beautiful, isn't it?

The same mechanism can be seen during the long decade of economic sanctions directed at Saddam Hussein's Iraq following the success of Operation Play in the Sandbox in 1991. The Iraqi people (but not the Iraqi government or military) were hurt, even desperately hurt by the sanctions. The middle class was financially wiped out. The well connected, the grifters, and the grafters made out like bandits.

All the while, the boys at the top in Baghdad could point, not at themselves, but at the faraway evil gnomes of Washington. Don't look at us! Look at Uncle Sam.

Beautiful, isn't it?

Now for Iran. Time to test the analogy again. Look for guide posts from previous experiences such as Cuba.

The mullahocracy has shown itself to be almost as pathetic in economic matters as the Castroistas. However, Iran started at a higher level than Cuba, and oil is more remunerative to a country than sugar cane. Additionally, Iran is not an island. That brings some automatic advantages. (Hint: mesh petroleum and natural gas with long, wide steel tubes.)

Iran also has some disadvantages compared to Cuba. It's population is larger and younger--much, much younger--than that of Cuba. The mullahs have not been as successful as the Castroites in transmitting revolutionary ideological zeal to the second (or third) generation. Today's technology assures that a significant percentage of Iran's youthful population will have its residual sense of revolutionary purpose challenged by a sense of rising expectations constantly thwarted by the old men with beards and a copy of the Quran.

Early signs of fault lines, generational and otherwise, have been appearing in Iran over recent years. Drawing on the general precept proven so often by history that outsider applied pressure consolidates long before it fractures, the most important guide post is this. Any economic sanctions must not, repeat, not, be seen as coming directly or indirectly from the United States.

Considering Iran's current economic condition, the dependence upon both neighboring countries and private enterprises located at great distance for so much of Iran's ambitions and giving appropriate weight to the signs of nascent disaffiliation within the Iranian population, economic sanctions have a fair chance of bringing about a positive outcome. That is, economic pressures might, just might, have a quieting effect upon the mullahs if one overriding caveat is followed.

The caveat?

The US follow a very difficult policy. The US must work quickly to normalize diplomatic relations with Tehran. Washington must not go public on sanctions of either a diplomatic or economic nature. Simultaneously, the weight of the US must come to bear on critical nodes of Iranian technological, economic, and diplomatic support, whether private companies or governments.

There are several important ramifications of this course of action. For it to work, the US must stop acting like it is what it is--the world's only Great Power. We must take Russia seriously as another Great Power. We must do the same with the Peoples' Republic of China. Diplomatic and public relations fences with Turkey, Syria and Pakistan must be mended with rapidity.

The Geek acknowledges the historical truth of the proposition that kicking one diplomatic rock may start an avalanche of change. To have any prospect of controlling the direction and velocity of the changes, the current--or, far more likely, the next--administration must develop a firm view of the world we would prefer to live in and a consistent road map on how to get there from here.

Even then the results will not be certain.

You can legitimately ask, "To what avail would all this be? Particularly since there is no guarantee of success."

The optimal case would be the increase of political disaffiliation within Iran. In that case the mullahs and their rock of support, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would become increasingly preoccupied with the requirements for domestic pacification. Energy, money and personnel which go into the task of quieting or assuaging political unrest are not available to expend on foreign adventures or technological quests. The Geek is neither calling for nor expecting a revolution in Iran. He would like to see an inward turn by the regime and their knock off of the SS.

Worst realistic case? Al-Quds Force ramps up its foreign actions. The mullahs are able to rally support from the mass of young men without a good, secure future. The rhetoric and behavior of the Tehran regime becomes increasingly frenzied and dangerous. Iran gets the bomb.

There is time enough for war, when and if the worst case comes to pass. Until then, let us try to do a better job than we have done with either Cuba or Iraq. The result will not be certain nor predictable with precision...

But--get a real tight grip on this--war is always uncertain and certainly unpredictable in its results.

The Almighty Dollar?

If the Geek were to be the totally trendy, completely contempo kind of guy which he isn't, this post would be on the scandal of the unaccounted for weapons provided by the US to various Iraqi security forces. After all, the GAO reports that nearly 200,000 weapons--mainly AK's and pistols--are "missing." That's a big deal, right?

If you believe the quacking, bloviating, and hyperventilating of the mainstream media and some of the big brains in Congress, well, then it is. A big deal, that is.

If, like the Geek, you are aware of the realities of military assistance provided by the US (and other countries) in the context of counterinsurgency, well, then it isn't a big deal. Using Vietnam as an example, far more than 200,000 rifles, carbines, machine pistols, mortars, and rocket launchers as well as heavier weapons furnished to the South Vietnamese went missing.

But, still, puff some, these weapons might end up in the hands of the insurgents!

You bet, the Geek agrees. So they might. In most insurgencies it is the status quo forces, the counterinsurgents, which are the source of weapons for the insurgents. Nothing new about that. In Iraq--and Afghanistan--it doesn't really matter if a few more guns get thrown into the insurgent pool. Both countries were neck deep in individual weapons before the Americans et al arrived.

In Afghanistan it was a matter of history, the long war against the Red Army and their host Afghans as well as the decade of internal war after the Russians left that assured weapons would be readily available to anyone and everyone who wanted one. In Iraq, a policy choice by Saddam coupled with the pathetically wrong American decision to fire the entire Iraqi Army assured that small arms (and not so small ones for that matter) would litter the landscape.

The bloviating alarmists need to get a grip. The unaccounted for weapons are neither a scandal nor an unacceptable increase in risk for our troops. The missing small arms is business as usual in the confused setting of counterinsurgency and create-a-state. The 200,000 more or less assault carbines and pistols are simply one small glob of spit in a very large ocean of hazards.

Done with a rant on behalf of sanity, the Geek proposes to plunge on with the real subject at hand. The power of economic sanctions: is it real or simply wishful self-delusion?

The perspicacious out there in the virtual universe (and that includes you by definition if, after stumbling on the Geek, you stay to read) undoubtedly noticed that the country of Panama was omitted from the brief list of nations where the US staged a regime change. The omission was intentional, since the Geek wanted to use Panama as example number one of the misplaced American faith in economic sanctions.

When the double agent, drug dealer Noriega finally became too obnoxious for the US to accept any longer, the first form of pressure we applied on Panama was a total trade embargo. This, of course, is the ultimate weapon in the economic sanction arsenal. It should have worked.

At the time the overwhelming majority of Panamanian trade was with the United States. The US dollar was the circulating medium in the country. Heck, economically it was so tied into the US that for all practical purposes it was the fifty-first state.

How well did the ultimate sanction of total financial and trade embargo work?

So well that the US had to send in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines as the world's largest SWAT team to apprehend the wanted criminal, Noriega, in Operation Just Cause.

After that overwhelming success, it is not surprising that the administration of George H. W. Bush sought to use economic sanctions applied through the United Nations to pressure the Iraqi military (it had to be the military since it alone had the guns and organisation necessary to do the job) into overthrowing Saddam and the Baathist regime.

These sanctions worked so well that not only did George W. Bush find it necessary and desirable to invade Iraq, but the overall effect of the economic warfare was to leave Iraq a hollow shell of a state filled with the festering and frustrating effects of wholesale corruption.

Sometimes economic sanctions are even less effective than they were in the cases of Panama and Iraq. The worst case outcome in US history was the attack on Pearl Harbor. Our rolling ramp-up of trade embargoes finally gave the Japanese government a stark choice: either a humiliating submission to US policy dictates or war.

Get a grip on this. You have to go back to the colonial non-importation agreement which came in response to the British Stamp Act to find an example of economic sanctions, trade embargoes and the like having a more or less clear cut successful outcome. But even then the outcome was mixed. The British repealed the obnoxious tax but at the same time restated their untrammeled right to impose whatever taxes deemed necessary.

Since the Stamp Act crises in 1766, the United States has tried economic sanctions of various sorts in support of any number of foreign policies. At no time has the relative success of 1766 been repeated. That's right, for a bit more than 250 years we've believed in the power of the almighty dollar. We've believed with a faith that surpasses understanding that all we have to do is deny trade, limit access to our finances or markets or services, and the target will crumble.

Get a grip! Economic sanctions don't work. Period. Best case they consolidate resistance within the target population because pressure consolidates political will. Worst case, the sanctions bring war in their wake.

So, what are we doing with respect to Iran and its noxious nuclear program?

That's right. Economic sanctions.

The Geek has to shake his head. The only people more wedded to economic determinism than Marxists are Americans.