Cuba went all giddy a couple of days ago. The reason was the Fiftieth Anniversary of the failed Bay of Pigs "invasion" of Cuba by an American trained and equipped motley brigade of refugees. The initial plan for the operation came during the closing days of the Eisenhower administration. The plan was predicated upon highly overly optimistic projections of weakness on the part of the Castro regime plucked from the imaginations of recently arriving political refugees.
The Eisenhower administration passed the plan along to the incoming Kennedy people. The bunch surrounding JFK was comprised of steely-eyed cold war liberals eager to show how the job of containing and rolling back communism should and could be done. Propelled by faith in their ideology, the New Frontiersmen backed the evermore ambitious plans of CIA for their proxy army. A glittering assemblage of unjustified assumptions and fond hopes was assembled. By the time it was necessary to make a final go/no-go decision, all hands with the exception of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had convinced themselves that the operation would succeed. Even the handful of doubters took comfort in the belief that should the operation stumble, the US military would come to the rescue.
When push did come to shove as it must, the belief that the cavalry would back the play of the invaders was proven false. For reasons good or bad President Kennedy refused to allow the US Navy, which was offshore with aircraft fueled and bombed up, to take part in the rapidly failing effort. Our aircraft were limited to making demonstration passes safely offshore, and the Marines most assuredly did not land.
Within two days it was all over. The invaders were all dead or captured. Castro was more firmly in control than ever. The US was humiliated. And, a valuable lesson should have been learned--there is no such thing as a plausibly deniable military operation after the administration of the United States had declared that a given foreign leader was unacceptable to it.
Before embarking on his strangely bifurcate effort in Libya, President Obama would have been very well advised to revisit the misadventure in Cuba. After all Mr Obama had made it clear that the policy goal of the US was the removal of Brother Leader Gaddafi (or choose the alternative spelling you prefer.) Once these words had passed the president's lips, the whole world knew just what the US, the purported front porch dog of the Free World, wanted in Libya. The real deal of the attendant UN Security Council resolution, for all its diplomatic pap (inserted so that neither Russia nor China would exercise the veto) about protecting civilians, was that the US in conjunction with at least two other Great Powers, France and the UK, sought the removal of Gaddifi. The Colonel would go, peacefully if possible, violently if that was the only option.
Every halfway thoughtful observer knows perfectly well that the removal of an obnoxious regime is not difficult. The US did the job in a matter of days in Afghanistan and mere weeks in Iraq. The removal part of regime change is easy to accomplish. The problems in both Afghanistan and Iraq came later--in the bootless attempt to create a modern Western style nation-state in Afghanistan and the very difficult task of seeing Iraq create of itself a reasonable simulacrum of a functioning nation-state with some aspects of democracy and rule of law.
In Libya the same paradigm would have applied if the Obama administration had not opted to retreat behind the screen of proxies, in this case NATO. When this choice was made, the path to a replay of the Bay of Pigs was charted.
Showing an abysmal ignorance of history--even very recent history, Mr Obama confused the removal part of regime change with the what-next? effort of seeing a new government created by a society unused to the freedom of creating its own polity. He also failed to understand that there is no way the US can hide the bright light of its policy under the bushel of a proxy.
Had the US gone full bore into Libya, including the use of ground forces for combat against Gaddafi's loyalist units, Brother Leader would be gone already. It is important to note that by removing the obnoxious leader the US would not have accrued an automatic responsibility for maintaining the good order within Libya. Nor would it have taken the burden of turning Libya into a modern, pluralistic Western style democratic nation-state. Both of these are misapprehensions.
The sole responsibility of the US would have been the execution of its declaratory policy--removing Gaddafi and by so doing protect civilians against the harm created by his loyalist forces. The follow-on of creating a national polity from the tribal matrix of Libya would have been up to the Libyans with whatever assistance from other states or international organizations they might request. The doctrine of R2P does not impose an unending task upon whatever state or states removes the threat to the civilians in need of protection.
Obama like Kennedy wanted to eat his cake while retaining it intact. Both presidents wanted to abate a nuisance to American policy interests but had no desire to carry the long term freight of reconstituting the polity. To this end both sought to use proxies. In part Obama has seen the rebels in Libya as the equivalent of the exile Cuban "freedom fighters" with NATO playing the role which should have been undertaken by the US at the Bay of Pigs.
The Libyan insurgents are an even weaker reed than were the exiles at the Bay of Pigs. This implies strongly that the Libyans would need even greater amounts of outside aid than did the Cubans of a half century ago. An acceptance of this ground truth places an even greater onus on the US to use effective military force against Gaddafi and his loyalists. Passing the buck to a divided and force impaired NATO set the stage for a stalemate in Libya and a loss of credibility for NATO.
Fifty years ago JFK made the worst decision possible. If Castro was as American declaratory policy had maintained completely unacceptable to us, a threat to the peace and stability of the Western Hemisphere and a potential threat to CONUS, the right decision was to send in our forces in sufficient numbers to abate the nuisance quickly and decisively. If, on the other hand, Castro was in fact a mere annoyance, a diplomatic conundrum, an embarrassment, the proper choice was to do nothing. The worst option by far was the unsupportable attempt at covert invasion by proxy forces.
So it is in Libya. If Gaddafi really is a challenge to national or strategic interests as Mr Obama's rhetoric holds, then the proper option is to go in fast and hard so as to remove the man and his forces. If, to the contrary, Gaddafi is a threat only to his own people, then the US should have stayed out. Or, if R2P is now to be a cornerstone of US policy, the correct choice is once again to move in openly, fast, and hard and then, after the removal of Gaddafi, back out and turn affairs over to the Libyans and whatever leaders they find in their midst giving only such aid as may be requested and justified.
From that list Mr Obama had a two in three chance of getting it right. He didn't. He chose the only bad option in the lot--the proxy effort to achieve American declaratory policy. He sought to justify his blunder by what must either be spectacular ignorance of recent history or flat out tergiversation. His use of Iraq, his "we have been down that road before" remark is a complete misrepresentation of what happened in Iraq. The regime was changed in mere weeks and the consequent internal war was in large measure the foreseeable and preventable consequence of an ill-founded effort at nation-building which could have been avoided by the simple expedient of leaving the matter up to the Iraqis and providing only such aid as they requested specifically.
The same could have been accomplished in Libya. All that was necessary was the assurance that the political goal was carefully and narrowly defined and that military force was crafted to achieve that goal. Bereft of any implied responsibility for giving the Libyans a turn-key modern Western style state (which they don't want in any event) the task of directly turning declaratory policy into actual events would have been easy.
JFK is one of Obama's heroes. It is too bad that the Nice Young Man From Chicago could not learn one simple lesson from Kennedy's second biggest blunder.
Showing posts with label Cuba. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cuba. Show all posts
Friday, April 22, 2011
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Human Rights And Propaganda
Tomorrow is a Day of Long Knives for the US at the UN Human Rights Council. The Obama administration, in an overly deep genuflection before the alter of international institutions, turned in a twenty-nine page document constituting the Universal Periodic Review of human rights in the US. In turn, a consortium of human rights advocacy groups headed by Human Rights Watch whipped out a four hundred page indictment of the US as a very grave violator of human rights.
On Friday, the speakers list in the Human Rights corral is oversubscribed by countries such as Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and China. Each is licking its metaphorical lips as it gets ready to get in its licks against Uncle Sam and the legions of human rights abusers currently running the slaughter house of liberty and justice known as the USA. For its part, the Obama administration has sent a thirty person delegation which it has been said, "will welcome all useful comments" but will actually serve as the designated flak catcher.
We the People are justifiably proud of our record in human rights. Not only have we been zealous, some would say too zealous, in pursuit of guaranteeing human, civil, and political rights to all resident within our borders, we are quite willing to acknowledge that perfection has not yet been reached. We should be equally proud of our political traditions--including one honored very much only in the breech by those countries so eager to tear a strip off our collective hind end. That particular tradition is freedom of expression which leads to white hot debate over contentious issues of rights such as a woman's right to control her own reproductive destiny or of two people of the same sex to enjoy a status equal in all respects to heterosexual marriage or just what constitutes pornography. Or what our immigration policy should be. The list goes on and on.
The citizens and residents of very, very few countries have the basic right to live in a social and political environment of free for all expression. The citizens and residents of very, very few countries understand that the consequences of the almost-anything-goes approach practiced in the US does, must, lead to social and political dynamics which are difficult to understand from the outside. As the media treatment in so many European media outlets made clear in their coverage of the recently concluded midterm elections, our methods of politics and expression seem not only disordered but dangerously chaotic when viewed from more staid, that is, more repressed venues.
It is the wide chasm separating the American approach to defining and solving collective problems from the methods employed in other states which makes the upcoming slice-and-dice session in Geneva more than a routine exercise in anti-Americanism. The countries already signed up on the Let's-Bash-The-US list for tomorrow are intent on inflicting a propaganda defeat on the US. The governments of Cuba, Iran, China, and the others understand that simple, simplistic attacks on the US are easy to understand throughout the world while the realities of American political and social discourse and practice are totally opaque to all but the most sophisticated and widely experienced (and not even all of those).
An example: Iran intends to excoriate the US, or more accurately, some American states, for having executed less than fifty people in the past year. The Iranians will portray the US not only as barbaric for its judicial killing fields but as a hypocrite for its criticism of other countries. There is no doubt but the Iranian delegation will not mention that Iran is second only to China in the number of executions or that Iran, unlike China but like other Muslim majority states, allows death by stoning for some crimes, most notably adultery.
Cuba intends to take the US to task for its immigration policies--using the Obama administration's characterization of the current system as "broken" as well as the four hundred page indictment referenced above as proof beyond rebuttal that the US is xenophobic, racist, and given to violating the presumed human rights of illegal immigrants beyond count. This from a country which has used force to prevent its citizens from leaving the Island Paradise Of Workers And Peasants.
Other states will aver that the pervasive racism of We the People condemns all people of color to perpetual poverty, systemic discrimination, and a fast track passage to prison. These states will take sections of the human rights consortium's four hundred page diatribe as well as words from the Obama administration review to substantiate the attack. No one will mention that the US has made massive strides toward eliminating the effects of past prejudice--often to the pronounced disadvantage of white males. Nor will it be mentioned that these strides were taken by We the People organically without any guidance from the "international community."
It goes almost without mention that none of those casting stones at Uncle Sam live in fragile glass houses. In the weird world of the UN Human Rights Council, those who sin most get to cast the first stone.
The problem, the danger, comes not from the fact that We the People cannot withstand baseless and evil criticism for nonexistent sins, but rather from the high likelihood that the malicious, malignant charges will be read and believed, heard and heeded in areas of the world where the interests of the US are both in play and at stake. The charges mouthed in Geneva will be repeated and magnified in most, if not all, the Arab-Muslim world. The same will happen in the three amigos of the Bolivarian Revolution. And, no surprise here, in China and Russia.
Whether from simple naivete or over subscription to an ideology celebrating the moral supremacy of international institutions, the Obama administration made a grave mistake by agreeing not only to join the Human Rights Council but to engage in the Universal Periodic Review process. No rational person well oriented in time and place could assume that any useful outcome would ensue. This hypothetical rational person could only conclude that the US handed a public diplomacy victory to hostile states.
In a completely unnecessary move, the Obama administration has compromised the status of the US in areas of the world where the key component of the war with advocates of violent political Islam is underway. The key component is, of course, the conflict of perceptions and images in the minds of the millions who have not yet firmly chosen a side.
In a basic way, the struggle for survival and supremacy between the US and other civilized states and the practitioners of violent political Islam focuses on the minds of the uncommitted majority. That's right, it is counterinsurgency writ large. It is in the short and long-term interest of the US to mobilize support from the uncommitted majority of Muslims so as, at the least, to deny their support to the perpetrators of jihad. It is not that the US wants or should want the majority of the world's Muslims to embrace our set of world views but, it is necessary that the same minds be convinced to add their voices to the struggle against the advocates of violent political Islam.
Consider in this context what a great victory it would be for the civilized states if a crowd of angry Muslims took to the street in one or another Muslim majority state to demand their government suppress quickly and resolutely Muslims who killed or terrorized Christian fellow citizens. The day that happens somewhere--Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia--the West could begin to breathe easily. Muslims would be publicly and vocally denouncing Muslims who crossed the line separating acceptable religion from unacceptable political action.
To achieve this end, it is not necessary (nor possible) to convince Muslims that we are the last, best hope of humankind. It is essential that we do not aid those hostile to us in branding the US as a violator of human rights, as a foul den of abusive inequity. The Day of Long Knives tomorrow does nothing to aid in achieving this essential.
The president and his "team" deserve a severe down check for having made such a major strategic blunder as the execution of a Universal Periodic Review. It was not an exercise in transparency or an illustration of our willingness to subject ourselves to the scrutiny of the world. It was a gesture of self-mutilation. A giving of an easy win to our mortal enemies.
On Friday, the speakers list in the Human Rights corral is oversubscribed by countries such as Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and China. Each is licking its metaphorical lips as it gets ready to get in its licks against Uncle Sam and the legions of human rights abusers currently running the slaughter house of liberty and justice known as the USA. For its part, the Obama administration has sent a thirty person delegation which it has been said, "will welcome all useful comments" but will actually serve as the designated flak catcher.
We the People are justifiably proud of our record in human rights. Not only have we been zealous, some would say too zealous, in pursuit of guaranteeing human, civil, and political rights to all resident within our borders, we are quite willing to acknowledge that perfection has not yet been reached. We should be equally proud of our political traditions--including one honored very much only in the breech by those countries so eager to tear a strip off our collective hind end. That particular tradition is freedom of expression which leads to white hot debate over contentious issues of rights such as a woman's right to control her own reproductive destiny or of two people of the same sex to enjoy a status equal in all respects to heterosexual marriage or just what constitutes pornography. Or what our immigration policy should be. The list goes on and on.
The citizens and residents of very, very few countries have the basic right to live in a social and political environment of free for all expression. The citizens and residents of very, very few countries understand that the consequences of the almost-anything-goes approach practiced in the US does, must, lead to social and political dynamics which are difficult to understand from the outside. As the media treatment in so many European media outlets made clear in their coverage of the recently concluded midterm elections, our methods of politics and expression seem not only disordered but dangerously chaotic when viewed from more staid, that is, more repressed venues.
It is the wide chasm separating the American approach to defining and solving collective problems from the methods employed in other states which makes the upcoming slice-and-dice session in Geneva more than a routine exercise in anti-Americanism. The countries already signed up on the Let's-Bash-The-US list for tomorrow are intent on inflicting a propaganda defeat on the US. The governments of Cuba, Iran, China, and the others understand that simple, simplistic attacks on the US are easy to understand throughout the world while the realities of American political and social discourse and practice are totally opaque to all but the most sophisticated and widely experienced (and not even all of those).
An example: Iran intends to excoriate the US, or more accurately, some American states, for having executed less than fifty people in the past year. The Iranians will portray the US not only as barbaric for its judicial killing fields but as a hypocrite for its criticism of other countries. There is no doubt but the Iranian delegation will not mention that Iran is second only to China in the number of executions or that Iran, unlike China but like other Muslim majority states, allows death by stoning for some crimes, most notably adultery.
Cuba intends to take the US to task for its immigration policies--using the Obama administration's characterization of the current system as "broken" as well as the four hundred page indictment referenced above as proof beyond rebuttal that the US is xenophobic, racist, and given to violating the presumed human rights of illegal immigrants beyond count. This from a country which has used force to prevent its citizens from leaving the Island Paradise Of Workers And Peasants.
Other states will aver that the pervasive racism of We the People condemns all people of color to perpetual poverty, systemic discrimination, and a fast track passage to prison. These states will take sections of the human rights consortium's four hundred page diatribe as well as words from the Obama administration review to substantiate the attack. No one will mention that the US has made massive strides toward eliminating the effects of past prejudice--often to the pronounced disadvantage of white males. Nor will it be mentioned that these strides were taken by We the People organically without any guidance from the "international community."
It goes almost without mention that none of those casting stones at Uncle Sam live in fragile glass houses. In the weird world of the UN Human Rights Council, those who sin most get to cast the first stone.
The problem, the danger, comes not from the fact that We the People cannot withstand baseless and evil criticism for nonexistent sins, but rather from the high likelihood that the malicious, malignant charges will be read and believed, heard and heeded in areas of the world where the interests of the US are both in play and at stake. The charges mouthed in Geneva will be repeated and magnified in most, if not all, the Arab-Muslim world. The same will happen in the three amigos of the Bolivarian Revolution. And, no surprise here, in China and Russia.
Whether from simple naivete or over subscription to an ideology celebrating the moral supremacy of international institutions, the Obama administration made a grave mistake by agreeing not only to join the Human Rights Council but to engage in the Universal Periodic Review process. No rational person well oriented in time and place could assume that any useful outcome would ensue. This hypothetical rational person could only conclude that the US handed a public diplomacy victory to hostile states.
In a completely unnecessary move, the Obama administration has compromised the status of the US in areas of the world where the key component of the war with advocates of violent political Islam is underway. The key component is, of course, the conflict of perceptions and images in the minds of the millions who have not yet firmly chosen a side.
In a basic way, the struggle for survival and supremacy between the US and other civilized states and the practitioners of violent political Islam focuses on the minds of the uncommitted majority. That's right, it is counterinsurgency writ large. It is in the short and long-term interest of the US to mobilize support from the uncommitted majority of Muslims so as, at the least, to deny their support to the perpetrators of jihad. It is not that the US wants or should want the majority of the world's Muslims to embrace our set of world views but, it is necessary that the same minds be convinced to add their voices to the struggle against the advocates of violent political Islam.
Consider in this context what a great victory it would be for the civilized states if a crowd of angry Muslims took to the street in one or another Muslim majority state to demand their government suppress quickly and resolutely Muslims who killed or terrorized Christian fellow citizens. The day that happens somewhere--Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia--the West could begin to breathe easily. Muslims would be publicly and vocally denouncing Muslims who crossed the line separating acceptable religion from unacceptable political action.
To achieve this end, it is not necessary (nor possible) to convince Muslims that we are the last, best hope of humankind. It is essential that we do not aid those hostile to us in branding the US as a violator of human rights, as a foul den of abusive inequity. The Day of Long Knives tomorrow does nothing to aid in achieving this essential.
The president and his "team" deserve a severe down check for having made such a major strategic blunder as the execution of a Universal Periodic Review. It was not an exercise in transparency or an illustration of our willingness to subject ourselves to the scrutiny of the world. It was a gesture of self-mutilation. A giving of an easy win to our mortal enemies.
Friday, April 17, 2009
Cuba Isn't The Distraction--Venezuela Is
President Obama still in pursuit of a diplomatic success after failing to find one in Europe and presenting a typical performance of show over substance in Mexico is hoping for a change of fortune at the Summit of the Americas. It is because the president's quest for a diplomatic coup on the level of the parting of the waters that members of his traveling circus have expressed a desire that Cuba's absence from the conflab in Port of Spain not prove a "distraction."
In spite of the more-than-welcome and long overdue minor change in US-Cuban relations announced by Obama a few days ago and Raul Castro's spring-loaded, favorable response, the always-open mouth of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez is working (that is to say, talking) overtime to assure Cuba is the central focus of the Summit. Supported by the other left-leaners of LatAm, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega, Chavez has been riding the Cuban horse for all it is worth.
In a very real sense Chavez needs Cuba more than Cuba needs him. More specifically, Chavez needs Cuba as it has been for nearly fifty years--standing on the outside of the Organization of American States (OAS) with its nose pressed against the glass. For Chavez, the ideal situation is one where the US continues with its long established and totally failed policy of isolating Cuba. If Cuba is kept on the outside, Chavez has no serious rival for the post of chief spokesman for the--stand by for standard issue, approved socialist terms-- underprivileged, marginalised, exploited majority of the LatAm population. At least within the halls of the OAS.
More, any continued exclusion of Cuba from the OAS and akin bodies gives Chavez an ongoing, perfect issue to prop up his claims of Yankee Imperialism and Wall Street Capitalist Exploitation. He needs this if he is to continue to enjoy the influence he has currently. He needs it even more if he is going to extend the Bolivarian agenda to more of Latin America.
Chavez is not going from triumph to triumph even considering his victory in his long running effort to amend the Venezuelan constitution so that he may become president-for-life. The decline in global oil prices which will persist for some time to come, perhaps measured in years, have eroded his much hyped re-armament program. At the same time the loss of petrobucks has undercut Chavez' ambitious social welfare program.
At the same time the bluster and bullying which have emanated from Caracas in great torrents at an ever increasing volume have caused more than a little nervousness in neighboring countries including Columbia and Brazil. Both countries, particularly the latter with its newly proven off-shore oil and natural gas reserves as well as a very well established and technologically competent industrial base, possess the capacity and (potentially) the will to contest Chavez' ambitions.
Hugo Chavez has been in the habit of nearly breaking his arm by patting himself on the back for having blocked the passage of the US supported hemispheric free trade agreement at the last Summit of the Americas. His success was far more shadow than substance.
There were other, more important, factors in play which taken in concert gave more than sufficient reason for a refusal to rush into a free-trade pact. The negative consequences of globalisation as well as the specific policies forced upon South American countries by the International Monetary Fund in support of globalisation and privatization were increasingly apparent to responsible LatAm governmental figures. Also, George W. Bush had made himself more than slightly detested in the region to a degree which made certain that anything he wanted would be resisted to the last trench.
If Mr Chavez is going to maintain high profile relevance in the councils of state throughout the region, he needs Cuba as a club with which to beat the US. Without the example of Cuba the Great Man of the Bolivarian Movement has nothing to enhance his credibility when attacking the US as an arrogant, imperious hemispheric hegemon. He has to hope (and pray, if Bolivarians are in the habit of doing such) that the US will not take any rapid steps toward full normalisation of relations with Cuba.
He has two reasons for hope. The first is that American domestic politics will inhibit any Obama administration action beyond the small, symbolic steps that have already been taken. The second is that of working on the egos of the Castro brothers with a view toward seeing them impose unacceptable conditions for accepting normalisation.
Giving Chavez has even more reason to believe he has some real chance of delaying or derailing normalisation is the fact that President Obama needs political cover for further, faster progress toward undoing a half century of bad American policy. This need has been made explicit by the president's requirement that Cuba make some genuine moves toward authentic political liberalization.
Given the very touchy Cuban understanding of nationalism and threats to it, making and meeting American demands for political changes is about as demanding a job as defusing an IED while wearing boxing gloves. Chavez has the ear of one or both Castro brothers. We can be sure what he is whispering (shouting?) in them is carefully calculated to make the job of "de-isolating" Cuba tougher, much tougher.
Chavez probably will push the mute button on his anti-American noise machine at least part of the time in Port of Spain. This will not be due to any respect Chavez may feel for his American counterpart. It won't even be a consequence of Obama's (to use the new MSM buzzword) "rock star" status in LatAm. Rather the relative low volume of Chavez diatribes will be propelled by a natural desire to see the new American president not be cast in the role of victim. Chavez is too good a local politician not to know that the same folks who cheered his attacks on W. Bush would rush to the defense of Obama.
As observers ranging from Nicholas Sarkozy to Mexican newsmedia have noted at some length, President Obama is very long on show but very, very short on relevant substance. Obama both acknowledges and justifies the truth of this observation in a rather backhanded way.
The Obama mantra, "I'm here to listen" is a very useful tool for avoiding policy pronouncements while at the same time appearing to be the polar opposite of the universally detested W. Bush. Up to a point the Listen-Don't-Talk gambit is fine, even excellent.
However much foreign leaders may feel flattered by the attention directed to their words by an American president, the gambit can only be taken so far. Even though it is good for American presidents to hear the concerns, hopes and anxieties of his foreign counterparts (after all there is a good chance he will actually learn something) there comes a point when people want to hear the American chief of state.
They want to know what US policy is and will be. They want a firm point around which to rally their own gambits, their own demarches, their own positions. This is true of allies and enemies alike. The universal expectation is that the US will have a policy for or against which their own might be mobilized and directed.
The crucial need for an American president speaking candidly on a matter of policy substance is underscored by the roles of Cuba and Venezuela at the Summit of the Americas. Throughout Latin American there has been little, if any, support for the US policy of Cuban isolation. This is what gives Chavez much of his clout.
If--as likely as Osama bin Laden converting to Catholicism--President Obama would announce that the US has dropped all objections to Cuba's rejoining the OAS in time for its May meeting, LatAm leaders would be happy, very happy to listen. There would be a couple of exceptions to this, like Chavez, Morales, Correa and Ortega.
But why should we listen to them?
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Khamenei Slam Dunks Obama
There is nothing surprising about the response offered by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the Persian New Year's tape of President Obama. The flat rejection was telegraphed by assorted underlings in the political apparatus of Tehran.
The Iranian rejection was (or at least should have been) expected by the professionals at Foggy Bottom and Langley. The tide of revolution is still riding high in Iran even though the actuality of deposing the ancien regime is more than a generation in the past.
Revolutionary zeal is most prolonged when external opposition is prolonged, high visibility but not fatal in effect. The analogy can be seen in Cuba. There the US has been implacably hostile or, at best, angrily indifferent to the regime.
The US embarked on a policy of active hostility including diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and even para-military operations nearly a half-century ago. Even after the most obnoxious features of the failed policy were abandoned in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy Assassination, the diplomatic and economic bars remained in place.
The US effort gave the Castro regime all the cover it needed not only to emplace the accomplishments of the 26th of July Movement in concrete, but to provide the excuses and justifications required to establish a police state, embark on foreign policy adventures and not address deep, systematic problems in the Cuban economy. US policy became Castro's best and most necessary accomplice.
(Can we say, "Law of Unintended Consequences?")
The US government and We the People threw a mighty hissy-fit following the Iranian Hostage Affair. It goes almost without saying that the capture of the American embassy by the so-called "students" was authorised and controlled by Ayatollah Khomenei. The event demonstrated to Iranians and the world that the Iranian Revolution was real, potent, outrageous of old norms and permanent. The permanence was assured by the American fear and loathing directed at Iran following the release of the hostages.
At the time of the Hostage Affair as well as in its wake a few perceptive individuals commented that under the Islamist rhetoric and seeming insanity the Ayatollah Khomenei was a shrewd and very skilled Iranian politician. He quite obviously understood the cruciality of an external enemy in maintaining and consolidating the Revolution. It was the Ayatollah who assigned the role of Great Satan to the US.
The Reagan administration cheerfully accepted the role, seemingly without thought. Once accepted the role could not be easily cast off. The inertia of American domestic political considerations made that certain.
The worst effects of the US having signed on to the Iranian game plan came during the Iraq-Iran War. The US tilted far--too far--toward Iraq. The reasons adduced for this tilt were at best dubious, at worst mere twaddle.
The effect of the US orchestrated global isolation of Iran during the war has blown back on us in recent years. Not only was Saddam Hussein strengthened in his power by the US policy, Iran was tossed over to the paranoid fringe of defensiveness.
When the UN--which in the estimate of Tehran was an American tool--did not come down four square in support of Iran's animadversions of having been the target of illegal chemical weapons, a policy Rubicon was crossed in the mullahocracy. Never again would Iran lack the necessary means of deterrence and retaliation. The country would develop and field weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and, in the fullness of time, nuclear.
The isolation, the hostility, interacted with the exsanguination of the Iraq-Iran War to buttress the revolutionary commitment of the Iranian religious and political leadership--and the mass of Iranian citizens as well. This dynamic resulted in two factors which bedevil us today.
The first of these is the Iranian drive for a nuclear capacity. The quest is expensive, very expensive. The assorted UN Security Council imposed sanctions as well as the American add-ons have increased the expense.
Every increase in cost has been ignored by Tehran at best. Met with truculent rhetoric more typically. Responded to by indirect application of counter threat at worst.
Ironically, but predictably, every attempt to abate the Iranian nuclear nuisance has made the nuisance harder to abate. Now there seems little likelihood that the Iranians will abandon either enrichment or the potential of acquiring plutonium from their soon-to-go-online heavy water "research" reactor.
The second consequence of the Us-Against-All-Of-The-World attitude so easily inculcated and nourished in the Shia population of Iran with its long, long history of persecution and war was the policy goal of leaping the ring of containment presented by the US and its Persian Gulf "allies" such as Wahhibist Saudi Arabia.
Leaping lines of containment was pioneered by the Soviet Union during the Fifties and Sixties. The Iranians followed the Moscow designed strategy.
Using the history-is-on-our-side appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Moscow fostered movements and wars of "national liberation" with the goal and intent of violating the global lines drawn by the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Proxy war and propaganda worked together to make less relevant the "Free World-Soviet Bloc" paradigm which informed US foreign policy. (It also had the desirable side effect of causing the US to fritter away diplomatic, economic and military resources in remote and inconsequential areas of the globe.)
The mullahocracy of Iran has also deployed the history-is-on-our-side ideology. True, this time it is derived from "sacred" rather than secular sources. But, the effect is the same. Yes, the ideology is drawn from the minority Shia experience, but it is powerfully reinforced by the undeniable successes of the Iranian Revolution in opposing the US and the West generally.
The most high profile result of the Iranian effort to leap the line has been its alliance with Syria and sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah. It deserves mention that the Iranian "outreach" efforts in countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines has not been without measurable success.
The House of Sand (oops! The Geek meant, Saud) has wakened to the danger in the past year or so along with some of the other Gulf States, but the awakening may have come a bit late and may have as its primary effect the reinforcing of Sunni Islamist groups both Wahhibist and Salifist. Other target states which have received the ministrations of the Iranian "Angels" are even further behind the curve and thus far more at risk of internally destabilizing effects from pro-Iranian Islamist groups.
So, to steal a title from one of Lenin's most famous works, "What is to be done?"
This is a genuine toughy. As with China and Cuba, the US has locked itself into a long duration policy of confrontation with Iran.
Now, the US did once in its recent history reverse a long standing effort of hostile confrontation. That one worked well from our perspective. At least initially.
The Nixon administration in one fell swoop abandoned twenty years of opposing the Peoples Republic of China. The Nixonites saw that the US and the PRC had an interlocking national and strategic interest. Both had a common rival in the Soviet Union. Beijing and Washington saw in each other a counter to Moscow. We both "seen our opportunity and took it." (With apologies to George Washington Plunkett.)
The same imperative has never existed with respect to Cuba. It does not exist in the case of Iran. Our opportunity came and was untaken twenty years ago as Chemical Ali's bombs fell on unprotected Iranian troops.
This brute fact seems to rule out any replay of Kissinger's "secret" trip to China forty years ago. It seems to obviate the potential for a dramatic rapprochement with Tehran. Certainly the terms for rapprochement laid out by Ayatollah Khameni are unacceptable. Great Powers may alter their policies thus tacitly admitting past errors, but they do not apologise.
(For the record, there is no hint that Lesser Powers make a habit of apologising. Being a government means never having to say you're sorry.)
Dropping sanctions without some sort of quid pro quo is also a non-starter. To do such would only embolden, would simply stoke revolutionary zeal and appeal with long term results which would not be desirable from an American perspective.
This leaves keeping to our present course. It implies an increase in sanctions. This means gaining full support from both Moscow and Beijing. This in turn implies that the US will have to have something to offer in return. Beijing is unthreatened by anything Iran does in the near to mid-term. Moscow feels qualified to deal with Iran unaided if a real threat seems to be developing.
Both countries may be right. The US may have to grant that point and keep its fingers crossed. The fall back position is greater reliance upon EU countries to firmly enforce the sanction regime. Given the leakage caused by German and French companies, there is room for improvement. A lot of room.
However, under current global economic conditions the Europeans are not going to do anything which harms national interest. What, if anything, can the US offer to offset this understandable position? Hard to say. But, probably not enough.
Well, what about the Israeli option?
Realistically that option does not yet exist. The Israelis will require US assistance and support. The climate is not right for that move. Yet.
That leaves public diplomacy. We have heard the official response from the mullahocracy. We have not yet heard from the "outlying precincts," the Iranian people. In a few more days word will start electronically leaking out in sufficient quantity to get some sense on the degree to which the average sort-of-upscale Iranian supports or opposes the Ayatollah-in-Chief.
If there are any grounds for encouragement, President Obama should go back to the TV studio. His greatest personal tool is his (teleprompter dependent) rhetoric and engaging public persona. Keep on using it, Mr President, you may be our best, least secret weapon. What the heck, it's better than bombs bursting in the sand.
The Iranian rejection was (or at least should have been) expected by the professionals at Foggy Bottom and Langley. The tide of revolution is still riding high in Iran even though the actuality of deposing the ancien regime is more than a generation in the past.
Revolutionary zeal is most prolonged when external opposition is prolonged, high visibility but not fatal in effect. The analogy can be seen in Cuba. There the US has been implacably hostile or, at best, angrily indifferent to the regime.
The US embarked on a policy of active hostility including diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and even para-military operations nearly a half-century ago. Even after the most obnoxious features of the failed policy were abandoned in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy Assassination, the diplomatic and economic bars remained in place.
The US effort gave the Castro regime all the cover it needed not only to emplace the accomplishments of the 26th of July Movement in concrete, but to provide the excuses and justifications required to establish a police state, embark on foreign policy adventures and not address deep, systematic problems in the Cuban economy. US policy became Castro's best and most necessary accomplice.
(Can we say, "Law of Unintended Consequences?")
The US government and We the People threw a mighty hissy-fit following the Iranian Hostage Affair. It goes almost without saying that the capture of the American embassy by the so-called "students" was authorised and controlled by Ayatollah Khomenei. The event demonstrated to Iranians and the world that the Iranian Revolution was real, potent, outrageous of old norms and permanent. The permanence was assured by the American fear and loathing directed at Iran following the release of the hostages.
At the time of the Hostage Affair as well as in its wake a few perceptive individuals commented that under the Islamist rhetoric and seeming insanity the Ayatollah Khomenei was a shrewd and very skilled Iranian politician. He quite obviously understood the cruciality of an external enemy in maintaining and consolidating the Revolution. It was the Ayatollah who assigned the role of Great Satan to the US.
The Reagan administration cheerfully accepted the role, seemingly without thought. Once accepted the role could not be easily cast off. The inertia of American domestic political considerations made that certain.
The worst effects of the US having signed on to the Iranian game plan came during the Iraq-Iran War. The US tilted far--too far--toward Iraq. The reasons adduced for this tilt were at best dubious, at worst mere twaddle.
The effect of the US orchestrated global isolation of Iran during the war has blown back on us in recent years. Not only was Saddam Hussein strengthened in his power by the US policy, Iran was tossed over to the paranoid fringe of defensiveness.
When the UN--which in the estimate of Tehran was an American tool--did not come down four square in support of Iran's animadversions of having been the target of illegal chemical weapons, a policy Rubicon was crossed in the mullahocracy. Never again would Iran lack the necessary means of deterrence and retaliation. The country would develop and field weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and, in the fullness of time, nuclear.
The isolation, the hostility, interacted with the exsanguination of the Iraq-Iran War to buttress the revolutionary commitment of the Iranian religious and political leadership--and the mass of Iranian citizens as well. This dynamic resulted in two factors which bedevil us today.
The first of these is the Iranian drive for a nuclear capacity. The quest is expensive, very expensive. The assorted UN Security Council imposed sanctions as well as the American add-ons have increased the expense.
Every increase in cost has been ignored by Tehran at best. Met with truculent rhetoric more typically. Responded to by indirect application of counter threat at worst.
Ironically, but predictably, every attempt to abate the Iranian nuclear nuisance has made the nuisance harder to abate. Now there seems little likelihood that the Iranians will abandon either enrichment or the potential of acquiring plutonium from their soon-to-go-online heavy water "research" reactor.
The second consequence of the Us-Against-All-Of-The-World attitude so easily inculcated and nourished in the Shia population of Iran with its long, long history of persecution and war was the policy goal of leaping the ring of containment presented by the US and its Persian Gulf "allies" such as Wahhibist Saudi Arabia.
Leaping lines of containment was pioneered by the Soviet Union during the Fifties and Sixties. The Iranians followed the Moscow designed strategy.
Using the history-is-on-our-side appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Moscow fostered movements and wars of "national liberation" with the goal and intent of violating the global lines drawn by the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Proxy war and propaganda worked together to make less relevant the "Free World-Soviet Bloc" paradigm which informed US foreign policy. (It also had the desirable side effect of causing the US to fritter away diplomatic, economic and military resources in remote and inconsequential areas of the globe.)
The mullahocracy of Iran has also deployed the history-is-on-our-side ideology. True, this time it is derived from "sacred" rather than secular sources. But, the effect is the same. Yes, the ideology is drawn from the minority Shia experience, but it is powerfully reinforced by the undeniable successes of the Iranian Revolution in opposing the US and the West generally.
The most high profile result of the Iranian effort to leap the line has been its alliance with Syria and sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah. It deserves mention that the Iranian "outreach" efforts in countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines has not been without measurable success.
The House of Sand (oops! The Geek meant, Saud) has wakened to the danger in the past year or so along with some of the other Gulf States, but the awakening may have come a bit late and may have as its primary effect the reinforcing of Sunni Islamist groups both Wahhibist and Salifist. Other target states which have received the ministrations of the Iranian "Angels" are even further behind the curve and thus far more at risk of internally destabilizing effects from pro-Iranian Islamist groups.
So, to steal a title from one of Lenin's most famous works, "What is to be done?"
This is a genuine toughy. As with China and Cuba, the US has locked itself into a long duration policy of confrontation with Iran.
Now, the US did once in its recent history reverse a long standing effort of hostile confrontation. That one worked well from our perspective. At least initially.
The Nixon administration in one fell swoop abandoned twenty years of opposing the Peoples Republic of China. The Nixonites saw that the US and the PRC had an interlocking national and strategic interest. Both had a common rival in the Soviet Union. Beijing and Washington saw in each other a counter to Moscow. We both "seen our opportunity and took it." (With apologies to George Washington Plunkett.)
The same imperative has never existed with respect to Cuba. It does not exist in the case of Iran. Our opportunity came and was untaken twenty years ago as Chemical Ali's bombs fell on unprotected Iranian troops.
This brute fact seems to rule out any replay of Kissinger's "secret" trip to China forty years ago. It seems to obviate the potential for a dramatic rapprochement with Tehran. Certainly the terms for rapprochement laid out by Ayatollah Khameni are unacceptable. Great Powers may alter their policies thus tacitly admitting past errors, but they do not apologise.
(For the record, there is no hint that Lesser Powers make a habit of apologising. Being a government means never having to say you're sorry.)
Dropping sanctions without some sort of quid pro quo is also a non-starter. To do such would only embolden, would simply stoke revolutionary zeal and appeal with long term results which would not be desirable from an American perspective.
This leaves keeping to our present course. It implies an increase in sanctions. This means gaining full support from both Moscow and Beijing. This in turn implies that the US will have to have something to offer in return. Beijing is unthreatened by anything Iran does in the near to mid-term. Moscow feels qualified to deal with Iran unaided if a real threat seems to be developing.
Both countries may be right. The US may have to grant that point and keep its fingers crossed. The fall back position is greater reliance upon EU countries to firmly enforce the sanction regime. Given the leakage caused by German and French companies, there is room for improvement. A lot of room.
However, under current global economic conditions the Europeans are not going to do anything which harms national interest. What, if anything, can the US offer to offset this understandable position? Hard to say. But, probably not enough.
Well, what about the Israeli option?
Realistically that option does not yet exist. The Israelis will require US assistance and support. The climate is not right for that move. Yet.
That leaves public diplomacy. We have heard the official response from the mullahocracy. We have not yet heard from the "outlying precincts," the Iranian people. In a few more days word will start electronically leaking out in sufficient quantity to get some sense on the degree to which the average sort-of-upscale Iranian supports or opposes the Ayatollah-in-Chief.
If there are any grounds for encouragement, President Obama should go back to the TV studio. His greatest personal tool is his (teleprompter dependent) rhetoric and engaging public persona. Keep on using it, Mr President, you may be our best, least secret weapon. What the heck, it's better than bombs bursting in the sand.
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Cuba--It's Way Past Time For A Change
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the triumph of the Cuban Revolution will be upon us in a couple of days. In the spirit of New Year's Resolutions and the inevitable accompaniment of nostalgia, the Geek wants to take a retrospective view of US-Cuban relations and argue that the Cold War is over, the Cuban Revolution is a fact on the ground, and it's time for a change.
The Geek is ancient enough to remember the victorious entrance of Fidel Castro and the rest of his bearded crew into Havana on New Year's Day 1959. Like many of his age he had watched the progress of the rebels with supportive interest over the previous years.
Indeed many Americans cheered Castro and the 26th of July Movement as they fought rather romantically through the hills of the Sierra Madre against the inept forces of the corrupt and brutal dictator, Batista. The Eisenhower Administration had done much during 1958 to assure the success of Castro and Company. For example, the administration stopped the flow of military supplies and instructed our ambassador to suggest strongly that Batista and his cronies seek retirement somewhere (other than the United States.).
The Eisenhower Administration acknowledged both publicly and privately that there were good reasons to see Castro replace the kleptocracy of Batista and his buddies from the American organised crime syndicates. The Administration hoped but was never really sure that other, non-criminal investments and property in Cuba would be safe from expropriation. There were hints of an emerging consensus within the second tier of administration officials.
The consensus focused on the idea that should expropriation occur it would be accompanied by appropriate, fair compensation. Balancing this was the fear that the nature of the compensation, while actually fair, would be seen by interested parties as not being fair. The parallel was with events in Guatemala following the Arbenz government's seizure of United Fruit company property. The Guatemalan government had offered compensation based on the declarations of value made by United Fruit for tax purposes. Not surprisingly these artificially low evaluations were unacceptable to UF and the race was on to oust Arbenz as a "Communist Menace."
Virtually all Eisenhower hands who had bothered to scan the intelligence assessments of the 26th of July Movement leadership acknowledged that the Castro brothers, Che and others were Marxist. Some of the administration officials, again mainly those on the second and third tier, saw this as no barrier to normal relations. After all it could (and was) argued that the US had reasonably normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Tito's Yugoslavia.
In the opposing corner were memories of the "Who Lost China" attacks which had performed yeoman service to Republican Party political fortunes in the 1952 elections. How much worse it would be if the Democrats could in 1960 demand to know just who had let the commies into the Western Hemisphere.
The result was the Eisenhower administration's decision not to decide but rather to engage in a combination of watchful waiting and "correct" relations with the new Cuban government. The administration and the American public didn't have to wait and watch for long.
The Cuban Revolutionaries were a young, highly emotional bunch. But much more than mere boyish enthusiasm was at work as the firing squads plied their dreadful trade in the dry moat of Morro Castle as crowds yelled, "Parado! Parado! at informal open air trials of alleged Batista goon squad members The American public including many who had been pro-Castro were nauseated to say the least.
Firing squads were followed by the paper work of expropriation (with compensation in the form of Cuban government bonds) and waves of Cuban refugees. As the US found out in recent years from its experience in Iraq, refugees and expats, particularly those of the former elite, are piss poor providers of accurate and useful intelligence.
Goaded by the expropriations--or, to err on the side of accuracy, the mighty moans of those corporate and private entities whose financial bull had been gored by the Cubans and annoyed by the seemingly irresponsible actions of Castro during a visit to the United Nations, the Eisenhower Administration made a major error.
While the Ike boo-boo might not have been in the same league with that of George W. Bush and the neocon ninnies in 2003, it was nonetheless both large and long lasting in effect. The root cause of the blunder was the Administration's acceptance of Cuban refugee protestations to the effect that Castro was hated by the Cuban people and could be deposed. Easily deposed.
To make a long and very sad story short, the Administration withdrew diplomatic recognition, ended economic aid, and used its diplomatic muscle to isolate the revolutionary government. This masterstroke produced an easily predictable result. Cuba and Castro turned in the direction of the Kremlin. In turn the Russian bear hugged the island and its bearded, fatigue wearing leader to its warm and furry breast.
The 26th of July Movement and its Marxist leaders had not been some sort of syphilitic chancre on the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The American attempt at strangling the revolution in its crib made it one.
The first Eisenhower blunder had been bad enough. But, it got worse. Much worse. And, fast.
In a classic case of how not to run covert operations, the Administration ginned up a bloated CIA operated series of hit-and-run attacks on Cuba. This was followed by the planning for the landing of a guerrilla force recruited from the refugee stream with the goal of fostering an anti-Castro general uprising.
Lest one get the impression that only Republican Administrations are capable of committing world-class acts of stupidity consider the next tragic chapter. The Administration of JFK proved itself both more persistently idiotic than its predecessor and more robust in its ill-considered actions.
Instead of cancelling the planned insertion of exile "freedom fighters: before they were landed in the Bay of Pigs, the New Frontiersmen beefed the exercise up to the level of a minor amphibious forcible entry. Compounding the chaos of error, President Kennedy tried to abort the operation as it was underway, thus assuring that it failed in a highly visible and humiliating way.
Neither JFK nor his younger, even more testosterone driven brother, Robert were inclined to allow humiliation to pass unpunished. The Brothers Kennedy went after Castro hammer and tongs with (c)overt operations, assassination attempts and finally the plan for a full-bore, all-out US invasion of the island which was ended by the killing of JFK in Dallas only months before the scheduled D-day.
It should not be forgotten that the overly muscular and completely unjustified exercises in removing Castro nearly brought about a nuclear exchange between the US and USSR in October 1962. The Russians stood "eye ball to eye ball" with us and "blinked first." This sort of thing is not a tribute to rational statesmanship.
The Republicans played the Cuban card as part of the successful Nixon era "Southern strategy" in 1968, thus giving the Cuban exile communities of Florida and New Jersey a political power which they neither deserved nor earned. As a result Cuba became one more "third rail" in US politics so that no reevaluation of the failed US policy of isolation and confrontation was possible.
Cuba soldiered on. Dependant upon subsidies from the Soviet Union it became a less than totally reliable Soviet proxy but nonetheless proved itself capable of causing much mischief in both the Western Hemisphere and Africa.
The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Kremlin's dole, but Cuba and Castro continued on. The accomplishments of the Revolution were both real and secure enough to survive the years of economic deprivation which ensued. In the past decade Cuba has recovered economically to a sizable extent thanks to the rest of the world not being so politically fossilized as the US.
Fidel lingers on still making the occasional pronouncement. The Cuban people survive, even begin to prosper at least in some part. The Revolution has created, as the Israelis like to say, "facts on the ground." The time has come at long, long last for the US to get a grip on the facts.
It is time for a change. Without any preconditions or apologies, the next administration should enter into discussions with a view to normalising relations with Cuba quickly and completely.
Yes, the aging expat community as well as some of the children and grandchildren of the refugees will whine and moan. Yes, some of the Right will howl that the Obama Administration is "soft on Communism" or that it tolerates "human rights abusers" or some such irrelevant zaniness.
There are sizable benefits which might accrue to the US and its national interests by dropping the half century of lunacy regarding Cuba. Normalising relations would have the potential of impairing the new neo-Castroite regimes of Venezuela, and Bolivia. It would rock the born again Sandinistas of Nicaragua. It might even show the countries to our south that the US is capable of acknowledging and rectifying mistaken policy--a first.
Oh, for all those capitalists out there, Cuban waters cover sizable deposits of that much maligned but still quite necessary commodity--oil. And, there is one heck of a potential used car market down there. All those Fifties vintage pieces of good American iron are getting in real need of replacement.
The Geek is ancient enough to remember the victorious entrance of Fidel Castro and the rest of his bearded crew into Havana on New Year's Day 1959. Like many of his age he had watched the progress of the rebels with supportive interest over the previous years.
Indeed many Americans cheered Castro and the 26th of July Movement as they fought rather romantically through the hills of the Sierra Madre against the inept forces of the corrupt and brutal dictator, Batista. The Eisenhower Administration had done much during 1958 to assure the success of Castro and Company. For example, the administration stopped the flow of military supplies and instructed our ambassador to suggest strongly that Batista and his cronies seek retirement somewhere (other than the United States.).
The Eisenhower Administration acknowledged both publicly and privately that there were good reasons to see Castro replace the kleptocracy of Batista and his buddies from the American organised crime syndicates. The Administration hoped but was never really sure that other, non-criminal investments and property in Cuba would be safe from expropriation. There were hints of an emerging consensus within the second tier of administration officials.
The consensus focused on the idea that should expropriation occur it would be accompanied by appropriate, fair compensation. Balancing this was the fear that the nature of the compensation, while actually fair, would be seen by interested parties as not being fair. The parallel was with events in Guatemala following the Arbenz government's seizure of United Fruit company property. The Guatemalan government had offered compensation based on the declarations of value made by United Fruit for tax purposes. Not surprisingly these artificially low evaluations were unacceptable to UF and the race was on to oust Arbenz as a "Communist Menace."
Virtually all Eisenhower hands who had bothered to scan the intelligence assessments of the 26th of July Movement leadership acknowledged that the Castro brothers, Che and others were Marxist. Some of the administration officials, again mainly those on the second and third tier, saw this as no barrier to normal relations. After all it could (and was) argued that the US had reasonably normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Tito's Yugoslavia.
In the opposing corner were memories of the "Who Lost China" attacks which had performed yeoman service to Republican Party political fortunes in the 1952 elections. How much worse it would be if the Democrats could in 1960 demand to know just who had let the commies into the Western Hemisphere.
The result was the Eisenhower administration's decision not to decide but rather to engage in a combination of watchful waiting and "correct" relations with the new Cuban government. The administration and the American public didn't have to wait and watch for long.
The Cuban Revolutionaries were a young, highly emotional bunch. But much more than mere boyish enthusiasm was at work as the firing squads plied their dreadful trade in the dry moat of Morro Castle as crowds yelled, "Parado! Parado! at informal open air trials of alleged Batista goon squad members The American public including many who had been pro-Castro were nauseated to say the least.
Firing squads were followed by the paper work of expropriation (with compensation in the form of Cuban government bonds) and waves of Cuban refugees. As the US found out in recent years from its experience in Iraq, refugees and expats, particularly those of the former elite, are piss poor providers of accurate and useful intelligence.
Goaded by the expropriations--or, to err on the side of accuracy, the mighty moans of those corporate and private entities whose financial bull had been gored by the Cubans and annoyed by the seemingly irresponsible actions of Castro during a visit to the United Nations, the Eisenhower Administration made a major error.
While the Ike boo-boo might not have been in the same league with that of George W. Bush and the neocon ninnies in 2003, it was nonetheless both large and long lasting in effect. The root cause of the blunder was the Administration's acceptance of Cuban refugee protestations to the effect that Castro was hated by the Cuban people and could be deposed. Easily deposed.
To make a long and very sad story short, the Administration withdrew diplomatic recognition, ended economic aid, and used its diplomatic muscle to isolate the revolutionary government. This masterstroke produced an easily predictable result. Cuba and Castro turned in the direction of the Kremlin. In turn the Russian bear hugged the island and its bearded, fatigue wearing leader to its warm and furry breast.
The 26th of July Movement and its Marxist leaders had not been some sort of syphilitic chancre on the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. The American attempt at strangling the revolution in its crib made it one.
The first Eisenhower blunder had been bad enough. But, it got worse. Much worse. And, fast.
In a classic case of how not to run covert operations, the Administration ginned up a bloated CIA operated series of hit-and-run attacks on Cuba. This was followed by the planning for the landing of a guerrilla force recruited from the refugee stream with the goal of fostering an anti-Castro general uprising.
Lest one get the impression that only Republican Administrations are capable of committing world-class acts of stupidity consider the next tragic chapter. The Administration of JFK proved itself both more persistently idiotic than its predecessor and more robust in its ill-considered actions.
Instead of cancelling the planned insertion of exile "freedom fighters: before they were landed in the Bay of Pigs, the New Frontiersmen beefed the exercise up to the level of a minor amphibious forcible entry. Compounding the chaos of error, President Kennedy tried to abort the operation as it was underway, thus assuring that it failed in a highly visible and humiliating way.
Neither JFK nor his younger, even more testosterone driven brother, Robert were inclined to allow humiliation to pass unpunished. The Brothers Kennedy went after Castro hammer and tongs with (c)overt operations, assassination attempts and finally the plan for a full-bore, all-out US invasion of the island which was ended by the killing of JFK in Dallas only months before the scheduled D-day.
It should not be forgotten that the overly muscular and completely unjustified exercises in removing Castro nearly brought about a nuclear exchange between the US and USSR in October 1962. The Russians stood "eye ball to eye ball" with us and "blinked first." This sort of thing is not a tribute to rational statesmanship.
The Republicans played the Cuban card as part of the successful Nixon era "Southern strategy" in 1968, thus giving the Cuban exile communities of Florida and New Jersey a political power which they neither deserved nor earned. As a result Cuba became one more "third rail" in US politics so that no reevaluation of the failed US policy of isolation and confrontation was possible.
Cuba soldiered on. Dependant upon subsidies from the Soviet Union it became a less than totally reliable Soviet proxy but nonetheless proved itself capable of causing much mischief in both the Western Hemisphere and Africa.
The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Kremlin's dole, but Cuba and Castro continued on. The accomplishments of the Revolution were both real and secure enough to survive the years of economic deprivation which ensued. In the past decade Cuba has recovered economically to a sizable extent thanks to the rest of the world not being so politically fossilized as the US.
Fidel lingers on still making the occasional pronouncement. The Cuban people survive, even begin to prosper at least in some part. The Revolution has created, as the Israelis like to say, "facts on the ground." The time has come at long, long last for the US to get a grip on the facts.
It is time for a change. Without any preconditions or apologies, the next administration should enter into discussions with a view to normalising relations with Cuba quickly and completely.
Yes, the aging expat community as well as some of the children and grandchildren of the refugees will whine and moan. Yes, some of the Right will howl that the Obama Administration is "soft on Communism" or that it tolerates "human rights abusers" or some such irrelevant zaniness.
There are sizable benefits which might accrue to the US and its national interests by dropping the half century of lunacy regarding Cuba. Normalising relations would have the potential of impairing the new neo-Castroite regimes of Venezuela, and Bolivia. It would rock the born again Sandinistas of Nicaragua. It might even show the countries to our south that the US is capable of acknowledging and rectifying mistaken policy--a first.
Oh, for all those capitalists out there, Cuban waters cover sizable deposits of that much maligned but still quite necessary commodity--oil. And, there is one heck of a potential used car market down there. All those Fifties vintage pieces of good American iron are getting in real need of replacement.
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
When Democracy Goes Sour
Former paratrooper Hugo Chavez promised his fellow Venezuelans a new and better deal through his program of "Socialism For the 21st Century." Enough folks believed him.
He was elected president. He survived a recall move.
Hugo Chavez was a big believer in democracy. He flew the flag of vox populi, vox dei high and proud.
Until the people said no to Hugo's proposed reform (read evisceration) of the constitution a couple of months back
Subsequently the Chavez regime dropped its false flag of democracy and raised the skull and crossbones of authoritarianism. Close down the television and radio stations that refuse to parrot the party line. Bash the heads of those who disagree with the regime's view of life.
Now Chavez has taken the next logical step. By an executive decree formulated in secret and sprung on the nation. (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/americas/03venez.html?th&emc=th) The new measure is not the sort which warms the hearts of pro-democracy types anywhere.
It must however make some of Hugo's nearest and dearest friends such as the Castro brothers very happy. It might even bring smiles to Hugo's new buddies, the Tehran mullahocracy.
What is the decree?
It "reorganises" the country's intelligence services. Nothing wrong with that. The US did it as well in the wake of 9/11.
There is such a thing as carrying reorganisation too far. Not that Hugo would admit that he could possibly do such a thing.
You tell me: Are the following features indicative of an over the top approach or not?
The decree requires full cooperation between members of the judiciary and the two new intelligence services, one of which focuses exclusively upon domestic threats to the government. Those judges who do not share fully with the domestic spooks (and accept their guidance) face mandatory imprisonment.
The decree requires all Venezuelans to cooperate fully not only with the secret police but even those "citizens" organisations loyal to Chavez under penalty of imprisonment for up to six years in the case of non cooperative government employees. That's as good a deal as KGB and its predecessors ever got in the old Soviet Union.
Of course the use of "citizens'" groups to assist the secret police in ferreting out and squashing dissent is taken right from the Cuban model of socialism. In Cuba the local neighborhood watch groups called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution have a long, dreary record of assuring that the Fidelistas can keep a tight lid on dissent of any sort.
Socialism For The 21st Century closely resembles the Police States Of The 20th Century.
Democracy anyone?
Initially the new fiat was justified by Interior Minister Ramón RodrÃguez ChacÃn as being necessary to combat "interference by the United States" by assuring that the secret police held a tight “ideological commitment.” Later, faced by a completely unexpected torrent of opposition he retreated slightly, “We are talking about the responsibility all Venezuelans have with the security of the state and the resolution of any crime."
The regime didn't intend any restriction of free expression or repression of political institutions. So averred the head of the secret police.
Right. And gasoline costs under a buck a gallon anywhere in the US.
Not all Venezuelans rolled over and licked the Chavez boot. Take for example the statement by a senior member of the national judiciary.
“We are before a set of measures that are a threat to all of us,” said Blanca Rosa Mármol de León, a justice on Venezuela’s top court, in a rare public judicial dissent. “I have an obligation to say this, as a citizen and a judge. This is a step toward the creation of a society of informers.”
A damn big step!
Chavez slashed back at critics like the justice by alleging that they were supporters of the imperialism of George W. Bush. He added that his new diktat would protect Venezuela against "imperialist attacks" and assure the country's "national security."
How many sins have been committed in the name of "national security" not only overseas but here in the United States?
At least here we have a periodic opportunity to endorse or reject the actions taken on behalf of our national security. At least here--unlike Cuba, Iran or, now, Venezuela we have a strong measure of protection against zealous snoops seeking to limit our right of dissent and opposition to those in power.
(The Geek maintains that position despite the numerous attempts by the current administration and the wallahs in Congress to infringe on our individual and collective rights of debate, dissent and disagreement. Yes, much of the PATRIOT act is objectionable and the FBI as well as other agencies have abused their authority in electronic interceptions and surveillance, but not nearly so egregiously as was the case forty or fifty years ago. We survived those abuses and will survive the more recent ones.)
Those who live under the sway of Hugo Chavez's delusions of adequacy will probably not have the chance to effectively oppose the new decree. Venezuela itself may survive but only after repression is resisted, blood flows and a new (hopefully) more humane order emerges.
Chavez may last as long as Castro, but unlike the Cubans who exchanged a brutal, corrupt dictatorship for a less corrupt but equally repressive and inefficient one, Venezuela has experienced genuine democracy and an open society for most of the past several decades. They are not used to grovelling before the authority of the state.
It's going to take more than a secret police force and a legion of snitches, more than Russian weapons and Iranian banking agreements, more than a high price for oil to keep Chavez in power long.
Hugo should have thought it through before he hauled up the jolly roger of dictatorship. In the end pirates are hung.
He was elected president. He survived a recall move.
Hugo Chavez was a big believer in democracy. He flew the flag of vox populi, vox dei high and proud.
Until the people said no to Hugo's proposed reform (read evisceration) of the constitution a couple of months back
Subsequently the Chavez regime dropped its false flag of democracy and raised the skull and crossbones of authoritarianism. Close down the television and radio stations that refuse to parrot the party line. Bash the heads of those who disagree with the regime's view of life.
Now Chavez has taken the next logical step. By an executive decree formulated in secret and sprung on the nation. (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/americas/03venez.html?th&emc=th) The new measure is not the sort which warms the hearts of pro-democracy types anywhere.
It must however make some of Hugo's nearest and dearest friends such as the Castro brothers very happy. It might even bring smiles to Hugo's new buddies, the Tehran mullahocracy.
What is the decree?
It "reorganises" the country's intelligence services. Nothing wrong with that. The US did it as well in the wake of 9/11.
There is such a thing as carrying reorganisation too far. Not that Hugo would admit that he could possibly do such a thing.
You tell me: Are the following features indicative of an over the top approach or not?
The decree requires full cooperation between members of the judiciary and the two new intelligence services, one of which focuses exclusively upon domestic threats to the government. Those judges who do not share fully with the domestic spooks (and accept their guidance) face mandatory imprisonment.
The decree requires all Venezuelans to cooperate fully not only with the secret police but even those "citizens" organisations loyal to Chavez under penalty of imprisonment for up to six years in the case of non cooperative government employees. That's as good a deal as KGB and its predecessors ever got in the old Soviet Union.
Of course the use of "citizens'" groups to assist the secret police in ferreting out and squashing dissent is taken right from the Cuban model of socialism. In Cuba the local neighborhood watch groups called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution have a long, dreary record of assuring that the Fidelistas can keep a tight lid on dissent of any sort.
Socialism For The 21st Century closely resembles the Police States Of The 20th Century.
Democracy anyone?
Initially the new fiat was justified by Interior Minister Ramón RodrÃguez ChacÃn as being necessary to combat "interference by the United States" by assuring that the secret police held a tight “ideological commitment.” Later, faced by a completely unexpected torrent of opposition he retreated slightly, “We are talking about the responsibility all Venezuelans have with the security of the state and the resolution of any crime."
The regime didn't intend any restriction of free expression or repression of political institutions. So averred the head of the secret police.
Right. And gasoline costs under a buck a gallon anywhere in the US.
Not all Venezuelans rolled over and licked the Chavez boot. Take for example the statement by a senior member of the national judiciary.
“We are before a set of measures that are a threat to all of us,” said Blanca Rosa Mármol de León, a justice on Venezuela’s top court, in a rare public judicial dissent. “I have an obligation to say this, as a citizen and a judge. This is a step toward the creation of a society of informers.”
A damn big step!
Chavez slashed back at critics like the justice by alleging that they were supporters of the imperialism of George W. Bush. He added that his new diktat would protect Venezuela against "imperialist attacks" and assure the country's "national security."
How many sins have been committed in the name of "national security" not only overseas but here in the United States?
At least here we have a periodic opportunity to endorse or reject the actions taken on behalf of our national security. At least here--unlike Cuba, Iran or, now, Venezuela we have a strong measure of protection against zealous snoops seeking to limit our right of dissent and opposition to those in power.
(The Geek maintains that position despite the numerous attempts by the current administration and the wallahs in Congress to infringe on our individual and collective rights of debate, dissent and disagreement. Yes, much of the PATRIOT act is objectionable and the FBI as well as other agencies have abused their authority in electronic interceptions and surveillance, but not nearly so egregiously as was the case forty or fifty years ago. We survived those abuses and will survive the more recent ones.)
Those who live under the sway of Hugo Chavez's delusions of adequacy will probably not have the chance to effectively oppose the new decree. Venezuela itself may survive but only after repression is resisted, blood flows and a new (hopefully) more humane order emerges.
Chavez may last as long as Castro, but unlike the Cubans who exchanged a brutal, corrupt dictatorship for a less corrupt but equally repressive and inefficient one, Venezuela has experienced genuine democracy and an open society for most of the past several decades. They are not used to grovelling before the authority of the state.
It's going to take more than a secret police force and a legion of snitches, more than Russian weapons and Iranian banking agreements, more than a high price for oil to keep Chavez in power long.
Hugo should have thought it through before he hauled up the jolly roger of dictatorship. In the end pirates are hung.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Ghost Of Fidel Haunts Current Administration
The Geek has to wonder if the Commander Guy and the neocon ninnies around him have noticed that Cuba--and the Castro boys--have been slogging on despite our ever present disapproval. He also has to scratch his head over the warning issued today by the CG sternly telling Fidel that the US will not continence his turning power over to little brother Raul.
Hasn't anyone mentioned to the encapsulated Decider that effective transfer of power has already occurred? Isn't that what the National Intelligence Czar is supposed to do? Isn't that one of the reasons the US has an enormous intelligence community?
Or, is the Commander and Decider pursuing some arcane political advantage with the aging expatriate Cuban community in Florida? In the alternative, have some of the nagging neocons with their visions of democracy and free enterprise in action yet undimmed by the dust of Iraq once again gained control of the current administration's decision-making loop?
At the moment, the latter seems probable given the invocation of the march of democracy through Latin America.
Ahh, yes! Democracy in action. Gotta love it.
Democracy brought Hugo Chavez to the presidency of Venezuela. It (aided by Chavez' closing of opposition radio and television stations and a host of questionable election practices) gave birth to the changes in the Venezuelan constitution giving authoritarian powers to the neo-Castroite.
Democracy in action has brought about neo-Castroite regimes in Ecuador and Bolivia.
What does the current administration think? Is it convinced that blowing the same ancient warnings and implied threats will bring about democracy in action in Cuba? Is it somehow convinced that by doing this the results of democracy in action in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia will be rolled back?
The evil synergy of ideology and perceived domestic political gain has powered some of the worst foreign policy errors in US history including the "Who-Lost-China?" debacle which shackled US policy in Asia for decades to say nothing of the forty-eight years of stupidity regarding Cuba.
If the US really wants to constructively engage Cuba, and the three neo-Castroite regimes in South America, it has to change its diplomatic and rhetorical course. Continuation of elderly, long proven to be ineffective postures is not only ideologically blind and intellectually bankrupt, it is counterproductive to the max.
There is nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
American national interest in Latin America and the Caribbean basin is furthered by open, authentic dialogue which is free from ideological cant. It requires that the deep thinkers at the policy level have ears as well as mouths.
The governments and peoples of Latin America do not constitute a monolith. Each nation has a different history, varied needs, separate priorities, and, never forget this, a unique, subjectively defined national interest.
Nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
Cuba and the Cubans have been living with the consequences both good and bad of the success of the 26th of July Movement for two generations now. There have been no, repeat, no genuine, large scale indications of dissatisfaction. If the Castro boys were the icky-poo repressors of Cuba, coups would have been attempted, insurgent movements would have populated the hills.
This hasn't happened. Even though the US stood ready, willing, and somewhat able to foster and assist wannabe over throwers of the Evil Island Empire as events of the early 1960s demonstrated.
Yes, the internal security establishment in Cuba is pervasive and effective. But, not that effective.
History has shown that no government can be totally effective at total repression over time. For a few years, yes. For a couple or three decades, probably. Day after day for a half century? Not likely.
This implies strongly that the Castro regime has what we Americans like to call the "consent of the governed." That means that most, if not all, Cubans see their regime as possessing either or both existential and functional legitimacy. To Cubans, or at least a critical mass of them, the current regime of the Castro brothers is their government, indigenous, organic, not imposed from without. Further, to the Cuban people, or at least a critical mass, the current regime delivers a satisfactory enough overall quality of life.
Ironically, the existential legitimacy of the Castro regime has been enhanced over time by the unyielding opposition of the United States. Administration after administration has failed to understand that pressure consolidates the political will and cohesion of the target population long before it shatters it.
The Commander Guy's stern speech would assure the overwhelming election of Raul Castro if elections were to take place tomorrow.
(Hint to the Cubans: Why not try it? Why not put the current administration to the ultimate test? Have an election. Go ahead, elect Raul, if that's who you want. Ask Jimmy Carter to monitor the election. That would put the current administration in the put-up or shut-up whipsaw.)
In the spirit of even-handedness, the Geek has a hint for the current administration. (Well, to err on the side of accuracy, two of them.)
Hint number one: Elections are a nice idea perhaps. But, democracy is not a panacea. It never has been. Elections bring good results. They are equally likely to bring bad ones. Elections can be and often are shams. They have no inherent white magic. So, current administration, quit pandering to a myth. Ask yourselves, what are we going to do if Raul or someone else like him wins an election in Cuba?
Hint number two: (Pay attention now, this is a several step hint.) Great Powers--like the United States--have long term national interests which are best served by a world order which is stable, predictable, and manageable over time.
Long term interests, history shows, are not, repeat, not served by hectoring another country. Neither are they served by attempting to export our systems and the myths that support them by coercive methods.
History also shows (in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines among others) that the long term stability so needed by a Great Power is not served by supporting or fostering tin plated dictators who promise short duration order.
Finally, history shows beyond even the irrational doubts of neocon ninnies that the greatest of Great Powers can have meaningful impact upon another country's social and political institutions only by working with the organic, indigenous trajectories which have developed within that country. The changes within a society or polity have both direction and inertia.
The inertia of human myths, beliefs, institutions is greater than any in the physical world. Get a grip on that.
The trajectories of the Cuban people cannot and will not be changed by stern words out of Washington. Fidel knows that. As a result, he rejected the words even before they were officially uttered.
Unfortunately for us the Commander Guy isn't is smart as the aging, ailing Cuban.
Hasn't anyone mentioned to the encapsulated Decider that effective transfer of power has already occurred? Isn't that what the National Intelligence Czar is supposed to do? Isn't that one of the reasons the US has an enormous intelligence community?
Or, is the Commander and Decider pursuing some arcane political advantage with the aging expatriate Cuban community in Florida? In the alternative, have some of the nagging neocons with their visions of democracy and free enterprise in action yet undimmed by the dust of Iraq once again gained control of the current administration's decision-making loop?
At the moment, the latter seems probable given the invocation of the march of democracy through Latin America.
Ahh, yes! Democracy in action. Gotta love it.
Democracy brought Hugo Chavez to the presidency of Venezuela. It (aided by Chavez' closing of opposition radio and television stations and a host of questionable election practices) gave birth to the changes in the Venezuelan constitution giving authoritarian powers to the neo-Castroite.
Democracy in action has brought about neo-Castroite regimes in Ecuador and Bolivia.
What does the current administration think? Is it convinced that blowing the same ancient warnings and implied threats will bring about democracy in action in Cuba? Is it somehow convinced that by doing this the results of democracy in action in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia will be rolled back?
The evil synergy of ideology and perceived domestic political gain has powered some of the worst foreign policy errors in US history including the "Who-Lost-China?" debacle which shackled US policy in Asia for decades to say nothing of the forty-eight years of stupidity regarding Cuba.
If the US really wants to constructively engage Cuba, and the three neo-Castroite regimes in South America, it has to change its diplomatic and rhetorical course. Continuation of elderly, long proven to be ineffective postures is not only ideologically blind and intellectually bankrupt, it is counterproductive to the max.
There is nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
American national interest in Latin America and the Caribbean basin is furthered by open, authentic dialogue which is free from ideological cant. It requires that the deep thinkers at the policy level have ears as well as mouths.
The governments and peoples of Latin America do not constitute a monolith. Each nation has a different history, varied needs, separate priorities, and, never forget this, a unique, subjectively defined national interest.
Nothing hard to understand about that.
Is there?
Cuba and the Cubans have been living with the consequences both good and bad of the success of the 26th of July Movement for two generations now. There have been no, repeat, no genuine, large scale indications of dissatisfaction. If the Castro boys were the icky-poo repressors of Cuba, coups would have been attempted, insurgent movements would have populated the hills.
This hasn't happened. Even though the US stood ready, willing, and somewhat able to foster and assist wannabe over throwers of the Evil Island Empire as events of the early 1960s demonstrated.
Yes, the internal security establishment in Cuba is pervasive and effective. But, not that effective.
History has shown that no government can be totally effective at total repression over time. For a few years, yes. For a couple or three decades, probably. Day after day for a half century? Not likely.
This implies strongly that the Castro regime has what we Americans like to call the "consent of the governed." That means that most, if not all, Cubans see their regime as possessing either or both existential and functional legitimacy. To Cubans, or at least a critical mass of them, the current regime of the Castro brothers is their government, indigenous, organic, not imposed from without. Further, to the Cuban people, or at least a critical mass, the current regime delivers a satisfactory enough overall quality of life.
Ironically, the existential legitimacy of the Castro regime has been enhanced over time by the unyielding opposition of the United States. Administration after administration has failed to understand that pressure consolidates the political will and cohesion of the target population long before it shatters it.
The Commander Guy's stern speech would assure the overwhelming election of Raul Castro if elections were to take place tomorrow.
(Hint to the Cubans: Why not try it? Why not put the current administration to the ultimate test? Have an election. Go ahead, elect Raul, if that's who you want. Ask Jimmy Carter to monitor the election. That would put the current administration in the put-up or shut-up whipsaw.)
In the spirit of even-handedness, the Geek has a hint for the current administration. (Well, to err on the side of accuracy, two of them.)
Hint number one: Elections are a nice idea perhaps. But, democracy is not a panacea. It never has been. Elections bring good results. They are equally likely to bring bad ones. Elections can be and often are shams. They have no inherent white magic. So, current administration, quit pandering to a myth. Ask yourselves, what are we going to do if Raul or someone else like him wins an election in Cuba?
Hint number two: (Pay attention now, this is a several step hint.) Great Powers--like the United States--have long term national interests which are best served by a world order which is stable, predictable, and manageable over time.
Long term interests, history shows, are not, repeat, not served by hectoring another country. Neither are they served by attempting to export our systems and the myths that support them by coercive methods.
History also shows (in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, the Philippines among others) that the long term stability so needed by a Great Power is not served by supporting or fostering tin plated dictators who promise short duration order.
Finally, history shows beyond even the irrational doubts of neocon ninnies that the greatest of Great Powers can have meaningful impact upon another country's social and political institutions only by working with the organic, indigenous trajectories which have developed within that country. The changes within a society or polity have both direction and inertia.
The inertia of human myths, beliefs, institutions is greater than any in the physical world. Get a grip on that.
The trajectories of the Cuban people cannot and will not be changed by stern words out of Washington. Fidel knows that. As a result, he rejected the words even before they were officially uttered.
Unfortunately for us the Commander Guy isn't is smart as the aging, ailing Cuban.
Monday, October 8, 2007
Happy Death Day, Che!
It tickles the Geek's funny bone whenever Fidel Castro launches into a paroxysm of praise accompanied by (crocodile) tears for Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the "exceptional combatant." Today marks the fortieth anniversary of Che's death at the hands of Bolivian troops. Cuba has pulled out the grief stops. See, as one example of the edifying spectacle (there are plenty of others) http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hkACLP0VAQzT6D6uEIRp84J-nv9QD8S583NG0.
Fidel gushes, "I halt in my daily combat to bow my head, with respect and gratitude, to the exceptional combatant who fell on the 8th of October 40 years ago." As if that wasn't enough even for an emotional old man, the Maximum Leader adds, "I give him thanks for what he tried to do, and for what he could not do in his country of birth because he was like a flower yanked prematurely from its stem."
Wow! That's enough to make the Geek weep.
Still, the Geek has to blow the whistle on Fidel's play.
Way back then, in the mid-Sixties when Fidel sent Che off on his travelling guerrilla theatrical production with the ostensible end of promoting revolution throughout South America, the "exceptional combatant" had become a pain in the patootie for the Maximum Leader and his little brother, Raul.
Che had become Trotsky to Fidel's Stalin.
Che wanted to export the revolution. Fidel wanted to assure revolutionary permanence in Cuba. Internal political considerations prevented Fidel from taking the Stalinist approach--a show trial followed by a bullet in the back of the head. The "no person, no problem" option wasn't viable.
The next best thing was to send Che off on a quixotic adventure in revolution. If the adventure proved successful, Cuba would benefit. If, as was far more likely, it failed, Fidel would have a very useful martyr.
The Argentinian born, Mexican trained physician turned rebel was a fine orator, a true believer in revolution, and a hopelessly inept guerrilla theorist, leader, and commander. His so-called "great victory" over a unit of the Batista army was really a self-inflicted defeat by the local commander who was even more incompetent than Che.
Che's great exercise in exporting the revolution was a cropper from the get-go. He picked the wrong place, the wrong potential recruits, and made more "noise" in the bush than a hippo in church. It was a no-brainer for the CIA, US Special Operations personnel, and Bolivian army units to nail Che and his ragged assemblage of wannabe freedom fighters.
The US did not want Che dead. CIA and military personnel on the ground in Bolivia didn't want him dead. A corpse has no use.
The Bolivians didn't see it that way. They brushed aside American protests and perforated the Cuban bandit. It was our loss.
It was Cuba's gain. Che as martyr was far more valuable to the lads in Havana than he had been as a guerrilla or Cuba's first Minister of Industry.
Che as symbol spread around the (Western) world. His poster hung on more than a few US college dorm rooms. His picture became iconic. His words became an inspiration to quite a few of the American New Left and their counterparts in Europe.
Live, Che was a flop. Dead, he became a megastar.
There is a lesson here. A lesson for all those who call for the head of Osama bin Laden, dead, or his body in an orange jumpsuit if taken alive.
As a strategist, Osama can't even aspire to the low levels achieved by Che. As a tactician, Osama is on the same abysmal level. But as a symbol--
In the symbol department, Osama bin Laden has it all over Che Guevara. As an icon, Osama bin Laden alive surpasses in effectiveness the best Che achieved dead.
A dead bin Laden, let alone one made to do the "perp walk" for the slavering delight of the great unwashed, would exceed Che at his best by orders of magnitude.
Get a grip on that reality those of you who demand, "Bring me the head of Osama bin Laden!"
Fidel gushes, "I halt in my daily combat to bow my head, with respect and gratitude, to the exceptional combatant who fell on the 8th of October 40 years ago." As if that wasn't enough even for an emotional old man, the Maximum Leader adds, "I give him thanks for what he tried to do, and for what he could not do in his country of birth because he was like a flower yanked prematurely from its stem."
Wow! That's enough to make the Geek weep.
Still, the Geek has to blow the whistle on Fidel's play.
Way back then, in the mid-Sixties when Fidel sent Che off on his travelling guerrilla theatrical production with the ostensible end of promoting revolution throughout South America, the "exceptional combatant" had become a pain in the patootie for the Maximum Leader and his little brother, Raul.
Che had become Trotsky to Fidel's Stalin.
Che wanted to export the revolution. Fidel wanted to assure revolutionary permanence in Cuba. Internal political considerations prevented Fidel from taking the Stalinist approach--a show trial followed by a bullet in the back of the head. The "no person, no problem" option wasn't viable.
The next best thing was to send Che off on a quixotic adventure in revolution. If the adventure proved successful, Cuba would benefit. If, as was far more likely, it failed, Fidel would have a very useful martyr.
The Argentinian born, Mexican trained physician turned rebel was a fine orator, a true believer in revolution, and a hopelessly inept guerrilla theorist, leader, and commander. His so-called "great victory" over a unit of the Batista army was really a self-inflicted defeat by the local commander who was even more incompetent than Che.
Che's great exercise in exporting the revolution was a cropper from the get-go. He picked the wrong place, the wrong potential recruits, and made more "noise" in the bush than a hippo in church. It was a no-brainer for the CIA, US Special Operations personnel, and Bolivian army units to nail Che and his ragged assemblage of wannabe freedom fighters.
The US did not want Che dead. CIA and military personnel on the ground in Bolivia didn't want him dead. A corpse has no use.
The Bolivians didn't see it that way. They brushed aside American protests and perforated the Cuban bandit. It was our loss.
It was Cuba's gain. Che as martyr was far more valuable to the lads in Havana than he had been as a guerrilla or Cuba's first Minister of Industry.
Che as symbol spread around the (Western) world. His poster hung on more than a few US college dorm rooms. His picture became iconic. His words became an inspiration to quite a few of the American New Left and their counterparts in Europe.
Live, Che was a flop. Dead, he became a megastar.
There is a lesson here. A lesson for all those who call for the head of Osama bin Laden, dead, or his body in an orange jumpsuit if taken alive.
As a strategist, Osama can't even aspire to the low levels achieved by Che. As a tactician, Osama is on the same abysmal level. But as a symbol--
In the symbol department, Osama bin Laden has it all over Che Guevara. As an icon, Osama bin Laden alive surpasses in effectiveness the best Che achieved dead.
A dead bin Laden, let alone one made to do the "perp walk" for the slavering delight of the great unwashed, would exceed Che at his best by orders of magnitude.
Get a grip on that reality those of you who demand, "Bring me the head of Osama bin Laden!"
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
The Limits (and Power) of US Economic Warfare
This post is motivated by a thoughtful comment entered on a previous post by Watcher in the Center. Watcher's comment is linked to Geek Demands a New Historical Analogy.
Economic sanctions up to and including total trade embargoes have a long standing historical appeal to US policy makers and We the People. While having a strong appeal, the success record of economic sanctions is not so sterling.
The closest to a complete success in pursuit of a major policy goal ever achieved by a trade embargo was the repeal of the highly obnoxious Stamp Act by the British Parliament in the 1760s. Since then the win/loss ratio has not been impressive.
In the years before the War of 1812, the US government tried to influence both British and French policy. The goal was limited. The US wanted its "rights" as a neutral to be respected by both belligerents. Not only did the embargo acts fail in their purpose, they served to nearly impoverish New England with its heavy dependence upon overseas commerce. (Oh, the embargo act and its successor, Macon's Bill Number Two, almost got the US embroiled in a war with both Great Britain and Napoleon's France.)
Jumping forward a century and a quarter, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt employed a campaign of escalating sanctions against Imperial Japan. The sanction program was gradual, well considered, and ultimately--when the US froze Japanese funds thus preventing the sale of petroleum, aviation gasoline, and scrap steel--left Tokyo with two choices: A humiliating capitulation to US policy requirements regarding China or war.
We know which they chose.
Not quite forty years later, US trade sanctions did not induce the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. Nor, a few years later did a virtual embargo on Panama (which used the dollar as its circulating medium) induce the country to disgorge Manuel Noriega. We had to send the US military as the world's largest SWAT team to arrest the man. (Sometimes regime change is harder than initially expected.)
With all that as background, let's push on to get a grip on Cuba and Iran once again.
During the years 1959-1961, the US diplomatic and economic embargo on Cuba had a disastrous effect upon the country's economy, which had been very heavily dependent upon selling its sugar and tobacco crops to the US. Cuba had also received significant national income from US tourism.
All of that came to a screeching stop with the embargo.
After Fidel declared Cuba to be a "socialist" nation, he was able to arrange increasing assistance from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact regimes. Even with the flow of money from Moscow and its satellites, the Cuban economy remained enfeebled.
The enfeeblement worsened as a result of badly bungled efforts by the Fidelistas to create a model economy. The ineptitude of some Cuban economic development schemes was sufficiently impressive to make the Geek wonder whether or not there had ever been any real need for the US economic sanctions in the first place.
Subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Cuba has been forced to compete on the international commodities export market. For some time, Havana benefited from a special relationship between itself and an ideological soulmate, Hanoi. But, that tie has weakened in recent years. The Fidelistas have opened tourism facilities to appeal to the Northern European market with some success. Balancing this is the Cuban government's uncanny ability to annoy trading partners at critical moments (with the exception, of course, of the Neo-Castroite regime in Venezuela.)
Still, the bottom line reads that Cuba soldiers on despite or because of the original and continuing US economic sanctions....
"Wait one, Geek." you shout. "What do you mean, 'because of'?"
That's the critical point. Every time the Castroistas had to announce another painful tug inwards on the collective Cuban belt, the blame could be foisted off on the Norteamericanos. The distress felt by a person and the anger that distress produced would be directed, not at Havana, but at Washington.
Take a good grip on a reality the Geek has mentioned many times before. Pressure consolidates long before it fractures.
Whether the pressure is economic, political, psychological, or military, pressure from an outside regime on the government and people of a nation will consolidate political will and support of the government. Eventually the pressure may cause political fractures. However, that eventually can be a bloody long time in coming.
The economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the US gave the inept Fidelistas a perfect out every time one or another of their pet economic schemes came a cropper. Point a finger (the Geek won't say which one) to the north. Scream loudly, "Parado, Uncle Sam!"
Beautiful, isn't it?
The same mechanism can be seen during the long decade of economic sanctions directed at Saddam Hussein's Iraq following the success of Operation Play in the Sandbox in 1991. The Iraqi people (but not the Iraqi government or military) were hurt, even desperately hurt by the sanctions. The middle class was financially wiped out. The well connected, the grifters, and the grafters made out like bandits.
All the while, the boys at the top in Baghdad could point, not at themselves, but at the faraway evil gnomes of Washington. Don't look at us! Look at Uncle Sam.
Beautiful, isn't it?
Now for Iran. Time to test the analogy again. Look for guide posts from previous experiences such as Cuba.
The mullahocracy has shown itself to be almost as pathetic in economic matters as the Castroistas. However, Iran started at a higher level than Cuba, and oil is more remunerative to a country than sugar cane. Additionally, Iran is not an island. That brings some automatic advantages. (Hint: mesh petroleum and natural gas with long, wide steel tubes.)
Iran also has some disadvantages compared to Cuba. It's population is larger and younger--much, much younger--than that of Cuba. The mullahs have not been as successful as the Castroites in transmitting revolutionary ideological zeal to the second (or third) generation. Today's technology assures that a significant percentage of Iran's youthful population will have its residual sense of revolutionary purpose challenged by a sense of rising expectations constantly thwarted by the old men with beards and a copy of the Quran.
Early signs of fault lines, generational and otherwise, have been appearing in Iran over recent years. Drawing on the general precept proven so often by history that outsider applied pressure consolidates long before it fractures, the most important guide post is this. Any economic sanctions must not, repeat, not, be seen as coming directly or indirectly from the United States.
Considering Iran's current economic condition, the dependence upon both neighboring countries and private enterprises located at great distance for so much of Iran's ambitions and giving appropriate weight to the signs of nascent disaffiliation within the Iranian population, economic sanctions have a fair chance of bringing about a positive outcome. That is, economic pressures might, just might, have a quieting effect upon the mullahs if one overriding caveat is followed.
The caveat?
The US follow a very difficult policy. The US must work quickly to normalize diplomatic relations with Tehran. Washington must not go public on sanctions of either a diplomatic or economic nature. Simultaneously, the weight of the US must come to bear on critical nodes of Iranian technological, economic, and diplomatic support, whether private companies or governments.
There are several important ramifications of this course of action. For it to work, the US must stop acting like it is what it is--the world's only Great Power. We must take Russia seriously as another Great Power. We must do the same with the Peoples' Republic of China. Diplomatic and public relations fences with Turkey, Syria and Pakistan must be mended with rapidity.
The Geek acknowledges the historical truth of the proposition that kicking one diplomatic rock may start an avalanche of change. To have any prospect of controlling the direction and velocity of the changes, the current--or, far more likely, the next--administration must develop a firm view of the world we would prefer to live in and a consistent road map on how to get there from here.
Even then the results will not be certain.
You can legitimately ask, "To what avail would all this be? Particularly since there is no guarantee of success."
The optimal case would be the increase of political disaffiliation within Iran. In that case the mullahs and their rock of support, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would become increasingly preoccupied with the requirements for domestic pacification. Energy, money and personnel which go into the task of quieting or assuaging political unrest are not available to expend on foreign adventures or technological quests. The Geek is neither calling for nor expecting a revolution in Iran. He would like to see an inward turn by the regime and their knock off of the SS.
Worst realistic case? Al-Quds Force ramps up its foreign actions. The mullahs are able to rally support from the mass of young men without a good, secure future. The rhetoric and behavior of the Tehran regime becomes increasingly frenzied and dangerous. Iran gets the bomb.
There is time enough for war, when and if the worst case comes to pass. Until then, let us try to do a better job than we have done with either Cuba or Iraq. The result will not be certain nor predictable with precision...
But--get a real tight grip on this--war is always uncertain and certainly unpredictable in its results.
Economic sanctions up to and including total trade embargoes have a long standing historical appeal to US policy makers and We the People. While having a strong appeal, the success record of economic sanctions is not so sterling.
The closest to a complete success in pursuit of a major policy goal ever achieved by a trade embargo was the repeal of the highly obnoxious Stamp Act by the British Parliament in the 1760s. Since then the win/loss ratio has not been impressive.
In the years before the War of 1812, the US government tried to influence both British and French policy. The goal was limited. The US wanted its "rights" as a neutral to be respected by both belligerents. Not only did the embargo acts fail in their purpose, they served to nearly impoverish New England with its heavy dependence upon overseas commerce. (Oh, the embargo act and its successor, Macon's Bill Number Two, almost got the US embroiled in a war with both Great Britain and Napoleon's France.)
Jumping forward a century and a quarter, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt employed a campaign of escalating sanctions against Imperial Japan. The sanction program was gradual, well considered, and ultimately--when the US froze Japanese funds thus preventing the sale of petroleum, aviation gasoline, and scrap steel--left Tokyo with two choices: A humiliating capitulation to US policy requirements regarding China or war.
We know which they chose.
Not quite forty years later, US trade sanctions did not induce the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. Nor, a few years later did a virtual embargo on Panama (which used the dollar as its circulating medium) induce the country to disgorge Manuel Noriega. We had to send the US military as the world's largest SWAT team to arrest the man. (Sometimes regime change is harder than initially expected.)
With all that as background, let's push on to get a grip on Cuba and Iran once again.
During the years 1959-1961, the US diplomatic and economic embargo on Cuba had a disastrous effect upon the country's economy, which had been very heavily dependent upon selling its sugar and tobacco crops to the US. Cuba had also received significant national income from US tourism.
All of that came to a screeching stop with the embargo.
After Fidel declared Cuba to be a "socialist" nation, he was able to arrange increasing assistance from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact regimes. Even with the flow of money from Moscow and its satellites, the Cuban economy remained enfeebled.
The enfeeblement worsened as a result of badly bungled efforts by the Fidelistas to create a model economy. The ineptitude of some Cuban economic development schemes was sufficiently impressive to make the Geek wonder whether or not there had ever been any real need for the US economic sanctions in the first place.
Subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Cuba has been forced to compete on the international commodities export market. For some time, Havana benefited from a special relationship between itself and an ideological soulmate, Hanoi. But, that tie has weakened in recent years. The Fidelistas have opened tourism facilities to appeal to the Northern European market with some success. Balancing this is the Cuban government's uncanny ability to annoy trading partners at critical moments (with the exception, of course, of the Neo-Castroite regime in Venezuela.)
Still, the bottom line reads that Cuba soldiers on despite or because of the original and continuing US economic sanctions....
"Wait one, Geek." you shout. "What do you mean, 'because of'?"
That's the critical point. Every time the Castroistas had to announce another painful tug inwards on the collective Cuban belt, the blame could be foisted off on the Norteamericanos. The distress felt by a person and the anger that distress produced would be directed, not at Havana, but at Washington.
Take a good grip on a reality the Geek has mentioned many times before. Pressure consolidates long before it fractures.
Whether the pressure is economic, political, psychological, or military, pressure from an outside regime on the government and people of a nation will consolidate political will and support of the government. Eventually the pressure may cause political fractures. However, that eventually can be a bloody long time in coming.
The economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the US gave the inept Fidelistas a perfect out every time one or another of their pet economic schemes came a cropper. Point a finger (the Geek won't say which one) to the north. Scream loudly, "Parado, Uncle Sam!"
Beautiful, isn't it?
The same mechanism can be seen during the long decade of economic sanctions directed at Saddam Hussein's Iraq following the success of Operation Play in the Sandbox in 1991. The Iraqi people (but not the Iraqi government or military) were hurt, even desperately hurt by the sanctions. The middle class was financially wiped out. The well connected, the grifters, and the grafters made out like bandits.
All the while, the boys at the top in Baghdad could point, not at themselves, but at the faraway evil gnomes of Washington. Don't look at us! Look at Uncle Sam.
Beautiful, isn't it?
Now for Iran. Time to test the analogy again. Look for guide posts from previous experiences such as Cuba.
The mullahocracy has shown itself to be almost as pathetic in economic matters as the Castroistas. However, Iran started at a higher level than Cuba, and oil is more remunerative to a country than sugar cane. Additionally, Iran is not an island. That brings some automatic advantages. (Hint: mesh petroleum and natural gas with long, wide steel tubes.)
Iran also has some disadvantages compared to Cuba. It's population is larger and younger--much, much younger--than that of Cuba. The mullahs have not been as successful as the Castroites in transmitting revolutionary ideological zeal to the second (or third) generation. Today's technology assures that a significant percentage of Iran's youthful population will have its residual sense of revolutionary purpose challenged by a sense of rising expectations constantly thwarted by the old men with beards and a copy of the Quran.
Early signs of fault lines, generational and otherwise, have been appearing in Iran over recent years. Drawing on the general precept proven so often by history that outsider applied pressure consolidates long before it fractures, the most important guide post is this. Any economic sanctions must not, repeat, not, be seen as coming directly or indirectly from the United States.
Considering Iran's current economic condition, the dependence upon both neighboring countries and private enterprises located at great distance for so much of Iran's ambitions and giving appropriate weight to the signs of nascent disaffiliation within the Iranian population, economic sanctions have a fair chance of bringing about a positive outcome. That is, economic pressures might, just might, have a quieting effect upon the mullahs if one overriding caveat is followed.
The caveat?
The US follow a very difficult policy. The US must work quickly to normalize diplomatic relations with Tehran. Washington must not go public on sanctions of either a diplomatic or economic nature. Simultaneously, the weight of the US must come to bear on critical nodes of Iranian technological, economic, and diplomatic support, whether private companies or governments.
There are several important ramifications of this course of action. For it to work, the US must stop acting like it is what it is--the world's only Great Power. We must take Russia seriously as another Great Power. We must do the same with the Peoples' Republic of China. Diplomatic and public relations fences with Turkey, Syria and Pakistan must be mended with rapidity.
The Geek acknowledges the historical truth of the proposition that kicking one diplomatic rock may start an avalanche of change. To have any prospect of controlling the direction and velocity of the changes, the current--or, far more likely, the next--administration must develop a firm view of the world we would prefer to live in and a consistent road map on how to get there from here.
Even then the results will not be certain.
You can legitimately ask, "To what avail would all this be? Particularly since there is no guarantee of success."
The optimal case would be the increase of political disaffiliation within Iran. In that case the mullahs and their rock of support, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would become increasingly preoccupied with the requirements for domestic pacification. Energy, money and personnel which go into the task of quieting or assuaging political unrest are not available to expend on foreign adventures or technological quests. The Geek is neither calling for nor expecting a revolution in Iran. He would like to see an inward turn by the regime and their knock off of the SS.
Worst realistic case? Al-Quds Force ramps up its foreign actions. The mullahs are able to rally support from the mass of young men without a good, secure future. The rhetoric and behavior of the Tehran regime becomes increasingly frenzied and dangerous. Iran gets the bomb.
There is time enough for war, when and if the worst case comes to pass. Until then, let us try to do a better job than we have done with either Cuba or Iraq. The result will not be certain nor predictable with precision...
But--get a real tight grip on this--war is always uncertain and certainly unpredictable in its results.
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Geek Demands a New Historical Analogy
A few years ago a couple of Harvard type academics did something unusual. They wrote a useful book about how to think. Their subject was reasoning by historical analogy. Their conclusion was that Washington decision makers do a very poor job of it.
The Geek (who admits a certain propensity to point out historical parallels, lessons and, with some trepidation, vague analogies) is in agreement with these two scholars. My agreement has grown since the Commander Guy fired his shotgun load of analogies (most incomplete, misleading, irrelevant or flatly wrong) at the VFW convention. Since then the slash and burn of competing bad analogies about Vietnam and Iraq has been impressive--and impressively teleologically didactic.
Of course, the Geek notes, the poor use of analogies runs in the Bush blood. Back in the run-up to the Gulf War back in 1990, H.W Bush compared Saddam Hussein with Adolph Hitler, a comparison that doesn't do either dictator justice.
The time has come for a new analogy. Perhaps an analogy which suits a country other than Iraq. How about Iran?
That's a good choice. Iran has been receiving a great deal of diplomatic, political, and media play recently. The Iranian government is well in the running for the title of Most Unpleasant Regime in the World Today. The US is annoyed at the mullahocracy--with good reason.
So, country one in the new analogy will be Iran!
How about country number two?
Here the Geek chooses a state with whom the US has had bad to very, very bad relations over a long time. A country where pathetic to absolutely stupid US policy choices were made on the basis of pique, annoyance, emotionalism, and similar well-rooted rational bases.
In short, country number two's relations with the US were (and are) driven by American policy choices of such an asinine and counterproductive nature that the Geek sometimes thinks they had to have been the product of that sublime statesman, Dick Cheney. Then I remember Cheney looks older than he is. He couldn't have been the big brain behind the plans.
Country number two is Cuba.
The new analogy: Iran and Cuba.
Let's get a grip on Cuba first.
While waging offensive insurgency against the rotten, corrupt Cuban government headed by Juan Battista, the 26th of July Movement headed by the young lawyer (and once-upon-a-time wannabe major league baseball player), Fidel Castro, was seen in heroic terms by many in the US. Even the administration of Dwight Eisenhower, which was scarcely known to be accommodating of communism, saw the guerrillas as an improvement on the Battista dictatorship. Ike and company cut off aid to the incumbent regime and the guerrillas took over.
The next chapter was not so pleasant. The Castroites expropriated US owned businesses and lands (including casinos owned by the American mob) without "proper compensation" OOH! The horror of it all still sends shivers up the Geekmo's spine.
But, the story got worse from the emotional perspective of the American media and, as a consequence, We the People. In an expectable fit of revolutionary boisterousness, the Fidelistas proceeded with a series of show trials held in a soccer arena before the most blood thirsty crowd since the Terror of the French Revolution. The victims were by and large minions, flunkies, and myrmidons of the ancien regime and were lead to the firing squads as the crowd shouted, "Parado!"
From the reaction of We the People you might think that the bearded barbarians of the 26th of July Movement were collectively squashing Lassie or some other iconic American puppy.
The Eisenhower response?
Diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, and the cranking up of a pseudo-revolutionary guerrilla force which would land in Cuba and throw the rascals out. Our own form of shouting, "Parado!"
Ike's response to Castro's provocation was so wrong as to make a soup sandwich look like the ideal Blue Plate Special.
Why?
That's obvious to anyone oriented in time and place. The problem of expropriation and compensation is one that is handled best through normal diplomatic engagement. Sure, some US companies (and the mob) wouldn't have been thrilled with either the inevitable delay or the probable final dollar figure. So what? All business (as the mobsters could attest) involves risk.
The revolutionary excesses of the soccer arena mob? It would have run its course as it did regardless of any frissons of horrified disgust felt by We the People. Anyway, the record shows clearly that most of those adobe walled deserved what they received.
The pseudo-insurgent invasion (manned by Cuban exiles, expats, and refugees) launched from "secret" CIA bases in Central America and controlled by the Miami located CIA station, JM/WAVE (which was so "secret" that taxi drivers picking up fares at Maimi International asked, "You want to go to the CIA place?") became the debacle known to history as The Bay of Pigs. Was that brilliant, or what?
The result of all our efforts including the April 1961 Kennedy approved and Kennedy weakened Bay of Pigs was the May 1st declaration by Castro that Cuba was now a "socialist state."
Great!
The brilliant American response to the bite of the flea had given Communism an entrepot in the Western Hemisphere. Now, things would really, really get serious. Deadly serious.
The combination of domestic political anxiety and personal anger within the Kennedy White House drove policy. The new policy was to overthrow the Cuban regime preferably with the assassination of Fidel, his brother, Raul, and others such as Che Guevara. The documented records released a week or so back by CIA show the seamy underside of this policy.
The raids, the attempted hits, the continued hostility diplomatically and economically demonstrated by Washington led over time to the Cuban Missile Crises in October 1962, which saw the world come closer to the pushing of launch buttons in Moscow and Washington than any other time before or since. It may even have brought about the killing of JFK in Dallas thirteen months later, aborting the well developed operational planning for a genuine US invasion of Cuba scheduled to take place before the 1964 presidential election.
Great policy, wouldn't you agree?
Over forty years have passed since Dallas. The US still is pretending that Cuba is the ultimate leper. Senator Obama was chastised for suggesting that it was past time for the US to take the first small step toward normalizing economic relations with Cuba.
Old, bad policies die hard--particularly when Cuban expats and their descendants are a significant bloc of votes in states such as Florida and New Jersey. Oy veh!
Now, let's get a grip on Iran.
Except for threats, and the occasional diplomatic meeting in a third country or in the delegates' lounge at the UN, the US has pretended Iran doesn't exist as a state with a legitimate government. Washington has used all the diplomatic and economic leverage at its disposal for nearly thirty years to isolate the mullahocracy in Tehran, damage the Iranian economy, and seek the overthrow of the Iranian government.
The reason?
Self-evident. The mullahocracy was behind the kidnapping and holding hostage of US diplomatic personnel, a more than four hundred day siege on the emotions of We the People. Since then the mullahs have shown a repeated, excessive desire to kill people, both in Iran, and, more importantly, elsewhere in the Mideast. Tehran was behind the truck bombings of US barracks in Lebanon a quarter century ago. It is the shadowy presence behind the rockets fired from Lebanon into Israel.
Thoroughly obnoxious bunch, there is no doubt about that.
Making the mullahocracy all the more irritating is its pursuit of nuclear capacities, including at least, as a real possibility, the atomic bomb. Then, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps or its al-Quds foreign operations component has been involved in the destabilizing of Iraq and the killing of US personnel in that country.
Even the Fidelistas weren't quite that over the edge.
The question is simple. What are we going to do about it?
So far, our Cuban type policy of diplomatic non-recognition, economic sanctions, and world opinion pressure have not brought any positive results. Adding on Congressional notions about working "secretly" to destabilize the mullahocracy has not improved the prospects for success.
That leaves war.
A fair amount of quacking and bloviating about the presumed necessity for war has been circulating among the Wallahs in Congress and the chattering classes generally within the past few weeks. War with Iran is equally easy to be for or against.
It depends on which analogy is used, and how it is employed.
The pro-war faction argues correctly that Iran is a clear danger to US interests. It argues that the US possesses the military capacities to destroy the Iranian nuclear plants, the logistics bases of al-Quds Force, and any number of other infrastructure targets. There can be little, if any doubt, but that the US Air Force and Navy have the stand-off munitions capabilities to bounce a lot of rubble quite high.. It could even be done without a very large number of collateral civilian casualties.
The anti-war group correctly maintains that any air attack would further alienate global opinion and consolidate Iranians behind their embattled government. The problem of what comes after the air attack also bothers the anti-war group for good reason. We do not have the ground forces necessary to occupy and pacify Iran. It's a damn big chunk of real estate.
The Cuban analogy shows a few guide posts. The first is that isolation of an obnoxious regime is counterproductive. Certainly, the record of the past twenty-five years indicates that is correct. The second guidepost is a little more complex as it involves the basis of intelligence used by Commander Guys and those in the decision making circle.
One major (the Geek would argue it was the major) mistake behind the policy blunders of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was an undue reliance upon the information provided by exiles, expats, and refugees from the former elites. Such people, whether Cuban, Iraqi, or Iranian, have a vested interest in both removing the new regime and portraying just how rotten and miserable things are back home and how unhappy and ready to revolt the people are.
The Cubans misled Ike and JFK. Iraqi exiles and expats misled the current administration back in 2002 and 2003. Deposed members of the old Iranian elite have been doing the same in recent months.
The lesson of Cuba (and Iraq for those with short memories) is clear. Do not trust former elites. They have too much at stake and too much personal involvement to provide reliable information and assessments.
A third guide post from the Cuban analogy is also apparent. Invasions must be up front and for real. There must be no attempt to hide behind pseudo-insurgents. There is and never has been any such thing as "plausible deniability" in an invasion.
A final guide post from the Cuban analogy is perhaps the most important. Questions of foreign policy can be entirely too important to the nation to allow decisions to be made from emotion, anger, personal or political considerations, or the ephemeral twists of public opinion.
The Cuban lessons distill to this: Is the regime so obnoxious, so intransigent that the only realistic recourse, the least-worst recourse, is war?
The Geek (who admits a certain propensity to point out historical parallels, lessons and, with some trepidation, vague analogies) is in agreement with these two scholars. My agreement has grown since the Commander Guy fired his shotgun load of analogies (most incomplete, misleading, irrelevant or flatly wrong) at the VFW convention. Since then the slash and burn of competing bad analogies about Vietnam and Iraq has been impressive--and impressively teleologically didactic.
Of course, the Geek notes, the poor use of analogies runs in the Bush blood. Back in the run-up to the Gulf War back in 1990, H.W Bush compared Saddam Hussein with Adolph Hitler, a comparison that doesn't do either dictator justice.
The time has come for a new analogy. Perhaps an analogy which suits a country other than Iraq. How about Iran?
That's a good choice. Iran has been receiving a great deal of diplomatic, political, and media play recently. The Iranian government is well in the running for the title of Most Unpleasant Regime in the World Today. The US is annoyed at the mullahocracy--with good reason.
So, country one in the new analogy will be Iran!
How about country number two?
Here the Geek chooses a state with whom the US has had bad to very, very bad relations over a long time. A country where pathetic to absolutely stupid US policy choices were made on the basis of pique, annoyance, emotionalism, and similar well-rooted rational bases.
In short, country number two's relations with the US were (and are) driven by American policy choices of such an asinine and counterproductive nature that the Geek sometimes thinks they had to have been the product of that sublime statesman, Dick Cheney. Then I remember Cheney looks older than he is. He couldn't have been the big brain behind the plans.
Country number two is Cuba.
The new analogy: Iran and Cuba.
Let's get a grip on Cuba first.
While waging offensive insurgency against the rotten, corrupt Cuban government headed by Juan Battista, the 26th of July Movement headed by the young lawyer (and once-upon-a-time wannabe major league baseball player), Fidel Castro, was seen in heroic terms by many in the US. Even the administration of Dwight Eisenhower, which was scarcely known to be accommodating of communism, saw the guerrillas as an improvement on the Battista dictatorship. Ike and company cut off aid to the incumbent regime and the guerrillas took over.
The next chapter was not so pleasant. The Castroites expropriated US owned businesses and lands (including casinos owned by the American mob) without "proper compensation" OOH! The horror of it all still sends shivers up the Geekmo's spine.
But, the story got worse from the emotional perspective of the American media and, as a consequence, We the People. In an expectable fit of revolutionary boisterousness, the Fidelistas proceeded with a series of show trials held in a soccer arena before the most blood thirsty crowd since the Terror of the French Revolution. The victims were by and large minions, flunkies, and myrmidons of the ancien regime and were lead to the firing squads as the crowd shouted, "Parado!"
From the reaction of We the People you might think that the bearded barbarians of the 26th of July Movement were collectively squashing Lassie or some other iconic American puppy.
The Eisenhower response?
Diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, and the cranking up of a pseudo-revolutionary guerrilla force which would land in Cuba and throw the rascals out. Our own form of shouting, "Parado!"
Ike's response to Castro's provocation was so wrong as to make a soup sandwich look like the ideal Blue Plate Special.
Why?
That's obvious to anyone oriented in time and place. The problem of expropriation and compensation is one that is handled best through normal diplomatic engagement. Sure, some US companies (and the mob) wouldn't have been thrilled with either the inevitable delay or the probable final dollar figure. So what? All business (as the mobsters could attest) involves risk.
The revolutionary excesses of the soccer arena mob? It would have run its course as it did regardless of any frissons of horrified disgust felt by We the People. Anyway, the record shows clearly that most of those adobe walled deserved what they received.
The pseudo-insurgent invasion (manned by Cuban exiles, expats, and refugees) launched from "secret" CIA bases in Central America and controlled by the Miami located CIA station, JM/WAVE (which was so "secret" that taxi drivers picking up fares at Maimi International asked, "You want to go to the CIA place?") became the debacle known to history as The Bay of Pigs. Was that brilliant, or what?
The result of all our efforts including the April 1961 Kennedy approved and Kennedy weakened Bay of Pigs was the May 1st declaration by Castro that Cuba was now a "socialist state."
Great!
The brilliant American response to the bite of the flea had given Communism an entrepot in the Western Hemisphere. Now, things would really, really get serious. Deadly serious.
The combination of domestic political anxiety and personal anger within the Kennedy White House drove policy. The new policy was to overthrow the Cuban regime preferably with the assassination of Fidel, his brother, Raul, and others such as Che Guevara. The documented records released a week or so back by CIA show the seamy underside of this policy.
The raids, the attempted hits, the continued hostility diplomatically and economically demonstrated by Washington led over time to the Cuban Missile Crises in October 1962, which saw the world come closer to the pushing of launch buttons in Moscow and Washington than any other time before or since. It may even have brought about the killing of JFK in Dallas thirteen months later, aborting the well developed operational planning for a genuine US invasion of Cuba scheduled to take place before the 1964 presidential election.
Great policy, wouldn't you agree?
Over forty years have passed since Dallas. The US still is pretending that Cuba is the ultimate leper. Senator Obama was chastised for suggesting that it was past time for the US to take the first small step toward normalizing economic relations with Cuba.
Old, bad policies die hard--particularly when Cuban expats and their descendants are a significant bloc of votes in states such as Florida and New Jersey. Oy veh!
Now, let's get a grip on Iran.
Except for threats, and the occasional diplomatic meeting in a third country or in the delegates' lounge at the UN, the US has pretended Iran doesn't exist as a state with a legitimate government. Washington has used all the diplomatic and economic leverage at its disposal for nearly thirty years to isolate the mullahocracy in Tehran, damage the Iranian economy, and seek the overthrow of the Iranian government.
The reason?
Self-evident. The mullahocracy was behind the kidnapping and holding hostage of US diplomatic personnel, a more than four hundred day siege on the emotions of We the People. Since then the mullahs have shown a repeated, excessive desire to kill people, both in Iran, and, more importantly, elsewhere in the Mideast. Tehran was behind the truck bombings of US barracks in Lebanon a quarter century ago. It is the shadowy presence behind the rockets fired from Lebanon into Israel.
Thoroughly obnoxious bunch, there is no doubt about that.
Making the mullahocracy all the more irritating is its pursuit of nuclear capacities, including at least, as a real possibility, the atomic bomb. Then, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps or its al-Quds foreign operations component has been involved in the destabilizing of Iraq and the killing of US personnel in that country.
Even the Fidelistas weren't quite that over the edge.
The question is simple. What are we going to do about it?
So far, our Cuban type policy of diplomatic non-recognition, economic sanctions, and world opinion pressure have not brought any positive results. Adding on Congressional notions about working "secretly" to destabilize the mullahocracy has not improved the prospects for success.
That leaves war.
A fair amount of quacking and bloviating about the presumed necessity for war has been circulating among the Wallahs in Congress and the chattering classes generally within the past few weeks. War with Iran is equally easy to be for or against.
It depends on which analogy is used, and how it is employed.
The pro-war faction argues correctly that Iran is a clear danger to US interests. It argues that the US possesses the military capacities to destroy the Iranian nuclear plants, the logistics bases of al-Quds Force, and any number of other infrastructure targets. There can be little, if any doubt, but that the US Air Force and Navy have the stand-off munitions capabilities to bounce a lot of rubble quite high.. It could even be done without a very large number of collateral civilian casualties.
The anti-war group correctly maintains that any air attack would further alienate global opinion and consolidate Iranians behind their embattled government. The problem of what comes after the air attack also bothers the anti-war group for good reason. We do not have the ground forces necessary to occupy and pacify Iran. It's a damn big chunk of real estate.
The Cuban analogy shows a few guide posts. The first is that isolation of an obnoxious regime is counterproductive. Certainly, the record of the past twenty-five years indicates that is correct. The second guidepost is a little more complex as it involves the basis of intelligence used by Commander Guys and those in the decision making circle.
One major (the Geek would argue it was the major) mistake behind the policy blunders of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was an undue reliance upon the information provided by exiles, expats, and refugees from the former elites. Such people, whether Cuban, Iraqi, or Iranian, have a vested interest in both removing the new regime and portraying just how rotten and miserable things are back home and how unhappy and ready to revolt the people are.
The Cubans misled Ike and JFK. Iraqi exiles and expats misled the current administration back in 2002 and 2003. Deposed members of the old Iranian elite have been doing the same in recent months.
The lesson of Cuba (and Iraq for those with short memories) is clear. Do not trust former elites. They have too much at stake and too much personal involvement to provide reliable information and assessments.
A third guide post from the Cuban analogy is also apparent. Invasions must be up front and for real. There must be no attempt to hide behind pseudo-insurgents. There is and never has been any such thing as "plausible deniability" in an invasion.
A final guide post from the Cuban analogy is perhaps the most important. Questions of foreign policy can be entirely too important to the nation to allow decisions to be made from emotion, anger, personal or political considerations, or the ephemeral twists of public opinion.
The Cuban lessons distill to this: Is the regime so obnoxious, so intransigent that the only realistic recourse, the least-worst recourse, is war?
Saturday, August 11, 2007
We Blew It Before. We Can Blow It Again
Syria and Cuba. Cuba and Syria. Don't often think of them as linked, do you?
The Geek sees a real, definite, and very instructive relation between them.
"Phooie," says you.
"Get a grip on this," replies the Geek.
The US government, with the support of the overwhelming majority of We the People, likes to pretend obnoxious regimes don't exist. Or, perhaps we think our moral purity will be tainted if we have any normal contact with icky-poo governments.
Consider this. We the People and our government were very, very angry at the Bolsheviks for winning in the Second Russian Revolution, pulling their troops out of World War I, and then going about a series of definitely not-nice internal measures. As a result we wouldn't recognize the Communist government or have normal diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union for more than a decade. When FDR moved to normalise relations, to exchange diplomatic delegations, and generally to behave as though a country extending across a third of the world's time zones really did exist afterall, a large number of Americans hyperventilated to the point of turning blue. (They wouldn't turn red for obvious reasons.)
In 1949 the Chinese Communists of Mao had the unmittigated gall to defeat the corrupt and inefficient government of Chaing, who had been declared by no less a foreign policy authority than Time/Life publisher Henry Luce to be both "our man in Asia" and "a true democrat." We the People huffed and puffed something fierce--particularly those of us who are Republicans. The question of the day was, "Who lost China?"
Of course it is hard to lose a country containing a goodly chunk of the globe's population, but that didn't bother us. No sir. We wouldn't recognise that Mao, the Chinese Communists, and the billion or so who lived under their authority existed. We went on for more than twenty years pretending that Chaing was still the man and Formosa was still China.
Even though Richard Nixon had impecable credentials as a commie hater and had very, very fine geopolitical reasons for ending the diplomatic coma, more than a few of We the People--generally Republicans of the right margin--predicted the End of the World As We Know It.
You get the picture.
To zero in on Cuba. In the months before finally ousting the gangster-loving, high-living, rotten to the core jefe grande, Battista, the insurgents of the 26th of July Movement headed by Fidel Castro were heros to many members of We the People. Indeed, the documents show that the Old Regime cashed it in when the Eisenhower Administration cut off military assistance and suggested that Battista and his ilk might want to consider retirement.
They retired, swag in the bag, and Castro took over. The new government in an excess of revolutionary enthusiasm held trials in a soccer stadium to the cheers of the most blood thirsty crowd since the Terror of the French Revolution. Up north We the People were shocked and horrified.
Shock and horror turned to something worse when Castro and Company proceeded to expropriate properties owned by Americans including Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil, the Mafia, and others. That was theft! Stealing! Worse, it was a mugging by a Communist!
Fidel was a Marxist, no doubt about it. He was also a Cuban. No doubt about that either. The real question in 1960 was which was paramount: Cuban or Communist?
Without any real, persuasive reason our government with the cheers of We the People decided the answer was Communist. We lifted our skirt to keep the hem free of of commie cooties, sniffed like the stereotype of an old maid librarian passing a drunk on her way to church, and pretended Cuba didn't exist.
Didn't exist that is except as a target of a total economic embargo backed by all the diplomatic leverage the US could muster. Didn't exist that is except as a target for fabricated coups, manufactured invasions, and failed assassination plots.
At this point, 1961, was anyone surprised when Castro embraced the Soviet Union?
If anyone was, they must have been severely mentally challenged. The Soviet Union was the only option if Castro, the Revolution, and Cuba were to continue as living entities.
Of course the yahoos within We the People cackled that Castro was showing his true color (red) and the entire Western Hemisphere would soon fall prey to the bear if we didn't continue to insist that Cuba (or at least Castro) didn't exist. The diplomatic and economic embargoes continued although with an ever growing number of holes as other nations, and not simply the USSR and its satellites, opened normal relations with Havana.
The (to our eyes) non-existent, evil Castro regime didn't officially exist. Meanwhile Cuba became an increasing irritant to us as it pursued adventures in Latin America and Africa through the Seventies, Eighties, and even a few of the Nineties.
Upshot? A week back the ailing, aging El Lieder Maximo stated that there would be no negotiations with the US as long as he lived. Meanwhile his regime continued to foster and assist Neo-Castroism in South America, particularly Venezuela.
Wow! Keeping our moral purity by turning our diplomatic and economic back on Cuba and Castro was a real winner!
At least we survived the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Remember it? You should. The US and USSR came within a nanometer or two of pushing the Big Button.) The nation survived the killing of JFK which was (in high, even very high probability) engineered by the Castro regime. We were able to bear up under the stress of Cuban mischief in Africa and Central America. We will most assuredly outlast the Neo-Castro fad of the present.
But it was all preventable. If We the People and our government had taken a firm hold of reality and accepted that Castro and his government were somewhat unpleasant. If Ike or JFK had maintained or re-established normal relations.... Well, we can't rewind the tape and see history as it might have been.
But, the Geek insists, we can, no, must learn from the mistakes of our history and not repeat the idiotic spasm of pretending a regime we do not like doesn't exist except as a target.
This brings us to Syria. The Geek has chosen Syria, not Iran, because the weight of the baggage is not nearly so great. (OK. Confession time. The Geek despairs of the US, or Iran for that matter, catching a good case of rationality in the near future,)
The US had touchy but basically normal relations with Syria for a long time. No less an authority on such matters as Henry Kissinger, who met with Assad, Senior a couple of times, was favorably impressed by the man's ability and orientation as to reality as well as his single-mindedness of purpose.
From the days of Nixon on there is no doubt but Syria was an obnoxious country, the Baathist regime annoying. Syria facilitated and harbored terrorists, played the role of mixer and trouble maker in Lebanon, and refused to negotiate with Israel unless the Golan Heights captured by the IDF during the Six Day War was returned. Despite this the US kept on pursuing normal diplomatic mechanisms, albeit with very little success.
Two years ago, US policy changed. Apparently afflicted with the old disease of arrogant contempt for bothersome regimes, the current Administration declared that Assad, Jr and his government were not worthy of continued normal relations. The Administration, in pursuit of this new High Moral Plane policy, even went so far as to stop former President Jimmy Carter from visiting Syria as a private citizen and refused Assad, Jr a visa to address the UN General Assembly.
Cutting Syria off. What a brilliant concept!
What has the High Moral Plane policy gotten us so far?
Get a grip on this. Syria has signed a military assistance pact with Iran, which will see more than two gigabucks of new Russian weaponry including tactical missiles flow to Damascus. Under the agreement Iran will have basing rights for its new Russian multi-role combat aircraft in Syria.
As if this wasn't enough to cause the White House to rethink matters, Syria is mucking about more and more once again in Lebanon. (Recall that Syrian history has Lebanon as an integral part of Syria and history ain't dead in the Mideast.) Furthermore, Syria has become even more intransigent on the vital matter of peace with Israel. (Try to image a comprehensive peace without the full, free participation of Syria.)
The current Administration owns pencils without erasers so the possibility of returning to a policy of normal relations is very, very slim. The next administration will have the chance of doing the right thing.
The Geek would advise whoever comes to the White House a year and a half from now that history shows clearly that while moral purity is nice, positive results are better.
The Geek sees a real, definite, and very instructive relation between them.
"Phooie," says you.
"Get a grip on this," replies the Geek.
The US government, with the support of the overwhelming majority of We the People, likes to pretend obnoxious regimes don't exist. Or, perhaps we think our moral purity will be tainted if we have any normal contact with icky-poo governments.
Consider this. We the People and our government were very, very angry at the Bolsheviks for winning in the Second Russian Revolution, pulling their troops out of World War I, and then going about a series of definitely not-nice internal measures. As a result we wouldn't recognize the Communist government or have normal diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union for more than a decade. When FDR moved to normalise relations, to exchange diplomatic delegations, and generally to behave as though a country extending across a third of the world's time zones really did exist afterall, a large number of Americans hyperventilated to the point of turning blue. (They wouldn't turn red for obvious reasons.)
In 1949 the Chinese Communists of Mao had the unmittigated gall to defeat the corrupt and inefficient government of Chaing, who had been declared by no less a foreign policy authority than Time/Life publisher Henry Luce to be both "our man in Asia" and "a true democrat." We the People huffed and puffed something fierce--particularly those of us who are Republicans. The question of the day was, "Who lost China?"
Of course it is hard to lose a country containing a goodly chunk of the globe's population, but that didn't bother us. No sir. We wouldn't recognise that Mao, the Chinese Communists, and the billion or so who lived under their authority existed. We went on for more than twenty years pretending that Chaing was still the man and Formosa was still China.
Even though Richard Nixon had impecable credentials as a commie hater and had very, very fine geopolitical reasons for ending the diplomatic coma, more than a few of We the People--generally Republicans of the right margin--predicted the End of the World As We Know It.
You get the picture.
To zero in on Cuba. In the months before finally ousting the gangster-loving, high-living, rotten to the core jefe grande, Battista, the insurgents of the 26th of July Movement headed by Fidel Castro were heros to many members of We the People. Indeed, the documents show that the Old Regime cashed it in when the Eisenhower Administration cut off military assistance and suggested that Battista and his ilk might want to consider retirement.
They retired, swag in the bag, and Castro took over. The new government in an excess of revolutionary enthusiasm held trials in a soccer stadium to the cheers of the most blood thirsty crowd since the Terror of the French Revolution. Up north We the People were shocked and horrified.
Shock and horror turned to something worse when Castro and Company proceeded to expropriate properties owned by Americans including Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil, the Mafia, and others. That was theft! Stealing! Worse, it was a mugging by a Communist!
Fidel was a Marxist, no doubt about it. He was also a Cuban. No doubt about that either. The real question in 1960 was which was paramount: Cuban or Communist?
Without any real, persuasive reason our government with the cheers of We the People decided the answer was Communist. We lifted our skirt to keep the hem free of of commie cooties, sniffed like the stereotype of an old maid librarian passing a drunk on her way to church, and pretended Cuba didn't exist.
Didn't exist that is except as a target of a total economic embargo backed by all the diplomatic leverage the US could muster. Didn't exist that is except as a target for fabricated coups, manufactured invasions, and failed assassination plots.
At this point, 1961, was anyone surprised when Castro embraced the Soviet Union?
If anyone was, they must have been severely mentally challenged. The Soviet Union was the only option if Castro, the Revolution, and Cuba were to continue as living entities.
Of course the yahoos within We the People cackled that Castro was showing his true color (red) and the entire Western Hemisphere would soon fall prey to the bear if we didn't continue to insist that Cuba (or at least Castro) didn't exist. The diplomatic and economic embargoes continued although with an ever growing number of holes as other nations, and not simply the USSR and its satellites, opened normal relations with Havana.
The (to our eyes) non-existent, evil Castro regime didn't officially exist. Meanwhile Cuba became an increasing irritant to us as it pursued adventures in Latin America and Africa through the Seventies, Eighties, and even a few of the Nineties.
Upshot? A week back the ailing, aging El Lieder Maximo stated that there would be no negotiations with the US as long as he lived. Meanwhile his regime continued to foster and assist Neo-Castroism in South America, particularly Venezuela.
Wow! Keeping our moral purity by turning our diplomatic and economic back on Cuba and Castro was a real winner!
At least we survived the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Remember it? You should. The US and USSR came within a nanometer or two of pushing the Big Button.) The nation survived the killing of JFK which was (in high, even very high probability) engineered by the Castro regime. We were able to bear up under the stress of Cuban mischief in Africa and Central America. We will most assuredly outlast the Neo-Castro fad of the present.
But it was all preventable. If We the People and our government had taken a firm hold of reality and accepted that Castro and his government were somewhat unpleasant. If Ike or JFK had maintained or re-established normal relations.... Well, we can't rewind the tape and see history as it might have been.
But, the Geek insists, we can, no, must learn from the mistakes of our history and not repeat the idiotic spasm of pretending a regime we do not like doesn't exist except as a target.
This brings us to Syria. The Geek has chosen Syria, not Iran, because the weight of the baggage is not nearly so great. (OK. Confession time. The Geek despairs of the US, or Iran for that matter, catching a good case of rationality in the near future,)
The US had touchy but basically normal relations with Syria for a long time. No less an authority on such matters as Henry Kissinger, who met with Assad, Senior a couple of times, was favorably impressed by the man's ability and orientation as to reality as well as his single-mindedness of purpose.
From the days of Nixon on there is no doubt but Syria was an obnoxious country, the Baathist regime annoying. Syria facilitated and harbored terrorists, played the role of mixer and trouble maker in Lebanon, and refused to negotiate with Israel unless the Golan Heights captured by the IDF during the Six Day War was returned. Despite this the US kept on pursuing normal diplomatic mechanisms, albeit with very little success.
Two years ago, US policy changed. Apparently afflicted with the old disease of arrogant contempt for bothersome regimes, the current Administration declared that Assad, Jr and his government were not worthy of continued normal relations. The Administration, in pursuit of this new High Moral Plane policy, even went so far as to stop former President Jimmy Carter from visiting Syria as a private citizen and refused Assad, Jr a visa to address the UN General Assembly.
Cutting Syria off. What a brilliant concept!
What has the High Moral Plane policy gotten us so far?
Get a grip on this. Syria has signed a military assistance pact with Iran, which will see more than two gigabucks of new Russian weaponry including tactical missiles flow to Damascus. Under the agreement Iran will have basing rights for its new Russian multi-role combat aircraft in Syria.
As if this wasn't enough to cause the White House to rethink matters, Syria is mucking about more and more once again in Lebanon. (Recall that Syrian history has Lebanon as an integral part of Syria and history ain't dead in the Mideast.) Furthermore, Syria has become even more intransigent on the vital matter of peace with Israel. (Try to image a comprehensive peace without the full, free participation of Syria.)
The current Administration owns pencils without erasers so the possibility of returning to a policy of normal relations is very, very slim. The next administration will have the chance of doing the right thing.
The Geek would advise whoever comes to the White House a year and a half from now that history shows clearly that while moral purity is nice, positive results are better.
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