Don't Veto The Palestinian State

Palestinian Authority jefe grande Abbas has tossed down the gauntlet to Barack Obama and the rest of his "foreign policy team."  The PA will seek full membership in the UN as a sovereign state Abbas declared in a highly reported speech to his fellow countrymen.

This move seems to be a very severe defeat for both Israel and the Obama administration.  The Netanyahu ministry has done everything short of declaring war on the PA.  The Obama "team" including the president has not been much more restrained, threatening (or promising, if you prefer) to veto the move when it comes before the Security Council for action.

A veto would not be looked at with favor in the Arab states generally as was made palpably clear in a recent op-ed piece in the WaPo by one of those interminable Saudi princes and diplomatic heavyweights.  Participants in outdoor sports favored by the "Arab Street" such as riots and suicide bombings will be much less restrained in their disapprobation.

Advocates of realpolitik have noted that even admission to the UN either as a state or a state observer will change nothing for the better on the ground.  There is much to justify this view.  Likewise there is much to support the dystopian notions that the Palestinians will  use either state observer or state status to cause a world of hurt for Israel in the assorted UN sub-agencies and the International Criminal Court.

The pessimistic interpretations do not, however, merit the US using its veto power in the Security Council.  Doing such would only assure the PA would take its petition to the General Assembly in search of the consolation prize of state observer status, which would give it all the trouble making possibilities along with assuring a very large can would be tied to Uncle Sam's tail.

A far better course of action for the Obama administration to take is that of delay.  The process established for seeking recognition as a state by the UN provides an almost infinite mechanism of creative stalling.  The formal request must first go to the Secretary General.  The Secretary General does not have to handle the matter instantly but can request further information before forwarding the request to the Security Council.  Doing this can take weeks--or months.

The Security Council can also demand more information as well as proof that the proposed Palestinian state meets all the diplomatic requirements for state status.  This means the Council can find itself caught in a set of hearings and debates over the degree to which the Palestinian Authority and the territory under its purported control does in fact constitute a fully functioning state.  Given the deep and growing divide between the West Bank based Palestinian Authority and its rival in the Gaza Strip, Hamas, and the fiction that Palestine constitutes a single entity, this could lead to a number of second thoughts within chanceries seemingly committed to the idea of Palestinian statehood.

A full fledged inquiry and debate within the Security Council could even have the potential to undercut any move in the General Assembly for state observer status.  This is not a nontrivial benefit given the uncertainty and ambiguity extant within the European Union for this gambit.  The US might even enlist the cooperation of Russia in seeking a complete airing of whether or not the Palestinian state really exists by quietly noting that any approval by either the Security Council or the General Assembly would constitute a bad precedent from the Kremlin's point of view considering the current ethnic and religious unrest in the Northern Caucasus.  The name, "Tibet," whispered in certain ears might elicit a reasonably favorable response from Beijing.

The point is the US could lobby effectively for a prolonged inquiry by the Security Council, which would buy that most precious of commodities--time--for bilateral diplomacy to make another run at the moribund "peace process" between Israel and the PA.  Abbas would have his political posterior covered enough to keep him in his tenuous position for some while since he would have delivered on his promises and cannot be held personally responsible for UN protocol.

Sure there would still be some riots, some bombings, some threats of worse from the "Arab Street" and other usual Muslim suspects such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but what else is to be expected?  The US would be spared the major problems which exercise of the veto would bring.

The Israelis, or at least some of them, would not be thrilled but, again, what else would you expect?  A delay might allow calmer heads (assuming there are any) around Netanyahu to provide sound counsel respecting the recommencement of talks with Abbas and company.  There is even the faint prospect that the Obama administration might find the right magic to convince Netanyahu to wake up to the new and alarming political realities in his neighborhood, realities which cannot be addressed by simple words and the implied threat of Israeli military displeasure.

A delay would benefit all interested parties.  A veto would not.  It looks like a no-brainer.  Of course, being the simplest and safest way to go means it is not acceptable to either the Deep Thinkers or the ideologues who populate too much of the foreign policy world, not only here but everywhere.

Becoming A State Isn't Enough To Bring Peace

There is no doubt that the Palestinian Authority (PA) can usher a state called "Palestine" into existence.  There is nothing magical nor even particularly difficult about achieving the status of "state."  Even the longest standing, most broadly accepted basic definition of statehood, The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which dates back to 1933, establishes rather minimal requirements for state status.

The Montevideo Convention provides only four prerequisites.  (1) A permanent population, (2) A defined territory, (3) A government, and (4) The capacity to enter into relations with other states.  In practice these requirements have been further reduced.  As a practical matter, a state can be said to exist when other states say it does.

Even when territorial limits are hazy, poorly defined or still in the process of being determined, an established state has the sovereign right to declare another entity has achieved the same status.  This is also the case when a government is not fully formed, fledged, or functioning.  All that is necessary is that other states recognize the new kid on the block.  The recognition need not be universal.  Nor does the new state need the recognition of any or all of the Great Powers to come into full, legal form.

History is full of examples of states being recognized long before they had achieved either defined borders or a fully functional government.  (Recall that the US falls into this category.)  History is also replete with examples of states and governments which were widely but not universally recognized or lacked recognition and acceptance by one or more of the contemporary Great Powers.  (The US non-recognition of the Bolshevik regime in Russia or that of Mao in China did not make these two states sudden nonentities.)

A state need not be contiguous (pace Constitutional law professor and president Barack Obama) to be both recognized and viable.  At its creation Pakistan consisted of two parts separated by more than a thousand kilometers of India.  It was both recognized and (until the fruits of Punjabi racism and Islamabad's inefficiency matured) viable.  Pakistan existed with its two disparate components because enough other states said it did.

To make it simple but without undue simplification: States come into existence when enough other states recognize its existence and enter into relations with it.  That's all, folks.  There is no need for UN action.  While the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council can extend membership to a new state, this is not required for the state to exist as both independent and sovereign.

All of this brings us back to Palestine.  An increasing number of countries ranging from Brazil to Russia have extended some form of diplomatic recognition to the territory of Palestine as governed by the PA.  As this tide gains force, it can be expected that most of the current membership of the UN will do likewise regardless of the well-intended but quite irrelevant counsel of President Obama.

By the old standards of diplomacy, this should mean that Palestine would come into existence as an independent and sovereign state.  But, the old norms do not apply.  There are two constraints which taken together render the old way inapplicable in this case.  One of these is the Oslo Accords, which formed an agreement between Fatah and Israel.  The PA is not mentioned.  It couldn't be--it did not exist at the time.  Nor was Hamas referenced.  Only Fatah and Israel.

The sundry agreements which fall under the appellation of the frosty Norwegian capital sharply limit the ability of the PA to exercise jurisdiction over territory and persons alike.  The Oslo agreements served to place the Palestinian territory under an ongoing form of Israeli suzerainty.  To a major extent, the effect of the Oslo agreements was to put a diplomatic and political gloss on an underlying brute fact.

The brute fact was (and is) the Israeli occupation.  Even if the territorial extent of full Israeli occupation has been reduced over the years, it still exists as the rock upon which the independence and sovereignty of the PA must founder.

The combination of the Oslo agreement and the fact of ongoing Israeli occupation renders the past experience with the process by which states come into existence nugatory.  This dreary reality is well understood and publicly accepted by PA officials.  They know that even if every country on the face of the globe extends diplomatic recognition, this will not change realities on the ground--as long as the US does not do the same.

Israel's stance in comparison is not central.  There are precedents of states and governments receiving full diplomatic recognition even though they were under full or partial military occupation.  Indeed, that was a key principle underlying the political integrity of governments-in-exile during World War II.  It can be argued that by failing to end its long condemned occupation, Israel has created a Palestinian version of a government-in-exile which has a legitimate claim on the international community for aid in regaining its (temporarily) lost land.

The PA (particularly if Hamas is left out of the picture somehow) has a good case for UN intervention based on both the government-in-exile precedents and international law generally.  Assuming the UN General Assembly took some sort of action equivalent to extending full membership to the PA controlled Palestine, so as to duck any US veto in the Security Council, would it really matter with respect to the larger and more important question--peace?

The short answer is no.  An independent Palestine would still have to deal directly with Israel regarding all the critical matters such as borders, land swaps, an Israeli military presence in the Jordan valley, the status of Jerusalem, and the return of Arab refugees.  These matters would be no less contentious and vexing should Palestine become an independent state than they are right now.

The best which could be asserted about potential benefits to the PA is it would have some additional diplomatic leverage.  As an independent state Palestine could be more effective in opposing additional growth in the Israeli "settlements."  As an independent state Palestine could sign on to the Statute of Rome giving it the right to seek prosecution of purported Israeli war criminals before the International Criminal Court.  This threat would have great leverage in and of itself.

A well coordinated use of mass mobilization of Palestinians in a move on the Israeli Wall and checkpoints along with diplomacy could bring about the desired UN action without US support.  Indeed, it is hard to see how the combination of non-violent mass action and diplomacy could be openly opposed by the Obama administration given the coming of the next election.

The reconciliation between the PA and Hamas has shored up the political base of Abbas.  Now if he and his fellows can show a modicum of smarts in orchestrating global opinion and the photogenic appeal of a series of totally non-violent marches on the Great Wall of (specious) Security behind which Israel cowers, he can pull off the coup of the decade--and mousetrap the Obama "team."

The record of the Palestinians in the theater of global politics and the realities of international diplomacy has more often than not been one of dismal incompetence and self-inflicted defeats.  But, sometimes all it takes is one successful attempt at swinging for the fence.  This time Abbas may do it with the result that Palestine will come into existence.

But, this may well not lead to peace.  And, one cannot expect the Palestinians to make it two-for-two.  That would take Elohim and Allah working in perfect harmony.  Anyone want to make a bet?

Our Way Or There Ain't No Way

That is the negotiating stance of the Palestinian Authority (PA.)  The PA capo, Mahmoud Abbas, has made that abundantly clear.  The centerpiece of the PA's current exercise in brinkmanship is the expiration of the temporary freeze on new construction in the Israeli "settlements."  Abbas has stated categorically that if a single brick is laid or a single shovel of dirt moved, the talks are off.  O-F-F.

The "settlers" are lined up, ready and willing, eager for the clock to run out.  Bulldozers and builders are fired up, good for go.  Feet are pawing the ground as fiery rhetoric fills the air over disputed land.

Facing a political crisis of major magnitude, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for "calm and restraint" on the part of the "settlers" as well as their supporters throughout Israel.  The latter are predominantly members of Netanyahu's Likud Party or its rightwing coalition partners.  Israelis of the Right have never been noted for their propensity for calmness and restraint.

On the other side of the hill, Abbas is seeking an "urgent" meeting of the Arab League so that a coordinated approach can be formulated assuming the moratorium will not be extended.  This call came as the PA sent conflicting messages about its own stance on continuing the talks with Israel.  A spokesman for the PA president averred that the PA would not pull out of the ongoing talks but warned that key members of the Fatah dominated group might do so.  What that vague language might mean in the real world is unclear but at least one group, the Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), has announced it was suspending its participation in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the PA was known in bygone days.

Further muddying the already turbid waters of Mideast diplomacy, the PA has suggested that Israel might release some seven thousand terrorists (Israeli view) or political prisoners (according to the PA) presently languishing in the custody of the Israel Prison Service.  According to the PA, such a release would constitute a "good will gesture" serving to facilitate the peace talks.

Golly, is the mass release to serve as a surrogate for a continuation of the freeze?  Or is this good will gesture to be in addition to the extension of the moratorium?  Either way, the reintroduction of this ancient ploy will serve as a platform justifying further foot dragging by the rejectionists of the PA.

Abbas is probably sitting back with his hands folded across his Buddha-like belly, a suitably inscrutable smile on his face as he waits for the US to do the heavy lifting on his behalf.  The Obama administration is apparently giving itself a rupture as it strains to do just that.  Various spokespersons, including those of the exalted rank of presidential intimate such as David Axelrod, have made it clear that the administration owns the problem and is using all means at its disposal to do Abbas' bidding.

While the PA is making non-negotiable demands, it has shown a total unwillingness to consider compromises.  There is a compromise available which would allow the speedy ending of the current impasse. The compromise would permit construction to resume at those "settlements" which will be on the Israeli side of the final border while prohibiting any in areas which will revert to PA rule.

To date Abbas has refused this approach.  The PA insists that the final border, including all necessary land swaps, be achieved first.  This is an unnecessary stipulation.  The pattern of settlement is clear.  Agreement was reached some time back on which blocks would go to Israel and which would remain in Palestine along with what land would be granted by Israel in compensation for the acreage occupied by the "settlements" incorporated into Israel.  No skill at precognition was or is required to see, literally, the lay of the land.

The "borders first" requirement of the PA is simply one more exercise in obscurantist delay.  Refusing the quite obvious and eminently logical compromise serves no useful purpose other than placating the slavering red meat eaters of the Palestinian extreme.  The contention that this placatory stance is necessary to Abbas' political survival is arguable.

Perhaps as a reward for the intense American efforts on his behalf, Abbas has given some hint that there is some chance the talks will not be cancelled instantly in the event the freeze is not extended.  Abbas has alluded to the necessity or at least the desirability of consulting with all stakeholders in the complicated PA structure as well as determining the will of the Arab League states.  This is not much but it does provide a basis for holding some cautious optimism.

Then there is Netanyahu.  He has very real political problems in play.  His coalition is not all that tightly knit.  His foreign minister represents a large strain of opinion which sees the slightest compromise on territory as an act of near treason.  There is no support on the Right of Israeli politics for giving in to PA pressures, even when those pressures are applied by the US.

Nor does the behavior of the assorted extremists within the PA and its constituent factions give any assistance to Netanyahu.  It is all well and good for Abbas to assert as he did yesterday that the Palestinian people will not respond with violence should the talks collapse.  It is another matter when a pregnant Israeli is shot while driving on a highway near an Arab village in the West Bank.

earthmoving equipment and wreaking havoc somewhere in Israel.

Israelis have not been allowed to forget at any time since they evacuated the Gaza Strip that the threat of violent death is a constant companion.  No country in modern history has been forced to live so long under such a high and pervasive level of fear.  No sane Israeli would be given to place much reliance on either the words or the capacities of Abbas when it comes to matters of violent politics.

Nor can any Israeli ignore for a microsecond the primary reason he lives under a constant threat.  It is because he is Jewish.  The Jewish basis of Israel is the basis of the fear, loathing, and hatred which colors all aspects of Arab-Israeli relations, at least at the collective, the state level.

It is for this reason as well as the historical reality of the Holocaust which propels the Netanyahu requirement that the PA recognize Israel as a Jewish state.  This is another issue on which Mr Abbas and the PA refuse to compromise.  Their refusal is not trivial.

The PA president and his supporters such as Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak have claimed that the international recognition of Israel as a Jewish state would compromise the rights of non-Jews residing in Israel.  Abbas has gone so far as to assert--contrary to fact--that the only reason Netanyahu has made his demand is as a preparatory move to the forced removal of all Arabs from Israel.

Some twenty percent of Israel's population is Arab in ancestry and language.  It is a matter of easily available fact that these people have the same civil and political rights as their Jewish compatriots.  This is not to imply that Arabs do not suffer discrimination and prejudice, they do.  But it demonstrates that Israel is not cranking up some sort of genocide machine which will be running full blast the instant the PA formally recognizes that Israel is a Jewish state.

It is of more than passing interest that public opinion poll after public opinion poll has shown a marked reluctance of Israeli Arabs to move to the PA administered territory.  It is equally worthy of note to acknowledge that the Arabs of Israel enjoy not simply a better standard of material existence than those resident in other countries, but they also possess political and civil rights which surpass by orders of magnitude those of other Arabs in other states.

These contextual matters demonstrate that the tender concern evidenced by Abbas and other Arab leaders for the present and future condition of Israeli Arabs is misplaced.  The real deal is that Abbas and company hope that by refusing to grant this quite reasonable Israeli condition they will be able to derail the talks without taking any direct responsibility.

It would behoove the American (and European Union) efforts to bolster and facilitate the talks if the Israeli position on the "Jewish state question" would receive full-throated support.  The identification of Israel as the Jewish state is historically justified.  The need for a Jewish state was recognized universally in the wake of World War II.  All non-biased observers agreed in those far gone days that the existence of a "Jewish state" would have gone far to prevent the Holocaust by providing both a refuge and a protector to the Jews threatened by Nazi policies.

It is not unreasonable nor counter-factual to contend that Jews in much of the world are under a threat as great today as was the case seventy-five years ago.  The existence of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state is essential.  The Obama administration must acknowledge this in the context of the current talks.

Coercive diplomacy is OK.  It can be quite useful.  But, as in the matter of the Israeli-PA talks, the coercion must be evenhanded.  If it is appropriate to pressure Israel to limit the "settlement" construction, it is also proper to pressure the PA to accept the compromise outlined above.  And, it is both apposite and necessary to lean on the PA to accept that Israel is a Jewish state, the Jewish state.  This recognition must be clear, unambiguous and formal.  Anything less is an ethical and realpolitik malfeasance.

Most of all, Mr Abbas must be brought to realize that negotiation is a two way street.  It must be all of "our" ways or nothing good will result.

Will Hilary Win Her Bones?

Hilary Clinton is a person with great determination, resilience and, never to be underestimated, a capacity for steep learning curves. She will need all of these and more as she takes on the most intractable problem in international politics these past thirty years--trapping the seemingly mythical beast known as Mideast Peace.

An important caveat is needed here. Even if the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority come to an agreement, that is only the first step of constructing a comprehensive Mideast peace.

If the president has decided to leave the negotiations, the making of deals which are both acceptable to parties long estranged by the forces of blood and ambition and enforcible over time to others in his administration and will limit his participation both on and off camera to ceremonial occasions, Ms Clinton has a slight chance of succeeding where so many of her predecessors have failed, some miserably. Admittedly the "if" is a very big "if."

Ms Clinton has established a mixed record as Secretary of State. Her stewardship at Foggy Bottom is seen with a liberal degree of cynical hope in Israel. The cynicism results from her role in executing the Obama dictated program of coercion. The hope springs from the realization that Ms Clinton has invested a great deal in the "peace process" and doesn't want it to go bust as if it were one more Whitewater but writ much larger.

Having faithfully complied with Mr Obama's blundering of reaching out to the unreachable while stomping on a government long noted for stomping back, it is to be hoped (and reasonably expected) that the Secretary of State will be allowed to play a free hand in her personal diplomacy over the next days, and, perhaps, weeks or even months as the direct bilateral talks lurch along. The Nice Young Man From Chicago should realize by now that as a statesman he is a fine tuba player.

The Israeli government knows that Ms Clinton had no realistic alternative to carrying the president's water in the past months. The prime movers in Jerusalem, most importantly PM Netanyhu, will cut her an appropriate amount of slack, will see her as offering genuine good offices as a facilitator and mediator. If not undercut by the Arabists in her own department, the role of woman-in-the-middle suits her well given her political and diplomatic skills.

As Secretary of State she has performed well, better than might have been expected twenty months ago. While she has been on the wrong side of some issues--Honduras, the Falkland Islands dispute, the decision to rejoin the UN Human Rights Cabal (to say nothing of the Universal Periodic Review)--other policy actions, most importantly the calling of China out despite Beijing's huffing and puffing over the disputed islands in the South China Sea, have been impressive.

The context in which she will be operating while being woman-in-the-middle has several favorable features. Iran looms largest in the fears of Israel with the security threats posed by a Palestinian state on the West Bank trailing as a distant second. Indeed the potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons has so sobered the Arab states to the degree that they can throw significant weight behind a treaty between the PA and Israel which does not meet the ambitious level of the Arab League proposal (aka the Abdullah Plan.)

The real game changer in the Mideast over the past two years has been Iran. More specifically, it has been the combination of Iran's quest for the "Mahdi Bomb" coupled with the all too obvious Iranian backing of regime change throughout the region.

Ms Clinton will be able to take advantage of the fears generated by Tehran's way too lofty ambitions. She will also be able to leverage the increasingly anti-Israel sentiments and behaviors of Europe into a useful tool to assure a degree of realism in the government of Israel.

The Palestinian Authority, most particularly the Fatah dominated government of Mahmoud Abbas, needs the support and assistance of the West led by the US if it is going to survive let alone prosper. A viable state on the West Bank needs, no, requires, investment by and trade with the West as well as direct assistance. Abbas understands this and his understanding is no doubt shared by the non-zany senior leadership of the PA. This gives Ms Clinton a potent way of gaining genuine PA cooperation.

The context also includes several important and very negative features. Some are sufficient kill-the-peace conversations before the month is over.

Topping the list is the continuation of the moratorium on "settlement" construction. The ten month halt will end on 26 September. This means the balloon can go up on the 27th.

The PA has made the settlement freeze the Absolute Line In The Sand. When Abbas and his cohorts say "no" on this matter they mean "NO." No expansions. No "natural increases." Not a single brick, a single plank, a single drop of concrete. Or else the PA is out of the talks. End of discussion.

The Netanyahu government imposed the total stoppage under great pressure from Washington and has resented every second the stop work order has been in effect. This resentment has been shared by a large and growing segment of the Israeli population generally. With the exception of the most pro-peace elements of society, the majority of Israelis have supported construction to meet the needs of natural increases.

No one in Israel has resented the halt more than Avigdor Lieberman, who is foreign minister and capo of the Yisrael Beitenu party. The YB is both very right wing and crucial to the continuation of the Netanyahu government. Leiberman has stated without any ambiguity that his party will pull out of the governing coalition if the moratorium is extended. YB is the second largest party in the Knesset following Netanyahu's Likud party, so the threat is both real and credible.

Even if the political crisis over settlement construction is avoided, Lieberman will remain a very tall speed bump in the "peace process." To put it bluntly--as Lieberman always does--the ForMin does not believe there is any possibility of a genuine peace agreement arising this year or even in the current generation. This world view has a pronounced tendency to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Another deal breaker is the requirement by Israel that any final (or interim) agreement explicitly characterize Israel as a "Jewish State." Netanyahu along with the majority of Israelis support this requirement without reservation. The Arabs oppose it. Whenever asked about this refusal, Abbas weasel words around something fierce. His non-answer answers are carefully crafted to deny the reality that Israel is--and was established as--a Jewish state.

The position of the PA is echoed (without any resort to the rhetoric of weasels) by Arab states generally. The Egyptian ForMin Aboul Gheit took the standard line for rejecting the proposition that Israel should be termed a "Jewish state." Gheit averred deep concern for the status of Arab citizens of Israel implying that they would be deprived of human and civil rights should Israel be considered a Jewish state. The touchingly tender regard for Arab civil and human rights expressed by Gheit and his peers throughout the region ignores completely that Arabs are and have been citizens of Israel for generations. Arabs have the same rights as Jews in Israel including the right to elect members of the Knesset.

The irony of Arab Muslim states which proudly define themselves as "Islamic" suddenly being frightened by the notion of a Jewish as opposed to secular Israel is easily explained. It is the hope (or expectation) that Arabs will win the "breeding war" between themselves and the Jewish population of Israel at some date in the future. The possibility of ending the "Zionist entity" in this way would, they fear, be ended should Israel be defined as a specifically "Jewish state."

These basic contextual matters must be addressed before the myriad of "details." Some of these "details" rise almost to the level of contextual. Among these is the question of what would constitute sufficient guarantees that the Palestinian state would not become the Gaza Strip on steroids? Certainly any guarantees must be more than those of the paper sort as the horrible experience of post-withdrawal Gaza has made clear.

Ms Clinton has a record of believing the UN is real. She would incline to turn the matter of credible guarantees, particularly those backed by a force on the ground, to the UN. She could (and probably will) point to UNIFIL as an example of efficient and effective UN peacekeeping.

The Israelis would see the matter in a completely different light. Their experience with the UN has been less than positive. More importantly, the growth of anti-Israel sentiments (which they fear with reason would not be lessened by any agreement between Israel and the PA) render the UN a less and less legitimate body.

The PA or at least its president reputedly insinuated that any US or other foreign force stationed on its soil could not include any Jewish troops. Perhaps President Abbas really does believe that an American, or British or whatever other soldier who happened to be Jewish would cheerfully betray his obligation to his country to somehow further some presumably dark Israeli design. Or, perhaps he is simply being more or less honestly antisemitic.

The religious/cultural prejudice shoe can fit on the Israeli foot. How comfortable would the government or citizens of Israel be if a peacekeeping force on the border with the PA territory included troops from Pakistan, Iran, or any member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference? Would this be mere "Islamophobia" or a legitimate apprehension based on the nature and character of both faith and culture?

The list of contextual and near contextual quality conundrums facing Hilary Clinton could be lengthened but that isn't necessary to establish the degree of difficulty facing her. Neither is the multi-page roster of lesser political or merely technical problems.

Our Secretary of State is taking on a diplomatic challenge before which even Talleyrand, Metternich, or Bismarck would have quailed. Even if she succeeds where so many others have either failed or failed to try, the irony remains. It is nothing but ironical that the signing of an agreement between the PA and Israel will not mean peace in the Mideast or even, necessarily the beginnings of comprehensive peace, but only the ending of one, politically irritating skirmish.

Israel & Palestine And Hamas & Iran

Expectations concerning the direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority reputedly range from low to non-existent. The main reasons given for a pessimism are (1) the Israeli government will not make sufficient concessions and (2) even if all the concessions sought by the PA are given by Israel, they won't be enough as the PA wants a "one state solution."

In addition it can be and has been argued repeatedly that Benjamin Netanyahu is not given to making dramatic give aways. Or, even if the PM was given to a move such as, say, abandoning East Jerusalem to the PA, his right wing coalition partners would pull the plug on his government.

Observers focusing on the PA have noted recurrently that Abbas' government is relatively weak and under constant threat by the gun and Koran wielding folks of Hamas. The reach of the Hamas terror oriented killers was demonstrated vividly with the murder of four Israeli civilians in territory under PA control.

While there is no reason to have a sudden attack of optimism, the pessimistic assessments of the probable outcome of the direct talks do overlook a key consideration or two. The first is that Israel and the PA are faced by a common set of enemies--Iran and Hamas. The second is that the possibility of Iran gaining nuclear weapons constitutes a threat far, far greater than any which might accompany the two state solution, even one which grotesquely favors the PA.

The potential of Iran having its very own "Mahdi Bomb" within the next year or two focused minds in both Israel and the US with a wonderful power. The palpable failure of Mr Obama's much loved outreach program went hand in hand with the equally self-evident inability of the "international community" to halt the spinning centrifuges.

This set of interlocking failures has served to limit the cone of options available to either or both the US and Israel to two: Accommodate themselves to a new global reality; employ force either with or without continued covert interference with the nuclear program and assistance to the political opposition within Iran.

While no one could describe the stance taken by Mr Obama toward Israel and PM Netanyahu in recent weeks as smacking of a love fest, it is a great distance from the flatly hostile attitude exhibited by the Nice Young Man From Chicago a few months back. It is not unsafe to assume that senior members of his administration have finally broken through his hard shell so he can hear and act on the truth regarding Israel and its view of the Iranian bomb.

Somebody (the Geek's money is on Secretaries Clinton and Gates) convinced Mr Obama that Israel cannot for very good reason rely upon the UN or even the US for security in the face of an Iranian existential threat. The president must have been convinced as well of the ground truth that Israel will strike on its own at a time of its choosing with or without US approval or even understanding when the Iranian menace stands ready to attack.

Since the US is Israel's primary source of advanced weapons systems, it is necessary and effective for Israel to maintain high quality relations with the US--as long as doing so does not open Israel to an enhanced probability of becoming "one with Nineveh and Tyre." This dynamic the president must have understood finally gave the US high quality leverage to employ on Israel in support of a primary US policy goal.

Obama wants (desperately needs, is more like it) to bring a peace settlement between Israel and the PA even if this is not synonymous with the oft referenced "comprehensive Mideast peace." Achieving this goal requires Israel marching to American music, and, as both Israelis and their American interlocutors well know, this can be very unpleasant for the marchers. Only the Israeli need for American support--and action--in the event force must be employed to stop the Iranian bomb makers can serve to make the music easier for Israelis to listen to.

In short conditions were ripe for a trade. The US would agree to take all necessary measures to stop the Iranian bomb. Israel would agree to make major concessions in a genuine search for a peace with the PA.

The PA at this point should be dancing in the streets. Events seem to have given the Abbas' coterie the whip hand. That would be true were it not for Hamas.

Hamas and the PA are locked in an existential struggle. Only one will be the sure enough, bona fide, genuine government of Palestine. The increasing totality of the struggle for ultimate power has gone too far to allow compromise. Even if Hamas suddenly dropped its demands for supremacy, ended its increasingly passionate embrace of Islamist purity and political Islam, there is no chance that Israel or the US or even the majority of the EU would go along with the apparent changing of the tiger's stripes.

The PA needs the understanding, support, and assistance of Israel, the US and the EU if it is to survive the challenge being offered by Hamas and its sponsor, Iran. The enemy of my enemy may not be my friend, but he is my vital supporter. Or, so a majority of PA supporters would agree.

This governing imperative implies that the PA will not seek the maximum concessions from Israel--at least not for real or for long. No one in the PA is really comfortable with the two state solution; most or all would prefer a one state approach--one state where Jews would be a minority from the start-up. This attitude is even more pronounced within the ranks of Hamas.

Abbas and others at the peak of the PA have long learned the limits of ideological extremism. All have found out the hard way--by experience--that being extreme may make for great TV but pays off very little when the klieg lights are switched off.

Being born again pragmatists of a sort, Abbas and the rest want to come away with a state, with their jobs intact, and with a reasonable prospect for a long life. Coming to terms with Israel in a way acceptable to the Israelis is the way to go. If necessary (and it will be), the US can sweeten the deal and soften any adverse impact with the cushioning of choice in much of the world--cash.

Right now the "correlation of forces" (to use that maximum fine old Soviet term) favors "let's make a deal." The interlocking bogymen of Iran and Hamas add the necessary fear. The needs of President Obama open the floodgates of American largess. The Israelis need a green light (and, in the best case, a cooperative US attack) to abate the Iranian menace--or at least delay it until internal events can result in regime change. The PA needs a future without Hamas bomb throwers.

Maybe a soupcon of optimism is not completely unjustified. Well, maybe, but don't bet the ranch.

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Once More With Feeling--Let's Talk About Peace

Once more the air is filled with the sound of the cuckoo. That bird is crowing, "Peace! Peace! Give peace a chance." It's calls are echoing around Washington. Reverberating through Israel. The bird's cheerful noise is bouncing through the wadis and souks of Palestine. Resounding across the capitals of at least some Mideast states. And, throbbing amidst the gunfire and IED blasts of Afghanistan.

Fer sure, dudes.

The world has been through the cycle of unwarranted optimism and unmerited depression too often to exhibit the slightest joy over the recent announcement by the Obama administration that it is investing whatever might still linger of its diplomatic and political prestige and influence on hosting the opening round of the latest bout between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The chances of success were in no way enhanced by the belief expressed by senior members of Team Obama that within a year a comprehensive settlement on substantial issues will be achieved.

That rhetoric of faith is akin to the "peace in our time" piety expressed by Neville Chamberlin on his return from the Munich Conference. If the Secretary of State or any one else in the administration really, really believes that, there is a desperate need for a change in medications.

Even if the hard right coalition headed by Prime Minister Netanyahu is ready, willing, and, most importantly, politically able to achieve peace at the cost of pulling thousands of "settlers" out of the disputed territories, there is no reason to conclude the weak, fractured, Palestinian Authority government of Mahmoud Abbas can agree to any formula which settles for less than their maximum demands.

Netanyahu has promised to take any deal reached over the next months to both the Knesset and the Israeli people. Not that he would have any choice. Any agreement will be both at Israel's expense and risk. As the Israelis learned to their sorrow in the wake of evacuating the Gaza Strip, the rest of the world cheers the withdrawal but is terribly unconcerned if the aftermath includes the loss of Israeli lives to the "liberating" rockets and mortar bombs of Palestinian "freedom fighters" and Islamist killers.

The Palestinian Authority is a government in name rather than substance even in the territory which it purportedly rules. Its legitimacy is questionable in the minds of many Palestinians. Of course the PA is under direct, continual, quotidian threats from the very hard line Islamist regime of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Any sign of purported "weakness" on the part of the PA will be seized upon by Hamas and its allies, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as one more lever with which to pry the Palestinian territory further into the irredentist camp.

The PA has a record of rejecting far better offers than any which can or will be made by the Netanyahu government. In the previous acts of pure rejectionism, the PA has continued the splendid record of diplomatic failure established back in the Thirties by the Arabs of the region and enhanced by the sorry and totally avoidable blunders of Fatah during and after the First and Second Intifadas.

As diplomats the Arabs of Palestine have a history which shows a level of sheer incompetence rivaled only by their success in military operations. The government of Israel is perfectly well aware of the Palestinian capacity for self-inflicted diplomatic defeat and will be prepared to take full advantage of it.

Of course, the PA is counting on the US and the European Union to do the necessary diplomatic heavy lifting. In this the PA is showing a shrewd understanding of the stance of both the Obama administration and the political and opinion molding elites of the EU.

The EU is clearly, if not pro-Palestinian, at least, quite anti-Israel. There is no doubt but the EU elites are fed up with the situation in the Mideast and hold the Israelis solely culpable for the current situation. There is equally little doubt but the EU will lean on Israel in every way possible regardless of reality or even without regard for the interests of the EU member states.

The Europeans have convinced themselves that a two state solution will not only bring in a permanent era of peace, love, and flower power between Israel and its Arab/Muslim neighbors, but will also end the global threat of terrorism and their domestic problems of creeping Islamism. This unicausal model is attractive because it is simple. It is wrong nonetheless.

The Obama administration will undoubtedly put the muscle on Israel. That is all it can do. It--and the US--have no measurable leverage on the governments of the Arab/Muslim states and no genuine credibility with the Arab/Muslim street. All the famed Obama "outreach" program has done is raise and quickly dash expectations among the many who are so ill-informed as to believe the hoary trope, "if the US can put a man on the moon, it can (fill in the blank.")

However there are very real limits on the amount of coercion the Obama administration can use on Israel. These limits are imposed by domestic political considerations which far transcend the purported power of the Israel Lobby or the alleged importance of the "Jewish vote," although neither of these are trivial matters. Poll after poll demonstrates that an overwhelming majority of We the People, particularly those who meet the Rasmussen poll definition of "mainstream," not only support Israel but pin the tail of blame on the Palestinian donkey.

Further limiting the capacity of Mr Obama or his administration to play an effective role in the upcoming direct negotiations is the absence of credibility. If LBJ had a "credibility gap" during the Vietnam War, Obama has a yawning credibility canyon. His word simply cannot be trusted by the government of Israel. To say this limits his capacity to influence affairs is to state the overly obvious.

Over in Afghanistan the Karzai government has acknowledged the self-evident. Karzai personally allowed as how his government is engaged in ongoing conversations of an informal nature with members of Taliban. That admission is scarcely stop-the-presses news.

The Karzai government and the president himself would be criminally negligent as well as suicidally out-to-lunch not to have been talking with representatives of both Taliban and the Haqqani network. Conflict resolution, even hostilities termination, depend upon the achievement of a working agreement with the insurgents. When the shooting stops--or even to facilitate the stopping of the shooting--a power sharing arrangement must be achieved.

Unless an insurgency is focused solely upon the ejection of what is perceived as a foreign political and military presence, the two contestants will have to live together at war's end. Thus it is essential to redefine the conflict in a way that assures neither combatant sees the war as existential in nature.

It is clear that this has been Karzai's goal for some years now. He is a very able politician in the Afghan context. He understands perfectly that the greater the body count, the more inflexible the dividing lines between insurgent and government, the more war weary the uncommitted majority population becomes, the more difficult, even impossible it will be to end the war without one side or the other existentially eliminating the other.

Being both a realist and a powerful nationalist, Karzai has laid down only one key condition regarding who from Taliban and the Haqqani is an acceptable interlocutor. He demands that only those who are not aligned with or dominated by al-Qaeda or other "foreign" entities come to the table--even for the informal conversations which have been underway.

To his credit Mr Karzai has made no grandiose promises. He has put forth no timetable. He sees no specific result eventually coming from the conversations. Once again he is showing both realism and a keen grasp of the potentials of Afghan politics.

Best of all Mr Karzai has kept the Obama White House and administration basically out of the loop. Keeping the current administration at a very long arm's length is probably the best way to assure something positive emerges from the shadows of informal conversations, the talks which happen but never are given more than tacit, offhand mention.

If only the Israelis and Palestinians could do the same--success might crown their efforts.