The Bad Guys Succeed Only With Our Help

Remember, bucko, the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize. The goals of terror are essentially negative. To put the best face on a strategy based on terror, particularly that of the suicide sort, the desired end is one of deterrence.

With respect to the US the minimum strategic goal of each and all of the al-Qaeda clones is identical with that of Osama bin Laden. The goal is to deter the US from any military presence in Arab Muslim states as well as continuation of its diplomatic, economic and military support of Israel. The goal is to force the US to stop doing that which it has been doing.

In a larger way the strategic hope is that by deterring the US from continuing policies of many decades standing they will accomplish the same with other Western actors. The US must remain the main focus since even when a terror attack may have a desirable impact from the perspective of its authors as was the presumed linkage between the Madrid bombings and the subsequent election, the results were too narrow track to be even slightly satisfactory. It mattered not if Spain kept troops in either Afghanistan or Iraq or withdrew them ASAP.

Substantially the hope of the Glorious Martyrdom Wannabes and those who offer religious comfort, political motivation and technical preparation is identical with those who once believed that hanging pickpockets would deter the pickpockets busily picking pockets in the crowd around the gallows. That didn't work. Neither will al-Qaeda and its ilk.

Here is why, bucko.

Deterrence works only in those rare occasions where it is mutual, based on a truly existential threat and the decision makers on both sides are not only rational actors but share the same calculus of rationality. Deterrence is assured if, in addition to the foregoing, both deterred actors have alternatives by which to pursue their respective policy goals below the deterred level of conduct.

It doesn't take a lot of thinking to remind oneself as to the one long time deterrence worked. Right on, bucko, the mutually assured destruction period of the Cold War.

Since the dynamic of the relationship between al-Qaeda or the rest of the Islamist jihadist groups and the US meets none of the tests of functional deterrence, they are doomed to fail in achieving their policy ends, no matter how minimally defined. The US is not going to cut and run from its obligations either in Arab Muslim states or regarding Israel.

So, all the bad guys can hope for is a species of self-inflicted defeat on our part. The worst part of this thesis is that it is not too much to hope for. The self-inflicted defeat option is a realistic one.

There are several reasons to justify this gloomy conclusion.

One is the misuse of US military power in both Afghanistan and Iraq. While both situations have changed for the better, the net effect on We the People has been negative. We have little stomach for more military engagements with Islamist adversaries.

The second reason is the economy. Thanks to a series of world class blunders on the part of three administrations (Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama) the US has a foreign funded deficit which severely crimps our capacity for independent action on the global stage. This situation will only worsen in the near to mid-term without major changes in D.C.

Thirdly one must not underestimate the impact of the post-modernist, multi-cultural oriented, blame-America-first, pity-the-poor-and-alienated portions of the American elite. Their influence in politics, the media, and academia is significant and growing. These "useful idiots," to use Lenin's phrase, can do much to sap American political will and internal confidence. They are the Islamists' Fifth Column.

Finally, as David Brooks noted in an op-ed piece in the NYT, We the People are not the same today as were our predecessors of fifty or seventy-five years ago. We want perfect outcomes and demand that the central government and the tools of the bureaucratic state provide such all the time. We are no longer willing to acknowledge that perfection is not possible in the real world, and we will not be held harmless from all those many things that go bump in the dark.

For people of this mentality surrender is an option--provided it is not termed as such. As long as we can hide behind the positive such as declaiming faith in "the international community" we can wave a carefully concealed white flag.

It is appealing and true to say, "We aren't the world's policeman." Or, "Israel has too much power over our domestic politics." Or, "If we pull out of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and so on, the Islamists will leave us alone." Or, even, "Get rid of poverty in Yemen, Somalia or wherever and there will be no more willing martyrs."

All true--at least in part. All dangerously wrong--at least in major part. But, convincing ways to put tie dyed colors on the universal flag of surrender.

The terror merchants of Islam cannot win. Not alone. They need us to do the heavy lifting.

Terrorism Or Not Terrorism

In a totally expectable fashion, a completely artificial debate has emerged in the aftermath of the Fort Hood mass shooting. The controversy is over whether or not the action of the Army shrink, Maj. Nidel Malik Hasan, constituted terrorism per se. The breakdown in positions is between those who find it terroristic such as Walid Phares and those who do not such as the shooter's aunt.

The debate is not likely to be productive. Beyond that it is fundamentally irrelevant. Regardless of the precise intentions of Major Hasan or the details of his motivation, the act was, broadly speaking, terroristic in effect. It did perturb the societal fabric not only of the personnel at Fort Hood but of the US population as a whole.

That is the effect of terrorism. The only predictable effect actually. The effect is a necessary but not sufficient component of the definition of terrorism. To be terrorism per se it is also necessary that the intent of the actor be to change some policy or aspect of policy held by the government of the target population.

There is no indication as yet that Major Hasan had any such well formed intention. Nor is there any hint yet that he held more than a generalized distaste for US policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, or with respect to the "Palestinian" territory which held his family roots. As usual, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

However, it is too simplistic, too pat to allege that the major went a little "funny" due to his impending overseas deployment. Murder/suicide is not typically the preferred way to get out of an unwanted posting.

It is also too simplistic, too pat to maintain that the major was driven off the rails by the climate of anti-Muslim feeling extant within the US military. If, as the major is quoted as telling relatives, some of his psychiatric patients expressed anti-Muslim undercurrents following their return from Iraq, these were not of a magnitude to be plausibly adduced as motive. At the very least, as a (presumably) well trained and supervised clinician, Major Hasan should have had the tools necessary to absorb the perceived negative feelings, creatively challenge them in the patient's own better interests, or, at the least, request assistance from his superiors.

The most accurate way to view the major's exercise in trigger pulling is as terroristic. It was not terror per se, but it was in effect. This means it was like but different from such well defined terror acts as 9/11, 7/7, and the Madrid train bombings. Major Hasan's actions ripped societal fabric, engendered both fear and grief, but had neither political intent nor effect. So, it was terroristic but not terrorist.

However, there is one very important way in which Major Hasan is joined at the hip and shoulder with Osama bin Laden and all the others. The major and the al-Qaeda chieftain as well as the suicide bombers, Taliban triggermen, Hamas rocket launchers all drew the inspiration for their acts from their religion, from their understanding of the requirements of their faith, and the strictures of their holy writings. There is no way in which Major Hasan can be separated from the ideological soil of Islam. No more can he and his motives be ripped from their Islamic context than can be the actions of the other jihadists both well known and anonymous.

A direct and unbroken continuum exists. It ranges from Islam qua Islam to Islamism (or, political Islam, if you prefer that euphemism) and thence to the armed expression of Islamism, jihad. One follows from the other as a more or less logical progression from lesser to greater commitment, from lesser to greater belief.

It is true that other religious confessions in recent times have shown a similar progression. Examples range from sectarian warfare and terrorism in Northern Ireland to violent, even lethal attacks on providers of abortion in the US. In these cases, particularly the latter, religious belief was exaggerated, even distorted by community tensions or individual personality features. In any event, their extent has been limited, severely limited.

In comparison, Islamist jihadism has been and continues to be both widespread and increasing in the number of practitioners. The result has been a climate of acceptability, even attraction for the jihadist world view and concomitant actions. Major Hasan showed both in his actions the other day and in the web postings attributed to him that he had been infected by the Islamist jihadist virus.

Infected is perhaps too strong for its use implies that Major Hasan was a sort of victim, the passive recipient of an outside pathogen. This implication does not do justice to the major. It is evident that he chose to adopt the Islamist jihadist world view. The web postings linked to his name show a mind engaged in justifying contemplated actions. He was, it would appear, in the process of convincing himself as to the correctness of a jihad act some months ago.

This and the oft repeated contention that the posting(s) had come to the attention of the "authorities" (don't you just love that bit of generic labeling?) prompts speculation over the roads not taken. Had the post(s) been linked conclusively with the major, it would seem possible that the massacre at Fort Hood could have been prevented. It seems possible, even probable, that the major's trajectory to the jihadist world view and its inevitable ending could have been halted.

Not by arrest. Not by law enforcement. No. The major was a psychiatrist. It seems that he would have been far more amenable to psychological intervention than is the typical Islamist jihadist. Even if an attempt at intervention were to have failed, at the very least the security concerns would have been brought to full light. Effective protective measures could have been taken.

The only possible positive effect of the major's bloody act is an increased awareness of the climate created by Islamist jihadism. An awareness that this sort of ideological context can produce, in a self-organizing way, individuals or groups which engage in terroristic acts. Not terrorism because the political aim and result will be absent, but lethal and scary acts which rip societal fabric and induce both fear and uncertainty.

Terroristic acts are every bit as serious and threatening as the activity of a truly terrorist entity such as Taliban or al-Qaeda. They are, however, harder to detect and prevent. The terroristic actor is homegrown, often quite unsuspected and radicalized, not by external propaganda but rather by personal choice, personal "growth" if you like.

But, the terroristic actor just like the terrorist has his roots in Islam. Whether the many Muslims who have never contemplated Islamist jihadism and may even genuinely detest the Islamist jihadists love affair with death are comfortable with this truth is irrelevant. Islam is the foundational glue which cements Major Hasan and the rest of the blood drenched Warriors of the One True Faith.

It's The Religion

Even more than the Geek the Geekness is bothered by the reluctance of senior American officials among many others to acknowledge the role played by Islam in the wars currently underway throughout the world. The Geekness has a much closer acquaintance with the power of religion to influence deeply the worldview and behavior of young people than does the Geek for whom the dynamic has always been a matter of intellectual curiosity only.

The other day the Geek posted on the continuum which takes political movements from Islamic to Islamist to Islamist jihadist with limited goals and ends to Islamist jihadist with global goals. It is similar but not identical to the process described long ago by Crane Britton to describe the leftward movement of the French and other revolutions. The processes in both cases are facilitated by the existence of external pressure whether military or non-violent but still coercive in intent. This leads to the maxim: Pressure consolidates long, long before it fractures.

In the post the Geek commented that Islam is a religion by and for warriors without superior in the faiths of humankind. The Koran celebrates both war and the virtues presumed to characterize the warrior. Mohammad, the Perfect Man, was a successful military leader--and a profligate spiller of blood. The Faith which the Prophet and his Companions brought to Mecca spread by the sword across an enormous swath of the Western and, ultimately, the Eastern world.

The warriors of the scimitar and Koran proved superior in both political will and pure military capacity to the Crusaders of the two handed sword and Bible. The warrior power of Islam propelled its believers to the walls of Constantinople and finally to the walls of Vienna where the crest of the flood broke and receded.

Islam promises eschatological rewards to those of the Faith who die in battle against either the infidel or the apostate. The promises are in the sacred literature. They were not later additions tacked on by ambitious religious leaders as they were in Christianity.

It is the eschatological dimension which assures not only that there will be an inherent appeal by Islamist jihadism to young men but that the appeal will be far stronger, far more pervasive, and far less easy to defeat in battle than the secular promises of ideologies whether Fascist, Nazi, or Communist. To enjoy the benefits promised by the secular ideologies, one must stay alive for all such ideologies are present life based. The eschatological rewards are to be provided in the life after life.

That is one very powerful difference between what the US and other countries are facing today and the foes fought and defeated in the past. Not to put too fine a point on the matter, both hostilities termination and conflict resolution are easier to achieve with an opponent who is present life oriented than one who looks to the life beyond the present one.

It is a commonplace that youth is attracted to causes larger than the self. The search for personal identity, worth, and meaning which typifies the years of adolescence and early adulthood is both bolstered and challenged by the need to belong to something larger, much larger than one's self. It is this universal experience which makes youth notoriously idealistic, ever ready and eager to embrace a large enough cause, a cause which demands much of the self and promises much in return.

The Geekness reminded the Geek of the tales of martyrdom for the faith which characterized so much of the American landscape during the Fifties. She related the tales heard day after day in the parochial school she attended about the way in which Christians were tortured, imprisoned, and killed by the "godless commies" of yore. She noted that many of her age both in and out of parochial environments embraced the idea of being "martyred" for belief with great enthusiasm.

On reflection the Geek recalled the mood of the day as well. He remembered and then researched the literature of the early Cold War including the stories which decorated that ancient universal publication, My Weekly Reader. The notion--and the appeal--of standing up, dying if necessary for belief were both omnipresent and powerful as a source of both worldview and behavior. The view and the behavior need not be Christian to be sure, but they were demanded of youth, by youth, and gave rise to much of what we look back on as the raging wonder decade, the Sixties.

If that dynamic was so prevalent and powerful within the semi-secular suburban middle class youth coming of age during the Cold War, then how much more compelling must be the beliefs of Islam and the far more demanding Islamist jihadism to the youth not only of the Mideast or Central Asia but the West and the US as well. Islam in and of itself is a very potent creator of a sense of community, an anodyne for anonymity, an answer to perceived impotency. Islamist jihadism due to its emphasis on war and martyrdom is far more so.

The notion of putting one's life on the line for a belief--for the meaning that belief brings to one's life--has an appeal in and of itself. When the demand is accompanied by the promise of a very great eschatological reward, it is irresistible--at least to some.

Not all Muslims need nor desire the attractions, the promises, the assumed rewards emphasized by the purveyors of Islamism and jihadism. The assorted surveys conducted by many different organizations over the past few years make that clear. It is a fact which is both real and irrelevant.

Islamist jihadists are drawn from a small percentage of all Muslims to be sure. The youth for whom the challenge and message of Islamist jihadism has both meaning and attraction may represent only a small fraction of all Muslims, but as events of recent months in countries as disparate as Somalia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the US have proven, it is a sufficiently large fraction as to be a very real problem.

True Belief as Eric Hoffer pointed out over a half century ago is potent because it provides an adherent with a personal identity, and, with that, a sense of belonging, of worth, of purpose, of cosmic meaning. Secular ideologies have capitalized upon this psychological reality.

So have religions. Christianity and Judaism have and do make use of the idealistic and searching nature of youth. Of these two, one does not promise eternal reward (or punishment) as a portion of its doctrine and the other makes no specific mention of the special rewards accruing to those who die in combat against the infidel and apostate.

Islam does so provide. And, Islamist jihadism emphasizes, perhaps to an exaggerated extent, the rewards to self and family of martyrdom in war. It gives both substance and reality to the oft repeated claim of Islamists that, "We love death more than the others love life."

That is why the crux of the war between the Islamist jihadists and the rest of the world's people is one of religion, not economics, nor political disenfranchisement, nor lack of social status, nor absence of "opportunity" (whatever that means), nor any of the other sociological and psychological explanations so glibly offered by regiments of academic, journalistic, and political "experts."

It's not the economy. It's not politics. It's not the Israeli "occupation." It's not the presence of American troops in the Mideast or Northwest Asia.

It's the religion, stupid.

As Allah wills.

Islam(ism) And The Future Of Afghanistan

A very important consideration which must enter the current and prolonged strategic review in and around the Oval Office is the role that Islam, or its more politically oriented variant, Islamism, is likely to play in Afghanistan. Arguably, this is the single most critical consideration other than that of preventing an obvious military defeat of the US and its Western allies.

The starting point is self-evident. The Taliban of Sheik Omar and its guest, al-Qaeda, were and are prime examples of both Islamism and its armed component, jihadism.

It is equally self-evident that the US and its associates have no desire to see their efforts at ending the threat of al-Qaeda and nation-building in Afghanistan crowned by a post-hostilities reemergence of an Islamist regime, particularly one which would tolerate or assist jihadist groups. The unfortunate reality is that such an outcome is of high probability.

To make sure there are no problems in communication, three definitions are in order. Islam refers to the religion in and of itself without considering any governmental or political implications.

Islamism refers to what is often called, "political Islam." The Islamist seeks the establishment of a political system as well as a judiciary based on the principles and practices of Islamic law, Shariah. The Islamist may use strictly constitutional and non-violent means to reach this goal. The Islamist goal may or may not be inclusive of the establishment of a global caliphate.

Jihadism rejects the non-violent approach. It seeks the Islamist goal or goals by means of military or quasi-military force including the use of political and social terrorism or the threat of such. The jihadist goals may be limited to a specific country or people. Or, the goals of the jihadist may be far more expansive including the realization of a global caliphate.

The original Taliban fostered by the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other elements of the Pakistani government was an excellent example of the limited form of Islamist jihadist group. The goals of Taliban were limited to the country dubbed "Afghanistan" and were more narrowly focused on the Pushtan segment of that region's population.

The assorted groups which fall under the general rubric of Taliban in Pakistan are also an example of the limited goal Islamist jihadist group despite some occasional lapses into a more expansive rhetoric. Unless either the Taliban of Afghanistan or its counterpart in Pakistan sponsor or invite the presence of Islamist jihadist entities of broader agenda, or gain control of nuclear materials, neither represents a clear and present danger to the rest of the world.

In reality, the probability of such a benign outcome coming to pass is slim to none. The reasons for a gloomy assessment are to be found in the record of history--both ancient and quite recent as well as in a brutal contemporary fact.

Islam in and of itself is a warriors religion without equal in the history of humanity. Its sacred writings both extol warfare on behalf of the faith and equate the non-Islamic peoples with the "House of War." Beyond these doctrinal features, the religion promises the greatest of postmortem rewards to those who die in combat with either the infidels or the apostates.

In the great days of early Islam, the warriors faith gave impetus to a series of conquests which were (and are) awesome in their breadth. The same may be seen in the response of the Islamic societies to the ill-advised, religiously justified wars of conquest launched by Europe under the rubric of "Crusades." Islam combined with ethno-linguistic motivations to provide an unbeatable combination. Not until the initial waves of faith diminished did Islam retreat from the Gates of Vienna and languish in the doldrums of the Ottoman Caliphate.

More recently, the movement from less to more extreme Islamism and jihadism is clear in Somalia. Looking back at the first of the Islamist groups in that bloody stretch of desert, the Islamic Union, one sees an Islamist group which had the limited goal of establishing an Islamic republic under Islamic law in place of the warlord dominated government.

The Islamic Union met with limited success. It was not militarily competent. And, its brand of Saudi sponsored Wahhibist austerity did not sit well with the majority of Somalis who were used to a more laid back form of Sufi oriented Islam.

The Islamic Union was a failure. After a time it was succeeded by the Islamic Courts Union, which was a far more dedicated group of Islamist True Believers. The ICU was not only more competent in the arts of military and quasi-military operations, it was far more ruthless in its application of both terror and Shariah. As a result, it conquered most of Somalia even if it did not win the affection or loyalty of most Somalis.

At the high point of its success, the ICU modified its application of Shariah so as to gain more popular support. It had nearly established unquestioned operational dominance of Somalia when the Ethiopian government with the support of the US launched its invasion of the country.

The Ethiopian military blew the ICU away. But, as an invader it could not gain any genuine acceptance let alone support from the Somali population. Resistance to the invader never ended.

Al-Shaabab emerged as the most extreme, most willing to kill--and die--faction in the badly divided resistance movement. It was also the group with the most severe view of Shariah and the most expansive view of its goals.

Al-Shaabab was and is an expansive jihadist group. It seeks not simply the establishment of an Islamic republic in Somalia but a conquest of those portions of surrounding countries which have a significant Somali population. This includes Kenya, Djibouti, and the Ogaden.

Al-Shaabab has openly aligned itself with not only al-Qaeda but the global Islamist jihadist movement generally. Al-Shaabab has a brisk two way trade with other jihadist groups around the world. It also serves as a convenient operational training ground.

The progression from less to more extreme in the theory and practice of Islamism as well as the identical progression from less to more expansive in goals is the result of the pressure of war. It is an illustration of the long exhibited truism that pressure consolidates far more than it fractures a political movement. Not only does pressure consolidate political will, it tends to make the political will demand an ever greater reward for the years of sacrifice.

The increased appeal of Taliban's ideology and sense of group commitment to the youth of Afghanistan is an indicator that the Somali trajectory is not unique to that venue or that particular people. The prolongation of the war in Afghanistan without a clear and convincing defeat to Taliban both by the foreign forces and the Afghan National Forces will assure the movement from less to more extreme, less to more expansive, will not only continue but accelerate in Afghanistan.

The same dynamic applies to Pakistan. The only difference is that the foreign presence is marginally less evident and thus marginally less inflammatory.

A second and even more dramatic justification for the gloomy assessment for the future of Afghanistan comes from History News Network. In a thoughtful post the writer presents a convenient synopsis of the current state of official play in the Wonderful World of Terrorism. Working from the US State Department listings, it is shown that of the 126 "official" terrorist groups, 64 are of Islamist jihadist nature. This number far and away eclipses the next highest sector, "secular nationalist," which can claim only 36 members.

The take-away from this is simple: Islamist jihadism has a wide appeal. While sometimes linked to nationalistic objectives in the short run, the majority of the listed groups have expanded their horizons in the same manner as seen by the progression in Somalia. It almost leads to an equation: The broader the view, the greater the appeal--and the zeal.

The implication for Afghanistan and the Obama administration's strategic review is clear. The US must finally rely upon the capacity of the regime in Kabul to cut a deal with those elements of Taliban most willing to abandon expansive goals. While doing that, the prime task for the foreign forces is to identify and kill those of Taliban and al-Qaeda least likely to play the old and honorable Afghan game of "let's make a deal."

For all his drawbacks, Karzai remains today what he was when we chose him to be "our man in Kabul"--an accomplished Afghan deal maker, or, if you prefer, an accomplished politician in the unique context of Afghan society. For all his many positive attributes, Abdullah Abdullah is not so skilled. But, the participation of Abdullah is critical since he is the main man for the Tajik minority, or the old Northern Alliance which was Tajik dominated.

The president has already shown a willingness to accept Taliban as a permanent fact of Afghan political life. That was a good move. It shows a readiness to acknowledge reality, no matter how unpleasant, that eluded the Bush/Cheney administration.

The crux of the challenge is to keep the correct up close and personal pressure on the most intractable elements of Taliban while holding the door to government participation open for those who may embrace Islamism but reject jjhadism. It is a circle which is most difficult to square, but not impossibly so.

Many if not most adherents of Taliban will pack it in if there is a reasonable probability of seeing their desires and needs addressed without the necessity of living under the constant threat of death from American or other guns (to say nothing of sleeping in the cold and eating bad food). Pressure only consolidates when there is no safe and honorable way out of the vise.

The role of the regime in Kabul, regardless of the way in which the 7 November election goes, is to provide the safe and honorable way out. The role of the American and other foreign forces is to provide the inducement of unceasing pressure--and to kill those jihadists who need killing.

Are You Man Enough?

The hoary question, "Are you man enough to---," is defunct in the US and most of the West, at least within the ever-so-polite circles of the academic, political, and chattering classes. It is, however, far from dead in most of the world, particularly in places such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The concept of "manliness" or machismo is found not only in Spanish cultures but in most of those where Islam is dominant. The reason for this is not that Islamic cultures are somehow "backward" or insensitive to gender issues but rather that the religion in and of itself is male oriented. It is, after all, a religion created by and for warrior based tribes of the Arabic Peninsula. The spread of Islam was not only by the sword but by the strong appeal of its belief structure to men of tribally based societies. This can be seen simply by tracing where Islam has enjoyed the greatest growth, persistence, and popular support.

War in an Islamic context is celebrated to a degree which has not been seen in the West for nearly a century. The strong belief in the purifying and consolidating nature of war on a society would not have been unfamiliar to Europeans or Americans at the outset of World War I. The combination of the "industrialization of death" and the consequent death toll served to erase the attractiveness of war in the Western mind.

That is most assuredly not the case in Islamic societies--even those such as Iran which have experienced prolonged and very costly wars. Even in Iraq where many have turned against sectarian war in the wake of the death count of the past several years, war is still lauded as the duty--even the privilege --of the believer.

Societies which have a pronounced tribal orientation such as is the case in both Afghanistan and Pakistan accept the view of war as an instrument of societal purification and consolidation to an even greater extent than those in which tribal affiliation has been weakened by the rise of a purely national identification. To put it bluntly: War is a symbol and a test of one's manhood.

The linkage between war and manhood is weak if it exists at all in the US and the rest of the West. We tend to deprecate the existence of this sort of linkage as atavistic, as a symptom of some sort of psychopathology, as "testosterone poisoning." The ultimate asymmetry in the "asymmetrical warfare" between ourselves and the Islamist jihadists is that we see war as an unpleasant reality forced upon us while the opposition sees it as a sign of personal worth, personal commitment, personal manhood.

What is to us a "continuation of politics by violent means" is to the jihadists a visible testament to belief and courage, to faith and manhood. This means that the political will of the Islamist jihadist is far more deeply rooted, far more pervasive, and infinitely more difficult to erode or eradicate than is ours. For us it is mere policy; for the jihadist it is the nature of life both now and eternal.

The recent attacks by Taliban in Pakistan, particularly the raid on the Pakistani version of the Pentagon have made the contest in that country very much one of mano a mano. The assault in Rawalpindi may prove to be the single greatest mistake ever committed by Taliban.

The Pakistani Army has no choice other than to finally launch a real attack on the Taliban strongholds in South Waziristan. It is either that or admit that the single most important institution in Pakistan has no cajones. The second alternative is outside the realm of possibility.

The attack also demonstrates to the ever hopeful pro-Islamists within the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence that their creation, Taliban, is no longer under their control--or even capacity to influence. The monster has escaped the Dr Frankenstein.

At nearly the same time Taliban again demonstrated its ability to be its own worst enemy. The teenage suicide bomber who blew himself up in Swat killed a half dozen troops, but eradicated several dozen civilians. Pakistanis, like Afghans, object to seeing civilians killed by either the foreign infidels or Islamist jihadists.

The net result of the recent Taliban attacks has been to enhance the political will of the Pakistani civilians, government, and, most of all, the Army to destroy Taliban. The only uncertainty in the minds of Pakistanis exists with respect to the US.

There is much doubt in both Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the willingness of the US to continue, let alone enhance, its efforts in Afghanistan. The opposition, most notably the two senior figures of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, have expressed confidence that the Americans will soon cut and run. This sense has been echoed in at least diminuendo form by members of the Pakistani military, legislature, and media.

There is a growing belief in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that the US does not have the testicular fortitude to keep on keeping on. Preparations have been underway in both countries by members of the local elites to get out of Dodge ahead of the Taliban victory--or the American pull out. The two are seen as one.

The spectre of Vietnam hangs heavy in the air of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. People in both countries as well as here in the US look back at the end game of that war as paradigmatic of what is soon to happen in Afghanistan. Unlike some American commentators who use the specious analogy of Vietnam to prove that we are engaged in a war we cannot win, the folks in Pakistan see the correct parallel. They see the US simply tossing in the towel and leaving--which is precisely what was done in the final days of the Vietnam War.

Behind the carping and hissy-fit tossing over American UAV attacks in the FATA and (yet to come) Baluchistan, the Pakistani government and military want the US and its allies to stay the course in Afghanistan. With the realization that Taliban has escaped its creator's control, there is a genuine anxiety as to what will happen if the US quits the war before the Islamist jihadists are well and truly defeated.

It is critical that Taliban, al-Qaeda, and others of the Islamist jihadist ideology not have any basis to claim that the US has been defeated by their efforts. These groups have a fine record of distorting history to prove their point. The constant claim of Osama bin Laden, Omar, and others is that the jihadists defeated the Red Army.

More recently, when the US evacuated a remote outpost which had been the scene of a heavy Taliban attack a few weeks earlier, Taliban claimed it was the result of its victory over the infidels. In reality the Taliban probe had been repulsed with very heavy losses after several hours of bitter, close range combat between the outnumbered defenders and the jihadists. That reality did not bother the Taliban propagandists. They pointed to the fact that the outpost had been abandoned. That was enough.

In order to achieve even the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing," the US and its allies must carry the war up close and personal to the Islamist jihadists. While taking pains to assure that any civilian casualties are the result of jihadist actions, we and our allies, including the Afghan National Forces, must confront the jihadists in very personal combat. We must accept the enemy's linkage of war with manhood.

This brutal reality means our forces must take greater risks than would otherwise be the case. Our superiority in stand-off weapons is of no assistance when the enemy scorns death dealt from a safe distance. Taliban and the others will not allow us to demonstrate the bravery of being out of range.

Whether we like the idea or not (and the Geek does not), the enemy's concept of war demands that we revert to "don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes." If--and only if--we show the Islamist jihadists repeatedly that we have both the capacity and personal will to take the war right to their doorstep will we be able to achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing." To put it crudely, we have to show the Islamist jihadists that we have bigger balls than they do.

This may be an atavistic way of war. It isn't the sort of war we in the US (or the West generally) prefer to fight. But, it is the understanding of war which is inherent to both Islam and the tribally based societies of Northwest Asia. And, now get a grip on this, the locals define what war is and how it must be fought. The locals see war as manhood. We must do the same, unpleasant as that may be.

The US military is and has been awash in phrases such as "kill the enemy in close combat," or "find, fix, and destroy." The war in Afghanistan demands that these phrases be translated from paper slogans to the reality of life and death in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan.

This is the "war of necessity" to which President Obama alluded some weeks ago in Phoenix. It is the way in which the war must be fought--if we are to "not-lose." It means that we must send more troops into hazard. It means that We the People and our purported representatives in Washington must accept an ever lengthening butcher's bill.

It means that both We the People and our representatives must accept the ground truth that what is at stake in Afghanistan is not simply the future of the people who live there or next door in Pakistan. It means that We the People and our representatives must accept the overarching reality that all Islamist jihadist groups everywhere in the world are linked head and hip so that a defeat one place is a defeat everywhere. Or, a success in one place is a victory for Islamist jihadism everywhere.

Finally, it means that President Obama must show that his manhood no less than that of the jihadists is at stake in the barren hills of Afghanistan. Only Mr Obama has the power to decide who has the bigger balls--the US or the Koran-thumping, trigger-pulling, bomb-wearing Warriors of Allah.

That's a hell of way to see matters, but it's a fact.

The Proof Is In The Plots

As has been the case through human history, today's confrontation between the American and other governments and the Islamist jihadists of the world is a battle between central authority and self-organizing groups. In this contest, the advantage, or at least the initiative, rests with the self-organizing entities.

Less abstractly, the recent Islamist jihadist terror plots show that the enemy is not, as Joe Biden and President Obama would have it, simply al-Qaeda. Nor is the enemy solely the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan, important as those areas are as places of training and indoctrination.

The enemy facing the US, and much of the rest of the world as well, is Islamist jihadism. The enemy is intangible but real. It is, at root an idea. But, ideas must exist first if action is to come later.

There have been a few attempts to link the individuals arrested in New York, Colorado, Illinois, Texas, and North Carolina by means of socio-economic speculations. People excluded from the American dream according to one CNN "expert" yesterday serves as one example of the species.

While the Jordanian illegal alien arrested in Texas and the American prison convert to Islam popped in the second of two sting operations might fairly be seen as marginal members of American life and society, the same cannot be written of the men arrested in Colorado and New York. It is beyond the realm of fact to claim the North Carolina men arrested last month were among the wretched of the Earth.

As has been argued so many times, by so many people, in so many fora, the socio-economic explanations for adherence to the ideas behind Islamist jihadism simply do not work. They do not accurately nor completely address the skein of motivations behind the wannabe martyr.

The only thing in common, the only bind between the men arrested in the US over the past month, is True Belief in one particular interpretation of Islam. This is also the only thing held in common by the Islamist jihadists of 9/11, of 7/7, of Madrid, of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Shaabab in Somalia, the assorted terror groups in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and elsewhere around the world.

Islamist jihadism is the idea around which individuals and groups organize. It is the central, the critical axis without which the terror could not, would not exist.

It is important to understand that the terror tactics employed by Islamist jihadists are rooted in soil fundamentally unlike that which has given rise to previous practitioners of the dark arts of terror. Whether the anarchists of a century and more ago or the more recent traditional terrorists of the assorted Palestinian entities such as Fatah, the motivation was purely political, and the goal was the removal of a particular regime or set of regimes.

Classic terror groups were quite secular.

Classic terror groups self-organized around a specific political ideology and pursued a specific political goal. Even the anarchists who walked a very bloody path for a couple of decades had a particular goal in mind: the removal of governments. Other groups best typified by those which organized in the wake of the Six Day War had a very limited (if equally impossible) goal: the ejection of Israel from the occupied territories.

At the beginning, even al-Qaeda was more secular than religious in its stated goals. Taking Osama bin Laden at his word, the goals of al-Qaeda in the mid-Nineties were limited to the ejection of the US from the Land of the Two Mosques, ending US support for Israel, and ending the "apostate" rule of Saudi Arabia. Religion per se played only a supporting role in the early days of bin Laden's war against the US and its "puppets" in the Mideast.

These rather abstract goals were mighty thin gruel on which to nourish an organization which called upon its adherents to die. As the months and then the years went by, the religious focus of the al-Qaeda message went front and center. No longer were the goals confined to the merely political, the mundanely secular.

Now the name of the game was Furthering The True Faith. No longer was it sufficient that the US take its forces out of Saudi Arabia or even toss Israel to the Arab wolves. Now it was necessary for the US and all those who lived there to sincerely repent, and, (drum roll, please) convert to Islam. The American eagle must exalt the One True Faith.

The putting of Islam at the center of the message allowed further self-organizing even when al-Qaeda was reduced to fugitive status seeking shelter in the FATA. Being a totalistic belief system in which there can be no distinction between faith and politics, faith and the individual, faith and the community, Islam lends itself quite well to the needs of an incomplete personality.

Putting it simply, an incomplete personality is one which has no sound, well-defined sense of personal identity. The incomplete personality seeks completion, seeks the establishment of a powerful sense of personal identity in some idea existing outside himself. Islam, particularly that of the Wahhibist or Salifist sort, is particularly attractive to the incomplete personality as it promises a degree of certitude, a sense of completion, and a totality of identity that cannot be equaled by any other belief or ideology.

Beneath the surface differences, the men arrested in the US over the past month have something very basic in common not only with each other but with the Islamist jihadists everywhere. They are incomplete personalities who discovered a compelling and fulfilling sense of personal identity and worth through becoming True Believers. True Believers in not simply Islam, but that particularly demanding form of Islam--Islamist jihadism.

None of these men needed to be recruited let alone directed by some central authority. They did not need to shake hands with a recruiter for al-Qaeda. They needed only exposure to the ideas comprising Islamist jihadism.

The same is true of the Islamist jihadist groups which jointly are dubbed "Taliban." It has been well understood for some time that there was no single, monolithic entity behind the name but rather an assemblage of groups having different goals in detail, following different local leaders, pursuing different tactics, but all united by the belief in Islamist jihadism.

Only the idea is necessary to create the appearance of joint action by many controlled by a central authority. We need to get a grip on a couple of ground truths here.

The first is that Islam in and of itself, common, everyday Islam has a very real power for many people around the world. It gives a sense of community, a feeling of belonging to something far larger than the mere individual which is not surpassed by any other religion and equaled by few. The totalistic nature of Islam assures that people know their roles in life and are comfortable with that knowledge. It's emphasis on justice (at least rhetorically) reassures those who see themselves as the victims of injustice.

Islamist jihadism adds to this powerful mix a message of self-sacrifice for the greatest of Great Causes--the defense and advancement of Islam. It also promises eternal reward for that sacrifice which is no small matter given the fear of eternal hell which is so much a part of Islam's preaching.

Humanity has long been marked by a willingness, even eagerness, on the part of individuals to die in the service of a great, compelling, and totalistic idea. Islamist jihadism simply continues the pattern with a particular focus on dieing in the process of killing the enemies of Islam.

The pervasiveness and power of the ideas constituting Islamist jihadism render the existence of a central command and control authority both unnecessary, and, arguably, undesirable. The ideas of Islamist jihadism are both quite powerful and highly personal. They provide for ready volunteers but not sheep commanded to the slaughter. Each jihadi makes his own decision, keeps his own council, joins associates as a purely volitional action. He does not need a commander. At most he needs only a local leader. More generally he needs only a symbol.

Osama bin Laden is such a symbol. That is and has been his only role for years now. Even if he were to be killed or, worse, captured, his value as a symbol would not be decreased. It would only be enhanced. This is why specifically targeting him is conterproductive: When we place value on the symbol it benefits only the symbol.

The power of the ideas underlying the term Islamist jihadism has been shown with undeniable drama since they emerged from the shadows of Islam a couple of decades ago. These ideas are not either countered or destroyed easily.

This means the self-organizing Islamist jihadist group or adherent is particularly difficult to defeat. Each one must be neutralized in a retail way. And, for each neutralized, at least in the short- to mid-term, others will emerge.

Only persistence of the most extreme sort will do the job. However, persistence alone is not enough. The US and other governments must learn and acknowledge as must We the People that ideas, even ones such as those underlying Islamist jihadism which are repugnant to us, are possessed of a terrific amount of power and appeal.

Islamist jihadism and its violent excrescences will be with us a long, very long time. Not until their appeal is so undercut by failure that they disappear on their own will we be rid of the incomplete personality who seeks True Belief driven completion by dropping a skyscraper, destroying a subway, or flying an airliner into the side of a building.

Hey! Who ever said life would be a pleasant walk in the sunshine of a forever Spring.

In Swat Payback Isn't Just A Medevac

No. In Swat payback is graves registration. After the Pakistani security forces dismantled, or, to err on the side of accuracy, displaced the Taliban from Swat, the locals as well as some of the replacement Pakistani para-military and police units have been wreaking vengeance of those Talib and their collaborators who did not flee the region--and stay fled.

None of this should surprise anyone, although, the MSM of this country and the UK want to affect postures of both shock and dismay. While some of the killings are undoubtedly the work of outsiders--that is the Pakistani security wallahs--most are homegrown efforts at payback. The locals know darn well who were either Talib or Taliban sympathisers.

When the main forces of the Islamist jihadist group were either killed or disbursed by the Pakistani offensive, it was time to settle scores with the survivors of the once swaggering, gun brandishing, head chopping, Koran waving boys of the Taliban. And, in Swat as in other parts not only of Pakistan or the Northwest Asian world, the best way to settle accounts with those who killed is by killing.

People who have been forced to abase themselves under the guns of True Believers who are quite willing to kill, mutilate, dictate, and who use fear as their stock in trade yearn for the worm to turn. When the old worm does turn, and, history shows time after bloody time that it will, those who crept and knelt before the muscle of the thugs now reclaim their dignity and plunge long knives (or at least shoot bullets) into the one time oppressor and its supporters.

While this will cost him the Humanitarian Concerned Citizen of the Year Award, the Geek both understands and applauds the production of mysteriously dead bodies in the streets and byways of Mingora and other parts of Swat. If nothing else, the corpses littering the landscape demonstrate the degree of anti-Taliban sentiment resident within the formerly dominated population.

Of course, there are other benefits to the proliferation of deceased Islamist jihadists. One is that it shows the laddybucks of the Taliban and its ilk that there are costs involved with their attempt to impose by fear and force a set of True Beliefs which are neither totally organic to the local population nor palpably legitimate in and of themselves.

Another benefit totally overlooked by human rights advocates and their propagandists is the longer term effects of the locals reclaiming their dignity and sense of collective self. It proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that Islamist jihadists have no particular right to rule, that they are outsiders, a form of occupying power which showed itself to be even more unacceptable than the faraway, often corrupt, and normally inefficient and inattentive Islamabad government.

The stimulus of Taliban and the response of payback time may also awaken the locals to the power of self-organization which they possess. This, in turn, will allow the formation of a local interest oriented structure to mediate between the private space of the locals and the public space controlled by Islamabad to the ultimate advantage of the locals.

The Swat response, like the earlier and much more violent reaction by tribal groups outside of Kandahar to a spectacularly outrageous Taliban suicide bombing of a mosque during Friday prayers, proves that Islamist jihadists are their own worst enemy. Similar excess in killing, lopping off body parts, and invading traditional private space has sown the seeds of defeat for Islamist jihadists in Iraq and parts of Afghanistan.

Overlooked in the brouhaha over the "surge" in Iraq was the small, totally non-linear effect of the Islamist jihadist anti-smoking campaign in Anwar Province. The chopping off of fingers and lips of those caught committing the great crime against Islam of smoking was a small input. But, the contribution of the attendant outrage to the formation of the Awakening Councils and the Concerned Local Citizens was the key determinant of the ultimate defeat of the Islamist jihadists in the region. Even more than the American money, which facilitated the growth of these local groups, (which were initially self-organizing and only later sponsored by the US), the behavior of the Islamist jihadists epitomized in the anti-smoking lunacy spelled the end of the turban-topped, Koran-bashing jihadists.

(It deserves mention that when a central authority such as a religious denomination seeks to control the most private of spaces such as what you eat, with whom and when does a person have sexual relations, or whether people smoke or not, it is attempting to exert total and absolute power over the individual and by such control the totality of the individual's perceptions, beliefs, and actions. In the West one might consult the history of the Catholic Church or, if that is too sweeping, Calvin's Geneva theocracy to see this statement in action.)

The lesson for those contesting against Islamist jihadists everywhere is this. Often the best course of action will be to wait on any counter blow until the Islamist jihadists have over played their repressive hand with the locals. Then, even a minor counter strike will be non-linear in effect as it will embolden the locals to self-organize on their own behalf against the oppressive and quite illegitimate "occupying force" of the jihadis.

The Pakistani effort in Swat was, despite the temporary dislocation of nearly two million people and an exchange ratio of better than ten to one, a less than major, far less than total effort. It was a rather small change operation involving far more para-military personnel of the Frontier Corps than regulars. Even now, some months after the first bombs fell in Swat and the "assault" wave of Frontier Corps troops moved up the road, there are some three thousand organized Taliban guerrillas in remote enclaves. This is not the sign of a really resolute, full-scale attempt at destroying the bad guys.

The destruction of Taliban will occur not only in Swat but elsewhere in Pakistan when the jihadists get the message that they are not tolerated, not wanted, and will be killed by the locals should they emerge without having abandoned Islamist jihadism--and perhaps not even then if they have waged oppression on the locals. Rather than wringing hands over the collection of dead Talib on the streets of Mingora, the government of Pakistan and all of those outside the country who want to see an end to the odious presence of Islamist jihadists everywhere should be clapping, cheering on the hidden hand of payback.

And, that's a fact, Jack.

So, How's It Going In Pakistan?

From the perspective of the MSM, the government and army of Pakistan are either serious about winning against Taliban or not. An excellent recent example of the latter view is found in Time. A rare representative of the contrary is to be seen in the NYT.

Parsing what is happening in Pakistan is not unlike being a Kremlinologist in the days of the Cold War. Context is everything. In Pakistan the context consists of several equally important features right now. One is the state of play in the Pakistani government as it attempts to balance the power of pervasive nationalism against the appeal of Islamism. Another is the in-built fear and loathing directed against India. A third is the need to preserve the Army as both the only national institution and the bulwark against the presumed Indian threat with the need to at least stifle the Taliban insurgency. The final piece of essential context is the nature and internal dynamics of Taliban following the removal of Baitullah Mehsud.

The Pakistani government or at least its judicial system took a stance for the power of nationalism when it defied the ongoing US pressure over A.Q. Khan. The court ordered the removal of all restrictions on the life of Khan. While not as emotionally infuriating as the recent "compassionate" release of the convicted Lockerbee bomber, the lifting of all limits on Khan does not please the US. From the perspective of Islamabad this is good.

The Pakistani government is quite happy to receive money from the US and other countries which is furnished with the presumption it will go to stabilization efforts in the FATA. More than this is rejected by Islamabad. Again, this is both good and necessary from the perspective of the government which recognizes far more than do foreign chattering and academic classes that nationalism is the best, perhaps the only, palliative for a bad case of latent Islamist jihadism.

Frictions with India over the Mumbai bombing and the judicial aftermath have not decreased. Hiding behind the requirements of judicial process (nationalism again) the Pakistanis have been less than expeditious or determined in their investigation and prosecution of citizens alleged to have been involved in planning and executing the attack. Not even the issuance of a "red notice" by Interpol has impressed the Pakistani authorities. So little were the Pakistanis impressed by Interpol's action that they rejected the so-called Sixth Dossier, which will not improve the state of relations with India.

The Indian government was probably equally unimpressed with the troop shuffle conducted by the Pakistani Army on its border. By the time all the trucks had stopped rolling, three battalion equivalents had been withdrawn purportedly for the planned offensive in the FATA, but these had been replaced by four. Shell games to the contrary notwithstanding, the Indians remain Pakistan's "main enemy."

Without sufficient troops the chance of a genuine "offensive" into the Waziristans is improbable in the extreme. The Army is unwilling to take losses. Period. The government agrees. Period. There will be no ground offensive worthy of the name. Air strikes will continue. They are sufficiently "manly," low risk and, what the hey? might kill some Talib trigger-pullers.

Beyond that, the approach of Islamabad in the post-Baitullah Mehsud days will focus on dividing if not really conquering the component groups of Taliban. Some will be (literally) bought off. Others will be offered "truces" or even "peace treaties" exchanging modified Shariah and local autonomy for renunciation of violence. Others, Islamabad hopes, will be neutralized by the threat of American UAV attacks.

While it is plausible to impute cynical motives to the Pakistani government having adopted this strategy, there are also sound reasons. One is the role of Islamism in Pakistan, its Army, and, last but far, far from least, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Islamism with or without the concomitant jihadism can be and has been a useful tool for ISI and is approved of in many parts of the nation, government, and military.

Another realistic justification for the non-campaign campaign against Taliban is found in the nature of the beast. Taliban is not a monolithic entity. It is a collection of local groups formed around a leader from the disaffiliated and Islamist leaning members of the society around him. Each group is independent. There is agreement amongst the groups on the goals and motivations, but none exists nor is necessary regarding means, methods, and tactics. The personality of Baitullah Mehsud allowed him to forge a degree of tactical alignment which others will have very great difficulty recreating.

This implies that each Taliban component must be dealt with in terms which are relevant to the cultural, social, economic, and personal relationship soil from which it has emerged and from which it receives daily nourishment. There is no "one size fits all" approach which has the slightest chance of succeeding. This includes a military offensive.

Force will be necessary but not sufficient to achieve even a "tame" Taliban. The ISI has more than sufficient contact with the assorted Taliban components to achieve the minimum operational goal of reducing the violence, if it chooses to use the opportunity. This remains to be seen.

The more-or-less in touch with reality number two in al-Qaeda may well be misreading the current situation with Taliban and the Pakistani Army. His latest production warns the "crusaders" and "apostates" of dire consequences should the offensive be pursued. On the upside, the Islamist jihadist blowhard agrees with most US observers that Pakistan is the primary battleground. But, where his side has no choice except fighting (if suicide bombings can be accurately labeled as fighting), the Pakistanis do not have to fight very much or very hard.

Given that the Talib fighters are members of a species of self-organising system and the personality of the leader is the locus around which self-organisation occurs, it is only necessary to "turn" the leader from following jihadism. The leader can be suborned into dropping jihadism from the group's agenda. He can be killed if he does not.

In the early mid-period of the US involvement in South Vietnam, the Quang Ngai Special Platoon Program was oriented toward this kind of action. Often, even quite often, the results were surprising in the number of people who changed sides and the low, even very low, body count.

A similar approach was undertaken with equal success by the Americans and locals in suppressing the post-WW II Huk Insurrection. In Malaya the British did the same during the long years of the Emergency. The lessons are there. Perhaps the Pakistanis have learned them. Time will tell.

In any event it is quite premature to characterize the Pakistanis as having tossed in the cliched sponge. The endgame may not be all that the US might wish, but there is a good likelihood that it will be sufficiently robust to provide a good measure of stability to the FATA and, thus, to the border with Afghanistan.

That's enough in this sort of war.

Yemen Zips On Down The Tube

Yemen is an important pimple on the collective rump of the globe. In that way it resembles the other important pimple sitting across the Gulf of Aden. You know, the one called Somalia.

The twin pimples are alike in another way. Both are in the process of succumbing to Islamist jihadist insurgent groups. Sure, Somalia has had all the big news play. Couldn't be helped; the morass in Somalia has been incrementally developing despite (or because of) the good intentions of outside actors including the US. It has also been helped in the old media exposure by the fun and games undertaken by the Merry Pirates of Puntland.

By comparison Yemen has sat back in the shadows unnoticed by the media and most foreign policy wonks. Quietly, but surely the place has been travelling down the same road as Somalia, just at a slower rate.

The spotlight flicked on recently when the government launched an offensive against the Shia insurgents in the north. This Islamist jihadist bunch is headed by Abdul-Malek al-Houthi and is, unsurprisingly, called the "Houthis." It is a revivalist branch of the Zaydi version of Shia. What this means theologically eludes the Geek completely, but it has importance in assessing the overall appeal of the sect to Yemenis generally.

With the start of the offensive including air strikes and armored operations (which while macho as all get out are of very dubious utility in countering tribal guerrillas in rugged terrain), the usual suspects--humanitarian entities and the UN--have raised the expectable cry of humanitarian crisis. Considering that the Yemeni forces are undoubtedly firing shells and heaving bombs with great enthusiasm and little skill, the generation of refugees has been and will continue to be the single major feature of the offensive.

It deserves mentioning that while the Yemeni armed forces are blowing holes in the desert, the country (the Geek uses that term generically only) faces two other, shall we say, "challenges." One of them is al-Qaeda. The other is a regional insurgency in the south which is so far at least relatively untouched by the hot hand of Islamist jihadism.

War has been endemic to Yemen (or, the Yemens, plural since for most of the past several decades there were two, one North and the other South) since 1962. In that far off year when JFK was in the White House and most Americans alive today not yet born, the thousand year old Zaydi imamate was overthrown. Since that distant day war has reigned supreme with assorted truces, ceasefires, peace treaties and even a partition having come and gone with the rapidity of mirages before the eyes of a desert traveler dying of thirst.

Oh, the Brits hung on for a few years trying to keep Aden (or North Yemen) alive and well. But, in 1967 following the "Battle of the Crater," the Labor Government tossed in the sponge and left the field "East of Suez." The ever-ambitious Egyptian government of the day kept on fighting a proxy war supporting South Yemen (AKA The Peoples Republic of Yemen) in its effort to subdue the North. Eventually even Nasser gave up and sought greener pastures by giving the Israelis plausible cover for their Great Land Grab War of 1967.

And so it went, hot war followed by cold peace. The place(s) dissolved more and more over time into a loose assemblage of tribes, religious sects governed locally only by sheiks, or others with local mojo. The central government(s) governed little and loosely.

Even the reconstitution of Yemen as a single entity did nothing to alter the basic dynamics as recent events have proven conclusively. There was little if any functional legitimacy attached to the central regime and utterly no existential legitimacy. The government governed only through the balancing of opposing forces or, less successfully, through naked coercion.

The vacuum at the center encouraged--no--demanded the Zaydi resurrection. That is the name of the game with the insurgent group in the north. It is avowedly Zaydi and demands the reconstitution of the ancient regime, the Zaydi imamate. Turning back time to the years prior to 1962 may be Quixotic, but that does not lower the appeal of the dream, particularly to those living in the long ignored, long impoverished, long futile, and frustrated folks of the North.

The fact that the Zaydi are a branch of Shia Islam is important because it has opened the doors to support by Iran both direct and through the Iranian proxy, Hezbollah. While proof of the involvement beyond rhetorical levels is absent, there is strong reason to suspect it, given the military capacities demonstrated by the Houthis.

Be that as it may, Iran has termed the conflict an internal Yemeni matter and called for a political settlement. But, what else would be expected? Iran is already in sufficiently deep kim chee not to desire further submergence.

There is less doubt that Saudi Arabia has been deeply involved on the side of the central government. The Saudis have furnished money, and perhaps more to the Saana regime in the hopes of bolstering the government sufficiently that Yemen will not become even more of a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and similar Islamist jihadist groups. The Saudis have a dog in the fight given the long record of al-Qaeda personnel training and equipping in the hills of Yemen for strikes on Saudi Arabia.

In a real sense the US does not give a fig who wins in the place. Provided that whoever comes out on top--Houthis, Saana or Southern insurgents--they do not give a safe haven to Islamist jihadists. The US administration has been keeping a (deliberately?) low profile in the resurgent fighting, limiting its direct involvement to an appeal to both sides to observe the truce agreement of last year.

The American caution is well-advised. There is no probability that the current Yemeni offensive will be successful even in the most limited definition of the word. Linking ourselves to the Saana government would be counterproductive in the longer haul, should the Houthis win or should they strike a deal with the southern insurgents.

The second alternative is not probable given that both the government and the insurgents in the south are Salafists and this is anathema to the Zaydis of the north. The Salafist orientation of Saana, of course, gives Saudi Arabia cover for its pragmatically based assistance.

Despite its growing military capacity, and regardless of (probable) foreign support and the presence of (possible) foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Houthis do not yet threaten Saana. This will come however as surely as dawn brings prayers across the bare mountains and desert of Yemen.

The worst case outcome from the perspective of Washington would be the emergence of an Islamist jihadist vise with one jaw in Somalia and the other in Yemen. Such a vise would be positioned perfectly to close on the critical southern approach to the Suez Canal.

The vise could also result from the success of an Iranian backed Zaydi government in Yemen. Stop and think for a moment about the implications of Iran having the potential to blockade both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden.

Not a pleasant prospect, eh, bucko? The Revolutionary Guard in their famed inflatable boats could put quite a crimp in international trade and commerce without having to do much of anything. A further deterrent to the exercise of the "military option" in the matter of Iran's nuclear efforts?

Not in the near term, certainly. But, far from improbable in the mid- to long-term. Right now, the dynamics are running in favor of the Houthis. Without resolute assistance from some outside party or parties, selling insurance to the Saana government is a loser.

Oh well, as Allah wills.

Really, Really Stupid Policy Choices Of The Day

Some days you gotta wonder just how it is that humanity is still around rather than having expired from a surfeit of bad thinking, short-sighted blundering in its collective version of inter-personal relations AKA foreign policy. This is one of those days when flat-out silliness seems to be ruling not only in Washington but around the world. A few items which demonstrate this contention follow.

As usual the US, or, more properly, the Obama administration leads off. The issue this time is the ongoing imbroglio over the non-coup "military coup" in Honduras. Not only does the Deep Thinking Brain Trust In Charge Of Foreign Policy not yet get the fact that the removal of Manuel (Lefty) Zelaya was mandated by the Honduran Supreme Court and merely executed by the military but that the majority of the country's institutions support the continued ouster of the wannabe President For Life.

Another basic reality of human affairs which eludes the Deep Thinkers is that pressure consolidates long before it fractures political will. The addition of yet more pressure, in this case the restriction of visa services, will further the will and ability of the de facto government and its supporters to hang tough. The people in charge of such matters as this might be aggrieved that the Organisation of American States delegation was unable to achieve an acceptance of the compromise plan brokered by Oscar Arias, but they have neither asked why this is the case nor considered the impact of their attempt at applying more pressure.

Quite possibly had Sr Zelayas refrained from some of his more belligerent rhetoric and bellicose demands during his sojourn in the friendly and fraternal land of the Ortega regime, the de facto government would have gone along with the idea of letting Zelaya back in to fill the last few months of his term--provided he didn't seek some new electoral ploy. But, Zelaya and his supporters, headed by Hugo (Mouth of the South) Chavez couldn't be bothered by taking a time out from berating not only the "Great Military Coup and Death Of Democracy As We Knew It in Honduras but also the supposed sponsorship of the coup by the US. (Of course, they also sought with success the diplomatic support of the US while lambasting the Yankees.)

Now, bucko, all policy choices cause reactions. The reactions are, in the terms of mathematics, emergent systems. That means there is no linear relationship between the magnitude of the input--the decision--and the output--the reaction on the part of the target government, state, or people. History shows rather conclusively that policy choices which are meant to coerce, to force the target to bend to our policy, will cause a greater, much greater firmness on the part of the target to resist. The direction of the target's response--resistance--can be predicted correctly but, and it's a big but, the magnitude cannot. It is often disproportionate to the input stimulus.

So, pace, all you Brilliant Minds in Foggy Bottom and littering the White House landscape, your most recent essay in coercive diplomacy is not likely to pay off. It is, however, not unlikely that it will result in both short and longer term resistance and hostility from Honduras. And, guess what, guys and gals, it won't buy you any warm fuzzies with Hugo, Daniel, and Raul. Not even with Ewo and Rafael for that matter.

In second place--no--strike that--in a tie for first place in policy debacles du jour comes Russia. In a move which seems almost carefully crafted to assure that the Islamist jihadist plus nationalist insurgency in the North Caucasus continues, Vladimir Putin has gone on down to warmly embrace (at least metaphorically) the Kremlin appointed regional strongman, a man capable of creating a desert and calling it peace but failing to quell insurgency, named Ramzan Kadyrov.

Kadyrov is both corrupt and inefficiently repressive. The latter characteristic is the more important. Under his sway a simulacrum of peace emerged in Chechnya. The insurgency was not defeated despite Putin's claims to the opposite. It went underground. Became stronger. Took on far more of an Islamist jihadist tinge. And, came back. First in Ingushtia and then in Chechnya.

The insurgents are back, bigger, badder and better than ever. It will be far harder to defeat them now then it was during the desperately mis-handled First and Second Chechnya Wars. The Third Chechnya War started even before the bodies of the Second had been counted--but no one was willing or able to realize this unpleasant, brutal reality.

There is a way which has the potential to defeat the insurgents. The Geek even took the time to outline it. The historically derived way to win definitely did not have a role for people such as Ramzan Kadyrov, who, by the way, has already been repeatedly and severely castigated in elements of the Russian media for his repeated boorish acts which rival those of previous Soviet era failures.

The decision to continue more of the same old same old is another example of the tenacity and universality of decisions resulting in emergent systems. Again the direction of the response by the insurgents and uncommitted majority in the North Caucasus can be predicted--resistance--but the magnitude cannot be accurately estimated other than to say more, a lot more, blood will flow without positive, long-lasting result.

Vladimir Putin has demonstrated that he is sufficiently ideologically blinded and short-sighted to get a job in the current US administration or State Department should he find himself unemployed back at home. No greater insult is possible in the Geek's estimate.

In distant third place in the derby of asininity in foreign policy comes the Nonaligned Movement. Reportedly one hundred of the one hundred eighteen members of the NAM have signed on to The Protect Iran's Nuke Plants From Israel (and the US.) Over the years the NAM has been a source of much amusement given their collective propensity for loud sounds, posturing, and generally overly boisterous behavior at the UN and other global fora.

Does this unwieldy congeries of nations ranging from the important to the utterly inconsequential really, really believe that by running the Iranian proposal through the UN to protect Iran's nuke facilities from attack would be worth the paper it is written on? Even if the nuclear powers of the Security Council would be willing to restrict their nuclear counter-force targeting to be restricted by the UN in principle, in practice it would be ignored utterly.

The same is true for other countries including NAM leader India which would hit Pakistan's nuclear plants in a New York second if there was good (read "existential") reason. Why should Israel be any more constrained by the Iranian proposal should it be passed by the UN?

The subtext of the NAM support for Iran is that the member states harbor a number of unrealized (and perhaps, unrealizable) nuclear dreams of their own. And, many face regional rivals with which relations are less than peace, love, and flower-power.

The subtext of the support also bespeaks of animus toward the US and its presumed desire and need to constrict access to nuclear power in all its forms. The American policy toward the spread of both military and peaceful uses of the uranium atom has been mixed. Uncle Sam has shown a real ability to turn the Nelsonian eye on nuclear developments in some countries but not others.

This admitted and (perhaps) regrettable inconsistency has given rise to a degree of paranoia on the part of some members of NAM, but this is scarcely justification for siding with a dangerous, destabilizing, and relentlessly hegemonic power such as Iran. Perhaps these countries have swallowed the preposterous Iranian line that it simply wants electrical power. In that case, the words of Nicholas Sarkozy are relevant. "Frankly, who can believe them?"

Iran is not some poor little hounded victim of Israeli and American persecution. The member states of NAM have to get a grip on this. Otherwise they are condemning NAM to even more irrelevance in the international game. Numbers aren't everything--even at the UN, and the NAM has to understand that as well.

To be sure there are other examples of human idiocy in the foreign affairs arena today. But, three are enough. The Geek is getting old. His stomach churns too easily at sheer unadultrated stupidity these days.

You Gotta Wonder How Serious Karzai Is

It is not unusual to read a piece in the NYT gleefully predicting defeat for the US in either or both Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems to be sort of mea culpa for having thumped the war drum so hard before the invasion of Iraq.

There are times when the Tales of Cassandra ring accurate and true. This is one of them. It passes the test of Inherent Probability. It was even foreshadowed.

The article details the difficulties, not to say flat impossibilities being confronted by one small, which is to say, understrength Marine battalion in the rugged, dry, hot terrain of Helmand Province. The impossible situation has been created by the Afghan government, which has not provided any of the civic action, police, or military units promised. These missing Afghan assets are the key to long term success in the region and thus in Afghanistan generally.

The Marines are able to provide an austere sort of security but nothing more. Their job was to clear the area of Taliban and then to provide the backbone of a "hold" strategy which depended upon Afghan Army and police forces for its full effect. The Marine shield was presumed to provide a cover for civilians and civilian action in the areas of government, education, and health care.

Well, the Marines are there. Taliban has withdrawn. But, the critical Afghan personnel both military and civilian are major non-participants. The police unit sent to the area was undermanned, untrained, tainted with criminal activity, and counterproductive in effect. The thirty man detail dispatched by the Afghan Army believed it was in the area for a little R&R before going somewhere else to fight. The health care, governmental, and educational folks never came to the party.

As a result the civilians (stand by for enormous shock) are sitting on the fence, happy to see Taliban gone but fearful of what will happen when (not if) the Marines leave. Taliban is not known for its charitable treatment of those it deems "apostates" due to cooperation with the foreign forces. The Marines are working with due diligence to gain the trust and cooperation of the locals, but the chance of developing the mechanisms let alone the record of mutual trust is low absent the Afghan portion of the mission.

As if to counterpoint the crucial nature of this microcosm of what gives the surface impression of having been a successful offensive campaign into Helmand by the Marines and their British colleagues, Admiral Mullen today described the situation in Afghanistan as "serious and deteriorating." How right he is.

As the Geek pointed out in a post last month, among the reasons for a (high potential) US defeat in Afghanistan are the unwillingness and inability of the Karzai government to cooperate effectively with the US and other foreign forces coupled with Karzai's basic imperative to stay in power no matter what it takes--including cutting deals tacit or otherwise with Taliban and al-Qaeda. At least one if not both of these considerations were at work when the offensive into Helmand commenced last month. The Afghan National Army and other pledged forces were missing in a significant way at the starting line.

The longer term implications of this Afghan lack of will or ability to wage war against the Islamist jihadists are all resident in the minor slice of life presented in the Times piece. As the Geek has said and written until he is both blue of face and arthritic of finger is that the locals finally win or lose the counterinsurgent conflict. It is up to them to make the "better state of peace" which must ensue if the end of hostilities marks the beginnings of conflict resolution.

The actions and attitudes of much (but not all) of the Karzai government hints that the idea of hostilities termination and conflict resolution currently held in Kabul is not simply one of power sharing, which isn't bad in and of itself, but rather some sort of surrender which leaves Karzai at the top of the heap--at least for some sort of "decent interval." This sort of delusional "peace without victors" has a genuine appeal for the Karzai government--and many others in Afghanistan, including Taliban.

While this endgame may be suitable from the perspective of Kabul, it is most certainly not so from an American point of view. Anything, any settlement, any hostilities termination which has the slightest odor of an American defeat attached will simply encourage other Islamist jihadists. Admiral Mullen must be aware of this ramification as he stated on a different TV talk fest that the primary American focus was on disrupting al-Qaeda and Taliban, which remain the single greatest threat confronting the US today.

Islamist jihadism takes courage from the slightest hint of failing political will and diminishing military capacity on the part of any of its enemies, headed, of course, by the US. This is what is at stake in Afghanistan.

Building a democracy, or assuring human (particularly women's) rights, developing the economic base in Afghanistan are all nice. But, they are not essential to US national and strategic interest. Even undercutting the production of opium falls in the "nice but not necessary" category. There is only one compelling reason for Americans to fight and die in that chunk of unpleasant real estate--the military defeat of Taliban, al-Qaeda, and any other Islamist jihadists polluting the place.

The war we are fighting is not against terrorism qua terrorism. Nor is it a war for freedom, democracy, and prosperity in Afghanistan.

The war we are fighting, the "war of necessity" as President Obama correctly termed it, is against Taliban, al-Qaeda and Islamist jihadism generally. It is a matter of defeating the hydra there or facing more of its heads elsewhere and elsewhen.

That's the brutal truth of the matter. Get a firm grip on it.

Obama Gets Something Right

Of late the excoriations and praise poured over the head of the Nice Young Man From Chicago have focused on domestic matters alone. Few of We the People pay much attention to the President's conduct of foreign affairs.

This is perhaps good considering the nature, quality, and effectiveness of whatever passes for foreign policy in the Obama White House and administration generally. If there is one area where Mr Obama and most of his henchmen (and women) lack competence, it is that of foreign policy and its close associate, military policy.

However, on occasion the President gets it right. On those rare moments the Geek is both willing and happy to acknowledge the fact.

A few days ago President Obama termed the war in Afghanistan to be a "war of necessity" while addressing the VFW annual convention. In this appraisal he was absolutely correct.

Later the President averred in response to the declining public acceptance and support of the war that it had not been underway for nearly eight years but rather for only those few months which have gone by since he approved the modest (17,000 personnel) increase in deployed US combat forces and appointed a new commander, General Stanley McChrystal. In this contention the President was absolutely correct.

The only point in then Senator Obama's record with which the Geek agreed a year and more ago was his opposition to the war in Iraq based on the view the Iraq effort diverted the US from the main goal of eradicating al-Qaeda and akin groups. While that is certainly not sufficient reason to elect a man president, it at least indicated that Mr Obama could be properly oriented as to time and place at least some of the time.

Afghanistan was and is a necessary war. The Taliban gave refuge and support to al-Qaeda including its jefe grande and refused to give him over following the 9/11 attacks. American and other diplomats placed all possible pressure on the Islamist jihadist regime to no avail. This meant that there was no meaningful option beyond invading the place.

There can be little doubt that Taliban and al-Qaeda of all ranks was shocked that the US would and did actually invade the sanctuary of Afghanistan. Previously our responses to outrageous attacks had been limited to ineffectual cruise missile strikes.

(Although, had Osama bin Laden not received a last second warning from a source in Pakistan on 20 August 98 there is a better than excellent chance he would have been caught by the incoming Tomahawks and the world would have been spared the rest of his handiwork. Osama's son, Omar recounts the tale in his new book thereby confirming what the Two Shops have long suspected.)

As the Geek has argued many times before in this blog as well as many other fora, had the Bush/Cheney administration waited a few weeks longer, brought more combat troops to the theater, and not depended so much on the locals from the Northern Alliance while at the same time giving the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence wallahs time and opportunity to spirit their Taliban clients and others out of harm's way, the "war of necessity" would have been over with both expeditiousness and full success. For reasons which may be adduced but defy both reason and logic, the administration opted to fight the war on the cheap, to send too few men and allow success to trickle away between their outstretched fingers.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Mullen, is both polite and politic enough to describe the effort in Afghanistan on the Bush/Cheney watch as being one of "an economy of force" nature. The Admiral undoubtedly knows full well that "economy of force" tactics are employed on the defensive--and only the defensive. The notion of "economy of force" in waging offensive missions is oxymoronic--and moronic.

Of course we well know that the neocon ninnies (or should that be morons) of the Bush/Cheney regime were cranking up for the main event--to quote Omar Bradley's famed comment on MacArthur's desire to go to war with China--"the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong enemy." The Bush/Cheney adventure in regime change in Iraq demonstrates in the most profound way possible (with the exception of Woodrow Wilson's performance at Versailles at the end of WW I) the ease with which ideologically driven True Believers can drag the US (and much of the world) over the cliff of blunder into the abyss.

(President Obama who has shown definite signs of being afflicted with the pathology of True Belief should take heed--and warning. But, history shows that True Believers are rarely, if ever, disabused of their ideologically based misapprehensions concerning how the real world works.)

The consequence of the previous administration's pathetic decision making and worse war fighting assured that the US never really fought a war in Afghanistan. Rather, it played at fighting with insufficient manpower, deficient material resources, an overly ambitious set of nation building goals, and commanders who reeked of the conventional war fighting mentality rather than that necessary to prosecute successful counterinsurgency in a large and rugged area populated by people long used to fighting against, not alongside, foreigners.

The results, which have been seen both on the ground and in the erosion of American political will to continue the war, are self-evident. The resurgence of both Taliban and to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda, were both predictable--and probably were.

Importantly, the growth of Taliban has made its destruction along with that of al-Qaeda more necessary than ever. The slightest indication that either or both have been or will be able to fight the US to a standstill will do nothing but assure the continued growth and horizontal escalation of Islamist jihadist entities around the world. Today, even more than on 9/12 it is utterly essential for American national and strategic interests that the US prove militarily superior to the Islamist jihadists in a clear and unmistakable way.

Anything less than a convincing military defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda will place the US and other countries at far greater risk in the future. Anything less means that we will be fighting another war in another place in the not distant future with greater costs than those that will be incurred in Afghanistan.

Recently it has been reported that General McChrystal is going to recommend that somewhere between fifteen and forty-five thousand additional troops be deployed in country. If this report is accurate, and the Doctrine of Inherent Military Probability supports it, the Pentagon and President should approve it without delay.

Senator John McCain called for doubling the number of Marines in country from three to six battalions, that is from nine to eighteen thousand jarheads. This would be a good down payment on what is needed to clear and hold the Taliban dominated border regions.

The escalation for which President Obama takes the credit (or the blame) was probably the result of urgings by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and National Security Advisor James Jones. There is a high probability that these two experienced and monumentally realistic men would give the thumbs up to General McChrystal's request when it arrives formally next month.

Both Gates and Jones have been around the block often enough to know in their bones that counterinsurgency is a manpower intensive form of war. They both know that technology is no replacement for boots on the ground no matter how much it make those wearing the boots safer and more effective.

The US does not have much time to visibly reverse the tide of battle in Afghanistan. SecDef Gates opined a couple of weeks back that the American public would demand a pullout within no more than eighteen months. That estimate is, if anything, on the sanguine side. A very real change must be evident in less than twelve months. And, the only way to do that is by sending a lot more troops to the conflict.

The progressive base of the Democratic party will howl and protest mightily. Balancing this, the Republican party in Congress will have no choice except backing the escalation as well as the inevitable hike in casualties. Obama will have at least his right flank protected and, who knows, might even be able to demand some sort of Republican "pro quo" for the presidential "quid" of taking the heat for bailing out the Bush inspired failure in Afghanistan.

Some Europeans may wail in protest as well. But, you know who won't protest at all? Who will give tacit support including extending the new, liberal overflight policy?

That's right, bucko. Russia. Putin,, Medvedev, and Company, who face their own problems with Islamist jihadists, know perfectly well that any Islamist jihadist success anywhere, at any time, emboldens all Islamist jihadists. And, they are entirely too aware of this brutal fact to wish the Americans and their allies anything other than a complete victory in Afghanistan.