So, How's It Going In Pakistan?

From the perspective of the MSM, the government and army of Pakistan are either serious about winning against Taliban or not. An excellent recent example of the latter view is found in Time. A rare representative of the contrary is to be seen in the NYT.

Parsing what is happening in Pakistan is not unlike being a Kremlinologist in the days of the Cold War. Context is everything. In Pakistan the context consists of several equally important features right now. One is the state of play in the Pakistani government as it attempts to balance the power of pervasive nationalism against the appeal of Islamism. Another is the in-built fear and loathing directed against India. A third is the need to preserve the Army as both the only national institution and the bulwark against the presumed Indian threat with the need to at least stifle the Taliban insurgency. The final piece of essential context is the nature and internal dynamics of Taliban following the removal of Baitullah Mehsud.

The Pakistani government or at least its judicial system took a stance for the power of nationalism when it defied the ongoing US pressure over A.Q. Khan. The court ordered the removal of all restrictions on the life of Khan. While not as emotionally infuriating as the recent "compassionate" release of the convicted Lockerbee bomber, the lifting of all limits on Khan does not please the US. From the perspective of Islamabad this is good.

The Pakistani government is quite happy to receive money from the US and other countries which is furnished with the presumption it will go to stabilization efforts in the FATA. More than this is rejected by Islamabad. Again, this is both good and necessary from the perspective of the government which recognizes far more than do foreign chattering and academic classes that nationalism is the best, perhaps the only, palliative for a bad case of latent Islamist jihadism.

Frictions with India over the Mumbai bombing and the judicial aftermath have not decreased. Hiding behind the requirements of judicial process (nationalism again) the Pakistanis have been less than expeditious or determined in their investigation and prosecution of citizens alleged to have been involved in planning and executing the attack. Not even the issuance of a "red notice" by Interpol has impressed the Pakistani authorities. So little were the Pakistanis impressed by Interpol's action that they rejected the so-called Sixth Dossier, which will not improve the state of relations with India.

The Indian government was probably equally unimpressed with the troop shuffle conducted by the Pakistani Army on its border. By the time all the trucks had stopped rolling, three battalion equivalents had been withdrawn purportedly for the planned offensive in the FATA, but these had been replaced by four. Shell games to the contrary notwithstanding, the Indians remain Pakistan's "main enemy."

Without sufficient troops the chance of a genuine "offensive" into the Waziristans is improbable in the extreme. The Army is unwilling to take losses. Period. The government agrees. Period. There will be no ground offensive worthy of the name. Air strikes will continue. They are sufficiently "manly," low risk and, what the hey? might kill some Talib trigger-pullers.

Beyond that, the approach of Islamabad in the post-Baitullah Mehsud days will focus on dividing if not really conquering the component groups of Taliban. Some will be (literally) bought off. Others will be offered "truces" or even "peace treaties" exchanging modified Shariah and local autonomy for renunciation of violence. Others, Islamabad hopes, will be neutralized by the threat of American UAV attacks.

While it is plausible to impute cynical motives to the Pakistani government having adopted this strategy, there are also sound reasons. One is the role of Islamism in Pakistan, its Army, and, last but far, far from least, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Islamism with or without the concomitant jihadism can be and has been a useful tool for ISI and is approved of in many parts of the nation, government, and military.

Another realistic justification for the non-campaign campaign against Taliban is found in the nature of the beast. Taliban is not a monolithic entity. It is a collection of local groups formed around a leader from the disaffiliated and Islamist leaning members of the society around him. Each group is independent. There is agreement amongst the groups on the goals and motivations, but none exists nor is necessary regarding means, methods, and tactics. The personality of Baitullah Mehsud allowed him to forge a degree of tactical alignment which others will have very great difficulty recreating.

This implies that each Taliban component must be dealt with in terms which are relevant to the cultural, social, economic, and personal relationship soil from which it has emerged and from which it receives daily nourishment. There is no "one size fits all" approach which has the slightest chance of succeeding. This includes a military offensive.

Force will be necessary but not sufficient to achieve even a "tame" Taliban. The ISI has more than sufficient contact with the assorted Taliban components to achieve the minimum operational goal of reducing the violence, if it chooses to use the opportunity. This remains to be seen.

The more-or-less in touch with reality number two in al-Qaeda may well be misreading the current situation with Taliban and the Pakistani Army. His latest production warns the "crusaders" and "apostates" of dire consequences should the offensive be pursued. On the upside, the Islamist jihadist blowhard agrees with most US observers that Pakistan is the primary battleground. But, where his side has no choice except fighting (if suicide bombings can be accurately labeled as fighting), the Pakistanis do not have to fight very much or very hard.

Given that the Talib fighters are members of a species of self-organising system and the personality of the leader is the locus around which self-organisation occurs, it is only necessary to "turn" the leader from following jihadism. The leader can be suborned into dropping jihadism from the group's agenda. He can be killed if he does not.

In the early mid-period of the US involvement in South Vietnam, the Quang Ngai Special Platoon Program was oriented toward this kind of action. Often, even quite often, the results were surprising in the number of people who changed sides and the low, even very low, body count.

A similar approach was undertaken with equal success by the Americans and locals in suppressing the post-WW II Huk Insurrection. In Malaya the British did the same during the long years of the Emergency. The lessons are there. Perhaps the Pakistanis have learned them. Time will tell.

In any event it is quite premature to characterize the Pakistanis as having tossed in the cliched sponge. The endgame may not be all that the US might wish, but there is a good likelihood that it will be sufficiently robust to provide a good measure of stability to the FATA and, thus, to the border with Afghanistan.

That's enough in this sort of war.

The Deeply Divided Mind Of Pakistan

If Pakistan or the collective Pakistani people were a single individual there is a better than good chance it would meet the criteria for schizophrenia outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. There has never been any real doubt that the Pakistani government was badly split over the nature of the threat or threats confronting it and the country. The Pakistani people are just as badly and deeply conflicted over who should do what regarding "extremists."

In one area alone is the collective mind of Pakistan in full unity. That area is religion. Specifically, Islam of an austere and demanding nature.

The government of Pakistan most recently demonstrated its capacity at double think (the capability to entertain two, antipodal ideas at the same time with the same fervor) in the matter of the US UAV hit on Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistani Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, is apparently quite pleased that the "drone" whacked the Taliban heavy. At the same time he demanded an end to the UAV operations.

It is not that the minister has anything against the Predators and Reapers in principle. No, not at all. Actually, he is rather in favor of them. So much so that he (along with the rest of the current government) demands the US furnish some to Pakistan so that the Pakistanis can decide against whom and at what time the machines will be used.

The target could be Taliban. It might be al-Qaeda. Or, it could be in India.

Considering the long standing focus on India as the main enemy, there is no reason to believe that the government has suddenly experienced an epiphany resulting in Taliban outranking the feared and hated power to Pakistan's south. This fundamental orientation is good and sufficient reason for the US not to pass along UAVs to Islamabad--even if we had some to spare, which we don't.

Malik maintains that the UAV attacks kill too many civilians. In this the Interior Minister is accurately reflecting the view of the majority of Pakistanis. The average Pakistani in the mosque is highly negative about both the UAVs and the US. Anti-Americanism has grown in recent years and months to the point that a poll taker hanging around after the Friday sermon would have no difficulty determining that most Pakistanis see the US as the new main enemy. India drops to a distant second place.

While the death-from-on-high delivered by remote control may be a high profile symptom, it is but a symptom of the underlying splits in the minds of Pakistanis. So also is the anti-Americanism which is far more apparent than real. Far more a sign of the divisions within than a stand alone phenomenon which should alarm policy makers (or their critics.)

The Pew Global Attitudes Project gives some important tools which aid in both parsing the nature and extent of Pakistani schizophrenia and understanding its relationship to the anti-American sentiments. The same report provides important insights into just how Pakistanis view Islam and what constitutes "extremism."

One very important factor in contemporary Pakistani public opinion is the growth in negative perceptions of both Taliban and al-Qaeda over the past year. Currently seventy percent of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of Taliban, which is more than double the percentage a year ago. The unfavorable view of al-Qaeda has nearly doubled from thirty-four to sixty-one percent. At the same time the favorable views of these groups has dropped significantly with only ten percent or less entertaining the positive outlook.

During the same period the percentage of Pakistanis concerned over "extremism" in the country has inched from seventy-two to seventy-nine percent. When the views on aspects of Islam or, more accurately, Islamist, doctrine and practices are taken in to account, one may wonder just how Pakistanis understand the word, "extremism."

The Pew pulse-takers found that more Pakistanis view India as a "very serious" threat than either al-Qaeda or Taliban. India leads the threat parade in the minds of sixty-nine percent with Taliban coming in with fifty-seven and al-Qaeda trailing at forty-one percent. At the same time some sixty-four percent of Pakistanis perceive the US as an "enemy" while only nine percent view the US as a "partner."

Going a bit deeper in the numbers, the anti-US feelings are nuanced. Over half of all Pakistanis want improved relations with the US. They perceive the best, fastest road to improved relations is for the US to pump humanitarian and economic development money into the country. Just shy of nine in ten Pakistanis want to see Yankee greenbacks flood the areas now contested with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The men at the mosque also are in favor of the US providing intelligence assistance to their government and armed forces.

Just don't kill anybody while you're at it. Money good. Intel OK. Doing something lethal is seen as very, very bad.

The downturn in favorable views of Taliban and al-Qaeda has been driven by the boisterous way in which the jihadists have been killing and maiming Pakistani civilians. It has also been driven in lesser part by the dim perception that the US strikes have been in response to the jihadist actions.

Factoring in the overwhelmingly positive feelings Pakistanis demonstrate regarding their Army, a rough calculus can be developed. Muslim troops kill jihadists--very, very good. Jihadists kill troops--very bad. Jihadists kill Pakistani civilians--very, very bad. Infidel American machines kill miscreant jihadists--very, very, very, very bad. Infidel Americans give Muslim Pakistanis money--very, very, very, very good.

Now the problem of defining "extremism." By most standards the monolithic views of Pakistanis on Islamic matters would be "extreme." Overwhelming majorities approve of applying the death penalty to any individual who "leaves" Islam for another religion, lopping off hands and feet or whipping for crimes such as theft, and stoning adulterers to death. These attitudes are indistinguishable from the practices and beliefs of both Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Only in the area of education for girls and women does the Pakistani perspective differ from that espoused by the Islamist jihadists. More than eighty percent of Pakistanis see education being equally important for both sexes.

A final, very important datum located by the Pew survey folks. Pakistanis are intensely nationalistic. The national identity trumps the ethnic or linguistic for nine out of ten. This goes a very long way in explaining why Pakistanis so strongly disapprove of the UAV attacks. They are seen a violation of national sovereignty.

The nationalistic orientation of both people and government is not only a cause of the apparent schizophrenia, it also suggests a way out for the US. The way out includes providing humanitarian and economic development aid as has already been proposed and partially put into action. It also requires a much stronger, far more public effort to persuade the Pakistani public that the UAV strikes are taken with the full cooperation, approval, and support of the Pakistani government.

So far the government of Pakistan may well know that most if not all strikes are undertaken with the knowledge and approval of Islamabad. But, the public does not know. It must be brought into the loop. Both the US and Pakistani governments must get on the stick and let the people of the country know that their national sovereignty is not being infringed or shown disrespect by the infidels and their machines.

The Interior Minister and all the others at the upper levels of both the government and the Army (which is the most trusted institution in Pakistan) must let their people know in no uncertain terms that the UAV strikes are both approved of and highly important in stopping "extremism." Maybe it is past time to go to the videotapes and show the Pakistani in the mosque just what is being done, how it is being done--and just who is being killed down range.

Sometimes dropping the veil of unnecessary secrecy is critical to achieving a necessary success. In this case the success will come when the Pakistanis both in and out of government can overcome the bad case of schizophrenia which is impairing our common effort against the black turbans of Islamist jihadism.

Baitullah Mehsud Is Dead--Don't Get Too Excited

In 1943 working from PURPLE intercepts the Army Air Forces planned and executed a daring, very long range assassination. The target was Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the too-complex-to-work plan which ended in the Battle of Midway. The operation was reviewed and approved at the highest levels of government since those were more innocent days and moral questions were raised regarding the targeted killing of a single man.

The Army P-38 aircraft operated at extreme range. The pilots knew the target was very, very important. The Admiral made a rendezvous with the American fighters and death over the jungles of a southwest Pacific island.

His death brought a fair amount of rejoicing in the ranks of the US military. It was a fine piece of payback. The news of Yamamoto's death brought smiles all around the White House. It was a fine piece of payback.

Beyond that it is doubtful that the death of Isoroku Yamamoto had any profound effect upon the war in the Pacific. His death may have lowered the depth on the Imperial Japanese Navy's bench significantly. But, it did not lessen the Navy's will and ability to keep on fighting. Nor was the capacity of the Imperial Japanese Army's capacity and desire for fighting diminished in the slightest by the shoot-down.

The killing of Baitullah Mehsud by an American UAV launched missile will have more impact on the capacity of Taliban in Pakistan to wage war than did the death of Admiral Yamamoto in the gunsights of a P-38 pilot. While Taliban's capacity to fight may be impaired at least slightly and temporarily by the Hellfire-up-the-butt attack, the jihadist group's will to fight remains intact, perhaps even strengthened.

Taliban is an irregular force. That means it is far more personality dependent in its operational efficiency than is a regular army. Lacking the mechanisms for orderly replacement of top leadership levels, there is a strong, even a very strong, probability that Taliban will suffer a period of organisational perturbation.

Disruption at the senior and mid-levels will result in deep and perhaps irreversible splits occurring in the amphyctony of tribal groups which comprise the far-from-monolithic Taliban structure. This new reality opens a fine opportunity for the armed forces of Pakistan. Once the process of organisational disruption starts it is easy to accelerate--and almost impossible to stop.

Even regular, well disciplined militaries with an intact chain of command can suffer from the pernicious results of senior level lack of leadership. The German Army in August 1918 suffered a collapse of political will at its highest levels in the wake of the Battle of Amiens. The Army High Command recovered its poise after a few days. But it was too late. Organisational disruption had spread down the chain and forward to the front line units. The German Army had lost its will and thus its ability for waging war effectively. It was defeated in all but formalities.

If the Pakistani army and government seize the (American provided) golden opportunity with a fast, hard, and well-coordinated offensive into the two Waziristans, it can finish the job of fracturing an already off-balance and faction ridden Taliban. That may be a big "if" but it is not an impossible one.

It has been reported that the civilian population of Peshawar and, presumably elsewhere in the FATA, has greeted the death of Mehsud with a mix of relief and joy. This implies that the army of Pakistan can shuck its aversion to casualties and actually operate on the ground rather than simply from the air and with the bravery of being out of range. The public will accept losses--if victory over Taliban is the result.

Taking advantage of organisational disruption and rivalries for succession gives the Pakistani Army the chance to gain the initiative for once and for all. In counterinsurgency as in conventional war, initiative is everything. It allows the battle to be taken to the enemy. It assures that the enemy is not only taken off balance but is kept that way. It means the enemy cannot mount either a coordinated, effective defense or break contact in an organised manner.

In short, the battle is now that for the Pakistani Army to win--or lose. It is a matter of courage and dedication on the part of the Army's command echelon. Further, it is a matter of whether or not the senior and mid-level officers are on the side of a (comparatively) secular and democratic government or closet supporters of the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

Even counter-terrorism "expert" and professional pessimist Walid Phares grants that the killing of Mehsud may give the Pakistanis the chance they need to win. He is of the view that the window of opportunity for this is limited. This is one of the few times that the Geek and Dr Phares are in tandem on something.

The Pakistanis have less than a month, perhaps as little as ten to fourteen days, to exploit the confusion which has emerged in the dust of the Hellfire's explosion. Should the Army sit on its hands using only aircraft and artillery rather than regular ground combat forces, the Taliban has a good to excellent chance of recovering its poise and combat efficiency.

If, however, the Army finds the courage and will to shift more of its regular forces from the Indian border to the Waziristans and start shooting Taliban up close and personal, then there is a better than good chance that the days of Taliban are numbered. And, the number will not be a big one.

Coupled with the continued pressure being exerted by US and allied forces across the border in Helmand province, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as well as the shattered remnants of al-Qaeda will be under nearly irresistible pressure. This implies that the military portion of the effort in Afghanistan may soon reach the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing."

Long term that is the very best that can be hoped for in Afghanistan. The corrupt and inefficient Karzai government is such that no long term stability can be achieved. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan, the country will revert over time to what it always has been--a geographical expression in which assorted rival tribal groups co-exist in some degree of cold peace.

The goal of the US and its allies in Afghanistan is and always has been the destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban. More than that has been either wishful thinking, self-delusion, or flat out tergiversation.

The situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are and always have been connected at the hip, shoulder and head. The elimination of Mehsud is important but not decisive in either of these interconnected wars. If--and only if--the Pakistani Army can take full, effective advantage of the new situation on the ground in the FATA can it be said honestly that we and our allies have reached, not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

The best advice which can be given the government and senior military leadership of Pakistan is that of the French national anthem: Form your battalions and march! March!

Finally--An End To The "Global War On Terrorism"

Among the idiotic actions of the Bush/Cheney administration was declaring war on terrorism. The notion of fighting a war against a specific tactic was both illogical and distracting. One fights an enemy--not the tactics the enemy employs.

Finally, the abominable circumlocution has been heaved out of the official US lexicon. Counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan gave the old "GWOT" the heave ho in a speech at Georgetown yesterday. The Geek applauds.

The Geek is not ready to give Brennan and the Obama administration kudos for abandoning the term "jihad" and its cognates. Tossing out "jihad" is an exercise in the absurd. It is also lacking in logic.

Brennan admits that our enemy, which he defines as al-Qaeda and akin groups, are seeking the establishment of a "global caliphate." Well, golly-gee, ain't that a religiously motivated goal? You know, Shariah and all that?

Then, gosh, what is wrong with "jihad?"

According to Brennan, the term means the internal struggle on the part of the believer to be an ever better Muslim. He is right. That is one of the word's denotative values. The lesser one.

The greater meaning is armed struggle against the infidels and apostates. It is an obligation on all good Muslims. It is the means by which "The House of Peace" (Islam) will defeat, conquer and occupy "The House of War" (everyone else.)

What is hard to understand about this? It is in the Sacred Writings of Islam as well as all the revered commentaries by Islamic scholars over the centuries. Heck, it is even what the jihadists say they are waging--jihad against the infidels and apostates.

Certainly as an old Mideast hand for the Agency, Mr Brennan is quite well aware of the word, its primary meaning, and its widespread currency. There is no need to attenuate the reality--particularly as Mr Brennan has correctly described the long-term goal of the Islamists including their armed component, the jihadists.

It is not, as Mr Brennan and others would pretend, a matter of elevating criminals to the dignity of religion. Not that at all. Rather it is a matter of correctly identifying the use of religiously rooted terms and concepts to justify criminal acts.

The religious coloration given to criminal acts by quoting Koranic verses, issuing fatwas, and insisting that jihad is incumbent on every true Muslim does not alter the basic nature of the act. Rather, acknowledging the use of concepts and terms from religion by terrorists and other criminals allows the proper parsing between observant Muslims and jihadists.

Getting beyond terms--important as these are in the definition of the enemy--and looking at motivations, Brennan seems to have adopted the socio-economic-political stance. He appears to have bought into the thesis that economic marginalisation, political marginalisation, and poor education are the root causes of Islamist terrorism.

While the poor, the disenfranchised, and ignorant are to be found in the ranks of Islamist jihadist groups including al-Qaeda, so also are the un-poor, the enfranchised, the educated. One need not be a former CIA officer nor a counter-terrorism specialist to know that the overwhelming majority of the leaders, the planners, even the executors of high profile attacks, have been drawn from the ranks of the economically well-founded, the educated, the upwardly mobile, even those who could have a most comfortable and well-integrated existence in their host society.

Even in the Gaza Strip an appreciable number of wannabe martyrs to say nothing of those who command and control them are not the flotsam of the refugee camps, the detritus of war. Even in that armpit of the human race, the chief jihadists, and most of the trigger pullers and suicide vest wearers are not poor, alienated, hopeless.

Social work, psychiatric intervention, economic uplift, educational outreach will not dent the population of actual or potential jihadists and the Islamists who direct their lives--and deaths. It beggars the imagination to believe that a man with the experience of Mr Brennan does not know this.

Islamists and jihadists alike are True Believers as Eric Hoffer defined the term. Their identity as individuals with worth and meaning is derived completely from their acceptance of and subscription to a particular interpretation of Islam. Some of the Islamists and jihadists are also nationalist True Believers. The combination of religious and nationalist True Belief cannot be addressed by mere economic or political reforms. Nor can it be countered by "public diplomacy" and education.

To the Islamist jihadist True Believer, other Muslims, even the most observant who do not share their world view of a global caliphate, Shariah for all, and the use of all means--fair or foul--to attain these goals, are suspect at best. The Islamist jihadist True Believer is more totalistic in his motivation than was even the most committed Nazi or Marxist-Leninist. Get a grip on that ground truth.

Mr Brennan has spent most of his adult life at the Agency. That sort of experience is noted for its breeding of a cynical but realistic view of people and their motivations. It is difficult to accept that Mr Brennan escaped this. Or that he really believes the pap about social work, economic development, and education as even a partial counter to the enemy before us.

However, Mr Brennan's boss, POTUS Obama is probably so naive as to believe that some ACORN style community organizing will end the jihadist (OOPS! Bad Geek! You should have written "violent extremist.") menace. And, as the hoary cliche has it: You have to go along to get along.

Sure, use the soft power tools to peel away the softest of the soft-core support for the Islamist jihadist agenda. That might work. But, for the hard core, the True Believers, there is but one sovereign remedy. They must be killed.

As the white eyes used to say about a chunk of the Geek's ancestors: "The only good Apache is a dead one." Every now and then as in the recent case of Baitullah Mehsud, we do manufacture a good Islamist jihadist.

The real deal is the need to make a whole lot more "good jihadists" not rename them.