Pakistan's "Mother Of All Battles"

After weeks, months really, of announcing, "We're coming! We're coming!" the Pakistani Army is finally moving into South Waziristan. The operation has been called--in imitation of Saddam Hussein's boast eighteen years ago--"the mother of all battles." As was the case with the late Iraqi dictator, the current Pakistani offensive is far more likely to be apparent than real. At least as regards its long term effects.

The Army had no choice but to finally send men (some thirty thousand according to reports) in on the ground considering the loss of military "face" in the series of attacks across the country last week. Actually, the Army had little choice following the 6 October television broadcasts of Hakimullah Mehsud, the new head of Taliban in Pakistan. The Army, it should be recalled, confidently declared Hakimullah dead, killed in a shoot-out with a rival. (The purported trigger pulling rival was on TV along with the AK-47 brandishing Hakimullah.)

The "boy general" as the twenty-eight year old Hakimullah has been dubbed wasted no time demonstrating that his televised threats were quite real. The coordinated series of highly embarrassing attacks convinced even the most denial laden doubters that there was more bite than boast in Hakimullah and Taliban alike.

The ponderous Pakistani ground offensive which features armored units, artillery, jet aircraft, helicopter gunships, as well as the far more useful infantry has moved with accustomed caution into the rugged and remote South Waziristan terrain. The offensive will be greeted by an estimated ten to fifteen thousand adherents of Taliban and al-Qaeda. With only a three to one advantage at best, the ground forces will not be able to range far or fast. And, every inch of the way they will be inhibited by the threat or the reality of ambushes, suicide bombers, and the ever present roadside IED.

It is also important to keep in mind when appraising the Pakistani offensive and its probable results that it is not aimed against threats beyond the Taliban and (a few, even a very few) al-Qaeda personnel. The Punjabi origin terrorist groups which were once trained and financed by either or both the Army and the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence for operations in the Kashmir are not in the cross-hairs. They are immune despite the fact that it was Punjabis and not folks from South Waziristan who executed the commando raid on the Pakistani "Pentagon" in Rawalpindi last week.

At the moment the public--or more accurately, the English speaking, educated, middle-class public--is in support of the new offensive. Whether the same can be said of the members of the public not easily accessible to Western media is highly questionable. In the past the opposition to military operations in Swat and elsewhere has come from the Pakistani hoi polloi not the Western oriented and educated elite.

The majority of the Pakistani Army ranks is drawn from the same voiceless element of Pakistani society. How long the snuffies will keep a will to combat once heavily engaged is also questionable. It is even legitimate to doubt that the rather road bound Army is physically up to the task of humping the bush of South Waziristan, particularly as casualties mount, the weather worsens, and results are hard to see.

The larger context also militates against any sort of definitive success crowning the new offensive. The Army (and ISI) do not see eye-to-eye with the civilian government. This lack of a unified vision came into sharp focus with the Army's severe criticism of the government for accepting the new US foreign aid package with its insistence on civilian supremacy and continuity of counter-insurgent efforts in return for a few billion more of our (borrowed) dollars.

Pakistan is a financial basketcase. It has survived (barely) on loans from the IMF and foreign aid. Industries are often silent because of electricity shortages. Healthcare in rural areas is non-existent. Education of a secular sort is available only to those who can pay, and pay well. The largest of Pakistan's provinces, Baluchistan, sits on vast amounts of natural gas and other extractable resources but remains both undeveloped and laden with political disaffiliation.

Then there are the "seminaries." Madrases litter the landscape. Religious education--much of it Wahhibist or Salifist in nature--is the only form of education available to many, perhaps most, Pakistanis. And, the record shows, these institutions are the wellspring of Islamist jihadism. In short, whether the current offensive fails completely or only partially (the most likely outcome) or succeeds beyond the wildest imaginings of its designers, the stockpile of up and coming jihadists will be replenished and then some.

The various Islamist jihadist groups in Pakistan which includes but is not limited to Pakistani Taliban have made the long term goal quite plain. The demand is for an Islamist state governed according to the strictest interpretation of Shariah. This means Islamist control not only of the state but of the Army and, last but far from least, the nuclear arsenal.

The Army by having picked up the gauntlet hurled by the "boy general" has mounted the tiger. Having climbed aboard, it has no easy way of getting off--unless the tiger is killed by the ride. This is not likely. At some point in the not very remote future, one can expect the offensive to simply peter out. The Army may declare victory but will probably limit itself to saying the goals of the offensive have been achieved.

If the Swat campaign is a fair example this will mean the Army has collected enough Taliban scalps to feel its honor has been maintained. The backstage reality will be, again in the mode of Swat, the slow pace of Army operations has allowed the heavyweights of Taliban as well as a good percentage of the trigger pullers and bomb carriers to exfiltrate at their leisure.

The Army will return to its cantonments. Taliban et al will stay undisturbed in their new locations and rebuild their structure in South Waziristan, provided the Army actually perturbed it in a noticeable way during the "mother of all battles."

At the same time the government will hold its begging bowl higher, maintaining it now has a greater claim on the resources of outsiders due to its having defeated the dreaded Taliban. Not much will change behind the public pretenses and diplomatic rhetoric.

Pakistan will continue to lurch from crisis to crisis unless and until the governing elite can convince an ever skeptical public by both word and deed that the status quo has both existential and functional legitimacy. The country will continue to be threatened by Islamist jihadism unless and until the government can meet the competing demands for an effective and non-corrupt rule of (admittedly Islamic tinted) law. The jihadists will continue to be both replenished and empowered unless and until the government can provide effective secular education for all who want it--and suppress the Islamist "seminaries."

Without basic, systemic changes, the outcome of the current offensive matters not in the slightest. Win, lose, or (most likely) draw, the government will not be more secure. And, Taliban and the others will not be more than temporarily discommoded.

That means President Obama had best not raise his (or our) hopes of a new day coming to the far marches of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It ain't a going to happen, not this time. And, probably not in our lifetime.

So, How's It Going In Pakistan?

From the perspective of the MSM, the government and army of Pakistan are either serious about winning against Taliban or not. An excellent recent example of the latter view is found in Time. A rare representative of the contrary is to be seen in the NYT.

Parsing what is happening in Pakistan is not unlike being a Kremlinologist in the days of the Cold War. Context is everything. In Pakistan the context consists of several equally important features right now. One is the state of play in the Pakistani government as it attempts to balance the power of pervasive nationalism against the appeal of Islamism. Another is the in-built fear and loathing directed against India. A third is the need to preserve the Army as both the only national institution and the bulwark against the presumed Indian threat with the need to at least stifle the Taliban insurgency. The final piece of essential context is the nature and internal dynamics of Taliban following the removal of Baitullah Mehsud.

The Pakistani government or at least its judicial system took a stance for the power of nationalism when it defied the ongoing US pressure over A.Q. Khan. The court ordered the removal of all restrictions on the life of Khan. While not as emotionally infuriating as the recent "compassionate" release of the convicted Lockerbee bomber, the lifting of all limits on Khan does not please the US. From the perspective of Islamabad this is good.

The Pakistani government is quite happy to receive money from the US and other countries which is furnished with the presumption it will go to stabilization efforts in the FATA. More than this is rejected by Islamabad. Again, this is both good and necessary from the perspective of the government which recognizes far more than do foreign chattering and academic classes that nationalism is the best, perhaps the only, palliative for a bad case of latent Islamist jihadism.

Frictions with India over the Mumbai bombing and the judicial aftermath have not decreased. Hiding behind the requirements of judicial process (nationalism again) the Pakistanis have been less than expeditious or determined in their investigation and prosecution of citizens alleged to have been involved in planning and executing the attack. Not even the issuance of a "red notice" by Interpol has impressed the Pakistani authorities. So little were the Pakistanis impressed by Interpol's action that they rejected the so-called Sixth Dossier, which will not improve the state of relations with India.

The Indian government was probably equally unimpressed with the troop shuffle conducted by the Pakistani Army on its border. By the time all the trucks had stopped rolling, three battalion equivalents had been withdrawn purportedly for the planned offensive in the FATA, but these had been replaced by four. Shell games to the contrary notwithstanding, the Indians remain Pakistan's "main enemy."

Without sufficient troops the chance of a genuine "offensive" into the Waziristans is improbable in the extreme. The Army is unwilling to take losses. Period. The government agrees. Period. There will be no ground offensive worthy of the name. Air strikes will continue. They are sufficiently "manly," low risk and, what the hey? might kill some Talib trigger-pullers.

Beyond that, the approach of Islamabad in the post-Baitullah Mehsud days will focus on dividing if not really conquering the component groups of Taliban. Some will be (literally) bought off. Others will be offered "truces" or even "peace treaties" exchanging modified Shariah and local autonomy for renunciation of violence. Others, Islamabad hopes, will be neutralized by the threat of American UAV attacks.

While it is plausible to impute cynical motives to the Pakistani government having adopted this strategy, there are also sound reasons. One is the role of Islamism in Pakistan, its Army, and, last but far, far from least, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Islamism with or without the concomitant jihadism can be and has been a useful tool for ISI and is approved of in many parts of the nation, government, and military.

Another realistic justification for the non-campaign campaign against Taliban is found in the nature of the beast. Taliban is not a monolithic entity. It is a collection of local groups formed around a leader from the disaffiliated and Islamist leaning members of the society around him. Each group is independent. There is agreement amongst the groups on the goals and motivations, but none exists nor is necessary regarding means, methods, and tactics. The personality of Baitullah Mehsud allowed him to forge a degree of tactical alignment which others will have very great difficulty recreating.

This implies that each Taliban component must be dealt with in terms which are relevant to the cultural, social, economic, and personal relationship soil from which it has emerged and from which it receives daily nourishment. There is no "one size fits all" approach which has the slightest chance of succeeding. This includes a military offensive.

Force will be necessary but not sufficient to achieve even a "tame" Taliban. The ISI has more than sufficient contact with the assorted Taliban components to achieve the minimum operational goal of reducing the violence, if it chooses to use the opportunity. This remains to be seen.

The more-or-less in touch with reality number two in al-Qaeda may well be misreading the current situation with Taliban and the Pakistani Army. His latest production warns the "crusaders" and "apostates" of dire consequences should the offensive be pursued. On the upside, the Islamist jihadist blowhard agrees with most US observers that Pakistan is the primary battleground. But, where his side has no choice except fighting (if suicide bombings can be accurately labeled as fighting), the Pakistanis do not have to fight very much or very hard.

Given that the Talib fighters are members of a species of self-organising system and the personality of the leader is the locus around which self-organisation occurs, it is only necessary to "turn" the leader from following jihadism. The leader can be suborned into dropping jihadism from the group's agenda. He can be killed if he does not.

In the early mid-period of the US involvement in South Vietnam, the Quang Ngai Special Platoon Program was oriented toward this kind of action. Often, even quite often, the results were surprising in the number of people who changed sides and the low, even very low, body count.

A similar approach was undertaken with equal success by the Americans and locals in suppressing the post-WW II Huk Insurrection. In Malaya the British did the same during the long years of the Emergency. The lessons are there. Perhaps the Pakistanis have learned them. Time will tell.

In any event it is quite premature to characterize the Pakistanis as having tossed in the cliched sponge. The endgame may not be all that the US might wish, but there is a good likelihood that it will be sufficiently robust to provide a good measure of stability to the FATA and, thus, to the border with Afghanistan.

That's enough in this sort of war.

Baitullah Mehsud Is Dead--Don't Get Too Excited

In 1943 working from PURPLE intercepts the Army Air Forces planned and executed a daring, very long range assassination. The target was Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the too-complex-to-work plan which ended in the Battle of Midway. The operation was reviewed and approved at the highest levels of government since those were more innocent days and moral questions were raised regarding the targeted killing of a single man.

The Army P-38 aircraft operated at extreme range. The pilots knew the target was very, very important. The Admiral made a rendezvous with the American fighters and death over the jungles of a southwest Pacific island.

His death brought a fair amount of rejoicing in the ranks of the US military. It was a fine piece of payback. The news of Yamamoto's death brought smiles all around the White House. It was a fine piece of payback.

Beyond that it is doubtful that the death of Isoroku Yamamoto had any profound effect upon the war in the Pacific. His death may have lowered the depth on the Imperial Japanese Navy's bench significantly. But, it did not lessen the Navy's will and ability to keep on fighting. Nor was the capacity of the Imperial Japanese Army's capacity and desire for fighting diminished in the slightest by the shoot-down.

The killing of Baitullah Mehsud by an American UAV launched missile will have more impact on the capacity of Taliban in Pakistan to wage war than did the death of Admiral Yamamoto in the gunsights of a P-38 pilot. While Taliban's capacity to fight may be impaired at least slightly and temporarily by the Hellfire-up-the-butt attack, the jihadist group's will to fight remains intact, perhaps even strengthened.

Taliban is an irregular force. That means it is far more personality dependent in its operational efficiency than is a regular army. Lacking the mechanisms for orderly replacement of top leadership levels, there is a strong, even a very strong, probability that Taliban will suffer a period of organisational perturbation.

Disruption at the senior and mid-levels will result in deep and perhaps irreversible splits occurring in the amphyctony of tribal groups which comprise the far-from-monolithic Taliban structure. This new reality opens a fine opportunity for the armed forces of Pakistan. Once the process of organisational disruption starts it is easy to accelerate--and almost impossible to stop.

Even regular, well disciplined militaries with an intact chain of command can suffer from the pernicious results of senior level lack of leadership. The German Army in August 1918 suffered a collapse of political will at its highest levels in the wake of the Battle of Amiens. The Army High Command recovered its poise after a few days. But it was too late. Organisational disruption had spread down the chain and forward to the front line units. The German Army had lost its will and thus its ability for waging war effectively. It was defeated in all but formalities.

If the Pakistani army and government seize the (American provided) golden opportunity with a fast, hard, and well-coordinated offensive into the two Waziristans, it can finish the job of fracturing an already off-balance and faction ridden Taliban. That may be a big "if" but it is not an impossible one.

It has been reported that the civilian population of Peshawar and, presumably elsewhere in the FATA, has greeted the death of Mehsud with a mix of relief and joy. This implies that the army of Pakistan can shuck its aversion to casualties and actually operate on the ground rather than simply from the air and with the bravery of being out of range. The public will accept losses--if victory over Taliban is the result.

Taking advantage of organisational disruption and rivalries for succession gives the Pakistani Army the chance to gain the initiative for once and for all. In counterinsurgency as in conventional war, initiative is everything. It allows the battle to be taken to the enemy. It assures that the enemy is not only taken off balance but is kept that way. It means the enemy cannot mount either a coordinated, effective defense or break contact in an organised manner.

In short, the battle is now that for the Pakistani Army to win--or lose. It is a matter of courage and dedication on the part of the Army's command echelon. Further, it is a matter of whether or not the senior and mid-level officers are on the side of a (comparatively) secular and democratic government or closet supporters of the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

Even counter-terrorism "expert" and professional pessimist Walid Phares grants that the killing of Mehsud may give the Pakistanis the chance they need to win. He is of the view that the window of opportunity for this is limited. This is one of the few times that the Geek and Dr Phares are in tandem on something.

The Pakistanis have less than a month, perhaps as little as ten to fourteen days, to exploit the confusion which has emerged in the dust of the Hellfire's explosion. Should the Army sit on its hands using only aircraft and artillery rather than regular ground combat forces, the Taliban has a good to excellent chance of recovering its poise and combat efficiency.

If, however, the Army finds the courage and will to shift more of its regular forces from the Indian border to the Waziristans and start shooting Taliban up close and personal, then there is a better than good chance that the days of Taliban are numbered. And, the number will not be a big one.

Coupled with the continued pressure being exerted by US and allied forces across the border in Helmand province, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as well as the shattered remnants of al-Qaeda will be under nearly irresistible pressure. This implies that the military portion of the effort in Afghanistan may soon reach the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing."

Long term that is the very best that can be hoped for in Afghanistan. The corrupt and inefficient Karzai government is such that no long term stability can be achieved. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan, the country will revert over time to what it always has been--a geographical expression in which assorted rival tribal groups co-exist in some degree of cold peace.

The goal of the US and its allies in Afghanistan is and always has been the destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban. More than that has been either wishful thinking, self-delusion, or flat out tergiversation.

The situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are and always have been connected at the hip, shoulder and head. The elimination of Mehsud is important but not decisive in either of these interconnected wars. If--and only if--the Pakistani Army can take full, effective advantage of the new situation on the ground in the FATA can it be said honestly that we and our allies have reached, not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

The best advice which can be given the government and senior military leadership of Pakistan is that of the French national anthem: Form your battalions and march! March!

What Did You Expect? An Easy Fight?

More out of Pakistan, which confirms some of the points made in yesterday's post regarding the unwillingness of the government of that country to redeploy significant elements of its regular army to the fight against Taliban. As previously written, this situation will remain unchanged unless and until the Pakistani government can bring itself to trust that India is not going to attack the moment the army is fully engaged against the Islamist jihadists.

The first bite out of Pakistan is the most to be expected. The army and government of Pakistan are pulling very long faces about the American/British effort in Helmand province, Afghanistan. The lads in command are complaining that the new offensive is driving Taliban and al-Qaeda trigger pullers across the line on a map known as the "border." This, the Pakistanis allege, is complicating their efforts in the FATA.

Well. Golly. Gee. Aw shucks.

As water runs down hill so also do guerrillas seek the line of least resistance. This means that in Helmand province for reasons right or wrong, good or ill, Taliban has concentrated its efforts against the British while giving the American Marines the next thing to a free pass in their advances. It also means that given the choice of facing the combination of disciplined fire power and mobility of the British or American forces, the Heroic Warriors Of The One True Faith would much rather slip across the frontier and take on the paramilitary units of the Frontier Corps and the odd regular Pakistani Army unit in the region.

Rather than whine, moan, bitch and complain about the Taliban doing what they must have been expected to do--take on the weakest opponent--the Pakistani government should dispatch the majority of the regular army to the real fighting front. Sitting on their collective duff and making ugly faces at the Indians across the way does nothing to defeat Taliban nor promote the genuine national security of Pakistan.

The fact that the two Waziristans, North and South, are difficult human and geographic terrain for the Pakistani forces to operate in does not obviate the reality that the people and territory of the Warziristans are the place where war must be waged. The FATA generally has never been brought under effective government control. Nor has the central regime ever done anything substantial to promote perceptions of either existential or functional legitimacy among the tribal population of the region.

These twin failures provided the soil necessary for Islamist jihad of the Taliban sort to take root and flourish. It is the up close and personal ability of Taliban to provide a sense of community identity, administer justice, and squash corruption that has brought recruits as well as provided the extensive passive mass support base without which a guerrilla entity cannot survive for long.

Rather than admit that the years of government neglect of and prejudice against the tribals of the two Warziristans might have been responsible for the rapid growth of Taliban, the Pakistani government again took the self-defeating and irresponsible path of blaming the American Predator strikes on Taliban targets in the FATA for the continuation and growth of Taliban support. The intellectual and moral bankruptcy of this approach is highlighted by developments in the contested area of Dir.

In this area as previously in South Waziristan, a civilian militia, which is to say an ad hoc group of pissed off locals, has surrounded and besieged a Taliban group. To finish the job the locals say they need assistance from the Pakistani army. The requested assistance has not been forthcoming.

Two questions are prompted by this development. One is obvious: why is the government not speeding the required troops to the assistance of the armed and angry locals?

The other is not so self-evident but strikes at the heart of the presumed impact of the icky-poo American Predator strikes. If, as the government insists, the American efforts at remote controlled death were both so inaccurate and ill advised as to turn civilian opinion en masse against the government, then why are the locals in both South Waziristan and Dir rising up angry against the jihadists?

The answer to the second question is simply that the locals finally have had a belly full of Taliban. In particular, the locals have had more than enough of Taliban's willingness to kill civilians. To the locals the suicide bombers along with the Taliban stone-throwing, sword-wielding enforcers of Islamist virtue have exhausted the local's patience with the Virtuous Army of the Prophet.

So, the locals have grabbed their guns and made their displeasure known. They also have asked the government--their government, at least in principle--for help.

The government's ear is deafened by two considerations. The first is the distaste in Islamabad for the idea of tribesmen with guns. The second is the paucity of resources the government is willing to commit to ground combat efforts.

As the war in Pakistan widens, Islamabad is once again playing an old, tired game. The name of the game is extortion. The other player in the game is the United States. The game is played this way: You want us to do something? Well, give us something. Like intelligence, ammunition and, most importantly, you give us Predators.

That's right, policy fans. The Pakistani government wants the same horrid machines that the evil Americans use to complicate Pakistani life by wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians caught in the cross hairs on some video screen thousands of miles away. You see, if we kill our own civilians, no one will mind. If you Yanks kill them, then Taliban will lose.

Gosh, who can fail to be convinced with logic like that? There is no way that Pakistan might want Predators for the same reason the government previously wanted F-16s and other platforms as well suited for counterinsurgent operations as a Baptist minister is for playing piano in a whorehouse? Like to use against the real enemy, India?

At the same time as the government of Pakistan wants us to provide more systems which would be useful against India, it wants us to convince India to cooperate with Pakistan in the "common" struggle against terrorism and terrorists. The time has come to explain the meaning of the word "consistency" to the men of the government of Pakistan. The boys just can't get their story straight.

And, that's a fact, Jack.

While we are at it, there are a couple of other points that diplomat extraordinary Richard Holbrooke might elucidate to the Pakistanis. The first point is that Taliban is the one and only existential threat confronting Pakistan. India is a mythic enemy only. It is a useful outside evil on which the government has pinned so many of its failures past, present, and future.

In point of fact had India really, really wanted to end the Kashmir dispute, it could have at any time of its choosing. The same fact still exists, Pakistan's rudimentary nuclear arsenal to the contrary not withstanding. The continuation of Kashmir as an active diplomatic dispute is testimony to India's unwillingness to use war as its instrument of choice.

The second fact of life which Mr Holbrooke or somebody ought to get through to the state-of-denial afflicted Pakistani government is that Taliban has the initiative. It has the ability to exercise horizontal escalation into Baluchistan. It can use urban terror whenever and wherever it chooses. It can avoid contact with the Pakistani forces in FATA. Or, it can attack from a local position of strength and inflict political will damaging casualties on the government forces.

And, those are facts, Jack.

The final ground truth that must be communicated to the boys in Islamabad is that they have grabbed the tiger's tail. They now have only two choices: Kill the tiger. Or, let the tiger eat them.

Whining, moaning, bitching, complaining, blaming the Americans for actually fighting a war in Afghanistan, seeking to extort Predators, or refusing to commit the majority of their ground combat forces instead of simply bombing from on high or blasting from far away are all simply ways to make damn sure the tiger eats them. Killing the tiger means standing there, facing the beast's claws and teeth--and slitting its throat.

That's the final fact, Jack.