So, How's It Going In Pakistan?

From the perspective of the MSM, the government and army of Pakistan are either serious about winning against Taliban or not. An excellent recent example of the latter view is found in Time. A rare representative of the contrary is to be seen in the NYT.

Parsing what is happening in Pakistan is not unlike being a Kremlinologist in the days of the Cold War. Context is everything. In Pakistan the context consists of several equally important features right now. One is the state of play in the Pakistani government as it attempts to balance the power of pervasive nationalism against the appeal of Islamism. Another is the in-built fear and loathing directed against India. A third is the need to preserve the Army as both the only national institution and the bulwark against the presumed Indian threat with the need to at least stifle the Taliban insurgency. The final piece of essential context is the nature and internal dynamics of Taliban following the removal of Baitullah Mehsud.

The Pakistani government or at least its judicial system took a stance for the power of nationalism when it defied the ongoing US pressure over A.Q. Khan. The court ordered the removal of all restrictions on the life of Khan. While not as emotionally infuriating as the recent "compassionate" release of the convicted Lockerbee bomber, the lifting of all limits on Khan does not please the US. From the perspective of Islamabad this is good.

The Pakistani government is quite happy to receive money from the US and other countries which is furnished with the presumption it will go to stabilization efforts in the FATA. More than this is rejected by Islamabad. Again, this is both good and necessary from the perspective of the government which recognizes far more than do foreign chattering and academic classes that nationalism is the best, perhaps the only, palliative for a bad case of latent Islamist jihadism.

Frictions with India over the Mumbai bombing and the judicial aftermath have not decreased. Hiding behind the requirements of judicial process (nationalism again) the Pakistanis have been less than expeditious or determined in their investigation and prosecution of citizens alleged to have been involved in planning and executing the attack. Not even the issuance of a "red notice" by Interpol has impressed the Pakistani authorities. So little were the Pakistanis impressed by Interpol's action that they rejected the so-called Sixth Dossier, which will not improve the state of relations with India.

The Indian government was probably equally unimpressed with the troop shuffle conducted by the Pakistani Army on its border. By the time all the trucks had stopped rolling, three battalion equivalents had been withdrawn purportedly for the planned offensive in the FATA, but these had been replaced by four. Shell games to the contrary notwithstanding, the Indians remain Pakistan's "main enemy."

Without sufficient troops the chance of a genuine "offensive" into the Waziristans is improbable in the extreme. The Army is unwilling to take losses. Period. The government agrees. Period. There will be no ground offensive worthy of the name. Air strikes will continue. They are sufficiently "manly," low risk and, what the hey? might kill some Talib trigger-pullers.

Beyond that, the approach of Islamabad in the post-Baitullah Mehsud days will focus on dividing if not really conquering the component groups of Taliban. Some will be (literally) bought off. Others will be offered "truces" or even "peace treaties" exchanging modified Shariah and local autonomy for renunciation of violence. Others, Islamabad hopes, will be neutralized by the threat of American UAV attacks.

While it is plausible to impute cynical motives to the Pakistani government having adopted this strategy, there are also sound reasons. One is the role of Islamism in Pakistan, its Army, and, last but far, far from least, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Islamism with or without the concomitant jihadism can be and has been a useful tool for ISI and is approved of in many parts of the nation, government, and military.

Another realistic justification for the non-campaign campaign against Taliban is found in the nature of the beast. Taliban is not a monolithic entity. It is a collection of local groups formed around a leader from the disaffiliated and Islamist leaning members of the society around him. Each group is independent. There is agreement amongst the groups on the goals and motivations, but none exists nor is necessary regarding means, methods, and tactics. The personality of Baitullah Mehsud allowed him to forge a degree of tactical alignment which others will have very great difficulty recreating.

This implies that each Taliban component must be dealt with in terms which are relevant to the cultural, social, economic, and personal relationship soil from which it has emerged and from which it receives daily nourishment. There is no "one size fits all" approach which has the slightest chance of succeeding. This includes a military offensive.

Force will be necessary but not sufficient to achieve even a "tame" Taliban. The ISI has more than sufficient contact with the assorted Taliban components to achieve the minimum operational goal of reducing the violence, if it chooses to use the opportunity. This remains to be seen.

The more-or-less in touch with reality number two in al-Qaeda may well be misreading the current situation with Taliban and the Pakistani Army. His latest production warns the "crusaders" and "apostates" of dire consequences should the offensive be pursued. On the upside, the Islamist jihadist blowhard agrees with most US observers that Pakistan is the primary battleground. But, where his side has no choice except fighting (if suicide bombings can be accurately labeled as fighting), the Pakistanis do not have to fight very much or very hard.

Given that the Talib fighters are members of a species of self-organising system and the personality of the leader is the locus around which self-organisation occurs, it is only necessary to "turn" the leader from following jihadism. The leader can be suborned into dropping jihadism from the group's agenda. He can be killed if he does not.

In the early mid-period of the US involvement in South Vietnam, the Quang Ngai Special Platoon Program was oriented toward this kind of action. Often, even quite often, the results were surprising in the number of people who changed sides and the low, even very low, body count.

A similar approach was undertaken with equal success by the Americans and locals in suppressing the post-WW II Huk Insurrection. In Malaya the British did the same during the long years of the Emergency. The lessons are there. Perhaps the Pakistanis have learned them. Time will tell.

In any event it is quite premature to characterize the Pakistanis as having tossed in the cliched sponge. The endgame may not be all that the US might wish, but there is a good likelihood that it will be sufficiently robust to provide a good measure of stability to the FATA and, thus, to the border with Afghanistan.

That's enough in this sort of war.

Baitullah Mehsud Is Dead--Don't Get Too Excited

In 1943 working from PURPLE intercepts the Army Air Forces planned and executed a daring, very long range assassination. The target was Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the too-complex-to-work plan which ended in the Battle of Midway. The operation was reviewed and approved at the highest levels of government since those were more innocent days and moral questions were raised regarding the targeted killing of a single man.

The Army P-38 aircraft operated at extreme range. The pilots knew the target was very, very important. The Admiral made a rendezvous with the American fighters and death over the jungles of a southwest Pacific island.

His death brought a fair amount of rejoicing in the ranks of the US military. It was a fine piece of payback. The news of Yamamoto's death brought smiles all around the White House. It was a fine piece of payback.

Beyond that it is doubtful that the death of Isoroku Yamamoto had any profound effect upon the war in the Pacific. His death may have lowered the depth on the Imperial Japanese Navy's bench significantly. But, it did not lessen the Navy's will and ability to keep on fighting. Nor was the capacity of the Imperial Japanese Army's capacity and desire for fighting diminished in the slightest by the shoot-down.

The killing of Baitullah Mehsud by an American UAV launched missile will have more impact on the capacity of Taliban in Pakistan to wage war than did the death of Admiral Yamamoto in the gunsights of a P-38 pilot. While Taliban's capacity to fight may be impaired at least slightly and temporarily by the Hellfire-up-the-butt attack, the jihadist group's will to fight remains intact, perhaps even strengthened.

Taliban is an irregular force. That means it is far more personality dependent in its operational efficiency than is a regular army. Lacking the mechanisms for orderly replacement of top leadership levels, there is a strong, even a very strong, probability that Taliban will suffer a period of organisational perturbation.

Disruption at the senior and mid-levels will result in deep and perhaps irreversible splits occurring in the amphyctony of tribal groups which comprise the far-from-monolithic Taliban structure. This new reality opens a fine opportunity for the armed forces of Pakistan. Once the process of organisational disruption starts it is easy to accelerate--and almost impossible to stop.

Even regular, well disciplined militaries with an intact chain of command can suffer from the pernicious results of senior level lack of leadership. The German Army in August 1918 suffered a collapse of political will at its highest levels in the wake of the Battle of Amiens. The Army High Command recovered its poise after a few days. But it was too late. Organisational disruption had spread down the chain and forward to the front line units. The German Army had lost its will and thus its ability for waging war effectively. It was defeated in all but formalities.

If the Pakistani army and government seize the (American provided) golden opportunity with a fast, hard, and well-coordinated offensive into the two Waziristans, it can finish the job of fracturing an already off-balance and faction ridden Taliban. That may be a big "if" but it is not an impossible one.

It has been reported that the civilian population of Peshawar and, presumably elsewhere in the FATA, has greeted the death of Mehsud with a mix of relief and joy. This implies that the army of Pakistan can shuck its aversion to casualties and actually operate on the ground rather than simply from the air and with the bravery of being out of range. The public will accept losses--if victory over Taliban is the result.

Taking advantage of organisational disruption and rivalries for succession gives the Pakistani Army the chance to gain the initiative for once and for all. In counterinsurgency as in conventional war, initiative is everything. It allows the battle to be taken to the enemy. It assures that the enemy is not only taken off balance but is kept that way. It means the enemy cannot mount either a coordinated, effective defense or break contact in an organised manner.

In short, the battle is now that for the Pakistani Army to win--or lose. It is a matter of courage and dedication on the part of the Army's command echelon. Further, it is a matter of whether or not the senior and mid-level officers are on the side of a (comparatively) secular and democratic government or closet supporters of the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

Even counter-terrorism "expert" and professional pessimist Walid Phares grants that the killing of Mehsud may give the Pakistanis the chance they need to win. He is of the view that the window of opportunity for this is limited. This is one of the few times that the Geek and Dr Phares are in tandem on something.

The Pakistanis have less than a month, perhaps as little as ten to fourteen days, to exploit the confusion which has emerged in the dust of the Hellfire's explosion. Should the Army sit on its hands using only aircraft and artillery rather than regular ground combat forces, the Taliban has a good to excellent chance of recovering its poise and combat efficiency.

If, however, the Army finds the courage and will to shift more of its regular forces from the Indian border to the Waziristans and start shooting Taliban up close and personal, then there is a better than good chance that the days of Taliban are numbered. And, the number will not be a big one.

Coupled with the continued pressure being exerted by US and allied forces across the border in Helmand province, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as well as the shattered remnants of al-Qaeda will be under nearly irresistible pressure. This implies that the military portion of the effort in Afghanistan may soon reach the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing."

Long term that is the very best that can be hoped for in Afghanistan. The corrupt and inefficient Karzai government is such that no long term stability can be achieved. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan, the country will revert over time to what it always has been--a geographical expression in which assorted rival tribal groups co-exist in some degree of cold peace.

The goal of the US and its allies in Afghanistan is and always has been the destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban. More than that has been either wishful thinking, self-delusion, or flat out tergiversation.

The situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are and always have been connected at the hip, shoulder and head. The elimination of Mehsud is important but not decisive in either of these interconnected wars. If--and only if--the Pakistani Army can take full, effective advantage of the new situation on the ground in the FATA can it be said honestly that we and our allies have reached, not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

The best advice which can be given the government and senior military leadership of Pakistan is that of the French national anthem: Form your battalions and march! March!

What Did You Expect? An Easy Fight?

More out of Pakistan, which confirms some of the points made in yesterday's post regarding the unwillingness of the government of that country to redeploy significant elements of its regular army to the fight against Taliban. As previously written, this situation will remain unchanged unless and until the Pakistani government can bring itself to trust that India is not going to attack the moment the army is fully engaged against the Islamist jihadists.

The first bite out of Pakistan is the most to be expected. The army and government of Pakistan are pulling very long faces about the American/British effort in Helmand province, Afghanistan. The lads in command are complaining that the new offensive is driving Taliban and al-Qaeda trigger pullers across the line on a map known as the "border." This, the Pakistanis allege, is complicating their efforts in the FATA.

Well. Golly. Gee. Aw shucks.

As water runs down hill so also do guerrillas seek the line of least resistance. This means that in Helmand province for reasons right or wrong, good or ill, Taliban has concentrated its efforts against the British while giving the American Marines the next thing to a free pass in their advances. It also means that given the choice of facing the combination of disciplined fire power and mobility of the British or American forces, the Heroic Warriors Of The One True Faith would much rather slip across the frontier and take on the paramilitary units of the Frontier Corps and the odd regular Pakistani Army unit in the region.

Rather than whine, moan, bitch and complain about the Taliban doing what they must have been expected to do--take on the weakest opponent--the Pakistani government should dispatch the majority of the regular army to the real fighting front. Sitting on their collective duff and making ugly faces at the Indians across the way does nothing to defeat Taliban nor promote the genuine national security of Pakistan.

The fact that the two Waziristans, North and South, are difficult human and geographic terrain for the Pakistani forces to operate in does not obviate the reality that the people and territory of the Warziristans are the place where war must be waged. The FATA generally has never been brought under effective government control. Nor has the central regime ever done anything substantial to promote perceptions of either existential or functional legitimacy among the tribal population of the region.

These twin failures provided the soil necessary for Islamist jihad of the Taliban sort to take root and flourish. It is the up close and personal ability of Taliban to provide a sense of community identity, administer justice, and squash corruption that has brought recruits as well as provided the extensive passive mass support base without which a guerrilla entity cannot survive for long.

Rather than admit that the years of government neglect of and prejudice against the tribals of the two Warziristans might have been responsible for the rapid growth of Taliban, the Pakistani government again took the self-defeating and irresponsible path of blaming the American Predator strikes on Taliban targets in the FATA for the continuation and growth of Taliban support. The intellectual and moral bankruptcy of this approach is highlighted by developments in the contested area of Dir.

In this area as previously in South Waziristan, a civilian militia, which is to say an ad hoc group of pissed off locals, has surrounded and besieged a Taliban group. To finish the job the locals say they need assistance from the Pakistani army. The requested assistance has not been forthcoming.

Two questions are prompted by this development. One is obvious: why is the government not speeding the required troops to the assistance of the armed and angry locals?

The other is not so self-evident but strikes at the heart of the presumed impact of the icky-poo American Predator strikes. If, as the government insists, the American efforts at remote controlled death were both so inaccurate and ill advised as to turn civilian opinion en masse against the government, then why are the locals in both South Waziristan and Dir rising up angry against the jihadists?

The answer to the second question is simply that the locals finally have had a belly full of Taliban. In particular, the locals have had more than enough of Taliban's willingness to kill civilians. To the locals the suicide bombers along with the Taliban stone-throwing, sword-wielding enforcers of Islamist virtue have exhausted the local's patience with the Virtuous Army of the Prophet.

So, the locals have grabbed their guns and made their displeasure known. They also have asked the government--their government, at least in principle--for help.

The government's ear is deafened by two considerations. The first is the distaste in Islamabad for the idea of tribesmen with guns. The second is the paucity of resources the government is willing to commit to ground combat efforts.

As the war in Pakistan widens, Islamabad is once again playing an old, tired game. The name of the game is extortion. The other player in the game is the United States. The game is played this way: You want us to do something? Well, give us something. Like intelligence, ammunition and, most importantly, you give us Predators.

That's right, policy fans. The Pakistani government wants the same horrid machines that the evil Americans use to complicate Pakistani life by wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians caught in the cross hairs on some video screen thousands of miles away. You see, if we kill our own civilians, no one will mind. If you Yanks kill them, then Taliban will lose.

Gosh, who can fail to be convinced with logic like that? There is no way that Pakistan might want Predators for the same reason the government previously wanted F-16s and other platforms as well suited for counterinsurgent operations as a Baptist minister is for playing piano in a whorehouse? Like to use against the real enemy, India?

At the same time as the government of Pakistan wants us to provide more systems which would be useful against India, it wants us to convince India to cooperate with Pakistan in the "common" struggle against terrorism and terrorists. The time has come to explain the meaning of the word "consistency" to the men of the government of Pakistan. The boys just can't get their story straight.

And, that's a fact, Jack.

While we are at it, there are a couple of other points that diplomat extraordinary Richard Holbrooke might elucidate to the Pakistanis. The first point is that Taliban is the one and only existential threat confronting Pakistan. India is a mythic enemy only. It is a useful outside evil on which the government has pinned so many of its failures past, present, and future.

In point of fact had India really, really wanted to end the Kashmir dispute, it could have at any time of its choosing. The same fact still exists, Pakistan's rudimentary nuclear arsenal to the contrary not withstanding. The continuation of Kashmir as an active diplomatic dispute is testimony to India's unwillingness to use war as its instrument of choice.

The second fact of life which Mr Holbrooke or somebody ought to get through to the state-of-denial afflicted Pakistani government is that Taliban has the initiative. It has the ability to exercise horizontal escalation into Baluchistan. It can use urban terror whenever and wherever it chooses. It can avoid contact with the Pakistani forces in FATA. Or, it can attack from a local position of strength and inflict political will damaging casualties on the government forces.

And, those are facts, Jack.

The final ground truth that must be communicated to the boys in Islamabad is that they have grabbed the tiger's tail. They now have only two choices: Kill the tiger. Or, let the tiger eat them.

Whining, moaning, bitching, complaining, blaming the Americans for actually fighting a war in Afghanistan, seeking to extort Predators, or refusing to commit the majority of their ground combat forces instead of simply bombing from on high or blasting from far away are all simply ways to make damn sure the tiger eats them. Killing the tiger means standing there, facing the beast's claws and teeth--and slitting its throat.

That's the final fact, Jack.

Caught In The Crossfire? Tough Luck, Wazirastani

It used to be fun to live in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters were the honored "guests," beneficiaries of tribal "hospitality."

The locals probably had a good time watching as the fighters kidnapped, killed, and decapitated Pakistani soldiers. The Geek can picture it all in his mind's eye.

AK's popping off in the air. Loud shouts of praise to the "Compassionate and Merciful." The smell of burning bodies mixing with the fragrances of dinner cooking. The cool mountain air invigorating all hands at the joyous assembly marking another victory over the apostates.

Terror is so much fun!

There was one little problem. One little wrinkle that the Talibanistas, the al-Qaedaites, and the hospitable local folks overlooked.

Soldiers do not appreciate being shot at, kidnapped, killed. They sure don't like to find the bodies of their comrades, headless and burned, dropped off alongside some mountain track.

More than that, soldiers, even less than civilians, are likely to be "terrorised" by the acts of terrorists. A bunch of spoilsports, the Pakistani army forces in the area finally had had enough.

It is true that morale among the Pakistani units fell for a substantial period of time. There were credible indications of demoralisation hitting such a level that entire units either surrendered, or deserted.

If the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership in the area possessed as many brains as the local sheep, they would have stopped the terror attacks as demoralisation set in. That would have been the intelligent course of action. After all, the goal had been the removal of Pakistani forces from North Waziristan, if not all seven Tribal Agencies.

Did they stop when the stopping was good?

Nope.

They kept at it, apparently believing that if a little terror was good, a lot of terror was better.

They forgot a basic principle of warfare--both conventional and unconventional. Pressure consolidates long before it fractures. The will to combat is increased, not decreased, if pressure of a non-destructive sort is continued.

The crossover point was reached when the blackhats hit a Pakistani army convoy. The Paks stopped hunkering down, going through the motions, playing the role of Graves Registration for more and more throat-slit or decapitated or burned bodies of other soldiers.

Now the Pakistani Army lashed back. The Taliban and al-Qaeda guerrillas found out that firepower kills. It kills just as certainly if it comes from a Pakistani artillery piece, helicopter gunship, or fighter-bomber as it does when coming from a US or NATO equivalent.

To put the matter short and not at all sweetly, the Paks greased the hilltops. They killed combatants and civilians alike.

The villagers of Mir Ali discovered quickly that being hospitable brought risks--and consequences. Heavy shells, rockets, bombs, and machine cannon rounds don't distinguish between civilians and combatants. They do not see the difference between a rock hut in which women and children huddle from the rock hut sheltering gunslingers.

Islam online reports the inevitable whining from displaced villagers running from the retaliation of the Pakistani army. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1190886271778&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout. The article paints the fleeing villagers as unfortunate individuals caught between the rock of Taliban/al-Qaeda and the hard place of the Pakistani army.

Get a grip!

The villagers of North Waziristan (and the other Tribal Agencies) have hosted the guerrillas. They have provided cover and concealment in their own homes for the blackhats. The "helpless" villagers have provided support, intelligence information, and other forms of direct military assistance to their guests.

The same villagers shouted, shot, and danced their joy whenever the militants killed, kidnapped, and mutilated. The enemy of their friends was their enemy too.

Now that the enemy (the Pakistani armed forces) is striking back, life is not so much fun. Constant tales of civilian misery find sympathetic media ears. One example is the al-Jazeera English language service which is often a surprisingly well balanced outlet. Seehttp://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FAD67AB0-C78A-4F3B-BF2A-97A7D8588E94.htm.

Al-Jazeera quotes show a refrain familiar to anyone who has experience in counterinsurgency. Reduced to its universal essentials, the statement made by a refugee from any village, anywhere, during any insurgency is this, "There were no guerrillas in our village. There were just us innocent civilians."

It used to strike the Geek (and still does) as a sentiment identical with what American GI's heard in Germany at the end of WW II. "I wasn't a Nazi. I didn't know any Nazis. No Nazis really, really lived in this village."

In Pakistan, the stories of horror passed by refugees finds a ready media reception which is not surprising given the current political instability in Pakistan. The (English language) News online edition takes a carefully anti-military line in its coverage. It's worth close examination for its framing, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=10587.

The writers, Mushtaq Yusufzai and Haji Yaseen, make the unsurprising observation that the civilians "have suffered the most from the ongoing violence in Mir Ali." It's unsurprising simply because that is the way of war.

Not just modern war, particularly counterinsurgency operations of the past fifty years, as some have alleged. No. It was true of most wars at most times throughout history. With the exception of the limited and rather inconclusive wars that dotted Europe between the end of the hideously destructive Thirty Years War and the commencement of the Wars of the French Revolution, the foot of war has crushed far more civilians than it has soldiers.

The hard realities of guerrilla insurgency assure that civilians will suffer under the harrow of war. This is particularly true with situations such as that existing in North Waziristan.

In a real, albeit painful, sense the villagers of Mir Ali and other hamlets in the mountains asked for what they are now receiving. When they allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda combatants to bunk down in their midst, they invited inevitable retaliation.

Perhaps, at least some of the villagers knew this. If so, they didn't act on the knowledge. Now, after the fact of the Pakistani armed forces attacks, the locals will have plentiful excuses as to why they permitted the combatants to stay or why they didn't assist the government forces to eject the unwelcome guests or why they didn't leave the area before the bang-bang started.

That's the way it has always been. As long as the guerrillas are ideologically sympathetic, or as long as they are winning, the local peasants are the loyal cheering section, the providers of shelter, supplies, and information.

Then, when the situation changes, when the bombs fall and bullets whine, it was all a mistake. The government is wrong, inhuman, the tool of foreign oppressors. There was no one here but us peace-loving peasants. Really! Trust us! We're the victims here.

The Geek understands this reaction. It's never enjoyable when the party's over. When its raided by the cops. So it is in North Waziristan.

As long as no one is taken in by the act, no harm is done. As long as we in the US and the West don't fall over from the propaganda winds generated by sympathetic media, its all business as usual in the mountains along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

For decades, generations, armies both conventional and not have marched, counter-marched, fought and bled over the rocky roads to nowhere in particular. All the while, it has been the civilians who take the heaviest losses.