Obama Gets Something Right

Of late the excoriations and praise poured over the head of the Nice Young Man From Chicago have focused on domestic matters alone. Few of We the People pay much attention to the President's conduct of foreign affairs.

This is perhaps good considering the nature, quality, and effectiveness of whatever passes for foreign policy in the Obama White House and administration generally. If there is one area where Mr Obama and most of his henchmen (and women) lack competence, it is that of foreign policy and its close associate, military policy.

However, on occasion the President gets it right. On those rare moments the Geek is both willing and happy to acknowledge the fact.

A few days ago President Obama termed the war in Afghanistan to be a "war of necessity" while addressing the VFW annual convention. In this appraisal he was absolutely correct.

Later the President averred in response to the declining public acceptance and support of the war that it had not been underway for nearly eight years but rather for only those few months which have gone by since he approved the modest (17,000 personnel) increase in deployed US combat forces and appointed a new commander, General Stanley McChrystal. In this contention the President was absolutely correct.

The only point in then Senator Obama's record with which the Geek agreed a year and more ago was his opposition to the war in Iraq based on the view the Iraq effort diverted the US from the main goal of eradicating al-Qaeda and akin groups. While that is certainly not sufficient reason to elect a man president, it at least indicated that Mr Obama could be properly oriented as to time and place at least some of the time.

Afghanistan was and is a necessary war. The Taliban gave refuge and support to al-Qaeda including its jefe grande and refused to give him over following the 9/11 attacks. American and other diplomats placed all possible pressure on the Islamist jihadist regime to no avail. This meant that there was no meaningful option beyond invading the place.

There can be little doubt that Taliban and al-Qaeda of all ranks was shocked that the US would and did actually invade the sanctuary of Afghanistan. Previously our responses to outrageous attacks had been limited to ineffectual cruise missile strikes.

(Although, had Osama bin Laden not received a last second warning from a source in Pakistan on 20 August 98 there is a better than excellent chance he would have been caught by the incoming Tomahawks and the world would have been spared the rest of his handiwork. Osama's son, Omar recounts the tale in his new book thereby confirming what the Two Shops have long suspected.)

As the Geek has argued many times before in this blog as well as many other fora, had the Bush/Cheney administration waited a few weeks longer, brought more combat troops to the theater, and not depended so much on the locals from the Northern Alliance while at the same time giving the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence wallahs time and opportunity to spirit their Taliban clients and others out of harm's way, the "war of necessity" would have been over with both expeditiousness and full success. For reasons which may be adduced but defy both reason and logic, the administration opted to fight the war on the cheap, to send too few men and allow success to trickle away between their outstretched fingers.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Mullen, is both polite and politic enough to describe the effort in Afghanistan on the Bush/Cheney watch as being one of "an economy of force" nature. The Admiral undoubtedly knows full well that "economy of force" tactics are employed on the defensive--and only the defensive. The notion of "economy of force" in waging offensive missions is oxymoronic--and moronic.

Of course we well know that the neocon ninnies (or should that be morons) of the Bush/Cheney regime were cranking up for the main event--to quote Omar Bradley's famed comment on MacArthur's desire to go to war with China--"the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong enemy." The Bush/Cheney adventure in regime change in Iraq demonstrates in the most profound way possible (with the exception of Woodrow Wilson's performance at Versailles at the end of WW I) the ease with which ideologically driven True Believers can drag the US (and much of the world) over the cliff of blunder into the abyss.

(President Obama who has shown definite signs of being afflicted with the pathology of True Belief should take heed--and warning. But, history shows that True Believers are rarely, if ever, disabused of their ideologically based misapprehensions concerning how the real world works.)

The consequence of the previous administration's pathetic decision making and worse war fighting assured that the US never really fought a war in Afghanistan. Rather, it played at fighting with insufficient manpower, deficient material resources, an overly ambitious set of nation building goals, and commanders who reeked of the conventional war fighting mentality rather than that necessary to prosecute successful counterinsurgency in a large and rugged area populated by people long used to fighting against, not alongside, foreigners.

The results, which have been seen both on the ground and in the erosion of American political will to continue the war, are self-evident. The resurgence of both Taliban and to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda, were both predictable--and probably were.

Importantly, the growth of Taliban has made its destruction along with that of al-Qaeda more necessary than ever. The slightest indication that either or both have been or will be able to fight the US to a standstill will do nothing but assure the continued growth and horizontal escalation of Islamist jihadist entities around the world. Today, even more than on 9/12 it is utterly essential for American national and strategic interests that the US prove militarily superior to the Islamist jihadists in a clear and unmistakable way.

Anything less than a convincing military defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda will place the US and other countries at far greater risk in the future. Anything less means that we will be fighting another war in another place in the not distant future with greater costs than those that will be incurred in Afghanistan.

Recently it has been reported that General McChrystal is going to recommend that somewhere between fifteen and forty-five thousand additional troops be deployed in country. If this report is accurate, and the Doctrine of Inherent Military Probability supports it, the Pentagon and President should approve it without delay.

Senator John McCain called for doubling the number of Marines in country from three to six battalions, that is from nine to eighteen thousand jarheads. This would be a good down payment on what is needed to clear and hold the Taliban dominated border regions.

The escalation for which President Obama takes the credit (or the blame) was probably the result of urgings by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and National Security Advisor James Jones. There is a high probability that these two experienced and monumentally realistic men would give the thumbs up to General McChrystal's request when it arrives formally next month.

Both Gates and Jones have been around the block often enough to know in their bones that counterinsurgency is a manpower intensive form of war. They both know that technology is no replacement for boots on the ground no matter how much it make those wearing the boots safer and more effective.

The US does not have much time to visibly reverse the tide of battle in Afghanistan. SecDef Gates opined a couple of weeks back that the American public would demand a pullout within no more than eighteen months. That estimate is, if anything, on the sanguine side. A very real change must be evident in less than twelve months. And, the only way to do that is by sending a lot more troops to the conflict.

The progressive base of the Democratic party will howl and protest mightily. Balancing this, the Republican party in Congress will have no choice except backing the escalation as well as the inevitable hike in casualties. Obama will have at least his right flank protected and, who knows, might even be able to demand some sort of Republican "pro quo" for the presidential "quid" of taking the heat for bailing out the Bush inspired failure in Afghanistan.

Some Europeans may wail in protest as well. But, you know who won't protest at all? Who will give tacit support including extending the new, liberal overflight policy?

That's right, bucko. Russia. Putin,, Medvedev, and Company, who face their own problems with Islamist jihadists, know perfectly well that any Islamist jihadist success anywhere, at any time, emboldens all Islamist jihadists. And, they are entirely too aware of this brutal fact to wish the Americans and their allies anything other than a complete victory in Afghanistan.

How Many Guarantees Would Be Enough?

Of all the reasons to develop a good case of the knee-knocks over Pakistan, the nuclear stockpile and associated production facilities have to be at the top of the list. It is small wonder that the US government continues to seek additional "guarantees" from the Pakistani military and government as to the security of the nukes.

There is equally little surprise to the Pakistani response. Everything is secure, they croon over and over. Everything is secure; don't worry. Everything is secure; there is no cause for alarm.

What else could they say? Is it credible that Zardiri or any Pak general would up and announce, "Well, for the moment it looks as if our toys are all accounted for, but who knows about tomorrow? That's up to Allah."

Of course the weapons are only a small part of the problem. Even if the stockpile is under the full, firm and resolute control of the government, that doesn't remove all grounds for anxiety.

The Pakistani nuclear materials production system is large--and getting larger. For example, there is one plutonium production reactor operating with two more under construction on the edge of the FATA. In addition to plutonium, the operating reactor makes a great deal of high level radioactive waste. After the desired plutonium is extracted chemically, the rest of the radwaste is still around.

In and of itself the radwaste is an attractive target for theft. This brew from hell would be sought as the prime component of a radiological weapon--the much feared "dirty bomb." All that is needed in addition to the radwaste is an explosive charge to distribute it at the target location.

Oh, yeah, and someone willing to deliver the dirty bomb. This, obviously, would not be a job for the faint at heart.

As the seeking after martyrdom is a job requirement for the jihadist, it is to be presumed that Taliban and akin groups are full of suitable candidates. The same sort of candidate would be appropriate for the task of knocking over a radwaste storage site.

While JCS Chairman, Admiral Mullens, is "comfortable" regarding the current state of security for the Pakistani nuclear weapons, can he say the same about the glow-in-the-dark trash heap adjacent to the plutonium separation plant and its production reactor? The Admiral would probably agree that the task of providing leak proof security to the radwaste dump or the processing facilities generally is a far more difficult task than keeping the weapons out of hostile hands.

A kilo or so of assorted long lived radionuclides would be sufficient to ruin a sizable part of a city. It would be more than sufficient to generate a level of public anxiety far surpassing that generated by the recent A,H1N1 non-pandemic.

It wouldn't matter what city was attacked. It need not be in the US or Europe. Whacking Mumbai, for example, would have a suitably dramatic effect upon the world--to say nothing of Indo-Pakistani relations.

As the attack on Mumbai a little while back showed, the problem of getting from Pakistan to the target does not present any particular problem. Nor does it take that much time.

If an entity were willing to accept a few fatalities from exposure to radioactivity, the lag between a theft of glowing trash in Northwest Pakistan and the detonation of a dirty bomb in Mumbai would not exceed four or five days. In short, the payoff could take place before the Islamabad government had acknowledged the breech of security.

A close examination of the satellite imagery posted over the past few years by the Institute for Science and International Security gives no indication of rigorous security systems in place at the Khushab facility (or any others for that matter.) The Khusab complex southwest of Islamabad is conveniently close to territory in which Taliban operates openly and freely. There is no reason to believe that a strike across the few dozen kilometers separating the plant from Taliban country is beyond the capacities of the jihadists.

The "miscreants" (to use the latest fashionable term in the Islamabad vocabulary) have the capacity to launch a breaking and entering raid on the plutonium production reactor at any time. The capability of the Pakistani army to prevent this is debatable at best. Which brings us back to the question: How many guarantees will be enough?

General Jim Jones, the National Security Advisor, has been quoted recently as again saying more guarantees of nuke security are necessary. As has been the case previously General Jones did not specify the nature of the "pledge" required to assuage American anxieties.

That isn't surprising. No amount of "guarantee" will be sufficient. None can be sufficient. Anything less than the direct involvement of US troops in the guarding of the weapons dumps, production reactors, processing facilities and trash heaps will be insufficient.

And, that will not happen. Not now. Not ever.

Even in the worst case situation of a Taliban takeover, the most the US can hope to accomplish is the armed seizure of some, but, realistically, not all of the actual weapons and stockpile(s) of fissile materials. Beyond that the US would be able to impair the production facilities.

We would not be able to destroy the reactors, separation facilities or radwaste depositories. Any attempt to do this would, perforce, release quantities, perhaps enormous in size, of radioactivity to the environment. Such a giga-curie release would wreak great harm on the Pakistani population, and, depending on several variables, the populations of other countries as well. This would not be an acceptable option.

Sure looks bleak, doesn't it?

That's the problem with nuclear proliferation. Like so much else in international affairs, it involves the Law of Unintended Consequences. Way back when, when the Pakistanis started their quest for an Islamic bomb, the US did not oppose the effort. Well, the opposition wasn't all that serious.

Pakistan was important to us. It was a Cold War thing. We needed Islamabad's cooperation in countering the Soviet gambit in Afghanistan. We needed Pakistan as a counter to India's pronounced and protracted leftward tilt in foreign affairs.

Anyway, the Pakistani military regime looked stable, pro-West and capable of behaving in a responsible, adult fashion. And, the bloody Indians were going full-tilt after their own bomb. So, all things considered, it was nothing to lose sleep over. Thus our opposition, such as it was, ran more along the lines of the pro forma than the serious.

The shaky logic of the decision(s) back then was apparent even at the time. Also apparent was the Islamist tendencies within the military and intelligence services of Pakistan. But, in the finest don't-think-long-term fashion of governments generally, we ignored the danger signs and acquiesced.

Now the Law of Unintended Consequences has caught up with us. Now high anxiety reigns. Now, no level of guarantee will or can be enough.

Ain't foreign policy fun?