In Swat Payback Isn't Just A Medevac

No. In Swat payback is graves registration. After the Pakistani security forces dismantled, or, to err on the side of accuracy, displaced the Taliban from Swat, the locals as well as some of the replacement Pakistani para-military and police units have been wreaking vengeance of those Talib and their collaborators who did not flee the region--and stay fled.

None of this should surprise anyone, although, the MSM of this country and the UK want to affect postures of both shock and dismay. While some of the killings are undoubtedly the work of outsiders--that is the Pakistani security wallahs--most are homegrown efforts at payback. The locals know darn well who were either Talib or Taliban sympathisers.

When the main forces of the Islamist jihadist group were either killed or disbursed by the Pakistani offensive, it was time to settle scores with the survivors of the once swaggering, gun brandishing, head chopping, Koran waving boys of the Taliban. And, in Swat as in other parts not only of Pakistan or the Northwest Asian world, the best way to settle accounts with those who killed is by killing.

People who have been forced to abase themselves under the guns of True Believers who are quite willing to kill, mutilate, dictate, and who use fear as their stock in trade yearn for the worm to turn. When the old worm does turn, and, history shows time after bloody time that it will, those who crept and knelt before the muscle of the thugs now reclaim their dignity and plunge long knives (or at least shoot bullets) into the one time oppressor and its supporters.

While this will cost him the Humanitarian Concerned Citizen of the Year Award, the Geek both understands and applauds the production of mysteriously dead bodies in the streets and byways of Mingora and other parts of Swat. If nothing else, the corpses littering the landscape demonstrate the degree of anti-Taliban sentiment resident within the formerly dominated population.

Of course, there are other benefits to the proliferation of deceased Islamist jihadists. One is that it shows the laddybucks of the Taliban and its ilk that there are costs involved with their attempt to impose by fear and force a set of True Beliefs which are neither totally organic to the local population nor palpably legitimate in and of themselves.

Another benefit totally overlooked by human rights advocates and their propagandists is the longer term effects of the locals reclaiming their dignity and sense of collective self. It proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that Islamist jihadists have no particular right to rule, that they are outsiders, a form of occupying power which showed itself to be even more unacceptable than the faraway, often corrupt, and normally inefficient and inattentive Islamabad government.

The stimulus of Taliban and the response of payback time may also awaken the locals to the power of self-organization which they possess. This, in turn, will allow the formation of a local interest oriented structure to mediate between the private space of the locals and the public space controlled by Islamabad to the ultimate advantage of the locals.

The Swat response, like the earlier and much more violent reaction by tribal groups outside of Kandahar to a spectacularly outrageous Taliban suicide bombing of a mosque during Friday prayers, proves that Islamist jihadists are their own worst enemy. Similar excess in killing, lopping off body parts, and invading traditional private space has sown the seeds of defeat for Islamist jihadists in Iraq and parts of Afghanistan.

Overlooked in the brouhaha over the "surge" in Iraq was the small, totally non-linear effect of the Islamist jihadist anti-smoking campaign in Anwar Province. The chopping off of fingers and lips of those caught committing the great crime against Islam of smoking was a small input. But, the contribution of the attendant outrage to the formation of the Awakening Councils and the Concerned Local Citizens was the key determinant of the ultimate defeat of the Islamist jihadists in the region. Even more than the American money, which facilitated the growth of these local groups, (which were initially self-organizing and only later sponsored by the US), the behavior of the Islamist jihadists epitomized in the anti-smoking lunacy spelled the end of the turban-topped, Koran-bashing jihadists.

(It deserves mention that when a central authority such as a religious denomination seeks to control the most private of spaces such as what you eat, with whom and when does a person have sexual relations, or whether people smoke or not, it is attempting to exert total and absolute power over the individual and by such control the totality of the individual's perceptions, beliefs, and actions. In the West one might consult the history of the Catholic Church or, if that is too sweeping, Calvin's Geneva theocracy to see this statement in action.)

The lesson for those contesting against Islamist jihadists everywhere is this. Often the best course of action will be to wait on any counter blow until the Islamist jihadists have over played their repressive hand with the locals. Then, even a minor counter strike will be non-linear in effect as it will embolden the locals to self-organize on their own behalf against the oppressive and quite illegitimate "occupying force" of the jihadis.

The Pakistani effort in Swat was, despite the temporary dislocation of nearly two million people and an exchange ratio of better than ten to one, a less than major, far less than total effort. It was a rather small change operation involving far more para-military personnel of the Frontier Corps than regulars. Even now, some months after the first bombs fell in Swat and the "assault" wave of Frontier Corps troops moved up the road, there are some three thousand organized Taliban guerrillas in remote enclaves. This is not the sign of a really resolute, full-scale attempt at destroying the bad guys.

The destruction of Taliban will occur not only in Swat but elsewhere in Pakistan when the jihadists get the message that they are not tolerated, not wanted, and will be killed by the locals should they emerge without having abandoned Islamist jihadism--and perhaps not even then if they have waged oppression on the locals. Rather than wringing hands over the collection of dead Talib on the streets of Mingora, the government of Pakistan and all of those outside the country who want to see an end to the odious presence of Islamist jihadists everywhere should be clapping, cheering on the hidden hand of payback.

And, that's a fact, Jack.

Feces From The Pakistani Air Impeller

Once the Pakistani government and army turned serious backed by a sufficient percentage of the politically articulate population, life turned rough for the Taliban in Swat. Even discounting the body count provided by the Pak military there can be little doubt but Taliban's trigger pullers have taken a heavy hit. The high command of the Pak army is feeling confident--perhaps too much so--that they will rid Mingora of the bearded Taliban thugs in a very few days.

Taliban has acknowledged its defeat in Swat. The announcement by Muslim Khan, the Taliban public information wallah, that the Mighty Fighters of Allah will not "attack" the incoming Pakistani government forces clearly was the face saving attempt at waving a white flag. In a quite unsurprising move Islamabad rejected the accompanying appeal for a "truce." With equal abruptness the government batted down the request by the UN for a "humanitarian truce" so that civilians might be both allowed to leave the area or be succored in place.

Regardless of the plight of the civilian refugees as well as those caught in the zone of operations the government and army were correct in rejecting any halting or slowing of combat operations. Right now the Pak army has what George H.W. Bush used to call "the Big Mo." As any strategist or tactician--even the most armchair bound--knows, momentum is the key to maintaining initiative and initiative is the key to victory. And, for the past few days the Pakistani forces have had the momentum.

The Pakistani government has to win in Swat. More, it has to win quickly before political support withers in the face of the wave of internally displaced persons. Nearly two and a half million people reportedly have fled Swat and Buner. Many of these come equipped with attention grabbing horror stories of cringing under the rockets, bombs and artillery shells fired and dropped by the government forces. These tales and the coverage given them erode support within Pakistan for the reconquest of Swat. International dissemination undercuts international support for Islamabad and gains sympathy for the Taliban.

There is another reason Islamabad has to quickly and successfully wrap up operations in Swat. No matter how well the campaign has gone there, the truth is Taliban is far from defeated. The blast in Lahore makes this point in a mound of bloody rubble. There is little, if any, question that Taliban made the attack against a police facility and the adjacent building occupied by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. The Pakistani government believes this to be the case.

Interior Minister Malik was blunt. Taliban did it. The motive was revenge for the army's successes in Malakand. Even if the attack was not one of revenge per se, it is a powerful statement of Taliban's will and capacity to keep on fighting. It was rhetoric made reality in a eye blink of fire and blood.

Lahore is the major commercial center of Pakistan. Punjab province is Pakistan's most populous province. Taliban is obviously well established in both the province and the city given that this bombing is the third terror spectacular there in three months. In March the Sri Lanka national cricket team was attacked. Days later a police training center was taken under siege with numerous casualties during the hours it took for security forces to recapture the facility.

The facts of the internal war combine to put enormous pressure on the army and government to win rapidly in Swat and the rest of Malakand. Unless a convincing victory over Taliban can be demonstrated, public support for the effort will evaporate. Worse, the politically articulate will lose faith in the ability and will of the government to maintain even a slight semblance of domestic tranquility.

The loss of faith by the politically articulate will exacerbate the flight of capital both fiscal and human which has slowed since the commencement of the assault on Swat. The loss of faith will flood--not trickle--down the social pyramid with the result that Taliban will pick up masses of opportunistic support on top of that which is ideologically based.

It is at this point that the army and ISI will have a choice to make. One choice is for the military to take over the government one more time and fight a war to the death with Taliban. The other is to accept a de facto merger with the Islamist jihadists--whether called Taliban or something else.

Neither choice is particularly palatable. Choice number one would result in an outpouring of vitriol from the human rights entities of the world to say nothing of the UN and (can there be any doubt?) the Obama administration. The totems and fetishes of democracy would be waved and flourished.

On the other hand, choice number two would be clearly unacceptable to the US and most other countries. This option would place the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and infrastructure in the hands of Koran-thumping, West-hating True Believers for whom dead bodies are merely Allah's way of keeping score.

In the event of a Taliban takeover under whatsoever cover the US would have few choices other than robust action to draw the nuclear fangs from the new Islamist jihadist serpent. This is not an option that can be contemplated with equanimity.

It is not hyperventilating to assert that any Islamist jihadist supremacy in Pakistan would constitute a world-historical event. At the least it would equal--and probably surpass--the Islamic Revolution in Iran as an event which (permanently) alters the balance of world politics.

In considering the dynamics of Pakistan's politics it is necessary to consider the emerging anti-American narrative in the country. This new narrative is not a replay of the long standing "War on Muslims" theme which has run through the past several years. Nor is it a replacement.

Rather it is a critical addition. This new approach focuses on Baluchistan. There are a few key points to the narrative. The first is that the remote and underpopulated primarily desert province of Pakistan has strategic and economic cruciality for the (presumptively) imperialistic planners of the US. The second is the presence of clandestine support for the Baluch Liberation Army's insurgency on the part of the US, the UK and Israel. The third is that the actual goal of the troop escalation in Afghanistan is to place thousands of US troops in the Afghan province of Nimruz which is primarily populated by Baluchis.

The final point in this paranoiac narrative is the contention that the US forces would cross the border into Baluchistan in hot pursuit of fleeing Taliban fighters. The result would be the de facto separation of the province from Pakistan under Baluchi leadership protected by US arms.

The writing of this new narrative provides a degree of political cover for Pakistani nationalists who are equally uncomfortable with being self-perceived pawns in the American war against Taliban and al-Qaeda and the religiously driven excesses of the Islamist jihadists. These people believe it is better to deal with the indigenous devil with which they share a language, a history and a religion than the foreign Great Satan.

With this new narrative in play along with the old stand-by of the American War on Muslims, it is more important than ever that the current campaign in Swat be brought to a speedy conclusion. It is critical that the conclusion be seen generally as a meaningful victory for the government. Then, Islamabad with the full support of the US and other interested countries must win the peace as well by rapid resettlement of the displaced persons, a rebuilding of ruined buildings, farms and personal property, a genuine renewal of civil life and institutions.

Anything less is defeat on the installment plan. Defeat for Islamabad. Defeat for the US. Defeat for Pakistanis hoping for a decent life.

Swatting Swat

The sound of knees knocking is getting louder in London. And, Islamabad. In both places the wind is up over fears that the US might get muscular. Do a Bush, so to speak, on the Taliban in Swat.

With almost palpable bitterness the usual anonymous source in Islamabad told his British interlocutor that the Obama administration had "pressurised" the Pakistani government over the expansion of Taliban's armed force into Buner with such vigor that the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) "ordered" the black turban wearing gunslingers to get out of town--or at least out of sight.

Maulvi Khalil responded by an ostentatious movement of his trigger pullers from the urban area to the surrounding hills. They left their threatening banners and a foul taste of fear behind. One could imagine an echo of the Terminator's ominous words, "I'll be back."

From the perspective of both London and Islamabad the highly public expressions of concern by high level US personnel carried an implied message: "If you don't push Taliban back, we will."

The implied (or to be more accurate, the inferred) ultimatum was taken seriously enough that the Pakistani ambassador to the US made the customary rejoinder.

The US needs to relate its comments to the ground realities in Pakistan instead of the mood in Washington. Most Pakistanis are not supportive of the Taliban way of life, but at the same time widespread anti-Americanism confuses many Pakistanis into having a conflicting view.

A fair idiomatic translation of this exercise in diplomatic-speak would be, "You Yanks don't see things the way we want you to see things so you are wrong."

Maybe. Quite possibly not.

The ambassador is a member of the Pakistani urban elite. Western educated, soft in his practice of Islam, open to the reality of the Twenty-first Century, willing and able to either ignore or scoff at the barbarism of the Taliban as long as its repugnant acts take place on the far frontier.

A number of reasonably well-conducted surveys of Pakistani public opinion indicate a widespread support for the goals of Taliban, most importantly the implementation of Sharia. While there may be disapproval of and disgust with some of the measures taken by Taliban such as a fondness for decapitation and flogging as well as a love of beards and veils, this does not do much to detract from the appeal of Taliban as long as it is an abstract, romanticised distant presence.

The urban elite has been able, like the ambassador, to ignore or discount the possibility that the non-elite majority of their fellow Pakistanis may be quite willing to see the corrupt, oppressive and inefficient current governing structure replaced by Taliban--swords, guns and whips included. At least, those of the "lower orders" believe Taliban goes by the Quran and espouses ideals they would like to see in action. It can't be worse and may be better than the status quo.

It is important to bear in mind that the outrage which greeted the video of a teenage girl being publicly flogged or the more recent and far more nauseating footage of a dude in a black turban casually shooting down a man and a woman believed by Allah's True Believers to have been adulterers was quite limited in its demographics. More, the outrage was very, very limited in duration.

Stories of Taliban's offensive acts such as those caught on tape have much longer legs in the West than they do in Pakistan. Here we want to see rejection of barbaric behavior and our media gives us what we want. In Pakistan the emphasis is different. For example, the main complaint about the flogging tape was that the whipping should have been administered in private, not on a public street. Regarding the shooting video, the reaction outside the urban elite was along the lines of "They shouldn't have let that reporter have a phone."

The take away is simple. Most Pakistanis, the majority of the hoi polloi, the non-elite mass of folks, harbors no distaste of Taliban. Or, if they do, it is outmatched by the dislike and distrust of the government and those aligned with the government.

The lack of Taliban inspired fear and loathing extends to the Army. All indicators point to Islamism having reached a new high point among military personnel both enlisted and of junior officer rank. A reason not to use the regular army in anti-Taliban operations beyond the usual preoccupation with the presumed Indian threat is there is no real will to combat in the Army. Operations against Taliban in the FATA last year gave proof that few if any grunts had any desire to close with and kill the enemy.

Use of the poorly trained, poorly equipped and pathetically commanded paramilitary forces in counter-Taliban operations provided and provides the Pakistani high command with the option of appearing to do something against the insurgents without either really doing anything or running the risk of "collective disobedience among the Islamist polluted soldiers. Trucking a couple of hundred paramilitary bullet-catchers into Buner was meant not as a serious counter to the black turbans. Rather it was a sop thrown in the general direction of the US. A means of showing resolve to those pesky Americans.

The movement of the hemi-demi-semi troops of the constabulary into the district also allowed Taliban to withdraw giving the reason as one of desiring to spare the civilian population any harm. As a result there was a slight residuum of gratitude to leaven the fear which Taliban left in its wake.

For the moment the balance of power in Swat and conterminous territory remains in stasis. Taliban can come back. The Army is not geared for a fight. The elite is quivering on the banks of denial. The men in the markets and the women at home both hope that things won't get a whole lot worse before they get better.

And, American options beyond jawboning remain limited in the extreme.

Other than sending Predators and Reapers over Swat there is not much we can do to directly counter the Taliban advance. The efficacy of UAV launched missiles is (or can be) tactically useful. On the larger scale this means of war fighting holds little potential for decisiveness. Absent a hit on the command cadre of Taliban in Swat there is no probability of an impact on the operational level of the war. There is no chance of a strategically decisive hit. Taliban has too deep a bench for that to happen.

The US lacks the troops, money, political will or diplomatic support to put boots on the ground. The only exception to that is the eventuality that puts Taliban or one of its associated groups in close proximity to any portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

Only that desperate extremity would allow, let alone demand, the direct insertion of US forces on the ground. Were that evolution to come to pass the incursion would last only so long as was necessary as to assure the nuclear weapons or materials were secured or otherwise removed as a potential threat.

However, the myth of President Obama donning George W. Bush's cowboy hat and picking up the former president's six shooters is useful in giving the Pakistanis a short acting backbone injection. The problem comes in that the Crazy American Thesis loses effect with repetition.

We did it once. We probably cannot do it again.

The best thing we can do is to let Taliban take over some more territory. Act more barbarously. Alienate more Pakistanis. Show elite and the others alike that there is no romance and much blood in the Taliban agenda and actions.

Pakistan--Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?

A year ago very few would have answered that question in the affirmative. Now, very, very few would say, "No" to the proposition.

There are some indications that members of the Pakistani economic and business elite have lost faith in the will and capacity of the government to slow, let alone halt and reverse the steady advance of Taliban. The number of families within the elite which has made either preparations for movement out of the country had been increasing at a slow rate since the immediate aftermath of the holiday bombing. Since the agreement with Sufi Muhammad regarding the imposition of Sharia in Swat and coterminous regions, the expatriation of money, the acquisition of real property and other precursors of a high speed move out of Dodge have accelerated.

Taliban has severely challenged the Islamabad government. First, it rejected completely the government's demand for Sharia courts to be integrated with the federal legal system. Then the lads with guns and Qurans took over the Buner district which brings it within sixty miles of Islamabad. The government's response has been, to be charitable, flaccid.

Simultaneously Taliban has been talking and acting as though it has already won. At the very least Taliban spokesmen have been talking the talk of victory. In essence the crew has defied the smart money of the world to bet against them.

The odor of impending Taliban success has drifted into Washington the past couple of days. Its arrival was delayed due to an attack of Willful Denial Syndrome. The chief symptom of this particular Weird Policy Disorder is a constant mental mantra, "Afpak needs Pakistan as a reliable, stable partner so Pakistan cannot be going down the Islamist tubes" repeated so as to block receipt of any stimuli to the contrary.

SecState Clinton and SecDef Gates are still suffering the aftermath of their WDS attack. Both, (but Secretary Gates more than his counterpart from Foggy Bottom), seem to believe that the forthcoming Islamist Extreme Makeover of Pakistan is a greater threat to the Islamabad government than it is to the US and the West generally.

While the Taliban issued Call to Islamism would constitute more than a standard-issue bad hair day for Zardari and the rest of the government, it would be a threat which at the least borders on the existential for the current world political order. Given the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, the Taliban hands on the levers of power would be quite literally existential in its threat to countries as diverse as India, Israel--and the United States.

The problem with history is simply this. History lacks any material presence. There is no "force of history." There is no such thing as "historical inevitability."

But, the forces generated in the past propel the dynamics and nature of current events. The power of the past resides in its capacity to form the perceptions, beliefs and therefor the actions of the people of the present.

Decisions, actions, events of years--even centuries--gone by serve to limit what is conceivable, dictate what is thinkable. The past conditions the present quite simply by taking away options, narrowing the cone of acceptable outcomes.

Derailing the Taliban Express at any time over the past two decades, in the roughly twenty years which have elapsed since the Reagan administration handed over responsibility for the endgame in our Afghanistan proxy war with the Soviets to the Pakistanis, would have been difficult to the point of impossibility. The reasons for this bleak conclusion have been given in previous posts.

Suffice it say that the senior decision makers of USG did not comprehend what they were told about the depth of Islamist penetration of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. Neither did these men understand the implications of the Pakistani focus on India and the perceived need for strategic depth in that confrontation.

The off the wall strategists of the W. Bush administration were equally blind to reality. Rumsfeld and company did not appreciate the absolute necessity of decapitating al-Qaeda and Taliban rather than merely wounding the two groups. They did not appreciate the implications of the obvious close laison between Pakistani agencies and the fugitives from our invasion. They did not comprehend the continued focus on India on the part of all Pakistani military figures--including those who had taken supreme political power. They were willfully obtuse regarding the expenditure by Pakistan of the billions in aid which the US provided in a sorely misguided effort to buy cooperation and stability in Islamabad.

Now the US is reduced to the sorry state of hoping (pretending) that a few billion more bucks with added requirements for Pakistani compliance is going to knock the Taliban Express off the tracks. SecState Clinton and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are of the (public) view that the five plus gigabucks will prove sufficient leverage to assure Islamabad will both comply with our appeals for "partnership" and possess the necessary wherewithal to promote its functional legitimacy as a government.

The Clinton-Congress conversation was intended to put added pressure on the Zardari government at least to cause it to revisit the peace agreement in Swat. This may also have been the intent behind Secretary Gates remarks to the media covering his visit to Camp Lejeune. We, along with some opposition politicians in Pakistan, have viewed the agreement with Sufi Muhammad through the prism marked Great Alarm.

The lack of concern within the Pakistani government was expressed well by Prime Minister Gilani. Let's listen in.

In case peace is not restored, then naturally the mandate is the provincial government - they will discuss with the jirga, with all of the political forces of their province, they will discuss with Sufi Muhammad. And if the provincial government decides otherwise or if peace is not restored, certainly we have to review our policy

Perhaps the problem is one of English as a second language. Perhaps not. But, to the Geek at least, there is no ringing call for Islamabad's supremacy here. No tocsin for maintaining the structural integrity of Pakistan's government or constitution.

But then, perhaps PM Gilani has no worries about a Taliban takeover. He may be a closet Islamist just waiting for the chance to let his true flag fly. Or, being a member of the elite, he may already have an alternative residence in an up-scale gated community backed by a Swiss account and a first-class ticket out of Islamabad.

It is all well and good to talk the talk of "partnership" and sing paeans of praise to the Pakistani government. It is necessary to bloviate at length about our new "Afpak" strategy. After all there is some slight chance these will payoff. There is always the rather realistic hope that Taliban will shoot itself in the foot with its all-too-typical outrages conducted under the banner of Sharia, of Pure Islam. The zealots of Islamist True Belief might yet defeat themselves.

The real task for the Deep Thinkers inside the Beltway now is that of developing a threefold "OnlyPak" plan. The three major features of this plan have to be (1) neutralising the Pakistani nuclear capacity; (2) Decapitating Taliban and al-Qaeda so as to attenuate its threat potential for some years to come; (3) Planning the punitive expedition which will have to be mounted after the Islamist jihadists leave their Pakistan-Afghanistan safe harbors and strike somewhere, anywhere in the world.

It is not a pretty option to contemplate, this "OnlyPak" plan. But, the realities of the past as expressed in the actualities of the present give us few, if any other rational choice. We gotta get a grip on it.

Pakistani Cleric: Allah Says Democracy Sucks

The other day the Islamabad government signed a deal with the Taliban of Malakand which includes Swat, the one time money making resort area of the country which has recently been a field of dreams and killing. The dreams were those of Taliban. The killing was reserved for those who opposed the dream.

The duly elected "democratic" regime headed by President Zardari committed itself to allow the use of Sharia in the contested region where the Pakistani army has shown itself to be either unwilling or unable to defeat the jihadists of Mullah Fazlullah. The deal was actually signed by Fazlullah's father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad.

Muhammad is reputed to be a "moderate." His love of moderation is shown by his having taken several hundred or more jihadists into Afghanistan in order to fight the Americans and others of the United Crusader and Apostate Force. After his capture Muhammad was released by the Pakistani government. This was done, allegedly at least, as a gesture of good will and reconciliation to the Islamists.

Due to Muhammad's purported moderation, the elected government of Pakistan assures the US and others among the skeptical that the agreement with Muhammad and, presumably, Fazlullah, is neither a concession to the Islamists nor a tacit admission of defeat in Swat and the rest of Malakand. Rather, the glib government spokesmen maintain that the "Lite" version of Sharia to be practiced in Swat will both defang the "extremists" and streamline the civil and criminal justice systems.

Right. Don't you just feel the trust?

Sufi Muhammad is not a man who is given to moderation. Consider his informed theological judgement on the value of democracy in the eyes of good Muslims such as himself. "From the very beginning, I have viewed democracy as a system imposed on us by the infidels. Islam does not allow democracy or elections." Assuming the German press agency quoted the man correctly that seems rather absolute.

Sufi Muhammad's perspective is not unique to him. Rather it is inherent to a broad stream of Islamic jurisprudence. Further it is compatible with the sweep of Islamic history and the practices of many--if not most--Islamic states.

As a True Believer in the One True Faith, Sufi Muhammad well understands that Islam is the world's most authoritarian and totalistic religion. There is no room in the chains of obedience and submission for democracy as Muhammad and others like him understand their faith. There is only room for utter and total submission to the dictates of dogma and the strictures of Sharia--as interpreted by men such as Muhammad and Fazlullah.

This belief system explains perfectly the view of Taliban held by Sufi Muhammad. Ready?

I believe the Taliban government formed a complete Islamic state, which was an ideal example for other Muslim countries. Had this government remained intact, it could have led to the establishment of similar Islamic governments in many other countries.

That about says it all. And, remember, Sufi Muhammad is reputed to be "moderate" in comparison to his presumably fire-breathing son-in-law.

Fazlullah has not yet allowed that he accepts the old man's deal with the apostates in Islamabad even though he declared a ten day ceasefire. The ceasefire will be observed by the Pakistani army (as though anyone will notice a difference.) Fazlullah has, however, demanded that the toothless Pakistani army withdraw completely from Swat and environs.

The army may not be packing up yet. But a lot of the local population is. Swat has already lost half or more of its pre-fight population as people have voted with their feet. Not all that many people are happy with the idea of Sharia. Apparently they are not thrilled with more stonings, decapitations, other summary executions. It seems that a life devoid of the small pleasures of life is not all that appealing to all.

The joyless, mirthless, songless, school-less (at least for girls) world of the Taliban dream obviously does not charm all those in Swat. So they leave. Leave their homes. Exit their past. Discard years, generations of life, hope, human dreams, and a human history. Better, it seems, to become rootless refugees than face the World According To Taliban.

The problem facing the US and its partners in the mountain morass of Afghanistan is simply this: Is the World of Taliban in Swat going to become the World of Taliban in Pakistan?

It is self-evident that Muhammad and his son-in-law, Fazlullah, believe it will and that is how matters should be. They see the apostate, democratically elected government in Islamabad as a sheep to be slaughtered.

And, with this agreement, the sheep has handed the knife to its butcher.

Surrendering To Islamists In Pakistan And The US

The white flag is getting all too common in the past day or two. However, the sudden flourishing of the banner of defeat is not at all surprising. Equally devoid of astonishment are the places where its shameful color droops over the landscape.

Both Pakistan and the Benevolent Despotate of the American Mainstream Media have joined the United Kingdom in bending their knees before the brandished scimitar of Islamism.

In Malakand the government has signed a deal with the ever-conquering Taliban, agreeing to impose Sharia law on the region. The deal went down even as Pakistan's civilian president, Asif Zardari, allowed as how the Islamists are, "trying to take over the state."

Get a grip, Asif! This veil-less capitulation means that the Black Turban Boys of Sufi Muhammad have taken over the state. Period. Just like they already have done without benefit of an agreement with the government.

In case your memory needs to be jogged, Sufi Muhammad, is a former leader of Taliban jihadists who took on the US and other coalition forces in Afghanistan. He was captured. In one of the recurrent fits of "reconciliation" the Islamabad authorities release him.

Released, the ole Sufi went back to the hills--and his gun-toting co-religionists. Now Malakand in the Northwest Frontier Province joins Swat as an area where Sharia reigns supreme. In celebratory commemoration of this, the Taliban of Swat has announced a ten day ceasfire. Presumably this is to encourage Islamabad to withdraw the army from Swat and let the new facts on the ground remain unchallenged.

Government spokesmen hasten to assure any and all who might listen and believe them that the form of Sharia to take effect in Malakand is a kind of Sharia-Lite which would serve to "undercut support for the extremists." Other apologists for surrender have asserted that the new Sharia based approach would streamline the delay plagued civil and criminal justice system which they aver is a creaky left over from the British Raj.

Fer sure, Dudes. Right. Must be.

There is no way that any form of Sharia other than the full-bore, industrial strength version espoused by the Taliban in Swat, the FATA and Afghanistan will be acceptable. Remember, that while Sufi Muhammad has fought alongside, even with, Taliban in Afghanistan, he is not a member of the Taliban cadre. His agreement to accept Sharia-Lite is most likely to be seen by the Taliban heavies as either a temporizing move or, perhaps more likely, a sell-out by an apostate.

In either event, the pressure by the ascendant Taliban will not slacken. The pressure on Zardari will not decrease. The Islamists of Pakistan smell the delightful fragrance of victory--or at least the odor of governmental defeatism. At the same time India, the US, and even the UK (which makes up for spinelessness at home by tough talk abroad) will keep pushing Islamabad to abate the Taliban nuisance.

The absence of coherent political will makes the waging of counterinsurgency with its complex mix of coercion and legitimacy enhancing inducements impossible. At the same time, the lack of coherent political will makes the raising of white flags very, very easy and attractive. This is particularly true when the flags can be colored over in a mild pastel shade--say very light green, a reasonable facsimile of the robust green of Islam.

The surrender to the dictates of Islamists in the US by the American mainstream media is not so simple and straight forward as the instrument of capitulation in Pakistan. Here, it is the implicit surrender of the carefully averted eye, the unseen and therefore unreported insult.

In Buffalo, NY a man killed his wife. This is not normally front page, let alone national news. Making the story all the more seemingly unworthy of national coverage is the fact that the killing took place at the same time as the crash of a commuter airliner in Buffalo with the loss of fifty lives.

What serves to elevate the story out of the ho-hum category is the identity of the killer and the means of the killing. The killer was Muzzamil Hassan. He is the founder and chief executive officer of a Muslim television network called Bridge TV, which launched in 2004 with the announced (and very widely reported both nationally and overseas) goal of countering the anti-Muslim sentiments which he alleged poisoned the US.

Hassan, a former bank vice president, with the full support of his wife, Aasiya, rounded up the venture capital and got the project up and running. Earlier this month, Aasiya filed for divorce and received a protection order against Muzzamil which barred him from the family home.

The protection order didn't matter. Muzzamil killed Aasiya at the offices of Bridge TV.

The worth of the story grows with the manner of Aasiya's death. She was decapitated. Muzzamil chopped her head clean off. This is not an insignificant detail. This is not a fine point to be debated as would be the choice of a .44 vice a 9 millimeter.

No. The manner of killing goes right to the heart of the story, the heart of Islam. Decapitation is a form of killing which is both sanctioned and applauded in the Quran. It was the favorite of the Prophet. And, it is seen in Islamic societies as a particularly degrading and ultimately final way of death. It is tantamount to both killing and dishonoring the victim.

These two elements serve to raise the routine man-kills-wife story to a deserved frontpage status. Still, the American MSM ignored the tale with the delicacy of a society matron avoiding the drunk she steps over. Head high, eyes turned elsewhere, pretending that it just isn't so.

While large circulation outlets in ever-so-sensitive England and oh-so-politically-correct Canada covered the killing, the media outside of Buffalo and Boston were silent here in the land of free and robust speech--and if-it-bleeds-it-leads journalism.

Why?

One can only speculate. But, the MSM are voices of the multi-cultural sensitive elite. The editors and publishers probably fear that coverage of this truly outrageous honor killing would unnecessarily excite the hoi polloi (you know, the rest of us folks.) Perhaps there is fear in the newsrooms of the NYT or the WaPo over the reaction of the ever-ready Muslim apologists and threat makers such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations. It is even possible that the decision makers of the MSM missed the essential Islamic nature of the killing, its deep roots in the doctrine and practice of Islam.

There is precedent for all these speculations.

One goes back almost a week. The LA Times reported on the sentencing of a man for torturing his children. The man who possesses an unmistakably Muslim name and had three wives (along with the 19 children he tortured and starved) was sentenced to multiple life terms by a judge who reamed the man out from the bench. At no point was the man identified as a Muslim. This was despite the fact that he adduced passages from the Quran as justification for his acts.

(Stop! Wait one! Before you go accusing the Geek of being some sort of Muslim basher, take note that the MSM have no difficulty identifying perpetrators as Christian when one of those sects goes a little funny and tortures or sexually molests children. This is done even when the defendant does not resort to Biblical passages as justifications.)

The second precedent goes back a couple of hours. In what must be the opening shot of a salvo of excuse making for Muzzammil's use of edged weapons, the New York Post reports that Bridge TV was experiencing financial problems. These problems according to a spokesman, Dr. Khalid Qazi (who is both a friend of the family and president of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee of Western New York) blamed the murder on "financial" difficulties. He rejected any connection between Islam and the murder.

According to Dr Qazi, "domestic violence" has no place in Islam. He must be reading an abridged version of the Quran and Hadith.

The careful, calculated tunnel vision of the American MSM does not do We the People any positive service. When behavior is rooted in the dogma and practice of a religion, then that connection needs to be observed and commented upon. Self-censorship for whatsoever reason of sensitivity or fear of organised protests is a surrender of the responsibility of the media to provide full and accurate information on matters of moment and note.

The Buffalo decapitation, a clear exercise in honor killing, is a matter of both moment and note. Silence about it is surrender.

While honor killings are not specifically approved of in Sharia, neither is the practice of such barbaric acts condemned by it either in consensually accepted theory or practice in the courts of Islamic countries. Honor killings along with other barbarities such as female genital mutilation fall in a grey area where the absence of condemnation equals approval.

The despicable murder in Buffalo is a warning. It warns of what happens if silence, or active surrender, allow the emergence of Sharia and the attitudes which accompany it. There are not many steps between the Sharia-Lite proposed for Malakand and the bloody headless corpse of a woman in New York.