Dictators fall when the army stands by with folded arms. That has been the one big lesson of the so-called "Arab Spring." Where the army or at least a significant portion of it has stood firm with the challenged jefe grande, the Mr Big of the place has retained at least a fair semblance of power.
This difference is the distinction between Egypt and Tunisia on the one hand and Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain on the other. This, in turn, makes the stance of the Syrian army key to the course developments will take in that dissent torn state.
Optimists (those who favor the speedy end of the Baathist regime) point out that while the majority of the armed services command structure like that of the multi-member intelligence community is comprised of Alawites or individuals from another minority religious community, the overwhelming majority of the rank and file are Sunnis. Thus, the optimists conclude, when push comes to shove the army will divide against itself with the numerical majority siding with the Sunni dissidents.
In support of this interpretation the optimists note that most of the killings to date have been executed either by members of the Baathist militia groups or one of the several intelligence services, most often that nominally belonging to the air force. The army has been in place but has not done much if any of the actual trigger pulling. The optimists also point to information flowing from Syria regarding the lethal purges of low ranking officers who refuse to participate in the suppression as well as reports of incidents of collective disobedience on the part of several different army formations.
The pessimists (those who are not particularly in sympathy with a rapid regime change in Syria) interpret matters somewhat differently. They underscore the existence of selected elite units with a higher percentage of loyalist personnel in all ranks as well as superior equipment and training. They also point to the array of privileges enjoyed by many members of the armed forces--and not simply senior officers. Most tellingly, the pessimists highlight the role played by the army in Syria and the indoctrination to this role practiced every day in all armed forces units.
Of the several arguments offered by the pessimists, it is the last which has the greatest force. It is also the basis for concluding that there is little, if anything, the US can do to foster a climate of indifference to the fate of the Baathist regime within the armed forces generally.
Like all national forces, the prime roles of the Syrian defense establishment is protecting the territorial integrity of the state as well as the sovereignty of the government. The Syrian armed forces are primarily focused on Israel but have demonstrated secondary foci on Jordan and Iraq. These lesser interests have faded even more in recent years.
In addition, the Syrian armed forces are conceived as being instruments of power projection. Importantly, the services see this role as critical. The venue for power projection is Lebanon. Syria has a deep and defining belief that Lebanon is part of Greater Syria. a part ruthlessly ripped away from the larger part by the colonial powers of France and England. The "lost province" of Lebanon has remained lost due to the sinister and exploitative manipulations of Israel and its key sponsor, the US.
It is critical that the Syrian armed forces remain constantly on the alert so as to reclaim Lebanon should the slightest opportunity present itself. The role of power projection even more than the defensive mission warding off or defeating an aggressive Israeli move is key to the extra benefits received by the armed forces and their personnel.
The unique combination of traditional territorial defense and power projection seeking the return of lost territory makes the Syrian army unique. The closest analogy would be the army of France between 1872 and 1918. The redemption of "lost provinces" in each case makes the army not only more loyal to the regime and meriting extra rewards but also assures that the army is less likely to take actions which might weaken the state and make the return of the lost land less probable.
The Syrian armed forces, particularly the army, have shown greater competence in combat than other Arab states during both the 1967 and 1973 wars. In the latter, the Syrians despite having been set up by the Egyptians for failure came within one defensive line of breaking through the IDF positions and overrunning northern Israel. The last second arrival of IAF fighter-bombers made possible by US intelligence regarding the Egyptian force distribution and positions, stopped the aggressive and well managed Syrian armored thrust at what was literally the last possible moment.
All ranks of the Syrian forces are robustly indoctrinated with the "glorious" record and equally "glorious" mission of reclaiming the lost province of Lebanon. This indoctrination includes the Sunni draftees. As a result it is pushing the envelop to see the army splitting on sectarian lines at the expense of its own identity and future relevance.
It is not as if the Baathist regime relies on indoctrination alone. Serious internal security operations are conducted only by those elite units with unquestioned loyalty predicated upon the existential concerns of their members. Other units, units with large undigested chunks of Sunni draftees are kept disarmed in their camps. The least reliable units are also fully penetrated by agents of the several military counterintelligence formations.
The Syrian high command is quite literally death on any sign of disloyalty or disobedience. This brutal reality is well known and understood within the military. This knowledge is quite an inhibition in and of itself.
The correlation of forces militates against any army action resembling those of the Egyptian and Tunisian armies. It also makes the probability of wholesale revolt within the army far from likely. This makes a copy of the Libyan dynamic the next thing to impossible.
The same correlation of forces limits the influence of the US upon the armed forces of Syria. Not only does the US lack the sort of direct connection it had with the Egyptian army, it has no plausible inducements to offer the army should that body cooperate with the anti-regime movement. There is literally nothing Washington can offer to match let alone replace the self-defined role of the Syrian army as both guarantor of the state and liberator of the lost province. No amount of new equipment, no amount of money or advice can begin to equal the intrinsic force of the role the armed forces see for themselves.
Nothing less than an armor plated guarantee of (1) a return of the Golan Heights and (2) a Syrian "free hand" in Lebanon could sway the armed forces from loyalty to the current regime. These are both beyond the capacity of the US to offer.
Even if the Baathists are compelled to rely upon the three brigade equivalents of absolutely loyal minority manned units as well as the air force for suppression of the dissidents, these would prove sufficient to the task of drowning the anti-regime movement in blood. Thus the only question is whether or not the Baathists have the political will to use all necessary force to stay in power regardless of the views of the "international community."
So far the answer is simple and blunt. The regime does have the will.
Showing posts with label Syrian Protests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syrian Protests. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Monday, April 25, 2011
It Looks As If Assad Has Made A Decision
The Baathist regime has sent the tanks to Daraa, the place where it all started. It would appear that Assad and company have decided to end the protests where they began a few short and bloody weeks ago. A cell phone image of the hulking mass of a top of the line Soviet era MBT lurking in a city street gives a particular air of menace--a air which is undoubtedly true.
One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago. Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence. The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down. If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.
Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case. The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate. The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations. The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.
It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change. While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival. The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities. Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.
This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists. The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support. However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.
With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back. And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks. If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression. The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.
Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives. More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions. And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.
Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow. The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces. The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement. This will lengthen the fighting. Lengthening means more killing. More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.
Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy. Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression. This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists. By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.
The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel. The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.
Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list. However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job. If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.
Israel loses as well. The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war. If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.
Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria. He was right. Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on. Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace. The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.
The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer. Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter. One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace. The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple. No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.
If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region. For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement. Syria gets the Golan Heights back. That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.
This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria. It is a time sensitive matter. If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria. Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down. The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert. Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people. Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."
And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region. With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt. The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.
There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement. Sanctions will not deter Assad. Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest. The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.
It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration. But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.
One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago. Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence. The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down. If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.
Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case. The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate. The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations. The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.
It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change. While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival. The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities. Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.
This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists. The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support. However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.
With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back. And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks. If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression. The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.
Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives. More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions. And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.
Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow. The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces. The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement. This will lengthen the fighting. Lengthening means more killing. More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.
Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy. Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression. This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists. By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.
The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel. The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.
Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list. However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job. If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.
Israel loses as well. The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war. If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.
Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria. He was right. Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on. Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace. The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.
The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer. Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter. One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace. The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple. No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.
If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region. For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement. Syria gets the Golan Heights back. That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.
This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria. It is a time sensitive matter. If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria. Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down. The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert. Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people. Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."
And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region. With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt. The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.
There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement. Sanctions will not deter Assad. Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest. The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.
It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration. But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.
Saturday, April 23, 2011
And Still The Blood Flows---
Yesterday the Syrian security forces killed more than one hundred anti-government protesters. Today it was more of the same as snipers in civilian clothes were reported to be engaging funeral processions in suburbs of Damascus. It is looking more and more like Bashir al-Assad is losing control of the situation as the old truism of the dead dictating policy is once again operative among the long repressed and fearful folks of Syria.
While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression. His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple. It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.
As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them. The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge. Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game. As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)
It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen. This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept. How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?
In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway. The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.
No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be. The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime. An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government. It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support. To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.
Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically. Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance. Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial. Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region. However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.
The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq. That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs. So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.
This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation. The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions. This is possible but meaningless in effect. As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming. Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.
In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company. The imperatives to do the same now exist. The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy. Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.
Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea. The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups. As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.
As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements. The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan. The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.
While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression. His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple. It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.
As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them. The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge. Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game. As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)
It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen. This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept. How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?
In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway. The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.
No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be. The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime. An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government. It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support. To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.
Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically. Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance. Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial. Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region. However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.
The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq. That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs. So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.
This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation. The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions. This is possible but meaningless in effect. As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming. Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.
In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company. The imperatives to do the same now exist. The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy. Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.
Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea. The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups. As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.
As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements. The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan. The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.
Saturday, March 19, 2011
Syrian Immune System Challenged--Or Compromised?
Not that many days ago the Syrian jefe grande y supremo, Bashir al-Assad, decreed that Syria was "immune" to the political unrest spreading contagion like across North Africa and the Mideast. Most observers around the world quickly agreed, nodding heads solemnly as they commented on how Bashir's anti-Israel and pro-Iran stance enjoyed widespread support among the common folk of the country.
That crowd sourced opinion may be correct. It is also irrelevant. Few people on the Syrian street place foreign policy on the head of the list of things liked or otherwise about the Syrian status quo. There are far more pressing issues confronting most people in Damascus or the parched former farmlands of the country's northeast.
At first, events--most notably the failure of the expat called and organized first day of "rage"-- seemed to confirm both Bashir's self-assessment and the views of the experts. Even later protests in Damascus were far more fizzle than the fanfare of revolution.
But the situation changed in a town far from Damascus, Daraa. While protests occurred yesterday in five cities including Damascus, Daraa was the spot where the game possibly changed. For reasons not yet clear, the security forces opened fire with lethal results for five civilians. The powers that be reacted quickly and, from initial reports, properly. Investigations and prosecutions were promised. Even if the guilty proved to be security officials, prosecution was guaranteed, "regardless of rank."
The situation in Daraa was not defused by the governmental actions. Today, at the funerals for two of the men killed, the security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. As is the case quite often with funerals, the one held today served as a platform for launching political protests. More than a few of the ten thousand close personal friends of the deceased took to the streets with a vengeance. In the customary point-counterpoint style of Mideast politics, the security forces pushed back with gas and mass arrests.
The new opposition group which has given itself the moniker of "The March 15 Revolution," has made the now obbligato move of establishing a Facebook page. Not surprisingly, it has blamed the regime for the deaths. Assorted human rights groups including the now ever present Human Rights Watch has backed the claims of the March 15 Revolution. The outside world responded in a way completely compatible with the protocol which has been established in the wake of the "Jasmine Revolution" and its follow-ons. The US and UN both jawboned away. Ban Ki-Moon called the lethal suppression "unacceptable." The White House condemned the use of force "strongly."
The government has sealed Daraa so confirmation of the events, body count, and number arrested is difficult or impossible. The government undoubtedly sees the move as necessary not only to prevent outsiders viewing Syrian dirty laundry but also as a means of quarantining the fatal virus of political challenge and change.
The events in Daraa are noteworthy if for no other reason as having been the most deadly outbreak of political violence since the Kurds got uppity in 2004. Back then security forces killed at least twenty-five in the northeastern city of Qwamishli and left another one hundred plus wounded. Politics, particularly those of a dissenting sort, constitute a full contact sport in Syria.
Any protests of any sort do rattle the regime's cage. It should be recalled that Syria has been under a "State of Emergency" since the Baath Party took control in 1963. That is one whacking big emergency--fifty-seven years and counting.
Even the typically youthful (median age of population is 21.7 years according to the CIA World Factbook) Syrians remember the bloodletting in the city of Hama. At that place Bashir's father, Hafiz, suppressed an uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood at a cost in lives which makes Gaddfi's efforts of late look like a festival of peace, love, and flower power. The city was virtually destroyed by heavy artillery, air attacks, and tanks. As many as one hundred thousand were buried in the rubble.
Syria's current problems must be set against the inhibitory effects of the Hama legacy. Syria has been hit hard by the global recession of recent years. Unemployment and its equally sickening twin underemployment are rampant--particularly among the critical segment, educated youth. The governmental deficit is very large and not likely to do other than grow in the next few years. A harsh and prolonged drought has worsened the already critical water shortage such as to severely cripple agriculture and turn large numbers of previously decently well off farmers into proprietors of dust bowls.
The combination of rapidly declining water supplies, shrinking oil production, a rapidly growing population, and a public economy skewed toward military procurement has place enormous pressure on the government to meet public demands. It has already terminally derailed Bashir's ambitious schemes for reform and modernization. The honeymoon with Bashir which started when he succeeded dear old dad proved to be short as the new kid found out what reality was all about.
Paradoxically, the inept response of the Bush/Cheney administration to the murder of Prime Minister Hariri served to rekindle the honeymoon. The diplomatic mistreatment of Syria unified the population behind the Bashir government. The American inspired isolation as well as the ongoing US stance of ignoring the Golan Heights in favor of the West Bank and Gaza not only reinforced public support for Bashir but gave the regime the impetus needed to cozy ever closer to Tehran. (The old cliche about shooting oneself in the foot comes to mind.)
Bashir is not Hafiz. This means that while the Syrian security and internal intelligence services are highly competent and omni-present, the government will not rely solely on the jackboot of repression. In an important symbol of this, Bashir has stated he will go personally to Daraa not only to assure the investigation is undertaken as promised, but, more importantly, to offer his condolences to the families of the dead. It is certain the meetings will receive first story coverage on Syrian state TV.
Bashir and his wife are both media savvy and understand the West better than the majority of Mideastern political figures. Bashir also understands the ways and means by which perceptions can be manipulated effectively within Syria. It is probable he will turn the deaths in Daraa to the regime's advantage.
Overall, the majority of the population continues to rally on Bashir's side. It is probable this applies even to the spearbearers of the current unrest--educated young people. Solidifying and expanding this support requires some major efforts to address the most critical problems, lack of jobs and lack of water. One way this might be done (if the budget deficit allows or Iran is sufficiently generous) is a new public works program aimed at capturing and transporting more water to the dessicated farmlands.
The US might be well advised to take another look at the Golan Heights. The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is more than simply moribund--it is stone cold stinking dead. The only viable available option for reviving the corpse is that of the Golan Heights. Israel can live very well without the Heights or even the ski resort and water in that area. It has no legitimate reason to cling to the ground given the changes in military technology and the record of the past thirty years of border tranquility.
Movement on the Golan would help stabilize Bashir's government. In this context it must be noted that he is not an odious dictator but rather a canny authoritarian who is operating a country which is a going concern, secular, possessed of a national identity, and capable of being an outpost of the civilized world against the advocates of violent political Islam. Even Syria's stance regarding Lebanon is not unrealistic or overly ambitious. Overall, Syria under Bashir is a Syria poised to incrementally enter the ranks of those states more democratic than not.
But, for any of this to happen, for Syria to turn its back on Iran, abandon any nuclear pretensions, drop Hezbollah and Hamas, inch toward real reform, requires a strong government, a stable government, a secure government. For this, there can be no better outside aid than assistance in getting Syrian land back to Syrian control.
That is a project worthy of the Deep Thinkers most urgent and earnest attention.
That crowd sourced opinion may be correct. It is also irrelevant. Few people on the Syrian street place foreign policy on the head of the list of things liked or otherwise about the Syrian status quo. There are far more pressing issues confronting most people in Damascus or the parched former farmlands of the country's northeast.
At first, events--most notably the failure of the expat called and organized first day of "rage"-- seemed to confirm both Bashir's self-assessment and the views of the experts. Even later protests in Damascus were far more fizzle than the fanfare of revolution.
But the situation changed in a town far from Damascus, Daraa. While protests occurred yesterday in five cities including Damascus, Daraa was the spot where the game possibly changed. For reasons not yet clear, the security forces opened fire with lethal results for five civilians. The powers that be reacted quickly and, from initial reports, properly. Investigations and prosecutions were promised. Even if the guilty proved to be security officials, prosecution was guaranteed, "regardless of rank."
The situation in Daraa was not defused by the governmental actions. Today, at the funerals for two of the men killed, the security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrators. As is the case quite often with funerals, the one held today served as a platform for launching political protests. More than a few of the ten thousand close personal friends of the deceased took to the streets with a vengeance. In the customary point-counterpoint style of Mideast politics, the security forces pushed back with gas and mass arrests.
The new opposition group which has given itself the moniker of "The March 15 Revolution," has made the now obbligato move of establishing a Facebook page. Not surprisingly, it has blamed the regime for the deaths. Assorted human rights groups including the now ever present Human Rights Watch has backed the claims of the March 15 Revolution. The outside world responded in a way completely compatible with the protocol which has been established in the wake of the "Jasmine Revolution" and its follow-ons. The US and UN both jawboned away. Ban Ki-Moon called the lethal suppression "unacceptable." The White House condemned the use of force "strongly."
The government has sealed Daraa so confirmation of the events, body count, and number arrested is difficult or impossible. The government undoubtedly sees the move as necessary not only to prevent outsiders viewing Syrian dirty laundry but also as a means of quarantining the fatal virus of political challenge and change.
The events in Daraa are noteworthy if for no other reason as having been the most deadly outbreak of political violence since the Kurds got uppity in 2004. Back then security forces killed at least twenty-five in the northeastern city of Qwamishli and left another one hundred plus wounded. Politics, particularly those of a dissenting sort, constitute a full contact sport in Syria.
Any protests of any sort do rattle the regime's cage. It should be recalled that Syria has been under a "State of Emergency" since the Baath Party took control in 1963. That is one whacking big emergency--fifty-seven years and counting.
Even the typically youthful (median age of population is 21.7 years according to the CIA World Factbook) Syrians remember the bloodletting in the city of Hama. At that place Bashir's father, Hafiz, suppressed an uprising orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood at a cost in lives which makes Gaddfi's efforts of late look like a festival of peace, love, and flower power. The city was virtually destroyed by heavy artillery, air attacks, and tanks. As many as one hundred thousand were buried in the rubble.
Syria's current problems must be set against the inhibitory effects of the Hama legacy. Syria has been hit hard by the global recession of recent years. Unemployment and its equally sickening twin underemployment are rampant--particularly among the critical segment, educated youth. The governmental deficit is very large and not likely to do other than grow in the next few years. A harsh and prolonged drought has worsened the already critical water shortage such as to severely cripple agriculture and turn large numbers of previously decently well off farmers into proprietors of dust bowls.
The combination of rapidly declining water supplies, shrinking oil production, a rapidly growing population, and a public economy skewed toward military procurement has place enormous pressure on the government to meet public demands. It has already terminally derailed Bashir's ambitious schemes for reform and modernization. The honeymoon with Bashir which started when he succeeded dear old dad proved to be short as the new kid found out what reality was all about.
Paradoxically, the inept response of the Bush/Cheney administration to the murder of Prime Minister Hariri served to rekindle the honeymoon. The diplomatic mistreatment of Syria unified the population behind the Bashir government. The American inspired isolation as well as the ongoing US stance of ignoring the Golan Heights in favor of the West Bank and Gaza not only reinforced public support for Bashir but gave the regime the impetus needed to cozy ever closer to Tehran. (The old cliche about shooting oneself in the foot comes to mind.)
Bashir is not Hafiz. This means that while the Syrian security and internal intelligence services are highly competent and omni-present, the government will not rely solely on the jackboot of repression. In an important symbol of this, Bashir has stated he will go personally to Daraa not only to assure the investigation is undertaken as promised, but, more importantly, to offer his condolences to the families of the dead. It is certain the meetings will receive first story coverage on Syrian state TV.
Bashir and his wife are both media savvy and understand the West better than the majority of Mideastern political figures. Bashir also understands the ways and means by which perceptions can be manipulated effectively within Syria. It is probable he will turn the deaths in Daraa to the regime's advantage.
Overall, the majority of the population continues to rally on Bashir's side. It is probable this applies even to the spearbearers of the current unrest--educated young people. Solidifying and expanding this support requires some major efforts to address the most critical problems, lack of jobs and lack of water. One way this might be done (if the budget deficit allows or Iran is sufficiently generous) is a new public works program aimed at capturing and transporting more water to the dessicated farmlands.
The US might be well advised to take another look at the Golan Heights. The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is more than simply moribund--it is stone cold stinking dead. The only viable available option for reviving the corpse is that of the Golan Heights. Israel can live very well without the Heights or even the ski resort and water in that area. It has no legitimate reason to cling to the ground given the changes in military technology and the record of the past thirty years of border tranquility.
Movement on the Golan would help stabilize Bashir's government. In this context it must be noted that he is not an odious dictator but rather a canny authoritarian who is operating a country which is a going concern, secular, possessed of a national identity, and capable of being an outpost of the civilized world against the advocates of violent political Islam. Even Syria's stance regarding Lebanon is not unrealistic or overly ambitious. Overall, Syria under Bashir is a Syria poised to incrementally enter the ranks of those states more democratic than not.
But, for any of this to happen, for Syria to turn its back on Iran, abandon any nuclear pretensions, drop Hezbollah and Hamas, inch toward real reform, requires a strong government, a stable government, a secure government. For this, there can be no better outside aid than assistance in getting Syrian land back to Syrian control.
That is a project worthy of the Deep Thinkers most urgent and earnest attention.
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