The House Of Saud Is Getting Very, Very Worried

Perhaps the best sign of growing Saudi anxiety over the near future is the recall of the legendary Prince Bandar from the diplomatic/political purgatory he has inhabited for the past several years.  Bandar's record in the many jobs he has held including a lengthy and very productive stint as the Kingdom's ambassador to the US shows him to be a man of unusual boldness, resourcefulness, and determination.  Given the way in which regional affairs have been going rapidly and steadily south from the perspective of Riyadh, it was a certainty that Bandar would be brought back, the Kingdom's diplomatic cavalry in action.

The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf.  The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom.  Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam.  This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques.  In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.

That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."

In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring."  Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.

According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.

Enter Prince Bandar.  The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia.  Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief.  But it was not the only part.

Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US.  The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout.  Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.

The same is true with respect to Russia.  The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production.  And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US.  Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."

Now for Pakistan.  It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia.  Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.  Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."

While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.

An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran.  The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan.  And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques.  Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.

As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US.  The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.

Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions.  They make a person feel good just considering them.  But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy.  The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.

Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf.  The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point.  An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach.  Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.

Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria.  The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary.  There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.

The outlines of a deal are hinted here.  Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain.  From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.

Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.

What's Really Interesting In The Mideast

In the great swath of territory extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Himalayans, the areas of North Africa, the Mideast, and Northwest Asia, the big noise has centered on the "Arab Spring,"  The main focus of interest over the past few weeks has been the shooting war in Libya.  It isn't the only place where bullets, bombs, and IEDs are flying, falling, and exploding, but it is the most recent.  So, the media, the politicians, the international organizations, and We the People are not yet suffering from attention overload disorder.

Subsidiary points of fascination are found with the incarceration of the two Mubarak boys and the impending arrest of their aged and ailing dad, the ongoing face off in Yemen and the repressions in Bahrain and Syria.  The hardy perennial of the Israeli-Palestinian Question has wilted of late save only when a refreshing burst of outrageous violence is perpetrated by one or another of the Zany Congeries of Gaza.

While Libya and the other specific "hot spots" of the Mideast get the spotlight, they are actually quite boring, lacking fundamental and long term interest.  The future is not impossible to predict in broad outline.  A form of semi-democracy will come to pass in Tunisia and Egypt--primarily to the benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood in the second case.  Libya will enter the stasis of stalemate unless and until Gaddafi catches a bullet or two--or until he has a sudden desire to decamp with his tent and his billions to some country which is not a signatory to the Statute of Rome.  Then Libya will simply be in stasis, a set of more or less rival tribes in search of a common center--and not finding it.

In Yemen it really will not matter if or when Saleh departs.  The place is either (1) a failed state or (2) a hollow one with operational dominance residing elsewhere.  (Of this more in a moment or two.)

Bashir al-Assad will stay in power.  A judicious mix of reforms more apparent than real plus repression will assure the Baathist regime stays where it has been for the past half century and more.  However, the processes of reform and repression loop directly into the really interesting dynamics of the Mideast.

The same is true with respect to Bahrain.  There is little to no chance of a sea change in the structure of authority in the kingdom.  However, the details of how the game plays out, including the degree to which Bahrain becomes one more hollow state, relate directly to the really interesting dynamic at work in the Mideast.

The only matter of fundamental interest, fundamental importance, and potential long term significance currently extant in the Mideast is not the usual suspect--the Israeli-Palestinian Question--but rather the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  This cold war, which has intensified continually for the past twenty years and with a high delta V in recent weeks, impacts directly and substantially the state of play in Yemen, the future of Bahrain, the direction of the Assad government--and the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian Question.  It also exercises profound effect upon the internal affairs of Lebanon, the direction of Egyptian Islamist politics, and a host of other inter- and intra-state affairs.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have never been known for their close and amiable relationship.  Part of the reason may be found in religion--Shiite Iran versus Wahhabist Sunni Saudi Arabia.  Part of the reason has been purely geopolitical--which country will be the front porch dog in the Gulf region and exercise a large measure of operational dominance over the Mideast generally.

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the rivalry has grown in a major way.  The mullahs and ayatollahs are True Believers for whom the demands of Shia beliefs powerfully enhance the interests of state.

Iraq at one time played a very important role as a buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as being a force of its own acting to prevent regional hegemony by either Iran or the Kingdom.  Those days ended with the American invasion.

The overthrow of Hosni Mubarak took another restraining player off the board.  As the most populous Arab state with a long record of exercising leadership in the often fractured Arab world, Egypt served to both moderate Saudi ambitions for regional hegemony and buttress Saudi opposition to Iranian efforts in the direction of dominance.

The removal of both Iraq and Egypt has served to clear the decks for a more direct and higher stakes confrontation between Tehran and Riyadh.  From the perspective of the ancient rulers of the Kingdom, the policies of the US have become a marker of despair.  The reaction of King Abdullah and his closest relatives has not been anger so much as terminal frustration.

For years (decades would be more accurate) the Saudis have tried repeatedly to convince the US that Iran is the major threat to the region--and not Israel.  Insofar as peace between the Israelis and Palestinians was an issue, it was such simply because the continued conflict served to advance Iranian interests.  As far back as 2002 when the Saudis proposed peace and normalization of relations between all of the Arab League states and Israel in return for a peace agreement predicated upon Israel observing the pre-Six Day War borders, the justification offered to their American interlocutors was that of pulling Iran's fangs.

To the present day the position of the Kingdom on the Israeli-Palestinian Question is dictated by the Iranian strategic threat.  This implies strongly that the Kingdom would accept significant modifications of the 2002 proposal.  King Abdullah and company would, for example, be quite willing to see territorial modification by agreed upon land swaps, drop any Palestinian "right of return," and even accept a limited Israeli security presence along the Jordan valley.  The comparative inflexibility of the Obama administration's stance on the "settlements" issue both surprised and disappointed the Saudis who were actually somewhat optimistic when the direct bi-lateral talks commenced all those months ago.

It is probable that the Saudis have been equally frustrated by the American position on Syria during the W. Bush administration and its Obama successor.  From the viewpoint of Riyadh, the US pushed Syria into the Iranian embrace.  It is self-evident that the fit between secularist Syria and Shiite Iran is both poor and unnatural.  It is a marriage forced by the American pressure for isolation.

The sub-text of the unrest in Syria and the Assad government's responses to that unrest hints at a backroom battle between the Iranians and the Saudis.  There is no doubt but the Iranians have provided assistance in the repression.  The bouts of reformist rhetoric from Bashir including his most recent promise to end the forty-eight year long "state of emergency" sometime next week point to Saudi influence and (in highest probability) blandishments.

Much of Iran's status as an ally of Syria has been bought and paid for.  Syria has a desperate need for infusions of cash on a scale that economically strapped Iran can no longer meet.  The infinitely deep pockets of the Kingdom would have no such difficulty.  Bashir is a very pragmatic and practical man who comes with instincts which push him in the direction of reform.  He is also very much afraid of religious extremism.  If (and this is a big if) the Saudis can restrain their predilection to export Wahhabism along with their cash, it would be far safer for Bashir to cozy up with the Kingdom than to continue his current flirtation with the ayatollahs.

The Baathists of Syria are very well aware that Wahhabism brings extremism as desert rains bring fast blooming flowers.  As a result the Syrians will be very, very cautious about what may come along with any Saudi assistance.  It is probable given the slight moves to reform at home made by King Abdullah that the Saudis are far more willing to disconnect Wahhabism from policy based aid now than in past years.

The Saudi monarchy has been watching American policy regarding Bahrain with the closest of scrutiny.  After the US moved to help ease Hosni Mubarak from power, alarm bells went off throughout the Kingdom.  If the US appears to be doing the same in Bahrain, there is no doubt but the Kingdom will simply take the place over.  Bahrain is too strategically important to the Kingdom to allow otherwise.  Riyadh is convinced (rightly) that Iran is neck deep in the unrest among the Shiite majority in Bahrain and will not sit back thumbs twiddling while Iran moves in.  This is as unlikely as Riyadh kicking back and chilling out as Iranian agents move around freely in the Shiite (and oil) heavy Eastern Province.

The movers and shakers of the Kingdom are also dismayed by the seeming indifference of the US to Iranian efforts in subversion in countries as far removed as Afghanistan and Indonesia, Yemen and the Philippines.  It boggles the Saudis collective mind that the US has not moved to counter even the Iranian's demonstrated efforts in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban.  If we can view that with equanimity, we must be totally out to lunch regarding the hostile nature of Iran everywhere in the world.

The greatest anxiety and distrust of the US revolves around the bootless American campaign to prevent the Iranian development of an atomic bomb.  If Iran acquires a nuclear capability or even a credible breakout capacity, it is over for Saudi Arabia--game, set, and match.  The most rudimentary nuclear arsenal either in hand or on the close horizon gives Iran regional hegemonic status.  It would also make Iran immune to pressure generally as has been the case with nuclear capable Pakistan.

US policy under President Obama has been irresolute beyond the level of rhetoric.  As far as the Kingdom is concerned, the purchasing of weapons is a prudent move but not one which will secure Saudi Arabia against the Iranian threat or achieve the hegemonic status desired by King Abdullah and the rest of the family.  Even selling our most advanced ballistic missile defense system would be no more than one more prudential move.  The ultimate interests and goals of the Kingdom demand a neutralization of the Iranian nuclear program.  This is not likely to occur with the current administration, or so the Saudis have concluded.

The Saudis have acted on this conclusion recently.  The House of Saud has made outreach moves toward the Trolls of Beijing as well as the Guys in the Kremlin.  Such a demarche would have been unthinkable even a short year ago.  The weakness of the current administration has given the Saudis no choice but to look for a strong horse wherever such might be found.

While the Saudis have sought either alternative strong horses or to man up the Obama administration, the Iranians have become more certain in their own success.  This is not simply reflected in the typically overblown oratory of Ahmedinejad and others but in the increasing activity of Iranian agents of influence in Iraq, in Yemen, in Indonesia, and in the Central Asian Republics.  It has been reflected as well in the enhanced flow of equipment to Taliban.  And in the tighter connections with Turkey.  And Venezuela.  And elsewhere.

The correlation of forces (to use that fine old Soviet term) currently favors Iran in the cold war with Saudi Arabia.  The House of Saud knows this.  It knows the reason as well.  The reason is simple.  It can be expressed in one word: Obama.

Pucker Factor Has To Be On The Rise In Saudi Arabia

Now that the government of Bahrain has reversed course on its treatment of the anti-government protests there, the House of Sand must be more worried than before.  There are two reasons for the probable uptick in uptightness in the Kingdom.

First, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is right across the narrow waterway from Bahrain.  The Eastern Province, like Bahrain, is majority Shiite in makeup.  Further, the Shiites of the EP echo their coreligionists in charges of discrimination at the hands of the Wahhibist regime and larger population.

Second, the House of Saud does not trust the current US administration.  The belief in Saudi Arabia is the Obama administration has gone wobbly with respect to the status quo in the Mideast.  The government at its highest levels is particularly torqued off over the administration having abandoned Hosni Mubarak with unseemly haste and without any eye on the future.  Of course, the future which Saudi Arabia worries about centers on any extension of Iranian influence in the region.

For several years now the primary concern of the House of Saud has been Iran not Israel.  The Saudis would be willing to sell out every Palestinian extant if that would help secure a future safe from Iranian ambitions.  The Saudis, as the WikiLeaks cables make clear, has lost no opportunity in conveying this position to the Obama administration as it did the Bush/Cheney team.  Any sign by Washington of decreasing interest in maintaining the status quo pushes the worry beads into hyperdrive all over the Kingdom.

Saudi Arabia has always been worried about being encircled.  In the old days of Pan-Arabism and the Soviet Union, the fear was the combination would create a Soviet controlled bloc running from Egypt to Iraq as well as from Egypt to Yemen.  Now the anxiety is that Iran will do something similar using proxies ranging from Hamas and Hezbollah to the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its "official" state ally, Syria.    The Saudi regime is now of the firm view that the US is not sensitive to this potential.

The House of Saud is not willing to believe its own propaganda.  The fear is the combination of gobs of money, Wahhibism, and a more or less popular royal house will not prove to be enough to defeat some full throated, Iranian assisted exercise in local "people power."  The first expression of this belief can be seen in the probable role being played by Saudi officials in the response by Bahrain to the pro-change demonstrators.

There is strong reason to believe (although no direct proof) that the very muscular response of the Bahraini security forces was orchestrated in Saudi Arabia.  The unexpected overnight shift to "dialogue" including the withdrawal of the army from Pearl Roundabout constituted a Bahraini act of regret.  Should the new, velvet glove approach not payoff and quickly, the fifteen mile causeway built by the Saudis exists for a reason far more military then providing a quick weekend getaway for Saudis in search of a drink.

The situation in Bahrain is far from settled.  The (perhaps temporary) back down by the government will probably prove insufficient to end the demonstrations permanently.  The blood of the martyrs will not allow such an easy out.  At the same time the House of Saud is not going to allow any move which smacks of regime change to occur.  While the Saudi army is probably not combat capable against the Iranians or any other real armed force, it is up to the task of squashing unarmed demonstrators.

The Obama administration will have to factor Saudi fears as well as probable Saudi actions into whatever passes as policy regarding Bahrain.  The Saudis will insist on order, the order of the status quo, being maintained against all comers and all American desires.  The Deep Thinkers of Team Obama will have to keep in mind the reality that the word "change" is an obscenity in the minds of the Saudi regime.

Recalling the rumors of Saudi campaign cash flowing into Obama coffers, one cannot help but wonder if the House of Saud believes now that it got value for its money.