One More Victory?

The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad.  The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered.  It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.

Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.

Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity.  The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.

The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date.  The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice.  The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.

There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan.  That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil.  Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally.  The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine.  Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.

Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray.  Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making.  As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues.  More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.

Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime.  There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause.  But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite.  Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."

Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point.  His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men."  The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint.  However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.

The same dynamic applied in Iraq.  The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion.  Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural.  The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was  to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate.  The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.

As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border.  Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities.  In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.

As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance.  This man is Muqtada al-Sadr.  He is a Shia cleric.  He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context.  He runs a very large and rather competent private militia.  And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.

The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing.  Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price.  For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran.  Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.

The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran.  The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.

A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon.  Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government.  The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level.  The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.

The departure of the Americans will have two results.  One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations.  The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.

Isn't that a fascinating prospect?

The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real.  The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad.  Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.

President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not.  They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik.  Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.

Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box.  Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France.  The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.

Libya is in a profound state of flux.  It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed.  The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on.  Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.

So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department.  While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.

Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it.  Doesn't it?

If You Like Pakistan, You'll Love The "Arab Summer"

Now that all the hyperbolic prattling about the wave of democracy rushing tsunami like over the sands of Arabia is fading away, perhaps overpowered by the sounds of exploding NATO delivered ordnance in Libya, it is possible to take a less biased look at the most likely course of events for the long hot Arab "summer" which is looming like the smoke of an Arizona wildfire.  While the details of the forthcoming "summer" are obscure, the broad outlines are coming more clear by the day.

It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months.  This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment.  It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military.  Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.

In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed.  This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism.  Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen.  But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.

Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence.  There is a simple reason for this prediction.  Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam.  Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.

Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely.  At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade.  At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power.  Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979.  To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.

The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired.  As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood.  It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders.  Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast.  No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces.  At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.

The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam.  The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora.  This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.

Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination.  This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole.  Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.

The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states.  They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools.  There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan.  The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.

The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt.  The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk.  Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole.  The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased.  As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.

The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises.  This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists.  Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy.  Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign.  Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly.  The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.

The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies.  This disengagement will exclude Israel.  The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.

With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense.  The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems.  As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium.  In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.

If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM.  The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0.  With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.

The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building."  We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention.  This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.

The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible.  The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition.  The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest.  To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.

On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan.  All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring.  The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad.  The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training.  Damn good training."

Yo! Mr O! There Is A Whole World Out There, You Know--Or Do You?

In last night's yawn producing set of stitched together rerun snippets from past speeches, the POTUS spent barely ten percent of his numerous words on foreign policy.  This continues and, arguably expands, his well-established record of undervaluing US foreign relations.

Either the Nice Young Man From Chicago is unaware that foreign governments and opinion molders parse the annual Ain't-My-Administration-Great festival or he knows and cares not at all.  In either event the absence of foreign affairs constituted a species of unilateral disavowal of American status as a Great Power.

The casting aside of foreign relations other than pro forma mention of our getting out of Iraq, our fine troops in Afghanistan, and ritualistic condemnation of the usual adversary, Iran, sends a clear signal to the world that it and its petty problems fly below our president's radar.  His evident disengagement from the affairs of the world indicates to friend, foe, and uncommitted alike that the US has only the most limited interest in pursuing its own national interests.

The denial of the world comes at a moment during which a volatile and critical region of the world--the Arab Mideast and North Africa--seems to be lurching toward a tipping point which has the potential of being world historical in importance.  The "Jasmine Revolution" may or may not prove to be a permanent success for democracy of the bottom up sort.  But, its having occurred, the mere fact that a firmly entrenched authoritarian regime supported by not only the former colonial power, France, but the West generally was overthrown by popular demonstrations and the unwillingness of the armed forces to gun down their fellow citizens has set (literal) fire to similar movements in other countries, most importantly Egypt.

The silence of Mr Obama last night serves to continue his rejection of the assertive support of democracy by the Bush/Cheney administration beyond the point of absurdity into the venue of the counterproductive.  Admittedly the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/neocon ninnie notion of using armed invasion as a tool to foster democracy was a world class blunder, but that in no way discredited the necessity of promoting democracy by other means, particularly the support of indigenous tendencies or groups.

The administration appears to be possessed by the view that any open support by the US of any pro-democracy effort in any Arab or Muslim majority country will doom the effort to failure.  The Deep Thinkers of the administration took this position openly in the wake of the demonstrations against the mullahocracy and the stolen presidential election.  More recently the same cover was employed implicitly to excuse the hands-off position of the US during the run-up to the "Jasmine Revolution."

This contention is ludicrous on the face.  Interviews and opinion surveys have shown repeatedly that people throughout the world look to the US for support of democracy and the other features customarily associated with that form of government.  The same sources document the severe disappointment felt by people when the government of the US either fails to support democratic aspirations, or, worse, openly supports authoritarian regimes for reasons of state.

The situation which developed rapidly in Egypt yesterday cried out for a statement by the American president.   The demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere not only were the largest anti-government action in many decades, it also constituted a direct challenge to the US president and the policies of his administration.  The challenge was simply: On which side does the US stand?

The president and his administration have supported the thirty year rule of Hosni Mubarak both publicly and privately in recent weeks and days.  There are reasons of state policy which would appear to compel our linkage with and support for the Mubarak regime.  However, these reasons--the moribund Mideast "peace process" and combating violent political Islam--can be both overstated and, more importantly, overtaken by events.

The US has nailed its flag to the Egyptian mast ever since Cairo kicked the Soviets out and realigned (sort of) with the US.  This in turn led to the Camp David Accords and the "normalization" of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel.  The substance of the post-Camp David years has been much less than the promise or the appearance.  The most substantial benefits of the Egyptian realignment were, no surprise here, awarded to Egypt.  The US has tied its aid to Egypt to the aid furnished to Israel with results which have been profitable for the Cairo regime, to put it mildly.

As a "partner" with the US in the "global war on terror," Egypt has proven to be less obstreperous than Pakistan but not by much.  The Egyptian government has done little if any cooperation beyond its own borders while serving as a pointman for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (along with Pakistan) on the various proposals to restrict freedom of speech by means of a UN resolution intended to protect Islam against any perceived attack--including the truth about the religion.

Domestically the Egyptian government has shown itself less than eager to protect the basic rights of its Coptic Christian population against outrages at the hands of the Muslims.  To say that Cairo has sat on its hands as Copts were murdered is only to tell it like it has been--and will be.

Simultaneously the Mubarak regime has shown its willingness to pervert the processes of democratic elections to assure its hold on power.  The recent parliamentary election gave clear indications of having been even more bogus than its predecessors.  The long arm and very heavy hand of the internal security organs have been evermore in evidence such that Egypt of recent months has a strong resemblance to the Iraq of Saddam Hussein.

In short, Egypt has become a heavier liability for American interests and influence in the region.  Bluntly, the costs of linking us to Egypt have far outweighed the benefits by any rational calculus.

The spread of anti-government demonstrations across Egypt in the aftermath of the "Jasmine Revolution" have given the US a perfect opportunity to get on the right side of the political dynamic in Egypt.  The moment is all the more propitious in that so far the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, all advocates of political Islam including the violent sort, have not been at the forefront of events.  Indeed, the Brotherhood shows signs of having been caught by the same surprise as the government.

Had Mr Obama made even brief mention of the anti-government demonstrations, it would have done much to embolden the reformers in the street.  A favorable reference, even if of the most attenuated sort, would have gone far to broadening the base of support for the pro-democracy movement.  It might even have assured that the working class and small merchant segment of society would have been motivated to get off the sidelines and join with the demonstrators.

The "Jasmine Revolution": succeeded in large part because the workers of Tunisia along with the lower middle class linked with the unemployed university graduates to oppose the autocracy.  The same would be the case in Egypt, but only if the cautious came to believe that success and not simply death or torture would be the most probable outcome.  This sea change could have occurred if Mr Obama had only said a few kind and accurate words concerning events in Cairo earlier that day.

Admittedly, the architects of foreign policy like to be slow, cautious, incremental.  Diplomats tend to be conservative, prone to being opposed to boat rocking.  But, in the real world of real people with real hopes, fears, frustrations, and aspirations, fortune often favors the bold.  Events by their very magnitude and pace may preclude the endless rounds of interagency working groups, endless processes of staffing papers, of seeking approval up a never ending chain of command.

This is what happened in Tunisia.  It is what may be happening in Egypt.  It is what could happen in Iran.  The US foreign policy community by virtue of its size, complexity, and attendant inertia is ill-equipped to take proper advantage of fleeting opportunities.  The president is not so limited.  As Richard Nixon demonstrated, it is possible for a president to act quickly and take advantage of a changing international dynamic.

The situations in Tunisia and Egypt as in numerous other countries in the Arab and Muslim world are essential in the definition of what the US stands for as well as what it opposes.  When the US president is silent he concedes the field to the adherents of violent political Islam.  Losing is bad enough. Losing by default is even worse.

So get a grip on this: By his ignoring the world, particularly the unfolding drama in the Mideast, President Obama is losing by default.  Arguably, he is throwing the match.

The State of the Union Address is a perfect opportunity to tell the world just where the US stands, what it stands for, and to what it stands in opposition.  This is necessary for the stability of the world.  Staking a position is what Great Powers are expected to do.  And, whether or not Mr Obama and his ideological soulmates like the idea or repudiate it, the US is a Great Power.

So, Mr Obama, the message is simple: Act like you are the chief executive of a Great Power, in point of fact, the best of the Great Powers.  Anything less is to duck your personal "Sputnik moment."

Is Tunisia The New Paradigm?

Many observers, particularly those who live in the Arab countries of the Mideast, see the overthrow of the aging authoritarian president, Ben Ali, as a sign of things to come in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, even the feudal oil kingdoms of the Gulf.  These optimistic folk revel in the apparent success of an unprecedented exercise in "people power."

There are striking but superficial similarities between the social, political, and economic dynamic which brought an end to the quarter century of Ben Ali's reign and those obtaining in other Mideast countries, particularly Egypt.  But, as history has so often shown, the differences are far more critical than the appealing similarities.

Ben Ali was only the second chief of state in the fifty plus years of Tunisian independence.  His predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, ushered in both independence and a rigid one party state rule.  Bourguiba was a realist in his domestic and foreign policy pursuing good relations with the ex-colonial power, France, while insisting on secularization, educational development, and economic progress domestically.  His thirty-one year regime provided a sound basis for Tunisia both socially and economically while stunting the country's political growth.

Ben Ali displaced Bourguiba in a non-violent coup in 1987.  His early terms in the office of president were distinguished only by his fealty to Bourguiba's visions.  However, by the end of his fifteenth year in power, Ben Ali had become increasingly repressive, given to nepotism and familial corruption and evermore remoteness from the people of Tunisia.  During terms number four and five, the general distaste for the regime grew apace, but manifestations of discontent were handled readily by the police.

As distaste for the regime grew so also did the wealth of the presidential family including the relatives of his second wife, a nearly illiterate one time beautician.  The situation would have remained in stasis had it not been for the impact of the global recession, particularly the hit taken by the large, educated, secularized, and European oriented youth of the country.

Bourguiba had emphasized the control of population growth with excellent results.  This insulated Tunisia against the early effects of too much education and too few suitable jobs.  However, the global recession upset the delicate balance with results which disproportionately hit the urban under thirty population.  In this context it should be mentioned that Tunisia is heavily urbanized with seven out of every ten people living in the cities.  Similarly Tunisia boasts an unusually large number of people with a post-secondary education.

In many but not all of these features--urbanization, a precarious balance between population growth and job growth, a significant number of young, educated, and under- or unemployed people, a rigid, one party political dynamic, inefficient, overbearing repression by police, corruption and nepotism at the highest level of government, maldistribution of wealth--Tunisia is closely resembled by Egypt, Algeria, and the Gulf states.  The same is true to a slightly lesser degree with respect to Jordan, Libya, and Syria.

None of this should be taken to imply that Hosni Mubarak is soon to go the way of Ben Ali.  The reason is to be found in the differences between Tunisia and the other Arab states.  Most of the critical differences are matters of degree rather than substance.  For example, Tunisia's population has a higher percentage of recipients of post-secondary education than the other countries in the region.  The average family size in Tunisia--an important consideration when evaluating the potential for political involvement by youth--is smaller than in the other Arab states.  The percentage of urbanites is larger.  The percentage of under-thirties with direct experience living in Europe is larger.  In short, the population of Tunisia is disproportionately educated, urban, technologically savvy, literate, and comes from a childhood of relative privilege.

Other differences are structural.  Tunisia has a small and non-politicized army.  While the police are more political than not, the army sat--and continues to sit--on the sidelines.  Its high command refused to suppress the escalating demonstrations/riots.  This was critical to the decision by the president to leave and the prime minister to step aside in favor of the legislative speaker.  Also structural is the matter of religion.  Tunisia is Muslim to be sure, but it is a country in which the seeds of violent political Islam or even the purportedly non-violent sort peddled by the Muslim Brotherhood have never been allowed to take root.

The act which triggered the final month of escalating unrest is quite atypical for an Arab/Muslim state and society but quite emblematic of Tunisia's uniqueness.  The event was the public self-immolation of a twenty-six year old university graduate who was forced to support himself as a fruit and vegetable peddler.  After being hassled by the police for having no license, Mohamad Bouazizi, took his own life in the same attention demanding way as did the famed Buddhist monks of South Vietnam fifty years ago--he doused himself with gasoline and struck a match.

Some Muslim clerics along with government spokesmen condemned Bouazizi's suicide as "non-Islamic."  This attempt at marginalization was unsuccessful to say the least.  It can be argued that the condemnation offered by Muslim clerics deligitimized any Islamist message.  Because of the widespread use of Internet, SMS, and other horizontal means of communication the death of Mr Bouazizi had an impact far from the small town of Sidi Bouzid.

Unemployed graduates were joined by urban workers and others in demonstrations and riots publicized by SMS and social networking sites in a manner redolent of raves and flash crowds.  The demonstrators were never effectively and efficiently repressed by the police.  It is important to note that the Tunisian organs of internal security were not and never have been efficiently repressive.  They could oppress but never gain the unchallenged upper hand which provides the necessary suppression of opposition.  In short, the police could repress enough to be counterproductive but not enough to be suppressive.  That has always been the worst case for an authoritarian regime.

In this very critical way then Tunisia is at a distance from countries such as Egypt.  Hosni Mubarak has a very efficient set of repressive instruments at his disposal including the army.  The same is true with other regimes which superficially resemble the old government in Tunisia.  Not to put too sharp a point on the matter, all the other potentially threatened governments have both the will and the ability to drown the opposition in blood.

It must never be forgotten that other countries from Algeria to Egypt and beyond have strong groups adhering to violent political Islam.  This means the usually more secular folks who would constitute a "people power" opposition would not have the field to themselves but would face Islamists as well as the status quo government and its supporting elites.

Putting together the similarities and differences leads to one conclusion: The events of the past month and days in Tunisia do not constitute a new paradigm for other societies and polities in the Arab Mideast.  While it would be very nice if the contrary were the case, the probability of any other authoritarian regime in the region being toppled in a manner akin to the downfall of Ben Ali is very slim to none.

Still there is a lesson here for the Deep Thinkers of the current administration.  It would behoove the US and other Western states including former colonial powers to take a long hard look at the possibilities for assisting "people power" movements in the region.  The neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney administration were right in pushing for democracy in the Arab states even if they were dead wrong in their belief that armed exercises in coerced regime change constituted the best means to foster democracy.  Working with nascent or incipient "people power" movements, even or especially those of the "leaderless" sort constitutes a far, far better way.