One More Victory?

The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad.  The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered.  It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.

Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.

Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity.  The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.

The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date.  The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice.  The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.

There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan.  That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil.  Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally.  The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine.  Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.

Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray.  Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making.  As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues.  More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.

Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime.  There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause.  But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite.  Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."

Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point.  His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men."  The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint.  However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.

The same dynamic applied in Iraq.  The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion.  Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural.  The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was  to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate.  The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.

As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border.  Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities.  In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.

As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance.  This man is Muqtada al-Sadr.  He is a Shia cleric.  He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context.  He runs a very large and rather competent private militia.  And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.

The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing.  Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price.  For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran.  Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.

The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran.  The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.

A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon.  Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government.  The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level.  The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.

The departure of the Americans will have two results.  One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations.  The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.

Isn't that a fascinating prospect?

The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real.  The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad.  Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.

President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not.  They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik.  Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.

Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box.  Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France.  The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.

Libya is in a profound state of flux.  It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed.  The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on.  Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.

So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department.  While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.

Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it.  Doesn't it?

Of Course Iran Is Behind The New "Surge" In Iraq

Admiral Mike Mullen made a blunt and truthful statement which has not been well received in Tehran.  The only thing at all wrong with the admiral's remarks was their tardy nature.  It is not inaccurate to characterize the chairman's accusation of Iranian complicity in the uptick of attacks on Americans in Iraq as yesterday's news.

With or without the active participation (or even the presence in country) of Moqtada al-Sadr, the famed anti-American Shiite paramilitary leader and part-time student of Islam, the ayatollahs and their goons of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have pursued national interest in Iraq.  The view from Tehran is simply that religion trumps national identity or, if that isn't enough motivation, the Iraqi Shiites have decades of scores to settle against the minority Sunnis who ran the place from the time of the British Mandate through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The ready presence of the Shiite fighters of the Sadrists seemed to underscore the accuracy of the Iranian calculations.  The enigmatic and illusive figure of Moqtada al-Sadr confused the picture to some extent--in the estimates of both American and Iranian decision makers.  Sadr played two cards with equal skill: Confessional loyalty and nationalism.  As he switched between the two, his eyes remained firmly on the prize he sought.  Not surprisingly, the prize was and remains power.

Sadr has no desire to sit on the throne.  He knows all too well that not only is the head which wears the crown likely to sleep uneasily but in Iraq for some time to come crown wearers are quite likely to lose both crown and the head under it.  Sadr wanted and wants to be the ultimate power behind the throne.  In pursuit of this end, the crafty cleric is willing to use Iranian assistance--if it is low profile enough.

He has been careful, very careful to keep daylight between himself and the theocrats of Tehran as well as the current crop of Shiite terrorists.  He understands quite well that the old Iraqi proverb holding that no fruit tastes as good as the product of one's own orchard applies today among Iraqis of all stripes.  To be seen as a tool or proxy of the Ayatollahs would be fatal to Sadr's ambitions.  All the more since he has achieved the long coveted status of Grey Eminence following his agreement to support al-Maliki--a promise of support which has become increasingly important as Maliki has lost popularity generally.

Sadr's hand will be strengthened by the completion of the American withdrawal.  His highest public priority has been that of seeing the last American posterior hitting the Kuwaiti border at year's end.  Ironically, accomplishment of this much desired result is being compromised by the Iranian uptick of direct support for the Shiite insurgents who have been attacking Americans as well as Iraqis.

The Deep Thinkers of Tehran apparently have convinced themselves that the infliction of fatalities on US personnel is the best way of assuring the American withdrawal.  The take in Tehran is simple:  Neither the American president nor the American people have the stomach for more death.

In this assessment the Deep Thinkers in Tehran may be correct.  We the People want no more of our own killed in Iraq.  The current administration and congress would like very much to see an end to our Great Adventure in Regime Change.  But, the view inside Baghdad is different.  So is the perspective from the Pentagon.

The Pentagon is afraid, very afraid that any final American withdrawal would now be seen by not only the Iranians but promoters of violent political Islam everywhere as having been forced upon us by the efforts of the jihadists.  Such a conclusion might be totally wrong, but it will be drawn nonetheless.  A previous generation of advocates of violent political Islam including Osama bin Laden wrongly concluded that it was the efforts of the "Arab fighters," the "martyrdom seekers," who defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan.  This work of fiction would be emulated next January if the US withdraws according to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.

It is to preclude this possibility and the evils which would flow from it (among other reasons) which has propelled the Defense Department to seek a modification of the SOFA.  Even a small (10,000) man package of combat capable personnel would prevent the false claim of military victory on the part of the Islamists.

The politicians of Baghdad along with many in the Iraqi military establishment favor a continued, low footprint American presence.  The leaders of the Kurds strongly support the idea.  Within the beleaguered Sunni areas of Anbar province, the support is both wide and deep.  Only Sadr is opposed.

Despite his opposition, there is very little probability that Sadr would seek to veto the idea should it be strongly and evidently favored by the other elements of Iraqi politics.  To do so would be to put himself  publicly in league with the Iranians.  This would undercut his power in Iraq.  Not a good idea from the Sadr perspective.

It would be best for Sadr if he could convince his Iranian comrades to call off their private war.  By doing so, the American desire to stay lest they appear to have been defeated would be eroded.  By lowering the climate of fear, the badly divided Iraqi political structure would be fragmented so that no unified support for a modification in the SOFA would develop.  And, it would make Sadr even more of a critical broker of power.

It is highly unlikely that Tehran would listen to Sadr even should he make the outlined argument.  Considering the dynamic in Syria there is real anxiety that Tehran is about to lose their only Arab state ally.  This implies that Iraq looms larger today than in the past as an Iranian Shiite outpost in the Arab world.  Tehran knows perfectly well that any American presence reduces greatly their hopes of turning Baghdad into a replacement for Damascus.

The strongest probability is that Tehran will not only continue but increase its support for the Shiite groups which have been carrying out the attacks.  This is a calculated risk.  The ayatollahs must believe that when push comes to shove, Sadr will carry Tehran's water within the circles of the Maliki government.  Or, even better, Sadr will whistle up the supposedly disarmed Sadrist militias.  Whether the Deep Thinkers of Tehran are right or not depends on Sadr's commitment to his faith: does his identity as a Shiite outweigh or not his identity as an Iraqi?

Sadr probably does not even know his own mind here.  His actions and words over the past nine years have been those of a man quite confused about his identity much as he knows his priorities.  Often he has tried to ride the horse of religion and that of nationalism simultaneously.  Inevitably, he has fallen one way or the other. His recurrent prolonged trips to "study" in Qom show the crisis of conscious which results each time he falls to the side of nationalism at the expense of Shia.

Perhaps his thinking would be clarified if someone were to whisper in his ear, "Iraqis are more likely to trust a fellow Iraqi with power than an Iranian in Iraqi costume."  That is a sentiment one can take to the bank in Iraq.

The Wonders Of Democracy In Iraq Or Have We A New Saddam Here?

Observers of Iraq since the end of American combat operations have focused correctly on the state of play in the new "democratic" government which is the legacy of the Great Adventure In Regime Change.  What has been evolving in Iraq shows all the dangers resident in celebrating "democracy" without proper regard to all the contextual factors which can allow democracy to be other than a portal to authoritarianism.

The most visible sign of something awry in Iraq was the seemingly never ending failure of the Maliki apparatus to form a functioning government following parliamentary elections.  The inability of the government to organize itself was illustrative of the deep fractures which characterize politics in post-Saddam Iraq.  Even leaving aside the many questions regarding the fairness and accuracy of the parliamentary vote, the deep ruptures running across Iraqi society and polity virtually make effective and responsive government impossible.

Maliki has already shown a propensity toward the authoritarian which far transcends his main rival.  Even though Mr Maliki has ambitions to near dictatorship, his government has proven itself inefficient and corrupt to a degree which has excited "days of rage" in many Iraqi cities.  The protests resulted in deaths as security forces opened fire with small arms.  As the deaths mounted so also have the protests.

The security forces have rounded up Baghdad intellectuals--lawyers, journalists, and academics--subjecting those arrested to beatings and intimidating interrogations before finally releasing them.  While this scarcely amounts to the sort of activity routinely engaged in by Saddam's internal security personnel, the arrests like the use of deadly force against peaceful albeit noisy demonstrators points in an alarming direction.

Even more alarming has been the steady accretion of power by Maliki.  In a move without equal in any parliamentary government elsewhere in the world, Maliki and his cabinet have been given unique authority by the Iraqi equivalent of the Supreme Court.  In a ruling which was stunning in both its breadth and lack of constitutional basis, the high court ruled that only Maliki and his cabinet could propose legislation to the parliament.  The legislators could not propose any legislation on their own initiative.  In effect this makes the Iraqi parliament something less than relevant.

The obliging court also gave Maliki control over the previously independent central bank.  It also made the formerly independent agencies responsible for investigating corruption and conducting elections mere tools in Maliki's ever grasping hands.

Additionally, human rights groups in Iraq have alleged credibly that Maliki's security forces have created secret detention centers in which dissidents are immured.  If this is not a symptom of creeping authoritarianism it would be hard to say what might be.

The record of Maliki's government is dismal at best.  As Iraqi citizens have complained in the street and elsewhere, the basic infrastructure is still a mess.  Electricity is still off nearly as much as it is on.  The economy is still in a shambles despite the ocean of oil a few thousand feet down.  Unemployment remains high.  And, inflation particularly in basics is on the up ramp.

Then, of course, the tensions between Shiite and Sunni remain.  So also do those between Arab and Kurd.  The purportedly secularist regime of Maliki;s State of Law party has shown a tilt toward the Shiite majority and most definitely against the Sunni minority.  This tendency emerged dramatically with the refusal of the Maliki government to honor commitments made to the Sons of Iraq and Awakening Councils which are Sunni and were key to the success of the American counterinsurgency effort.  Since then the government has marginalized the Sunni population even more.

The security situation has gone south over the entire period since the American combat forces withdrew.  The bombings have been directed against Shiites much of the time but there has been no evidence, not even credible rumors, pointing the finger at Sunnis.  The cynical killing of Shiites by Shiites is not unprecedented in Iraq and would fit the agenda of both Iran and its agents in Iraq.  It would also meet the agenda of a wannabe dictator, particularly one who happens to be a Shiite.  Maliki has control of specialist security units capable of undertaking spectacular operations whether the targets are government facilities, Shiite pilgrims, or Christian churches and homes.

It is more than simply interesting that persons suspected of involvement in bombings and assassinations are arrested in a blare of publicity but then simply fade away.  No trials.  No convictions.  No executions.  Nothing.  Considering that one of the fastest roads to total authority is creating a climate of disorder and lack of safety, that there is a loud demand for law'n'order, it is not implausible that Maliki and his cohorts have orchestrated at least some of the prevailing insecurity.

The schism between the Arabs of Baghdad and the Kurds in their semi-autonomous region has grown of late again at the behest of the central government.  The Kurds may be obstreperous but they have shown themselves to be rational negotiators.  The current talks over the status of Kirkuk and the oil fields surrounding it could come to a satisfactory conclusion, but the Maliki government keeps upping the ante as if looking for an excuse to turn the army loose in the region.

As the clock ticks down to the date certain when the last American forces withdraw, the influence of the US declines apace.  The loss of American influence is exacerbated by the Obama's administration which appears flatly indifferent to what is happening in Iraq in the wake of our unilaterally declared victory.  Unlike Vietnam the Obama administration has not even sought a "decent interval" before Iraq's "democracy" collapses into an authoritarian regime.

It is more than slightly ironic that as pro-democracy movements have spread across many Arab majority states, the tide is running in the opposite direction in Iraq.  Increasing the irony is the crowing of unreconstructed neo-cons over the flood of protests ranging from Tunisia to Yemen as having proved just how right, how prescient was George W. Bush when he ordered the invasion of Iraq.  It certainly looks like the American monument to democracy built with the blood of so many Americans and so much American money is at great risk of imploding into an imitation of the dictatorship it was intended to replace.

The lesson here is simple and brutal.  It is far easier to talk about nation-building than it is to do it.  It is easier to envision the creation of a Western style democracy than it is to realize the vision.  Or, most simply: Democracies can not be created; they can only create themselves.

Maliki Plays (Tough) Tribal Politics--Well

The critical Iraqi elections are just a couple of weeks away. The conduct as well as the results are crucial to the stability of the country as well as US plans to remove all troops over the next eighteen months.

The MSM here have paid a great deal of attention to the presumed downsides of the election process, the campaign, and the prospects. One gets the strong sense while reading the assorted treatments that dramatic failure is in the offing, that the results of the election will go a very long way to demonstrating the inherently bankrupt policy of the US from the moment of the invasion onward.

It doesn't push the envelop too far to aver the MSM convey the strong impression of wishing, hoping (perhaps even praying) for a debacle in Iraq of seismic magnitude. A failure of Iraq's internal politics which screams, "The US was wrong! All those American lives were wasted! Our adventure was one not of regime change but of evil."

The reality, of course, is not so simple or so much a projection of an American political morality play. Rather the events in Iraq during the run-up to the election are a completely expectable manifestation of Iraqi demographics, culture, and recent history. Beyond that they reflect the actions of two men who are not only rivals for power but also able practitioners of the tribal or, at best, regional politics which are indigenous to Iraq.

The rivals are the one time favorite son of the neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld years, Ahmed Chalabi, and the up-from-nowhere surprise Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Both men play the game of Iraqi politics quite well; al-Maliki has been playing it better--despite the predictions of the MSM.

To say that Chalabi is duplicitous, mendacious, and tergiversatious is to both state the obvious and pay him a deserved compliment. To point out his connection with Iran is both honest and damning. To continue belaboring the obvious, Chalabi is out for himself. He has a lust for power which crosses the border into the flatly obscene. When leaning on his American "friends" came a cropper several years ago, Chalabi, a man whose religious convictions have the flexibility of those possessed by Saddam Hussein, moved ever closer to the Shia majority finally aligning himself firmly with those who are agents of Tehran.

In his role with the commission vetting the many candidates for the upcoming election, Chalabi used this heaven(?) sent opportunity to plant--and detonate--an electoral IED. He whisked nearly five hundred names off the ballot, most of which were borne by Sunnis, with the bland statement that all were tarnished with a Baathist past. In partial justification of this action Chalabi pointed back to the "de-Baathification" program and orders of Jerry Bremer. He did this while cheerfully ignoring the more recent actions driven by al-Maliki in the "reintegration" effort which brought numerous "Baathists" back into government and the military.

The astute(?) journalists from the US and elsewhere shook their collective heads and declared disintegration of Iraq had been brought closer. In doing so these writers again emphasized the decaying security systems in the country as made evident in the uptick of VBIED attacks. The media assured us that these were the manifestation of spiraling sectarian conflict and a reprise of the bloody days of three to five years ago would soon be upon the nation.

During this brouhaha al-Maliki had made placatory gestures to the Islamist oriented component of the Shia community. The highest profile of these was the growing ban on alcohol sales and use in Baghdad. These moves have paid off to a significant degree.

The main move of al-Maliki came late last week. He dramatically expanded the "reintegration" effort by announcing the immediate recall of some twenty thousand Saddam era officers and NCOs to the armed forces.

The reaction within the American MSM was simply that al-Maliki had made a crass political move, seeking votes at any price. There was a general odor of censure in the coverage as if seeking to gain votes with a "public employment" project is somehow underhanded.

Of course al-Maliki sought votes by this action. It probably has gained him beaucoup--the recalled personnel, their families, their friends and so on. Nothing wrong with that.

Beyond the votes al-Maliki needs, the recall provides badly needed mid-level "management" for the Iraqi armed and security forces. The creation of a three hundred thousand man force has been done very rapidly, and quite incompletely. The particular deficiencies reside within the senior level NCOs and lower field grade officer corps. Bringing back men who never, but never, should have been sacked by Proconsul Bremer is a must-do if the Iraqi armed and security forces are going to become both an effective instrument of state and a representative institution of the nation.

The armed forces are the only potential national institution in a country deeply divided by region, religion, and tribal identity. Over the years, the generations, the centuries, there has rarely, if ever, been a unified Iraqi national identity. There is not one at the moment. However, the potential for one exists today. In large measure this pleasant and optimistic development is the product of al-Maliki and his party.

Prime Minister Maliki and his cohorts have placed a very high emphasis upon the notion that there does exist a unique and compelling Iraqi national identity. On occasion this has reflected itself in obnoxious ways such as the "victory" celebrations last summer with the withdrawal of American forces from Iraqi urban centers. The Geek cheered at the time. He still does.

If the accomplishment of the minimum necessary American strategic goal, that of "not losing" is to have any lasting value or true and positive impact on the Iraqi people, it must come from the propagation and development of a credible sense of national self among the fractionated Iraqi publics. This means, in short, the creation and acceptance of a transcendent national sense of self.

Transcendent national identities do not come quickly. Nor do they come easily. We Americans forget too often and too completely how recently the primary sense of identity, of place came, not from the nation--the US of A--but from a particular region, state, or locality. In shorthand form, the stress was placed on the word, "states" not the word, "united." We were, not so much Americans as Southerners or New Englanders, Texans, or New Yorkers. (Some few of us were even New Mexicans.)

In national politics "ticket balancing" in presidential elections was considered absolutely essential. Even today faint echoes of this hoary tradition persist in the face of all the centripetal forces acting upon us. Most recently regional and state loyalties have resurfaced, albeit cautiously, in the rediscovery of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments propelled by a growing anxiety (dare one write "fear") of the remote, one-size-fits-all approach favored by Washington.

As his actions have made clear, al-Maliki understands the only counter to the divisions which threaten Iraq with energetic disassembly is the force draft development of a transcendent national identity. He has pursued this goal with a well judged and reasonably well-timed balancing of religious, tribal, and (to an unfortunately lesser extent) regional factions and interests.

He has not been successful yet. And, importantly, his nascent chance of success is not only threatened by intentional "wreckers and saboteurs" (to use a fine old Soviet term) such as the Iranian tool and expansively ambitious Chalabi but also by the challenge presented by the return of hundreds of thousands of emigres as well as the resettlement of an even greater number of internally displaced persons.

Iraq as well as al-Maliki have a long and very tough road to travel. The reality is they must travel this road alone. But, it is important to them, to the region and the US that they do not travel this long, lonely road unassisted. If nothing else the blood of our dead, the pain of our wounded, demand that We the People offer whatever helping hand is requested--or even our collective hind end when the development of an Iraqi national sense of self demands that Uncle Sam be given a swift kick.

It would also be pleasant, even important, if the American MSM quit licking their chops in apparent eager anticipation of disaster in Iraq. They do us, their readers, the Iraqis, and even themselves a massive disservice by seeking defeat where victory may yet flourish.