Worrying By Analogy

Since even Hosni Mubarak has agreed that his days are numbered and that the number isn't a large one, it seems fair to consider the hypothetical "day after."  The fact that quite a few Egyptians do not agree with Hosni's estimate of seven more months in his political life gives the consideration a real impetus.

Humans have a tendency (lamentable much of the time) to reason by analogy.  Often the basis of analogy is historical with the inevitable consequence that the reasoning process is highly selective both as to the data used and the interpretative methods used.  In considering Egypt after Mubarak there is a great appeal to employing the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution as the analogy.

There are some seemingly compelling points of identity between Egypt today and Iran of thirty-two years ago.  Both countries belong to the species dictatorship.  Both dictators enjoyed very significant American support.  Both were seen by administrations of both Democratic and Republican nature as key allies in the region as well as islands of predictable stability.  In both countries the armed forces and internal security organs received massive US assistance and training.

Both Egypt and Iran are majority Muslim countries.  Egypt today like Iran thirty-two years ago fields a large, well organized, and militant advocate of violent political Islam.

At that point the identities end.  Even similarities fade.  The differences become all important--and, critically, make the process of reasoning by analogy suspect.

Chief among the differences is the brand of Islam prevalent in Egypt compared with that of Iran.  Egyptians are predominantly Sunni while ninety percent or more of the Muslims in Iran in 1979 were Shia.  There is a mound of distinction between the two "brands."  Shia is given to political expression, martyrdom, and centralization of religious doctrine.  Sunnis, while far from indifferent to politics per se, are not such eager seekers after martyrdom as their Shia cousins.  More importantly, religious doctrine and direction is decentralized, diffuse within the Sunni community.  There is no figure equivalent to the Grand Ayatollah, the Supreme Guardian of the faith.

Another critical distinction between Iran in 1979 and Egypt today (and one which is still subject to change) is the role of the army.  The army in Egypt is held in high repute due to its having administered a severe drubbing to the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War.  The Iranian army had no such cachet.  Beyond that, the Egyptian army to date has taken no suppressive actions against the demonstrators.

When the Iranian army made the fateful and fatal decision to execute the Shah's orders to open fire on demonstrators on 8 September 1978 (with the result that hundreds died in Tehran's Jaleh Square from tank and helicopter gunships), that spelled the end of any perceived legitimacy for the army as a transitional instrument.  So far the Egyptian army has not done the same.  Hopefully, it will not even should Mubarak be so ill-advised as to order a crackdown.

Another important consideration is the role of the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.  The Muslim Brotherhood has been a latecomer to the party, undoubtedly as a calculated decision later reversed when the demonstrators were not blown away in the first police actions.  In sharp contrast, the followers of Khomeini were good to go from the giddy-up moving swiftly to the forefront as the Shah's regime crumbled.

While the Geek in no way agrees with presidential advisor and former CIA officer, Bruce Reidel, to the effect that there ain't no reason to be scared of the Muslim Brotherhood as the group has long dropped its agenda of violent political Islam, there is no basis for the belief that the Brotherhood will take over the post-Mubarak environment.  The Brotherhood has a wide base of popular support within Egypt's most impoverished and politically marginalized citizens thanks more to its excellent network of social, education, and medical services than to its agenda, the assumption that this will translate into domination of any post-Mubarak government is poorly justified at best.

Egypt contains not only a large demographic segment of the impoverished and marginal, of former peasants forced to seek employment in the bursting urban centers, it also contains a larger portion of educated, more or less, Westernized youth who seek jobs, opportunity, a sense of personal dignity, personal future, who are not prone to accept the austere religious dictates of the harder line Muslim Brotherhood cadre.  The balance of power resides with the second group to a far greater extent than to the myrmidons of the Brotherhood.  This view is reinforced by the nature of the demonstrators as well as their creative use of Western developed horizontal communications methods as well as the absence of obvious Islamist slogans (either in Arabic or English) in the iconography surrounding the protests.

The most likely result of the tension between Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptians less given to political Islam is the formation of an Egyptian version of the Turkish AKP.  While the AKP has shown some disquieting signs of being a little too inclined to see the positive with respect to more violently inclined advocates of political Islam, it has not gone over--or even near--the edge of the abyss.  The AKP has shown itself to be more pragmatic than ideological, more success oriented than willing to risk all for the "cause."

Another key distinction which is all too often overlooked particularly by members of the American Right is simply that Barack Obama is not Jimmy Carter.  Even when it became obvious to all but the most intellectually challenged, Jimmy Carter dithered.  He did not put effective pressure on the Shah to step aside in a bid for "orderly transition."  Then he made the situation worse by not supporting the Shah when support would still have mattered.  Finally, he turned sentimental with his allowing the ailing fugitive Shah to find sanctuary for a time and of a sort in the US.  This demonized the US all the more in the eyes of the True Believers of the Ayatollah Khomeini.  Obama may have started late compared to events on the Egyptian street but has come up fast, perhaps claiming too much credit for Mubarak's I'm-leaving-in-September pledge.

The influence of the US on the Egyptian military should not be overlooked either.  That plus the personal relationship between Mubarak and Secretary of State Clinton have been of great assistance in assuring that Mubarak came to realize sooner rather than later that getting out of power skin intact requires speedy action.

This is not to imply that there is no cause for anxiety about the next few days and weeks to say nothing of the hypothetical "day after," but it does imply strongly that the Iranian analogy is not the best one to use in assessing Egypt or US policy toward that country.  It does imply that the probability of the Muslim Brotherhood establishing a Sunni counterpoise to the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran or the Egyptian army becoming the next Revolutionary Guards Corps is very low.

The looming regime change in Egypt should give Israel grounds for reconsidering its intransigence on the Two State Question.  This becomes more salient given the pressure being exerted by advocates of violent political Islam and others on the government of Jordan.  The specter of these countries both abrogating their peace agreements with Israel should focus Israeli attention sharply on the role of the Two State Solution in maintaining the less-than-perfect but still acceptable Mideast status quo.  A dramatic move by Israel to meet some of the demands of the Palestinian Authority would go a long way to pulling the propaganda fangs of the Muslim Brotherhood and others of the political Islam bent.  It would also bolster the PA against the potential of Hamas going more radical hoping to capitalize on the general dissatisfaction in the Arab populations.

It would behoove the US administration to play this card not only in its dealings with the political opposition in Egypt and Jordan but also with the Netanyahu government.  Right now intransigence is not in Israel's best interests, even at the cost of losing domestic political support.  Rocks may stand against the waves but will always be submerged by the tide.  At this time the tide of events in the Mideast is running in favor of change, even remarkable, unprecedented change.

Egypt can yet become the new century's Iran.  But, for that to happen will require stupidity in Cairo, in Washington or in Jerusalem of a very high order.  One way, perhaps the best, to assure stupidity reigns is to focus too narrowly on the Iranian analogy.

It has been mooted about that President Obama is a keen student of history as well as being a very unsentimental character.  The second proposition is no doubt correct.  The first can be proven only if Mr Obama really understands history rather than simplemindedly reasoning by (inapposite) historical analogy.

It's (Long Past) Time To Rewrite The (Muslim) Narrative

The single most important event in Twentieth Century history other than the Bolshevik Revolution was the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the coming to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini and his theocratic regime.  A second chain of events which reinforced powerfully the impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution also started in 1979.  In that year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to keep its Marxist-Leninist client government in power.

Even before the American diplomatic personnel kidnapped and held prisoner by "students" in Iran (which group included a young Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) were released and long, long before the Red Army kicked the dust of Afghanistan from its combat boots, a specifically Muslim narrative emerged concerning, first, the deposing of the Shah and, later, the "defeat" of the Soviet forces.  The twin, interlocking narratives have been and continue to be key in understanding the seemingly sudden rise of violent political Islam.  Certainly the Muslim narratives are critical in propelling the belief in the invincibility of Islam which pervades the Islamic societies and the states they control today.

Stripped to its essential, the core narrative for the Islamic "victories" in Iran and Afghanistan is simply this: The power of pure faith so filled and inspired the fighters for Muslim verities that not even the well armed, well trained, well supplied military of the Shah, even with the support of the US and other Western countries, could withstand the assault.  In Afghanistan it was also the power of faith which assured that a small number of fighters unafraid of death and sure of Allah's favor would defeat the enormous forces of the atheistic Soviets.

This narrative has captured the Muslim world almost to the last man.  Beyond that, it has been accepted in slightly modified form by many people in the West, particularly among the uncritical adherents of moral equivalence and cultural relativism.  By virtue of repetition in a context remarkably free of critical analysis or historical understanding, the Muslim narrative has gained remarkable traction and endurance.

The narrative is quite appealing to Muslims.  It is almost as appealing to those who "blame America first" and those of similar mind.  It is utterly, totally, absolutely specious, as wrong as a cat barking, as disconnected from reality as the ravings of a frank schizophrenic.

Because the narrative is so important in the development and growth of violent political Islam--and its non-violent but equally injurious conjoined twin--it must be both understood and challenged.  While exposing the counterfactual nature of the Islamist narrative will not change any Muslim minds, there is another reason for no longer allowing it to have a get out of jail free card.  By demonstrating the baseless nature of the narrative by underscoring the actual reasons the Shah fell and the Red Army finally compelled to withdraw, it may be possible for more Americans and their counterparts in other civilized states to resist the encroachments and threats of expansionist political Islam more effectively in the years to come.

There is only one reason the Shah was tossed from the Peacock Throne.  The context may have been rich in variables, filled with justifications, replete with motives, but when night falls there was and is only one proximate reason the Ayatollah bested the Shah.

The reason is to be found, not in Tehran nor in Paris nor in Qom; rather, the eyes must focus on Washington, DC.  Specifically one has to consider the Oval Office and the man sitting behind the only desk in the room.  The man was Jimmy Carter.  It was his evaluation of the Shah, the Ayatollah, the probable consequences of seeing the Shah gone and someone else coming to power which decided the direction of history for decades, perhaps generations, to come.

For many years now, the role played by a single person in the tipping points of history has been deprecated by historians.  Starting in Europe in the aftermath of World War II and spreading to the US during the Sixties, historical inquiry refocused from the role of high profile individuals (the "Great Men" interpretation) to the part played by the historically inarticulate "mass."  Individuals were seen as important only insofar as they gave focus and identity to the "masses."

With that as intellectual background, it is not surprising that Western, even American, historians have been eager to grant credit to the Ayatollah while deprecating the part played by Jimmy Carter.  The Ayatollah was seen as giving a face and an identity to the desires of the Iranian "masses" while Carter was simply an American president.  As a result there was no immediate push back to the rapidly blooming Muslim narrative.

Comes now, a bit of a push back.  Jimmy Carter may still see himself as having been ill-served by the American intelligence, diplomatic, and military communities.  In part he was.  The intelligence regarding the precarious relationship between the Shah's posterior and the Peacock Throne was misleading where it was not flatly wrong.  The US Embassy in Tehran was no more perceptive.  Nor was the US military assistance group.

Even if Mr Carter had received more accurate appreciations and a better, more comprehensive evaluation of the probable consequences of a clerical takeover, there is little reason to believe he would have acted any differently.  President Carter had a deep dislike for the Shah.

In part this dislike was justifiable in terms of the Carter priority given (for the first time in American foreign relations) on human rights.  The Shah's regime had no regard for human rights if having such would interfere with internal stability.  Savak, the Iranian internal security service, rivaled KGB or the SD at their worst.  Other instruments of state including the army were no better.  As an exponent of human rights, the Shah was below zero.

Beyond the dislike which could be justified easily with the preeminence accorded human rights by Jimmy Carter, there was a deep personal dislike.  Personalities do count in foreign relations even if the fact is not acknowledged by one or the other individual.

As a result, the American president was not loath to see a regime change in Tehran.  Given the Shah's record including his imperviousness to American advice, the change would have to come from within and thus would be more likely than not to be revolutionary in nature--in all senses of the word.

The main opponent to the Shah was a cleric, a senior and highly respected one at that.  Mr Carter was a man of deep faith.  He was preconditioned to see men of the cloth, regardless of the details of confession, as being of the better sort: high minded, lofty thinking, just, loving peace not war, men exhibiting all the virtues and few if any of the vices to which humans are heir.

Given the nature of the contest--total--and the nature of the two opponents, it was simple for Mr Carter to determine which side he was on.  American support for the Shah was withdrawn.  The outcome from that point on was predetermined.  The rapidly aging and quite ill Shah understood that without complete US support he could not let his army off the leash.  He also knew that without overwhelming force, his hold on power was measured in microseconds.  His political will evaporated with the loss of American support and he cashed in his chips.

Because Carter was a good Christian man he compounded his surrender of national interest by extending a humanitarian hand to the homeless and very sick Shah.  This act infuriated the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries from the Ayatollah on down as they wanted to slit the Shah's throat, stone him, hang him, and then get tough with the guy.  Thus ensued the "hostage crisis" and the long lived implications of that humiliating episode which, of course, features prominently in the Muslim narrative under the heading of Allah Punishes The Great Satan.

In a sense President Carter had a failure of political will.  He failed to properly appreciate US national and strategic interests at the time or into the future.  He failed to consider the needs of the state over time against his personal predilections, preferences, and prejudices.  He failed to set aside the personal in order to consider properly just what was at stake in the Iranian context.

In short, Mr Carter paved our collective road to hell with the asphalt of his personal convictions and understanding.  No amount of ex post facto explanations or excuses or finger pointing can erase that fact.

Nor can the Muslim narrative be right.  It was not the power of Islamic faith which toppled the Shah.  Nor did Allah show an interest in Iranian politics when the Ayatollah triumphed.  Both resulted from a man far removed from the position of deity: Jimmy Carter.

It may not be intellectually fashionable to assign such a great responsibility--the crucial decisions which forged a world historical moment--but that is the real deal.  It is no comfort to Americans to acknowledge that their own president formed the face of the new great enemy--the Iranian theocracy.  It is not bracing for the advocates of political Islam to face the reality that their faith had nothing to do with the triumph of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.

The boisterous confidence of the adherents of political Islam both violent and non-violent is based on a very, very big lie.  The real deal is simply the American president blinked.  Had he stood firm, there is little doubt that the son or grandson of the Shah would be on the Peacock Throne presiding over a constitutional monarchy not unlike that in Jordan today.

The actualities in Afghanistan during the years following the Soviet invasion are at a great distance from the Muslim narrative.  The specious view peddled by, among others, Osama bin Ladin, gives no credit to the intense tribal and provincial drives at work within the Afghan population during the years of anti-Soviet war.  Nor does it give credit to the enormous amount of American aid which flowed directly and, later, through the Pakistanis to the anti-Soviet groups.  No reference is made, for example, to the game changing nature of the US provided Stinger shoulder fired antiaircraft missiles.

Most importantly, the Muslim narrative gives no credit to the most important single factor determining the Soviet defeat.  That was the collapse of political will within the Soviet leadership.  The Afghan fighters did not win nearly so much as the Soviets admitted defeat.

This, of course, is typical in all unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaigns.  During the American War of Independence, it was not the patriots who "won."  Rather it was the realization by the British elite and as a consequence the government that the game just was not worth the expense.  The American rebels maintained their political will and the British lost theirs.  So it was in Afghanistan as well.

The Soviet loss of political will in Afghanistan was part of the general collapse of faith which infected the geriatric ruling class and drifted downward in the ranks until their successors caught the same disease.  In understanding the Soviets in Afghanistan, it is essential to recognize that it was not Allah who triumphed but rather the god of Marxism-Leninism which failed.

For different reasons the civilian leadership of Russia and the command structure of the Russian Army have been content to let the Muslim narrative pass unchallenged.  The Army has taken the same position as the German Army after World War I or the US Army following the Vietnam debacle--the civilians stabbed us in the back.

The civilian leadership has adopted a different interpretation, one that is closer to the facts.  Civilian historians in recent years have argued that the Communists were responsible for the defeat; the Communists gave up, loss heart.  In tandem, it is contended that the same outcome would not happen today as it is now good Russian nationalists running things--and nationalists cannot lose faith in the Motherland and her people.

The facts comprising the dynamics of both the Iranian regime change and the self-inflicted Soviet failure are simple, straight forward and so easy to grasp that even a Congressional staffer can get a grip on them.  The facts are on the side of the civilized states and plumb against the myth makers of political Islam.  Considering that the struggle between the civilized states and their Islamist opponents is one of political will, it is important, essential even, that the realities be put forth.  This can benefit the civilized states; it only can harm the adherents of political Islam.

Get a grip on it, Mahmoud.  Allah had nothing to do with it.

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