Is The Islamist War Getting Wider--And Longer?

The prime difficulty with fighting a limited war in support of policy is that both sides have to agree to keep the show under control.

In the Korean War, which should be seen as the prototype of modern period limited war, that was the case. The US along with the USSR and the PRC wanted to keep the war limited in space and means.

None of the three saw any advantage in widening the war geographically. As a result, the US did not bomb north of the Yalu river even though airbases there were sanctuaries for North Korean and PRC fighters. In an often overlooked quid for the American quo, neither the PRC nor the North Koreans attempted to interfere with the lines of communication between Japan and South Korea.

The Soviet Union may have made a mistake when Joe Stalin gave the thumbs-up to the North Korean plan for a quick war in the South, but it did not worsen the error by seeking horizontal escalation at a place and time of its choosing. The US leadership fretted over the Soviet potential but finally came to the realization that it wasn't going to happen.

Another non-starter was the desire expressed by the American proconsul in Asia, Douglas MacArthur, to either "turn Chaing loose" or to go ahead on our own and dump atom bombs on Chinese targets. MacArthur's vision of both horizontal and vertical escalation across the nuclear threshold had a fair measure of support among some of the more stegosaurian types in Congress, the press, and the public.

The politically beleaguered Truman Administration kept on course. Korea was not a crusade of roll-back. It was a carefully limited war in support of one particular policy--containment.

The Korean War was seen symmetrically by the three major powers. By the tacit agreement of congruent national interests, the war was kept limited in scope, means, and goals.

The current administration has shown itself completely gripless concerning the nature of limited war. Or, if you prefer a more sinister interpretation of the past six years, it has shown itself to have no interest in limiting the wars which we are fighting.

The Geek admits that the second, the sinister, interpretation is implied by the grandiose and completely out-of-touch-with-reality phrase, "global war on terrorism." Even so, the Geek cannot pump up enough paranoia to make the charge.

The invasion of Afghanistan could, charitably, be characterised as a limited war in support of policy. At least the goal was limited: Eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The geographic scope was limited. The means were limited.

Arguably the goal and means were too limited...

"What's that!" You interrupt.

The Geek believes a case can be made for contending our goals and means were too limited in the beginning of our Afghan adventure. The interlocking, negative goals of eliminating Taliban and al-Qaeda were necessary but not sufficient.

The accomplishment of either or both of the negative goals required the setting and accomplishment of a complementary positive goal. Afghanistan would have to be (re)constituted as a functioning social-economic-political entity. As is so often the case in life, the positive goal would be far harder to accomplish than the negative.

The limitation of means, specifically the refusal of the current administration to deploy sufficient troops, assured that not even the negative goal could be accomplished. The replacement of men by technology, of boots on the ground by Tomahawks from submarines, made sure that both Taliban and al-Qaeda would be damaged but not destroyed.

Machiavelli wisely counseled the Prince not to leave any wounded enemies. The current administration developed and executed a plan of overly limited war on the cheap that created wounded enemies in wholesale lots.

Not only was the attack on Afghanistan too limited in goal and means, it was too limited in scope.

Before you squawk in outrage, let the Geek continue, please. As the desperately flawed endgame strategy of the Reagan Administration demonstrated, it is impossible to achieve anything in Afghanistan without considering Pakistan.

The current administration should have known this. All the information was right there. In the archives as well as in the living memories of individuals who had played key roles in the denouement of the American proxy war in Afghanistan during the Reagan-Bush years.

Taliban was the creation of Pakistan. The Islamists of the Zia al-Huq period in Pakistan made sure that this "Student" organization came into existence; that it was supported; that it gained military ascendancy over rivals in the Afghan internal wars.

There were two reasons for this "tilt to Taliban" approach within the government and military of Pakistan. One was ideological--Islamism to be precise. The other was the perceived need for "strategic depth" to the north and west against the threat to the east and south--India.

The second reason may seem idiotic from the perspective of the US, but it had (and has) power within the Pakistani government and military. This perceived strategic need links directly, even intimately, with the ideological cause.

India has a potent advantage over Pakistan in geographic area, population, and economic strength. In all the features of "hard" power, India has it all over Pakistan. The only possible counter to this advantage was the increase of Pakistan's resources in territory, population, and, most importantly, the social/cultural/political coherence of its human assets.

If Pakistan could extend its sway over not only Afghanistan but potentially beyond that region into the Islamic societies of at least some of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, it could off-set many of the Indian advantages. The off-set could be made even more potent if the Islamic population could be made coherent by ideology--Islamism.

This strain of thinking gave rise to the Pakistani support of Taliban as well as the efforts of A.Q. Khan. The combination of Islamism and nuclear proliferation would do much to assure that Pakistan would have superiority when the bell rang for the next round of Indian-Pakistani fighting. (It might even make war unnecessary as the Indians realized the shift in what the Soviets used to call the "correlation of forces.")

Instead of taking a long, hard, cold look at the realities of Pakistan and its international politics before sending Tomahawks to Kabul, the current administration simply assumed that the new military strongman in Islamabad, General Musharraf, would be a staunch ally in the effort. It kept on with the long standing, and not particularly well advised, policy of tilting toward Pakistan.

Gosh, the Geek knows that the Indian government to say nothing of particular personalities within that government can be extremely annoying. India has a long record of irritating US administrations going all the way back to that of Harry Truman. Just because the lads (and lassies) in New Delhi have been aggravating doesn't mean they are threatening to either the United States or Pakistan.

By overly limiting goals, means, and geographic scope to the war in Afghanistan, the US assured that the war could not remain limited. It would spill over into Pakistan whether we or the government of Pakistan wanted it to. Over time, the spill over would be of such magnitude as to threaten the continued existence of the Musharraf regime.

None of what is happening right now in Pakistan should have come as a surprise to anyone with even a cursory understanding of the region's history over the past fifty years. The way in which the current administration planned and executed its invasion of Afghanistan kicked the rock over the edge. Now we are seeing the avalanche.

Had the US not invaded Iraq it might have been able to retrieve the situation in Afghanistan by putting enough boots on the ground. The Geek believes this would have been unlikely. By the time the current administration would have realised that the "shock and awe" approach to limited, unconventional war didn't work, Taliban and al-Qaeda would have already gone to ground in the Tribal Agency areas of Pakistan.

The choice would have been between sending the new boots to Pakistan or depending on military assistance to the Pakistanis to boost their ability to fight the Islamist groups on their own territory. The highest probability is that the current administration would have taken the latter course.

In short, we would have done in Pakistan what we have been doing. With the same results. Inevitably the war would have widened. And lengthened.

As it was, the current administration opted for horizontal escalation by invading Iraq. Not surprisingly, the opposition, the Islamists, have sought horizontal escalation of their own.

There is no doubt that the war with the Islamists which was forced upon us on 9/11 will widen more. This will occur whether or not the current administration takes military action in Iran.

What's the lesson in all of this?

Simple. Define the political goals, both negative and positive which will bring about a better state of peace from at least the American perspective. Limit the geographic scope of the war by correctly understanding not only the dynamics in play within the target country but between it and other regional actors. Use means that will allow the accomplishment of the goals within the limited geographic scope of the war. Finally, it is necessary that goals and means combine to effectively deny the opposition the opportunity to seek horizontal escalation.

If a country (us in this case) can't define goals, scope, and means such as to assure a better state of peace is achieved rapidly enough to prevent horizontal escalation; if coinciding national interests cannot be at least tacitly enlisted to hinder horizontal escalation, then don't go to war. Find some other way to project national power so that the goal might be achieved.

Did Musharraf Have Another Choice? Do We?

The Geek has been waiting for General Musharraf to take the big step of imposing martial law ever since the contretemps between his regime and the Pakistani Supreme Court a few months back. The Geek can't say that he has been anticipating the inevitable with any degree of glee, 'cause that ain't the case.

Pakistan reminds the Geek of an incident he experienced some years back at an Air Force Base. The then brand new F-111 was being displayed on Armed Forces Day. It did a slow, dirty pass over the runway in front of the crowded bleachers. Suddenly the plane's nose pitched up. Diamond shaped shock waves hit the concrete below as the pilot hit throttle up.

In the stands every man who was a pilot stood up, fists clenched, mouths forming the words, "Oh, shit," as he willed the airplane to keep flying. All the non-pilots remained sitting, many applauding what they believed to be a fine piece of exhibition flying.

It was fine flying for sure as the pilot kept the bird balanced on its afterburners until it was past the stands. Then it pancaked in.

Pakistan has been like that F-111, nose up in a full stall but powered on by a combination of international will and the flying ability of General Musharraf. Experienced observers, like the flyers in that long ago crowd, knew that something was dreadfully wrong with the country, knew it would crash, but hoped the crash would be delayed--and survivable.

With the imposition of martial law under whatsoever term is like putting full emergency military power to the afterburners. It is a short-term, desperate attempt to avoid catastrophe. If it fails, the crash will be fast, hard and deadly.

Musharraf's action may be his only viable option. His indictment of the Supreme Court has merit. It should not be cast aside as political posturing by a power-hungry despot.

The Court has acted as if it were far more concerned in settling political scores with the military junta than in being an effective collaborator in the task of developing democratic stability in Pakistan. The position taken by the Court at the behest of opponents of Musharraf that the validity of the presidential election would be decided weeks after the election of Musharraf had taken place must rank as an act of judicial stupidity or sabotage far surpassing the akin act taken by the US Supreme Court in December 2000.

The General's references to the growth of terrorist and insurgent activity in recent months are the truth. If anything, they are an understated version of the reality within Pakistan,

Much of the dramatic upswing in Islamist/Jihadist activity must be laid directly at the feet of Musharraf and his military partners. Would you like an example?

OK, here it is, The Frontier Corps formed initially by the British generations ago to patrol the border between what are now Pakistan and Afghanistan is a paramilitary force. It lacks equipment, modern weapons, training, doctrine and good command and control. It's morale is shaky as exhibited by mass surrenders upon occasion. The loyalty to the government of many of its members is questionable.

Sounds good, right?

Now the best part. The Frontier Corps does the heavy lifting in the Tribal Agency territory where Taliban and al-Qaeda relocated following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Frontier Corps is the primary opponent of the rested, regrouped, refitted, resupplied and reinforced Islamist presence in North Waziristan and elsewhere in the Tribal Agencies.

And, now for the kicker.

The US has provided over ten billion dollars in aid to Pakistan since 9/11. Most of that money was for the purpose of military assistance so that Pakistan could be a more effective ally in the "global war on terrorism."

This must mean that the cash went to the Frontier Corps and other counterinsurgency oriented forces. Right?

Wrong!

In a fit of incredible stupidity on the part of Musharraf and the current American administration which allowed it to happen, most of the bucks went to better equip the conventional Pakistani military forces. To better prepare the Paks for another rematch with India, perhaps? Or maybe the deep thinking neocon ninnies of the current administration hopes that Pakistan might invade Iran and force a little regime change?

Phooey!

Musharraf and his coterie of appropriately bemedaled associates want a conventional army, want the prospect of yet another go-around in the Kashmir. Want to win (or at least not lose badly) the next time. If any American had shown the temerity to inquire as to the utility of high performance aircraft or heavy artillery to the hard but low tech realities of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, the Musharraf regime would have played the "necessity to keep the army happy card."

There is some truth to that. The army is the most stability oriented institution in Pakistan. It is the only truly "national" structure in an otherwise basically feudal, tribal country which might become a nation someday.

The army and police forces are the afterburners on Musharraf's jet now. He has no choice but to rely on them to keep him and Pakistan around him from a free fall to disaster.

That's bad. Even worse--we have little choice except to hope the afterburners keep flaming. That means we have to keep the fuel--the Geek means money--flowing.

The Geek feels frustration out the ying-yang over the current state of play in Pakistan! It's not like it couldn't be seen coming. We've been through it before.

We went through it in Vietnam. One damn stupid bunch of tunnel visioned bumblers after another whipsawed South Vietnam until it was ready to fall apart. Each time the Washington deep thinkers and pragmatic strategists decided we had no choice except keep on supporting the bunglers du jour in Saigon and hope for the best. (The one time we didn't. The time we decided on a little exercise in guided regime change, matters went from disastrous to catastrophic. The Geek refers to the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem.)

Heck! We've even been through it before in Pakistan. Twenty or so years ago, we turned responsibility for the endgame in Afghanistan over to the Paks. The result? Chaos followed by Taliban for Afghanistan. For us and the rest of the world the result was A.Q. Khan--and the increased power of the Islamists in the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence service.

Pakistan may hold a geographically critical position. The Pakistani government is not an ally. It cannot be given the fissures running through its society and polity alike. It can be a partner in an endeavor where Pakistani and American national interests are closely coinciding. That is if and only if the Pakistani regime and its use of our assistance is very closely and very coldly monitored and directed.

The current administration blew the requirement for close scrutiny and direction. In that way it became the equivalent of the hydraulic valve that failed and caused the F-111 to crash in front of the Geek and hundreds of others.

Back then the superb competence of a General Dynamics test pilot assured that no one died or was even seriously hurt when the plane smacked the ground. The Geek doubts that General Musharraf is so skilled.

Osama Videos Go Into Reruns--With a Twist

Al-Qaeda Video Productions has made an industry shaking change in its new approach to reruns. Combining previously released footage with a new audio track featuring favorite personality, Osama bin Laden, the new rerun format shows a new trend in Islamist Terror Entertainment.

While the format may be new, there is nothing fresh in the style and content. Sheik bin Laden's voice is almost as wooden as his face as he calls upon Pakistanis to wage jihad against their apostate Chief of State, General Pervez Musharraf. The script was stale, repetitive, and lacked imagination in its recycling of typical Islamist (and old style Communist) characterizations of Musharraf as a tool and lackey of the United States and its running dogs.

The uninspired production has been dismissed by spokesmen on behalf of the General. Even so, the Geek takes the rerun--poor production values and all--seriously. Four years ago, the purported Number Two in al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahari, released a similar tape.

It was followed by two very serious attempts on General Musharraf's life.

Additionally, there is little doubt but that bin Laden has a base of support among Pakistanis which extends far beyond the narrow wedge of Islamists political parties. There are a number of signs which indicate this.

The most disturbing of these indicators is the less than inspired performance of the Pakistani Army in the critical tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan. One example, there is strong reason to conclude that some, if not all, of the alleged "kidnappings" of Pakistani troops in the region were, in fact, mass surrenders to the al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters.

Another indicator of a crisis of confidence in the Pakistani Army comes from a close examination of the claim by the government that the army is "taking casualties." It is true that Pakistani soldiers are being killed and wounded by al-Qaeda/Taliban trigger pullers. That isn't what counts.

"What does count?" You ask.

Did the casualties happen during offensive operations or defensive? That's where the rubber hits the road. An examination of all available information points at the majority of the casualties resulting from enemy initiated actions.

An army that sits on the defensive is not showing an impressive willingness to close with and destroy the enemy. Without closing and killing there is no realistic possibility of defeating the enemy. Period.

The prize for al-Qaeda, Taliban, and bin Laden is not the death of Musharraf. (Although the Geek doubts any tears would be shed by these worthies if the General were to buy the farm.) The real prize sought is not even the assurance that Musharraf would lose the forthcoming elections. Of course that would be nice as Ms Bhutto is a denier of the Islamist threat.

The real prize at stake is simply the further reduction of Pakistani political will to control effectively the border areas. Those rugged, remote mountains where Taliban trains, al-Qaeda hides out, and bin Laden studies the mysteries of Islamist theology.

There is always the chance that some jihadist will succeed in whacking the General. The implications of a successful assassination are wide in scope. One thing is sure. None of the ramifications would be good from the American perspective.

Pakistan is the next thing to a failed state. It possesses nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear knowledge. Within the Pakistani military, intelligence service, and nuclear establishment exist a significant number of Islamists. A.Q, Khan, the most profligate prolifiater of nuclear weapons technology on record is still alive, kicking, and Islamist.

Then there is geography.

Pakistan borders both Afghanistan and Iran. What more do you need to know?

How about this?

Admiral Fallon, the Commander of Central Command, has noted pointedly in the past twenty-four hours that Iranian origin materials for roadside bombs have been shipped to Afghanistan. This is not the first time that an American senior commander has made reference to this factor in the ongoing Afghan war. The boringly repetitive Iranian denials like the statements made by "experts" that Iran has no truck with Taliban are simply not credible.

Should Pakistan collapse as a state or should an "Islamism denier" become president of Pakistan, the strategic balance in the Northwest Asian region would shift. A new and from the American perspective (and, in all probability, that of Russia, India and China), unpleasant alignment would likely emerge: Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan.

While this pessimistic outcome is unlikely, it is far from impossible. Whether it is the end desired by bin Laden and company is not for the Geek to surmise.

But, the Geek would be inclined to tell the Wizard of al-Qaeda to be careful what he asks for. He just might get it. Since al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the mullahocracy of Tehran would be even stranger than the classic Axis of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan, the sheik might discover that not all jihads are good jihads

Iran or Pakistan--Who's the Bigger Threat?

It's time to get a grip on a very important matter.

The current administration has done everything except declare Iran to be Global Enemy Number One. A goodly crop of the Wallahs in Congress led by self-identified, "Independent," Senator Joe Lieberman, have chorused approval.

Also nodding their heads in agreement has been a large chunk of We the People. Simultaneously, members of that monstrous regiment, the Defense Intellectuals, have been licking their lips over the possibility of a three day blitz which would leave Teheran's nuclear ambitions and military installations in blasted ruins.

Wow! What an exciting prospect. Kind of makes the Geek shiver all over.

Now. Get a grip.

Iran is annoying. Iran is more irritating than sandpaper underwear. The mullahocracy is possessed by delusions of regional hegemony and nuclear power status. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps al-Quds Force is actively assisting Iraqi insurgents to kill Americans and destabilize Iraq. The same al-Quds Force is probably involved with Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. And so on. And so on.

All true or very probably true.

Also, taken all together, not enough to merit the chest-pounding, saber-rattling, almost foaming-at-the-mouth oratory out of Washington and elsewhere.

Here's the important matter. Get a firm grip on it.

The largest threat to the US in its "global war on terrorism" is Pakistan.

"What!" You say. "They're our ally."

Sure. And, Iran is a drinking buddy of Uncle Sam.

Listen up and grip tight.

Pakistan is not a wannabe nuclear power. It is a real one. It hot tested a bomb as far back as 1984. The US Government knew it--real time. The same USG concealed its knowledge not only from the American people but from as many governments as it could.

Why?

The short but accurate answer is Cold War imperatives. The Soviet Union was neck deep in the Afghan swamp, and the Reagan administration, like that of Carter before, saw this as a perfect opportunity to make life miserable for the Kremlin without any real risk.

Pakistan was critical to our support for the various Afghan factions fighting the Soviets and their client regime in Kabul. Anyway, USG could rationalize, the Indians already have the bomb. Perhaps some symmetry will help keep the peace on the Sub-continent.

Toward the end of the Soviet mis-adventure, USG essentially bowed out of any role with respect to Afghanistan beyond supplying weapons and money. Direction of the resistance, decisions on which faction to support, were left up to the Pakistanis. Ultimately, it was the government of Pakistan, more specifically, the leadership of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence, that made the decision to support the Taliban.

The ultra-Islamist Taliban won out over its rivals because Islamibad supported it over the others in the internal war which followed hard on the heels of the last retreating Soviet troopie.

USG had sufficient information to understand that Taliban was not, as the name makes explicit, a nice group of religious students. In fact, the intelligence agencies of the US knew perfectly well that the Taliban "students" were students only in the sense of the Iranian "students" who took over our embassy in Tehran and held our personnel hostage for over four hundred days.

Our government also had the information necessary to conclude properly that the Pakistani military and intelligence services were not only behind Taliban's success, but were ideologically (OK, "religiously") in tandem with the Islamist bunch that took over in the shattered wreck called Kabul.

The man behind the increasing Islamist orientation of the military and intelligence services was the same man who was behind the Pakistani nuclear weapons program--General Zia ul-Huq. Zia ran the country for a decade ending in 1988. By the time he left office, Pakistan had the bomb, and the army, at the higher levels of command at least, was as Islamist as al-Qaeda, and Taliban was on the road to power.

USG did nothing. There are a couple of reasons or at least justifications for this. Pakistan wasn't high on the agendas of either the outgoing Reagan or incoming Bush administrations. Then, there was the unpleasant reality that Pakistan had the bomb. They had had the bomb since 1984 and USG had accepted this fact with a wink and a nudge.

During the Clinton administration the US became increasingly aware not only of the relationship between Islamabad and Taliban, but its nuclear technology exchanges with North Korea, Libya and--does this surprise you?--Iraq and Iran. The contacts between Pakistan and the latter two countries dated back to 1987, so no political embarrassment would have ensued if the president had blown the whistle.

The Pakistani bomb became front page news around the world when the boys in Islamabad let off a series of "test shots" in a game of we've-got-'em-too with the Indians. Washington did the usual amount of huffing and puffing but didn't blow any one's house down.

The reason?

Well, it wasn't the Cold War. Or at least not the old Cold War.

Leaving aside problems with the born-again Republican moralists in Congress, the Clinton administration had a full enough plate. There was Bosnia. There was Iran. There was al-Qaeda starting its climb to notoriety. Africa was going though seismic shocks as one state after another collapsed, from Somalia to Liberia. Anyway, just what the hell could we do about it?

The current administration inherited twenty plus years of ignoring, denying, looking the other way, and plain old fashioned griplessness. W Bush and company marched down the same parade route for as long as possible.

Just as Vietnam had not been on Cheney's or Rumfield's agendas back in their youth, Pakistan and its pesky possession of the bomb, its irritating support of Islamist terrorism, its obnoxious support of al-Qaeda hosting Taliban, and its genuinely anxiety producing proclivity to facilitate nuclear proliferation just didn't mesh well with the Neo-con agenda.

In a fit of brilliance which almost matches the invasion of Iraq, the administration tried bribery. The billion dollar debt was forgiven. A new three billion dollar military and economic assistance program was announced.

It didn't work.

What worked was the ongoing program of Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, the chief honcho of the Pakistani bomb, to continue efforts to assist (for a price) other countries in developing bombs of their own as well as improving, miniaturizing, and weaponizing the Islamabad bomb.

Finally, due in large measure to effective pressure from the UK, the current administration confronted Pakistani military strongman, Musharraf, with the evidence that showed conclusively that we knew what the Pakistanis were up to right to the nuts and bolts level.

The confrontation was executed by CIA director George Tenet when General Musharraf was in New York for a UN hoedown. The upshot was simple and dishonest. Musharraf pretended that the whole proliferation operation was an illegal enterprise run by A.Q Khan for personal benefit. A.Q. was arrested and is held to this day in the horrid captivity of his home.

The USG pretended to believe Musharraf's story. The aid deal went forward. Also going forward was the support of Islamabad for the Taliban.

The details of the cozy deals made between the Islamists of the Pakistani government, military, and intelligence with Taliban leaders living in the tribal regions of Pakistan near the Afghan border are not publicly known. That they have been made and are still honored more in the observance than in the breech is evident from the renewed strength of Taliban in recent months.

Musharraf is barely holding onto the tiger's back as it gallops through heavy bush on route to the next presidential elections. From all appearances, it would not take too much of a bump or too strong a gust of wind to dislodge the General from power.

The current administration in another fit of policy brilliance has been attempting to lever Musharraf into a power sharing arrangement with his political rival, Benizar Bhutto. This notion is akin to levering the pope into a power sharing agreement with the mullahocracy of Tehran.

The government of Pakistan has grudingly allowed US forces to launch missiles and conduct special operations into the tribal regions where Taliban has its base camps. Our troops have done so, but always been careful not to include identifiable Pakistani personnel in the casualty counts.

All along, from the very beginning of the current administration, the Pakistanis have continued to use front companies in order to purchase vital materials to continue and enlarge their nuclear program. This is known and documented not only by US intelligence agencies but by similar organisations in Europe.

How good is the documentation?

We have imagery of a Pakistani C-130 Hercules cargo plane at the airfield in Pyongyang, North Korea unloading equipment used for the production of fissionable materials.

Is that good enough?

It ought to be. But, there's more. It's more alarming. Get a grip on it.

Forty canisters of highly enriched (weapons grade) uranium is missing from the Pakistani enrichment facility at Kahuta. That's enough good stuff for a passel of "dirty bombs" or a few good sized Hiroshima type atomic bombs.

That's a lot of threat. Actual threat. Not the potential sort represented by the Iranian centrifuges.

Connect the dots. Pakistan is a collapsing state. Pakistan has a government that is inherently unstable. Pakistan is leaning heavily toward the Islamist ideology. The Pakistani army, intelligence service, and government are filled at the higher and mid-levels with Islamists.

Enough?

If not, keep a grip on this. A.Q. Khan is an Islamist. Two "retired" scientists from A.Q.'s program met with Osama bin Ladin as far back as 2001. Forty canisters, over 100 kilograms, of weapons or near weapons grade uranium are missing and unaccounted for.

Enough?

If not, get a grip on this. No fewer than seventeen groups listed by the US, the EU or the UN as Islamist terrorist or terrorist support groups are openly doing business in Pakistan. Apparently, the highly efficient Inter-Services Intelligence people don't know this.

Now, ask yourself this question. Which is the greater threat--Iran or Pakistan?

Then ask yourself another question. Why is the current administration so gripless?