Showing posts with label A.Q. Khan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label A.Q. Khan. Show all posts

Sunday, June 15, 2008

Sometimes Ignorance Is Bliss

For the past five years the unenlightened in the world could rest more or less secure in the belief that the plans furnished by the A.Q.Khan Nuclear Technology Smuggling Group were for relatively elderly, comparatively inefficient weapons that used a lot of highly enriched uranium for a rather small (if nukes can ever be considered "small") bang. The A.Q. Khan state of the art seemed to be embodied in the Libyan designs derived from a late Fifties Chinese design.

Turns out that just wasn't true. Dang it!

Computers belonging to the A.Q. Khan network found in Switzerland, Bangkok and other places contained the electronic blueprints for designs of much greater efficiency. Greater efficiency means less HEU and more bang. Greater efficiency means a smaller throw-weight so a warhead could be mated more easily with small ballistic missiles such as the recently tested Iranian Shahab III. The Shahab III, it should be recalled, is based on a North Korean prototype.

The new information regarding the accomplishments of the A.Q. Khan network can be found at several sites including, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/world/asia/15nuke.html?em&ex=1213675200&en=7dae8fb60503ce92&ei=5087%0A, and from the associated press, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i8CzKrsV9Az2UJ81BzmjgA8Z2k4wD91ALK5O1. The AFP covers it as well, as does the BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7455249.stm, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j9hJbJWhcA7PMnBt0YGHZG7r5PxQ. (It is interesting to note that Google lists less than 120 outlets covering this revelation.)

The computers containing the electronic blueprints were discovered in 2006 in the possession of Swiss "businessmen." The data were recently destroyed under proper supervision. While those copies of the information are no longer with us, we are left with a very large question.

Where else did the designs go?

It has been well established that the Khan Nukes-For-Profit program sold information and technical expertise to the North Koreans, the Libyans and (in highest probability) the Iranians. That is a passel of bad actors.

But, it is not all the bad actors in the world. Not by a long way.

A closely linked question concerns the nature of the designs. Did they deal simply with HEU "gun type" weapons or did they include plutonium based implosion devices as well?

Justifiably most media and political attention has been focused on the matter of highly enriched uranium. The high profile Iranian effort is focused in that direction. Beyond that geopolitical reality lies a technological one.

The "gun type" weapons such as the one the US employed on Hiroshima are easier to build. Further they do not need to be tested. As long as the two subcritical masses of HEU are brought together hard enough and fast enough to initiate fission, a satisfactory bang will result.

(The Geek stipulates there are other important considerations such as the reflector, shielding and so on, but the basic fact remains: the damn things are easier to make.)

The plutonium or implosion bomb is harder to make. First one needs plutonium. The nice thing about plutonium is that it is made automatically in any nuclear reactor which contains slugs of the common uranium isotope, U-238. This is particularly true in reactors not intended for electric power production such as apparently was the case with the reactor under construction in Syria.

It is more difficult to extract the plutonium from the irradiated slugs than to produce it in the first place. All the separation operations, chemical and mechanical, must be carried out by remote control because of the fierce radioactivity of the raw materials.

Still, the technology for plutonium separation is well understood, at least in principle and has been practiced by the US since 1944 and other countries more recently.

More difficult than obtaining the plutonium is its machining into the correct shape for implosion. A task of equal magnitude is formulating and fabricating the mix of explosives into the proper configuration for the rapid application of equal implosive force to all portions of the plutonium sphere.

Again the process and design parameters are well understood in principle. The devil resides in the details of execution.

If the electronic blueprints found on the computers included those for an implosion device with requisite details as to the plutonium machining and the explosive lens fabrication, the nuclear threat facing the world from rogue and other irresponsible or unstable states as well as non-state actors grows appreciably.

By and large, implosion devices are smaller, lighter and far more powerful than gun type uranium weapons. Also, the plutonium weapon, unlike its less sophisticated uranium cousin, admits of "boosting" by the introduction of tritium into the hollow spot in the center of the plutonium core. Boosted fission weapons were common by the mid-sixties, so if the A.Q. Khan plans were, as stated, representative of that period, there is every possibility that they contain this feature.

Normally implosion weapons come with an automatic downside. They have to be tested. Reality has to confirm the math. That was why the US held its "Day of Trinity" in July 1945.

If, however, the Khan plans are either based on tested Chinese designs or were represented by the successful North Korean nudet (nuclear detonation), there would be no need to test a device made in strict accordance with the blueprints.

The seemingly fortuitous release of the new information regarding the Khan smuggling group does serve to reinforce the need to bring Iran in out of its self-imposed, arrogantly asserted shell. Whether the uranium enrichment facility which has so preoccupied the West for months or other aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, it is essential to assure us and the rest of the world that all portions of the nuclear fuel cycle are under the strictest possible supervision.

The possibilities brought to mind by the belated release and confirmation of information held by various national governments and international agencies for nearly two years are too serious to be either ignored or pushed aside. A.Q. and his associates have let the most evil of genies loose in the world.

We may not be able to put the cloud back in its bottle. But, we sure as hell have to try.

Sunday, September 2, 2007

Iran or Pakistan--Who's the Bigger Threat?

It's time to get a grip on a very important matter.

The current administration has done everything except declare Iran to be Global Enemy Number One. A goodly crop of the Wallahs in Congress led by self-identified, "Independent," Senator Joe Lieberman, have chorused approval.

Also nodding their heads in agreement has been a large chunk of We the People. Simultaneously, members of that monstrous regiment, the Defense Intellectuals, have been licking their lips over the possibility of a three day blitz which would leave Teheran's nuclear ambitions and military installations in blasted ruins.

Wow! What an exciting prospect. Kind of makes the Geek shiver all over.

Now. Get a grip.

Iran is annoying. Iran is more irritating than sandpaper underwear. The mullahocracy is possessed by delusions of regional hegemony and nuclear power status. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps al-Quds Force is actively assisting Iraqi insurgents to kill Americans and destabilize Iraq. The same al-Quds Force is probably involved with Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. And so on. And so on.

All true or very probably true.

Also, taken all together, not enough to merit the chest-pounding, saber-rattling, almost foaming-at-the-mouth oratory out of Washington and elsewhere.

Here's the important matter. Get a firm grip on it.

The largest threat to the US in its "global war on terrorism" is Pakistan.

"What!" You say. "They're our ally."

Sure. And, Iran is a drinking buddy of Uncle Sam.

Listen up and grip tight.

Pakistan is not a wannabe nuclear power. It is a real one. It hot tested a bomb as far back as 1984. The US Government knew it--real time. The same USG concealed its knowledge not only from the American people but from as many governments as it could.

Why?

The short but accurate answer is Cold War imperatives. The Soviet Union was neck deep in the Afghan swamp, and the Reagan administration, like that of Carter before, saw this as a perfect opportunity to make life miserable for the Kremlin without any real risk.

Pakistan was critical to our support for the various Afghan factions fighting the Soviets and their client regime in Kabul. Anyway, USG could rationalize, the Indians already have the bomb. Perhaps some symmetry will help keep the peace on the Sub-continent.

Toward the end of the Soviet mis-adventure, USG essentially bowed out of any role with respect to Afghanistan beyond supplying weapons and money. Direction of the resistance, decisions on which faction to support, were left up to the Pakistanis. Ultimately, it was the government of Pakistan, more specifically, the leadership of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence, that made the decision to support the Taliban.

The ultra-Islamist Taliban won out over its rivals because Islamibad supported it over the others in the internal war which followed hard on the heels of the last retreating Soviet troopie.

USG had sufficient information to understand that Taliban was not, as the name makes explicit, a nice group of religious students. In fact, the intelligence agencies of the US knew perfectly well that the Taliban "students" were students only in the sense of the Iranian "students" who took over our embassy in Tehran and held our personnel hostage for over four hundred days.

Our government also had the information necessary to conclude properly that the Pakistani military and intelligence services were not only behind Taliban's success, but were ideologically (OK, "religiously") in tandem with the Islamist bunch that took over in the shattered wreck called Kabul.

The man behind the increasing Islamist orientation of the military and intelligence services was the same man who was behind the Pakistani nuclear weapons program--General Zia ul-Huq. Zia ran the country for a decade ending in 1988. By the time he left office, Pakistan had the bomb, and the army, at the higher levels of command at least, was as Islamist as al-Qaeda, and Taliban was on the road to power.

USG did nothing. There are a couple of reasons or at least justifications for this. Pakistan wasn't high on the agendas of either the outgoing Reagan or incoming Bush administrations. Then, there was the unpleasant reality that Pakistan had the bomb. They had had the bomb since 1984 and USG had accepted this fact with a wink and a nudge.

During the Clinton administration the US became increasingly aware not only of the relationship between Islamabad and Taliban, but its nuclear technology exchanges with North Korea, Libya and--does this surprise you?--Iraq and Iran. The contacts between Pakistan and the latter two countries dated back to 1987, so no political embarrassment would have ensued if the president had blown the whistle.

The Pakistani bomb became front page news around the world when the boys in Islamabad let off a series of "test shots" in a game of we've-got-'em-too with the Indians. Washington did the usual amount of huffing and puffing but didn't blow any one's house down.

The reason?

Well, it wasn't the Cold War. Or at least not the old Cold War.

Leaving aside problems with the born-again Republican moralists in Congress, the Clinton administration had a full enough plate. There was Bosnia. There was Iran. There was al-Qaeda starting its climb to notoriety. Africa was going though seismic shocks as one state after another collapsed, from Somalia to Liberia. Anyway, just what the hell could we do about it?

The current administration inherited twenty plus years of ignoring, denying, looking the other way, and plain old fashioned griplessness. W Bush and company marched down the same parade route for as long as possible.

Just as Vietnam had not been on Cheney's or Rumfield's agendas back in their youth, Pakistan and its pesky possession of the bomb, its irritating support of Islamist terrorism, its obnoxious support of al-Qaeda hosting Taliban, and its genuinely anxiety producing proclivity to facilitate nuclear proliferation just didn't mesh well with the Neo-con agenda.

In a fit of brilliance which almost matches the invasion of Iraq, the administration tried bribery. The billion dollar debt was forgiven. A new three billion dollar military and economic assistance program was announced.

It didn't work.

What worked was the ongoing program of Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, the chief honcho of the Pakistani bomb, to continue efforts to assist (for a price) other countries in developing bombs of their own as well as improving, miniaturizing, and weaponizing the Islamabad bomb.

Finally, due in large measure to effective pressure from the UK, the current administration confronted Pakistani military strongman, Musharraf, with the evidence that showed conclusively that we knew what the Pakistanis were up to right to the nuts and bolts level.

The confrontation was executed by CIA director George Tenet when General Musharraf was in New York for a UN hoedown. The upshot was simple and dishonest. Musharraf pretended that the whole proliferation operation was an illegal enterprise run by A.Q Khan for personal benefit. A.Q. was arrested and is held to this day in the horrid captivity of his home.

The USG pretended to believe Musharraf's story. The aid deal went forward. Also going forward was the support of Islamabad for the Taliban.

The details of the cozy deals made between the Islamists of the Pakistani government, military, and intelligence with Taliban leaders living in the tribal regions of Pakistan near the Afghan border are not publicly known. That they have been made and are still honored more in the observance than in the breech is evident from the renewed strength of Taliban in recent months.

Musharraf is barely holding onto the tiger's back as it gallops through heavy bush on route to the next presidential elections. From all appearances, it would not take too much of a bump or too strong a gust of wind to dislodge the General from power.

The current administration in another fit of policy brilliance has been attempting to lever Musharraf into a power sharing arrangement with his political rival, Benizar Bhutto. This notion is akin to levering the pope into a power sharing agreement with the mullahocracy of Tehran.

The government of Pakistan has grudingly allowed US forces to launch missiles and conduct special operations into the tribal regions where Taliban has its base camps. Our troops have done so, but always been careful not to include identifiable Pakistani personnel in the casualty counts.

All along, from the very beginning of the current administration, the Pakistanis have continued to use front companies in order to purchase vital materials to continue and enlarge their nuclear program. This is known and documented not only by US intelligence agencies but by similar organisations in Europe.

How good is the documentation?

We have imagery of a Pakistani C-130 Hercules cargo plane at the airfield in Pyongyang, North Korea unloading equipment used for the production of fissionable materials.

Is that good enough?

It ought to be. But, there's more. It's more alarming. Get a grip on it.

Forty canisters of highly enriched (weapons grade) uranium is missing from the Pakistani enrichment facility at Kahuta. That's enough good stuff for a passel of "dirty bombs" or a few good sized Hiroshima type atomic bombs.

That's a lot of threat. Actual threat. Not the potential sort represented by the Iranian centrifuges.

Connect the dots. Pakistan is a collapsing state. Pakistan has a government that is inherently unstable. Pakistan is leaning heavily toward the Islamist ideology. The Pakistani army, intelligence service, and government are filled at the higher and mid-levels with Islamists.

Enough?

If not, keep a grip on this. A.Q. Khan is an Islamist. Two "retired" scientists from A.Q.'s program met with Osama bin Ladin as far back as 2001. Forty canisters, over 100 kilograms, of weapons or near weapons grade uranium are missing and unaccounted for.

Enough?

If not, get a grip on this. No fewer than seventeen groups listed by the US, the EU or the UN as Islamist terrorist or terrorist support groups are openly doing business in Pakistan. Apparently, the highly efficient Inter-Services Intelligence people don't know this.

Now, ask yourself this question. Which is the greater threat--Iran or Pakistan?

Then ask yourself another question. Why is the current administration so gripless?