Real Nice--If They Can Be Trusted

On the surface it appears as if the Obama administration has achieved a pair of diplomatic successes. The first is the response made by the Kremlin leadership to Obama's "brave move" (to quote Vladimir Putin) in cancelling the land-based ABM system in Central Europe planned by the Bush/Cheney team. The second is the new receptivity on the part of Kim Jong-il to multilateral efforts to end the Hermit Kingdom of the North's nuclear weapons program.

The Dear Leader has indicated that North Korea will re-enter the Six Power Talks following a chat with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese PM, who also delivered a personal letter from the Chinese president, Hu Jintao. The new Chinese demarche is critical as only the Peoples Republic can put credible pressure on the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

Ever since 6 October 1949 when the Peoples Republic extended diplomatic and fraternal relations to North Korea, it has been the primary supporter of the Hermit Kingdom. Without Chinese assistance the North Korean state would have ceased to exist back in the Fall of 1950. Subsequently, the Chinese have assured that the North Koreans have been fed, given military and economic development aid, and generally been protected against the worst effects of their rambunctious behavior.

When the Hermit Kingdom detonated its second nuclear test shot, it went over the line as far as Beijing was concerned. The Chinese government is (perhaps unrealistically) concerned that a nuclear armed North Korea would trigger an arms race in the region. There is little doubt that both South Korea and Japan could produce nuclear weapons in very short order, and this is an eventuality which Beijing wants to avoid at almost any cost.

At the same time Beijing has been concerned that pushing the Hermits too hard or too fast would result in a destabilization of the country. Any fracturing of the regime in Pyongyang would result in a flood of refugees across the Yalu and Tuman rivers. A flow of refugees would have an echo effect on the stability in northeast China, which has already experienced internal unrest as the aging rust belt industries of the area have been closed.

Apparently, Beijing has concluded that Kim Jong-il is in sufficient command of the situation and further that the succession "crisis" has been averted or sufficiently postponed that it can now put the screws to Dear Leader. As a result, the Chinese leadership has taken advantage of the sixtieth anniversary of the diplomatic relations and fraternal friendship to "suggest" that Pyongyang should return to the Six Power Talks.

If the Hermits follow through on the initial indications and come back to the multi-lateral talks, not only will this be a complete reversal of previous policy, but, more importantly from the perspective of Beijing, it will be a major diplomatic coup for their team. China has more to gain from bringing the long running in fits and starts Six Power talks to a successful conclusion than merely the avoidance of a nuclear arms race in their backyard.

In case no one has noticed, China is in the midst of a major multi-year effort to become a significant international actor not only in economic affairs but in global politics. The Six Power talks have been a prime component of this campaign, so the ultimate success of the talks is a matter of global importance to Beijing. If the talks resume and come to a conclusion agreeable to the US, then China will have established itself as the ultimate regional power and have a good shot at rivaling the US and eclipsing Russia globally.

With a goal of this magnitude in play, the Beijing government has decided it is worth the slight risk of the Hermit Kingdom being either intransigent or tottering toward the abyss of internal rupture. At the very least, the resumption of the Six Power Talks will place the US and the (new) Japanese government in Beijing's debt.

More, a successful resolution of the North Korean nuclear question will make Beijing's light of leadership all the more attractive to the (new) Japanese government in its quest to chart a course more independent of the US. The same light will beckon to the South Koreans, giving their present and future governments an alternative to the US.

While not constituting a shift in the seismic plates of Pacific Rim relations, the Chinese role in a (still hypothetical of course) success in the Six Power Talks will add leverage to the goal of Beijing of reabsorbing Taiwan into the homeland. As the center of diplomatic gravity shifts closer to Beijing and further from Washington, the opposition to the reclamation of Taiwan is automatically attenuated--significantly.

A Chinese guided success in the Six Power Talks will also put Washington somewhat in Beijing's debt with ramifications of importance to other looming problems. Like Iran. The success of the Six Power Talks--or merely their resumption--will assure that Beijing has a greater freedom of action with respect to Iran. That it can ignore calls for enhanced sanctions with impunity--an even greater impunity than currently exists.

The Obama administration and its State Department would be well advised to view the new Chinese efforts with a careful eye--even a jaundiced one. The Boys In Beijing are not running a global eleemosynary institution. Beijing is pursuing self-defined national and strategic interests with a view to enhancing its global authority while necessarily reducing that of the US.

The same degree of skepticism should be employed by the Deep Thinkers of the Obama crew with respect to the impact of the scuttling of the land-based Central European ABM system. To no great surprise the move has been hailed in Moscow. Not only has PM Putin greeted it as a "brave move;" Dmitry Medvedev has promised that American concerns will be listened to "more closely."

WOW! How shocking! So what?

At the same time the Obama reversal has lowered the credibility of the US as the ultimate guarantor of national self-determination and independence of countries uncomfortably close to the Russian frontier. In the estimate of realpolickers in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungry, the Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic States, the center of diplomatic gravity shifted overnight from the far reaches of the Atlantic Ocean to the walls of the Kremlin. The apparent capitulation of the Obama administration to long standing Russian demands hints (or more) at a lack of political will in Washington and a willingness to sacrifice the countries of Central Europe to the political and historical paranoia of the Russians.

Regardless of the intrinsic merits of the Obama administration's decision (and there are many including a rejection of the insultingly high-handed way in which the Bush/Cheney bunch rammed the ABM policy down the Kremlin's throat), the action was taken without any immediately evident quid pro quo. The absence of a "quo" from Moscow in return for the Obama "quid" in and of itself gives the appearance of surrender, of weakening political will, of a withdrawal from Central Europe.

Quid pro quo is the basic reserve currency of diplomacy. Mood music and honeyed words from Putin, Medvedev, and Company do not constitute a quid pro quo. Perhaps one will be forthcoming. Perhaps Moscow will reverse its course and join in the (proposed) next round of sanctions against Iran following the failure of the upcoming talks in Turkey. Perhaps whales will sprout wings and fly.

The Russians were the first to jump in bed with Ahmedinejad. They have consistently opposed sanctions as an unworkable approach--and continued to do so immediately after the Obama concession on the ABM matter. Moscow wants increased rights in the Caspian. It believes that the road to peace in the North Caucasus runs through Tehran. And, Iran is a good customer for Russia's major industrial exports--arms and nuclear reactors.

In short, what would Russia gain--and lose--if it were to listen more "closely" to US "concerns" regarding Iran? The quick answer is it would gain nothing and lose much.

The Obama administration gave a tasty morsel to the Russian Bear with the cancelling of the ABM project. Now the Bear is smiling. Who wouldn't after a free lunch?

Mr Obama--It May Not Be A Cold War, But--

The reality of US-Russian relations in recent years has been one of at least a "Chilly War." Much of the responsibility may be given to the Bush/Cheney administration with its alternating stances of hectoring and ignoring the Kremlin. But, even more belongs to the Russians, particularly Vladimir Putin.

Vladimir The Bare Chested has repeatedly played the nationalist card with both supreme skill and a very heavy hand. It was the nationalist card which brought him to prominence and has kept him there as the latest incarnation of the "Good Czar." Mr Putin well understands the fundamental nature of the Russian collective mind. Its feelings of chronic inferiority vis a vis the West. Its need to believe that Russia is great, powerful, and respected.

Putin knows the heart, mind, and soul of Russia as can be seen by the carefully staged and posed political photos taken a couple of months ago. His skill as a Russian politician can also be seen concretely in the strongly nationalistic posture taken over the past several years with respect to what the Russians have consistently referred to as the "near abroad."

It was this focus on Russia's privileges and special interests in the "near abroad" which resulted in the ongoing contretemps concerning the missile defense system proposed by the US for installation in Poland and the Czech Republic. While the Russians continually maintained that the limited ABM system constituted a clear threat to its security by eroding its strategic missile capacity and thus its deterrent effect, no one really, really believed this either in the Kremlin or in Washington. The ABM system was credibly directed against Iran, and the Kremlin darn well knew that.

To Putin and Company the value--and the threat--of the proposed system was its status as an emblem of US involvement in and protection of elements of the "near abroad." The implementation of the system meant to the Russians that their special position in relation to both the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the new nations carved out of the carcass of the old Soviet Union such as the Ukraine and Georgia was being eroded, perhaps fatally.

The decision by the Obama administration to replace the land based missiles and fire control radars with ship borne and mobile systems may well be fully justifiable on sound technological grounds. The replacement of the Bush era concept by the new one may be the better military choice at least in the near- to mid-term. Certainly SecDef Gates, who is not noted for his capacity to play the role of political tool, thinks so.

Outside of purely military and technological considerations, it may be argued that the Obama administration's decision is not the best. It may, for example, be asserted that the seeming genuflection to the desires and fears of the Kremlin will result in the Russians becoming even more assertive regarding their presumed "rights" in the "near abroad." The apparent capitulation by the Obama administration may serve to erode the pro-Western orientation of the shaky governments of the Ukraine and Georgia. It might undercut the confidence in the US and the EU in the Baltic States, which are inconveniently close to the ambitious Bear.

On the other hand it might be asserted, as it has been by Obama supporters such as Nancy Pelosi, that this gesture will result in greater Russian cooperation as regards Iran. This is a comforting notion with a reality akin to whistling in the graveyard at midnight on Halloween.

Today, in the immediate wake of the Obama administration's abandonment of the ABM system, the Russian ForMin reversed the hint given yesterday by President Medvedev. The Foreign Minister stated categorically that any new, tougher sanctions would prevent a solution to the Iranian question evolving through diplomatic engagement. Once again the Russian leadership is giving the impression of a right and left hand disconnect. The dichotomous statements of president and foreign minister also implies a Putin-Medvedev split, the seriousness of which cannot be judged but might well be growing given Vladimir's hints at running for president again in 2012.

Russia wants and needs to be treated as a Great Power. From the perspective of the Kremlin--and most Russians on the street--their country has the prerequisites of Great Power status including rich reserves of oil, an army in the first steps of long overdue modernization, and, of course, a nuclear capacity of sizable nature. To a Great Power of a continental nature as Russia always has been, and particularly a continental power without natural borders, the control of adjacent territory as a glacis against invasion has always been paramount.

Russia's history demands a glacis. It is a continental power. It does not have natural feature defined borders. It has a long record of having been invaded. From the Russian perspective, these realities coupled with its Great Power status give full justification for its demands of special "rights" in the "near abroad."

The US is and always has been a maritime power. Our experience has been one of force projection by sea. Our borders have, in the main, been secured by the combination of sea and fleet. Thus we are rather bemused, uncomprehending even, when faced by the Russian demands and the fears behind them. It is a difference in historical experience which assures that now in the "Chilly War" as back in the Cold War the two governments have talked past each other most of the time.

What makes the effect of the Obama administration policy change on the Central European based ABM system on Russia difficult to assess at the moment is the instability within Russia itself. Russia's leadership is caught in a very real conundrum.

On the one hand it is very, very hard to represent Russia as a genuine Great Power when it is faced with a festering and rapidly recrudescent insurgency in the North Caucasus. On the other hand it is the existence of the insurgency and the Kremlin's fumbling attempts to counter it which demand an assertion of external power for purposes of regime maintenance.

The North Caucasus insurgency makes the Russian Bear both more temperamental and touchy in its external assertions. When coupled with the ongoing and severe economic conditions in Russia, which have been exacerbated by the fall in global oil consumption and thus prices, the temptation to the men in the Kremlin to become more extreme in their foreign affairs will be very hard to resist.

Given the way in which past American administrations have been unable to properly couple the internal and external affairs of the Russian government, it seems likely that the Obama administration's recent decision has likewise been blind to the dilemma facing Russia. To the Kremlin's need to show potency in the face of the insurgency one way or another and thus meet the Russian collective need to believe in their country as a great one, a world leader, feared and respected around the world.

Every decision made in the Kremlin is powerfully conditioned by the Russian history as a continental power without clear natural borders of long existence and with a record of having been invaded repeatedly. It is also conditioned by the long standing Russian feeling of general inferiority to the West. Similarly, decisions in the Kremlin of late have been influenced to a great extent by the insurgency in the North Caucasus and the potential for the expansion of this instability to other parts of Russia--a far from homogeneous nation.

Any decision made by the US which has an effect on its relations with Russia must take these intangible but very real factors into account. If not, the effects are likely to be both negative and non-linear.

It seems that the decision to strike the Bush plan of a land-based ABM system did not consider the implications of the Russian way of thinking, of the Kremlin's unique calculus. As a result the outcome is probably going to be far less positive than President Obama, SecDef Gates, and the others might wish.

As the Chinese toast runs: "May you live in interesting times." Once more we do.

Some Free Advice For Vladimir And Dmitry

Well, guys, the Geek understands that matters have been going down hill at a high rate of knots in the North Caucasus, particularly Ingushtia and, everyone's old favorite, Chechnya. It's got to be tough getting a good night's sleep even in the Kremlin what with all the bombs going off and what not.

The problem is you all are getting all fired up to do the "same old, same old" which has brought such stunning lacks of success as those experienced in Afghanistan, as well as the two Chechen Wars. Come on, men, even the US military has shown it can (eventually) learn from its own mistakes, blunders, and wrong-headed doctrine. What's wrong with you Russians? Trying to equal Israel as the World's Most Inept Counterinsurgent?

The Geek knows enough Russian history to understand that the reflexive reaching for the knout is almost as deeply embedded as a vodka based toast. But, come on, get a grip, fellows!

There is a role for coercion in successful counterinsurgency as any reader of this blog knows. It is critical to remember one very important fact: The role is critical but limited. Coercion is the secondary, not the primary means by which those pesky insurgents can be removed as an ongoing nuisance.

"Toughness" is not the watchword. Sure, Dmitry, calling for "tough" trials for terrorists may sound good on TV and even play well in the Russian equivalent of Peoria, but it isn't the magic word, or even the right one. Anyway, the judicial remedy is, as you darn well know, only a very small part of the solution.

OK, let's walk it through slowly.

You boys have a real problem on your hands in Ingushtia and the rest of the neighborhood. Your little insurgencies there are of a mixed sort. They combine nationalism with Islamist jihadism. And, that makes the insurgents a far more difficult sort of proposition.

The reinforcing nature of nationalism which has been stoked repeatedly by the worst sort of foul treatment from the Kremlin for some two hundred years and Islamist jihadism with its ability to use religious beliefs of a particularly powerful and pervasive form makes the insurgent in Ingushtia, Chechnya, and akin spots very highly motivated, quite willing to kill, and rather immune to the fear of death. The new guy you have appointed to "clarify" and "put to order" the affairs of the insurgent rich North Caucasus ought to know this.

Arkady Yedelev (who looks both brutal and thuggish, if the photo is any guide) ought to be aware of the challenge presented by the nationalistic Islamist jihadist (whew! That's a mouthful!) from his service in Chechnya. This "battle hardened" former KGB and Federal Security Service general was responsible in part for creating a desert in much of Chechnya and calling it peace.

The problem comes in that while Yedelev and others might have declared peace reigned forever more in the North Caucasus, it was rather the case that the war went underground to await a better day in the future. And, the future is now.

To put it simply, unless you lads in the Kremlin are willing to risk the global opprobrium which would result from turning the Yedelevs of your military and security forces loose, you will not be able to kill your way to victory. The truth of the matter is the Russian Army would have to kill entirely too many people in order to create enough of a desert to be peaceful in the aftermath.

And, that sort of mass effusion would not escape both notice and condemnation. You boys have to remember this isn't the good old days of Joe Stalin when it was possible to quietly murder a few tens of thousands without anyone being particularly aware of it.

So, put a stout leash on the neck of General Yedelev and consider a better, lower body count way of achieving the interlocking goals of restoring a semblance of long term stability to the region while not abandoning the reality of effective operational dominance there. It may take a bit longer, be a little more hazy in outcome, but it will spare Russia any embarrassment before the global audience.

First remember the ground truth: The insurgencies in Ingushtia and Chechnya and environs are a mixture of nationalism and Islamist jihadism.

Next, you have to demobilize the nationalists from the Islamist jihadists since it this second category which is the real tough nut. This means the Kremlin will have to settle for effective operational dominance, not total authority or even evident political supremacy. (Hint, effective operational dominance can be assured by economic and infrastructure means.)

A good starting point would be finding the right man to be the Ingushtian chief executive. It boggles belief that the Kremlin cannot find a single qualified native of Ingushtia to run the place. The bad practice of naming some retired former general as jefe grande simply has to end--that is if you want to defeat the insurgency and not simply purchase another "time-out" through bloody repression.

Then, quite openly and with wide publicity turn over all local matters to the locals--and mean it! No bait and switch, do it!

To gain legitimacy for both the Kremlin and the new local regime find some nice, juicy, high profile, notorious grafters, the real princes of corruption. The more well known, the better. Then, have a show trial. That's what show trials are for. Not for insurgents, for them the trial is simply a venue to dominate. For corrupt, overbearing, grafting officials, the show trial is a great way to both throw the red meat of revenge to the locals and up the perceived functional legitimacy of both the Russian central government and the new local regime.

Think hard, Vladimir, you did the same sort of thing not that many years ago when you cut the oligarchs off at the knees. Did you a lot of good, right? It will again, you can trust the Geek, he's a doctor.

After prying the nationalists from the grasp of the Islamist jihadists, you have to deal with them. While the Geek has no objections to such things as saying nice words about Islam qua Islam, this sort of feel good approach will get you precisely nowhere with the Islamist jihadists. These are the hardest of hard core types.

Now it is time for toughness. Islamist jihadists have often and loudly proclaimed that they love death more than you infidels love life. Take them at their word. These specialists in what they call "martyrdom operations" seem to have a need to die.

The Geek believes in meeting human needs. So, his advice is simple: Kill them.

The Islamist jihadist needs killing. There is no other way to end his infection of the larger population. The reason that Yuri Andropov created your super-mucho-beaucoup elite Alpha Unit was to kill hostiles of the sort represented by the Islamist jihadists in the North Caucasus.

Whistle up the Federal Security Service or whoever runs Alpha these days and tell them to get on with the job. The job is locating, isolating, and eliminating the Islamist jihadists starting with the leadership echelon(s). The critical caveat is that Alpha or whatever trigger-pulling bunch is sent in must not kill anyone other than identifiable Islamist jihadists. And, it is critical that all the Islamist jihadists, particularly those in a leadership billet, be killed. Not some. Not most. All. Otherwise, like a lethal pathogen which has been only partially eliminated by an antibiotic, they will be back--bigger and badder than previously.

Along the way make sure the Kremlin pumps in infrastructure, educational, and economic development funds. These must be expended according to the self-perceived needs and priorities of the locals--not some Deep Thinker in some distant ministry. And, the money must be spent, invested really, in an open, transparent, fair and non-corrupt way. Otherwise the rest will have been in vain and the Kremlin's future effective operational dominance will be put in peril.

There you have it, Dmitry and Vladimir, the Geek's history derived and tested recipe for successful counterinsurgency. Of course, there are risks involved. Success resides in the details of application. And, Russia has a lot of historical inertia to overcome if the details are to be executed properly.

The Geek is not optimistic but feels an obligation to give the advice he has. You see, the prospect of still more bloody war without purpose, without a real, achievable goal, lacking a genuine prospect of resulting in a better state of peace makes the Geek want to engage in projectile vomiting. And, that ain't no fun, brother.

Our Guy Is Tough, Not Just Likable

The image makers and message spinners reportedly are viewing the Moscow meetings between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev yesterday and the Real Power Dude of the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, as the big chance to show that the American president is not simply a Nice Young Man From Chicago with a great smile and the divinely bestowed title of Transformer Guy. No, while he is both these things, the meetings in Moscow also demonstrate beyond any doubt that the Transformer Guy is also tougher than a posse of velicoraptors on steroids.

Wow! You bet. You could just see Obama's canine teeth becoming ever more fang-like as he shook hands with one time judo champ, Putin. Gonna put that Rooshan in his place fer sure.

The fabricators of public perceptions must be hard up considering that the big news of the mini-summit was the announcement of plans to replace the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty set to expire this year with one which provides for further reductions in both nuclear munitions and delivery systems. This development is both welcome and overdue. It certainly is not a mark of "toughness," however that word might be defined.

On the margins of the main topic, the related one of the proposed missile defense system was discussed. The Obama administration is not enamored of the current plans set in place by the Bush-Cheney administration.

The President belabored the obvious by averring fearlessly (and presumably with a tough glint in his eyes) that there would be no need for an ABM system if Iran was somehow to forgo its ambitions. Adding to his tough stance, Mr Obama added that no defense system could possibly impair or impede the "mighty" Russian offensive capability.

That must have made Putin, to say nothing of Medvedev (who never shot a bear in Siberia or won a judo match or been seen in the public press sans shirt), just standing in awe of Mr Obama's toughness. Further afield there can be no doubt that after this display of hardnose, hard line, refractory verbiage, the mullahocracy in Iran, the Dear Leader in the Hermit Kingdom of the North, and the Men of the Forbidden City instantly decided not to try their luck against the hard boiled President from the streets Al Capone made famous.

Presumably, the prestidigators of spin as well as those who direct their services have been perceiving a need to portray Mr Obama as not falling in the less-backbone-than-a-banana category. Perchance there is a hint of fear in the corridors surrounding the Oval that Obama may be falling into Category W (as in wimp) in the foreign affairs department.

Oh! Say it ain't so!

What could possibly be leading to the interpretation of the Presidential Posture as being closer to over cooked pasta than Krupstahl?

Could it have something to do with asymmetrical pressuring in the Mideast? Pushing on Israel to make concessions (not that the notion of a few timely giveaways is a poor idea) while giving the Arab states a walk on reciprocity?

Or, perhaps, might it have something to do with the Obama rejection of real enforcement of real sanctions against Iran even though some of the usually highly reluctant to do anything beyond natter European Union states are ready to go that way as the last, best chance to avoid the blandly termed "military option?" Is it the patented Obama method of "engagement" with a regime which is not simply repressive but using an effective combination of deeply rooted Iranian nationalism with religious zeal with the goals of regional hegemony and global influence?

Or, to add a third factor, is it acting as the running buddy of "progressive" regimes such as those headed by Hugo Chavez, Ewo Morales, Daniel Ortega, and Rafael Correa to cozen or coerce the Honduran government into reversing itself and re-installing the "progressive" Zelaya, who was removed from office according to the lawful decisions of the country's Congress and Supreme Court?

Perhaps, there was a surfeit of "likable" and a paucity of "tough" in the craven rewriting and companion distorting of history in the Cairo Address so as to fit the needs of the self-esteem challenged Muslims of the world.

Then there is the small matter of President Obama, his White House flacks, and his State department bending over and spreading their collective cheeks to offer assurances that the US had not given a "green light" for an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear complex just because Joe (Flapping Lips) Biden had been factually correct by saying that Israel is a sovereign state with the sole right to determine how to respond to threats it perceived as "existential." A spectacle? Yes. Edifying? No.

The list could go on. But, the Geek bores of the exercise.

Being liked is nice. Most all politicians want to be liked, even loved. However, in a famous primer for rulers, a philosopher of rulership, an Italian fellow, one Machiavelli by name, stated a brutal truism: It is better to be feared than loved.

"Feared" may be too stark a word for our sensitive and enlightened age. The word "respected" may be profitably substituted. A country, a government, a president is respected when it (or he) takes a consistent, reality based view of the world. When it (or he) sets and executes policy in a candid, straight forward manner. When it (or he) takes the world as it is without any need to pander, to genuflect, to pitter-pat around the facts, the truth, the national and strategic interests.

When and if Mr Obama and his administration can show that he and it sees the world as it is, understands what American national and strategic interests might be, comprehends what states, entities, and personalities seek to limit, constrain, or defeat our attempts to implement policies in our national interest, then the president and his administration are on the road to respect. If in addition he and it can eschew post-modernist confections suitable for the English department but not government such as espousing, at least implicitly, cultural, political, and ethical relativism, then he and it will be moving well toward the goal of respect.

And, what does respect get a country?

It gets one a fair chance at achieving a better state of peace without the horrid necessity of having to go to war first. It means being liked less, but not having to produce "tough" acts to support the earlier "tough" words.

So, Mr Obama, some free advice from the History Geek. Don't worry about being liked. Don't fret over being tough enough. Just go for a little of that R*E*S*P*E*C*T.

Obama In Europe--Substance Or Show?

Like Yogi Berra was reputed to have said, "It's deja vue all over again." So it is with the Obama Rave and Diplomatic Extravaganza.

While the Geek isn't quite old enough to remember the news reports of the hosannas ringing all over Europe when Woodrow Wilson made his triumphal tour prior to the Versailles Peace Conference, he can remember the outpourings which greeted JFK and reached a decibel peak with the Ich bin ein Berliner speech. Journalists reported all the noise and celebration surrounding both Wilson and JFK.

But, only historians, masters of the dry dust of the morning after, take note of what happened afterwards. When one considers the disdain with which Americans treat the small whining voice of history, it is not surprising that the thrill of the victorious moment will be noted while the agony of any succeeding defeat will be ignored.

The lesson of the Wilson and Kennedy visits was simple. The fun of the party must not be recalled at the expense of remembering the vomiting and hangover which came afterwards.

None of this is intended to undercut the validity of President Obama's public diplomacy. It is what he is best at as last year's campaign demonstrated. He can work a crowd rhetorically with an uncanny skill. The halo effect may extend past the moment and the personality to include new American foreign policy initiatives.

It is the policy which matters. It is the policy which will bring long term success or failure to the US, not the personality du jour.

To use the negative example currently so beloved of the cheering Europeans ranging from high school students to heads of government, George W. Bush may have been an annoying person but it was US policy developed and implemented on his watch which degraded America's image and influence in Europe and throughout the world. Had George W. not pushed unilaterialism, rejection of Russia as a Great Power and given a thumbs-up to the invasion of Iraq, his personality and personal attributes would not have equalled a gnat's ass in impact on European political leaders or public.

Importantly, it is the policy stance of the Bush administration which forms the context in which Obama is viewed and cheered. If and only if the policies of his administration are seen as beneficial not only to the US but to Europe as well will the cheering continue and the hangover delayed.

Public opinion is notoriously fickle. This truism applies as well to Europe as it does in the US. The views, opinions and actions of political leaders are no more stable and long lasting.

Nicholas Sarkozy might have emoted and effused over Obama as the greatest thing since the invention of the croissant yesterday, but if the Obama administration policies fail to meet the what's-in-it-for-us test, the French and their president may see Obama as vinegar laced wine in a couple of months. Medvedev may hail the American president as his "new comrade" now, but that is subject to change without notice if the Kremlin decides its latest charm offensive has not paid off sufficiently.

American observers may, as did Politico, applaud Obama for his having delivered a message of "tough love" at the Strasbourg "Town Meeting." Yes, the Geek agrees, it was refreshing to hear an American president call upon the Europeans to end their "casual" and endemic anti American words and actions. To remember that al-Qaeda was not a threat to the US alone. To bear in mind that the US public, regardless of the arrogance and indifference to European sensibilities of the previous administration, was not anti-European.

These remarks were public diplomacy at its best. Not simply mouthing an apology for past "bad" American behavior. No. Doing that to be sure, but also letting the folks of Europe and the world know that we were not alone on the sinners' bench.

Leaving aside the financial matters which constituted the critical, necessary core of the G-20 meeting as the Geek is not qualified to offer more than the opinion of ignorance, at least one very substantial matter of policy emerged from London. It came in the context of the bilateral discussions between Obama and Medvedev.

While acknowledging that the Russians have a long tradition of launching peace-and-charm offensives in the midst of saber-clanking and more-or-less shrill outpourings of It's-All-The-American-Capitalist-Camp's-Fault, the hints of a new round of nuclear weapons reduction talks may prove to be a genuine basis for a real policy shift. Even the consideration of a new round of talks on the subject represents a welcome break from the policy of the neocon ninny laden Bush II administration.

But, the shift has to go far beyond that of the merely comparative.

The Geek has been a supporter of the Finite Deterrent school of nuclear doctrine for over forty years. (OMG! Forty years! Where has time and youth gone?) The US and Russia would have more than sufficient capacity to inflict unsurvivable damage on each other with as few as five hundred high kiloton to low megaton yield warheads (or in the old and delightful Soviet terminology, "nuclear charges.") Similarly either would have the capacity to effectively green glass any third party who was so bold as to initiate a nuclear attack. That includes the Peoples Republic of China (pace Mao.)

A reduction in current stockpiles to no more than 1,500 nuclear charges would be an excellent and long overdue course of action. Given the improvements in delivery technology as well as terminal guidance, the survivability of retaliatory force sufficient to assure the effective counter-value targeting of a second strike is now highly probable. Thus, mutually assured destruction (MAD) which has served us well for a half-century would be unimpaired.

Nuclear weapons systems including delivery vehicles are very, very expensive. The stockpiles of both the US and Russia are aging and in need of upgrading in numerous ways. This upgrading as indicated by the American Reliable Warhead Program are hugely capital intensive.

By reducing the current suite of nuclear systems, both countries could afford (literally) the necessary upgrading. Each would also have the wherewithal to engage in critical programs of nuclear materials control and denaturing.

By reducing stockpiles to an effective level, both countries would also gain a measure of moral authority in the common effort to inhibit proliferation and to take (perhaps joint) action against unseemly proliferaters such as North Korea and Iran. A reduction would also have some real potential to defuse the annoyingly accurate argument presented by a number of second and third tier countries that the Original Nuclear Club uses the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) as a means of securing a monopoly on the instruments of mass murder.

If the hints have any substance, the grunts of the diplomatic and defense communities in both Moscow and Washington will get to work shortly. They will work without cheers. Without screaming kids hoping to get a look, get a listen. Without the media panting after them.

Theirs is the substance which works behind the show of summits, of international gatherings, of public diplomacy. Only time will show if there is substance behind the spectacle.

If a year or so down the line, Medvedev and Obama meet, greet and sign a treaty reducing nuclear charges on each side to a number approaching that of a finite deterrent, there will be ample time and reason to applaud. To cheer. For, when--and if--that were to occur, there will have been at least one genuine, positive outcome from the Big Traveling Show in Europe.

Now, Obama Best Consider A Gesture To Russia

Russian President Medvedev has tossed down a gauntlet to the US. He has also handed the Republicans a major issue for 2010 and, tah-dah!--2012. The front man half of the Putin-Medvedev duarchy has announced that not even the current economic distress in which Russia finds itself will prevent a major modernisation of the Russian military capacity.

According to Medvedev and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov something approximating ninety percent of Russia's military machine is outdated. The Deep Thinkers of the Kremlin also believe (or at least pretend) that Russia faces a number of national security threats including "NATO encroachment." The remedy to these looming menaces is an expensive, extensive upgrading of Russia's military capacities including nuclear and strategic forces.

It is doubtful that NATO is casting covetous eyes at Russian territory. Nor is NATO seeking to coerce Russia into compliance with its policy dictates. That doesn't matter. The outside threat is sufficient to provide a stimulus for internal support of rearmament.

Given the history of Russia and the Soviet Union before that, in fact stretching back into the mists of the Russian Empire, the government has never lacked the political will to spend money on the military regardless of negative consequences to the civilian population. It is legitimate to take Medvedev at his word. It matters not that oil prices have fallen, the Russian stock market melted to oblivion and foreign direct investment fled. Defense uber alles will be the watchword.

Or not. There is a big "unless" tacit to the Medvedev declaration.

It is an "unless" predicated upon a real world concern. Or, to err on the side of accuracy, a real world deficiency within the Russian version of the "military-industrial complex." Not to put to fine a point on matters, it is doubtful that Russia currently possesses the physical or intellectual infrastructure to play catch-up with the US and the West in the new categories of military technology.

While espionage might remedy some of the intellectual deficiency in the near future as it did so often in the Soviet past, that force multiplier will not be enough to cure all the systemic lacks suffered by the Russians. It will not, for example, give the core of very highly skilled technicians necessary to construct and maintain the systems. It will not provide the industrial facilities needful to make the devices the Russians must make if they hope to hold their own with the US and the rest of the West--or even China for that matter.

When it comes to countries which may have a political need to inhibit Russian diplomatic actions or coerce the Kremlin into compliance, China has to lead the list for any rational Kremlin strategist. Even if the Men in the Forbidden City harbor no ambitions regarding those portions of Siberia which lingered so long as a bone of contention, there can be little doubt that these men want the most free hand possible in pursuing global ambitions.

This means that the Russians as well as the Americans have to be inhibited, deterred from opposing Chinese policy. The massive improvements in the Chinese military as well as in the underlying economy generally provide the basis for this.

This implies an opportunity for the US. Taking advantage of this opportunity will require more than symbols and smooth words--even if those are a necessary launching pad. The first challenge for the Obama administration is that of convincing the Putin-Medvedev regime that the US sees Russia as a fellow Great Power and will treat it accordingly.

The second challenge is simply not to be taken in by Putin or Medvedev. The record of the past several years shows that both men, particularly the first, are accomplished workers in the snow job department. Apparent affability or seemingly implacable hostility are both tools in the kits of these accomplished political sharks.

All too many European and American diplomatic and policy level politicians have failed to recognise that Putin (and therefore his chosen front guy, Medvedev) is a Russian nationalist. The current regime is nationalist. This reality is not going to change. Not now. Not in the next few years. Perhaps not ever.

European and American statesmen beyond counting made the precise same error in dealing with the leaders of the Soviet Union. They ignored the obvious. Regardless of internationalist rhetoric, Soviet bosses from Stalin on were resolute Russian nationalists. All efforts were bent to securing and protecting Russian national and strategic interests.

This fundamental Russian trajectory did not die with the last of the Czars. It did not fall with the last of the Commissars. It is alive and well today with Putin and company.

Putin, Medvedev, et al are not globalists. They are not sensitive multi-culturalists. They do not accept such soft, squishy ideas as "We are all passengers on spaceship Earth."

They are Russians, the lot of them. This means they pursue Russian national and strategic interest first, last and always.

So, get a grip, folks. Don't bemoan the nationalism of the Kremlin Crew. Don't think of it as backwards, reactionary, a grave violation of the Lofty Ideals of the High Minded of the West.

Work with it! Nationalism is neither inherently evil nor necessarily good. It simply is a brute fact which must be taken into account in formulating and executing foreign policy.

For the Obama administration and for the president personally, this recognition is liberating. It allows, indeed, demands a fresh approach to US-Russian relations. The US and Russia have several critical coinciding national and strategic interests. The list of real world, realpolitick issues which can either divide or unite us is headed by Iran, Islamism, economic imperatives, nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism and China (not necessarily in that order.)

Putin, Medvedev and company have been waiting to see if the new administration has a better grip on the realities of international life than the neocon ninnies of the past eight years. Medvedev has provided a solid wake-up call.

Will the Obama administration (and the president personally) pick up the phone? Will it and he accept that Russia is a Great Power, first among all other potential claimants of that status? Will it and he recognise that nationalism--not ideology--provides the best, perhaps the only, base for productive relations? Constructive address of mutual interests and concerns?

Obviously it is too early to give the answers to these critical questions. It is not too early to assert that if the US does not give the correct response, we are in for an expensive arms race when we can least afford it and the Obama agenda will be buried in the rhetoric of democrats-are-soft-on-defense as have been so many administrations and agendas before it.