Some Free Advice For Vladimir And Dmitry

Well, guys, the Geek understands that matters have been going down hill at a high rate of knots in the North Caucasus, particularly Ingushtia and, everyone's old favorite, Chechnya. It's got to be tough getting a good night's sleep even in the Kremlin what with all the bombs going off and what not.

The problem is you all are getting all fired up to do the "same old, same old" which has brought such stunning lacks of success as those experienced in Afghanistan, as well as the two Chechen Wars. Come on, men, even the US military has shown it can (eventually) learn from its own mistakes, blunders, and wrong-headed doctrine. What's wrong with you Russians? Trying to equal Israel as the World's Most Inept Counterinsurgent?

The Geek knows enough Russian history to understand that the reflexive reaching for the knout is almost as deeply embedded as a vodka based toast. But, come on, get a grip, fellows!

There is a role for coercion in successful counterinsurgency as any reader of this blog knows. It is critical to remember one very important fact: The role is critical but limited. Coercion is the secondary, not the primary means by which those pesky insurgents can be removed as an ongoing nuisance.

"Toughness" is not the watchword. Sure, Dmitry, calling for "tough" trials for terrorists may sound good on TV and even play well in the Russian equivalent of Peoria, but it isn't the magic word, or even the right one. Anyway, the judicial remedy is, as you darn well know, only a very small part of the solution.

OK, let's walk it through slowly.

You boys have a real problem on your hands in Ingushtia and the rest of the neighborhood. Your little insurgencies there are of a mixed sort. They combine nationalism with Islamist jihadism. And, that makes the insurgents a far more difficult sort of proposition.

The reinforcing nature of nationalism which has been stoked repeatedly by the worst sort of foul treatment from the Kremlin for some two hundred years and Islamist jihadism with its ability to use religious beliefs of a particularly powerful and pervasive form makes the insurgent in Ingushtia, Chechnya, and akin spots very highly motivated, quite willing to kill, and rather immune to the fear of death. The new guy you have appointed to "clarify" and "put to order" the affairs of the insurgent rich North Caucasus ought to know this.

Arkady Yedelev (who looks both brutal and thuggish, if the photo is any guide) ought to be aware of the challenge presented by the nationalistic Islamist jihadist (whew! That's a mouthful!) from his service in Chechnya. This "battle hardened" former KGB and Federal Security Service general was responsible in part for creating a desert in much of Chechnya and calling it peace.

The problem comes in that while Yedelev and others might have declared peace reigned forever more in the North Caucasus, it was rather the case that the war went underground to await a better day in the future. And, the future is now.

To put it simply, unless you lads in the Kremlin are willing to risk the global opprobrium which would result from turning the Yedelevs of your military and security forces loose, you will not be able to kill your way to victory. The truth of the matter is the Russian Army would have to kill entirely too many people in order to create enough of a desert to be peaceful in the aftermath.

And, that sort of mass effusion would not escape both notice and condemnation. You boys have to remember this isn't the good old days of Joe Stalin when it was possible to quietly murder a few tens of thousands without anyone being particularly aware of it.

So, put a stout leash on the neck of General Yedelev and consider a better, lower body count way of achieving the interlocking goals of restoring a semblance of long term stability to the region while not abandoning the reality of effective operational dominance there. It may take a bit longer, be a little more hazy in outcome, but it will spare Russia any embarrassment before the global audience.

First remember the ground truth: The insurgencies in Ingushtia and Chechnya and environs are a mixture of nationalism and Islamist jihadism.

Next, you have to demobilize the nationalists from the Islamist jihadists since it this second category which is the real tough nut. This means the Kremlin will have to settle for effective operational dominance, not total authority or even evident political supremacy. (Hint, effective operational dominance can be assured by economic and infrastructure means.)

A good starting point would be finding the right man to be the Ingushtian chief executive. It boggles belief that the Kremlin cannot find a single qualified native of Ingushtia to run the place. The bad practice of naming some retired former general as jefe grande simply has to end--that is if you want to defeat the insurgency and not simply purchase another "time-out" through bloody repression.

Then, quite openly and with wide publicity turn over all local matters to the locals--and mean it! No bait and switch, do it!

To gain legitimacy for both the Kremlin and the new local regime find some nice, juicy, high profile, notorious grafters, the real princes of corruption. The more well known, the better. Then, have a show trial. That's what show trials are for. Not for insurgents, for them the trial is simply a venue to dominate. For corrupt, overbearing, grafting officials, the show trial is a great way to both throw the red meat of revenge to the locals and up the perceived functional legitimacy of both the Russian central government and the new local regime.

Think hard, Vladimir, you did the same sort of thing not that many years ago when you cut the oligarchs off at the knees. Did you a lot of good, right? It will again, you can trust the Geek, he's a doctor.

After prying the nationalists from the grasp of the Islamist jihadists, you have to deal with them. While the Geek has no objections to such things as saying nice words about Islam qua Islam, this sort of feel good approach will get you precisely nowhere with the Islamist jihadists. These are the hardest of hard core types.

Now it is time for toughness. Islamist jihadists have often and loudly proclaimed that they love death more than you infidels love life. Take them at their word. These specialists in what they call "martyrdom operations" seem to have a need to die.

The Geek believes in meeting human needs. So, his advice is simple: Kill them.

The Islamist jihadist needs killing. There is no other way to end his infection of the larger population. The reason that Yuri Andropov created your super-mucho-beaucoup elite Alpha Unit was to kill hostiles of the sort represented by the Islamist jihadists in the North Caucasus.

Whistle up the Federal Security Service or whoever runs Alpha these days and tell them to get on with the job. The job is locating, isolating, and eliminating the Islamist jihadists starting with the leadership echelon(s). The critical caveat is that Alpha or whatever trigger-pulling bunch is sent in must not kill anyone other than identifiable Islamist jihadists. And, it is critical that all the Islamist jihadists, particularly those in a leadership billet, be killed. Not some. Not most. All. Otherwise, like a lethal pathogen which has been only partially eliminated by an antibiotic, they will be back--bigger and badder than previously.

Along the way make sure the Kremlin pumps in infrastructure, educational, and economic development funds. These must be expended according to the self-perceived needs and priorities of the locals--not some Deep Thinker in some distant ministry. And, the money must be spent, invested really, in an open, transparent, fair and non-corrupt way. Otherwise the rest will have been in vain and the Kremlin's future effective operational dominance will be put in peril.

There you have it, Dmitry and Vladimir, the Geek's history derived and tested recipe for successful counterinsurgency. Of course, there are risks involved. Success resides in the details of application. And, Russia has a lot of historical inertia to overcome if the details are to be executed properly.

The Geek is not optimistic but feels an obligation to give the advice he has. You see, the prospect of still more bloody war without purpose, without a real, achievable goal, lacking a genuine prospect of resulting in a better state of peace makes the Geek want to engage in projectile vomiting. And, that ain't no fun, brother.

For Russia, It's A Case Of Deja Vue All Over Again

The Russians fought two less than spectacularly successful counterinsurgency campaigns in Chechnya. True, the noise level in Chechnya is down a great deal from its high point(s) but, to make up for the quiet affairs, the noise in next door Ingushetia has grown much louder.

In both places the cause of the noise is Islamism combined with the effects of systematically suppressed nationalism. Either Islamist jihadism or nationalism by itself would not have been sufficient to raise the festering political alienation of the ethnic majorities to the level of insurgency, but together these factors did the job. And, did it well.

The Republic of Ingushetia is another of the many "self-governing" Russian republics. Like its neighbor, Chechnya, Ingushetia is predominantly Muslim as well as being profoundly different both ethnically and linguistically from the Russian minority. The Ingushians are genetically different from their close linguistic and cultural relatives in the Caucasus including the Chechens.

Russia occupied Ingushetia in the early Nineteenth Century. The official Russian version of this holds that the locals voluntarily accepted the rule and law of the Czar. However, a close look at Russian military records for the first half of the century shows a pattern of repeated violent repression followed by yet another outbreak of anti-Russian attacks.

Stalin attempted to liquidate the "nationalities problem" in both Chechnya and Ingushetia by liquidating the population. Many were killed either directly or in the Gulag for their alleged "pro-Nazi" activities. Far more were simply loaded on cattle cars and deported to the various Central Asian Republics. Stalin's approach to ethnic cleansing was robust but ultimately a failure.

Ingushians and Chechens were allowed to return to their homelands following Stalin's death. Upon their return the Ingushtians found that much of the country had been resettled by people from North Ossetia. The resulting friction was substantial.

The repression of the Ingushtians by both Russians and Ossetian transplants culminated in a peaceful demonstration in Grozny in January 1973. The Red Army and KGB Border Troops crushed it with blood in the snow.

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ingushtia stayed with the new Russian Federation in the expectation that the Kremlin would be favorably inclined to honor the Ingushian demand that lands and homes assigned to the transplants from Ossetia be returned. The Ingushtians were disappointed, to put it mildly.

In late 1992 war broke out between Ossetia and Ingushtia. When the shooting stopped the Ingushtians had lost one more time. In the fall out of defeat more than fifty thousand Ingushtians were given the heave-ho from North Ossetia. This bit of ethnic purification went by unnoticed in the West where the events in dissolving Yugoslavia got the marquee billing.

The First Russian-Chechen War spilled over into Ingushtia. In part this was the result of Chechens comprising a fifth of the population. In larger part it was the result of the Russian's very ham handed style of counterinsurgency.

The Russian way of war generated vast numbers of refugees. This was the case in both the First and Second Chechen Wars. It was also the case in Russian counterinsurgency operations in Ossetia. By 2000 there was nearly one refugee for every native Ingushtian. The sketchy infrastructure, poorly developed economy, governmental inefficiency, and terrain combined to assure a maximum of wretchedness for locals and refugees alike.

The situation was made even worse (even though that barely seems possible) in 2001 when the incumbent president was ousted by the Kremlin and replaced by a former KGB general named Murat Zyazikov. Zyazikov presided over a fair approximation of a reign of terror. Russian and Ossetian death squads roamed the countryside. Young Ingushtians were declared fair game in an always open season.

The result was (stand by for shock and surprise) the emergence of an Ingushtian insurgency. It was powered in equal measure by an Islamist strain of Islam and a deep loathing of the Russians.

The Russians responded in the tried, true, and counterproductive fashion of sending more troops with more bullets and greater latitude to use the latter against anyone who might be Ingushtian. The Russians, particularly those of the Federal Security Service, went to work with a whoop and wild abandon.

The result?

(Stand by for yet one more shock.) The insurgency went more or less underground. For the next few years the insurgents recruited, organised, received arms and training. At the same time the Islamist motivations were stoked as recruits were indoctrinated in the nuances of martyrdom and similar prerequisites for jihad.

Last October the results of recruitment, travel to such Islamist jihadist training and operational areas as Iran, Iraq,Afghanistan, and the FATA as well as the improvements in arms, tactics, and willingness for martyrdom became obvious. On 18 October the insurgents showed one time KGB heavy Zyazikov to have been way too top spin in his reports to the Kremlin.

Approximately fifty Russian troops were killed when a very well coordinated ambush was pulled on their convoy. The Kremlin and the locals took an old page from the Soviet playbook. They lied, alleging that only two men died as a result of a minor skirmish with disaffected Muslims.

Only the last two words approached accuracy. Vladimir Putin punted General Zyazikov out the door and sent in yet more troops. This proves that even Vladimir The Bare Chested can make mistakes--no, blunders.

How big a blunder has become increasingly evident during 2009. The insurgents have been (almost literally) decimating the official government of the Republic.

True, Vladimir working through his front guy, Dimitri Medvedev, appointed a new president. The new man, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, was speedily approved of by the local parliament and the major political parties of Ingushtia.

The former paratroop general (what's the matter, can't the Kremlin find anyone other than retreaded brasshats to make president of Ingushtia?) was not given a thumbs-up by the insurgents. They showed their disapproval of the new guy at the top on 22 June with a suicide type attack on Yevkurov which narrowly failed to kill the man. The severely injured president was in a coma for weeks but survived. Well, paratroops are noted for being tough even if not particularly brilliant nor subtle.

A few days back Yevkorov recovered sufficiently to say he was staying on the job and was quite committed to ending the unrest and corruption. The still rather unwell appearing man stated that he did not want "revenge" but he would continue the policies of repression albeit perhaps a little "tougher."

While the Kremlin designated Maximum Leader was getting the best of medical care in a Moscow hospital, the insurgents had not been resting on their laurels. The number and skill of attacks increased much to the dismay and displeasure of the Kremlin. At the center, Russian senior level leaders were casting around for the causes of the "spike" in violence--or, lacking that, at least a scapegoat.

The designated fall guy was the Kremlin's own man. Specifically the Regional President responsible for the North Caucasus region, Ramzan Kadyrov. This worthy is a thug. As long as the lid was on in Chechnya, Ingushtia and other regional republics, old Ramzan was a good thug. But, with the lid popping off in Ingushtia, he had become a bad thug.

The hatchetman appointed for the job of offing the bad thug was General Gennady Zaitsev, the commander of the hot shot, mucho elite counter-terrorist group, the Alpha unit, started by KGB chief Yuri Andropov a generation back. Zaitsev as much as said it was time to give Kadyrov a bullet in the back of the neck.

Finding the right man to sacrifice and the correct dude to do the job may be satisfying to Putin, Medvedev and Co., but it means squat in the game of Beat The Islamist Insurgent. Ritual victims are exercises in myth; insurgencies are real world.

The Islamist jihadists grew ever more active. Ever more willing to kill without particular discrimination. They were matched by the "security forces," which seemed bent on matching the insurgents in bloodlust.

The Islamist jihadists were willing to die as well. Provided only that the "martyrdom seeker" could bring enough victims with him. Suicide bombings of police stations have their place. So also does the ongoing campaign of selective assassination of government officials.

In total the efforts of the insurgents demonstrate a high level of competence as well as the type of dedication one has grown to expect from true Islamist jihadists. In total the efforts of both the Russian and Ingushtian government to end the insurgency have shown both a strikingly low level of proficiency and a willingness to operate on a business-as-usual basis tolerating corruption, inefficiency, and contempt for the locals.

The Kremlin, specifically, President Medvedev has taken action in the wake of the suicide bombing. In keeping with all past Russian behavior, he has appointed a "battle hardened" general to take charge of the situation. To, in Medvedev's pithy phrase, "clarify what happened."

It is going to take more than one general, no matter how "battle hardened" to "clarify" and "put in order" the situations in Ingushtia, Chechnya, and other Islamist jihadist anterooms to Paradise in the North Caucasus. Even if President Medvedev is unacquainted with the results of blending Islamist jihadism with nationalism as was the case in Afghanistan, the man behind the throne, Vladimir (Bare Chested Man On Horseback) Putin must be aware. After all he was in the KGB.

Since the Russian memory is apparently short as the Bear got its hairy rear end kicked hard in Afghanistan only twenty years ago, the men of the Russian Army, Federal Security Service (KGB under a nicer name) and the Kremlin must have to relearn the lesson that Islamist jihadism plus nationalism makes for a very hard opponent to defeat. Given that the Russians place even more faith in coercion as the sovereign remedy for all political ills than do the Israelis (or before they got the message in Iraq, the Americans) it is unlikely in the extreme that the new jihad in the Caucasus will be over quickly or, from the Russian perspective, succesfully.

Couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of guys.