Meanwhile In The North Caucasus...

The Kremlin hates to be outpointed, really doesn't like being one upped by the Imperialist Camp.  OK, so Putin did congratulate the US on the Great Abbottabad Raid, but he had to spoil the moment by suggesting that his boys and ours get together on a joint campaign against, well, you know, those pesky terrorists.  Behind the smiles Putin and Company sought to prove that their counterterror forces were every bit as high speed, low drag as Boat Six.

The Lads in the Kremlin did have a small reason to crow over recent developments in the North Caucasus, but, regardless of the best efforts of the spin masters, the "liquidation" of a few Koran-waving trigger pullers is not equivalent to sending Osama bin Laden to his rewards.  April proved to be a very good month for the forces of law and order (or the Russian equivalents thereof.)

Around mid-month the security forces liquidated (don't you love that term?) Israpil Validzhanov.  Israpil had been the jefe grande of Dagestani jamaat, the major exponent of violent political Islam in Dagestan before his final, fatal encounter with FSB operatives.  This was followed on 23 April by the removal of a high profile genuine foreign fighter, an Arab who went by the moniker of Emir Mukhannad.  This Mighty Warrior of the Prophet was a leading (and very controversial) figure in the Chechen Islamist insurgency.

Six days later the adherents of violent political Islam (the Kabardino-Balkaria jamaat) took a very large hit in their leadership echelon when the security forces hit a house in the outskirts of the village of Progress (no joke, that is the name).  When the shooting stopped some hours later, the occupants of the house were all dead--a total of eight men and two women.  The dead were identified as having been the leaders of the group.

In the aftermath of the firefight, the Russian authorities did what so many US prosecutors do--greatly inflate the charges.  The dead men (and women) were held responsible for almost every terrorist operations other than 9/11, 7/7, and the Madrid Subway bombing.  The insurgent group confirmed both the deaths and the critical leadership roles performed by the deceased.

Allowing for the normal Soviet--oops! Bad Geek!--Russian tendency to inflate accomplishments, the dead were very bad actors and the region is better off without them.  What is open to question now is whether or not the government will be able to capitalize on the confusion within insurgent ranks this decapitation operation must necessarily produce.  Based on past experience the prognosis in this area is not wildly optimistic.

This contention is underscored by events in Dagestan following the death of Israpil.  There the insurgents continued to mount at least one operation per day.  On occasion the Islamists oversubcribe their production norm to the embarrassment of the authorities.

During the same period Chechnya has been dominated by government efforts.  Despite some blatant missteps, the government apparently wrested and maintained the initiative.  The situation there shows repeated government initiated strikes against the insurgents.  One can conclude that Chechnya is the epicenter of a major, region wide campaign by the Kremlin to bring the political Islamists to their knees well before the next hot spot grows even hotter.

That next hot spot is the Sochi region of the former Circassian tribal area of the western Caucasus plains.  The Circassian tribes roamed far and free in this area until roughly two hundred years ago when the Russians started their long campaign of conquest.  At the present moment the critical group is the Shapsugs.  They constitute only 12,000 of the five million people living in the Krasnodar region.  This pitiful remnant is important only because (1) the upcoming Winter Olympics of 2014 and (2) there are a lot more Circassians living not too far away.

The Kremlin has started meeting with Shapsug representatives in order to "address their questions."  The Circassians have more than questions; they have a series of very serious complaints not dissimilar from those which motivated the American Indian Movement thirty plus years ago.  These include cultural destruction, poverty, lack of economic development, and the biased nature of social and political institutions and processes.

The larger Circassian population is getting increasingly restless with the Kremlin's ongoing foot dragging.  There has been at least one minor effort to internationalize the contretemps using Georgia as the mechanism.  At the minimum this will cause some pinking of faces in the Kremlin, so there will be a push back directed at Georgia, a state with few cards to play following the border skirmish of a couple of years back.  The Circassians may be hoping that Georgia will seek the aid and support of the EU and/or the US as a way of countering Russian ripostes on the Circassian question.

No matter how the specifics of the Georgia connection play out, the move constitutes an escalation in expressed nationalism on the part of the Circassians, which has taken full advantage of the impending Winter Games.  This enhanced nationalistic sentiment is also reflected in recent attempts by the Circassian National Congress to foster repatriation of Circassians from Turkey, the Mideast, and, perhaps most disturbing to the Kremlin, Libya.  Since the foundation of the modern nationalist movement in 1989, the Circassians have been moving slowly but seemingly inexorably toward a serious push for autonomy at the least and independence at the most.  Russian counter proposals have been vague, amorphous, and amount to the offer of decrees easy to cancel when the Olympics are over.

The Kremlin's strategy is obviously one of stall, delay, and equivocate.  There is little doubt that some Circassians will take this to mean that they must emulate the more robust methods used in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.  While there have not yet been any episodes of violence directly linked to Circassian independence, these will be coming soon.

The tipping point will most probably come when Moscow doesn't allow any significant resettlement of Circassians in the region.  To allow resettlement would be a reversal of decades of Kremlin policy as well as being against the personal inclinations of Putin.  It may be expected that Moscow will seek the cooperation of Turkey in preventing any wholesale relocation of expat Circassians.  Given the current good state of Russian-Turkish relations, it may be anticipated that Ankara will respect Russian desires in this matter.  Considering the relatively lower levels of Circassian population in the Mideast and North Africa, stopping significant migration from Turkey would put a stop to Circassian efforts to bring the tribe back home.

Should the tipping point be reached, the Kremlin will face a problem in counter insurgency rivaling or surpassing the challenges present in the North Caucasus.  This implies the security forces throughout the region must work against the clock big time.  The "siloviki" have their work cut out for them.

It's no wonder that Vladimir of the Bare Chest would like to have some cooperative counter terrorist operations with the US.  Perhaps President Obama can just offer to loan him Team Six for a few weeks?

Hey! Vladimir! Better Call Off The Ski Resorts

Irony without equal exists in the world news section of the London Daily Telegraph today.  The lead article is, of course, the suicide bombing at the main Moscow airport.  But, sharing the page is a story from the other day which relates of the plans announced by Vladimir Putin and Dimitri Medvedev for a series of five star ski resorts to be built on the hillsides of the North Caucasus.

The irony resides in the fact that the bombing comes courtesy of the the jihadists of the North Caucasus--the insurgency which has spread from Chechnya to the other segments of the North Caucasus in large measure because the Russian efforts at counterinsurgency have been sufficiently robust to inflame but not to suppress.  The Kremlin may have taken false comfort in the slow motion pace of insurgent activities in the North Caucasus while failing to recall that the the jihadists of the North Caucasus have preferred mediagenic attacks far from home, usually in Moscow.

The suicide bombing meets the test of being a politically shocking media spectacular.  It will grab the full and undivided attention of both Putin and Medvedev.  For Putin in particular the bombing has a very real urgency given that he most probably will seek to return to the presidential post in elections next year.

Putin, it should be remembered, won his political bones in 1999 with his successful ending of the Chenchen war.  Each and every outrage since then has reminded the Russian people and particularly the elites that the insurgency continues.  Each and every outrage is a challenge to Putin's reputation and a threat to his future.

The attack on the international arrivals area of Domodedovo airport has thrown down the gauntlet at a time and in a place which will no doubt convince many in the political elite that Putin has lost his magic, that only a well polished surface remains of a man once thought to be tough and innovative enough to provide a secure and prosperous future for the rebuilding Russia.  Medvedev may be the man issuing enhanced security orders today, but no one in the Russian "know" believes that anyone other than Putin is actually responsible for the situation in the North Caucasus.

If Putin is really serious about returning to the president's office--or even remaining as prime minister--he will have to take a much more hands-on approach to the challenge represented by the advocates of violent political Islam in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.  Gone are the easy going days of appointing a local strongman as capo, or delegating some former KGB general to "clarify the situation and put it to order."  Putin may have to go personally to direct a massive operation aimed not so much at counterinsurgency as at (using the old Russian/Soviet practice) creating a desert and calling it peace.

Next year, 2012, is election time in Russia, and then two years later it is the time of the Winter Olympic Games scheduled to be hosted by Russia in a venue uncomfortably proximate to the heartland of violent political Islam.  This means that for the Kremlin, time is of the essence as attorneys like to put it.  Putin's less than competent, not to say, half-baked, notions of counterinsurgency have frittered away the past several years without either suppressing the leadership or demobilizing support within the population for the goals, if not the total agenda, of the pro-violent political Islam cadre.

From the shortness of time and the probable ill effects upon the elites' perception of Putin's competence, it is not risky to infer that Vladimir of the Bare Chest has few options other than a massive military campaign aimed at the rapid destruction of the jihadists capacity to stage attacks on any but the smallest of small scales. Approaches of greater finesse simply take too much time.

Of course, the use of large military formations, even battalion sized units of special duty troops, carries with it some very real risks.  One risk, of course, is failure.  The local terrain both physical and human favors the insurgents.  The Russian army, even its special duty units, have not demonstrated a high degree of capability so far either in the North Caucasus or Tajikistan.  During the earlier Chechen wars, the Russian military showed the same deficiencies as it had in Afghanistan, including a willingness to kill far more people than genuinely needed to be killed.

Another, larger risk, is that military operations carry with them the strong potential of a negative portrayal in the media of the world.  Media and human rights organizations which feed the media have exhibited both a strong aversion to the reality that people are killed and things broken during wars, including counterinsurgcies. The same crew have demonstrated repeatedly that they have a very tender concern for the fate not only of non-combatants caught in the theater of operations but also insurgents.  Time after time, both media and human rights groups have declared in effect that insurgents are all pure and good but the status quo forces are all evil and malignant.

Russia and Putin need a bad international press like they need another insurgency.  The costs which may be imposed by the US, the EU, and other "concerned" parties may be high.  If that proves to be the case there is a strong probability that the Russian leadership will respond by invoking some of the bad behavior internationally which was once the patented product of the Soviet Union.  This sort of reaction would complicate the diplomatic life of the US and others.

Even with these risks, doing nothing, or nothing more than more of the same, constitutes a greater risk for Mr Putin.  Both he and Mr Medvedev have termed the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus the single greatest security threat facing Russia.  The blast at the airport may convince both, or at least Vladimir (the Strong Horse) Putin that the time has come to treat the insurgents appropriately.

If that proves to be the case, it will take more than Allah's will to save the insurgents.

Red Faces On Red Square

OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the red faces are not in Red Square but right nearby in the Kremlin.  The cause for the embarrassment is easy to discover.  Despite recent declarations of victory, the advocates and practitioners of violent political Islam are not only alive and well in Chechnya but eager to show their vitality.

As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve.  Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.

The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny.  They died, of course.  They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.

The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted.  The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year.  In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.

Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle.  This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated.  He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."

The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year.  But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.

For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties.  Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005.  In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period.  All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.

The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus.  Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency.  The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."

The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate.  While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic.  The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.

Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring.  The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance."  Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies.  While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat.  With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.

If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable.  The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings.  In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus.  Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.

The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics.  Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency.  The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation.  Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.

Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy.  Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets.  Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.

Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies.  Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition.  This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.

Back to the drawing board, Vladimir.  The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism.  The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior.  It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid.  So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.

In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin.  The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan.  The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.

Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley.  The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years.  Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.

The IUU has been around since 1991.  Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well.  Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports.  This make IUU a large and growing threat.

The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone.  The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents.  However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.

Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents.  Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division.  This unit shares responsibility for border security.  Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.

The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water.  Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.

Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region.  Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.

The US has a bull in this herd.  Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses.  The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan.  Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.

The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions.  More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere.  To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.

There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia.  The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran.  In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.

Don't you just love it?

Co-opting To The Extreme

Crane Brinton in his classic study of offensive insurgencies Anatomy of Revolution focused on a critical dynamic found in most insurgencies which he called "co-option to the left."  By this he meant the process by which all offensive insurgencies (those which seek a total reconstruction of the political, social, and economic order of a state) move continuously to the Left, a trajectory to the ever more extreme.  The dynamic is reversed with the inevitable reaction.  The reaction sees a continuous move to an ever more extreme Rightest position.

It has been interesting to see a akin process at work in several Muslim venues.  The only difference between that which is seen currently in Muslim locations as diverse as the Gaza Strip and Chechnya and the one described by Brinton is the ideological basis.  In Muslim societies the predicate is religious while the examples employed by Brinton were secular in nature.

Let's take a quick dekko at Gaza.  Hamas shot its way to power as a nationalistic entity with the larger goal of ending Israel as a sovereign state.  The lads of Hamas had far more familiarity with crude rockets, AK-47s, and suicide vests than the Koran or Haddith.  In addition to their long standing and now defeated rival, the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority, Hamas faced other rivals most notably Islamic Jihad.

Islamic Jihad and other, smaller groups were every bit as dedicated to the dubious proposition of wiping Israel off the map.  Beyond this the rival groups expounded an austere version of Islam based as was that of Taliban on the Wahhibist interpretation favored by Saudi Arabia.  Hamas found itself under challenge not for a deficiency of zeal in seeking to kill Israelis but in its dedication to the One True Faith.

To meet this threat Hamas has moved speedily to the extreme.  It has called and raised its rivals in religious enthusiasm and commitment to the strictures of Islam.  In quick order Hamas moved to force the citizens of Gaza to act like Muslims--or else.  In ways completely devoid of surprise, the weight of the new Hamas Live Up To Mohammad campaign fell on women.

Hamas shoved women back into garbage sacks from which they had long been liberated.

It moved on to suppress women so boldly un-Islamic as to puff water pipes in public.

Then coed beaches were banned.  As was swimming apparel more revealing than the landlocked garbage bags.

A man on a motorbike with a woman riding behind him?  No way!  Mixed sex groups at a cafe?  Forget it!  A public display of the mildest affection?  Call the cops!

If necessary Hamas will emulate Taliban in all respects.  School for girls?  Yer outta your mind.  Women working?  Against the will of Allah.

Badda-bing!  We, the Fearless Warriors of Hamas have proven ourselves far more truly Muslim than the wannabes of Islamic Jihad and the rest.  We can oppress women better!

Lest one think that only thuggish groups comprising pretend governments can enter the Live Pure Or Die! contest, Chechnya is a case study.  In that insurgency wracked backwater of Russia, the insurgency oriented adherents of violent political Islam are in the process of being religiously outpointed by the handpicked local chieftain put in place by Vladimir Putin with the demand that the situation "be clarified and put to order."

While there is a strong odor of violent political Islam in the air of Chechnya, the insurgents are primarily oriented toward gaining independence from Moscow.  The agenda is: Independence first, Shariah later.  For most Chechans, most of the time, the fashion statements and etiquette requirements of Islam are not of great moment.  The insurgent leadership has not wasted time, energy, or legitimacy on insisting that women show no more of themselves than one or two eyes or putting chastity barriers between the sexes.

The Moscow subservient government of Chechnya has taken up the cause of Islamic morality.  Thugs in the employ of the government both uniformed and not have been set out in pursuit of un-garbage bagged women, as well as women in the company of men other than their brothers, fathers, or husbands.  Condign and salutary beatings have been freely and publicly administered to women found not in compliance with the new government standards of appropriate Islamic apparel and conduct.

The government is saying to all Muslim Chechens, "See, we oppress women best.  We are the True Embodiment of the True Faith, you must rally to us--or be branded apostate."

There is a problem here, Moscow.  You see, your local heavyweights have misread the situation.  Chechnya is not Afghanistan of fifteen years ago.  It isn't even Gaza today.  It is not the right place for an imitation Taliban.

In Chechnya, a very traditional society, custom dictates that it is the father, or the husband, who has the sole responsibility and authority to determine what constitutes proper Islamic clothing or behavior for his daughters or wife.  Not the government.  Not even the nationalistic insurgents.  Islam in practice, Islam as it has an effect on daily life, is not even the province of the local cleric.  It is the sole prerogative of the man of the house, archaic as that term may be to Westerners.

Pakistan is balancing precariously on a tipping point between continuing as it has--an Islamic republic with notable secular features--or becoming a quasi-theocracy of the Taliban variety.  In the contest with the Taliban of Pakistan and related groups, the pressure on the government to get out in front of the anti-government forces in applying severe strictures is intense and may prove irresistible.

Much of the population of Pakistan is already far to the religious "right" of the government.  To keep its slim hold on power, the government may see the least-worst option is that of adopting a more-Muslim-than-thou approach.  Proving it can oppress women better may be the course of action most attractive to the men of the current elite and the government it controls.

A lurch to the religious extreme would have severe and immediate repercussions in the already tenuous relation between the US and Pakistan.  A government crackdown on immodest dress or "immoral" behavior on the part of women particularly if combined with a Taliban or al-Shabaab campaign against music, movies, dancing, or anything smacking of fun would not sit well with many in the US government to say nothing of many of We the People.

But, desperate governments undertake desperate actions.  Faced with an imminent loss of power, a seismic shift to Wahhibism on steroids is not only thinkable but the only thinkable proposition.  The potential of American opposition, of a weakening of US support, will be discounted on two predicates: The US needs Pakistan too much and, what the hey, the US can accept the Saudi oppression of women.

Both rationalizations may prove true.  But, before the government of Pakistan considers adopting the out-Taliban-Taliban approach it might recall the joy with which those Pakistanis who had at first welcomed Taliban came to despise and fear the Men of Turban and Koran.  Despise them so much that the incoming Pakistani forces were welcomed literally as liberators.

Having no fun in life wears thin.  Just ask an Iranian.

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The "Black Widows" Make It Personal For Vladimir

Vladimir Putin owes his rise to power to Chechnya. He became the Mr Big of the Kremlin by appearing to have suppressed the Islamist guerrillas and terrorists of that North Caucasus region both effectively and permanently.

The appearances have proven deceptive at the very least.

The Islamists of Chechnya--and the rest of the North Caucasus--have proven to have more lives than a brigade of cats. Despite boasts to the contrary ("Chechnya is now the safest place on Earth") the efforts of the Kremlin's (read "Putin's") handpicked local strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov, have failed to suppress or limit the will to fight on the part of the Islamists and, even more, their lady's auxiliary, the "Black Widows."

Not even the dispatch of yet one more retired KGB general last fall with orders "to clarify the situation and put it to order" has done other than bolster both the capacities and political will of the Islamist jihadi under the leadership of Doku Umarov. Umarov famously warned, "Blood will no longer be limited to our towns and cities. The war is coming to their cities."

And, so it has. Dramatically.

Even more, the war has been brought not simply to Moscow but straight to Vladimir (Just Think Of Me As The Good Czar) Putin.

Doku Umarov has personally slapped the glove of challenge in the face of Vlad The Bare Chested. While the "glove" was a pair of female suicide bombers reprising earlier attacks on the Metro subway and Russian domestic airliners, the fist inside the glove was Doku's.

The goal of the attack was not simply that of killing Moscow strap hangers. Nor was it limited to instilling terror in the city.

Doku is not the sort of Islamist who thinks that small. He is, after all, the self-styled "Emir" of the equally self-proclaimed Emirate of the Caucasus. Today's attack was intended to fry far larger fish.

Even if not followed by more spectaculars, this hit on the Metro puts the lie to the overly optimistic declaration a year ago by President Medvedev that Chechnya and environs were peaceful. Eager to agree, Ramzov proposed a fifteen billion dollar investment by the Kremlin with a view to turning Chechnya into a tourist magnet.

Well, that hallucination which should have been firmly put to rest by events later in 2009 most assuredly has been shredded by the shrapnel filled explosive belts detonated by the latest Black Widow team. Putin quite obviously both acknowledges this reality--and has accepted the personal nature of the challenge.

He cut short his trip to Siberia and, on his way to Moscow, promised to "destroy" the terrorists responsible. One should take Putin at his word. The record shows that Vladimir shares with past, successful Russian leaders a tilt to blunt speech--and blunt actions to match.

From Vladimir's perspective not only is his status on the line, so also is the Great Power status of Russia. The irony here is that only days after having levered the US successfully to achieve not only a new START but also the level of diplomatic and political attention and respect due a Great Power, the Black Widows prove that Russia is not master of its own house. That sort of thing does not further the credibility and good repute of a genuine Great Power.

If Vladimir Putin is to remain in power, under whatsoever job title, Doku Umarov and his scrofulous jihadist gang including the ladies auxiliary must be eliminated. If Russia is to continue to lay claim to the title Great Power, Doku Umarov and his crew must be eliminated. Or, to use that fine old Soviet origin term, "liquidated."

The repressive measures taken to date, most importantly those of the past few years following Putin's decision to localize the Chechen war and marginalize both its existence and its costs, have been sufficiently repressive enough to force the evolution of the insurgents from a local band focused on the local goal of autonomy to an internationally linked entity which accepts the unlimited vision of Islamism including but not limited to the creation of an independent Islamist republic in the North Caucasus.

During the same time period and for the same reasons the counterinsurgency efforts of the Putin team have not been such as to lever the insurgents of limited goals away from the more expansively oriented Islamists. The net result of the several military campaigns stretching back over a decade has been the creation of a lot of dead bodies. The dead bodies in turn have created an ever greater number of ever more dedicated and expansively oriented insurgents whose fury has been stoked by foreign Islamists.

The dead bodies of the two wars and numerous "anti-bandit" operations have created another reality, a reality which is not only the centerpiece of today's Metro attack but is far more typical of the Caucasus conflict than it is other Islamist insurgencies. That reality is the female suicide bombers long ago dubbed the "Black Widows" not only because they are widows or because they habitually dress in black, but because they are highly lethal in both intents and actions.

The "Black Widows" are a product of the culture of the Caucasus. They are not specifically Islamist nor even Islamic. Rather they are part and parcel of the long traditions of family and clan loyalty which includes the blood feud and revenge over generations. The "Black Widows" are avenging the deaths of their husbands, fathers, brothers, sons. They are a culturally approved expression of an underlying "payback is a medivac" worldview.

The Black Widows can be killed but otherwise they are an unstoppable force. Recognizing this, the Islamist jihadists of Umarov readily employ this priceless asset. This asset ably employed by a leadership which is also quite willing and capable of employing other mediagenic tactics such as seizing hospitals, theaters, and schools filled with the sick, the young or, at least, the civilian, knowing what the Russian response will, must, be.

The choice presented to Vladimir Putin and company is simple and stark. Create a desert and name it "Peace" and by so doing risk the opprobrium of the world, or at least the Great Powers (other than China.) Do less and run the real risk of both political collapse domestically and the loss of even the pretense of Great Power status globally.

Putin used the word "destroy" so it is apparent which way he is tilting. It is unfortunate that he cannot face Umarov mano a mano, since that possibility and that one alone would allow the "Good Czar" to win without losing even more in the process.

Meanwhile, Back In The Caucasus--

It has been awhile since the last consideration of Vladimir Putin's favorite war--the one in the Caucasus. The Geek, ever motivated by an earnest belief in the fellowship of nations, did offer a recipe for success against the jihadists of Chechnya (and environs) but Vlad Of The Bare Chest did not deign to take the hint.

Instead he chose to send yet one more retired general to the region with orders "to clarify the situation and put it to order." Well, bucko, that just hasn't happened. Nor is it likely to.

The local defensive insurgent agenda which originally powered the jihadists has now been supplemented, if not totally replaced, by the all inclusive, ever expansive one of global jihad. This spells even more trouble for the Guys In The Kremlin and their subordinates in the KGB, oops! the Geek meant to write FSB, to say nothing of the army.

The leadership of the self-organizing Islamist insurgents is now comprised of genuine True Believers in political Islam. Men such as Doku Umarov may be local boys by birth and ancestry but they are globalists in their Islamism guided by clerics such as the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Mohammad al-Maqdidi. Other key figures such as the East Siberian born Alexander Tikomirov now renamed Said Buryatski have spent years studying Islam, Arabic, and the fine art or craft of waging jihad abroad. Buryatski, for example, lived in Egypt for years.

A couple of weeks back FSB special operations personnel killed a genuine al-Qaeda operational level commander, Makhmoud Mokhammad Shaaban, in Dagestan. Shaaban was both an Egyptian national and, according to FSB, the man behind several shootings and suicide bombings. This development pleased FSB as it gave credence to its long held position that the "rebels" in the Caucasus were al-Qaeda inspired and directed.

There have been other signs showing the increased importance of global jihad. An excellent example is the proliferation of "martyrdom" videos on the assorted Islamist websites. This was unheard of only a short time back. In some of the videos all of which feature flags of the North Caucasus "Emirate," the martyrs-to-be are heard chanting in Arabic. And, upon translation, some of what is being said tracks back to the words of al-Maqdidi, the Man Of The Faith who lives in the Kingdom of Jordan.

The prolific Jordanian cleric has been a person of interest to US and other Western intelligence agencies for quite a while now given his relations with and influence upon Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahri. The man is an intellectual heavyweight in the global Islamist movement and must not be underrated in his effect upon the initially rather localized defensive insurgency.

Putin, Medvedev, and Company have tried to continue the failed policy of pretending that somehow Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are not part of Russia. This pretense has been driven by a desire to assure the conflict is contained to the region.

Russia has at least twenty million Muslims in its population. Only half of these live in the North Caucasus. This means the insurgents have a very real potential to horizontally escalate their war with the Kremlin. And, the Kremlin knows this.

As the hold of global Islamist jihad grows tighter and stronger within the North Caucasus insurgent groups, the drive to carry jihad deeper and stronger into the heartland of Mother Russia will grow apace. At the same time as the technical proficiency of the insurgents increases--as it must given that combat experience in Afghanistan is being transmitted by returning Caucasians--the walls of the Kremlin and the pavement of the square in front will be covered by Russian blood.

Vladimir The Robust has already missed his last, best chance at suppressing the insurgency. The Russian government and "organs of state security" failed to separate the local grievance motivated sheep. Now the power and appeal of the Islamist message assures that the goats are proliferating as the sheep die out.

Iran exists as a complicating factor for Putin, et al. The mullahs can, should they so decide, provide assistance to the jihadi of the North Caucasus. The border with Iran is even more porous than that between the US and Mexico--and we all know how permeable The Great Fence of the Southwest is. Improved munitions such as explosively formed penetrators would constitute a major enhancement of jihadi capabilities.

At the same time the Kremlin must be aware of just how easily weapons and munitions up to and including those of a mass destruction nature can be acquired within Russia itself provided the buyer has the money. Money need not be an issue given the growth in drug usage in Russia and the role Russia plays as a point of transit between the poppy fields of Afghanistan and the markets of Europe.

This reality implies a motive for Russian understanding and cooperation with the US and its allies in the Afghan war. Russia would benefit greatly from a military success on the part of the US in that venue.

In any event the initiative rests firmly with the Islamist jihadists of the North Caucasus as of this moment. Unless the Kremlin acts as though the region is part of Russia and that the conflict can spread rapidly and in an undesirably bloody fashion whenever and wherever the jihadists choose, the war can only favor the insurgents.

Putin, Medvedev, and the rest have a choice to make. It is not a nice choice. They can continue to putter about waiting for the Islamists to strike. Or, they can reprise many episodes in Russian history and create a desert named "peace."

It is nice to see that the US is not alone in making very tough choices.

Some Free Advice For Vladimir And Dmitry

Well, guys, the Geek understands that matters have been going down hill at a high rate of knots in the North Caucasus, particularly Ingushtia and, everyone's old favorite, Chechnya. It's got to be tough getting a good night's sleep even in the Kremlin what with all the bombs going off and what not.

The problem is you all are getting all fired up to do the "same old, same old" which has brought such stunning lacks of success as those experienced in Afghanistan, as well as the two Chechen Wars. Come on, men, even the US military has shown it can (eventually) learn from its own mistakes, blunders, and wrong-headed doctrine. What's wrong with you Russians? Trying to equal Israel as the World's Most Inept Counterinsurgent?

The Geek knows enough Russian history to understand that the reflexive reaching for the knout is almost as deeply embedded as a vodka based toast. But, come on, get a grip, fellows!

There is a role for coercion in successful counterinsurgency as any reader of this blog knows. It is critical to remember one very important fact: The role is critical but limited. Coercion is the secondary, not the primary means by which those pesky insurgents can be removed as an ongoing nuisance.

"Toughness" is not the watchword. Sure, Dmitry, calling for "tough" trials for terrorists may sound good on TV and even play well in the Russian equivalent of Peoria, but it isn't the magic word, or even the right one. Anyway, the judicial remedy is, as you darn well know, only a very small part of the solution.

OK, let's walk it through slowly.

You boys have a real problem on your hands in Ingushtia and the rest of the neighborhood. Your little insurgencies there are of a mixed sort. They combine nationalism with Islamist jihadism. And, that makes the insurgents a far more difficult sort of proposition.

The reinforcing nature of nationalism which has been stoked repeatedly by the worst sort of foul treatment from the Kremlin for some two hundred years and Islamist jihadism with its ability to use religious beliefs of a particularly powerful and pervasive form makes the insurgent in Ingushtia, Chechnya, and akin spots very highly motivated, quite willing to kill, and rather immune to the fear of death. The new guy you have appointed to "clarify" and "put to order" the affairs of the insurgent rich North Caucasus ought to know this.

Arkady Yedelev (who looks both brutal and thuggish, if the photo is any guide) ought to be aware of the challenge presented by the nationalistic Islamist jihadist (whew! That's a mouthful!) from his service in Chechnya. This "battle hardened" former KGB and Federal Security Service general was responsible in part for creating a desert in much of Chechnya and calling it peace.

The problem comes in that while Yedelev and others might have declared peace reigned forever more in the North Caucasus, it was rather the case that the war went underground to await a better day in the future. And, the future is now.

To put it simply, unless you lads in the Kremlin are willing to risk the global opprobrium which would result from turning the Yedelevs of your military and security forces loose, you will not be able to kill your way to victory. The truth of the matter is the Russian Army would have to kill entirely too many people in order to create enough of a desert to be peaceful in the aftermath.

And, that sort of mass effusion would not escape both notice and condemnation. You boys have to remember this isn't the good old days of Joe Stalin when it was possible to quietly murder a few tens of thousands without anyone being particularly aware of it.

So, put a stout leash on the neck of General Yedelev and consider a better, lower body count way of achieving the interlocking goals of restoring a semblance of long term stability to the region while not abandoning the reality of effective operational dominance there. It may take a bit longer, be a little more hazy in outcome, but it will spare Russia any embarrassment before the global audience.

First remember the ground truth: The insurgencies in Ingushtia and Chechnya and environs are a mixture of nationalism and Islamist jihadism.

Next, you have to demobilize the nationalists from the Islamist jihadists since it this second category which is the real tough nut. This means the Kremlin will have to settle for effective operational dominance, not total authority or even evident political supremacy. (Hint, effective operational dominance can be assured by economic and infrastructure means.)

A good starting point would be finding the right man to be the Ingushtian chief executive. It boggles belief that the Kremlin cannot find a single qualified native of Ingushtia to run the place. The bad practice of naming some retired former general as jefe grande simply has to end--that is if you want to defeat the insurgency and not simply purchase another "time-out" through bloody repression.

Then, quite openly and with wide publicity turn over all local matters to the locals--and mean it! No bait and switch, do it!

To gain legitimacy for both the Kremlin and the new local regime find some nice, juicy, high profile, notorious grafters, the real princes of corruption. The more well known, the better. Then, have a show trial. That's what show trials are for. Not for insurgents, for them the trial is simply a venue to dominate. For corrupt, overbearing, grafting officials, the show trial is a great way to both throw the red meat of revenge to the locals and up the perceived functional legitimacy of both the Russian central government and the new local regime.

Think hard, Vladimir, you did the same sort of thing not that many years ago when you cut the oligarchs off at the knees. Did you a lot of good, right? It will again, you can trust the Geek, he's a doctor.

After prying the nationalists from the grasp of the Islamist jihadists, you have to deal with them. While the Geek has no objections to such things as saying nice words about Islam qua Islam, this sort of feel good approach will get you precisely nowhere with the Islamist jihadists. These are the hardest of hard core types.

Now it is time for toughness. Islamist jihadists have often and loudly proclaimed that they love death more than you infidels love life. Take them at their word. These specialists in what they call "martyrdom operations" seem to have a need to die.

The Geek believes in meeting human needs. So, his advice is simple: Kill them.

The Islamist jihadist needs killing. There is no other way to end his infection of the larger population. The reason that Yuri Andropov created your super-mucho-beaucoup elite Alpha Unit was to kill hostiles of the sort represented by the Islamist jihadists in the North Caucasus.

Whistle up the Federal Security Service or whoever runs Alpha these days and tell them to get on with the job. The job is locating, isolating, and eliminating the Islamist jihadists starting with the leadership echelon(s). The critical caveat is that Alpha or whatever trigger-pulling bunch is sent in must not kill anyone other than identifiable Islamist jihadists. And, it is critical that all the Islamist jihadists, particularly those in a leadership billet, be killed. Not some. Not most. All. Otherwise, like a lethal pathogen which has been only partially eliminated by an antibiotic, they will be back--bigger and badder than previously.

Along the way make sure the Kremlin pumps in infrastructure, educational, and economic development funds. These must be expended according to the self-perceived needs and priorities of the locals--not some Deep Thinker in some distant ministry. And, the money must be spent, invested really, in an open, transparent, fair and non-corrupt way. Otherwise the rest will have been in vain and the Kremlin's future effective operational dominance will be put in peril.

There you have it, Dmitry and Vladimir, the Geek's history derived and tested recipe for successful counterinsurgency. Of course, there are risks involved. Success resides in the details of application. And, Russia has a lot of historical inertia to overcome if the details are to be executed properly.

The Geek is not optimistic but feels an obligation to give the advice he has. You see, the prospect of still more bloody war without purpose, without a real, achievable goal, lacking a genuine prospect of resulting in a better state of peace makes the Geek want to engage in projectile vomiting. And, that ain't no fun, brother.

For Russia, It's A Case Of Deja Vue All Over Again

The Russians fought two less than spectacularly successful counterinsurgency campaigns in Chechnya. True, the noise level in Chechnya is down a great deal from its high point(s) but, to make up for the quiet affairs, the noise in next door Ingushetia has grown much louder.

In both places the cause of the noise is Islamism combined with the effects of systematically suppressed nationalism. Either Islamist jihadism or nationalism by itself would not have been sufficient to raise the festering political alienation of the ethnic majorities to the level of insurgency, but together these factors did the job. And, did it well.

The Republic of Ingushetia is another of the many "self-governing" Russian republics. Like its neighbor, Chechnya, Ingushetia is predominantly Muslim as well as being profoundly different both ethnically and linguistically from the Russian minority. The Ingushians are genetically different from their close linguistic and cultural relatives in the Caucasus including the Chechens.

Russia occupied Ingushetia in the early Nineteenth Century. The official Russian version of this holds that the locals voluntarily accepted the rule and law of the Czar. However, a close look at Russian military records for the first half of the century shows a pattern of repeated violent repression followed by yet another outbreak of anti-Russian attacks.

Stalin attempted to liquidate the "nationalities problem" in both Chechnya and Ingushetia by liquidating the population. Many were killed either directly or in the Gulag for their alleged "pro-Nazi" activities. Far more were simply loaded on cattle cars and deported to the various Central Asian Republics. Stalin's approach to ethnic cleansing was robust but ultimately a failure.

Ingushians and Chechens were allowed to return to their homelands following Stalin's death. Upon their return the Ingushtians found that much of the country had been resettled by people from North Ossetia. The resulting friction was substantial.

The repression of the Ingushtians by both Russians and Ossetian transplants culminated in a peaceful demonstration in Grozny in January 1973. The Red Army and KGB Border Troops crushed it with blood in the snow.

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ingushtia stayed with the new Russian Federation in the expectation that the Kremlin would be favorably inclined to honor the Ingushian demand that lands and homes assigned to the transplants from Ossetia be returned. The Ingushtians were disappointed, to put it mildly.

In late 1992 war broke out between Ossetia and Ingushtia. When the shooting stopped the Ingushtians had lost one more time. In the fall out of defeat more than fifty thousand Ingushtians were given the heave-ho from North Ossetia. This bit of ethnic purification went by unnoticed in the West where the events in dissolving Yugoslavia got the marquee billing.

The First Russian-Chechen War spilled over into Ingushtia. In part this was the result of Chechens comprising a fifth of the population. In larger part it was the result of the Russian's very ham handed style of counterinsurgency.

The Russian way of war generated vast numbers of refugees. This was the case in both the First and Second Chechen Wars. It was also the case in Russian counterinsurgency operations in Ossetia. By 2000 there was nearly one refugee for every native Ingushtian. The sketchy infrastructure, poorly developed economy, governmental inefficiency, and terrain combined to assure a maximum of wretchedness for locals and refugees alike.

The situation was made even worse (even though that barely seems possible) in 2001 when the incumbent president was ousted by the Kremlin and replaced by a former KGB general named Murat Zyazikov. Zyazikov presided over a fair approximation of a reign of terror. Russian and Ossetian death squads roamed the countryside. Young Ingushtians were declared fair game in an always open season.

The result was (stand by for shock and surprise) the emergence of an Ingushtian insurgency. It was powered in equal measure by an Islamist strain of Islam and a deep loathing of the Russians.

The Russians responded in the tried, true, and counterproductive fashion of sending more troops with more bullets and greater latitude to use the latter against anyone who might be Ingushtian. The Russians, particularly those of the Federal Security Service, went to work with a whoop and wild abandon.

The result?

(Stand by for yet one more shock.) The insurgency went more or less underground. For the next few years the insurgents recruited, organised, received arms and training. At the same time the Islamist motivations were stoked as recruits were indoctrinated in the nuances of martyrdom and similar prerequisites for jihad.

Last October the results of recruitment, travel to such Islamist jihadist training and operational areas as Iran, Iraq,Afghanistan, and the FATA as well as the improvements in arms, tactics, and willingness for martyrdom became obvious. On 18 October the insurgents showed one time KGB heavy Zyazikov to have been way too top spin in his reports to the Kremlin.

Approximately fifty Russian troops were killed when a very well coordinated ambush was pulled on their convoy. The Kremlin and the locals took an old page from the Soviet playbook. They lied, alleging that only two men died as a result of a minor skirmish with disaffected Muslims.

Only the last two words approached accuracy. Vladimir Putin punted General Zyazikov out the door and sent in yet more troops. This proves that even Vladimir The Bare Chested can make mistakes--no, blunders.

How big a blunder has become increasingly evident during 2009. The insurgents have been (almost literally) decimating the official government of the Republic.

True, Vladimir working through his front guy, Dimitri Medvedev, appointed a new president. The new man, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, was speedily approved of by the local parliament and the major political parties of Ingushtia.

The former paratroop general (what's the matter, can't the Kremlin find anyone other than retreaded brasshats to make president of Ingushtia?) was not given a thumbs-up by the insurgents. They showed their disapproval of the new guy at the top on 22 June with a suicide type attack on Yevkurov which narrowly failed to kill the man. The severely injured president was in a coma for weeks but survived. Well, paratroops are noted for being tough even if not particularly brilliant nor subtle.

A few days back Yevkorov recovered sufficiently to say he was staying on the job and was quite committed to ending the unrest and corruption. The still rather unwell appearing man stated that he did not want "revenge" but he would continue the policies of repression albeit perhaps a little "tougher."

While the Kremlin designated Maximum Leader was getting the best of medical care in a Moscow hospital, the insurgents had not been resting on their laurels. The number and skill of attacks increased much to the dismay and displeasure of the Kremlin. At the center, Russian senior level leaders were casting around for the causes of the "spike" in violence--or, lacking that, at least a scapegoat.

The designated fall guy was the Kremlin's own man. Specifically the Regional President responsible for the North Caucasus region, Ramzan Kadyrov. This worthy is a thug. As long as the lid was on in Chechnya, Ingushtia and other regional republics, old Ramzan was a good thug. But, with the lid popping off in Ingushtia, he had become a bad thug.

The hatchetman appointed for the job of offing the bad thug was General Gennady Zaitsev, the commander of the hot shot, mucho elite counter-terrorist group, the Alpha unit, started by KGB chief Yuri Andropov a generation back. Zaitsev as much as said it was time to give Kadyrov a bullet in the back of the neck.

Finding the right man to sacrifice and the correct dude to do the job may be satisfying to Putin, Medvedev and Co., but it means squat in the game of Beat The Islamist Insurgent. Ritual victims are exercises in myth; insurgencies are real world.

The Islamist jihadists grew ever more active. Ever more willing to kill without particular discrimination. They were matched by the "security forces," which seemed bent on matching the insurgents in bloodlust.

The Islamist jihadists were willing to die as well. Provided only that the "martyrdom seeker" could bring enough victims with him. Suicide bombings of police stations have their place. So also does the ongoing campaign of selective assassination of government officials.

In total the efforts of the insurgents demonstrate a high level of competence as well as the type of dedication one has grown to expect from true Islamist jihadists. In total the efforts of both the Russian and Ingushtian government to end the insurgency have shown both a strikingly low level of proficiency and a willingness to operate on a business-as-usual basis tolerating corruption, inefficiency, and contempt for the locals.

The Kremlin, specifically, President Medvedev has taken action in the wake of the suicide bombing. In keeping with all past Russian behavior, he has appointed a "battle hardened" general to take charge of the situation. To, in Medvedev's pithy phrase, "clarify what happened."

It is going to take more than one general, no matter how "battle hardened" to "clarify" and "put in order" the situations in Ingushtia, Chechnya, and other Islamist jihadist anterooms to Paradise in the North Caucasus. Even if President Medvedev is unacquainted with the results of blending Islamist jihadism with nationalism as was the case in Afghanistan, the man behind the throne, Vladimir (Bare Chested Man On Horseback) Putin must be aware. After all he was in the KGB.

Since the Russian memory is apparently short as the Bear got its hairy rear end kicked hard in Afghanistan only twenty years ago, the men of the Russian Army, Federal Security Service (KGB under a nicer name) and the Kremlin must have to relearn the lesson that Islamist jihadism plus nationalism makes for a very hard opponent to defeat. Given that the Russians place even more faith in coercion as the sovereign remedy for all political ills than do the Israelis (or before they got the message in Iraq, the Americans) it is unlikely in the extreme that the new jihad in the Caucasus will be over quickly or, from the Russian perspective, succesfully.

Couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of guys.

Russian Counter-terrorism--Spare Me!

The Geek would enjoy very much standing on the sidelines and watching the recent "anti-terrorism" war game involving Chinese and Russian forces. It would have been more of a hoot than listening to Dick Cheney prognosticate a quick, easy, and cheap victory in Iraq.

And, just as out to lunch.

If the Russians are as good at counter-terrorism as they are at counter-insurgency, Osama bin Ladin and the rest of the merry bomb throwers are absolutely safe.

To be quite blunt, it is the Geek's typically humble opinion that the Russians are so bad at both varieties of military force employment they make the US look good. What the hey, the Russians are so pathetic, they make the Israelis look good at it,

(Pre-emptive strike follows. Before any Israeliphiles out there hyperventilate too much, answer this question for yourselves. If the Israeli Defense and security forces are so good at counter-insurgency, then why are they still doing the job every day forty years after the Six Day War?)

Back when the Russians were the Soviets, the Red Army, NKVD, and the other odious mechanisms at the disposal of the Kremlin could defeat an insurgency. One good example of this is from the closing days of WW II when the "Great Leader and Beloved Teacher" Josef Stalin was running the show. His henchman, Nikita Khrushchev, ramrodded the effort necessary to defeat the Ukrainians who showed displeasure at the return of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat by piling Red Army corpses up in untidy heaps. To shorten a lengthy and very bloody story, Khrushchev created a desert and called it peace.

Stalin approved. He had done the same during the more vigorous days of his youth and rise to power. He had learned a couple of important lessons. It is possible to kill your way to victory. That was lesson number one. Lesson number two was: Don't let word get out about what you're doing.

When outsiders know about what a counter insurgent is doing, it is far less possible to kill your way to victory.

Those pesky folk, those interlopers from the larger world, can impose costs which make the notion of making a desert and calling it peace far less attractive. Not only can they focus diplomatic and economic sanctions, they can provide assistance either covert or open to the insurgents.

There is a second inhibition on the Stalinesque approach of turning whole peoples into corpses. To execute either genocide or ethnic cleansing through population relocation, overwhelming force and enormous resources must be applied quickly and thoroughly. The alternative, too little force, or too much time, assures that the counter insurgent will fall behind the wave. More new insurgents will be created than are removed through death or relocation.

In fairness to historical experience, the second reason has been operative more often in the Russian (and Chinese) experience than the first. It is all too easy for an authoritarian regime to block the word. (Yes, even today. The Internet has a plug. Any government can pull it. Anytime. At least right now.)

The Geek will not bore you with the humorous details of the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan. Suffice it to say that it was not US assistance to the guerrillas that spelled the difference. Nor was it the presence of foreign fighters. Nor was it the simply the determination of the Afghans. Nor, does the Geek believe, was it Allah's will. The Soviets were simply politically and militarily more inept than the US had been in Vietnam. That is saying two or three mouthfuls.

Closer to the Kremlin, the Russians have been facing an insurgency in Chechnya for thirteen years. After numerous assaults (including one by armored units into urban areas which is a recipe for disaster) and boredom with the Chechen war within the West, the Russian Army finally subdued organised resistance and occupied the territory.

Since then the behavior of the Russian Army personnel (and the secret police as well) are of the sort that guarantees a continuation of the insurgency by terroristic means as the recent almost devastating attack on the rail line between Moscow and St. Petersberg shows. If the Geek were to write a list of Things You Must Not Do, If You Want To Win, the Russians can be shown to have violated almost every Thou Must Not.

The troops burgle, assault, rape, and murder with impunity. At least 5,000 rapes by Russian personnel have been reported--not committed, but reported--since 1999. The total number of murdered and disappeared Chechens cannot be estimated accurately. Suffice it to note that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled against Russia no fewer than thirteen times in the past few years. (Stalin must be spinning in his grave. In the old days the word never would have leaked out.) In the most recent decision, the Court ordered the Kremlin to pay 143,000 euros to a village where drunken troops killed fifty-six civilians (none of them of military age and most women or children.)

Lest anyone think the Russians learn from the mistakes of the past, just a few days back in another "counter-terrorist" operation in one more small, rural village, twenty-seven were hospitalised including a woman seven months pregnant and kids less than fifteen years old. There was no definitive word on either the number of dead or the number of terrorists captured.

The humanitarian side of the Geek would like to give some friendly advice to the Russians such as the days of Stalin are past. Creating a wasteland and calling it peace is not a viable option. He will refrain as he hates to waste good advice.

The Russians wouldn't listen. Perhaps they are deaf from the sound of exploding bombs.