While events in the Mideast, most recently Libya, have been sucking all the media and diplomatic oxygen, a faraway state in Central Asia faces both internal and external threats. Tajikistan hasn't made the news, but it is currently facing set of challenges which threaten to turn it into either a failing state or a hollow one.
Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Its poverty has not helped in the process of repairing the deep social and political wounds inflicted on the country by the five years of warfare between Tajiks and Uzbeks. Even though that particular war ended nearly fourteen years ago, the scars run Grand Canyon deep across economy, society, and polity alike. Insofar as there has been any recovery from that disastrous little war, it has been the inadvertent consequence of the attention and money flowing into Tajikistan following the invasion of Afghanistan.
Not unexpectedly that money and the "recovery" have served just as much to exacerbate underlying problems as it has to rehabilitate the place.
The sole reason the US or anyone other than either Russia or China is interested in the remote Wisconsin sized region is Afghanistan. Tajikistan has a twelve hundred mile border with Afghanistan. This border edges the formerly peaceful northeastern portion of Afghanistan. The operative word here is "formerly."
Tajikistan borders China for a bit more than four hundred kilometers. While much less than the borders with any of its other neighbors, the Chinese one has been the focus of international tensions. Recently the tensions slacked apparently with the signing of a treaty which ceded some Tajik territory to China. The government of Tajikistan crowed about its victory in that the Chinese gained only a small percentage of the territory it claimed. But, to Tajiks living near the Chinese border, the victory was hollow at best. In a side agreement the government agreed to lease ten square miles of land to China at, to put it delicately, well below market rates. Also, the government permitted China to provide several hundred (thousand? reports differ) farmers to use the land.
President Rahmon has been attacked over the China deal which is seen even in Dushanbe by the microscopic local elite as a sell-out to Beijing. There is a fair amount of belief that China will seek to "lease" more agricultural and pastoral land in the near future while defenders of the president see him as a canny player of the China card as a make weight to Russia.
There is a good deal of accuracy in the notion that President Rahmon is attempting a balancing act so as to curb the possible de facto takeover of Tajikistan by the Kremlin. At the moment Tajikistan is heavily dependent upon Russia for external defense as well as the heavy lifting regarding the insurgency mounted by advocates of violent political Islam.
Rashmon is shaking in his boots over the ever increasing presence of the advocates of political Islam, particularly those of the violent sort. He has been facing a shooting war for the past five years in which the security forces of Tajikistan have not covered themselves with glory--or even much success. Not to overstate the matter, there is a direct link between the uptick of insurgents in the border region and the insertion of larger numbers of lethal and well motivated Afghan Taliban into the northern part of Afghanistan. Given that the Tajik-Afghan border is so porous as to make the Great Fence of the Southwest look more impenetrable than ever was the Berlin Wall, this development should not have surprised anyone--even the Germans who sought service in north Afghanistan as a way of doing something for NATO without actually having to be involved in a shooting war.
The only effective force on the Tajikistan side of the border is a unit of the Russian army. It is there both to stop insurgent border crossers and drug smugglers. The border area is a primary, perhaps the primary, land route for opium and its derivatives on route to Russia and Eastern Europe. The most recent estimates from the Tajikistan government is that some 130 million "doses" of heroin cross the border every year. There was, of course, no source for this figure.
While the amount of drug traffic may be in doubt, there is no doubt who controls the route to and through Tajikistan. The men who run the affair are all advocates of violent political Islam. Most are native Tajiks. The drugs are, along with unemployed workers, the major export of Tajikistan. The Kremlin is of the view, with accuracy, that many of the migrant workers from Tajikistan are themselves members of groups espousing violent political Islam which increases the domestic threat from that quadrant.
The Rahmon regime has taken measures against the growth of political Islam. Some of these have been unique and wide reaching. Notable are the severe restrictions placed upon Tajiks studying in foreign madrassas. Equally severe limits have been placed upon the number of mosques, madrassas, and religious students allowed in Tajikistan. Most recently Rahmon's ministers have proposed prohibiting any person younger than eighteen from attending religious services of any sort. This would affect Muslims primarily as ninety percent of the people are Muslims (eighty-five percent Sunni, five percent Shiite.)
The government has taken the firm position that the unrest, the drug trafficking, and the internal instability are all the result of Islam. While the suppression of the religion may be impossible, it is clear the government has determined to lower the impact of political Islam to an irreducible minimum. As a one time Soviet nomenclatura member, he recalls the old ways and days with fondness.
The Kremlin is quite willing to back Rahmon as it is better to rule the Tajiks from a distance than up close and personal. At the same time any significant growth of the Tajik presence in the North Caucasus based Muslim insurgency will result in more direct, more significant Kremlin involvement in Tajikistan.
The most basic need of the country is money. The problem is the place has little to offer in return for investment. Only the Chinese can see a real potential in Tajikistan. That potential comes not from the microscopic hydrocarbon resources under the soil but the soil itself. The areas closest to the Chinese border are those with the best soil, longest growing season and, the big consideration, the best water. China is facing crop and water shortages at home such as to occasion investment in farmland in Africa. Extending Chinese agriculture and pastoral activities over a few hundred (or thousand) square kilometers of Tajikistan is both cheaper and more convenient.
Should the proposed hydroelectric dams be completed either with World Bank or Chinese investment, they will produce not only quite a bit of electricity (most of which will have to be transported hundreds of kilometers to market), but also irrigation water. This implies that even more land can be brought under (Chinese?) cultivation. If the Chinese insist on providing their own labor force, the difficulties with Tajikistan could be monumental given that nearly eighty percent of the Tajik population is agrarian or pastoral.
Should the Chinese displacement of native Tajik workers continue, and the Islamist insurgency not be fully suppressed, the combination would spell failed state for the Dushanbe government. The only alternative would be to become an independent government and state in name only. This would make Tajikistan the first "hollow state" within the Central Asian Republics. It would probably not be the last.
While most US attention has been directed to other of the several "stans" in Central Asia, it has a dog in the Tajikistan fight. The long, open border with Tajikistan means Taliban and others have free access to Afghanistan not only from Pakistan. As has been seen in recent months, this provides the insurgents with opportunities for horizontal escalation which render American battlefield victories less impressive in their overall effect. Also the convenience of Tajikistan as well as the tightly organized Muslim Tajik cartels which handle the cargo provide an alternative cash cow route. This, in turn, means that even a total halt to flows through Iran or Pakistan will not end the utility of narcotics to the Taliban and others.
All of the various assessments of the state of American strategy (if what we are doing really deserves that term) in Afghanistan have given very, very short shrift to the Tajikistan connection both material and religious. This has been another of the numerous blind spots which have plagued American Deep Thinkers tasked with finding success in that dismal contest.
Just a little reminder that important things are underway far from the attention of the fly-by-night media and their diplomatic cousins. It is an interesting world even when the television cameras aren't there to record.
Showing posts with label Tajikistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tajikistan. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Red Faces On Red Square
OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the red faces are not in Red Square but right nearby in the Kremlin. The cause for the embarrassment is easy to discover. Despite recent declarations of victory, the advocates and practitioners of violent political Islam are not only alive and well in Chechnya but eager to show their vitality.
As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve. Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.
The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny. They died, of course. They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.
The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted. The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year. In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.
Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle. This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated. He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."
The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year. But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.
For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties. Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005. In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period. All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.
The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus. Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency. The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."
The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate. While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic. The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.
Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring. The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance." Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies. While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat. With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.
If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable. The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings. In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus. Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.
The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics. Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency. The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation. Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.
Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy. Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets. Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.
Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies. Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition. This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.
Back to the drawing board, Vladimir. The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism. The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior. It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid. So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.
In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin. The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan. The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.
Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley. The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years. Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.
The IUU has been around since 1991. Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well. Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports. This make IUU a large and growing threat.
The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone. The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents. However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.
Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents. Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division. This unit shares responsibility for border security. Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.
The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water. Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.
Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region. Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.
The US has a bull in this herd. Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses. The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan. Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.
The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions. More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere. To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.
There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia. The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran. In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.
Don't you just love it?
As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve. Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.
The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny. They died, of course. They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.
The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted. The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year. In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.
Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle. This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated. He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."
The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year. But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.
For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties. Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005. In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period. All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.
The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus. Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency. The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."
The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate. While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic. The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.
Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring. The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance." Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies. While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat. With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.
If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable. The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings. In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus. Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.
The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics. Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency. The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation. Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.
Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy. Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets. Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.
Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies. Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition. This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.
Back to the drawing board, Vladimir. The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism. The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior. It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid. So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.
In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin. The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan. The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.
Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley. The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years. Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.
The IUU has been around since 1991. Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well. Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports. This make IUU a large and growing threat.
The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone. The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents. However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.
Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents. Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division. This unit shares responsibility for border security. Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.
The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water. Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.
Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region. Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.
The US has a bull in this herd. Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses. The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan. Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.
The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions. More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere. To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.
There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia. The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran. In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.
Don't you just love it?
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Another Fun War You May Have Missed
Considering all the wars of much higher profile currently underway around the world, a person may have missed the one steadily accelerating in Tajikistan. Not until eight days ago when the NYT performed its self-assigned task as "the newspaper of record," have events in the faraway Central Asian state of Tajikistan made even the smallest of blips on the Western media (and probably, political) radar scopes. The attention grabbing specific was one more exchange in the see-saw war between the central government and groups combining adherents of violent political Islam and nationalists who also are Muslims.
Tajikistan's southern border is with Afghanistan. Its eastern border is with China. To the west is Uzbekistan while the northern border is with Kyrgyzstan. Several features unite Tajikistan with its coterminous states or regions. They are all Muslim majority. They are all possessed of internal instability including violent unrest and the presence of groups advocating violent political Islam. With the exception of Afghanistan all are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO.)
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan went through five years of internal war. The war for control of the state was ethnic (usually camouflaged as "regional") between Uzbeks, who had run the place during the seventy years of Soviet overlordship, and the native Tajiks. The war ended in a peace of exhaustion which featured the appearance but not the reality of power sharing. While roughly eighty percent of the population is Tajik, these did not exercise an equivalent amount of power. Rather, it was the sixteen percent who were Uzbek who got the majority of the "say" as well as the benefits.
It is not surprising that many Tajiks did not find the settlement agreeable. Retreating to the remote, mountain ringed and almost totally isolated Rasht valley, the die hards rested and regained strength. They also gained both recruits from and combat experience in Afghanistan. For years, until May 2009, the valley was a no-go area for the central government and its army. During the years of immunity, the resting, regrouping insurgents also discovered a very prolific cash cow--establishing drug transportation routes. While the dollar amount accruing to this ever more lucrative activity cannot be estimated with any pretense of precision, there is no doubt but much, perhaps most of the morphine base flowing from Afghanistan to customers in Russia and beyond came through the friendly Rastht valley.
The Dushanbe government was under Kremlin pressure to "do something" about the embarrassing flow of drugs. To this end as well as with the expectation of speedily ending the pesky rebels, the army moved a regimental equivalent (say, 2000 men) into the valley in May 2009. It may be that the Tajik government anticipated goodies from the US and its NATO partners for playing an indirect roll in reducing the narco-trafficking from Afghanistan.
In the event, the insurgents did not pack it when the army showed its flag a year and half ago. What happened instead was a slow motion but still bloody exchange of raids and counter-raids, ambushes, snipers, vehicle bombings, and the usual accompaniment of atrocities, extra-judicial killings, and general human rights abuses. But, being remote and in part protected by the media blackout capabilities of both Russia and China, the nasty little war went unnoticed.
Then, in a dramatic change, the government opted for its own version of a war winning "surge." The surge resulted in a very dramatic culmination: On 19 September a platoon plus sized column of Tajik troops was ambushed in Komarob Gorge by forces headed by a veteran of the earlier civil war, Alovuddin Davlatov. When the bang-bang stopped, twenty-eight Tajik troopers were dead. At least twenty-five more were wounded. The insurgents took no known losses.
The government has made retaliatory raids. Small success has crowned the efforts. Effective escalation is not a viable option--unless it was underwritten by an outside power. And, this is unlikely as the only candidates, Russia and Uzbekistan, are preoccupied with internal problems such that neither would seek further complications either domestic or international.
The capacities of the Tajikistan government are limited by several very powerful constraints. The first is economic. Tajikistan is far and away the most impoverished of the states carved from the corpse of the Soviet Union. It is not a gross exaggeration to say that hunger is already stalking the land.
A second potent limitation on the government's ability to act decisively is the widespread nature of anti-government sentiment. The impoverished majority blame their situation on the government, its corruption, its inefficiency, its arrogant remoteness, and its minority nature. This combination propelled the overthrow of a seemingly well-entrenched regime in Kyrgyzstan. President Rahmon is not eager to share the same fate.
Yet another limitation arises from the low average age of the population. The median age of men in the place is under twenty-two. As history and contemporary events show clearly, it is young men who are most amenable to the appeals of true belief such as that offered by political Islam. Men of this age cohort are also afflicted with the adolescent belief in immortality and invulnerability so are perfect candidates for the excitement, challenge, and specious sense of meaning provided by war.
The US has a presence in Tajikistan which is linked to the overall infrastructure supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. So the current administration has some reason to worry about the direction of affairs in the country. So far our response to the growing problem in Tajikistan is an offer to establish an anti-terrorist training center. Beyond that there is probably a hope that no matter which way the governmental chips might fall whoever is in charge will still need the revenue provided by our base rights lease so we can afford a "what! Me, worry?" approach. (This level of non-response response is also predicated upon the Kremlin's automatic opposition to any American move which might undercut the presumed Russian preeminence in Tajikistan.)
Russia has much more to fret about, but given the failure of the Kremlin and its handpicked agents to "clarify and put to order" the Muslim insurgency in the Northern Caucasus, it has little to offer. Further, the relations between the Kremlin and Tajikistan are, to put it in polite terms, "strained."
Then there is China, China has been having more than a few problems with its homegrown advocates of violent political Islam coupled with nationalism. They have no reason to ignore a bunch of like minded Muslims next door in Tajikistan. That, after all, is one of the, more accurately, the reason behind Beijing creating the SCO. (Russia played a game of "me-too" in a defensive move protecting its privileged position in the Central Asian Republics and isn't thrilled about the SCO's existence.)
Beyond the SCO flexing its semi-mythical muscle, there is nothing real the Trolls of Beijing can do--except send money. To date the Trolls have seen no need to do this perhaps as they see Rahmon's regime as a poor investment.
Winter's winds are starting to blow from the mountains surrounding the Rasht valley. The government, having been soundly bested in its attempt to wind up the insurgency before the snow calls a time out, there is not much chance that anything spectacular will happen in the next few months. Yet, as is the case in most "time-outs" in insurgent guerrilla war, the advantage goes automatically to the insurgents. They have the greater opportunity to operate, recruit, gain resources. The government will have the time to be weakened further by the slow but sure erosion of legitimacy and support which comes with pervasive poverty and loss of confidence in the future.
Don't despair, bucko, we will be hearing and seeing a lot more from the fun little war in a very faraway place by the time the next equinox rolls around.
ADMIN NOTE Despite anti-spam comment defenses which can be frustrating the Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments.
Tajikistan's southern border is with Afghanistan. Its eastern border is with China. To the west is Uzbekistan while the northern border is with Kyrgyzstan. Several features unite Tajikistan with its coterminous states or regions. They are all Muslim majority. They are all possessed of internal instability including violent unrest and the presence of groups advocating violent political Islam. With the exception of Afghanistan all are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO.)
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan went through five years of internal war. The war for control of the state was ethnic (usually camouflaged as "regional") between Uzbeks, who had run the place during the seventy years of Soviet overlordship, and the native Tajiks. The war ended in a peace of exhaustion which featured the appearance but not the reality of power sharing. While roughly eighty percent of the population is Tajik, these did not exercise an equivalent amount of power. Rather, it was the sixteen percent who were Uzbek who got the majority of the "say" as well as the benefits.
It is not surprising that many Tajiks did not find the settlement agreeable. Retreating to the remote, mountain ringed and almost totally isolated Rasht valley, the die hards rested and regained strength. They also gained both recruits from and combat experience in Afghanistan. For years, until May 2009, the valley was a no-go area for the central government and its army. During the years of immunity, the resting, regrouping insurgents also discovered a very prolific cash cow--establishing drug transportation routes. While the dollar amount accruing to this ever more lucrative activity cannot be estimated with any pretense of precision, there is no doubt but much, perhaps most of the morphine base flowing from Afghanistan to customers in Russia and beyond came through the friendly Rastht valley.
The Dushanbe government was under Kremlin pressure to "do something" about the embarrassing flow of drugs. To this end as well as with the expectation of speedily ending the pesky rebels, the army moved a regimental equivalent (say, 2000 men) into the valley in May 2009. It may be that the Tajik government anticipated goodies from the US and its NATO partners for playing an indirect roll in reducing the narco-trafficking from Afghanistan.
In the event, the insurgents did not pack it when the army showed its flag a year and half ago. What happened instead was a slow motion but still bloody exchange of raids and counter-raids, ambushes, snipers, vehicle bombings, and the usual accompaniment of atrocities, extra-judicial killings, and general human rights abuses. But, being remote and in part protected by the media blackout capabilities of both Russia and China, the nasty little war went unnoticed.
Then, in a dramatic change, the government opted for its own version of a war winning "surge." The surge resulted in a very dramatic culmination: On 19 September a platoon plus sized column of Tajik troops was ambushed in Komarob Gorge by forces headed by a veteran of the earlier civil war, Alovuddin Davlatov. When the bang-bang stopped, twenty-eight Tajik troopers were dead. At least twenty-five more were wounded. The insurgents took no known losses.
The government has made retaliatory raids. Small success has crowned the efforts. Effective escalation is not a viable option--unless it was underwritten by an outside power. And, this is unlikely as the only candidates, Russia and Uzbekistan, are preoccupied with internal problems such that neither would seek further complications either domestic or international.
The capacities of the Tajikistan government are limited by several very powerful constraints. The first is economic. Tajikistan is far and away the most impoverished of the states carved from the corpse of the Soviet Union. It is not a gross exaggeration to say that hunger is already stalking the land.
A second potent limitation on the government's ability to act decisively is the widespread nature of anti-government sentiment. The impoverished majority blame their situation on the government, its corruption, its inefficiency, its arrogant remoteness, and its minority nature. This combination propelled the overthrow of a seemingly well-entrenched regime in Kyrgyzstan. President Rahmon is not eager to share the same fate.
Yet another limitation arises from the low average age of the population. The median age of men in the place is under twenty-two. As history and contemporary events show clearly, it is young men who are most amenable to the appeals of true belief such as that offered by political Islam. Men of this age cohort are also afflicted with the adolescent belief in immortality and invulnerability so are perfect candidates for the excitement, challenge, and specious sense of meaning provided by war.
The US has a presence in Tajikistan which is linked to the overall infrastructure supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. So the current administration has some reason to worry about the direction of affairs in the country. So far our response to the growing problem in Tajikistan is an offer to establish an anti-terrorist training center. Beyond that there is probably a hope that no matter which way the governmental chips might fall whoever is in charge will still need the revenue provided by our base rights lease so we can afford a "what! Me, worry?" approach. (This level of non-response response is also predicated upon the Kremlin's automatic opposition to any American move which might undercut the presumed Russian preeminence in Tajikistan.)
Russia has much more to fret about, but given the failure of the Kremlin and its handpicked agents to "clarify and put to order" the Muslim insurgency in the Northern Caucasus, it has little to offer. Further, the relations between the Kremlin and Tajikistan are, to put it in polite terms, "strained."
Then there is China, China has been having more than a few problems with its homegrown advocates of violent political Islam coupled with nationalism. They have no reason to ignore a bunch of like minded Muslims next door in Tajikistan. That, after all, is one of the, more accurately, the reason behind Beijing creating the SCO. (Russia played a game of "me-too" in a defensive move protecting its privileged position in the Central Asian Republics and isn't thrilled about the SCO's existence.)
Beyond the SCO flexing its semi-mythical muscle, there is nothing real the Trolls of Beijing can do--except send money. To date the Trolls have seen no need to do this perhaps as they see Rahmon's regime as a poor investment.
Winter's winds are starting to blow from the mountains surrounding the Rasht valley. The government, having been soundly bested in its attempt to wind up the insurgency before the snow calls a time out, there is not much chance that anything spectacular will happen in the next few months. Yet, as is the case in most "time-outs" in insurgent guerrilla war, the advantage goes automatically to the insurgents. They have the greater opportunity to operate, recruit, gain resources. The government will have the time to be weakened further by the slow but sure erosion of legitimacy and support which comes with pervasive poverty and loss of confidence in the future.
Don't despair, bucko, we will be hearing and seeing a lot more from the fun little war in a very faraway place by the time the next equinox rolls around.
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