Russia Chooses A Side

While it is not a surprise, the decision of Vladimir Putin's regime to join China in the support of North Korea (or, if not precisely that, in opposition to the South Koreans and thus the US) must be a disappointment to the Obama administration.  If the vaunted "Team of Rivals" which constitutes the Obama inner circle had a realpolitik view of life, the sharp turn against Seoul and Washington would not be a disappointing further rejection of the "Reset Button" policy.

In calling for an emergency closed door UN Security Council meeting on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Russians were doing the expectable.  In the Russian condemnation of the US for not immediately convening the emergency meeting in its role as this month's chair, Moscow was doing the predictable.  When Moscow called for the cancellation of the impending South Korean live fire exercises on Yeonpyeong Island, the Masters of the Kremlin went over the edge.  No longer could they maintain the pretense of evenhandedness; the characterization of the military exercises as a "dangerous aggravation" demonstrates clear partisan orientation.

In so closely associating itself with China, the Russians have embarked on a risky course of diplomacy, a course with one intention which may well result in a defeat on another, far more important diplomatic front.

The Russian move is linked to the ratification of the new START pending in the Senate.  As the Russians have no bull in the Korean herd unlike Beijing, the goal of their demarche in the UNSC must be that of demonstrating to the Obama administration the consequences of a failure on the part of the "US side" to ratify the treaty without further delay or modification.  The Kremlin is flexing its trouble making muscles in a high profile venue to show unmistakably that there will be a price to be paid should the Republicans stall the ratification process or insist upon modifications which would necessitate reopening the entire negotiation effort.

In the present Korean context, the North Koreans continue to be very much in the wrong.  Their actions, whether sinking a South Korean warship or bombarding an island located to the south of the Northern Limit Line, Pyongyang has acted contrary to the provisions of the 1953 Armistice as well as relevant international law.  The South Korean responses to date including the live fire exercises have been both "restrained" (to use the favorite word of both Beijing and, now, Moscow) and completely within its rights as a sovereign state.  No observer unless blinded by the requirements of ulterior motives and objectives can deny that.

In its support of South Korea, which includes a refusal to engage in a re-run of the Six Power Talks without Pyongyang making serious and severe concessions in advance, the Obama administration is on the side of the angels.  To hold talks with the Hermits of the North without the Hermits first demonstrating a genuine repentance would be to reward aggression, submit to extortion, and unduly reinforce the foundations of a regime facing a possible succession crisis.  It would be, in short, counterproductive and self-defeating.

The Russian leadership is not comprised of situationally naive people.  Putin, Medvedev and company well understand that the US position is both realistic and justified by regional political dynamics.  More than most governments, that of Russia understands the political and diplomatic games of extortion from both sides of the relationship.

So there is no direct rationale for the Russian effort to muck about in the Korean swamp.  There is, however, a very powerful indirect one.  The Kremlin wants the new START ratified quickly and cleanly.  The Boys at the Top understand that there is a potent opposition to the new treaty within the Republicans of the Senate.  Thus they are hopeful that a bit of pressure might somehow, someway, push the Obama administration into doing something to pull the Republican fangs.

It is even possible that Putin, et al may even entertain the notion that the Republicans in the Senate might get the message, might come to understand what is at risk should the new START not be ratified.  If this is the case, the Geek fears they have vastly overestimated the mentality of the Republican opposition.  The current exhibition of Russian intransigence is more likely to stimulate left over Cold War apprehensions regarding the intentions of the Kremlin than to serve as an example of what might be expected absent START ratification.

The proposed treaty is not perfect from the American perspective particularly with respect to force modernization and anti-ballistic missile system development.  Objections in these areas are not figments of feverish Republican imaginations, nor are they baseless renewals of Cold War fears.

Even with the asymmetries built into the treaty, it deserves ratification.  There are benefits to the US.  The most important of these is the reestablishment of the inspection regime which lapsed with the expiry of the former treaty.  The reduction in (to use the old Soviet term) "nuclear charges" is to the advantage of the US as well given the expense of maintaining the larger number of active and reserve "charges" and delivery systems.  Provided that the current or some future administration does not use the new START as a cover for an unwillingness to pay the economic and political price of force modernization, that feature of the treaty should not serve as an obstacle.

This leaves the objections centering on ABM research, development, and deployment as a legitimate point.  This point along with the very ticklish problem of theater or tactical nuclear weapons can be put to one side for the moment without the US suffering any real disadvantage over time.

This implies that most of the Republican objections are not so much rooted in the language of START as they are in a general distrust or dislike of the Russian government today.  While superficially resembling the so-called "Cold War mentality" so often invoked by rhetoricians in both Beijing and Moscow, it is not the same.  The distrust and dislike of Russia's government stems instead from the highly nationalistic behavior of that government coupled with the perception that the Russian government is, in fact, a non-democratic regime tainted with corrupt authoritarianism.

These perceptions are accurate.  Russia is not and never has been a democracy.  It is not and never has been noted for honest, transparent governance.  Russia is not and never has been free of a strong authoritarian bent.

So what?

It matters not that Vladimir of the Bare Chest cannot live up to the requirements of the Boy Scout Oath.  It matters not that a Russian election is not open, fair, honest.  It is utterly irrelevant that corruption is rampant.  It is of no consequence that the rule of law consists of whatever the Person in Charge says it is.

All that really matters is the ground truth that Russia is what it always has been--a country strongly motivated by nationalism, by the unqualified pursuit of national interest.  The very fact that Russia is nationalistic to an extent that few in the American elite can comprehend is the greatest single reason in favor of ratifying START.  A new treaty puts some verifiable limits on Russian expansion in the nuclear arena.  It places a ring fence around nuclear deployment and the size of the ready use nuclear arsenal.

To put it in very simple words: The more nationalistic a government is, the more vital it is to put limits, verifiable limits on its actions.

While imperfect, this is what START does.  It is all it does.  And, doing so is very much in US interests.

This is why the Russian posture on Korea is so troublesome.  By its unnecessary skewing in favor of the Chinese defined line and totally unjustifiable tilt against South Korea exercising its sovereign rights, the Kremlin may have strengthened the opposition to START.  It may even have provided a political impetus or at least cover for some conservative Democrats to break with Obama administration and vote against the treaty.

If this assessment of Russian motives and goals is close to accurate, it implies something larger and more important about the current Russian leadership.  The implication is both simple and alarming.  The Kremlin Boys, or at least the one who counts most, Vladimir Putin, has no clear understanding of how American politics operate or how Americans at the top of the political pyramid think.

Of course, with its emphasis on the fiction of a "Rest Button," the Obama administration generally and the president in particular have done nothing to educate the Russians topside in the whys and ways of US politics.  If anything the administration and president have convinced the ever-so-muscular Putin that the US has gone soft, flabby, and irresolute, and, thus, is suitable for a bit of creative bullying.

If that is the case, the Kremlin has made another serious miscalculation.  One mile of bad diplomatic road almost always leads to another.

Obama And "Point 31"

Hidden under the plethora of ink and electrons generated by Ahmedinejad at the UN and (fortunately) inept Pakistani makers of VBIEDs, there are some real foreign policy and national security matters. This is not to deprecate the potential for major bloodletting had Faisal Shahzad been less incompetent. Nor is to minimize the dangers lurking behind the hyperbolic rhetoric and warped history purveyed by Iran's Orator-in-Chief at the UN.

Both represent clear and present harm to American national security and interests.

Still, there are times when the largest of future harms resides in cool text buried away in tedious documents read by few and acted upon by still fewer. Such is the case with a draft document currently being circulated by this year's capo of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Egypt, for the guidance of the one hundred or so countries holding membership in NAM. Deep in the bowels of this paper is Point 31.

Point 31 calls for all signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to refrain from transferring or allowing the transfer of any and all materials, equipment, and knowledge related to nuclear research and engineering to Israel unless and until that country joins the NPT. Point 31 also calls upon all signatories to the NPT (which, of course, includes the US) to disclose all information in their possession regarding the Israeli nuclear program including but not limited to a full release of all information relevant to previous transfers of equipment, technology, materials, and knowledge to the Jewish state. The Egyptian position paper is unclear if this requirement would be rendered null in the event Israel signs the NPT.

Egypt is, as it has been for many years now, plumping for the nuclear disarmament of Israel under the beguiling guise of creating a nuclear weapons free Mideast. The Egyptians are not motivated in this so far bootless quest by high minded desires to see the Mideast as an idyllic place in which heavy atoms eager to fission or light atoms equally happy to fuse are conspicuous by their absence.

The government and military command of Egypt like their counterparts throughout the Arab majority region recognize perfectly that Israel's nuclear capacity is the ultimate guarantor of Israel's existence, of Israel's capacity to defeat any hypothetical combination of adversaries, even one equipped with overwhelming superiority in the most technologically advanced warlike stores and munitions. This realization has a universal deterrent effect upon even the most zealous advocate of wiping the Zionist entity off the map.

Mark this well. It is the Israeli possession of nuclear weapons which assures Israel's survival and not any promises on the part of any and every American administration. History has proven to the satisfaction of the Israelis (at least) that the promises of an outside Great Power are not sufficient to deter a resolute and motivated enemy. They, in apparent contrast to President Obama and others in his administration, learned the single greatest lesson of World War II. That lesson is contained in the failure of the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland.

Sure, the agreement was signed. It was publicly declared to be the guiding light of national policy in both London and Paris. Yet, Hitler unleashed the panzers anyway. He was unimpressed by either the political will or material capacity of the French and British to intervene effectively on Poland's behalf.

Hitler was proven wrong. It took nearly six years and millions of dead. And, what good did Poland receive in the process? Ask the corpses of Katyn forest.

The government and people of Israel mean no disrespect to the US when they aver or imply that a country must look to its own resources to protect its own interests, chief among which is national survival. It is not so much that the Israelis do not believe the good intentions of the many American presidents (including Mr Obama) when they announce the linkage between Israel and the US, but rather, they know that reality may prove different when push comes to shove.

In this the government of Israel is no different from that of France under Charles de Gaulle. The Great Charles irked the US no end when he went his independent way with the creation of an all-French nuclear force. Small to be sure, but existing solely to protect French interests.

France was easily accepted as a nuclear power, a member of the NPT committed in theory to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. In that status France is equal to the earlier developers of nuclear arms, the US, the UK, the USSR, and China. All of these members of the "Official" Nuclear Club are equally committed to the goal of a "nuclear free"world.

Whether the same can be said of the members of the "Unofficial" Nuclear Club, those countries which have nuclear weapons but are not subscribers to the NPT is arguable. India, Pakistan, and (in an intentionally ambiguous way) Israel constitute the "Unofficial" bunch. On a purely realpolitik basis it is quite unlikely that any are in favor of proliferation. But, none are legally committed to this which puts them at inherent odds with the five big guys of the "Official" club.

It is of more than simply passing interest that the Egyptian Point 31 mentions only Israel by name. Arguably there is not even an implication that the same strictures should apply to NPT signatories with respect to the other two members of the "Unofficial" group. Perhaps this is due to an Egyptian capacity to sleep soundly given that (a) Pakistan is a fellow Islamic country and (b) India is too preoccupied with either or both Pakistan and China to spare any bombs for Egypt.

More probably the Egyptian care in labeling is based on practical politics. Cairo has no desire to annoy fellow NAM heavyweight India or its colleague in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC,) Pakistan. Assuring the full compliance of the juggernaut of the NAM or the slightly smaller bloc of the OIC means not ruffling any of the easily displaced diplomatic feathers of the highly nationalistic governments of India and Pakistan.

Point 31 does represent a diplomatic tarbaby for the Obama bunch. By so eagerly and publicly embracing the chimera of a "nuclear free" globe as well as a similar status for the Mideast, the Nice Young Man From Chicago has created a very pretty problem for himself.

Linking the threat presented by Iran with a reduction in nuclear weapons has boxed Obama quite well. It will be far, far more difficult to isolate Iran sufficiently at the current NPT review conference without giving some measure of support to the Egyptian position. At the same time, any support for Cairo's cleverly worded Point 31 will result in further intransigence on the part of Israel.

Obama has overlooked or willfully ignored the ground truth here. Without its ambiguous nuclear policy, Israel is a small, stationary target for all attackers from the suicide bomber to the combined conventional forces of the Arab "frontline states."

Obama has overlooked or willfully ignored the necessary corollary. No state can rely upon the promises of another when existential matters are involved. As Le grande Charles put it, "Is it believable that the US will put New York or even Chicago at risk to protect Paris or Lyon?"

Even if much lower stakes are involved, can any responsible government hand over the guarantee of existence to an outside power? Particularly one whose support for Israel seems to be evanescent to a degree previously unthought?

So far Iran has done a commendable job in enlisting the support of members of NAM as well as other "small" non-nuclear states with the contention that the West generally and the US in particular constitute an oppressive minority practicing the most hypocritical of policies with respect to nuclear energy. The addition of Egypt's Point 31 goes a long, long way to firm this pro-Iranian tilt at the UN.

Much of President Obama's approach deserves (cautious) commendation. But, his stance on a nuclear free world generally and a Mideast similarly lacking in nuclear weapons is misguided and counterproductive. If nothing else, Mr Obama, Ms Clinton, and others need to get a grip on the reality that pressuring Israel to join the NPT and relinquish its nuclear guarantee of national survival is as wrong as a cat barking.

Mr Obama, Ms Clinton, and the other high minded idealists of the administration also need to take a very firm grip on another reality. The opponent right now in the Mideast/Persian Gulf region is not Israel. It is Iran. And, on the diplomatic front as well as the practical one of developing a breakout capacity, Iran is winning.

This means, we--and the rest of the civilized world--are losing. Thank you, President Obama. Will you ever learn that vaporous words and invoking the shade of Saul Alinsky won't hack it in international politics? Before it is too late?

Will (Re)START Be Stopped Or Just Delayed?

There hasn't been a whole lot of cheering over the more-or-less joint announcement by the Kremlin and the White House concerning the successful negotiation of the new START which will result in a one third reduction in each country's nuclear warheads and associated long range delivery vehicles. While there is much left unaddressed by the new agreement including short range, tactical systems and nuclear charges withdrawn from inventory but not dismantled, it is a major step towards a stable system predicated on the concept of "finite deterrence."

So, why the lack of good cheer in political circles and mainstream media alike?

There is not yet any reason to celebrate given the great gulf between mere agreement and signing on the one side and necessary Senate ratification on the other. Previous nuclear agreements between the US and, back then, the Soviet Union have fallen into the gap never to emerge to the sunlight of ratification. There is no basis to believe at the moment that ReSTART will not join the pile of corpses at the bottom of the gap.

There is no way that the Obama administration despite Secretary Clinton's brave words regarding the bipartisan nature of national security can avoid the reality that the Democratic Party's take-no-prisoners approach to health care overhaul and other legislation has poisoned the well of bipartisanship. Mr Obama and his henchmen will discover that bullies stand alone when they call upon their victims for assistance.

Making Republican foot dragging if not flat out rejectionism more rather than less likely is the fact that there are excellent pegs upon which recalcitrant elephants can hang their oppositional hats. One such peg is provided by the perceived need to modernize the American nuclear warhead stockpile. Another is provided by the questions revolving around any understandings reached with Putin, Medvedev, and company regarding ballistic missile defense systems and their deployment.

Legislation mandating the administration to put forth a plan for the modernization of warheads has already passed. To date the administration has been unresponsive to the requirement. The American warheads are elderly to say the least. They present very real problems of reliability and security which need to be solved. The technical work to properly fix the problems has been underway for years at Los Alamos and Lawrence-Livermore. But, the administration has been unwilling to use the work done as a foundation for providing an overall scheme for modernization.

It is a safe bet that more than a few Republican Senators will be quite willing to let the START languish until an acceptable modernization plan is presented by the administration. This trade off is completely justifiable and serves the national interest.

A smaller deterrent is credible if it is both reliable and secure. The Russians know this and have publicly pledged to bring their long-in-the-tooth nuclear charges into the 21st century. We have to do this as well or cut our own deterrent throat along with the numbers.

The expressed concerns over Russian objections to the planned limited missile defense system proposed by the Obama administration are also well taken. The Kremlin has been irrational regarding forward based limited ABM systems since the W. Bush administration first mooted the idea over two years ago.

The Russian military and government know perfectly well that the proposed system in no way threatens the credibility and utility of their missiles or at least those aimed at the US. In principle the US ABM system could marginally attenuate a Russian strike using short ranged missiles aimed at Western or Central Europe. Even this very limited "threat" could be easily overcome by either decoys or simple overloading. The Russians have nothing to worry about even given the one third reduction in charges and long range delivery vehicles.

The Russians have expressed a large degree of paranoia regarding American missile defense capacities either actual or under development. This is a critical area of national security considerations in which they are always far behind the curve in comparison with the US. As a result the Kremlin has harbored a deep need to control, to limit or, best of all, to extinguish US efforts in this area.

Taking advantage of President Obama's all-too-obvious desire (need?) to move the globe to a nuclear-free status the Russians could have made limitations on or removal of American ABM capabilities--even those directed against rogue states of limited offensive capacity--an understood prerequisite for signing ReSTART. It is in American national and strategic interest to be absolutely certain that there are no limits, explicit or tacit, now or in the future placed by the Kremlin on our discretionary deployment of ABM systems.

A principled Republican unwillingness to vote to ratify could be based on the need to fully and satisfactorily ascertain the absence of any Russian imposed limits on the US in the ABM area. Anything less would constitute dereliction of duty.

Politics being what politics has become in recent months and years, there are any number of unprincipled bases for opposition by Republicans. Trade-offs, log rolling, linkages between a vote for ratification and any number of flatly irrelevant issues is not only possible but likely. Not even the skills of Senator Lugar, a full-bore supporter of ReSTART can assure that obstructionist efforts of this sort will not occur. Nor can Senator Lugar and other "Reds" of like mind be sure of rounding up the necessary Republican votes.

President Obama cannot be sure that he can corral his own base in support of ratification. The progressives of his party are well known for their seemingly Utopian pursuit of unilateral American nuclear disarmament.

It is almost as certain as the law of gravity that progressives will contend that ReSTART is insufficiently bold. They can and will argue that the quantum improvements in the quality of conventional munitions have rendered nukes evermore useless. This is not a position without real merit. As the power and accuracy of conventional weapons have improved, the justification for the necessity of nuclear munitions and associated delivery systems has lessened. It is a linear progression as well as a tandem one.

The result of both Republican and progressive considerations is that an agreement to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia which should have been a slam dunk for ratification is not. The person ultimately responsible for this transmogrification is Mr Obama.

Far from being the first "post-partisan" president since the Era of Good Feelings nearly two centuries ago, the Nice Young Man From Chicago has proven himself to be a polarizing figure of such potency as to make George W. Bush and even Dick Cheney appear as models of bipartisan harmony in comparison. Quite simply the ratification of ReSTART provides the perfect opportunity for the vultures to return to the manure wagon.

Well, Mr O, you win one only in order to lose another. The tragedy is that the one you are shaping up to lose also is a loss for the world as a whole. Think about it as you celebrate the victory of bringing poverty medicine to the American public.

How Much Change Is Too Much?

Prague is a wonderfully romantic city. It is a place where one feels free to pursue ideals. It is, in fact, a place where ideals propelled people to make a genuine challenge to the Soviet Union. Not once in 1968 but again twenty years ago.

Perhaps it is the mood and history of Prague which inclined President Obama to have his speech writers craft a fine paean to ideals. And, in the process stick the president's fingers into an electric socket.

The more idealistic and, paradoxically perhaps, less difficulty producing portion of the president's speech dealt with the need to end nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, eliminate the current nuclear weapons stockpiles. Obama was appropriately conservative about a time line for the eradication of nukes from the world, saying, "It may not occur in my lifetime."

The speech served to confirm the earlier reports that Russia and the US would proceed to negotiate a reduction of nuclear charges to 1,500 each. This would constitute a necessary first step to achieving the finite deterrent level of roughly five hundred warheads each. As noted in an earlier post MAD would continue to exist giving an appropriate "comfort level" to two nations which will never be "friends" but will continue to be (using a delightfully ambiguous Vietnamese term) "partners in struggle."

President Obama called for the US to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Doing such would not harm US interests. Improvements in the US weapons would not require testing of the physics packages. Whether or not the CNTBT would then be ratified by China, India, Pakistan, Israel or Iran is open to question. Further it should be noted that decoupled underground tests of low yield devices are not susceptible to definitive detection since the Earth is a restless place with seismic shocks occurring as a form of geological background noise.

The North Koreans flipped the bird in the general direction of the "international community" (whatever that might be) with their launch of a prototype ICBM. This act calls into serious question the relevance of international agreements as it did Security Council resolutions. It's fine to talk of "breaking the rules" as the president did, but it also irrelevant.

There is no credible means of enforcing the will of the Security Council or the "international community" (which the Geek takes to be the equivalent of the bumper sticker, "We are all passengers on spaceship Earth") against the Hermit Kingdom of the North. As has been argued in previous posts, economic sanctions will not prove any more efficacious in the future than they have in the past. War is not an option. Only bribery might work. And, Pyongyang is unlikely to stay bribed for long. For Dear Leader and company, blackmail is an unending enterprise.

Unfortunately President Obama and his speech writers demonstrated a lamentable ignorance of historical reality when the Nice Young Man From Chicago beat his breast on behalf of the US. He averred that the US had a "moral responsibility" to take the lead in seeking total nuclear disarmament. He linked this alleged "moral" load to the US having employed two nuclear bombs against Japan in World War II.

Morality is not involved either then or now. There is and never has been any requirement for the US to enter a mea culpa in its nuclear usage. A nation at war has the goal of ending the war as quickly as possible at the lowest cost in friendly lives compatible with its political demands. The bombings of two Japanese cities accomplished this goal. (And, saved Japanese as well as American lives in the process.)

It is in American national and strategic interest to lower the levels of nuclear weapons extant today. It is in our national and strategic interests to end proliferation. To control nuclear materials so as to prevent their drifting into the hands of rogue states and non-state actors. These are matters of realpolitick. Morality has nothing to do with it.

There is no objection to using moral terms to cover the naked flesh of national interest. But, (as usual here is the big "but") it is critical that morality not become the engine of policy. As we should have learned from the disaster of Woodrow Wilson's moral based approach to foreign affairs, the adoption of the high moral tone is the road to failure. Similarly, the moral stance adopted by the US in its assorted "non-recognition" moves directed against the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Iran and Cuba dragged failure in their train.

Perhaps it was morality more than ideals which caused President Obama to stick his wet fingers into a particularly dangerous electric socket. At the European Union meeting in Prague Obama told the assembly, "The United States and Europe must approach Muslims as our firends, neighbors and partners in fighting injustice, intolerance and violence, forging a relationship based on mutual respect and mutual interests."

Nothing wrong with those words. Glittering generalities are a politician's stock in trade. Then the president bore down on a specific. "Moving forward toward Turkish membership in the EU would be an important signal of your commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe."

Nothing like sticking your face in a fan, is there, Mr President? Turkish membership in the EU is not a popular concept in France or Germany.

Nicholas Sarkozy, perhaps regretting the Gallic bouquets he had verbally heaved at Obama earlier in Strasbourg, was quick to respond. He stated on French TV, "I have always been opposed to this entry." In case there was any doubt in anyone's mind, he added,"I still am and I think I can say that the immense majority of member states shares the position of France."

Sarkozy was quick to toss some rhetorical flowers in the general direction of Ankara. He called Turkey an ally and stated it would remain what it has been, "a privledged partner." But, not a member of the EU.

Angela Merkel, German PM, took a similarly dim view of President Obama's advice. Being German she used fewer words. They were, however, Teuton-blunt. "It's clear there are different opinions." In other word, "Butt out, buster."

The US is concerned that Turkey will drift further and further into the Islamist camp. There is good reason for any such apprehension given the background of the ruling party and the growth of Islamism among the hinterland dwellers of Turkey. Beyond that, Turkey is an important energy nexus. The importance of Turkey in this role will grow in the near- to mid-term.

These reasons along with the potential of Turkey as an intermediary in Mideastern affairs as well as Central Asian gives the US powerful reasons to wish Turkey to be tied closer to the West through EU membership. It is in our national and strategic interests that this occur.

The critical question is not if Turkey's joining the EU is in American interests. That is a given. Is it in the national and strategic interests of the European states? That is the question. The US, as PM Merkel suggested, is not in a position to answer that question. Sarkozy took a more robust line. EU membership for Turkey is not in French national interest.

Sarko is probably correct in assessing that France is not alone in its rejectionist stance. Certainly other countries have reasons to keep Turkey out of the EU. There are many, but one remains the hippo in the bedroom.

That issue is immigration. EU rules provide for unrestricted movement between member states. Turkey as a member would be an open door for uncontrollable immigration of Muslims. The demographic, cultural and political effects of a Muslim "Open Door" are unpredicable as to scale but predictable as to effect. The effect would be negative.

Admittedly the multi-culti oh-so-sensitive elites of Europe do not want to openly acknowledge that Muslim populations in European cities have already caused social, cultural and political frictions which do not bode well for the structural integrity of these societies and polities in the future. The unemployment which has accompanied the present economic situation has provided a degree of cover in that one can oppose immigration now on the basis of protecting jobs.

The pleasant economic cover and concealment will not last forever. Looking ahead, the politically articulate elite of the EU member states have to decide if they really, really believe that their societies and political structures will survive a large, very large influx of Muslims through the Gates of Ankara. This elite has to decide how much change and how much rapid change the nations of Europe can accept and survive. They have to decide how much they want to see the far right of European politics empowered by the flood of Muslims.

The American president can afford to be High Minded and Lofty Thinking about Turkey, the EU and migration. It is, after all, not in our backyard.

It would be good if some blunt, bold European head of state would ask President Obama the following questions. "If NAFTA had provided for free migration between the US and Mexico, would the American Senate have approved it? The American president signed it? Would you?"

Obama In Europe--Substance Or Show?

Like Yogi Berra was reputed to have said, "It's deja vue all over again." So it is with the Obama Rave and Diplomatic Extravaganza.

While the Geek isn't quite old enough to remember the news reports of the hosannas ringing all over Europe when Woodrow Wilson made his triumphal tour prior to the Versailles Peace Conference, he can remember the outpourings which greeted JFK and reached a decibel peak with the Ich bin ein Berliner speech. Journalists reported all the noise and celebration surrounding both Wilson and JFK.

But, only historians, masters of the dry dust of the morning after, take note of what happened afterwards. When one considers the disdain with which Americans treat the small whining voice of history, it is not surprising that the thrill of the victorious moment will be noted while the agony of any succeeding defeat will be ignored.

The lesson of the Wilson and Kennedy visits was simple. The fun of the party must not be recalled at the expense of remembering the vomiting and hangover which came afterwards.

None of this is intended to undercut the validity of President Obama's public diplomacy. It is what he is best at as last year's campaign demonstrated. He can work a crowd rhetorically with an uncanny skill. The halo effect may extend past the moment and the personality to include new American foreign policy initiatives.

It is the policy which matters. It is the policy which will bring long term success or failure to the US, not the personality du jour.

To use the negative example currently so beloved of the cheering Europeans ranging from high school students to heads of government, George W. Bush may have been an annoying person but it was US policy developed and implemented on his watch which degraded America's image and influence in Europe and throughout the world. Had George W. not pushed unilaterialism, rejection of Russia as a Great Power and given a thumbs-up to the invasion of Iraq, his personality and personal attributes would not have equalled a gnat's ass in impact on European political leaders or public.

Importantly, it is the policy stance of the Bush administration which forms the context in which Obama is viewed and cheered. If and only if the policies of his administration are seen as beneficial not only to the US but to Europe as well will the cheering continue and the hangover delayed.

Public opinion is notoriously fickle. This truism applies as well to Europe as it does in the US. The views, opinions and actions of political leaders are no more stable and long lasting.

Nicholas Sarkozy might have emoted and effused over Obama as the greatest thing since the invention of the croissant yesterday, but if the Obama administration policies fail to meet the what's-in-it-for-us test, the French and their president may see Obama as vinegar laced wine in a couple of months. Medvedev may hail the American president as his "new comrade" now, but that is subject to change without notice if the Kremlin decides its latest charm offensive has not paid off sufficiently.

American observers may, as did Politico, applaud Obama for his having delivered a message of "tough love" at the Strasbourg "Town Meeting." Yes, the Geek agrees, it was refreshing to hear an American president call upon the Europeans to end their "casual" and endemic anti American words and actions. To remember that al-Qaeda was not a threat to the US alone. To bear in mind that the US public, regardless of the arrogance and indifference to European sensibilities of the previous administration, was not anti-European.

These remarks were public diplomacy at its best. Not simply mouthing an apology for past "bad" American behavior. No. Doing that to be sure, but also letting the folks of Europe and the world know that we were not alone on the sinners' bench.

Leaving aside the financial matters which constituted the critical, necessary core of the G-20 meeting as the Geek is not qualified to offer more than the opinion of ignorance, at least one very substantial matter of policy emerged from London. It came in the context of the bilateral discussions between Obama and Medvedev.

While acknowledging that the Russians have a long tradition of launching peace-and-charm offensives in the midst of saber-clanking and more-or-less shrill outpourings of It's-All-The-American-Capitalist-Camp's-Fault, the hints of a new round of nuclear weapons reduction talks may prove to be a genuine basis for a real policy shift. Even the consideration of a new round of talks on the subject represents a welcome break from the policy of the neocon ninny laden Bush II administration.

But, the shift has to go far beyond that of the merely comparative.

The Geek has been a supporter of the Finite Deterrent school of nuclear doctrine for over forty years. (OMG! Forty years! Where has time and youth gone?) The US and Russia would have more than sufficient capacity to inflict unsurvivable damage on each other with as few as five hundred high kiloton to low megaton yield warheads (or in the old and delightful Soviet terminology, "nuclear charges.") Similarly either would have the capacity to effectively green glass any third party who was so bold as to initiate a nuclear attack. That includes the Peoples Republic of China (pace Mao.)

A reduction in current stockpiles to no more than 1,500 nuclear charges would be an excellent and long overdue course of action. Given the improvements in delivery technology as well as terminal guidance, the survivability of retaliatory force sufficient to assure the effective counter-value targeting of a second strike is now highly probable. Thus, mutually assured destruction (MAD) which has served us well for a half-century would be unimpaired.

Nuclear weapons systems including delivery vehicles are very, very expensive. The stockpiles of both the US and Russia are aging and in need of upgrading in numerous ways. This upgrading as indicated by the American Reliable Warhead Program are hugely capital intensive.

By reducing the current suite of nuclear systems, both countries could afford (literally) the necessary upgrading. Each would also have the wherewithal to engage in critical programs of nuclear materials control and denaturing.

By reducing stockpiles to an effective level, both countries would also gain a measure of moral authority in the common effort to inhibit proliferation and to take (perhaps joint) action against unseemly proliferaters such as North Korea and Iran. A reduction would also have some real potential to defuse the annoyingly accurate argument presented by a number of second and third tier countries that the Original Nuclear Club uses the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) as a means of securing a monopoly on the instruments of mass murder.

If the hints have any substance, the grunts of the diplomatic and defense communities in both Moscow and Washington will get to work shortly. They will work without cheers. Without screaming kids hoping to get a look, get a listen. Without the media panting after them.

Theirs is the substance which works behind the show of summits, of international gatherings, of public diplomacy. Only time will show if there is substance behind the spectacle.

If a year or so down the line, Medvedev and Obama meet, greet and sign a treaty reducing nuclear charges on each side to a number approaching that of a finite deterrent, there will be ample time and reason to applaud. To cheer. For, when--and if--that were to occur, there will have been at least one genuine, positive outcome from the Big Traveling Show in Europe.