Parting Company With Secretary Gates And Admiral Mullen

Robert Gates is well known as a "realist" in the areas of foreign policy and national security.  His nearly thirty years in the intelligence racket and serving as Secretary of Defense have convinced him that the realities of international politics require the US to continue its difficult relationship with Pakistan.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, concurred with this view as the two men testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense today.

The subcommittee pushed both Gates and Mullen hard on the question of Pakistan.  The senators were exercised not only by the general attitude of Islamabad to the purportedly joint effort against advocates of violent political Islam but more particularly with recent, dramatic actions such as the arrest of Pakistani citizens who provided information to CIA in the run-up to the killing of Osama bin Laden.  Those arrested reportedly included an army major who furnished license plate numbers among other items.

When asked about the propriety of providing cooperation and sizable aid to an "ally" who engaged in such actions while conducting a non-stop campaign of tergiversation and mendacity, Secretary Gates dismissed the question in a way which was simultaneously both quite accurate--and significantly misleading.  The secretary responded by noting that governments routinely lie to each other, that doing so allowed work to be accomplished.  He also pointed out, once more accurately but in a way which is not germane to the Pakistani Question, that even friendly governments spy on one another.

Spying and lying are normal government activities.  Only hopeless idealists or those who inhabit the lotus lands of Julian Assange and Anonymous might think (or desire) otherwise.  But as generalizing from the particular is an intellectual error so also is particularizing from the general.

And, particularizing from the general is precisely what Dr Gates and Adm Mullen were doing.  They did it well but that does not make the effort either useful or honest.

Pakistan is a particular case.  It has a unique relation with the US defined by the current context of the war in Afghanistan and the larger conflict between the civilized states and the forces of violent political Islam.  This means that Pakistan's relation with the US differs not only from American relations with other countries which do not harbor, protect, and assist some groups motivated by violent political Islam while attacking others.  It also means that Pakistan's relation with the US today and in recent years is qualitatively different from the relation between the two countries during the cold war.

Simply put, the relationship between Pakistan and the US is utterly unique.  It is one of a kind.  Further, it is a relationship without precise historical counterpart.  To put that in focus, imagine a situation during World War II where the US provided massive aid and support to a country which simultaneously harbored the Nazi party, supported its actions in third countries, protected it against any US attacks, and mounted half-hearted actions against a Fascist organization within its borders.  The mind boggles at the concept.

Yet, that is precisely what is happening in Pakistan today.  It has been precisely what has gone on month after month from the day American bombs and boots hit the ground in Afghanistan.  The government, army, and intelligence service of Pakistan have aided and protected "good" jihadists while on occasion and with great reluctance attacked the "bad" jihadists.

Throughout the charade, the government, army, and intelligence service have benefited from vast amounts of US aid, most of which has been both military and useful not for counterinsurgent campaigns but rather for conventional operations of the sort which would be required when Pakistan gets its wish for one more rematch with India.  To ensure the benefits keep pouring in while maintaining its "strategic" asset of terror, the Pakistanis have lied non-stop.  They have lied with creativity.  They have lied consistently (while being quite unperturbed when the internal inconsistencies of the lies come to light.)  They have lied loudly.  They have even lied about their lies.

An alliance, any alliance, no matter how limited in nature, scope, and goals cannot be maintained when one of the allies relies upon a dedication to untruth.  The US government has been remarkably patient with the Pakistanis and their addiction to prevarication.  However, the raid at Abbottabad made the continuation of this policy of patience politically impossible.  No person reasonably well oriented in time and place can possibly accept the proposition that the Pakistani regime at its highest levels was clueless as to where Osama might have been for the past half decade or so.

Nor can any person even cursorily aware of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan accept Pakistani protestations that they have made great efforts, suffered mighty sacrifices in the joint cause.  The expeditions mounted by the army against the advocates of violent political Islam in Swat and other parts of the FATA were conducted not by the regular army in the main but rather by the poorly trained, poorly equipped, and very poorly officered Frontier Corps.  The three thousand fatalities so often pointed to by the Pakistani government and army as proof positive of their efforts are the result not of hard fought combat but the consequence of using second and third rank troops against a far better adversary.

As the Pakistani regular army and air force showed the bravery of being out of range, the unfortunates of the Frontier Corps were murdered by inept commanders and a self-serving bunch topside in order to provide a basis for the ongoing lies.  A close look at the several "campaigns" shows the troop movements were carefully choreographed to allow the majority of the jihadists to withdraw in perfect safety to havens in South Waziristan.  It needs to be recalled that the Pakistanis continue to refuse to operate in South Waziristan regardless of US requests and pressure.

The Geek has laid out in detail the strategic and political thinking which motivates the government, army, and intelligence service to continue their support of the several groups advocating violent political Islam which Islamabad considers to be "good," that is useful strategic assets in the war with India.  In these and other posts the Geek has provided a detailed history of the poor US decision making which facilitated the Pakistani efforts to create and maintain terrorist entities as a strategic weapon as well as the critical role played by Zia and Saudi Arabia in the overall Islamazation of the Pakistani people.  It is not necessary to recapitulate all that now.

The past, however, is prologue for the situation today.  And, today's bad situation will become only worse unless the US pulls the plug on the current relationship with Pakistan.

Dr Gates, as might be expected, raised the nuclear bogeyman.  The prospect of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and production facilities falling into the possession of advocates of violent political Islam is worrying indeed, but does not on its own constitute good and sufficient reason to continue the toxic relation with Islamabad.  If necessary there can be no doubt that the US has the capacity to eliminate the nuisance provided it is willing to accept the diplomatic consequences of collateral damage.  The ultimate fate of the Pakistani nuclear program is a grave issue to be sure but not an insurmountable problem as Dr Gates and Adm Mullen know from the contingency plans already on the shelf.

As the US draws down in Afghanistan--a question not of "if"or even "when" but rather of "how fast" and "how many," the need for Pakistani cooperation drops apace.  Reduction of the American footprint in Afghanistan is liberating as it allows Washington to focus more on the real heartland of terror threats to the US and other civilized states--the FATA.  This reality in turn puts a very real pressure on Islamabad.  Who is going to abate the jihadist menace in the area, Washington or Islamabad?

The reduction of the US and other foreign presence in Afghanistan shifts the burden for dealing with advocates of violent political Islam on Kabul and Islamabad.  The governments of these two counties will have to determine the degree to which they will exist independent of the threats and domination of the extremists.  The question for both Afghanistan and Pakistan is ultimately existential.  That should provide a real motivation for both political and military solutions to be developed and implemented.  The presence of the US and its foreign allies has given both Pakistan and Afghanistan a free pass to ignore the existential threat represented by the advocates of violent political Islam.

Now, with a withdrawal and a shift in policy toward Pakistan, the free pass will be revoked.  If the US also takes the position that it is indifferent to what happens within the borders of either country but is concerned only with the exportation of violent political Islam, the two regimes will have no real option beyond dealing effectively with the various Talibans and related groups.

In an ideal world the US would also tilt more and more toward India including supporting that country's efforts in Afghanistan.  India has a real strategic need to establish an effective presence in Kabul and has worked diligently in this direction for the past several years.  Considering the number of coinciding interests which exist between the US and India including a well-founded apprehension of Chinese ambitions in the region, the US would be well advised to shift its focus from Afghanistan and Pakistan to India so as to assist and support India in its policy gambits in the region.

The fundamental reality of policy in the subcontinent is simply that no government can do business with a regime based solely on lying.  Pakistan's behavior is over the edge when it comes to the way in which governments routinely mislead each other.  Dr Gates must be very well aware of this.  It is most unfortunate that in his last appearance before this subcommittee he felt obliged to shade the truth to a degree which constitutes an insult to American national interest--and the intelligence of many who heard or read his comments.

As there are limits in permissible lying between governments, there are limits to "realism" in foreign and national security policy.  In his assessment of Pakistan, Dr Gates regrettably transcended these limits.  It is a very sad note on which to end a most distinguished career.

Here A Bomb, There A Bomb, Everywhere A Bomb

No.  Not those pesky and ubiquitous roadside bombs, not even the upscale models now being imported by Taliban in Afghanistan from those friendly mullahs across the border in Iran.  No.  Not the personal type of bomb so beloved by wannabe seekers after martyrdom.

The bomb(s) in question are those of a nuclear nature.  It seems the latest growth industry in such stable, peace loving countries as North Korea and Pakistan is making more plutonium and, in the fullness of time, more fission or (drum roll) fusion weapons.

The situation in North Korea is somewhat ambiguous as is to be expected, but there are rather alarming indications that the Hermit Kingdom of the North is either cranking up the supposedly decommissioned plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon or is taking another pass at reprocessing the spent fuel rods so as to extract more plutonium.  The South Koreans, who have both a tendency to get nervous and a set of good reasons for doing so, also believe the Northerners are enriching more uranium.

Recent satellite imagery shows construction work in progress near the foundations of the cooling tower destroyed by the North three years ago as part of the now moribund denuclearization process.  The indications are minor and give no hint as to what is--or is going to be--constructed.  There is even the possibility that the Northerners, knowing that the site is constantly monitored by both national and commercial imaging satellites, are engaged in a bit of creative chain rattling.

However, the impending transition of power from Dear Leader to his Number Three Son brings a number of imponderables into play.  These include necessary genuflections before the hardest of the military hardliners or counters to the new, improved South Korean psyops program, which can be commenced at any moment for any reason.  Or, it may simply be one more of those, take-us-seriously-damnit! gestures of which Pyongyang is so fond.

The capacity for Pyongyang to make mischief cannot be overstated and must not be underestimated.  The impending succession does nothing to lessen either the intentional making of mischief or the potential for miscalculation.  While the North may only have sufficient plutonium for a half dozen bombs, the amount of highly enriched uranium cannot be estimated with rigor.  It is within the realm of conservative plausibility to estimate the Hermits have sufficient fissile material to double the number of potential warheads on the shelf.  In addition, the fact that the North does not yet have warheads small enough to mate with their current stock of missiles in no way lessens the degree of threat.

Pending miniaturization--an accomplishment not likely to be in the distant offing--the North can wreak a sufficient degree of havoc simply by getting one or two truck borne devices across the DMZ.  Even a couple of small (Hiroshima sized) nudets in or near the Seoul metroplex would all but fatally cripple South Korea.  In short, the war could be over almost before anyone knows it had begun.

In this context it might be recalled that the Northerners are the tunnel rats from hell.  Their subterranean earth moving skills have provided a number of tunnels easily capable of passing five ton trucks under the Z.  Sure, the North would (to quote a line in Dr Strangelove) "get their hair mussed," but the costs to the South would be much greater, potentially quite unbearable.

That's enough for one depressing subject.  Time to go to the next, even more depressing one.

Pakistan.  That's right, our "ally" and "close friend," the always stable, ever reliable, constantly honest, and aboveboard "partner" in the Grand Campaign Against Violent Political Islam.

The context first.  Pakistan is broke.  It depends upon the success of its extortion program to keep the international (primarily US) money flowing.  The floods have made the basket case even more supine.  The army is allegedly engaged in both flood relief and fighting the Taliban in the FATA while actually standing ever vigilant on the Indian border facing a threat which will not come--no matter how much Islamabad may wish otherwise.  The government is an excellent definition of the term, "non functional."  At the same time the perceived existential and functional legitimacy of the government has sunk to levels which make President Obama's approval ratings seem stratospheric in comparison.

With this as background consider that Pakistan is plunging on at flank speed in the construction of a third reactor in its Kushab plutonium production facility.  Satellite imagery shows that the second reactor has been finished, tested, and may be in full scale production while the construction work on the third unit is proceeding at a rate faster than that of the second.

The Kushab complex exists for one primary purpose, the production of plutonium.  Plutonium for weapons.  The increase in production indicates that Pakistan is pushing for a thermonuclear capability as well as boosting the number of deployable weapons.  As the details of the reactor as well as its predecessors are not available in the open literature, the secondary purposes of the reactors cannot be determined.  However, it is fair to assume that at least one of the reactors is configured for the production of tritium, the form of hydrogen central to initiating fusion reactions.

There is undoubtedly a direct linkage between the forced draft expansion of the Kushab complex and the Pakistani resistance to the fissile materials limitation treaty which has been languishing for years now.  This makes the unopposed election of Pakistan to chair the IAEA all the more ironic.

Pakistan is not only a member of the nuclear club, it is a particularly ambitious one.  The Islamabad government and the army both justify the investment in nuclear weapons production as defensive, a necessary deterrent to any Indian employment of its arsenal.

That position is, to be polite, a mess of caca.  Pakistan already has a sufficient number of weapons to serve as a credible finite deterrent.  Considering the distances involved and the flight time of either missiles or manned aircraft, the Pakistanis must use a launch-under-warning approach.  This doctrine is most effective if the targeting philosophy is counter-value not counter-force.

Given the size of India and, thus, the number of alternative launch points as well as the near term potential of an Indian submarine launched cruise missile capacity, the notion of counter-force targeting in a second strike configuration makes no sense.  Only a form of mutually-assured-destruction predicated on counter-value targeting operates as a sufficient deterrent.

For this approach there is neither need nor justification for a large number of warheads and launchers.  A modest--less than one hundred deliverable warheads--is sufficient.  The enormous expense of expanding the Kushab complex cannot be justified on legitimate defense needs.  Complicating the situation for the government is that the expansion of the physical plant and concomitant work force enhances the problems of security.  The same applies to any proliferation of warheads or fissile materials stockpiles.

Other than a sort of military elephantiasis, there is no excuse for what the Pakistanis are doing at Kushab.  There is certainly no rational explanation.  But, considering the propensity for the grandiose often exhibited by Pakistani senior military personnel, the elephantiasis diagnosis may be correct.

The US has cause for enhanced anxiety with the expansion of Kushab.  The civilian government of Pakistan is, to be kind, not overly stable.  The military forces of Pakistan are riddled at all levels with adherents of violent political Islam.  The strategic ambitions of members of the armed forces, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the bureaucracies are no less than grandiose as all hands focus with an irrational but deeply historically rooted hostility on India.

For the US and other civilized states, the problem of securing the Pakistani nuclear facilities, arsenal, and fissile stockpile are real and pressing.  Bluntly, the possibility of violent political Islamists gaining a nuclear capability via Pakistan is greater than the nuclear threat presented by Iran.

Pakistani officials have proclaimed loud and long that their country is both stable and responsible.  These protestations ring hollow when considered in conjunction with the irresponsible action of expanding the Kushab complex at a time of very real, very great national peril.

There is an upside to the Pakistani nuclear dilemma.  The US and its Western European allies are not alone in this contretemps.  The prevailing winds--both those geographic in nature and those of armed political Islam--assure that both Russia and China have a dog in the fight, whether they either recognize or like the idea.  Any nudet in the sub-continent will have impact in both countries.  Similarly, any access via Pakistan to nuclear materials or weapons by advocates of violent political Islam will have effects deleterious to both.

The takeaway?  Simple.  To date the nuclear club has been able to exercise self-control.  Today, that reassuring state of affairs is under direct threat from both North Korea and Pakistan to a degree surpassing the danger represented by Iran.  And, it is up to the initial members of the club to keep matters from getting worse.

Let's Try Bribery--Again

Stripped of all the high minded and lofty rhetoric, foreign aid is simply bribery much of the time. It is an attempt to create a simulacrum of coinciding national interest. That is, when there is an insufficiency of actual coinciding national interest so that two states can work jointly on a joint problem, foreign aid can be trotted out to manufacture the appearance of coincidence of interest.

For obvious reasons this kind of fiction is generally the prerogative of Great Powers, or, at least, countries laden with cash or other equally useful and attractive items. The potlatch of bribe-your-way-to-an-alliance hit a (temporary) pinnacle of drunk sailor spending during the Cold War. The old Soviet Union built steel mills in countries without iron ore while China built eight lane divided highways or dual track railroads from Nowhere to Nothingness. For its part, the US scattered shiny new weapons and fresh from the factory warlike stores to armed forces better suited to brigandage than to any real national security use.

At least most of the recipient states had the common courtesy to stay bought for at least a few years. And, these grateful new allies and supporters of whichever Great Power had spilled the greatest amount of its wealth rarely crossed the line from bribery--a limited activity--to flat out extortion--an endless exercise in ever increasing demands.

Bribery as a tool of foreign policy entered into a brief decline during the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. It was no longer necessary for the US to rent-a-friend by foreign aid largess in most of the world.

There were, however, exceptions. One was Egypt. The US under four administrations has felt (word used advisedly as the process has been less than rational, other than based on careful calculation) that Egypt must continue to be bribed lest something unspecified but terrible occur. Another exception was carved out for Pakistan.

In the case of Pakistan the thin and wavering line separating bribery from extortion was crossed years ago, during the days of Bill Clinton. For each and every year of the Clinton, W. Bush, and, now, Obama administrations, the extortion campaign waged by Islamabad has accelerated. Each of these presidents has felt the need to pay more and more tribute to the Pakistanis lest something horrid happen.

Lest, for example, the Pakistanis gain nuclear power status. Lest, for example, the Pakistanis stir up more trouble with India, or in Afghanistan. Lest, for example, the Pakistanis surrender to the importuning and threats of the Islamists. Lest, for example, the Pakistanis fail to fight with valor and dedication against the terrorists of al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the Haqqani network. Lest, for example, Islamabad cozies up with the Trolls of Beijing.

Billions of dollars have flowed from future generations of Americans to the leaders and military commanders of today's Pakistan. The result of all these bribes, of answering all the extortionate demands of the government and military of Pakistan?

The Pakistanis have the bomb. The Pakistanis have worked overtime to exacerbate tensions with India. The army and government of Pakistan have waged a quarter-hearted war against carefully selected portions of the Islamist/jihadi congeries in the FATA. Islamabad has cozied up with Beijing to the extent of entering into a deal to purchase two Chinese nuclear reactors despite the objections of the US.

Wow! With this record it seems only sensible that we ship another giant bunch of money to Pakistan. Perhaps the concept "more is more" will work. This time.

Secretary of State Clinton, who is well-known to harbor significant doubts regarding the reliability of Pakistan in the "common" war against Islamic terrorist groups (OOPS! Bad Geek! The Geek meant to write, "radical extremest groups") is in Pakistan with a wad of cash in her hand.

The cash, one and half gigabucks worth, is the first installment of the seven and a half billion promised by Congress for civilian development projects over the next five years. This masterpiece of fabricating the appearance but not the reality of coinciding national interest, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman act, was passed last year. The intent is to purchase Pakistani cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the Haqqani Network as well as to buy a large measure of economic, social, and political stability in the country.

Ms Clinton, in announcing the payment of the civilian portion of the annual Pakistani Extortion Scheme, made loud reference as to the emphasis on civilian development as being a dramatic departure from the bad old days of George W. Bush. She is, of course, being quite economical with the truth.

George W. Bush's administration did hand over ten or so billion dollars in military aid to the military junta which ran Pakistan. This is what the Pakistanis demanded lest something horrid but unspecified occur. Similarly Ms Clinton's husband, Bill, did the same when he was in the Oval. So did George H.W. Bush. And, Ronald Reagan.

It is simple to understand why all these presidents paid off in military coin. When one is paying bribery or extortion, one pays in the coin demanded by the recipient. The Pakistanis have always preferred the warlike to the peaceful as they live in a paranoid fear and desire for one more war with India.

Adding civilian assistance, the building of dams, irrigation projects, infrastructure, electric generation plants, and the like is a form of bonus. The real deal continues to be the military assistance. When the US insisted on providing equipment more suitable to counterinsurgency than to a force-on-force war with India, it was necessary to sweeten the deal--again lest something horrid but unspecified occur.

The sweetener, the bonus is the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Soak Our Great-Grandchildren-To-Rent-The-Paks bill. As with all previous bribes or extortion payments, the money will be spent, some projects will be finished in a blare of Thanks Be To Our Government And Allah The Most Merciful And Compassionate propaganda. And, Islamabad will do what it wants to regardless of US interests or representations.

Islamabad has a ready portfolio of reasons why it cannot do what the US desires. It is oh-so-easy to point at the low repute in which the US is held by the great Pakistani public. It is oh-so-easy to say the US is responsible for the animus held against it due to our Predator attacks, or the presence of US troops in Afghanistan, or US support for Israel, or, even the tolerance showed to homosexuals in the US.

"See! You Americans do it to yourselves! And, that is why, we, the democratically elected government of Pakistan cannot and will not compromise our sovereignty by fighting terrorists or seeking genuine peace with India or even not buying Chinese plutonium producing power reactors."

Unless, of course, the US sends more money. Do that and amazing things can happen. For enough of a bribe, we will even grant visas to the more than four hundred diplomatic personnel who have been waiting for weeks, months. Money can move mountains. (Provided doing so does not run across Pakistani national interests as the Paks define them.)

Mr Obama, Ms Clinton, and Congress have set the stage for We the People to once more learn a basic lesson. Bribery is limited in its effects. Extortion has no limits to its demands.

They just don't teach that sort of thing at Harvard Law School, do they?

Pakistan's Double Game

Virtually everyone in every damn intelligence service in the West who knows a bloody thing about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and, last, but most important, Pakistan, has been aware for two decades that the "Students" (to use the correct translation of "Taliban,") have been and remain the creature of the government of Pakistan and more specifically, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Noises to this effect have sounded lightly in the MSM of the West from time to time over the years, but never loudly nor with much definition.

The London Times has finally ripped the curtain of silence to small shreds with an article drawing on a well done paper from the London School of Economics, which institution has a plethora of expertise far surpassing the dismal science for which it is named. Based upon extensive interviews with past and present Taliban figures as well as former and current ISI personnel and others in the government of Pakistan, the conclusion of the report is both stark and irrefutable. It was quite pleasant to read in an open source the unspeakable truth: ISI is the ongoing mainbrace of Taliban and this is known to and approved of by the Pakistani government at the highest level, the country's president, Asif Ali Zardari.

Despite all the odious protestations of the Bush/Cheney administration and its successor under Obama that Pakistan is an ally in a joint war against "terrorism" or "radical extremism" or simply the named groups al-Qaeda and Taliban, the truth is simply that Pakistan consorts more eagerly with the enemy than it does with the US. Not even the billions in bribes have served to budge the government of Pakistan, or the Pakistani army, let alone ISI from the course of supporting, facilitating, assisting, the Scrofulous Vermin of the Koran.

There are good reasons for the position adopted by Islamabad in the closing days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At that time it appeared Pakistan could create strategic depth for itself by using a proxy force to rule Afghanistan when the Red Army finally headed home. The US was indifferent. As long as the Soviets got and stayed got, the administrations of Reagan and H.W. Bush were happy. No one at the top two levels of the national security and foreign policy staffs cared for the nuances of Afghan politics nor the fine grained details of just how Pakistan sought to outpoint India in their never ending conflict.

During the years of assisting the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance Americans had come to find the Afghans to be a very difficult sort to work with. There was no great objection from the fieldhand level when the endgame of the proxy effort against the Red Army was turned over to the Paks.

It has to be admitted that the Pakistanis took to the assignment with vim, vigor, and vitality. They were skilled and able in the task of taking the young men from the Saudi funded madrassas near the border and turning them into the Taliban. The ISI guys were Muslim, some quite oriented to political Islam and all that implies. They were also good nationalists and were oblivious to the ill effects Taliban had on the Afghan social, political, and economic life as long as the strategic interests of Pakistan were served.

For some years the ISI para-military officers rode high. Afghanistan was dominated by Taliban. Other ISI created and run Muslim entities waged asymmetrical war against the Indian main enemy particularly in Kashmir. During the same stretch of time in the mid to late nineties, ISI became increasing aware of and entwined with al-Qaeda.

This is not to say that ISI either worked directly with or abetted Osama bin Laden or even knew of specific plans, but rather that ISI had a loose working relation with al-Qaeda, which came in handy for the Sublime Ethereal Shaykh when he and his associates relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan. Relations between ISI and Osama were warm enough that, when the US launched a cruise missile attack on the man's camp, he received a timely phone call from a Pakistani who knew the time the Tomahawks would be crossing Pakistani air space.

This one phone call, which had to be from a senior member of the Pakistani military or ISI, assured Osama was out of the impact area in a timely fashion. And, it assured the US would suffer the trauma of 9/11. Unsurprisingly, no heads rolled even metaphorically for this most treacherous phone message.

Even an observer no closer to the scene than the planet Mars could not have missed the way in which ISI personnel with al-Qaeda and Taliban wallahs in hand were able to leave Afghanistan by air and foot as the American boots advanced at an unduly leisurely rate. There are strong indications that the days following the American "invasion" constituted in part a carefully choreographed ballet between the Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies and the government, army, and intelligence service of our good and great ally, Pakistan. (Oh, may the winds of the universe grant the Geek a life long enough so that he can see the documents when they finally emerge from the Burn Before Reading file!)

Not to put too fine a point on the matter--the Pakistanis absolutely hate the US. Yes, there are individual exceptions, but the general climate of opinion in the hellhole of Pakistan is that there is an evil triad out to get them: India, Israel, and the US. The relative ranking of the three satanic powers varies over time, but none ever slip from the list no matter what the realities might be.

The government of Pakistan, its army, and ISI resonate perfectly with this climate. It propels the government to denounce the Predator strikes in the FATA even though interviews with the locals in the areas liable to Predator attention show support for the strikes. (Consult the archives of the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor for documentation.) The real deal is simply that the tribesmen exposed most up close and personal to the Taliban of either or both Pakistani or Afghan origin dislike them the most and are most pleased when a Hellfire missile energetically disassembles some Talib.

During the past year or so the government of Pakistan, its army, and even the puppet masters of ISI have come to realize that, like Dr Frankenstein, their monster has eluded complete control and threatens its creator. That more than any alleged US pressure (the Obama administration pressuring? Since when? Unless the victim is Israel) made it necessary for the army to go through the motions of fighting Taliban. The very methodical actions first in Swat and then in South Waziristan were calculated to provide ample opportunity for the bag guys to evacuate to safer areas while minimizing friendly fatalities.

Pakistan will undertake only the bare minimum of actions necessary to convince their homegrown Talibs to focus on India and the foreigners rather than attack domestically. At the same time the operations conducted by Pakistani security forces will make certain that the surviving Talib are better skilled in the arts of combat. In short, the Pakistanis are serving as a live fire course of instruction turning out more competent jihadi to fight the Americans and others in Afghanistan. In the alternative, the foreign jihadis subjected to the Pakistani courses of combat instruction will go home as much better fighters.

What a fine concept! If you are the government, army, and ISI of Pakistan.

Much as it pains the Geek to once more lay the responsibility for the bootless policy of the US toward Pakistan at the feet of the inept Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies considering that the Obama administration is even more adrift at the policy level, such is the ground truth. The simplest and perhaps most accurate explanation for the Bush/Cheney decision to bribe our pretend ally into a further pretense of alliance is that of inertia. Previous administrations had made the same superficial, not to say lame brained appreciation.

Not even the Pakistani success at evading our half-hearted efforts to stop its nuclear weapons program served as a wake-up call. The Pakistani possession of a rudimentary nuclear arsenal simply served then to provide an excuse for more soft treatment. ("We can't piss off the Paks! They have the freakin' bomb!)

This overlooked the fact that the US had never, (not since the Truman administration when India was first seen as a dangerously pro-Soviet leaning country), not even once, tried a hard touch on Islamabad. Also overlooked is the accompanying reality that no Muslim country has ever responded positively to any touch other than a hard one. Soft play, the play of pretense, and bribes breeds contempt, contempt for the weakness exhibited.

So where does the situation finally blown wide open by the Brits leave us and our allies in Afghanistan? Simple. Between a rock--Karzai's search for a separate peace--and a hard place--the ISI sponsorship and protection of Taliban.

The answer? There is an answer, not a complete one to be sure. With respect to Afghanistan, focus on killing as many of the hard core jihadis of Taliban and akin groups as possible while empowering to the maximum degree possible the self-organizing potentials of Afghans at the local level. In the FATA ,continue or, better, expand the Predator attacks to the greatest extent supportable by actionable intelligence so as to kill as many heavyweights--and ISI officers--as possible in the shortest period of time.

Pakistan is the tougher problem. The hole we have dug for ourselves there is too deep to be filled quickly. This means we had best limit our aid while preparing for ground and air actions so as to neutralize their nuclear stockpile and supporting facilities. Particularly if the political Islamist strain in the society and government--including the army and ISI--becomes oriented toward the notion of outdoing Iran in the capacity to use indirectly applied nuclear fire on an "infidel" target.

Most of all it is critical to cease privileging Islam. There is danger in pretending that political Islam is any different from Communism or National Socialism. It is an ideology hostile in all respects to the values, interests, and goals of the US and other civilized states. Further, it is aggressive, given to duplicity of a degree which would have embarrassed even Goebbels, and more implacable than Joe Stalin on a tear.

The unfortunate reality is that the war between political Islam and the civilized states has barely started. Equally unfortunate is the fact that Pakistan, even more than Iran, is the major epicenter of aggressive political Islam. Look at Pakistan and see the face of the enemy.

Pakistan--A Dangerously Split Personality

Pakistan tested two nuclear capable ballistic missiles. In the context of this event the Pakistani Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, made two statements of importance.

In the first he flatly declared that Pakistan had "laid to rest" all the concerns held regarding the security of the country's nuclear arsenal and program. In the second Gilani said, "It is time for the world to recognize Pakistan as a dejure nuclear power with equal rights and responsibilities."

Don't you love the ambiguity of the PM's use of the phrase "equal rights and responsibilities?" Is it Mr Gilani's intent to assert that Pakistan's possession of nukes gives the country "rights and responsibilities" which are "equal" to those appertaining to other, longer established members of the Official Nuclear Club--the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China? Or does he mean that as a "dejure" nuclear power (whatever that might mean) Pakistan has "responsibilities" which exist equally with its "rights?"

Then there are are a couple of other, more basic questions which scream for answers buried in Gilani's adventure in declaratory policy: What "rights" accrue to a state as a consequence of its owning some nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them? The second is that of just what "responsibilities" can Pakistan be trusted to shoulder?

It is all well and good for Mr Gilani to urge, "There is now a need for the world to move on beyond safety and security concerns." It is something else all together to provide a sound, credible basis for the world to believe the accuracy and relevance of his assertion.

It requires a vast willingness to suspend disbelief to accept the Pakistani PM's contentions. To swallow unquestioningly his view that Pakistan can be counted upon to exercise its "responsibilities" as a nuclear power would necessitate taking a very potent reality altering drug.

The primary responsibility of a country possessing a nuclear capability no matter how small--or large--is to act consistently in its foreign policy so as to be both a force for stability and a predictable actor on the global and regional stages. A closely related responsibility is that of forming a political and military strategy as well as supporting doctrine which serves to decouple crises or uses of force generally with the potential for vertical escalation across the nuclear threshold.

Undergirding both of these exercises in responsibility is the prime requirement that a government be in full and effective control of its country. This duty includes demonstrating both the will and capacity to thwart any group working from an extreme ideological base in its attempts to gain access to the nuclear capacity.

It is not necessary to adopt an unduly jaundiced view of Pakistan's history or current dynamics to conclude that Pakistan fails on each and every of the four points adumbrated. With specific regard to the second two areas of responsibility, the observer need not be overly skeptical to conclude that the government of Pakistan is not in control of its own territory and that it lacks the inherent capacity to prevent Islamist and jihadist groups from accessing its nuclear capacities.

There is no need to resort to overstatement to allege that Pakistan is the epicenter of transnational terrorism conducted by True Believers in political Islam--Islamists. Nor is it mere rodomontade to contend that Islamists exist within the Pakistani government, military, and intelligence service.

The lack of structural integrity so evident in Pakistan is evident not only in the ongoing, daily requirement for their army and our Predators to carry the war against Islamists to the hills, villages, and towns of the FATA. The holes in the hull of the Pakistani ship of state are also demonstrated in the reality that the vast majority of transnational terror operations can be tracked back to Pakistan.

Americans were reminded in a most dramatic way of the role served by Pakistan in the terror business with the failed Times Square vehicle bomb. Leaving aside all the apologetic quacking seeking to explain (and justify) the action of Faisal Shahzad, one important fact remains: The guy went to Pakistan and received training in the fine art of bomb making.

Even if Shahzad was self-recruited to the jihadist mission, there is no way of ignoring that he knew where to go, who to see in order to get both instruction and resources to carry off his attack. Shahzad was no wannabe martyr. He had no intention of dying while he killed. He was expected both to live and return to the hills of Pakistan.

The obvious fact that Shahzad not only intended to live but to return to the people who had underwritten his effort puts his case in a different league all together from that of the Underware Bomber or others of the martyrdom brigade. Inferentially at the least, Shahad's controllers in Pakistan wanted him to come back alive so the knowledge base of penetrating American security could be enhanced. Perhaps the controllers even anticipated Shahzad coming through so clean that he could be used again. Experienced assets with valid US passports are thin on the soil of Pakistan (it can be hoped.)

It is true that Pakistani authorities have made a great show of activity in the days since the smoking Pathfinder attracted unwanted attention. They have made arrests. A good number of arrests. Beyond that they have made promises to the US. A very great number of promises.

But then, the Pakistanis have made any number of promises to the US over quite a few years. On occasion they have even delivered on the promises. These times have occurred when immediate and pressing Pakistani national interests are involved. (Recall that the Army got serious about operation in Swat and portions of South Waziristan only after the Islamists showed a very real, quite immediate capacity to fatally destabilize the regime.)

Even when the Islamists present threats which border on the existential, the government, military, and intelligence service of Pakistan show remarkable reluctance to act with rapidity, overwhelming force, and palpable determination. No amount of American provided mood music regarding Pakistani efforts and sacrifices can change that.

Nor can the honeyed words and soothing music change the reason which most probably underlies the slow, hesitant, and anything-but-resolute actions taken by Islamabad to extend its uncontested authority over all of the geography constituting Pakistan. The real deal of motive is simply that many senior members of government, military, intelligence service, and nuclear weapons program are in basic agreement with the goals of the Islamists.

When ground truths are reached in Pakistan, it is evident that the Islamist agenda, even the jihadist actions, are not actually existential in nature. The structures of the government, the army, the intelligence service, are not threatened in the slightest by the Islamists. Even if the Taliban and its ilk were to come to power, it would not change business as usual for any of these features of state.

The emergence of Taliban from the mountainside caves would mean the faces at the top would change. It would mean more beards, more garbage sacks covering more women, more amputations, more casting of stones, and a whale of lot more regional, even global instability.

It would not mean, however, any fundamental alteration in the government, the army, the intelligence service, or the nuclear weapons program. The agendas of the army, the intelligence service, the nuclear weaponeers, even the bureaucracy, mesh almost seamlessly with the goals and agendas of the Islamists. Both the history of Pakistan from its creation and the current dynamics of the place underscore this melancholy reality.

None of these unpleasant truths mean, necessarily, that Prime Minister Gilani was intentionally dissembling when he made his remarks to a collection of Army officers giddy with the most recent test of missiles capable of planting mushrooms on New Delhi. But, they do mean that the US along with much of the rest of the world should--even must--expend as much anxiety over the nuclear status of Pakistan as is demonstrated over the still under development Iranian bomb project.

More, President Obama must disabuse himself of any specious notion holding Pakistan to be an "ally" of the US in a joint war against the Islamists. At best Pakistan is a semi-hostile neutral in the war. At worst it is in semi-covert league with the enemy.

In any event Pakistan is not capable of exercising the "responsibilities" of being a nuclear power. Thus the time has not yet come when the "world can move beyond safety and security" as such obtains to the defacto nuclear status of Pakistan.