Caught In A Morass Of Delusions

Over the weekend Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari told the Guardian that the American war in Afghanistan was destabilizing his country.  Presumably with a straight face he averred that absent the war being waged by the US, Pakistan would be a fountainhead of democracy, free enterprise, and tranquility with nary a problem of the social, economic, political, or religious sort.

Continuing the exercise in monumental dementia, the head of the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which is the  organization that not only cranked up Taliban in the first place but has done everything in its considerable power to prop up, assist, hide, and facilitate in all respects not only Taliban but other, to use the Pakistani term, "anti-Indian assets," was in Washington today.  The ISI chief, LtGen Ahmad Sujah Pasha, was passing on an ultimatum which was decreed by the most powerful man in Pakistan today.

No.  Not the president.  Rather the armed forces chief of staff, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.  General Kayani no doubt with the complete support and approval of LtGen Sujah Pasha has demanded an end to most Predator strikes, a reduction in force of both CIA and Special Operations personnel, and an abandonment of the Agency's attempts to penetrate the assorted "anti-Indian assets" established and to some extent controlled by ISI.

The purported basis for the virtual ending of the effective use of CIA personnel as well as the training program being operated by Special Forces troopers for the Pakistani Frontier Force was the arrest of CIA contract employee Raymond Davis.  Davis, you will certainly recall was busted on a murder rap after having blown away two Pakistanis usually characterized as "muggers."  Davis executed a good shoot on two men who were almost certainly assets of ISI who were assigned to harass Davis if not do more.

Davis, a former Green Beret fluent in Pushtu had been working out of the consulate in Kandahar tasked with penetrating Lashkar-e-Taiba.  LeT is another of those "anti-Indian assets" such as the Haqqani network both established and protected/facilitated by ISI.  CIA attempts to penetrate these groups without authorization from ISI, which is the only possible way to play the game given that ISI is not given to cooperation against its own goons.

ISI along with the Pakistani armed forces lives in a delusional universe where the most important consideration, the prime directive, is to defeat India in the next war.  These men are all of the view that another war with India is not only inevitable, it is desirable and will be won by the Mighty Warriors of the Koran if only the Pakistanis have sufficient strategic depth, a large nuclear arsenal, and the means of waging war on all levels from local terrorism to nuclear Armageddon.

To this end, the Pakistani military and its supporters in the country's elite have bent every effort toward the blessed day when war again breaks out.  The mere fact that this orientation has distorted the country's economy, suppressed domestic political freedoms, truncated education, imported Wahhibism and all that implies, fostered social divisions, and fractured the political structure is of no consequence.  Nor is it worthy of considering all available evidence indicating India has no desire for war, no plans of initiating war, and well understands that war would be very bloody, extremely destructive, and might take decades for recovery--and that is for the winner.

The Pakistani military is so consumed by its delusions that it sincerely believes that the US has two goals in mind currently: (1) Suppressing totally Pakistani influence in Afghanistan while allowing Indian influence to increase without limit, (2) Suppress Pakistan's nuclear capability while allowing that of India to cruise along unimpeded.  Therefore, the Agency and Special Forces operations in Pakistan are actually oriented toward one or the other of these two goals.

The military is supreme in Pakistan and President Zardari knows this.  His civilian government like all those which have gone before stays in office at the let and sufferance of the military.  Of course, it helps that Mr Zardiri like his predecessors lacks moral courage, lacks the capacity to take on the military, to enlist the citizenry of the long suffering nation in a hard trek back to some sort of political sanity.

The position of the US is of no aid in this matter.  While different administrations may from time to time weakly chastise the Pakistani government as the Obama administration did last week, the various extortion efforts made by Islamabad always result in more cash flowing to Pakistan's coffers.

When the end of the Cold War opened the door for the US to reappraise its long standing hostility to India and friendship with Pakistan, it took the chance.  There was a definite tilt to India during the years of Bill Clinton.  The Pakistanis were left comparatively speaking high and dry.  They were given a fresh start and a brand new chance following 9/11.

The W. Bush administration made the horrid decision that we could do nothing in Afghanistan without the cooperation of Pakistan.  This choice was made despite the definite knowledge extant inside the Beltway of the relationship between ISI and both Taliban and al-Qaeda.  The choice was made despite the awareness of history, awareness that the decision made by Reagan to hand off the endgame in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis had resulted in the creation of Taliban.  (The junior partnership of CIA in this creation should not be seen as mitigation of primary ISI culpability.)

The fateful decisions made by Bush/Cheney--not only the involvement of Pakistan, the paying of bribes to Pakistan, but also and more importantly, the changing of the mission from one which was primarily punitive to one of "nation-building"--cast our policy in a way which could do nothing but impair our interests in the region and block our goal of defeating violent political Islam in both Afghanistan and across the border in the FATA and adjacent regions of Pakistan such as Kandahar and Quetta.

Even now with the Pakistani president and chief of staff undertaking efforts of both rhetorical and practical nature to impair further the American efforts and policies, the US, at least publicly, continues to dance to the tune called in Islamabad.  The US ambassador has called for a "renewal."  Cameron Munter is of the view, if his public pronouncements are to be taken at face value (admittedly a dangerous activity when assessing the words of a diplomat) the US and Pakistan are on the same side facing the same enemy: violent political Islam.

Of course we are, provided one is willing to define the intelligence service of our "ally" here as something other than the founder, protector, and aid of nearly every Islamist group the US is fighting.  That can be done, but only if the US is willing to join Pakistan in the deadly morass of delusions.  Unfortunately, it appears that the Obama administration is willing to do so.

Gates Gets It Right--Why Can't Anyone Else?

It is good to know that there is one mature, realistic, and plain speaking person in the Obama administration. Amid all the amateur strategists, self-proclaimed experts in geopolitics, and other assorted talk-without-thinking, speak-without-knowledge folks, Robert Gates stands out as the voice of both accuracy and rationality.

This time the secretary was on CNN responding to the WikiLeaks "revelations," particularly those dealing with the collaboration between the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Taliban. Predictably, he did play down the current closeness between ISI and the insurgents. As a needed balance he did bring the historical dimension of that cooperation into sharp focus. In this he is unique among the flurry of pontification, viewing-with-alarm, and all around hand-wringing which has characterized both politicians and the mainstream media.

Gates said, " we walked out on Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989 and left them basically holding the bag. And there is always the fear that we will do that again. And I believe that's the reason there's a certain hedge." The Geek can say only, "Amen." (Of course, with his usual modesty the Geek points out that he has made the same point several times in posts over the past three years.)

The unthinking way in which the administrations of both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush walked away from the morass in Afghanistan not only "left them basically holding the bag" but paved the way for the emergence of Taliban. The senior decision makers of both administrations were warned in a timely manner as to the dangers of handing the Afghan brief over to Islamabad generally and the ISI particularly. But the warnings came from people far down the food chain in the bureaucracies in Langley, Foggy Bottom, and the Pentagon. And, the folks topside had bigger fish to fry as well as a very short term view of the future.

In recent years the short-term vision of the Reagan and H.W. Bush days has been mirrored by the short memories of the W. Bush and Obama administrations. The people breathing the rarefied air around the Oval (as well as journalists and politicians generally) have forgotten the experiences of our earlier activities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This statement presupposes that the minds of today have ever been cluttered by any knowledge of the past, even the very recent and quite critical past.)

When the Americans went to Afghanistan nine plus years ago, their plans were in no way based upon the vast experience collected during the long years of the anti-Soviet proxy war or the years of Pakistani-Taliban collaboration which followed. It is was this willful and easily cured ignorance which both allowed and encouraged the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld bunch to fail to properly define the goal of the invasion as being purely punitive. Or, to use the less offensive term invented during the Obama administration, "counter-terrorism."

Rather than putting the most narrow focus on the goal of the invasion, the W. Bush administration opted for a hazy and attractive view of somehow building a modern Western style nation-state in the rocky and sterile soil of Afghanistan. At the same time neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney days were scared silly by the prospect of somehow angering, alienating, even slightly annoying the military junta which ran Pakistan.

As a result the Americans stood by as the ISI assisted any number of Taliban and al-Qaeda heavyweights to flee the new boots on the ground for the hospitable lands of the FATA--and Pakistan proper. This gross blunder assured that two unpleasant realities would come to pass in the fullness of time. Taliban along with the Haqqani network and other, smaller adherents of armed political Islam would recover their strength; ISI and other components of the Pakistani military and government would continue to provide support and assistance.

When Taliban and the others were ready, they returned to the fight in Afghanistan. The reentry was done with the full support of ISI and understanding of other parts of the Pakistani military and government. There is no doubt but ISI and others depended upon two eventualities coming to pass so as to secure Pakistani goals and reduce any risks to Islamabad.

The first of this was the existence within the US of sufficient war weariness to limit the American will and capacity to counter the new, stronger Taliban. Along with this, the planners of ISI assumed the armed political Islamists of Taliban, et al would be focused sufficiently upon gaining victory in Afghanistan to be willing to refrain from attacks against Pakistan.

In both assumptions ISI was proven wrong. To their consternation, the new, ever-so-peaceful, ever-ready-to-reach-out President Obama was willing to take the risk of sending more troops as well as a competent commander to Afghanistan. And, the LeT was quite willing and able to present an existential challenge to Islamabad in the FATA and elsewhere.

In response to the (unplanned for if not completely unexpected) ramping up of the Islamist political challenge as well as the violence which accompanied it, the government and armed forces of Pakistan had no choice but to wage war against LeT and other groups. The campaigns in Swat and portions of the FATA have been slow motion, fought primarily by the second string of paramilitary forces or the low risk, low effectiveness means of air and artillery strikes and have been conducted in a way assuring minimum losses to the "bad guys," particularly the command echelons.

The Pakistanis have been somewhat more forthcoming in assistance to the US in its conduct of the Predator targeted killing program. The actionable intelligence flow has increased along with the tempo of Predator operations. This has benefited the Pakistanis by eliminating key hostile personnel without any political risk.

If the remarks of Secretary Gates regarding the improvement in Pakistani cooperation are restricted to this area, they are completely correct. At the same time it is critical to note that the collaboration of Islamabad in such matters as impairing the Haqqani network have remained unchanged month to month for years now.

The mention of targeted killings opens the door to the question of just which strategy is the US now following in Afghanistan--counterinsurgency with nation-building or a punitive counter-terrorism approach? At root this constitutes a distinction without a difference. However, since there are some contemporary Great Captains such as Vice-president Joe Biden and the New York Times for which it is critical, a general comment is required.

Both Joe (If-I-Feel-It-I-Say-It) Biden and the NYT are of the view that targeted killing is the hallmark of punitive counter-terrorism but is totally unsuited to counterinsurgency. The V-P and the NYT see the recent higher volume use of both air and ground strikes against identified commanders of Taliban and other groups as being the refutation of the protect the civilians emphasis of General McChrystal.

They are as wrong as a soup sandwich. Organizational disruption is equally important in a genuine counterinsurgent strategy as it is in a pure effort at counter-terrorism. Any success in a counterinsurgent effort requires mobilizing support from the uncommitted majority of the civilian population to the government at the expense of the insurgent. Any success in a counter-insurgent campaign also demands a progressive reduction of the organizational coherence of the insurgents.

In short, successful counterinsurgency requires protecting those who need protection, converting the insurgents who are open to conversion, and killing those insurgents who are immune to any compromise, any power sharing agreement, any alternative less than total victory. For the hard core leadership of Taliban et al, the war is existential in nature. This means they must be killed. Period.

When a commando team on the ground or a UAV delivered Hellfire kills a Taliban heavyweight, it is both a success in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. Killing these people is both a necessity and a good thing. Period.

The difference between punitive oriented counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency comes in the other measures taken. Insofar as an emphasis is placed upon all the areas falling under the rubric "nation-building" the outside intervenor as well as the host government is waging a counterinsurgent effort.

The nature of the human terrain in Afghanistan militates against nation-building if such is defined as the creation of a Western style nation-state in Afghanistan. This reality does not allow the US and its partners an easy way out however. The domestic political realities as well as the mindset of American and Western European elites will not allow a simple refocus on the eminently realistic policy of punitively oriented counter-terrorism.

It is necessary for reasons endemic to the politics and values of the West to make a good show of nation-building in Afghanistan even if such provides an endstate far less than wished. There is no way in which most Western elitfes would be satisfied if, when the shooting stops, Afghanistan is a medieval feudal theocracy--even if that is precisely what most Afghans are most comfortable with.

The next time Secretary Gates is on TV it would be nice if he could turn his highly realistic and vastly experienced brain loose on that matter. On the matter of explaining just why there can be no nation-building possible in Afghanistan without a severe redefinition of the term.

David Cameron Is One And One

British prime minister David Cameron was well on his way to winning the Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon" Award for his characterization of Gaza as a "prison camp" during his genuflection to Turkish sensibilities while speaking in Ankara. Cameron tossed away his chances to be an official "Maroon" when he followed his exercise in asininity with an unprecedented bit of blunt truth telling in India.

In the context of a speech to Indian businessmen, Mr Cameron delivered a view of the role of elements within the Pakistani military and government. He warned Islamabad that it could no longer "look both ways," toward supporting Taliban, the Haqqani network, and LeT and toward "respect as a democracy." His warning in both its starkness and accuracy has been long overdue for issuance in a public forum.

Pakistan has engaged for some time now in what Cameron correctly described as the "export" of terror acts. It is the source of some seventy percent of all recent threatened or executed attacks. That is a ground truth which exists independently of any or all of the WikiLeaks document dump of contemporary notoriety. The role of Pakistan as a country as well as that played by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as well as other components of the military and government constitute the unmentionable T. rex in the bathroom.

Mr Cameron has performed a great service by finally publicly pointing to the T. rex and calling it precisely what it is--a thwacking great killing beast.

The reaction of Islamabad's minions was instant, vociferous, and freighted with indignation. It is no surprise that the Pakistani officials pinned the rap on the WikiLeaks documents. Without exception, the worthies of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan claimed (inaccurately) that Mr Cameron had shamefully accepted the low level reports emanating originally from Afghan intelligence agencies as proof of the accusations of partnership between ISI and Taliban.

While numerous items within the WikiLeaks trove do point to the ISI-Taliban linkage and many but not all did originate with Afghan sources, Mr Cameron had no need to rely upon them as evidence for the bang-on nature of his observations. There is evidence aplenty extending back many years and coming forward in time to the testimony of the confessed Times Square bomber of direct Pakistani involvement with terror.

The Indian authorities have demonstrated convincingly that "retired" members of ISI were directly involved in both the planning and execution of the Mumbai attack. Cases in Germany, Austria, and elsewhere in Western Europe have connected the dots of local terror cells and acts with planners, financiers, and operational managers in Pakistan, at least some of whom were employees of ISI.

It was someone in the Pakistani government and most likely ISI who called Osama bin Laden while the Tomahawk missiles were crossing Pakistani airspace. The satellite phone warning allowed bin Laden to get out of the impact area literally minutes before the incoming missiles arrived. In the immediate wake of the Bush ordered invasion of Afghanistan, it was ISI and Pakistani military personnel who held the hands of assorted al-Qaeda and Taliban heavyweights as they left Tora Bora almost literally one step ahead of the Americans.

It was ISI and the Pakistani military (which was the government at the time) who formulated an agreement with Taliban and the Haqqani network which opened the FATA as a sanctuary for their displaced fighters in the years following the American led invasion. The Fearless Fugitives of the One True Faith were provided all facilities necessary for their recovery and rejuvenation by ISI. Had it not been for ISI and the larger military/government understanding and support, the war in Afghanistan would have ended long ago.

That is the record. That is the evidence behind Mr Cameron's indictment. That is the justification for his demand that Islamabad choose a side and stick to it.

In truth, Islamabad should not have it both ways. It should be denied the opportunity to work both sides of the street.

However, as pointed out in yesterday's post on this site, the US and UK need Pakistan far more than the Pakistanis need us. That is the conundrum facing both Foggy Bottom and Whitehall.

Mr Cameron did suggest a viable way out of the morass. It is a route which is neither pleasant to contemplate nor easy to travel. It consists of forcing Islamabad to make a choice: With the civilized states or with the savage primitives of violent political Islam.

The way in which this choice can be forced upon Islamabad consists at root of a truth offensive. This means telling the Pakistanis and, perforce, the world all that we known and can prove concerning the close relationship between ISI or other elements of the Pakistani government and military on the one hand and groups practicing violent political Islam on the other. As an accompaniment, the US, the UK, and other civilized states must make continuation of assistance contingent upon Pakistan making the right choice--and abiding to it.

The reaction of the Pakistani establishment to Mr Cameron's remarks shows it is embarrassed by the truth. Embarrassed to the point of hysteria. This implies the establishment in government and the elite sectors of society which support the government are vulnerable in this area, the area of being openly associated with the primitives of violent political Islam, which is a very real existential threat to both the establishment and the elite.

The vulnerability exists. It exists to be exploited. To be exploited for the interests and benefit of the US, the UK, and the other civilized states. To be exploited for the interest and benefit of Afghans and whatever state they finally create. Even to be exploited for the interest and benefit of Pakistan, its government, its elite sectors, and its future.

Sometimes truth is not only the best, most effective weapon, it is the only weapon. Mr Cameron had both the foresight and intestinal fortitude to recognize this. And, use it.

Pakistan's Double Game

Virtually everyone in every damn intelligence service in the West who knows a bloody thing about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and, last, but most important, Pakistan, has been aware for two decades that the "Students" (to use the correct translation of "Taliban,") have been and remain the creature of the government of Pakistan and more specifically, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Noises to this effect have sounded lightly in the MSM of the West from time to time over the years, but never loudly nor with much definition.

The London Times has finally ripped the curtain of silence to small shreds with an article drawing on a well done paper from the London School of Economics, which institution has a plethora of expertise far surpassing the dismal science for which it is named. Based upon extensive interviews with past and present Taliban figures as well as former and current ISI personnel and others in the government of Pakistan, the conclusion of the report is both stark and irrefutable. It was quite pleasant to read in an open source the unspeakable truth: ISI is the ongoing mainbrace of Taliban and this is known to and approved of by the Pakistani government at the highest level, the country's president, Asif Ali Zardari.

Despite all the odious protestations of the Bush/Cheney administration and its successor under Obama that Pakistan is an ally in a joint war against "terrorism" or "radical extremism" or simply the named groups al-Qaeda and Taliban, the truth is simply that Pakistan consorts more eagerly with the enemy than it does with the US. Not even the billions in bribes have served to budge the government of Pakistan, or the Pakistani army, let alone ISI from the course of supporting, facilitating, assisting, the Scrofulous Vermin of the Koran.

There are good reasons for the position adopted by Islamabad in the closing days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At that time it appeared Pakistan could create strategic depth for itself by using a proxy force to rule Afghanistan when the Red Army finally headed home. The US was indifferent. As long as the Soviets got and stayed got, the administrations of Reagan and H.W. Bush were happy. No one at the top two levels of the national security and foreign policy staffs cared for the nuances of Afghan politics nor the fine grained details of just how Pakistan sought to outpoint India in their never ending conflict.

During the years of assisting the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance Americans had come to find the Afghans to be a very difficult sort to work with. There was no great objection from the fieldhand level when the endgame of the proxy effort against the Red Army was turned over to the Paks.

It has to be admitted that the Pakistanis took to the assignment with vim, vigor, and vitality. They were skilled and able in the task of taking the young men from the Saudi funded madrassas near the border and turning them into the Taliban. The ISI guys were Muslim, some quite oriented to political Islam and all that implies. They were also good nationalists and were oblivious to the ill effects Taliban had on the Afghan social, political, and economic life as long as the strategic interests of Pakistan were served.

For some years the ISI para-military officers rode high. Afghanistan was dominated by Taliban. Other ISI created and run Muslim entities waged asymmetrical war against the Indian main enemy particularly in Kashmir. During the same stretch of time in the mid to late nineties, ISI became increasing aware of and entwined with al-Qaeda.

This is not to say that ISI either worked directly with or abetted Osama bin Laden or even knew of specific plans, but rather that ISI had a loose working relation with al-Qaeda, which came in handy for the Sublime Ethereal Shaykh when he and his associates relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan. Relations between ISI and Osama were warm enough that, when the US launched a cruise missile attack on the man's camp, he received a timely phone call from a Pakistani who knew the time the Tomahawks would be crossing Pakistani air space.

This one phone call, which had to be from a senior member of the Pakistani military or ISI, assured Osama was out of the impact area in a timely fashion. And, it assured the US would suffer the trauma of 9/11. Unsurprisingly, no heads rolled even metaphorically for this most treacherous phone message.

Even an observer no closer to the scene than the planet Mars could not have missed the way in which ISI personnel with al-Qaeda and Taliban wallahs in hand were able to leave Afghanistan by air and foot as the American boots advanced at an unduly leisurely rate. There are strong indications that the days following the American "invasion" constituted in part a carefully choreographed ballet between the Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies and the government, army, and intelligence service of our good and great ally, Pakistan. (Oh, may the winds of the universe grant the Geek a life long enough so that he can see the documents when they finally emerge from the Burn Before Reading file!)

Not to put too fine a point on the matter--the Pakistanis absolutely hate the US. Yes, there are individual exceptions, but the general climate of opinion in the hellhole of Pakistan is that there is an evil triad out to get them: India, Israel, and the US. The relative ranking of the three satanic powers varies over time, but none ever slip from the list no matter what the realities might be.

The government of Pakistan, its army, and ISI resonate perfectly with this climate. It propels the government to denounce the Predator strikes in the FATA even though interviews with the locals in the areas liable to Predator attention show support for the strikes. (Consult the archives of the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor for documentation.) The real deal is simply that the tribesmen exposed most up close and personal to the Taliban of either or both Pakistani or Afghan origin dislike them the most and are most pleased when a Hellfire missile energetically disassembles some Talib.

During the past year or so the government of Pakistan, its army, and even the puppet masters of ISI have come to realize that, like Dr Frankenstein, their monster has eluded complete control and threatens its creator. That more than any alleged US pressure (the Obama administration pressuring? Since when? Unless the victim is Israel) made it necessary for the army to go through the motions of fighting Taliban. The very methodical actions first in Swat and then in South Waziristan were calculated to provide ample opportunity for the bag guys to evacuate to safer areas while minimizing friendly fatalities.

Pakistan will undertake only the bare minimum of actions necessary to convince their homegrown Talibs to focus on India and the foreigners rather than attack domestically. At the same time the operations conducted by Pakistani security forces will make certain that the surviving Talib are better skilled in the arts of combat. In short, the Pakistanis are serving as a live fire course of instruction turning out more competent jihadi to fight the Americans and others in Afghanistan. In the alternative, the foreign jihadis subjected to the Pakistani courses of combat instruction will go home as much better fighters.

What a fine concept! If you are the government, army, and ISI of Pakistan.

Much as it pains the Geek to once more lay the responsibility for the bootless policy of the US toward Pakistan at the feet of the inept Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies considering that the Obama administration is even more adrift at the policy level, such is the ground truth. The simplest and perhaps most accurate explanation for the Bush/Cheney decision to bribe our pretend ally into a further pretense of alliance is that of inertia. Previous administrations had made the same superficial, not to say lame brained appreciation.

Not even the Pakistani success at evading our half-hearted efforts to stop its nuclear weapons program served as a wake-up call. The Pakistani possession of a rudimentary nuclear arsenal simply served then to provide an excuse for more soft treatment. ("We can't piss off the Paks! They have the freakin' bomb!)

This overlooked the fact that the US had never, (not since the Truman administration when India was first seen as a dangerously pro-Soviet leaning country), not even once, tried a hard touch on Islamabad. Also overlooked is the accompanying reality that no Muslim country has ever responded positively to any touch other than a hard one. Soft play, the play of pretense, and bribes breeds contempt, contempt for the weakness exhibited.

So where does the situation finally blown wide open by the Brits leave us and our allies in Afghanistan? Simple. Between a rock--Karzai's search for a separate peace--and a hard place--the ISI sponsorship and protection of Taliban.

The answer? There is an answer, not a complete one to be sure. With respect to Afghanistan, focus on killing as many of the hard core jihadis of Taliban and akin groups as possible while empowering to the maximum degree possible the self-organizing potentials of Afghans at the local level. In the FATA ,continue or, better, expand the Predator attacks to the greatest extent supportable by actionable intelligence so as to kill as many heavyweights--and ISI officers--as possible in the shortest period of time.

Pakistan is the tougher problem. The hole we have dug for ourselves there is too deep to be filled quickly. This means we had best limit our aid while preparing for ground and air actions so as to neutralize their nuclear stockpile and supporting facilities. Particularly if the political Islamist strain in the society and government--including the army and ISI--becomes oriented toward the notion of outdoing Iran in the capacity to use indirectly applied nuclear fire on an "infidel" target.

Most of all it is critical to cease privileging Islam. There is danger in pretending that political Islam is any different from Communism or National Socialism. It is an ideology hostile in all respects to the values, interests, and goals of the US and other civilized states. Further, it is aggressive, given to duplicity of a degree which would have embarrassed even Goebbels, and more implacable than Joe Stalin on a tear.

The unfortunate reality is that the war between political Islam and the civilized states has barely started. Equally unfortunate is the fact that Pakistan, even more than Iran, is the major epicenter of aggressive political Islam. Look at Pakistan and see the face of the enemy.