The Land Of Pinocchio Is At It Again

No one oriented in time and place expects governments to be open, honest, and ever truthful in their public (or most private) statements.  Diplomacy is often a contest of careful mendacity on a par with the sort practiced by lawyers working in an adversarial system.  That is, blatant duplicity of the easily exposed sort is eschewed in favor of the well-crafted framing of a statement, an issue, a position.  The good diplomat like the good advocate in court depends on what is not said even more than that which is said to mask the truth--particularly when the truth is uncomfortable from one's perspective.

The heavyweights of the Pakistani military and intelligence service (ISI) fail to meet the standard of proper diplomatic lying.  This is unfortunate as the armed forces and ISI are the government of Pakistan far eclipsing in both power and public esteem the elected civilian political structure.  As such, they are far more a part of the problem and in no way a contributor to the solution as regards the threat posed to civilized states by the damaged but not yet defeated advocates of violent political Islam which stalk Afghanistan, the FATA, and Pakistan proper.

The power elite of the armed forces and ISI is back at it.  As has so often been the case, they are lying in a fashion which boggles the mind in its breathtaking absurdity.  In the most recent ejaculations of denial and counter accusation, the spokesman for the Pakistani general staff insults the intelligence of all who read or hear his thundering denunciation of a recent spate of articles and editorials linking the ISI and armed forces with groups dedicated to violent political Islam and the recent murder of a well known and respected Pakistani journalist.

The immediate reaction of any half-way intelligent and well-informed person to the preposterous posturing of Major General Athar Abbas' remarks is to quote Ronald Reagan's comment during one of the 1980 debates, "There he goes again."  The line delivered with a slow, sad shake of the head.  The modern major general was announcing that the shoe put upon the collective foot of the Pakistani military and ISI fit tightly--it pinched and he was yelling, "Ouch!"

As unbelievable fables go, the Abbas Denial was on a par with the outpouring of outraged dignity following the Great Abbotabad Raid.  The credibility of the Pakistanis, never high, was stretched far beyond its Young's Modulus with the earnest protestations of innocence with which the Pakistani heavies met the news that the Americans had found and liquidated Osama bin Laden within pistol shot of their very own military academy.

While the US government for reasons of state (the justification of all ill-advised and ultimately less than productive actions) has downplayed the possibility that the senior ranks of our "ally" in the "joint" war with al-Qaeda, the various Talibans, and all similar groups could possibly have known that bin Laden resided close at hand in comfortable isolation, this reticence should not be interpreted as accepting the Pakistanis as being pure and lofty of motives and intentions.  Indeed, it is hard to see how anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the long standing relationship between ISI and the army on the one hand and the several terror merchant groups on the other could keep a straight face while stating they had seen "no smoking gun."

Back in the Oligocene--the days of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush--one did not have to be a member of the American intelligence community to know that ISI and the Pakistani armed forces were connected hip and shoulder with various Islamist groups, including the one which would come to power in Afghanistan as the Taliban.  Minority opinion in both administrations warned against turning over responsibility for the endgame in the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis as the latter would take advantage of the opportunity to install entities hostile to the interests of the US in the region and globally.  As is usually the case, the minority was shoved to the margins so they could watch their gloomy prognostications come to pass with the fullness of time.

Way back in the regime of Zia it was obvious that the Pakistani military would eagerly embrace the ideas of the dictator which focused on importing Wahhibism so as to promote Islam of the most austere and demanding sort as a mechanism of social and political cohesion.  The implications of this were high profile: The Islamification program would drive a move to the more and more extreme.  The program would facilitate the growth of violent political Islam oriented groups.  And, ultimately it would assure that Pakistan would become an evermore Islamist state.

American decision makers were immune to the negative counsel, seeing instead an easy way to slip out of the continued burden of doing something in a small, inconvenient, and out of the way state with a history of being ungovernable.  Anyway, the boys of Islamabad were big on reassuring Washington's rarefied levels about the pacifistic nature of Islam and the need of the Pakistani people for a stronger national identity in the face of Indian aggression.

In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war put the problem of Pakistan and its operations in Afghanistan very much on the far back burner.  The Clinton administration was so disinterested in Pakistan that its Deep Thinkers would have had a hard time finding the place on a map--until the Pakistanis demonstrated their nuclear capacity.  By then, of course, it was too late.  Too late to stop the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.  Far too late to undo the damage done by the Pakistani backed installation of Taliban in Kabul.

Of course, the ending of the cold war reduced Pakistan's importance in American eyes.  For decades Islamabad had depended upon the Left-leaning policies of India to turn on the spigot of US military aid along with the occasional civilian project.

The best thing that happened to Pakistan was the attack on 9/11.  After a nearly proforma demonstration of reluctance, Islamabad signed on to the Global War on Terror in exchange for massive amounts of American money.  It was interesting to say the least that the goodies demanded by the armed forces of Pakistan were those useful for high intensity conventional war with India rather than the more pedestrian items having utility in counterinsurgent or counter terrorist operations.

To keep the goodies flowing, the Pakistanis had to rely on their capacity to lie convincingly and in a well-timed manner.  They played a transparently double game from the very outset of the so called "joint" effort.  Given that the US already knew that the only reason Osama bin Laden had escaped a cruise missile strike years before 9/11 was a phone call from Islamabad, yet we went on catering to the Pinocchio of the Sub-continent. There was no intention of even closing the borders to Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel escaping the American invasion and its aftermath let alone actually fighting the Mighty Men of the Koran.

But the Pakistanis talked a good game.  And, because they had a nuclear arsenal, we had to pretend they were telling us the truth.  All we could do was hope that the bribes we paid bought us sufficient influence on their decision making that the armed forces and ISI might stop their training, supporting, harboring, and strategic planning efforts.

The hope was illusory at best.  However, the US had compounded its errors by invading Iraq and so mishandling the day after "victory" that it became the main event and Afghanistan a mere sideshow.  As a result, we had to continue believing the palpably false assurances of cooperation issuing from Islamabad on a daily basis.  The reality was far different.  The Pakistanis provided sanctuary in the FATA in return for a promise, since broken, that the Great Warriors of the One True Faith would limit themselves to killing Americans and apostate Afghans.

During the long interim from 2004-2010 the Taliban(s) and the Haqqani network as well as al-Qaeda rested, retrained, refitted, and grew safe from harm in the cities and hillsides of Pakistan and the FATA.  As a result, the Americans were losing more and more in country and the Pakistani military and ISI felt more and more confident in their ability to lead Uncle Sam around by the nose using a string of lies.

The pity of it all was the lies worked.  They worked because there seemed no viable alternative available to American decision makers.  We became co-conspirators in our own defeat.  Our role was limited to a continued refusal to blow the whistle on the easily demonstrated prevarications of the Pakistanis.  One of the services provided by Private Bradley Manning and his publicists at WikiLeaks has been to expose many (but not all) of the lies peddled by Islamabad as well as the reality that American diplomats knew them to be untruths.  In short we were not stupid, merely adrift at the policy level.

The Pakistani string of successful lying came to an end dramatically in May.  There was no way the lies of the Pakistanis could be accepted, even as a pretense, after the raid.  It is regrettable that the Obama administration has not taken advantage of the sea change initiated by Boat Six to force the Pakistanis to choose sides finally and definitely.

The biggest advantage which will accrue to the US from the decision to draw down our forces in Afghanistan and adopt more of a counter terrorist posture is our logistics dependence upon Pakistan will be decreased.  This means we will be in a much better position to link any continued assistance to Islamabad on demonstrated performance rather than nice sounding words.  It is much harder to lie by actions than it is with mere words.  So, Pakistan will be deprived of its advantage, an advantage it has used against us for a decade now.

While it may not be approved diplomatic form, it would be good politics both domestic and international to call the liars of Islamabad to account.  Diplomacy is usually conducted by vague words and ambiguous phrases so everyone walks away claiming success, but the Pakistanis need to be handled with a direct and blunt approach.

The time is now to say to Islamabad, to the armed forces, to ISI, to Major General Abbas, "Cut the crap!  You're busted!"

The Abbottabad Raid--A Lesson For India?

Last week, one or another of the assorted chiefs of the Indian armed services assured the press of the country that India could replicate the American raid which ended the career and life of Osama bin Laden.  While the statement must have sounded good in the ears of many Indians, it was one showing remarkable economy with the truth.

India has been baffled for years on how it should respond to the numerous attacks mounted by terror groups supported, trained, equipped, commanded, and controlled, and, in some cases, created by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.)  The default response within the realms of journalism and politics has been to demand air strikes, a limited armored thrust, general war, or, on occasion, a "covert" operations.  The default response of the government since the terrorist attack on India's parliament by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad in December 2001 and the consequent US brokerage has been a combination of diplomatic notes and "restraint."

After the May 2002 attack by Pakistani assets of the violent political Islamic nature, the US engaged in months of coercive diplomacy with the result that then Pakistani chief of state Pervez Musharrif offered the most sincere and official assurances that never more would any terrorist operate against India from any soil controlled by Pakistan.  The assurances were guaranteed by then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.  The government of India bought the Pakistani promises because and only because they were backed by the words of the US.

There were six more Pakistani backed terror attacks on India over the next several years, most notably the Mumbai Affair in November 2008.  In the last event, the Indian government presented Pakistan with reams of carefully documented evidence of involvement on the part of Pakistani nationals operating on Pakistani territory.  The accompanying requests for extradition of the named suspects were studiously ignored by the government of Pakistan.  So were Indian demands for investigations, reports, and judicial action.  Recently a government spokesman yawned off renewed requests for extradition as "familiar and outdated."

The Indian government has demonstrated a remarkable desire for a peaceful end to the ancient conflict with Pakistan.  The Indian president, Manmohan Singh, has invested his prestige as well as tremendous effort in this direction.  The pursuit of a peaceful end to the Kashmir conflict as well as the plethora of other matters on which Pakistan and India differ mightily has come to nothing.

Nor is it likely to do otherwise in the foreseeable future.

The Pakistan government, army, ISI, and their supporters or hangers-on in the elite need the ongoing pseudo-war with India to survive in power and prosperity.  Without the forever war against India, the current structure of government, military, spooks, and jihadists would collapse.  The greatest enemy of the status quo in Pakistan is peace with India.

While there is no reason for India to abandon the fruitless search (it helps assure good relations with the US if nothing else), the folks in New Delhi have to consider other options.  And do the consideration very, very rapidly.

No matter how the specifics of the aftermath of the shooting of Osama bin Laden play out with respect to US relations with Pakistan, there is no reason to conclude that the ISI and army will abandon the jihadist weapon in the necessary war with India.  Since the war must continue in order for the status quo to survive, it is requisite that the conflict be fought with means militating against vertical escalation.  The Pakistanis have no real desire to see escalation as such would run the very high risk of crossing the nuclear threshold.  Both India and Pakistan did learn that the risk of unwanted escalation runs high with the rapidly blooming crisis following the December 2001 parliament attack.

The Indians evidently learned more than did the Pakistanis as is demonstrated by their having continued to stay the course of pro forma protests over the run of Pakistani sponsored if not ordered terrorist outrages down to and beyond the Mumbai massacre.  The Pakistanis seem certain that India will stay with this approach into the future, so the risk of any response from New Delhi more robust than a sternly worded Note is perceived to be very low.

Unless and until the Indian government and military demonstrate the political will to mount armed responses commensurate with the provocation, there will be no end to the use of the jihadi weapon by Islamabad.  This translates into two specific actions, at least one of which would be very visible to the public at large.

The first, and most self-evidently public of these, is the creation of a legal framework which would serve to justify and make legal any Indian action, overt or covert, armed or not, directed against terrorists and their sponsors or facilitators located anywhere in the world.  This sort of act, like the American prototype, assure a patina of law for any retaliatory actions outside the "hot pursuit" paradigm.

Behind the scenes the Indian military must develop a low signature capacity for special operations of the same sort as that conducted by the US in Abbottabad.  It would also be necessary to demonstrate the new capacity publicly so as to dispel the impression of total incompetence generated in Mumbai by Indian commandos who took a vast number of hours filled with highly visible missteps to subdue the handful of terrorists.

Admittedly, the Americans by coming in the "back door" from Afghanistan had an easier task than would any Indian raiding party given that they would have to come via the heavily guarded "front door."  (One factor which seems to have eluded all of the legion which has argued the Paks had to be in on the Abbottabad operation is the simple one that very few of Pakistan's defenses, air or ground, face the direction of American penetration.)   This gives additional saliency to the contention that India must give some public show of a very high level of competence in special operations so as to obtain the necessary deterrent capacity in the estimate of the Pakistanis.

It is also stipulated that the creation and development of the necessary capacity in special operations of the Abbottabad sort will take money.  This means the Indian budget makers will have to make more tough decisions of the sort exhibited recently with the reprogramming of money from buying more aircraft carriers to supporting anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.

However, it should be noted that the robust, not to say aggressive, stance taken by India regarding the pirates provides a platform for demonstrating both political will and military capability to Islamabad.  The Indian navy has taken a leading role in offensive moves against the pirates--a move which surprised many observers even though the importance of Indian Ocean maritime commerce to India is well known.  A judicious use of the anti-piracy mission will allow further development of the special operations capabilities including intelligence, command and control, coordination of assets, rapid response, and low visibility.

As new capacities are developed and firmly in place, the Indian government can make use of its assorted minor insurgencies to put a public face on them.  In a way it is to India's benefit that it has several insurgencies in progress out in the boonies; they provide both good exercise for special operators and excellent opportunity to allow adverse parties to gain a hint of what might befall them or their proxies.

In the meantime, don't brag, no matter how good the words sound in your ears--they might come back to bite you in an anatomically unpleasant location.

It Was A Good Day, But Not The Final Day

The death of Osama bin Ladin is good--and long overdue--news.  The means of the man's demise is a credit to what is arguably the best special operations unit in the world today, Boat Six of the Navy's SEALs.  The consequences of this termination with extreme prejudice are easy to overstate.

Also easy to overstate is the decisive courage of President Obama.  The most annoying aspect of the aftermath of the Raid At Abbottabad has been the praise lavished on the Guy in the Oval.  Much has been made as well of the lack of unanimity among the presidential advisors concerning the raid.  Lack of unanimity is a good thing--it would have been better, much better for the US had there been more dissent from the group think during the run up to the Bay of Pigs or the adventure in regime change in South Vietnam which resulted in the death of the authoritarian ruler, Diem, and the onset of a decade of political chaos in the insurgency and American riddled republic.  And, to be sure, it would have been better had the White House crew of George W. Bush had a few more dissidents and a lot fewer team players.

When the interminable number of National Security Council meetings--five--finally came to an end, the president took the only rational choice available--a commando style operation.  The stand-off alternatives might not have done the job correctly as was the case with the recent attack in Tripoli which missed Gaddafi the dad but did manage to kill his youngest son and three of that man's children.  Or, even if the stand-off alternative did succeed, there would have been even less convincing proof of Osama's death than is the case currently.  And, not a trivial consideration, only the up-close-and-personal approach would have the positive collateral of collecting useful material to keep intelligence analysts occupied.

Of course, there would have been those in the NSC or supporting staff who would have feared a replay of "Blackhawk Down"--a prospect which came oh-so-close when one of the birds either suffered a mechanical malfunction or combat damage and had to be left on the ground.  Others might have felt a pucker factor over the possibility of American combat fatalities and how that would play at home.  Still others might have dreaded a complete debacle equivalent to that at Desert One.

Since no special operations senior commander would be so out of touch with reality as to guarantee success, there was a risk with the operation, but the use of Boat Six went a very long way to mitigate that consideration.  So also have the vast improvements generally in the tactics, techniques, and materiel of special operations.  When night fell, the use of the commando raid option was the only way to go--other than to convince oneself that the intelligence just was not sufficient and let the moment go by ungrasped.

There is, in the real world at least, never enough intelligence.  It is rare to the point of being nonexistent for a Two Shop--including CIA--to say, "This is the real deal, one hundred percent sure thing."  For an intel weenie to say such a thing would be identical to the Spec Ops guy saying success would be certain.  In this case, even given the chance that the narrative released by the Obama administration regarding the long, winding, and rough road traveled is a cover for simple penetration, the correlation of intelligence factors was strong, even very strong--and it just doesn't get any better than that.

One cannot help but wonder if the decision making process was so lengthy because so many lawyers must have been involved.  It rather appears that the actual planning and rehearsal for the raid took less time than did the five meetings of the NSC and who knows how many confabs between the legal counsel for the principals.  It may  even be that the factor tilting the final decision in favor of the on-the-ground option were legal considerations, specifically the existence of a remote chance that bin Laden could have been taken prisoner.  No matter how slight that chance might be and no matter how certain it was that Osama or those around him would offer armed resistance thus allowing fire to be returned, the legal fiction of a possible arrest was maintained.  That would have been impossible using the stand-off options.

The theoretical option of turning over the "actionable intelligence" to the Pakistanis was, no shock here, a non-starter.  Outside of Islamabad, is there anyone willing to hazard the view that the Pakistani army, Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, and government had no idea that Osama had been living in a nice, large, and well furnished semi-prison located cheek-to-cheek with a major military academy and a large army base for some years?  Similarly, is there anyone, again outside of Pakistan, who would argue with a straight face that Osama could not have lived on the outskirts of Abbottabad without a "support service" furnished by Pakistanis, and not just ideological soulmates operating as private citizens?

The movers and shakers of Pakistan will have to do a lot of fast talking--something at which they are quite experienced and competent.  The Obama administration will not put too much pressure on the Koran loving senior men at ISI or in the army.  Congress, particularly the House, is not likely to be quite so easy going--and they control the flow of bribes to Islamabad.  Even considering that factor, the odds are in favor of the US going along with some (very) modest changes in Pakistani behavior and public protestations of innocence in a manner not unlike that of earlier administrations and congresses (think Panay Incident.)

The removal of bin Laden from the board does not change the Great Game of countering terror conducted by proponents of violent political Islam in any significant way.  The global movement has sufficient inertia, manpower, and experience to keep on going and growing even with the loss of Osama to the welcoming arms of seventy-two virgins.  Even if the US is able to follow on by removing the al-Qaeda number two man, al-Zawahiri, it will not make an end to to violent political Islam as  practiced by Taliban, AQIM, AQAP, or any of the other groups.

In short, the Abbottabad Raid has been an emotionally satisfying moment in a long and bloody war with years if not decades yet to run.  It demonstrated not only the very high competence of the US in a very demanding form of military operation but also the dedication the country can have over two administrations of vastly differing political ideologies and world views.  It also has shown that Mr Obama like JFK has the capacity to wreak havoc when his masculinity has been challenged--which bin Laden has done to a degree not equaled even by JKF's bete noir, Fidel Castro.

The game will go on.  The war between the civilized states and the reactionary, barbaric proponents of violent political Islam will continue.  Obama will get a bump in the polls.  His reelection chances may even have been enhanced.  On the upside, Osama bin Laden will not be around to enjoy life and the Great Game.

Pakistan Is Not Worth The Trouble Or Money It Is Costing Us

The government and military of Pakistan is continuing its campaigns of lies and extortion.  That is as self-evident as the size of the US budget deficit.  It is also self-evident that Pakistan will keep on with its dual track approach of prevarication and extortion because it has no alternative.

The Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Mike Mullen, grabbed the stinging nettle the other day when he stated categorically in the Pakistani English language newspaper Dawn as well as the TV service Geo that we knew perfectly well that the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintained its ongoing relationship with the Haqqani network, the most deadly American adversary in Afghanistan.  The long-standing and very strong connection between ISI and the Haqqani crew has been the worst kept secret in Washington for years now.  Mullen, bringing it into the open on an official level only hours before meeting mano a mano with his Pakistani counterpart, did the cause of honesty between alleged allies a great and long overdue service.

The response from the government and military of Pakistan was not one of either embarrassed silence or humiliating acknowledgement of the truth of the allegation.  Of course not.  The Army Chief of Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, was quoted as denouncing the Mullen statement as "negative propaganda."  The brazen effrontery of the general would be breath taking had it come from anyone other than a senior Pakistani official.

However, bald face lying is a tried and true approach practiced by Pakistani officials in and out of uniform.  The finance minister, straight face firmly in place, averred that it was "largely a myth" that Pakistan had received billions of US dollars in aid from the Great Cash Cow pastured in Washington, DC.  In the real world, the US has provided twenty or so billion bucks in the years since 9/11.  Of this mountain of money, roughly half has come under the auspices of the program entitled "Coalition Support Funds."  Much of the money shifted to Islamabad under this program has been not been properly documented or accounted for.

Other funds have flowed under other programs such as the civilian development oriented Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill.  Still more money has been expended under assorted military assistance programs including those which have provided Pakistan with big ticket items such as F-16s with little utility in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts.  In short, the money has been authorized, appropriated, and in major part expended all to the benefit of Pakistan.  Still, the finance minister felt obliged to carry on with a lie so humongous as to make Dr Goebbels blush.

On the extortion side of the twin prong offensive, the Pakistanis have reiterated their demands for more intelligence sharing on the part of the US--allegedly so the Paks can get on with the job of acting upon it--and transferring our UAV technology to Pakistan--supposedly so that they and not us can use Predators and Reapers to take out Haqqani network and Taliban figures in the FATA.  Actually these demands are not simply extortionate, they are part of the keep-on-lying tactic.

The Pakistanis want access to our most sensitive intelligence sources, methods, and practices so that Islamabad will know all that we know about the connections between Pakistan and the assorted groups under the protection of ISI.  After all, the highest goal of any intelligence service is finding out in detail what the enemy's spooks know and don't know about your operations.  As KGB bent every effort to penetrate MI6, MI5, OSS, and CIA, so now does Pakistan's ISI want to penetrate our intelligence operations.  There is no desire to act upon American intelligence with any goal in mind other than better protecting and facilitating the operations of the Haqqani network and other like minded groups.  (Sure, the Paks would use our information to neutralize individuals or sub-groups that have wandered too far off the reservation, but that is scarcely a benefit from our point of view.)

The Pakistani military has long drooled after our UAVs.  The generals and the spooks have had a perpetual case of the woodies ever since the first Predator launched its first Hellfire.  From their perspective, the UAVs represent a fine way of countering the Indian doctrine of "Cold Start," even better by being lower signature than their new short range battlefield missiles.  One must never forget that India and only India is the "main enemy" in the estimate of the Pakistani military.

The US has offered to provide Pakistan with eighty-five Ravens.  These small, short range, and non-lethal UAVs are "drones" and thus meet the demand for access.  It is doubtful that the Pakistanis will be satisfied with this sop.  Eighty-five Ravens do not change the calculus of forces as between India and the Muslim Republic.

After his carefully titrated dose of honesty, Admiral Mullen went back onto the standard message.  Our relationship with Pakistan is strong.  They are our close and important allies in the war on terror.  Pakistan's cooperation is critical for success in Afghanistan.  Stopping terror in the FATA is the key to universal and permanent peace.  Yadda-yadda, dabba-dabba-do and harrumph!

Let's get down, dirty, and honest here.  The US could get out of Afghanistan right now without any real decrement in its security.  It could leave that sorry piece of real estate without any meaningful increase in the risk of terror acts directed at the American homeland.  True, it would be better if we were to engage in one hellacious crescendo of lethal violence directed at each and every important al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Haqqani network figure we could pinpoint.  It would be preferable if, so to speak, we leave doing what we should have done when we first went in--launch a destructively punitive blow at the bad guys of violent political Islam.

This means admitting reality.  Afghanistan will become what it both wants to be and will be forced by the Pakistanis to be--an Islamic nation living in a hollow state.  The FATA will remain what Islamabad wants it to be--the safe haven of violent political Islam.  Both are acceptable outcomes provided the government and military of Pakistan understand that should any jihadist with any connection to either the FATA or Pakistan dominated Afghanistan harm a hair on Uncle Sam's head, we will be back.  Back not as an occupation force or a nation-building crew but as a destructive force of such a punishing nature as to make the floods and cyclones of the past appear to be gentle love pats from a benign mother nature.

It would not harm our interests either short- or long-term interests if the lying extortionists of Islamabad were made to understand and appreciate that our interests and those of India were far more closely coincident than were ours and those of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  In truth we have been cozying up too close for too long with the loser on the sub-continent.  India and the US have far more shared norms and values, far more coinciding interests.  Tilting ever more in the direction of India is in our interests--and against those of Pakistan.

Consider that last sentence for a moment.  It suggests a viable alternative should the Obama administration demonstrate its ongoing inability to play hard ball.  We too can play the extortion game.  Give Pakistan an option:  Islamabad can either both sit down and shut up, get serious in the FATA and squash the Haqqanis and the others, or we will well and truly tilt more in the direction of India.  A closer alliance between India and the US would give the army and government of Pakistan something very, very important to think about.  At the very least, it would make their dream of another rematch with India a suicidal folly.  At most, it would empower India in Afghanistan thus further cutting back on Pakistan's goal of strategic depth and a sphere of influence in the Islamic nations of the Central Asian Republics.

This tilt-to-India threat is a hard ball option but one which does not run the political risks of simply getting the hell out of Afghanistan.  As such it is a rational and realistic way to overcome the Pakistani's game of lie and extort.  But, its realism alone means the Obama administration would never consider it.  More's the pity.

Caught In A Morass Of Delusions

Over the weekend Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari told the Guardian that the American war in Afghanistan was destabilizing his country.  Presumably with a straight face he averred that absent the war being waged by the US, Pakistan would be a fountainhead of democracy, free enterprise, and tranquility with nary a problem of the social, economic, political, or religious sort.

Continuing the exercise in monumental dementia, the head of the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which is the  organization that not only cranked up Taliban in the first place but has done everything in its considerable power to prop up, assist, hide, and facilitate in all respects not only Taliban but other, to use the Pakistani term, "anti-Indian assets," was in Washington today.  The ISI chief, LtGen Ahmad Sujah Pasha, was passing on an ultimatum which was decreed by the most powerful man in Pakistan today.

No.  Not the president.  Rather the armed forces chief of staff, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.  General Kayani no doubt with the complete support and approval of LtGen Sujah Pasha has demanded an end to most Predator strikes, a reduction in force of both CIA and Special Operations personnel, and an abandonment of the Agency's attempts to penetrate the assorted "anti-Indian assets" established and to some extent controlled by ISI.

The purported basis for the virtual ending of the effective use of CIA personnel as well as the training program being operated by Special Forces troopers for the Pakistani Frontier Force was the arrest of CIA contract employee Raymond Davis.  Davis, you will certainly recall was busted on a murder rap after having blown away two Pakistanis usually characterized as "muggers."  Davis executed a good shoot on two men who were almost certainly assets of ISI who were assigned to harass Davis if not do more.

Davis, a former Green Beret fluent in Pushtu had been working out of the consulate in Kandahar tasked with penetrating Lashkar-e-Taiba.  LeT is another of those "anti-Indian assets" such as the Haqqani network both established and protected/facilitated by ISI.  CIA attempts to penetrate these groups without authorization from ISI, which is the only possible way to play the game given that ISI is not given to cooperation against its own goons.

ISI along with the Pakistani armed forces lives in a delusional universe where the most important consideration, the prime directive, is to defeat India in the next war.  These men are all of the view that another war with India is not only inevitable, it is desirable and will be won by the Mighty Warriors of the Koran if only the Pakistanis have sufficient strategic depth, a large nuclear arsenal, and the means of waging war on all levels from local terrorism to nuclear Armageddon.

To this end, the Pakistani military and its supporters in the country's elite have bent every effort toward the blessed day when war again breaks out.  The mere fact that this orientation has distorted the country's economy, suppressed domestic political freedoms, truncated education, imported Wahhibism and all that implies, fostered social divisions, and fractured the political structure is of no consequence.  Nor is it worthy of considering all available evidence indicating India has no desire for war, no plans of initiating war, and well understands that war would be very bloody, extremely destructive, and might take decades for recovery--and that is for the winner.

The Pakistani military is so consumed by its delusions that it sincerely believes that the US has two goals in mind currently: (1) Suppressing totally Pakistani influence in Afghanistan while allowing Indian influence to increase without limit, (2) Suppress Pakistan's nuclear capability while allowing that of India to cruise along unimpeded.  Therefore, the Agency and Special Forces operations in Pakistan are actually oriented toward one or the other of these two goals.

The military is supreme in Pakistan and President Zardari knows this.  His civilian government like all those which have gone before stays in office at the let and sufferance of the military.  Of course, it helps that Mr Zardiri like his predecessors lacks moral courage, lacks the capacity to take on the military, to enlist the citizenry of the long suffering nation in a hard trek back to some sort of political sanity.

The position of the US is of no aid in this matter.  While different administrations may from time to time weakly chastise the Pakistani government as the Obama administration did last week, the various extortion efforts made by Islamabad always result in more cash flowing to Pakistan's coffers.

When the end of the Cold War opened the door for the US to reappraise its long standing hostility to India and friendship with Pakistan, it took the chance.  There was a definite tilt to India during the years of Bill Clinton.  The Pakistanis were left comparatively speaking high and dry.  They were given a fresh start and a brand new chance following 9/11.

The W. Bush administration made the horrid decision that we could do nothing in Afghanistan without the cooperation of Pakistan.  This choice was made despite the definite knowledge extant inside the Beltway of the relationship between ISI and both Taliban and al-Qaeda.  The choice was made despite the awareness of history, awareness that the decision made by Reagan to hand off the endgame in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis had resulted in the creation of Taliban.  (The junior partnership of CIA in this creation should not be seen as mitigation of primary ISI culpability.)

The fateful decisions made by Bush/Cheney--not only the involvement of Pakistan, the paying of bribes to Pakistan, but also and more importantly, the changing of the mission from one which was primarily punitive to one of "nation-building"--cast our policy in a way which could do nothing but impair our interests in the region and block our goal of defeating violent political Islam in both Afghanistan and across the border in the FATA and adjacent regions of Pakistan such as Kandahar and Quetta.

Even now with the Pakistani president and chief of staff undertaking efforts of both rhetorical and practical nature to impair further the American efforts and policies, the US, at least publicly, continues to dance to the tune called in Islamabad.  The US ambassador has called for a "renewal."  Cameron Munter is of the view, if his public pronouncements are to be taken at face value (admittedly a dangerous activity when assessing the words of a diplomat) the US and Pakistan are on the same side facing the same enemy: violent political Islam.

Of course we are, provided one is willing to define the intelligence service of our "ally" here as something other than the founder, protector, and aid of nearly every Islamist group the US is fighting.  That can be done, but only if the US is willing to join Pakistan in the deadly morass of delusions.  Unfortunately, it appears that the Obama administration is willing to do so.

The Alternative Reality Called Pakistan

One collateral benefit from the WikiLeaks diplomatic traffic data dump has been the "real time" confirmation of deep Pakistani involvement with the Taliban in Afghanistan.  While no sentient person well oriented in time and place has ever doubted the umbilical connection between the jihadists and the government, army, and intelligence service of Pakistan, there is something quite comforting in reading the assessments of qualified diplomatic observers.

The Paks were caught with their hands very deep in the cookie jar.  Rather than acting the part of the career criminal caught red handed and acknowledging that the pinch was a fair one, the Pakistani ruling elite in and out of uniform has behaved rather like a first time crook issuing denials that make Richard Nixon's famed "I am not a crook" declaration appear honest in comparison.  Indeed, the movers and shakers of military Pakistan have followed the old, disreputable approach of making counter-accusations.

To be effective, the counter-accusation gambit must be plausible.  It has to have some semblance of believability. The Pakistani effort fails this basic test.  The Paks have taken the road leading to an alternative universe by stating categorically the documents leaked are pure "disinformation" meant to discredit the government and military of Pakistan.  In the alternative reality of Pakistan, these products of the US Foreign Service are a "conspiracy" mounted by hostile forces within the US government.

The Obama administration might be wishing it too could join with Pakistan in the alternative universe given that the players of mood music inside the Beltway have been making reassuring noises about Pakistan's commitment to the joint effort against "extremism," which now seem more off key than ever in the context of the diplomatic cables.  How anybody, even one of those denizens whose brains have been damaged by too much rarefied Washington air, can really, really believe that Pakistan is and has done anything other than support Taliban in Afghanistan while doing the minimum necessary for national survival against the Pakistani equivalent boggles the mind.

Pakistan has defined its national interest in terms of a Forever War with India in which Afghanistan has represented the chimera of strategic depth.  That is why Pakistan created Taliban twenty years ago.  That is why Pakistan not only supported Taliban but gave timely warning to Osama bin Laden regarding incoming cruise missiles.  It is why Pakistan, again acting through the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), linked with the Haqqani network.  It is why to this day ISI and the army assist, support, and protect both Taliban and the Haqqani network.

The notion that Afghanistan represents strategic depth is as false as the driving imperative of the Forever War against India.  Both hallucinations are,  however, central to assuring the army's pride of place in Pakistan.  Both are the sole reason the army and ISI can continue to glom onto the sizable share of Pakistan's national resources, which has been the standard for generations now.  Without the fictions of Indian hostility and the centrality of Afghanistan to Pakistan's need for strategic depth, the army and ISI would not have the perceived moral authority to take so much of the public pie that the country as a whole is endangered by the resulting paucity of capacities to deal with very real, very pressing problems.

A key, perhaps the key, source of revenue for the army and ISI is the money paid by the US to ensure cooperation in the "joint" struggle against violent political Islam.  The extortion racket practiced by Islamabad requires keeping the war in Afghanistan perking along while somehow convincing the US that the army is doing all it can do against the areas of the FATA which provide necessary bases and support for Taliban and the Haqqani network as well as the remnants of al-Qaeda.

The release of the cables will (hopefully) make the duplicity so necessary for the extortion to continue a bit more difficult to maintain.  In this context the US government is facing a challenge of corruption far more serious than the attention grabbing graft in Afghanistan.

There is no doubt that the continued existence of cross border sanctuaries in Pakistan's FATA along with the aid and comfort provided by ISI have been and will remain crucial to both Taliban and the Haqqani network. If the FATA were to be closed or interdicted with greater efficiency than is the case presently, the pressure placed upon the trigger pullers of Islam by the US/ISAF forces would prove effective in undercutting both the ability and will of the jihadi to carry on the war.  It would lay the pavement on a genuine road to conflict resolution as well as the more limited goal of hostilities termination.

Since the documents have come out, the Obama administration can do the same.  There is ample basis for the administration to tell Islamabad in essence, "They've got the goods on us now.  Time for you to get damn serious or those highly moral Republicans in Congress will pull the plug on the money machine."

This approach, of course, requires some cooperation from the Republicans.  As the war in Afghanistan not only started under a Republican president but, far more importantly, was fought ineptly with too few resources and too grandiose a set of goals by that president, the GOP has a stake in seeing the war brought to a successful conclusion before 2012.  Doing this is impossible unless the FATA is shut down--with or without the cooperation of the Pakistanis.

Pakistan's genuine national interest including the survival of the government as currently constituted demands both the suppression of their domestic jihadis and the ending of the war in Afghanistan.  The same considerations apply to the continuation of the American money flow.  Unless and until the lads in Islamabad come to realize that here in the real world the cash cow will stop spouting as long as the army sits on its collective butt regarding the FATA, there is no chance of the US achieving even the minimal necessary strategic goal of not losing in Afghanistan.  The same ground truth apples to the domestic violence brought by the Mighty Warriors of the Koran in Pakistan.

The appeals of the alternative universe of disinformation and conspiracy may have some sort of emotional appeal to the Pakistan government, army, and ISI, but are so transparently false that they should be dismissed by the Obama administration with the contempt it merits.  Beyond dismissal, the Obama crew must insist the Pakistanis live in the same world as the rest of us--or face the inevitable and inevitably bad consequences of their tergiversation.

Perhaps as a warm-up exercise, the Obama administration can take on Turkey given that the Islamist leaning AKP regime in Ankara has done the Pakistanis one better alleging that the Israelis are behind the entire WikiLeaks episode.  Surely scotching that ploy and requiring the Turks to choose sides with greater accuracy should not be beyond the capacity of the administration and Secretary of State Clinton.

Rather than just seeing the leak as an embarrassment or a major disaster, the administration should see it as an opportunity to use a bit of honest, coercive diplomacy with respect to two troublesome "allies."  By doing so, the Obama "Team" cannot only retrieve some success from a defeat, but exploit the consequences to suit our policy needs.

Try it, people, you have nothing to lose except defeat.

Gates Gets It Right--Why Can't Anyone Else?

It is good to know that there is one mature, realistic, and plain speaking person in the Obama administration. Amid all the amateur strategists, self-proclaimed experts in geopolitics, and other assorted talk-without-thinking, speak-without-knowledge folks, Robert Gates stands out as the voice of both accuracy and rationality.

This time the secretary was on CNN responding to the WikiLeaks "revelations," particularly those dealing with the collaboration between the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Taliban. Predictably, he did play down the current closeness between ISI and the insurgents. As a needed balance he did bring the historical dimension of that cooperation into sharp focus. In this he is unique among the flurry of pontification, viewing-with-alarm, and all around hand-wringing which has characterized both politicians and the mainstream media.

Gates said, " we walked out on Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989 and left them basically holding the bag. And there is always the fear that we will do that again. And I believe that's the reason there's a certain hedge." The Geek can say only, "Amen." (Of course, with his usual modesty the Geek points out that he has made the same point several times in posts over the past three years.)

The unthinking way in which the administrations of both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush walked away from the morass in Afghanistan not only "left them basically holding the bag" but paved the way for the emergence of Taliban. The senior decision makers of both administrations were warned in a timely manner as to the dangers of handing the Afghan brief over to Islamabad generally and the ISI particularly. But the warnings came from people far down the food chain in the bureaucracies in Langley, Foggy Bottom, and the Pentagon. And, the folks topside had bigger fish to fry as well as a very short term view of the future.

In recent years the short-term vision of the Reagan and H.W. Bush days has been mirrored by the short memories of the W. Bush and Obama administrations. The people breathing the rarefied air around the Oval (as well as journalists and politicians generally) have forgotten the experiences of our earlier activities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This statement presupposes that the minds of today have ever been cluttered by any knowledge of the past, even the very recent and quite critical past.)

When the Americans went to Afghanistan nine plus years ago, their plans were in no way based upon the vast experience collected during the long years of the anti-Soviet proxy war or the years of Pakistani-Taliban collaboration which followed. It is was this willful and easily cured ignorance which both allowed and encouraged the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld bunch to fail to properly define the goal of the invasion as being purely punitive. Or, to use the less offensive term invented during the Obama administration, "counter-terrorism."

Rather than putting the most narrow focus on the goal of the invasion, the W. Bush administration opted for a hazy and attractive view of somehow building a modern Western style nation-state in the rocky and sterile soil of Afghanistan. At the same time neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney days were scared silly by the prospect of somehow angering, alienating, even slightly annoying the military junta which ran Pakistan.

As a result the Americans stood by as the ISI assisted any number of Taliban and al-Qaeda heavyweights to flee the new boots on the ground for the hospitable lands of the FATA--and Pakistan proper. This gross blunder assured that two unpleasant realities would come to pass in the fullness of time. Taliban along with the Haqqani network and other, smaller adherents of armed political Islam would recover their strength; ISI and other components of the Pakistani military and government would continue to provide support and assistance.

When Taliban and the others were ready, they returned to the fight in Afghanistan. The reentry was done with the full support of ISI and understanding of other parts of the Pakistani military and government. There is no doubt but ISI and others depended upon two eventualities coming to pass so as to secure Pakistani goals and reduce any risks to Islamabad.

The first of this was the existence within the US of sufficient war weariness to limit the American will and capacity to counter the new, stronger Taliban. Along with this, the planners of ISI assumed the armed political Islamists of Taliban, et al would be focused sufficiently upon gaining victory in Afghanistan to be willing to refrain from attacks against Pakistan.

In both assumptions ISI was proven wrong. To their consternation, the new, ever-so-peaceful, ever-ready-to-reach-out President Obama was willing to take the risk of sending more troops as well as a competent commander to Afghanistan. And, the LeT was quite willing and able to present an existential challenge to Islamabad in the FATA and elsewhere.

In response to the (unplanned for if not completely unexpected) ramping up of the Islamist political challenge as well as the violence which accompanied it, the government and armed forces of Pakistan had no choice but to wage war against LeT and other groups. The campaigns in Swat and portions of the FATA have been slow motion, fought primarily by the second string of paramilitary forces or the low risk, low effectiveness means of air and artillery strikes and have been conducted in a way assuring minimum losses to the "bad guys," particularly the command echelons.

The Pakistanis have been somewhat more forthcoming in assistance to the US in its conduct of the Predator targeted killing program. The actionable intelligence flow has increased along with the tempo of Predator operations. This has benefited the Pakistanis by eliminating key hostile personnel without any political risk.

If the remarks of Secretary Gates regarding the improvement in Pakistani cooperation are restricted to this area, they are completely correct. At the same time it is critical to note that the collaboration of Islamabad in such matters as impairing the Haqqani network have remained unchanged month to month for years now.

The mention of targeted killings opens the door to the question of just which strategy is the US now following in Afghanistan--counterinsurgency with nation-building or a punitive counter-terrorism approach? At root this constitutes a distinction without a difference. However, since there are some contemporary Great Captains such as Vice-president Joe Biden and the New York Times for which it is critical, a general comment is required.

Both Joe (If-I-Feel-It-I-Say-It) Biden and the NYT are of the view that targeted killing is the hallmark of punitive counter-terrorism but is totally unsuited to counterinsurgency. The V-P and the NYT see the recent higher volume use of both air and ground strikes against identified commanders of Taliban and other groups as being the refutation of the protect the civilians emphasis of General McChrystal.

They are as wrong as a soup sandwich. Organizational disruption is equally important in a genuine counterinsurgent strategy as it is in a pure effort at counter-terrorism. Any success in a counterinsurgent effort requires mobilizing support from the uncommitted majority of the civilian population to the government at the expense of the insurgent. Any success in a counter-insurgent campaign also demands a progressive reduction of the organizational coherence of the insurgents.

In short, successful counterinsurgency requires protecting those who need protection, converting the insurgents who are open to conversion, and killing those insurgents who are immune to any compromise, any power sharing agreement, any alternative less than total victory. For the hard core leadership of Taliban et al, the war is existential in nature. This means they must be killed. Period.

When a commando team on the ground or a UAV delivered Hellfire kills a Taliban heavyweight, it is both a success in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. Killing these people is both a necessity and a good thing. Period.

The difference between punitive oriented counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency comes in the other measures taken. Insofar as an emphasis is placed upon all the areas falling under the rubric "nation-building" the outside intervenor as well as the host government is waging a counterinsurgent effort.

The nature of the human terrain in Afghanistan militates against nation-building if such is defined as the creation of a Western style nation-state in Afghanistan. This reality does not allow the US and its partners an easy way out however. The domestic political realities as well as the mindset of American and Western European elites will not allow a simple refocus on the eminently realistic policy of punitively oriented counter-terrorism.

It is necessary for reasons endemic to the politics and values of the West to make a good show of nation-building in Afghanistan even if such provides an endstate far less than wished. There is no way in which most Western elitfes would be satisfied if, when the shooting stops, Afghanistan is a medieval feudal theocracy--even if that is precisely what most Afghans are most comfortable with.

The next time Secretary Gates is on TV it would be nice if he could turn his highly realistic and vastly experienced brain loose on that matter. On the matter of explaining just why there can be no nation-building possible in Afghanistan without a severe redefinition of the term.

David Cameron Is One And One

British prime minister David Cameron was well on his way to winning the Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon" Award for his characterization of Gaza as a "prison camp" during his genuflection to Turkish sensibilities while speaking in Ankara. Cameron tossed away his chances to be an official "Maroon" when he followed his exercise in asininity with an unprecedented bit of blunt truth telling in India.

In the context of a speech to Indian businessmen, Mr Cameron delivered a view of the role of elements within the Pakistani military and government. He warned Islamabad that it could no longer "look both ways," toward supporting Taliban, the Haqqani network, and LeT and toward "respect as a democracy." His warning in both its starkness and accuracy has been long overdue for issuance in a public forum.

Pakistan has engaged for some time now in what Cameron correctly described as the "export" of terror acts. It is the source of some seventy percent of all recent threatened or executed attacks. That is a ground truth which exists independently of any or all of the WikiLeaks document dump of contemporary notoriety. The role of Pakistan as a country as well as that played by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as well as other components of the military and government constitute the unmentionable T. rex in the bathroom.

Mr Cameron has performed a great service by finally publicly pointing to the T. rex and calling it precisely what it is--a thwacking great killing beast.

The reaction of Islamabad's minions was instant, vociferous, and freighted with indignation. It is no surprise that the Pakistani officials pinned the rap on the WikiLeaks documents. Without exception, the worthies of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan claimed (inaccurately) that Mr Cameron had shamefully accepted the low level reports emanating originally from Afghan intelligence agencies as proof of the accusations of partnership between ISI and Taliban.

While numerous items within the WikiLeaks trove do point to the ISI-Taliban linkage and many but not all did originate with Afghan sources, Mr Cameron had no need to rely upon them as evidence for the bang-on nature of his observations. There is evidence aplenty extending back many years and coming forward in time to the testimony of the confessed Times Square bomber of direct Pakistani involvement with terror.

The Indian authorities have demonstrated convincingly that "retired" members of ISI were directly involved in both the planning and execution of the Mumbai attack. Cases in Germany, Austria, and elsewhere in Western Europe have connected the dots of local terror cells and acts with planners, financiers, and operational managers in Pakistan, at least some of whom were employees of ISI.

It was someone in the Pakistani government and most likely ISI who called Osama bin Laden while the Tomahawk missiles were crossing Pakistani airspace. The satellite phone warning allowed bin Laden to get out of the impact area literally minutes before the incoming missiles arrived. In the immediate wake of the Bush ordered invasion of Afghanistan, it was ISI and Pakistani military personnel who held the hands of assorted al-Qaeda and Taliban heavyweights as they left Tora Bora almost literally one step ahead of the Americans.

It was ISI and the Pakistani military (which was the government at the time) who formulated an agreement with Taliban and the Haqqani network which opened the FATA as a sanctuary for their displaced fighters in the years following the American led invasion. The Fearless Fugitives of the One True Faith were provided all facilities necessary for their recovery and rejuvenation by ISI. Had it not been for ISI and the larger military/government understanding and support, the war in Afghanistan would have ended long ago.

That is the record. That is the evidence behind Mr Cameron's indictment. That is the justification for his demand that Islamabad choose a side and stick to it.

In truth, Islamabad should not have it both ways. It should be denied the opportunity to work both sides of the street.

However, as pointed out in yesterday's post on this site, the US and UK need Pakistan far more than the Pakistanis need us. That is the conundrum facing both Foggy Bottom and Whitehall.

Mr Cameron did suggest a viable way out of the morass. It is a route which is neither pleasant to contemplate nor easy to travel. It consists of forcing Islamabad to make a choice: With the civilized states or with the savage primitives of violent political Islam.

The way in which this choice can be forced upon Islamabad consists at root of a truth offensive. This means telling the Pakistanis and, perforce, the world all that we known and can prove concerning the close relationship between ISI or other elements of the Pakistani government and military on the one hand and groups practicing violent political Islam on the other. As an accompaniment, the US, the UK, and other civilized states must make continuation of assistance contingent upon Pakistan making the right choice--and abiding to it.

The reaction of the Pakistani establishment to Mr Cameron's remarks shows it is embarrassed by the truth. Embarrassed to the point of hysteria. This implies the establishment in government and the elite sectors of society which support the government are vulnerable in this area, the area of being openly associated with the primitives of violent political Islam, which is a very real existential threat to both the establishment and the elite.

The vulnerability exists. It exists to be exploited. To be exploited for the interests and benefit of the US, the UK, and the other civilized states. To be exploited for the interest and benefit of Afghans and whatever state they finally create. Even to be exploited for the interest and benefit of Pakistan, its government, its elite sectors, and its future.

Sometimes truth is not only the best, most effective weapon, it is the only weapon. Mr Cameron had both the foresight and intestinal fortitude to recognize this. And, use it.

Pakistan's Double Game

Virtually everyone in every damn intelligence service in the West who knows a bloody thing about Afghanistan, the Taliban, and, last, but most important, Pakistan, has been aware for two decades that the "Students" (to use the correct translation of "Taliban,") have been and remain the creature of the government of Pakistan and more specifically, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI.) Noises to this effect have sounded lightly in the MSM of the West from time to time over the years, but never loudly nor with much definition.

The London Times has finally ripped the curtain of silence to small shreds with an article drawing on a well done paper from the London School of Economics, which institution has a plethora of expertise far surpassing the dismal science for which it is named. Based upon extensive interviews with past and present Taliban figures as well as former and current ISI personnel and others in the government of Pakistan, the conclusion of the report is both stark and irrefutable. It was quite pleasant to read in an open source the unspeakable truth: ISI is the ongoing mainbrace of Taliban and this is known to and approved of by the Pakistani government at the highest level, the country's president, Asif Ali Zardari.

Despite all the odious protestations of the Bush/Cheney administration and its successor under Obama that Pakistan is an ally in a joint war against "terrorism" or "radical extremism" or simply the named groups al-Qaeda and Taliban, the truth is simply that Pakistan consorts more eagerly with the enemy than it does with the US. Not even the billions in bribes have served to budge the government of Pakistan, or the Pakistani army, let alone ISI from the course of supporting, facilitating, assisting, the Scrofulous Vermin of the Koran.

There are good reasons for the position adopted by Islamabad in the closing days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At that time it appeared Pakistan could create strategic depth for itself by using a proxy force to rule Afghanistan when the Red Army finally headed home. The US was indifferent. As long as the Soviets got and stayed got, the administrations of Reagan and H.W. Bush were happy. No one at the top two levels of the national security and foreign policy staffs cared for the nuances of Afghan politics nor the fine grained details of just how Pakistan sought to outpoint India in their never ending conflict.

During the years of assisting the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance Americans had come to find the Afghans to be a very difficult sort to work with. There was no great objection from the fieldhand level when the endgame of the proxy effort against the Red Army was turned over to the Paks.

It has to be admitted that the Pakistanis took to the assignment with vim, vigor, and vitality. They were skilled and able in the task of taking the young men from the Saudi funded madrassas near the border and turning them into the Taliban. The ISI guys were Muslim, some quite oriented to political Islam and all that implies. They were also good nationalists and were oblivious to the ill effects Taliban had on the Afghan social, political, and economic life as long as the strategic interests of Pakistan were served.

For some years the ISI para-military officers rode high. Afghanistan was dominated by Taliban. Other ISI created and run Muslim entities waged asymmetrical war against the Indian main enemy particularly in Kashmir. During the same stretch of time in the mid to late nineties, ISI became increasing aware of and entwined with al-Qaeda.

This is not to say that ISI either worked directly with or abetted Osama bin Laden or even knew of specific plans, but rather that ISI had a loose working relation with al-Qaeda, which came in handy for the Sublime Ethereal Shaykh when he and his associates relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan. Relations between ISI and Osama were warm enough that, when the US launched a cruise missile attack on the man's camp, he received a timely phone call from a Pakistani who knew the time the Tomahawks would be crossing Pakistani air space.

This one phone call, which had to be from a senior member of the Pakistani military or ISI, assured Osama was out of the impact area in a timely fashion. And, it assured the US would suffer the trauma of 9/11. Unsurprisingly, no heads rolled even metaphorically for this most treacherous phone message.

Even an observer no closer to the scene than the planet Mars could not have missed the way in which ISI personnel with al-Qaeda and Taliban wallahs in hand were able to leave Afghanistan by air and foot as the American boots advanced at an unduly leisurely rate. There are strong indications that the days following the American "invasion" constituted in part a carefully choreographed ballet between the Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies and the government, army, and intelligence service of our good and great ally, Pakistan. (Oh, may the winds of the universe grant the Geek a life long enough so that he can see the documents when they finally emerge from the Burn Before Reading file!)

Not to put too fine a point on the matter--the Pakistanis absolutely hate the US. Yes, there are individual exceptions, but the general climate of opinion in the hellhole of Pakistan is that there is an evil triad out to get them: India, Israel, and the US. The relative ranking of the three satanic powers varies over time, but none ever slip from the list no matter what the realities might be.

The government of Pakistan, its army, and ISI resonate perfectly with this climate. It propels the government to denounce the Predator strikes in the FATA even though interviews with the locals in the areas liable to Predator attention show support for the strikes. (Consult the archives of the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor for documentation.) The real deal is simply that the tribesmen exposed most up close and personal to the Taliban of either or both Pakistani or Afghan origin dislike them the most and are most pleased when a Hellfire missile energetically disassembles some Talib.

During the past year or so the government of Pakistan, its army, and even the puppet masters of ISI have come to realize that, like Dr Frankenstein, their monster has eluded complete control and threatens its creator. That more than any alleged US pressure (the Obama administration pressuring? Since when? Unless the victim is Israel) made it necessary for the army to go through the motions of fighting Taliban. The very methodical actions first in Swat and then in South Waziristan were calculated to provide ample opportunity for the bag guys to evacuate to safer areas while minimizing friendly fatalities.

Pakistan will undertake only the bare minimum of actions necessary to convince their homegrown Talibs to focus on India and the foreigners rather than attack domestically. At the same time the operations conducted by Pakistani security forces will make certain that the surviving Talib are better skilled in the arts of combat. In short, the Pakistanis are serving as a live fire course of instruction turning out more competent jihadi to fight the Americans and others in Afghanistan. In the alternative, the foreign jihadis subjected to the Pakistani courses of combat instruction will go home as much better fighters.

What a fine concept! If you are the government, army, and ISI of Pakistan.

Much as it pains the Geek to once more lay the responsibility for the bootless policy of the US toward Pakistan at the feet of the inept Bush/Cheney neocon ninnies considering that the Obama administration is even more adrift at the policy level, such is the ground truth. The simplest and perhaps most accurate explanation for the Bush/Cheney decision to bribe our pretend ally into a further pretense of alliance is that of inertia. Previous administrations had made the same superficial, not to say lame brained appreciation.

Not even the Pakistani success at evading our half-hearted efforts to stop its nuclear weapons program served as a wake-up call. The Pakistani possession of a rudimentary nuclear arsenal simply served then to provide an excuse for more soft treatment. ("We can't piss off the Paks! They have the freakin' bomb!)

This overlooked the fact that the US had never, (not since the Truman administration when India was first seen as a dangerously pro-Soviet leaning country), not even once, tried a hard touch on Islamabad. Also overlooked is the accompanying reality that no Muslim country has ever responded positively to any touch other than a hard one. Soft play, the play of pretense, and bribes breeds contempt, contempt for the weakness exhibited.

So where does the situation finally blown wide open by the Brits leave us and our allies in Afghanistan? Simple. Between a rock--Karzai's search for a separate peace--and a hard place--the ISI sponsorship and protection of Taliban.

The answer? There is an answer, not a complete one to be sure. With respect to Afghanistan, focus on killing as many of the hard core jihadis of Taliban and akin groups as possible while empowering to the maximum degree possible the self-organizing potentials of Afghans at the local level. In the FATA ,continue or, better, expand the Predator attacks to the greatest extent supportable by actionable intelligence so as to kill as many heavyweights--and ISI officers--as possible in the shortest period of time.

Pakistan is the tougher problem. The hole we have dug for ourselves there is too deep to be filled quickly. This means we had best limit our aid while preparing for ground and air actions so as to neutralize their nuclear stockpile and supporting facilities. Particularly if the political Islamist strain in the society and government--including the army and ISI--becomes oriented toward the notion of outdoing Iran in the capacity to use indirectly applied nuclear fire on an "infidel" target.

Most of all it is critical to cease privileging Islam. There is danger in pretending that political Islam is any different from Communism or National Socialism. It is an ideology hostile in all respects to the values, interests, and goals of the US and other civilized states. Further, it is aggressive, given to duplicity of a degree which would have embarrassed even Goebbels, and more implacable than Joe Stalin on a tear.

The unfortunate reality is that the war between political Islam and the civilized states has barely started. Equally unfortunate is the fact that Pakistan, even more than Iran, is the major epicenter of aggressive political Islam. Look at Pakistan and see the face of the enemy.