Dithering And Despondency Over Afghanistan

There is still no word from the Commander-in-Chief regarding the deployment of more US troops to Afghanistan. Nor has anyone questioned the wisdom of looking for an exit strategy while the Taliban and al-Qaeda are generally perceived as winning and the Americans seen by and large as on the verge of unmistakable defeat.

As the days and weeks have rolled along, the rationale for delay in making the least worst choice among the many available has eroded. The Pakistani offensive has continued longer than most expected it would--bolstered by the revulsion generally held in Pakistan at the Islamist jihadist resort to indiscriminate suicide bomb attacks on soft targets.

As has been the case so often in both Iraq and the AfPak efforts, the killing of civilians has been shown as quite counterproductive. While the US and its allies have learned the lesson, it is most fortunate that the Islamists are intellectually challenged in this most critical area. The equation is simple and has been seen at work in every war since the 20th Century started.

Killing civilians, particularly in ways which seem particularly cowardly such as air strikes and suicide bombings turns opinion sharply against the killers--not against the side which failed to protect its civilians. When American and other aircraft piled up stinking heaps of dead civilian bodies, sentiment and its handmaiden political will turned against the Americans. When Islamist jihadists blow themselves and oodles of nearby non-combatants into a red froth of protoplasm, sentiment and political turn against the Heroic Warriors of Allah.

The three hundred or so victims of Taliban bombs during the course of the Pakistani offensive into South Waziristan have done much to keep political support on the side of Islamabad. This is good from the American perspective even if Washington does have legitimate grounds to complain that the Pakistani forces have cut deals with anti-American, pro-Afghan Taliban rather than fight them.

However, the American dithering over further troop deployments is serving to erode Pakistani political will within the government, media, and--army. The uncertainty over the willingness of the US under its current administration to pay a higher butcher's bill in Afghanistan has been exacerbated by the never ending delays in the announcement of a decision.

No matter how long the US stays, one month, one year, five years, eventually the last US boot will leave. When that happens Afganhanistan will once more be in play as a proxy theater for competitors in the region. This will be true even if the Karzai regime does the impossible--stops corruption and delivers efficient, competent basic government services and a modicum of economic development.

Iran, Pakistan, India, and at least a couple of the Central Asian Republics see Afghanistan as a theater of political-military operations. Even now with the US still involved, the various external contenders are plumping up those Afghan factions with which they have the most effective relations. Iran has its proxies. Pakistan, just as was the case twenty years ago, has it's. India has made great gains both openly and otherwise cultivating potential proxy assets.

Arriving a bit late but with unlimited ambitions and cash the Chinese have also started finding or manufacturing clients within Afghanistan. At the present their interests are primarily economic but this is liable for change so as to include the political.

The projected uncertainty over the American future in Afghanistan has done nothing to slow the growth of adverse proxy forces in the country. Rather it has done the opposite.

Unless the assorted jihadist groups are neutered to an extent that none are attractive proxies, the scramble for advantage in the war after the war will continue to escalate. Thus the most critical goal of the US--that of destroying the Islamist jihadist groups in Afghanistan and along the porous border between that country and Pakistan becomes even more important.

The improbability of the Karzai regime reforming itself coupled with the strategic plans of neighboring states assures there will be a war after the war. From our perspective the necessity is assuring that the next time around there will be no chance of an Islamist jihadist success being achieved in the manner of the Pakistan created and supported Taliban not quite twenty years ago.

If Afghanistan is not to become a future home of yet one more semi-indigenous, semi-artificial Islamist jihadist government, the jihadists of today must be operationally destroyed. There is no need to create nor to leave behind some sort of imitation Western style secular state--that cannot be done. Nor is there any need to cleanse Afghanistan of Islamist tendencies--that cannot be done either.

What is necessary is to remove the stain of jihadism which covers the territory of both Afghanistan and Pakistan with the color of drying blood. It's simple. Islam? Sure. Islamism? Well, OK. Jihadism? No blinking way!

To achieve even this limited and barely realistic goal it will be necessary to fight directly and back the Pakistanis in their current and (it is to be hoped) future offensives. This means more troops. More body bags. More American blood shed in the hopes that less will be sacrificed in future years.

As the Geek well knows it takes a certain amount of testicular fortitude to enter combat. However, it takes as much--or more--to bite down on an unpleasant, bitter reality and put one's political future on the line and order more men to face the possibility of death, maiming, or psychological trauma in order to have some slight chance of securing a better future for the US.

It is necessary for a real president, or a real man for that matter, to make tough choices, choices between the bad and the worse, choices no one ever wanted to make. But, that is part of a president's job description. In case the current occupant of the Oval has not noticed yet, it takes a lot more than a charming smile and a good way with speeches to be a genuine president. It takes balls.

One can hope that the Nice Young Man From Chicago finds his.

Delay Is Good--Up To A Point

The US is a maritime power. It is also a semi-accidental simulacrum of an imperial power. As George Friedman at STRATFOR correctly points out, the US has the "imperial" role not by design nor intent but rather as the inevitable result of its economic and geographical position. And, the Geek adds, its unique history.

These two factors dictate why the US, like Great Britain (but not, as Friedman argues, the Roman Empire) practices a grand strategy which focuses on maintaining a balance of power favorable to its interests and attempting to the greatest degree possible to refrain from the direct commitment of its military force. In the effort to minimize direct US force deployment, the basic approach is not one of "divide and conquer." Rather it is one of "delay, decide, select, support, and sustain."

In practice this means the US has been and continues to be well advised to emphasize standing off from a problem area, observing the interplay of the internal forces, selecting one to support, enshrining that decision in policy, and, finally, executing that policy in terms of supporting and sustaining the selected side. Importantly, the side selected need not be the status quo entity although, unfortunately, it usually has been.

The minimum intervention based select and support approach is the necessary centerpiece of successful counterinsurgency. The corollary of select and support is the manipulation of those entities not selected with the view of providing an impetus to a final power sharing formula. This approach when applied in Iraq along with the overdue "surge" was effective despite the recent spate of bombing spectaculars.

Both Iran and Afghanistan are on the table right now. It is relevant to consider both in terms of delay, decide, select, support, and sustain. This formulation can be used with respect to both internal contestants and potential external associates of the US.

Friedman suggests that the Obama administration has two options regarding Iran. One is the old standby--the military option. The other he proposes is to take a Nixon-like approach. That would mean recognizing Iran as a nuclear power, attempting detente with the mullahs with a view to a common focus against Russia.

There is a third option brushed aside by Freidman. That option is linking the US with Russia against Iran and its overt as well as covert supporters. To accomplish this the US would have to draw a firm line as to what we are willing to do both positively and negatively regarding Moscow's many, many ambitions. It is also necessary that the US forthrightly offer a partnership of equals relationship with Russia in pursuit of high value definable coinciding interests.

Maritime powers typically enlist the aid of other powers, particularly those of the continental sort, in the accomplishment of grand strategic goals. If the US can, in the words of one Israeli commentator, "suck up" to Israel, the Obama administration can and must do the same with Moscow--if it wants a viable option other than the choice of war or, in effect, surrender to Iranian policy dictates.

At the same time, the "correlation of forces" (to employ that nifty old Soviet term) in Iran gives the US a unique opportunity to employ delay, decide, support, and sustain with respect to the several internal contestants within Iran. Given the current indisposition of the Ayatollah Khemenei and the ruptures within both civil society and clerical establishment which persist even now five months after the "election" of Ahmedinejad, the US has an unparalleled opportunity to muck around creatively in the Iranian swamp.

The Afghan situation is absolutely rife with opportunities for delay, decide, support, and sustain. The Afghan nation is not a single entity but rather a congeries of tribes, ethnic backgrounds, languages, and forms of Islam. The constitution is weak. The president is strong in some aspects but not overall. The culture has a long tradition of let's-make-a-deal. Many, if not most, of the Taliban membership is less than True Believers in Islamist jihadism.

And, best of all the culture has a mechanism in place for resolving differences, settling old scores without bloodshed, making inter-community deals, and generally setting the stage for a tolerable facsimile of stability. It is the Grand Assembly of Elders. Ignored since the first American boots hit the ground so long ago in the haste to create a Western style democracy, it provides the best chance for the US to achieve its minimum strategic goal of "not-losing" to the Islamist jihadists.

While it is necessary to augment the number of US trigger pullers as well as training and advisory personnel in-country, it is even more critical that the US employ its current freedom to select a new set of entities and individuals to support and sustain--discretely. The Grand Assembly of Elders is the most appropriate, least intrusive way to effectively use influence for both hostilities termination and ultimate conflict resolution.

There is a very real danger in the delay, decide, support, and sustain approach to strategy. It is possible to delay too long. When that happens, events drive the decision making process as they did during the Bush/Cheney administration. The danger exists right now with respect to both Iran and Afghanistan. The time to exercise options as opposed to reacting to the events created by others is rapidly passing by.

President Obama has much--too much perhaps--on his desk. All are marked, "Action Immediate." He and his people would be very well advised for the best interests of the US to push the files marked "Iran" and "Afghanistan to the very top of the pile.

Time, tide, and national strategy wait for no man. Not even a man named Obama.

It's All So Predictable

The Iranians are so drearily predictable--in some ways. The bombings the other day which sent a fair number of people including heavyweights of the Revolutionary Guard Corps to their paradisaical reward was followed immediately with all the customary accusations against the US and UK.

Now the factotums of the mullahs have rounded up the usual suspects. These unfortunates, who may or may not be connected with the Soldiers of God, will be subjected to the normal interrogation methods of the Revolutionary Guards and, in the fullness of time, the survivors will confess and implicate others.

That is all normal in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The rituals are so ingrained as to be stereotypical. No surprises.

The only surprise in the wake of the bombing was the absence from state television of the Grand Ayatollah Khemenei. Normally the Supreme Leader takes to the air to sermonize up a storm whenever something perturbs the the Iranian scene. He was all over TV and radio during the weeks of opposition unrest following the election fraud last June. This time he was AWOL.

The lack of reassurance and thundering denunciations directed against the malignant counter revolutionaries gives much credence to the scattered reports from the Land of the Mullahs to the effect that the Grand Ayatollah is desperately ill, perhaps comatose, maybe even dying. The state media have been silent on the rumors, neither indignantly denying them nor even, Soviet style, averring the Ayatollah had a "minor indisposition."

In the category of What-Is-Going-On-Here? an advisor to the secretary of the Iranian National Security Council has told the press in that country that there "are circumstances" which may require Iran to enrich uranium to sixty-three percent. The advisor did not vouchsafe just what reasons or "circumstances" might require enrichment to this level.

So far the centrifuges have spun the devil's metal to five percent U 235, a level suitable for use in electrical production oriented reactors (among other uses.) The Iranians have agreed, more or less, perhaps, quite possibly, to send 1.2 metric tons of their current inventory of five percent stock to Russia for enrichment to twenty percent. That is the level necessary for use in the elderly US supplied reactor which is used, according to the Iranians, for the production of radioisotopes used in medical procedures.

For use in nuclear munitions, the uranium must be enriched to well above ninety percent, the higher the better.

Why the Iranians might need sixty-three percent enriched uranium is a poser. Perhaps the advisor simply plucked the number from the vacuum. Perhaps a messenger of Allah whispered it in his ear, but there seems no real-world based reason for that number.

Or, it could be one more example of institutional confusion within the Iranian government. The record shows the mullahs and their wallahs are often afflicted with a lack of left hand-right hand coordination.

Most likely it is another small move in the predictable Iranian game of introducing confusion in the context surrounding international negotiations. In the past the Tehran minions have shown a real genius for tossing contradictory statements, conflicting requirements, and alternating threats with protestations of peaceful intent all with the apparent goal of keeping their interlocutors off balance.

In any event the Iranians seem to be winning one more time with their fun, fantasy, confusion, and chaos approach to international relations. The West, or at least the P5+1, seems content with the Iranian's seeming commitment to send uranium to Russia and thence to France for final fabrication into fuel rods. The International Atomic Energy Agency, or at least its outgoing Chairman, seems quite pleased with the Iranian's promise to cooperate one more time with the inspection regime which will now include the formerly secret enrichment facility.

SecState Clinton has warned the Iranians not to dither over the details of the agreement for outsourcing uranium enrichment. She animadverted any delay would prove costly to the regime. Her play was accompanied by a solemn statement by the EU ForMin, Solano, to the effect that the world will not accept a nuclear weapons equipped Iran.

Well, everybody played their expected roles in Vienna. The Iranians, the West, SecState Clinton, ForMin Solano, the IAEA. Time has been bought--maybe. But, for what purpose?

The script is different for different players when it comes to the purpose. For the West, it now looks like a year or so has been purchased during which something more permanent might be worked out with the Tehran regime. For that regime it means more time during which more centrifuges, both declared and otherwise, might be set to spinning without fear that bombs might start falling.

Buy time and hope for the best--now that is real recipe for creative, forward looking foreign policy. It is a real prescription for attaining the Obama goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

The Geek fearlessly predicted that when push came to shove both Russia and China would make sure the Security Council did nothing with the infamous Human Rights Council resolution further perverting the already less-than-evenhanded Goldstone Report. China has now made clear that it would assure the Security Council would not refer the matter to the International Criminal Court.

That was an easy prediction to make. China (and Russia) is very, very sensitive to matters of national sovereignty and defense. Considering that the Chinese tend to be very robust in protecting the structural and territorial integrity of regime and country, the mandarins would be quite loath to establish any precedent which might someday, in some way, restrict their freedom of action. The Kremlin is no more willing than Beijing to see action limiting precedents established. So, it is no surprise that neither Power is willing to do other than join with the US in blocking any meaningful action on the UNHRC resolution or the underlying report.

The final piece of drearily predictable action (or words) comes from President Obama. He allowed on MSNBC (AKA Obama-Is-The-One network) that he may make a troop decision before the final outcome of the scheduled 7 November presidential runoff election is known. He also said that the decision might not be announced. Well, whowie-zowie! How's that for a good, clear presidential statement?

Considering that the decision has to be made sooner rather than later as it takes time to get troops moving--or to properly prepare the public for a unilateral declaration of defeat, the time sensitivity is self-evident. At the same time, as it is equally self-evident that the needs of the US as regards both national and strategic interest is separable from the composition of the Afghan government, there is no need, no requirement, that a "legitimate" (at least from the perspective of Washington) be in place in Kabul.

Our only real national or strategic interest in play over there is the ability of the Islamist jihadists to claim military victory over us as they have with the Red Army back in pre-Taliban days. Anything else from the status of women in the country to the amount of opium produced or the nature of the central government (if any) is of diminishing importance. All that matters is that the US inflict a sufficient number of losses on both Taliban and al-Qaeda that neither is in a position to offer a threat to the US or its allies in the near- to mid-term. The necessary penumbra surrounding that centrality is to provide no possible basis for a later claim by the Koran toting thugs of jihad that they had forced the US out of the place, that they had won.

To assure that will require more troops. That is axiomatic.

If the president makes the choice to impose a unilateral defeat on the US in the manner that Congress did during the end period of the War in Vietnam, then he needs to say so now in order to limit the political damage before the next election comes to pass.

One thing for sure, it is neither necessary nor desirable for Mr Obama to play some sort of updated version of "I've got a secret" regarding his decision. It is akin to hiding a rhinoceros under a tablecloth.

Give that sort of bushwa a rest, Mr Obama. You should be too grown-up to play that kind of game.

Voting, Voting And More Voting

Forty some years ago the protest folk singer Phil Ochs did a dreary ditty about the loss of the nuclear submarine Scorpion. It contains the line, "The crew have turned to voting; the officers to drink." Well, the Geek rather reckons that voting both in Afghanistan and the UN Human Rights Council may drive the Obama administration--or at least its foreign policy section--to drink.

In the Afghanistan theater of operations (which on occasion resembles a theater of the absurd) the voting is that of a contested nature. OK, it should not surprise anyone oriented as to time and place that Karzai's crowd stole the election. It is unfortunate that so many Americans and others in the West ignore the commonality of fraud, election theft, ballot box stuffing, and other related peccadilloes throughout the world. (Heck, leaving aside the questionable role of the SCOTUS in the 2000 election, electoral fraud was a major contributor to the 1960 presidential election right here in the good ole USA.)

The crucial factor in the Afghan elections is not contained in the question, "Did Karzai win fair and square?" Nor is to be found in the closely related query, "Will Karzai beat Abdullah Abdullah fair and square in a (so far hypothetical) runoff election?"

The critical question is actually, "What difference in the course and probable outcome of the war in Afghanistan will it make if Abullah wins?" The answer is simple, "Not much."

Abdullah will preside as has Karzai over a government which is disunited, inefficient, and riddled with corruption. None of these unpleasant realities is unique to Karzai. (Indeed, none are unique to Afghanistan or the Afghan culture.)

True, the Tajiks might enjoy more of the blessings(?) of power and closeness to the money stream. Equally true, some of the Pashtuns displaced at least temporarily from access to money and power may show their displeasure by uniting with their fellow Pashtuns in the Taliban. Neither of these developments will either aid or hinder the US and its allies in the task of militarily subduing the Glorious Warriors of the One True Faith.

The only possible impact the election of Abdullah might have on the course of events in Afghanistan is with respect to Pakistan. The Tajiks were the majority of the anti-Taliban oriented Northern Alliance. The Pakistani memory regarding such things runs long and deep. There is little reason to believe that an Abdullah presidency will have any real, positive impact upon Islamabad--and particularly on the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. When Abdullah was foreign minister in the Karzai government, his ministrations had no good effect on the movers and shakers of ISI, the Pakistani government, or Army.

A further complication which might well ensue upon an Abdullah victory in the proposed runoff comes from his deficiencies as a politician Afghan style. The lack of personal charisma, personal appeal, magnetism and charm was the main reason the US chose Karzai as "our man in Kabul."

One of the implications of Karzai's personal skills exists in his capacity as a deal maker. This, of course, is one of the main things we have against him and his fraudulent election now. He made deals then and now. Back then, the US, the UN, and all the other outsiders liked his style. Over the ensuing years, his deal making orientation caused us and all the rest to see him increasingly as an undesirable fountainhead of corruption and, (perish the thought) potential maker of a separate peace with Taliban and the other Islamist jihadist groups.

Politics in Afghanistan has always come in one of two forms. The lesser form is that of a ruthless central authority which cozens and coerces the several antipathetic ethnic and tribal entities into a moment of unity--normally against an external threat or invader. The greater form is one of national level Let's-Make-A-Deal. In this area Karzai is superior to Abdullah.

Now take a dekko at the importance of Let's-Make-A-Deal. Every insurgency ends in two distinct phases.

The first is hostilities termination. That means simply the fighting stops. It may stop because one side sees itself being defeated. It may come because both sides are exhausted. One or both sides no longer have the political will to keep on shooting.

The second phase is conflict resolution. Unless and until the insurgency--which means both the insurgent and the status quo--reach the stage of being willing to hammer out a way of coexistence, of power-sharing, of alleviating the grievances which led to war, simple hostilities termination means a temporary armistice, not a permanent or semi-permanent peace. The nitty-gritty of conflict resolution is making deals, pure and simple. Deals must be struck, bargains made on how power is to be shared, on how money is to be apportioned, on what the basic institutions of society and polity will be.

While outsiders may be useful in achieving hostilities termination (and that is the definition of success for the US in seeking to assure the Islamist jihadists cannot claim a military victory over all of us "infidels") the outsiders are useless in achieving conflict resolution. The second, more critical stage in ending an insurgency is an insiders-only game.

Conflict resolution means quite bluntly that at some time, in some place, somebody from Kabul must sit face-to-face with Omar or his successor and make a deal. At this place and at this time the presence of outsiders is not only superfluous, it will be counterproductive.

From all reports, Karzai is better equipped to play the role of deal maker than is Abdullah. It is also important to note that Abdullah will not be a negligible quantity when deal making time comes. He knows that. Karzai knows that. The question is, "Does the Obama administration not only know that but is it willing to act on that knowledge?"

The Obama administration and other outsiders can and should play a key role in assuring that Karzai and Abdullah work together regardless of elections past or future so that both men can play their roles when conflict resolution time comes around. This may mean overlooking the irregularities of Karzai's reelection. It means going along with Karzai should he reject any negative conclusions from the Electoral Complaints Commission. It means accepting whatever "vox populi, vox dei" emerges should a runoff be held.

The Obama administration and all the other well-intentioned outsiders have to keep their collective eyes on the prize. The prize for us is that of "not-losing," of achieving hostilities termination without giving the slightest excuse for the Islamist jihadists to claim victory over the "forces of infidelity." (Memo to the administration: al-Qaeda and Taliban still declare that they and they alone "defeated" the Red Army way back when during the days of Reagan/Bush.)

Now, gang, the other vote. The Human Rights Council has once more shown the truth behind all the accusations that it, like its ill-begotten predecessor, exists only as a cudgel with which the countries of the Arab-Muslim World can bash Israel. Once more, the worthy nations of the Council led by the Arab states and ably supported by human rights champions such as Russia and the Peoples Republic of China passed a resolution which endorses the justly criticized Goldstone Reprt.

Exacerbating the sin committed against both truth and impartiality, the resolution made specific reference to Israel alone. It ignored even the mild negative comments made by Justice Goldstone and his colleagues concerning the wrongs committed by Hamas and other groups in the months and years before Operation Cast Lead.

The US opposed the resolution along with five other courageous countries. Eleven other countries abstained. Five, including the UK and France, declined even to abstain showing a degree of gutlessness which surpasses rational understanding. Twenty-five states, primarily members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, voted in the affirmative.

Now the issue passes along to the Security Council. The US--if the POTUS is to be believed--will do whatever is necessary to block the report and its associated (or grafted on) provisions and recommendations. Presumably, this means the US will exercise its veto.

A veto in the UNSC does not mean the end of the Goldstone Report or the included demands that the International Criminal Court be invoked against Israeli governmental and military personnel. The OIC is inventive. It is persistent. And, it has potent support from at least two Great Powers (Russia and China) as well as a host of Small Powers in Africa and Latin America.

With the members of the European Union apparently afflicted by a massive case of Kick The Stubborn Israelis Around, it is not beyond the pale to think that a General Assembly move will be made to circumvent the Security Council. Nor is it unthinkable that the relevant committees of the UN will lean hard on Israel to acknowledge its nuclear arsenal--and abandon it.

While there are a number of negative potentials with the Goldstone Report, one ground truth already exists. The Obama plan for a comprehensive Mideast peace is dead in the water. Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear.

The "international community" or at least the UN did nothing, zero, nada, to stop the rain of rockets, mortar rounds, and other attacks conducted by Hamas from the Gaza Strip of which it has been the de facto government since it shot its way to power back in 2007. Now Justice Goldstone, his committee, the UNHRC have condemned Israel, and Israel alone, for the actions it took in legitimate self-defense.

Israel took the self-same "international community" including the UN at its collective word in 2005 when it withdrew from the Gaza Strip. The word was worthless as events proved beyond a shadow of a doubt--reasonable or otherwise.

It is totally illegitimate to expect Israel to take more "risks for peace" in the wake of the Human Rights Council's action. It is totally without foundation in the consensually accepted reality to expect Israel to look to any entity beyond its borders for defense, for protection, or even for support when the rockets fly again. No Israeli government would now be so lacking in sense as to take any action whatsoever which might increase the risks faced by the citizens of Israel.

Well, the action of the Human Rights Council was democracy in action. The majority rules. And, the Obama administration now has to face the unpleasant fact that its Mideast policy is a casualty of democracy. All of the genuflections to Muslim sensibilities, all of the distortions of history in favor of the Muslim sense of self-worth, all of the pressure on Israel regarding the "settlements" have come to nothing.

If anything the famed Obama "open hand" has emboldened the intransigence of the members of the OIC. The same "open hand" and apologies for presumed past American "sins" also emboldened countries whose interests and policies are inimical to the interests of the US. The cliched chickens have come home to roost.

Perhaps the time to grow up is upon the Nice Young Man From Chicago. The time is over for him to believe his own press releases about his greatness. The time is now for Mr Obama to accept that he is the president of a Great Power--and act like it! The time is now for an end to apologies, for explanations of how he is not George W. Bush, for "open hands." Most of the countries in the world expect the US to take a stance, a clear and consistent stance with policies which reflect that. Like us or hate us, the nations of the globe expect the US to act as a leader, to say without ambiguity what is and is not acceptable to the US. And, to carry out with deeds what we announce with words.

Just About Everybody Wants Out--

Of Afghanistan, that is. Remember, the so-called "good war?" Yeah, that one. The one which was deemed non-essential by only six percent of We the People when Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld launched the disastrously ill-conceived "shock and awe" campaign without enough trigger pullers on the ground to do much more than look on as the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence pulled their Taliban and al-Qaeda clients out of harm's way. And, then compounded their collective blunder by initiating not "mission creep" but rather "mission leap" into an ill-founded, non-achievable exercise in "nation-building."

Now over half of We the People surveyed apparently want the US out of Afghanistan. This is echoed throughout the European population. And, this percentage is bound to continue on its upward trend along with the number of American dead.

The support for seeing Americans die or come back home wounded--often desperately with life long and life crippling results--will be further eroded by the sick circus of the presidential election in Afghanistan. With every passing day there are more--and more credible--allegations of vote fraud on Hamid Karzai's part which put to shame the game played by Ahmedinejad. The latest involves the prevention of voting in an entire district with the Karzai gang forging nearly twenty-four thousand votes for the incumbent.

While no one expected the election to be honest, fair, and transparent, the actions of Karzai and company are rather too, too much. The massive cheating by the incumbent is completely in keeping with the massive corruption which has and continues to characterize the current Kabul regime. It is also completely compatible with the inherently friable nature of tribal politics when such are artificially projected onto a "national" scale.

The fraudulent election, the corruption, the inefficiency of the central "government" are all to be expected in a population which is deeply divided along ethno-linguistic and tribal lines. It is part and parcel of a "nation" which has been united only rarely and then because of a combination of external pressure (think invasion by foreigners) and a charismatic indigenous leader. These conditions have been met only rarely since Alexander the Great briefly touched on the Afghan consciousness.

The emergence of a central government will come if and when the self-organizing imperatives emerging from the population as a whole compel it to. Until and unless that happens, any pretense of a central government can only be installed and maintained by brute force and oodles and oodles of external financial aid. This mixture might keep up the pretense of government, but it cannot provide for the reality of one.

The brutal ground truth is simple to get a grip on. The mission of the US must be limited to the destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban. The destruction must be so complete and so evident that no future government of Afghanistan, regardless of its commitment to Islam, will repeat the mistake of Omar and his Taliban--allowing Islamist jihadists to root themselves in the rocky soil of Afghanistan.

President Obama maintained last month before an audience of VFW members that this was the strategic goal of the US. That this goal made the effort in Afghanistan a "war of necessity." If his words were honest and remain so, he was and is right. If not, then, the US and its allies are well and truly on a treadmill to oblivion.

Gen. Stan McChrystal has changed the US tactical and operational doctrine significantly. But, from the direction of change, it may be hard for some to see the direct relation between what appears to be an enhanced "nation-building" approach and the requisite penumbra to accomplishing the strategic goal presented by the President. McChrystal's emphasis upon "clear-and-hold" as well as limiting the use of airpower and refusing combat if such would unduly put civilians at risk is both prudent and realistic--even if the end goal is simply the obliteration of the Islamist jihadist entities and as many individual jihadis as possible.

Among the many who fail to see the linkage between the McChrystal doctrine and the Obama Objective is George Will. His recent "retreat now!" op-ed in the WaPo makes that pellucid. Somehow, somewhere, Mr Will has gained the impression that General McChrystal and his troops have morphed into a collection of armed social, educational, and economic development workers who also pull triggers. Further, he seems to be under the misapprehension that successful counterinsurgency (and a successful counter-jihadist war as well) require an effective central government in full control of the territory and population of the country.

He agrees with the British historian of World War II and the Falklands Islands War, Max Hastings, that "our" Afghans are equivalent to "our" South Vietnamese forty or so years ago. By implication that means that both "our" Afghans and us are on the road to defeat. Both the linkage and the analogy are as wrong as a cat barking.

Wrong that is if President Obama was being honest, straightforward, and full of only the truth when he spoke to the VFW. (Admittedly, his track record in the honesty and being filled only with the truth is quite dubious.)

Assuming for purposes of argument that President Obama had an uncharacteristic attack of truthfulness and that he continues to labor under its after effects, there is reason to believe that General McChrystal was right, that the situation in Afghanistan is "serious but salvageable." It is also necessary that one way or another the general receives the additional troops which are so obviously necessary to achieve the redefined goal.

It is necessary for foreign troops--our troops in the main--to interpose themselves between the Islamist jihadists and the uncommitted majority. It is necessary that we fight in a way which consistently and as a matter of operational design does not kill civilians.

The uncommitted majority not surprisingly are like people everywhere. They want to be insulated from war's dark devastation. A complication emerges from the fact that while no Afghan wants to be killed by a fellow Muslim, all find dying at the hands of an "infidel" far worse. As the Geek has written before, "Muslim killed by Muslim--bad. Muslim killed by infidel--very, very bad."

This means that our people have to be placed at greater risk. It means fighting up close and personal. It means our physical presence must be real in the eyes of the population. And, presence, the sine qua non of interventionary operations, brings higher friendly casualties as surely as new boots make sore feet.

Worse, at least from the perspective of We the People, our troops have to maintain their presence over time. Persistence is the second sine qua non of success in interventionary operations. And, the longer we persist, the more friendly casualties will result.

Finally--and this is the most difficult sine qua non of all at least for Westerners in general and Americans in particular--patience is necessary. There are no phase lines in an interventionary operation whether the goal is countering an insurgency or obliterating Islamist jihadists. This kind of war does not end with an unconditional surrender. Nor does it end simply because a fatuous leader declares, "Mission accomplished!" This kind of war simply fades out. Hostilities simply taper off. The noise level subsides. The number of bodies, both friendly and hostile, simply decreases--ultimately to zero.

Hostilities end but that does not mean the conflict has been resolved. This is a major reason that countering an insurgency can be a multi war affair as the Russians are finding out one more time in the North Caucasus.

Conflict resolution is an emergent system. It is a self-organizing dynamic which must result organically from the local contestants. It will be messy, even inherently chaotic. It will not meet the expectations or policy requirements of foreign observers. But, it is the only way in which an internal political conflict finally can be resolved.

This implies something quite important for US and other policy makers. It also has an important implication for US and other troops on the ground. The soft power aspects of conducting what is at root a very, very long punitive expedition must be applied at the local level. This means the central government, the Karzai regime must be bypassed, ignored when it comes to providing local necessities whether police, medical clinics, educational systems, infrastructure development, or economic development.

By directing all--well, at least most--soft power money and advice to the locals, it is possible to both capitalize upon and facilitate the self-organizing that is critical to both providing assistance in the war against the jihadists and laying the foundation for effective conflict resolution. The locals: the tribals, the men in the villages no matter what they need, what they lack, what they must have to feel like members of a dynamic and functional community. It is these locals who we must work with--not the wallahs in Kabul. They can wait. They have no where to go.

So far the signs are that General McChrystal understands all of this. So do most of those under his command. Regardless of jihadist bombing spectaculars, the jihadists are on the defensive. As long as clear-and-hold continues, as long as we carry the fight to the black turbans, as long as we seek to gain and retain the initiative, Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the others in country have no chance of winning.

George Will is wrong. So also are the "progressives" among the Democrats of the House. So is public opinion. Provided that President Obama does not change his mind, or choose to sell out the war and all those Americans killed and injured in Afghanistan to achieve some bit or another of his Great Transformational Agenda, the situation is "serious but salvageable." The US can yet achieve its minimal strategic goal of "not losing." We can still achieve the somewhat more expansive end of obliterating the Islamist jihadists and providing a long lasting object lesson in the perils of hosting those who seek to harm us.

That is if President Obama has more brains than a lettuce and more backbone than a banana.

The Credible Capacity To De-Commit

In any interventionary operation it is critical that the intervening party never lose the credible capacity to de-commit from the venture. It is the ability to leave that gives the interventionary party leverage on the indigenous government. Without any believable departure option, the leverage available is limited, even fatally limited.

The US should have learned this critical lesson during the Vietnam War. Our ability to convince the Saigon governments to do what was in our and their best interest declined steadily as the number of American troops (and corpses) rose. The (often) corrupt, (usually) inefficient, (typically) self-involved, (normally) legitimacy lacking Saigon regime(s) could ignore American urgings, hectoring, advice, and guidance with the impunity of knowing that we had no choice but to stay and fight their war.

Only in the fading days following the Easter Offensive did the denizens of Saigon realize that the big Yankee Train was leaving the station for home--sooner rather than later. Not only did the train leave--it rolled right over the now fully alert, ready to act, able to fight South Vietnamese government and armed forces. (The latter was courtesy of the now robustly anti-war Democrats in Congress with the sainted Ted Kennedy baying in the van.)

Of course, by then it was way too late. The absence of an earlier credible capacity to de-commit had set up the South Vietnamese for failure. It had also cost the Americans lives and treasure needlessly.

Now the US is traveling the same road in Afghanistan. In large measure due to the utter and complete idiocy of the Bush/Cheney administration, we entered Afghanistan without either a narrowly defined mission such as the eradication of al-Qaeda and Taliban as well as the ground forces necessary for the task but without any credible capacity to leave the place.

As a result we have been joined hip and shoulder to an indigenous regime which is every bit as corrupt, odious, inefficient, out of touch, and unwilling to do anything in the way of effective war fighting as the worst days in Vietnam. The full extent of the failure to establish both a limited, doable mission and a credible capacity to de-commit is becoming all too visible in the wake of the presidential election.

The primary challenger to the incumbent Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, has provided evidence of a high probative value demonstrating election fraud on a scale which might make even Ahmedinejad blush. Karzai can afford to blow off American and other outside protests or demands for a run off vote of demonstrable integrity as he is convinced the US has no choice but to stay and fight the war against Taliban and al-Qaeda for its own reasons and benefit.

Hamid Karzai is, of course, right in his stance. Because the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld crew entered Afghanistan without having limited the mission, providing sufficient forces on the ground, and allowing "mission leap" into the vacuum of nation-building, the Islamist jihadist entities grew in strength, numbers, and sophistication.

While Afghanistan qua Afghanistan has no importance to US national and strategic interests, the appearance, no matter how unjustified by fact, of an American military defeat by the Islamist jihadist is absolutely critical to the US--and the West generally. To redeem the failure of the past several years in that unpleasant place is essential for our future peace and security.

That is a brutal fact. It is, nonetheless, a fact, a real, powerful fact. Any odor of an American military failure, including a loss of political will on the part of We the People, will embolden the Islamist jihadists everywhere, meaning we will be neck deep in the martyrdom seeking, human rights abusing, True Belief driven thugs for years to come.

Sounds wonderful, doesn't it?

The Obama administration must make it utterly clear and unmistakable that the troops in country as well as the augmentation which must necessarily come in the future months are there for one purpose only. The purpose is not to build a nation. It is not to prop up the Karzai regime. It is not there to guarantee peace and security for all Afghans for all time to come.

The troops are there to kill Talib, destroy Taliban as a threat now and in the future. And, to do the same to al-Qaeda and any other Islamist jihadists who hope to gain paradise by killing Americans or other Westerners.

The only doable mission now, or in the future (or in the past for that matter), is the squashing of Islamist jihadist entities and the teaching to future Afghan governments that providing safe haven to Islamist jihadists is too risky to contemplate. The realities of Afghan culture, society, history as well as the foundation truth of human social groups as self-organizing precluded and precludes any more.

The current governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan must be brought to understand, to know in their collective guts that we are interested only in the obliteration of Islamist jihadism in the region now and in the future. What the locals do with their own governments, their own societies, their own lives is their concern alone. Not ours.

Sure, it would be lovely as all get out to see Afghanistan as a liberal, pluralistic, secular democracy with free enterprise and social welfare, sexual equality, an independent judiciary, a free media, and clerics sticking to the mosque, but that is a self-defeating delusion. Good intentions, good hopes, high minded thoughts are simply a form of pavement.

Pavement for the road to hell.