There are weeks when the Geek has regretted his lifelong interest in matters of war, diplomacy, and the shadow lands of covert/clandestine affairs. The past month of so has been one of those periods. It is not that the world has suddenly been infected by a fulminating virus of peace and love. Quite the contrary. Rather the intellectual languor has been promoted by the combination of events having unfolded in a drearily predictable factor and the lack of imagination exhibited by the Deep Thinkers and Bold Actors on all sides of all the many conflicts, armed and otherwise.
A useful example of both predictability and the lack of imagination is presented by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. The energetic dismantlement of the New Mexican borne cleric is both welcome and long overdue. The fact that he was accompanied on his trip to paradise by the one time resident of North Carolina, Samir Khan, rendered the event all the more pleasurable.
Anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the UAV campaign in the FATA and the building of a base convenient to Yemen from which Agency operated Predators might make their lethal flights well understood that Awlaki's days were numbered, and that the number was small. The violent death of the genius of Internet (and personal) radicalization became as certain as sunrise when he was placed on the "kill or capture" list last year. Despite the inevitable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the ACLU and other advocates of human rights above the dictates of real life, and regardless of the equally certain condemnations of "extrajudicial execution" already resounding around the world, the Obama administration by it's listing of the imam let it be known that the governing considerations were those of war--a war in which Awlaki had voluntarily enlisted and waged with ever growing success.
With the failure a few months ago to capture Awlaki by a force of Yemeni personnel backed by USSOCOM assets, the only option was killing, and the only practical tool was provided by a Predator launched Hellfire. The only time limits were imposed by the requirements for constructing an operational base and gaining from both Yemeni and national technical means sufficient actionable intelligence. When fractured open source reports out of Yemen a couple of weeks ago indicated a diminishing of drone traffic over the area of Yemen in which Awlaki's tribe holds sway with a ramping up over territory to the country's north, it became evident that the endgame for the preacher was underway.
The removal of Awlaki and Khan from the board is good. But, it is drearily predictable that it is not much more than that. The strike in no way lessens the nature or effectiveness of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). Had the reported inclusion of AQAP's chief bombmaker in the body count not been later retracted, the Hellfire would have well and truly hurt the group. As it is, the most that can be said is the killing has had a marginal beneficial impact by reducing AQAP's capacity to use Internet radicalization with the same effect in the future that it has in the past.
Neither the killings nor the knee trembling on the part of human and civil rights lawyers and groups will change the nature of the ongoing war between advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states and people of the world. The bad guys will keep on being bad actors. The administration and any future one as well will use whatever means are necessary within the broad limits of proportionality to defend the country and its allies against attacks of whatsoever nature.
If there is any alteration in the future, it will be in the direction of placing increased reliance upon UAVs and other means of long range, low signature, low cost of commitment war fighting. The use of special forces teams and UAVs has been both tested and proven in the harsh laboratory of the FATA as well as the one next door in Pakistan. Both capabilities can be of great assistance in countering the potential threats resident in AQAP, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.) Both may be required urgently against the latter threat if AQIM demonstrates greater capability as the result of having tapped into the arms stream flowing from the looted arsenals of Libya.
A greater use of UAVs will provoke an enormous consternation on the part of the usual suspects--the NGOs involved with human and legal rights as well as the apologists for countries which wish ill to the US but cannot match the American technological capacities. There will be more and more political strange bedfellows both domestic and international as the US leans more heavily upon the impersonal, remotely controlled deliverers of death from above. There will be demands beyond count for new conventions to bar such devices as Predator. There will be calls for a moratorium on the use of these infernal machines until the law can catch up with the new technologies.
The only reply to those who believe the Predator and its tribe are inhuman and inhumane is,"Phooey!" It is far better for a single Awlaki to die downrange than to see real war with its effects, unpredictable in detail but certain to include hundreds if not thousands of dead--most of whom will be civilians.
The Predators will continue to fly over Libya even long after NATO's warplanes have packed up and gone home. They will be overhead to observe not only the intended targets of weapons being smuggled or saboteurs preparing but also the probable agony of protracted internal war as the joy of liberation turns into the pain of political disagreements of a very fundamental nature.
Libya (and its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt) is also drearily predictable. Much of the reason for this observation is found in a remark made by a Salifist Tunisian, 23 years old and holder of a degree in engineering who, when interviewed, opined, "We Salifists are the majority. Democracy is rule of the majority. Why should we allow the minority (secular oriented Tunisians as well as their non-Salifist fellow countrymen) dictate how we should live?"
By this question as well as similar content expressions by legions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, and their supporters in the West, the young man demonstrated just why the "Arab Spring" will turn into a Winter, a most harsh and bitter Winter. The promoters of democracy show they well understand democracy in and of itself but fail to see the necessary corollary: Democracy is the tyranny of the majority.
Unless properly constrained within the firm dikes of a representational republic and held in check by dams formed by both division of powers and an independent judicial system, democracy is tyranny pure and simple in which the rights of the minorities are either non-existent or tenuous at best. In the rush to embrace democracy without the time necessary to build the essential dikes and dams, no citizen is secure, no rights and liberties are permanent, nothing is safe from the fads and fantasies of public opinion and the winds generated by demagogues.
Libya, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, but quite like Yemen and Afghanistan or other Islamic states, has the additional burden of tribalism. This is not to say tribalism is bad. It isn't. Tribal identity is predominant in several states to the point that they are not real, integrated nation-states but rather collections of tribes sharing a flag.
The attempt to force tribal based societies and polities to pretend they are Western nation-states is doomed to fail. Don't believe? Take a look at Somalia. It is not a failed state because it never was a real state. Rather it was an artifact created by Western diplomats who used the only model making sense to them--the nation-state. The same is true of Afghanistan. Much of the inherent instability there results from ignoring the tribal nature of the human terrain in order to pretend we can make it into a Western style state.
When looking at Libya or Yemen or, to a lesser extent, Syria, the same dynamic is present--tribes forced to act as if their members owed a higher loyalty to the state. The example of Iraq is instructive here. As long as we outsiders insist on democracy and the nation-state as the touchstone of legitimacy, we are helping to doom the targets to a long, harsh Winter.
Even if tribalism of the usual sort is absent as it is in Egypt and Tunisia, there is a functional equivalent at work. That is the existence of differing interpretations of Islam and thus the relation of the faith to the state. The ground truth is Islam carries the seeds of its own failure as a foundation of state. This actuality has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan. People may think they want to live in a Shariah based system until they are actually in one. The proponents of austere Islam have and will find that their vision of life is totally unattractive to most people. Then, they must (as do the austere Islamists of Iran) rely upon naked force to oppress their way to continued power.
Put together, the two forms of tribalism, traditional and religious, along with unchecked democracy point to a long, bitter Winter of pronounced discontents. This, in turn, implies a high possibility of protracted or episodic internal war in all its manifold and evil forms. Such is the result of ill-advised exercises in "nation-building" or regime change or support of the "peoples' will.
Coming full circle, the several downsides of either intervention or unthinking support are circumvented completely by using Predators or even special forces units. These approaches to defending against hostile intents and acts minimize the probability of unintended consequences. Predators do not engage in "nation-building," neither do they change regimes. They kill people in serious need of being killed.
To this end, the killing of Awlaki is one important small straw in the very stiff winds of the coming Arab Winter.
Showing posts with label AQIM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AQIM. Show all posts
Saturday, October 1, 2011
Saturday, September 10, 2011
The Next Ten Years
The US (and a hell of a lot of other countries) is approaching the zero point marking the official start of "The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT.)" To err on the side of accuracy, the US had already been in a war against advocates of violent political Islam for eight years when the hijacked passenger aircraft were turned into cruise missiles.
Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention. Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED. The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression. The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort. The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.
The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor. It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched. It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.
Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead. At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states. The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.
Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11. Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader. Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.
As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace. Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country. Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.
The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan. The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations. The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.
The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation. Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.
Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow. AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure. Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.
In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance. AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao, "a paper tiger."
The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated. There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.
The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population. AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs. Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor. They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.
The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis. In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures. This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed. Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.
The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen. Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority. They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power. (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)
There is an important caveat to this. Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly. This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam. They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.
Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted. Neither should they be diminished. The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces. The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers. In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants. It is OK. A fact of life. But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.
When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US. The winner would be AQAP.
The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen. In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.
We did this once before. In Vietnam. The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.
Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated. But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.
Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only. The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP. Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam. Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.
Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention. Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED. The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression. The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort. The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.
The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor. It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched. It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.
Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead. At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states. The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.
Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11. Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader. Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.
As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace. Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country. Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.
The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan. The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations. The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.
The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation. Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.
Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow. AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure. Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.
In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance. AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao, "a paper tiger."
The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated. There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.
The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population. AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs. Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor. They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.
The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis. In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures. This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed. Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.
The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen. Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority. They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power. (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)
There is an important caveat to this. Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly. This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam. They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.
Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted. Neither should they be diminished. The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces. The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers. In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants. It is OK. A fact of life. But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.
When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US. The winner would be AQAP.
The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen. In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.
We did this once before. In Vietnam. The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.
Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated. But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.
Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only. The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP. Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam. Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.
Saturday, August 6, 2011
Carrying Water And Doublethinking
Leon Panetta is an old Chicago pol. He came of political age as a cog in the oldest, longest running, smoothest operating machine in the US--the Cook County Democratic Party. As such, he knows well the primary duty of a machine man--loyalty to the Boss. By definition the Boss is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Barack Obama.
Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach." Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.
Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size. And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well. If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.
Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11. In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.
Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated. Al-Qaeda is not dead. It is not on some sort of Islamic life support. It is not even gravely ill.
The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed. It has changed profoundly from its original form. Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.
In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system. It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser. None of this obtains today. Nor has it obtained for some time. Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.
Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam. Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.
The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises. Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original. "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group. It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.
The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea. This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.
In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea. It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct. The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam. These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics. Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West. Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.
Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda. Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies. The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.
Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone. In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles. AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat. AQIM is growing. Rapidly.
The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe. This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better. In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death. Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.
AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria. Kidnapping Europeans. This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy. In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort. Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago. Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe. There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.
Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say. Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year. Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US. It is one more rapidly growing threat.
Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge. He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground. He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today. Probably on a larger scale geographically.
Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American. Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits. When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.
Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI. That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols. It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there, that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US. If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.
Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach." Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.
Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size. And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well. If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.
Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11. In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.
Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated. Al-Qaeda is not dead. It is not on some sort of Islamic life support. It is not even gravely ill.
The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed. It has changed profoundly from its original form. Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.
In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system. It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser. None of this obtains today. Nor has it obtained for some time. Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.
Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam. Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.
The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises. Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original. "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group. It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.
The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea. This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.
In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea. It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct. The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam. These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics. Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West. Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.
Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda. Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies. The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.
Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone. In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles. AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat. AQIM is growing. Rapidly.
The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe. This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better. In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death. Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.
AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria. Kidnapping Europeans. This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy. In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort. Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago. Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe. There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.
Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say. Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year. Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US. It is one more rapidly growing threat.
Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge. He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground. He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today. Probably on a larger scale geographically.
Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American. Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits. When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.
Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI. That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols. It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there, that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US. If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.
Monday, March 28, 2011
Internal War--Neocons And The Tea Party
Like the shambling corpses in the classic black and white version of Night of the Living Dead, the neocon ninnies have been resurrected by the fragrant miasma surrounding the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions. Eliot Abrams and Joshua Muravchik having been baying in the van, eager for a faster, harder intervention in Libya and chomping after the chance to depose Bashir Assad.
Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver. The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.
Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants. The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.
Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison. Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms. There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.
At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations. It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."
As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya. They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs. They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.
The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering. By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.
As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch! This sketch is silly."
The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today. At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.
This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right. It is not. It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.
There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.
The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power. It is not simply first among equals. It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities. There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this. The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)
The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest. True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.
This positive statement is accompanied by a negative. The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology. Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq. This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure. As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.
The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong. The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress. No Great Power has ever resigned its status. The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs. Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.
Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock? A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?
Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam. The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy. Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.
If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish. Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war. Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.
Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war. It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica. This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations. It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.
There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP. In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group. Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.
Then, of course, there is Iran. There is always Iran. The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb." The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)
The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months. The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction. So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority. Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides. This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.
This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast. The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.
John Bolton was right. And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him. Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage. This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.
The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents. We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go. Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?
Unfortunately it is. That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.
And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.
Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver. The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.
Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants. The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.
Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison. Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms. There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.
At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations. It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."
As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya. They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs. They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.
The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering. By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.
As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch! This sketch is silly."
The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today. At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.
This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right. It is not. It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.
There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.
The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power. It is not simply first among equals. It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities. There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this. The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)
The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest. True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.
This positive statement is accompanied by a negative. The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology. Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq. This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure. As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.
The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong. The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress. No Great Power has ever resigned its status. The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs. Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.
Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock? A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?
Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam. The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy. Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.
If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish. Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war. Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.
Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war. It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica. This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations. It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.
There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP. In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group. Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.
Then, of course, there is Iran. There is always Iran. The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb." The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)
The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months. The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction. So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority. Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides. This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.
This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast. The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.
John Bolton was right. And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him. Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage. This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.
The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents. We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go. Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?
Unfortunately it is. That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.
And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.
Saturday, May 15, 2010
The Latest Twist For A Long Running Insurgency
Once upon a time the Spanish flag whipped in the sirocco where sandy wastes met the sea in a geographic expression then known as Spanish Sahara. Thirty-seven years ago, even before Richard Nixon cashed in his Watergate tinted chips, a group known by its Spanish initials as Polisario declared itself to be the vanguard of an independence oriented revolution. (Well, to use the proper term, a defensive insurgency with the goal of making the hot, arid, economically useless desert a zone as free of Spaniards as it is rain.)
The post-Franco Spanish government allowed as how it was quite willing to let this meaningless remnant of past colonial glory go its own way. At a speed which would put a thoroughbred racing camel to shame both Morocco and Mauritania claimed the now orphaned area of miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles. Polisario disagreed. Forcefully.
The lackluster Mauritanian simulacrum of an army after a tad of defeat in its token resistance packed it in. The Moroccans were made of sterner stuff. By 1976 Morocco was in defacto control of most of what was now called simply, Western Sahara.
Never one to admit defeat--and having secured the not unimportant backing of Algeria--Polisario kept on with the good fight. Over the next decade or so the Moroccans pushed the Berber and Arab fighters of Polisario back until their only secure bases were refugee camps in Algeria.
Following the UN brokered ceasefire in 1991, which had the promise of a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara as a key feature, Morocco secured its status in the largest and more valuable part of the place with a sand berm of monumental dimensions. Polisario repaired to lick its considerable wounds in the Algerian camps. Given that Algeria had leveraged a seat in the Organization of African Unity for Polisario and continued to support its political and military ambitions, the situation was acceptable to the Polisario insurgents, leader and follower alike.
The situation stayed in this stasis with the promised referendum being postponed time after time and Morocco perfecting its hold on most but not quite all of Western Sahara for the next decade. The stasis continued for several reasons chief among which was the political crisis and attendant mass deaths which blighted the Algerian political and social landscapes as government and Islamist (primarily Salifist) opposition. The Algerian military needed more stability not less and thus acted to inhibit Polisario's ambitions.
The new century opened with changes in Morocco, particularly the coming to the throne of Mohammed VI in 1999. Since then the Kingdom has been able to inaugurate a series of political, social, and, most importantly, economic development measures which have had the incidental benefit of strengthening Morocco's hold on Western Sahara. This development has raised the bar to Polisario's success.
Also impairing Polisario in realizing its long-held dream of independence is the recurrent tilt of the UN, particularly the Security Council, in Morocco's favor. Thus frustration has grown year by year during the past decade in the camps of Algeria. No one is more frustrated and willing to embrace the most extreme of measures than the young men who have been born and come of age in the camps.
Once again something first noted in the concentration camps of the American West (aka "Reservations") has been demonstrated in the remote camps of Algeria. As on the assorted "reses" of the US and the refugee camps inhabited by Palestinians, the involuntary "refugees" constitute a ready, willing, able, and eager source of recruits for war. Even the certainty of death in war has once again been proven to be less unacceptable than continued life in the camps.
As a result the young men of the camps have become a source of recruits for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Polisario-AQIM linkage has been demonstrated with increasing frequency in the past several months with Polisario members and leaders such as Imam Muhamad Seedi and Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.
The Polisario recruits are powerfully motivated--and not simply nor solely by the desire for independence. The Salifist ideology of AQIM is at least as important--probably more so--in providing the impetus to revival within the almost moribund ranks of Polisario. This implies that the fresh troops are as willing to kill and die in Algeria as they are in Morocco or Western Sahara.
AQIM is not noted for harboring limited ambitions. The reach of the AQIM dreams (or, perhaps delusions) is seen in their urging that Morocco be attacked. The goal is not the liberation of Western Sahara. No. That would be too limited. The aim is that of compelling the Kingdom and Army of Morocco to serve as the mechanism of Islamist revanchism.
The target of the revanchist dream is Spain. More precisely it is the recovery of the lost province of al-Andalus. Actually the goal is not limited to the far marches of the Pyrenees, and since the Islamic and Islamist tenet is that any territory over which the crescent flag of the Prophet's forces once flew is forever Muslim, AQIM and its supporters demand the reconquest of south France. (Apparently the victory of Geoffry Martel at Tours was only a preliminary decision.)
AQIM has failed to gain great traction in Algeria perhaps because the memories of the pools of blood are too recent in the collective memory of Algerians generally. The addition of a large chunk of the twenty-five or so thousand young men without a country but with a faith is a most welcome boost to AQIM.
The "refugees" from Western Sahara also provide a strong mechanism for penetrating on a peer-to-peer basis the alienated youth of Morocco--thirty percent of whom are currently unemployed. Radicalization of Moroccan young men was shown in a melodramatic way last week with the deportation of two such from Italy following the discovery of their hazy plan to kill the current pope.
Moroccans are well represented in France, Spain, and Italy. They are present all through the EU. Not all are even marginally integrated in their host societies. Not all are meaningfully employed. More than a few have convinced themselves that they and their religion is the focus of baseless excoriation by Europeans. These, particularly those of the last category, represent fertile recruiting pools. The same religion based approach which has proven quite successful with the Polisario in Algeria will work with the rootless young men living in Europe.
Morocco presents a cheerful face to the world, particularly the West and the US. It likes to portray itself as a modern, tolerant, open society with a well-respected and regarded constitutional monarch supported by a democratically elected parliament. In comparison to other Muslim majority states, the Kingdom does enjoy a wide measure of civil rights, a relatively free press, a reasonably efficient bureaucracy, and a prosperous economy.
The image is attractive. It is also fragile. Morocco as a state is tenuous. It would fall before a resolute Islamist attack. This is precisely what AQIM intends as the first, necessary step to grander things.
Polisario provides a tool to mobilize people against the Kingdom. This is the case not only in the arena of domestic stability but also in international fora. Polisario has legitimacy in international affairs given its status in the African Union. It is not a declared terrorist entity unlike AQIM. It has access to the UN. And to the international media as shown by its protests during the vote to reauthorize the UN mandate in Western Sahara.
AQIM and Polisario are not strange bedfellows. Their goals are intertwined, interlocked, not simply coinciding but mutual. Beyond that, the two groups share the most intimate of connections, those of faith.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb Puffs Its Chest
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been doing a fair bunch of threatening and killing in recent weeks. The group has been littering the desert with bodies in Algeria and Mali. When AQIM could take time off from shooting soldiers and murdering captives, it wiled away the long hours by making threats.
First the group threatened France. The Islamist jihadists were mightily put out by the derogatory remarks made by Nicholas Sarkozy concerning the wearing of the burqua (AKA "a garbage sack") by women in France. Using the high and lofty wording which Islamists generally employ to justify their intentions to butcher, injure, and terrorise, AQIM warned it would "protect the honor of our sisters" living under the threats of "Islamophobia" in France. The Bravos of Allah's Army called upon French Muslims to join in the "war" against the Crusader oppressors.
Showing a resolve more closely approaching that exhibited at Verdun in 1916 than the version on display in May 1940, the French parliament went ahead with hearings on whether or not to put the body-enclosing bag beyond the pale of law. All that is missing to date is for President Sarkozy to come out singing, "Form your battalions! March! March."
Not at all taken aback by the failure of the Muslims resident in France to take up the challenge and throw up barricades in Paris, AQIM has taken on a bigger target. A much bigger target.
China. That's right, China. The scrofulous group best known for massive atrocities in Algeria and, more recently, ambushing the poorly trained and equipped troops of Mali, has tossed down the gauntlet to one of the world's most formidable militaries backed by a very fine clandestine service and political will almost beyond measure.
But, what else could a poor, humble but True Believing Warrior For the Prophet do given the provocation offered by China in its repression of the Uighurs? While Islamic governments may shy away from confronting Beijing, and the Islamic neighbors of China, the Central Asian Republics, even ally themselves with the Very Big Satan, the Desert Swords of Islam will rise to the occasion.
North Africa, particularly Algeria, is a target rich environment. There are more than fifty thousand Chinese nationals living and working there. Spread thinly across a huge, potentially hostile physical and human terrain, the Chinese, whether oil field workers or employees of other Chinese government sponsored business activities or private citizens pursuing profit and pleasure according to individual definitions, all are now at an elevated risk.
Unlike previous threats or attacks against Chinese nationals as in the Sudan, Beijing responded quickly, vigorously, and publicly to the AQIM declaration. Qin Gang, a ForMin spokesman stated that China would take all necessary measures to protect Chinese personnel and institutions against attack in Africa.
One measure which will not be taken is any backing down in Xanjiang. The central government is--quite literally--death on the three evils of "separatism, terrorism, and extremism." In the estimate of Beijing, the Uighurs are guilty of all three "evils." Being foreigners, the best AQIM can aspire to is guilt in the second two categories. That will be enough, more than enough, if AQIM carries through with its threat.
The Deep Thinkers of the Band of Relentless Fighters For Muslims Everywhere might be well advised to consult history. Knowing these devout adherents of killing their way to the Perfect Peace of the New Caliphate are too busy with prayers or bomb making to consult the books, the Geek, in his public spirited way will give a thumbnail of the relevant historical experience.
Long ago (say in the 1980s CE) and far away (in a place called Lebanon) there were a number of groups which combined True Love of the Prophet with such secular concerns as driving Israel into the sea, freeing the Palestinian people from bondage, removing the apostate rulers of sundry Islamic states, and generally raising merry hell. As part of achieving these Glorious Goals and assured eternity in Paradise, these Fine Men of the Faith practiced the kidnapping of hostages.
They took captive assorted Americans and Europeans. Some were (in a style already familiar to AQIM) murdered after torture. Others (again in a way copied by AQIM) were released upon the payment of ransom. Still others were held until somehow, somewhere, sometime, they simply disappeared.
Simultaneously flushed with success and frustrated at their failure to drive Israel into the sea, free the Palestinians from bondage, force the US to abandon its role in the Mideast, and achieve other goals sanctified in the Koran, the Deep Thinkers of one group among the multitude resolved to alter matters by kidnapping some Russian diplomats.
Some appropriate minions of the Soviet state were duly taken hostage. The captors sat back secure that they had achieved a measure of leverage over events previously denied them.
Having failed to study Soviet history and the methods by which the Soviets often responded to such acts of base counter-revolutionary activity, the hostage-takers were themselves taken by surprise.
Far from bowing to the Will of Allah as expressed by the kidnappings, the Soviet leadership dispatched a team from their highly efficient clandestine service. This team snatched close relatives of the chief kidnappers. After getting frankly Medieval on the bodies of these relatives they were delivered personally to the local Thug-in-Chief.
The surviving Soviets were speedily released. Appropriate funeral services were held for the relatives taken by the clandestine team.
End of story. Well, not quite. The real end is that while Americans, Europeans, and even Israelis were captured by the Intrepid Men of the One True Faith, Russians were now immune from this fate.
The sweep of Chinese history both before and after the Communist Revolution indicates strongly that the Chinese are far more likely to take the Soviet approach than they are to emulate the hand wringing, can't-we-talk-this-over approach of the Americans, particularly the Americans of the Age of Obama. The French did not roll over and ask AQIM to forgive them for the nasty things said by their president. The Chinese are even less inclined than the French to collapse before AQIM's interpretation of the Will of Allah.
Here endeth the lesson--unless AQIM has a further attack of terminal stupidity. (As Allah wills.)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)