Michael Oren is a historian whose works by and large have met with the Geek's unqualified approbation. He is also the current Israeli ambassador in Washington. Presumably he is good at this job. One strong indication of his quality of work as well as the sorry state of present day relations between the government of Israel and the Obama administration is an excellent article in Foreign Policy.
The article is a very fine short compass rendition of the American relation with Israel as well as the firm foundations for that relation. It is nothing less than tragic that the ambassador believed himself compelled to have to write it. Before the Obama administration there would have been no call for so doing.
The unfortunate reality is that the emerging Obama quasi-doctrine for foreign policy--at least as such obtains in the Mideast, a doctrine labeled "leading from behind" has brought about the necessity of Ambassador Oren's argument. The same Obama doctrine has resulted in the totality of the mess which constitutes current US policy for the region. More than that, it has alienated other key allies such as France and the UK as well as perhaps obliging one or both of these countries to deploy ground forces in Libya.
As has been noted many times in this blog, Mr Obama is apparently determined to test whether or not a Great Power can voluntarily resign its status. Doing so is without historical precedent. Throughout the sweep of human events, many Great Powers have lost their status through the efforts of other emerging powers or have been dethroned as a consequence of internal collapse, but none have ever simply walked away from it as a voluntary choice.
The approach to the politics of the globe favored by the Nice Young Man From Chicago is one which combines "humility" with a predilection for hectoring of a sermonizing sort. The "humility" expresses itself in the placing of responsibility for decision making upon international organizations both regional and global. It is as if the US constantly said to the world, "Well, if you all really, really want us to do something, well, then, we guess, we can go along with it--as long as we are not alone in the job."
What an image! The US as the most humble and obedient servant of the political will of others, of others in regional or global congress assembled. Not for us will be the reactionary notion of defining and achieving our national and strategic interests. No sir, we will meekly seek to submit to the stated will expressed by the consensus or votes of transnational assemblies--that is provided the will is predicated upon ideals we find laudable.
The insect in the Jello of the Obama approach is found in ideals. The US has ideals, the Obama administration has insisted repeatedly. To pursue these the US will stand in the background, suitably humble, pressing meekly for decisions on the part of regional and global organs which express our ideals with good effect. The real key to the notion of "leading from behind" is found in this dynamic--appearing to bow to international will while setting the climate of ideals to which we will bow.
While seeking the shadows in order to be the "hindmost" in international decision making, the administration generally and the president in particular prefers the spotlight. Standing under the klieg lights, Mr Obama is right at home with his unique brand of hectoring sermon--demands that this leader or that depart the scene without delay, declaring that this or that government's actions are "unacceptable," the general announcement of broad goals with Olympian force. All of these have been notable during the long days of tumult in the Mideast.
The combination--or more properly, the tension--of ideals based international decision making and absolutist rhetoric have brought about the current strategic and operational dilemma in Libya. The same duo have resulted in the disconnects between US actions in Libya, and those not taken in Yemen, Syria, or Bahrain which have resulted in accusations of American hypocrisy.
The fecklessness of NATO in Libya has degraded the credibility of that organization. At the same time it has added force to the repeated denunciations of the US and NATO being peddled by Vladimir Putin. It is scarcely necessary to point out that both would have been obviated by the US having acted like the Great Power, taking one or the other of the two top options: stay out or go all the way in.
Had the US done the second--gone all the way in with both air and ground forces in a short duration mission of regime removal only--it could be argued that Syria would have been far more circumspect in its dealing with demonstrators and far more open to the bribe and reform concept favored by the Saudis. Had the US taken the first of the two options--the stay out option using as its reason the absence of any compelling national or strategic interest, the revolt would have been crushed long ago, probably at a lower overall body count than will prove to be the case when the current fracas is completed.
Either option would have been suitable for the US as a Great Power. Even the use of a Security Council resolution is completely in keeping with past American Great Power behavior. However, the present bastard child of "leading from behind" is not befitting of a Great Power. It is in keeping with the Obama record of refusing to take a public lead, which is consistent over time. It is keeping with the variable stances taken by Mr Obama in Egypt and Tunisia. It is in keeping with his long standing practice of trivializing allies while ineffectually genuflecting to assorted adversaries, particularly those of a Muslim majority nature.
Of all the people on the planet least likely to be impressed by a posture of humility and mildness none excel Muslims, particularly Arab Muslims. Strength acts like strength. The strong decide--and act on the decision rapidly and without either second thoughts or regrets. Only weakness is humble. Only weakness is indecisive. Only weakness talks tough but fails to lead from the front.
The one time anti-Vietnam War protester and now Secretary of State may sincerely believe that the US should be a less-than-great power. In this she may be joined by the president who, after all, was nurtured by a mother who was an early member of the blame-America-First school of thought and educated in academic environments almost totally populated by members of the same school. Both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton may really, really believe that the day of the nation-state is over and the globalist world is upon us. Both may rue any American exceptionalism or any American will and ability to act decisively. But, their view is not one shared by the majority of people--or governments--in the world today.
It is this disconnect between members of the American elite such as Mr Obama and Ms Clinton on the one hand and the majority of folk on the other which make it impossible for the US to resign its Great Power status. To put it bluntly, governments and people alike expect the US to lead--from the front--to lead as a Great Power. We and our government are expected to take a clear stand and stick to it. Then there is a fixed point in favor or opposition of which other states can react.
While the US cannot do everything--even though quite a few people around the world think that we can--it is imperative for the stability and well being of the world that we do some things, things which are in our clear and demonstrable national interest. We are expected to make decisions and abide by them for more than a single news cycle. We are expected to be and act like a Great Power and not even the most well meaning of the Lofty Thinking people behind "lead from behind" can change that.
Showing posts with label The US As Great Power. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The US As Great Power. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Thursday, April 14, 2011
Coercion Is Not The Only (Or The Best) Way
George Kennan's "Long Telegram" of 1946 constituted a seminal moment in American foreign policy. More, it served to define a strategic world view emphasizing the need to confront and contain threats. While perhaps unintended by Kennan, there was a natural tendency on the part of American leaders both civilian and military to place an onus on coercion as the preferred instrument by which to confront and contain.
In his later years, the famed diplomat and historian bemoaned the "militarization" of his musings on containment as applied to one area--the Eurasian landmass--and one opponent--Russia under the Soviets. He maintained that he had never implied containment to be a sovereign remedy of universal applicability or that coercive military threats should be the primary tool of diplomacy.
The Geek has always been of the view that Kennan's later appreciation of his thinking was honest and accurate. Kennan had a profound mind capable of fine gradations of nuance. Unfortunately the politicians and diplomats, the soldiers and operations analysts who were called upon to put containment into practice under the overall requirements of the Long Telegram inspired NSC 68 were not so fine grained in their understandings of time and place, of world and politics, of threats and opportunities. NSC-68 (signed by President Truman in 1950) has not only governed the warp and woof of American foreign and national security policies ever since but has served to make these policies increasingly irrelevant, increasingly unrelated to the contemporary realities of global politics and evermore counterproductive.
The reason for the persistence of the NSC-68 mode is simple. It worked. The doctrine of containment enforced primarily by coercive means headed by the US military did contribute significantly to the downfall of the Soviet Union. While not the sole cause by any stretch, the American persistence in applying containment, in surrounding the Soviet sphere with a steel ring of bases and alliances, of being both willing and able to fight wars of dubious connection to the Kremlin, placed real and continued pressures on the inefficient Soviet regime with important consequences which served in aggregate to sap the political will of the Soviet elite to keep on keeping on.
Sanctified by apparent success, the draw-a-line-in-the-sand mentality of the Cold War soldiered on. The natural inclination of people to divide groups into two categories--Us and Them--was reinforced by the intellectual legacy of containment. The equally natural inclination of most people to rely on coercion first in the accomplishment of goals was likewise buttressed by the seeming success of militarily predicated coercion during the Cold War.
The short span of time which elapsed between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of attacks by advocates of violent political Islam did not permit for any sort of measured appraisal of the containment-by-coercion mode of the Cold War. As a result, the default response of the American government and We the People was rooted in the Cold War paradigm: divide US from Them, draw a line in the sand, employ military coercion to bend Them to Our will.
The focus on military based coercion was seen as early as the mid-Fifties to be having the expectable albeit unintended consequence of warping all aspects of American foreign policy, the national economy, and virtually all aspects of our domestic society and polity in ways that might not be at all beneficial over time.
In foreign relations the Are-you-with-us? test dominated all other considerations. Foreign governments which failed the test were put beyond the pale as Nasser, among others, found out.
The economic effects of NSC-68 gave rise to what Ike notably called "the military-industrial complex" which extended far beyond cabals of generals and industrialists to include academia, the media, and even entertainment. (Recall the "mine shaft gap" line in Dr Strangelove, the perfect risible parody of all the many "gaps" which punctuated political discourse for thirty and more years.)
Investment in both human and physical capital alike which were completely appropriate were justified politically as being required by "national security." (Think of the Interstate highway system or even the name of the first federal student loan project, the "National Defense Student Loan" program.)
Even the first stumbling efforts of the national government in the field of civil rights were explained as being necessary not for reasons of inherent justice or domestic tranquility but rather to deny the "Communists" from reaping a propaganda harvest in the context of the decolonizing Third World. And, it is worth remembering the assaults on free speech made by those seeking to present a unified American public resolute in its defense of all rights and freedoms against the "Communist" menace.
We are now a full twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failed coup against the Yeltsin government in Russia. We are now more than ten years into a seemingly endless confrontation with the forces of violent political Islam, seeking without measurable success to contain the new threat by coercion based primarily upon military means.
And, it might be asked fairly, "What have we learned?"
At the very least it might be asserted with accuracy that we have learned the limits or, to be more honest, the irrelevance of coercion based containment. A sign, small but telling, that at least some of the American establishment has learned this highly valuable lesson.
Two serving officers, one Navy and the other a Marine, have delivered themselves of a very important "private" paper. While "private," this product of two staffers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not have become public had it not been approved of by very senior members of the Defense Department.
Writing under the pen name of "Mr Y" in intentional imitation of Kennan who published an article in Foreign Affairs based on his Long Telegram under the pseudonym of "Mr X," the two officers, Captain Porter and Colonel Mykleby, have offered a viable alternative to the containment by coercion thesis of Kennan. While not complete in itself, the paper points in a new direction, a direction which places far less reliance upon either coercion or the military and places far more emphasis on refocusing our efforts on traditional American values such as entrepreneurship and education and, in the foreign relations sphere, on engagement and influence rather than dominance.
At the center of the "Mr Y" paper is the contention that the world is not a venue composed of threats but rather a complex political ecology in which opportunities for engagement and influence far outnumber actual threats requiring deterrence or defeat by purely military means. They argue forcefully against the contention that those who are not obviously "with us" must be resolutely "against us." They also contend with vigor that the US has become destructively astigmatic in its focus on violent political Islam.
While there is room for debate regarding the second contention, the overall thrust against dividing the people of a complex and rapidly evolving global population into simple camps of threats and allies is well neigh onto impossible to defeat. So also is a critical accompanying theme: The necessity of properly balancing the foundational reality of the nation-state with the need for and existence of supra-national entities.
This secondary theme deserves more consideration than the two officers give it. For example, they overlook the critical reality that strong centrifugal forces are at work in a large number of "states." The reality that some "states" are such in name only as well as the potent disintegrative pressures of language, culture, religion, and defining mythology are fracturing more than a few actual states, some of which have long historical existence. The addition of sub-state entities to the mix gravely complicates the global political ecology.
With respect to the US the two authors are of the view that policy has gone very much astray. They argue the self-evident but willfully ignored: the US has not invested well or enough in the development of its most important asset, its human capital. In a way they are simply enlarging the perspective of that wise and insightful soldier, Dwight Eisenhower. Ike held that the diversion of money into weapons and other military equipment came at the expense of human capital investment. And that is a ground truth none can deny.
The same applies to the argument adduced by the captain and the colonel to the effect that the real strength, the fountainhead of all our instruments of national power, resides in the creativity, energy, and efforts of Americans in all fields of endeavor. From those comes American prosperity, American self-confidence, the American optimism which has been such a notable feature of the American character for over two hundred years. All aspects of national power, hard as well as soft, arise from the reality of prosperity, the actuality of confidence, the presence of optimism.
The authors contend for a diplomatic paradigm based on engagement and influence. This approach, they imply but do not state, would allow for a level of American authority on the global stage which would equate to operational dominance without any of the obnoxious features of "with-us-or-against-us" which have so often blighted our relations with other states. This assessment is so self-evident that the need to set it forth even by implication should not be necessary. The fact that it was put forth serves to underscore just how drastically the Cold War model has skewed American diplomacy.
Mr Y has lit a candle against the current foreign and national security darkness. One can hope it will ignite an intellectual firestorm, but as a historian, the Geek cannot be so optimistic. As recent debates and votes on the budget demonstrate, the Congress is still stuck in the morass of coercion first and shows no sign of desiring otherwise. It is unfortunate, but it is quite unlikely that Mr Y's paper will have even a small fraction of the influence enjoyed by the Long Telegram.
In his later years, the famed diplomat and historian bemoaned the "militarization" of his musings on containment as applied to one area--the Eurasian landmass--and one opponent--Russia under the Soviets. He maintained that he had never implied containment to be a sovereign remedy of universal applicability or that coercive military threats should be the primary tool of diplomacy.
The Geek has always been of the view that Kennan's later appreciation of his thinking was honest and accurate. Kennan had a profound mind capable of fine gradations of nuance. Unfortunately the politicians and diplomats, the soldiers and operations analysts who were called upon to put containment into practice under the overall requirements of the Long Telegram inspired NSC 68 were not so fine grained in their understandings of time and place, of world and politics, of threats and opportunities. NSC-68 (signed by President Truman in 1950) has not only governed the warp and woof of American foreign and national security policies ever since but has served to make these policies increasingly irrelevant, increasingly unrelated to the contemporary realities of global politics and evermore counterproductive.
The reason for the persistence of the NSC-68 mode is simple. It worked. The doctrine of containment enforced primarily by coercive means headed by the US military did contribute significantly to the downfall of the Soviet Union. While not the sole cause by any stretch, the American persistence in applying containment, in surrounding the Soviet sphere with a steel ring of bases and alliances, of being both willing and able to fight wars of dubious connection to the Kremlin, placed real and continued pressures on the inefficient Soviet regime with important consequences which served in aggregate to sap the political will of the Soviet elite to keep on keeping on.
Sanctified by apparent success, the draw-a-line-in-the-sand mentality of the Cold War soldiered on. The natural inclination of people to divide groups into two categories--Us and Them--was reinforced by the intellectual legacy of containment. The equally natural inclination of most people to rely on coercion first in the accomplishment of goals was likewise buttressed by the seeming success of militarily predicated coercion during the Cold War.
The short span of time which elapsed between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of attacks by advocates of violent political Islam did not permit for any sort of measured appraisal of the containment-by-coercion mode of the Cold War. As a result, the default response of the American government and We the People was rooted in the Cold War paradigm: divide US from Them, draw a line in the sand, employ military coercion to bend Them to Our will.
The focus on military based coercion was seen as early as the mid-Fifties to be having the expectable albeit unintended consequence of warping all aspects of American foreign policy, the national economy, and virtually all aspects of our domestic society and polity in ways that might not be at all beneficial over time.
In foreign relations the Are-you-with-us? test dominated all other considerations. Foreign governments which failed the test were put beyond the pale as Nasser, among others, found out.
The economic effects of NSC-68 gave rise to what Ike notably called "the military-industrial complex" which extended far beyond cabals of generals and industrialists to include academia, the media, and even entertainment. (Recall the "mine shaft gap" line in Dr Strangelove, the perfect risible parody of all the many "gaps" which punctuated political discourse for thirty and more years.)
Investment in both human and physical capital alike which were completely appropriate were justified politically as being required by "national security." (Think of the Interstate highway system or even the name of the first federal student loan project, the "National Defense Student Loan" program.)
Even the first stumbling efforts of the national government in the field of civil rights were explained as being necessary not for reasons of inherent justice or domestic tranquility but rather to deny the "Communists" from reaping a propaganda harvest in the context of the decolonizing Third World. And, it is worth remembering the assaults on free speech made by those seeking to present a unified American public resolute in its defense of all rights and freedoms against the "Communist" menace.
We are now a full twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failed coup against the Yeltsin government in Russia. We are now more than ten years into a seemingly endless confrontation with the forces of violent political Islam, seeking without measurable success to contain the new threat by coercion based primarily upon military means.
And, it might be asked fairly, "What have we learned?"
At the very least it might be asserted with accuracy that we have learned the limits or, to be more honest, the irrelevance of coercion based containment. A sign, small but telling, that at least some of the American establishment has learned this highly valuable lesson.
Two serving officers, one Navy and the other a Marine, have delivered themselves of a very important "private" paper. While "private," this product of two staffers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not have become public had it not been approved of by very senior members of the Defense Department.
Writing under the pen name of "Mr Y" in intentional imitation of Kennan who published an article in Foreign Affairs based on his Long Telegram under the pseudonym of "Mr X," the two officers, Captain Porter and Colonel Mykleby, have offered a viable alternative to the containment by coercion thesis of Kennan. While not complete in itself, the paper points in a new direction, a direction which places far less reliance upon either coercion or the military and places far more emphasis on refocusing our efforts on traditional American values such as entrepreneurship and education and, in the foreign relations sphere, on engagement and influence rather than dominance.
At the center of the "Mr Y" paper is the contention that the world is not a venue composed of threats but rather a complex political ecology in which opportunities for engagement and influence far outnumber actual threats requiring deterrence or defeat by purely military means. They argue forcefully against the contention that those who are not obviously "with us" must be resolutely "against us." They also contend with vigor that the US has become destructively astigmatic in its focus on violent political Islam.
While there is room for debate regarding the second contention, the overall thrust against dividing the people of a complex and rapidly evolving global population into simple camps of threats and allies is well neigh onto impossible to defeat. So also is a critical accompanying theme: The necessity of properly balancing the foundational reality of the nation-state with the need for and existence of supra-national entities.
This secondary theme deserves more consideration than the two officers give it. For example, they overlook the critical reality that strong centrifugal forces are at work in a large number of "states." The reality that some "states" are such in name only as well as the potent disintegrative pressures of language, culture, religion, and defining mythology are fracturing more than a few actual states, some of which have long historical existence. The addition of sub-state entities to the mix gravely complicates the global political ecology.
With respect to the US the two authors are of the view that policy has gone very much astray. They argue the self-evident but willfully ignored: the US has not invested well or enough in the development of its most important asset, its human capital. In a way they are simply enlarging the perspective of that wise and insightful soldier, Dwight Eisenhower. Ike held that the diversion of money into weapons and other military equipment came at the expense of human capital investment. And that is a ground truth none can deny.
The same applies to the argument adduced by the captain and the colonel to the effect that the real strength, the fountainhead of all our instruments of national power, resides in the creativity, energy, and efforts of Americans in all fields of endeavor. From those comes American prosperity, American self-confidence, the American optimism which has been such a notable feature of the American character for over two hundred years. All aspects of national power, hard as well as soft, arise from the reality of prosperity, the actuality of confidence, the presence of optimism.
The authors contend for a diplomatic paradigm based on engagement and influence. This approach, they imply but do not state, would allow for a level of American authority on the global stage which would equate to operational dominance without any of the obnoxious features of "with-us-or-against-us" which have so often blighted our relations with other states. This assessment is so self-evident that the need to set it forth even by implication should not be necessary. The fact that it was put forth serves to underscore just how drastically the Cold War model has skewed American diplomacy.
Mr Y has lit a candle against the current foreign and national security darkness. One can hope it will ignite an intellectual firestorm, but as a historian, the Geek cannot be so optimistic. As recent debates and votes on the budget demonstrate, the Congress is still stuck in the morass of coercion first and shows no sign of desiring otherwise. It is unfortunate, but it is quite unlikely that Mr Y's paper will have even a small fraction of the influence enjoyed by the Long Telegram.
Monday, March 28, 2011
Internal War--Neocons And The Tea Party
Like the shambling corpses in the classic black and white version of Night of the Living Dead, the neocon ninnies have been resurrected by the fragrant miasma surrounding the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions. Eliot Abrams and Joshua Muravchik having been baying in the van, eager for a faster, harder intervention in Libya and chomping after the chance to depose Bashir Assad.
Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver. The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.
Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants. The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.
Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison. Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms. There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.
At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations. It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."
As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya. They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs. They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.
The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering. By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.
As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch! This sketch is silly."
The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today. At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.
This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right. It is not. It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.
There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.
The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power. It is not simply first among equals. It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities. There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this. The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)
The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest. True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.
This positive statement is accompanied by a negative. The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology. Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq. This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure. As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.
The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong. The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress. No Great Power has ever resigned its status. The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs. Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.
Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock? A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?
Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam. The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy. Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.
If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish. Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war. Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.
Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war. It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica. This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations. It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.
There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP. In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group. Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.
Then, of course, there is Iran. There is always Iran. The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb." The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)
The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months. The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction. So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority. Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides. This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.
This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast. The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.
John Bolton was right. And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him. Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage. This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.
The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents. We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go. Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?
Unfortunately it is. That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.
And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.
Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver. The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.
Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants. The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.
Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison. Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms. There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.
At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations. It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."
As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya. They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs. They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.
The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering. By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.
As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch! This sketch is silly."
The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today. At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.
This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right. It is not. It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.
There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.
The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power. It is not simply first among equals. It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities. There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this. The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)
The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest. True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.
This positive statement is accompanied by a negative. The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology. Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq. This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure. As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.
The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong. The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress. No Great Power has ever resigned its status. The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs. Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.
Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock? A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?
Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam. The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy. Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.
If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish. Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war. Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.
Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war. It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica. This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations. It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.
There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP. In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group. Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.
Then, of course, there is Iran. There is always Iran. The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb." The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)
The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months. The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction. So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority. Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides. This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.
This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast. The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.
John Bolton was right. And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him. Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage. This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.
The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents. We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go. Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?
Unfortunately it is. That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.
And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.
Monday, February 28, 2011
A Little Fear Would Mean A Great Deal Of Respect
The days when the US was both feared by its enemies and respected by its allies and most of the nonaligned are over. That is a given. It is also self-evident. Equally obvious is the absence of American influence in the councils of states both hostile and friendly.
The reason for this does not reside with the economic catastrophe which started in late 2007 and continues to date. The reason the US is largely irrelevant to the calculations of governments around the world is the failure of the Obama administration, most particularly and importantly the president personally, to develop and consistently implement a foreign policy which is rooted in American norms and values and seeks to foster or protect our national and strategic interests.
Mr Obama is personally responsible for the decline and near fall of the US as a Great Power. He is personally responsible for the simple and sad fact that no country, no dictator, no advocate of violent political Islam, no aggressive, ambitious regime fears us. The wrath of the United States is seen to exist no longer. Without the perception of potential wrath there is no fear. And, without the capacity to engender fear in those who oppose us, there can be no respect in the estimate of those who are favorable in their inclinations to us.
As recently as 2008 the US was seen as a leader. Seen as the Greatest of Great Powers. Seen through the prism of fear by opponents. And viewed with genuine respect by all others.
Whether the motivations are ideological or purely personal or some mixture (a subject more suitable for a practitioner of a discipline other than history), the fact remains that the US has lost its capacity to influence the world. While still a Great Power by all the metrics applicable, the president and his "team" have pretended that we are no different, no better, no more powerful than any small and marginal country anywhere on the face of the Earth. As a result, the states of the world can afford to ignore us and seek leadership elsewhere.
One result of this is implied in a question posed by Nile Gardner in the Daily Telegraph: "Do tyrants fear America anymore?" The answer, of course, is, "no." Gardner places the blame correctly on Mr Obama's timid approach to global politics.
If anything, this interpretation is too kind. The Obama way of dealing with foreign affairs is not merely timid. It is far worse. The Obama approach is a combination of utter indifference, contempt for the past role of the US in world affairs, and ideologically predicated naivete. As a consequence he has been well behind the wave in each and every one of the recent developments in the Mideast. Another result has been that he has alienated allies ranging from the UK to Israel. Still another is the simple fact that both Russia and China can turn a blind eye to American policy entreaties without hesitation--or adverse result.
Obama could learn from history--were he so inclined. He could learn from the example of Ronald Reagan, a man with whom he has compared himself recently. Early in the Reagan presidency the administration directly tackled the problem of low global fear of the US. In carefully calculated moves, the US quickly refurbished its image as a strong and borderline ruthless state by (1) invading Grenada under plausible pretenses and (2) attacking Libya by air with even more plausible pretenses.
Neither operation was really necessary to safeguard directly threatened American interests either national or strategic. Both were utterly essential in rebuilding the respect and fear which had been so completely lost during the disastrous Carter years. Whether the result was fear, respect, or, in the case of the rather anti-American French government, the "crazy American hypothesis," the net consequence was that all, both foe and friend, had to recognize that the US was back as an independent and assertive actor on the world stage.
Should the Clueless Guy in the Oval tire of presiding over the Incredible Shrinking United States, and decide the time had come for a little creative and effective fear engendering, a very good target of Uncle Sam's wrath would be the port havens of the Somali pirates. The recent killing of four Americans gives a good enough plausible reason to forcibly abate the nuisance presented by the pirates of Puntland.
The key to the success of a fear and respect engendering exercise in American power projection is contained in one word--punitive. The goal would not be the creation and building of a nation-state in Somalia. Such is impossible as the disaster in Afghanistan and the near debacle in Iraq have made manifest. The purpose of the exercise would be the liberation of as many hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates, broadly defined as is convenient in the scope of a short duration military raid.
Lest the current administration be inhibited by residual folk memories of "Blackhawk Down," it needs to recalled that the operation was very poorly planned and worse in its execution. It needs to be noted that had the operation been postponed a matter of hours, the Marine light armored vehicles would have been available for ground support. Such a ground component would have militated against any success by the Somali forces even with their numerical advantages.
It is also important, indeed vital, to note that the US has a number of very experienced combat forces in its inventory even with the Afghan war still in progress. We have learned volumes in both Iraq and Afghanistan which is directly transferable to a short duration punitive expedition. Such an operation would not be manpower heavy. Nor can it last more than a matter of a few tens of hours. Combined with air action, an up close and personal raid would not only free captives but kill gun slingers and intimidate potential successors to those who have died for the "cause."
Provided the operation meets the requirements of being hard, fast, violent, and highly lethal, there is no reason the US cannot nor should not mount it unilaterally. After all, it was our citizens who died at the hands of the pirates. Retaliation is a recognized right. It was the right invoked by the Bush/Cheney administration for the invasion of Afghanistan.
Provided the Americans and retrieved international hostages are evacuated fully in a matter of hours, two days at the most, the diplomatic repercussions will be favorable. Yes, there will be cries of horror from the ever-so-sensitive members of the Western European and American elites, but even Mr Obama might be able to ignore the expectable.
Somalia will be no more of a mess afterward than it was before. There might even be some improvement given the deterrent impact of such a punitive raid on the survivors, even those at a distance from the action. The Somali gun thugs have no experience with the high degree of lethality American forces dispose in even limited usage venues. For once, "shock and awe" would have a high degree of applicability.
In a way, the mounting of a punitive expedition on the pirate lairs would give us a chance to replay Afghanistan correctly. This would be good. It would draw a line between that which can be done--punish bad guys--and that which is impossible--construct a modern Western style nation-state from a traditional, tribal Muslim base. It would also be good in that such an operation would put all bad actors on alert as to what might come their way should they get too over the edge.
Most importantly and most beneficially, a quick and dirty raid would show the world, from our allies in Western Europe to our opponents in the Kremlin, Tehran, Beijing, Caracas, and elsewhere that the US was not a potted plant decorating the global arena. And that, bucko, is something the world needs badly right now.
The reason for this does not reside with the economic catastrophe which started in late 2007 and continues to date. The reason the US is largely irrelevant to the calculations of governments around the world is the failure of the Obama administration, most particularly and importantly the president personally, to develop and consistently implement a foreign policy which is rooted in American norms and values and seeks to foster or protect our national and strategic interests.
Mr Obama is personally responsible for the decline and near fall of the US as a Great Power. He is personally responsible for the simple and sad fact that no country, no dictator, no advocate of violent political Islam, no aggressive, ambitious regime fears us. The wrath of the United States is seen to exist no longer. Without the perception of potential wrath there is no fear. And, without the capacity to engender fear in those who oppose us, there can be no respect in the estimate of those who are favorable in their inclinations to us.
As recently as 2008 the US was seen as a leader. Seen as the Greatest of Great Powers. Seen through the prism of fear by opponents. And viewed with genuine respect by all others.
Whether the motivations are ideological or purely personal or some mixture (a subject more suitable for a practitioner of a discipline other than history), the fact remains that the US has lost its capacity to influence the world. While still a Great Power by all the metrics applicable, the president and his "team" have pretended that we are no different, no better, no more powerful than any small and marginal country anywhere on the face of the Earth. As a result, the states of the world can afford to ignore us and seek leadership elsewhere.
One result of this is implied in a question posed by Nile Gardner in the Daily Telegraph: "Do tyrants fear America anymore?" The answer, of course, is, "no." Gardner places the blame correctly on Mr Obama's timid approach to global politics.
If anything, this interpretation is too kind. The Obama way of dealing with foreign affairs is not merely timid. It is far worse. The Obama approach is a combination of utter indifference, contempt for the past role of the US in world affairs, and ideologically predicated naivete. As a consequence he has been well behind the wave in each and every one of the recent developments in the Mideast. Another result has been that he has alienated allies ranging from the UK to Israel. Still another is the simple fact that both Russia and China can turn a blind eye to American policy entreaties without hesitation--or adverse result.
Obama could learn from history--were he so inclined. He could learn from the example of Ronald Reagan, a man with whom he has compared himself recently. Early in the Reagan presidency the administration directly tackled the problem of low global fear of the US. In carefully calculated moves, the US quickly refurbished its image as a strong and borderline ruthless state by (1) invading Grenada under plausible pretenses and (2) attacking Libya by air with even more plausible pretenses.
Neither operation was really necessary to safeguard directly threatened American interests either national or strategic. Both were utterly essential in rebuilding the respect and fear which had been so completely lost during the disastrous Carter years. Whether the result was fear, respect, or, in the case of the rather anti-American French government, the "crazy American hypothesis," the net consequence was that all, both foe and friend, had to recognize that the US was back as an independent and assertive actor on the world stage.
Should the Clueless Guy in the Oval tire of presiding over the Incredible Shrinking United States, and decide the time had come for a little creative and effective fear engendering, a very good target of Uncle Sam's wrath would be the port havens of the Somali pirates. The recent killing of four Americans gives a good enough plausible reason to forcibly abate the nuisance presented by the pirates of Puntland.
The key to the success of a fear and respect engendering exercise in American power projection is contained in one word--punitive. The goal would not be the creation and building of a nation-state in Somalia. Such is impossible as the disaster in Afghanistan and the near debacle in Iraq have made manifest. The purpose of the exercise would be the liberation of as many hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates, broadly defined as is convenient in the scope of a short duration military raid.
Lest the current administration be inhibited by residual folk memories of "Blackhawk Down," it needs to recalled that the operation was very poorly planned and worse in its execution. It needs to be noted that had the operation been postponed a matter of hours, the Marine light armored vehicles would have been available for ground support. Such a ground component would have militated against any success by the Somali forces even with their numerical advantages.
It is also important, indeed vital, to note that the US has a number of very experienced combat forces in its inventory even with the Afghan war still in progress. We have learned volumes in both Iraq and Afghanistan which is directly transferable to a short duration punitive expedition. Such an operation would not be manpower heavy. Nor can it last more than a matter of a few tens of hours. Combined with air action, an up close and personal raid would not only free captives but kill gun slingers and intimidate potential successors to those who have died for the "cause."
Provided the operation meets the requirements of being hard, fast, violent, and highly lethal, there is no reason the US cannot nor should not mount it unilaterally. After all, it was our citizens who died at the hands of the pirates. Retaliation is a recognized right. It was the right invoked by the Bush/Cheney administration for the invasion of Afghanistan.
Provided the Americans and retrieved international hostages are evacuated fully in a matter of hours, two days at the most, the diplomatic repercussions will be favorable. Yes, there will be cries of horror from the ever-so-sensitive members of the Western European and American elites, but even Mr Obama might be able to ignore the expectable.
Somalia will be no more of a mess afterward than it was before. There might even be some improvement given the deterrent impact of such a punitive raid on the survivors, even those at a distance from the action. The Somali gun thugs have no experience with the high degree of lethality American forces dispose in even limited usage venues. For once, "shock and awe" would have a high degree of applicability.
In a way, the mounting of a punitive expedition on the pirate lairs would give us a chance to replay Afghanistan correctly. This would be good. It would draw a line between that which can be done--punish bad guys--and that which is impossible--construct a modern Western style nation-state from a traditional, tribal Muslim base. It would also be good in that such an operation would put all bad actors on alert as to what might come their way should they get too over the edge.
Most importantly and most beneficially, a quick and dirty raid would show the world, from our allies in Western Europe to our opponents in the Kremlin, Tehran, Beijing, Caracas, and elsewhere that the US was not a potted plant decorating the global arena. And that, bucko, is something the world needs badly right now.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
Words And Reality
President Obama is very good with words. He sure does talk pretty. His rhetoric can be soaring. He invites one and all to share his lofty view of life and the world. He exemplifies all that is high minded and progressive.
If global politics depended only on honeyed words and fine sounding platitudes, on calls to a higher minded shared vision of the world and stroking the feelings of any and all people who feel themselves put upon and otherwise either insulted or ignored, Mr Obama would be the greatest foreign policy president in history.
Unfortunately for Mr Obama, the world cares not a whit about the mood music of his speeches. No speech, no capability for sounding good, not even a talent surpassing that of Winston Churchill buys a country the smallest particle of the most prized commodity in international politics.
The commodity?
Simple, bucko, influence. The capacity to substantially, materially, and directly occasion changes in the policies and actions of other governments in a way which serves the national interest.
In the acquisition and maintenance of influence, actions speak infinitely louder and infinitely more effectively than words. Words are useful only insofar as they provide either the context of action or amplify upon the intent of the action. More importantly, the words of a Great Power are useful in the influence game only when they are consistent with actions.
States, whether Great Powers or of a lesser status, demand the US speak clearly and consistently as to our policies, and, further, that our actions are congruent with the words. For generations now, foreign leaders and publics have expected the US to provide clear declaratory policy backed by actions including contractual understandings which are maintained consistently over time and between administrations of different parties.
It does not matter if the other country, again whether of Great Power status or not, agrees with American policy. What matters is that the US provides a fixed point of reference in global affairs. Other actors know in advance if a contemplated action will meet with American acceptance or rejection. They will know in advance of a contemplated policy or act if it infringes upon American national and strategic interests. And, if it does, to what extent will the US exact a cost.
The need for a clear conveyance of American policy limits can be well illustrated in the post-World War II diplomatic history of the world. In 1950, Dean Acheson neglected to put South Korea on the American side of the line delineating our sphere of concern. As a result, Joe Stalin concluded that the US would offer no objection to the proposed North Korean invasion of the South. Or, in 1990 the new American ambassador to Iraq was not given proper instructions from Foggy Bottom or the Oval with the result that she inaccurately gave Saddam Hussein the impression that an invasion of Kuwait would not meet with American disapprobation.
The congruence of words and actions is equally important with that of clear, consistent declarations of policy. This actuality eludes Mr Obama completely (as does, arguably, the first consideration.)
The long, drawn-out diplomatic dance with Iran has made the disconnect between words and deeds very apparent. In a similar way, the strong US denunciation of the North Korean sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan coupled with the improbability of any action beyond a Security Council condemnation and a chance that Pyongyang will be put back on the list of governments sponsoring terrorism shows a failure to appreciate that words and actions must be congruent.
Mr Obama chose the graduation at the US Military Academy to lay out his new strategy for global politics. He said that his view of life meant that our strategy would rely upon diplomacy, upon strengthening old alliances and forming "new partnerships," on developing new "international standards and institutions." Unfortunately, in this noble view of a future which might be such as to justify his Nobel Prize, Mr Obama gave no hint of how he proposed to strengthen the old alliances, or with whom he proposed to form new partnerships or--get ready for the big event--any idea of just what might constitute American national interest.
In justice to Mr Obama it may be the case that he sees American national and strategic interests as coinciding to the point of identity the interests of the always-undefined "international community." In his answer to George W. Bush's West Point speech eight years ago, Mr Obama made the same numerous allusions to international institutions which have peppered all of his speeches dealing with foreign affairs. This encourages the inference that Mr Obama sees no blue sky between the interests of the US as a sovereign nation-state and that of assorted international institutions, with the UN heading the list.
If that is the case then it is easy to see the motives for as well as the justifications of Obama's curious practice of diplomacy. His cavalier treatment of old allies such as Great Britain, Germany, even Canada. His pressurization campaign against Israel.
The Obama version of "we are all passengers on spaceship Earth" also would allow a motive for his interesting way of establishing "new partnerships" such as the one way street arrangement with Russia which has such delightful features as exempting Russian arms sales from any new round of Iran sanctions or conceding Russia a membership in the WTO despite the country's flagrant flouting of WTO practices and the shared philosophy which serves as the group's foundation.
It is the same bumper sticker phrase which seems to be the intellectual underpinning of the Obama outreach-to-the-Muslims effort which has so far been as one way as the exchange with the Russians and as much of a success as the effort to derail the mullahs' march to the bomb. We can all agree that the Muslim hyper-sensitivity is a drag, a bore, an exercise in tedium without equal, but it is not reason to abandon honesty in the defining and securing of US national and strategic interests.
Genuflecting before Muslim groups and their totems is an excellent way to assure that goals of American national interest will not be achieved. Muslim majority states more than most appreciate and react favorably to a posture of consistent strength and resolve. The historical record shows the US has enjoyed its greatest success in diplomacy with Muslim governments when it has been perceived as having the ability and will to kick one in the teeth--to act the part of the strong horse.
Only weak horses bow, scrape, evade, equivocate, and fail to follow an announced and well charted course. Mr Obama, by his love affair of international organizations no matter how biased or ineffectual, has convinced more than a few of the pragmatically inclined leaders of Muslim states that he rides a very weak horse. One more example of nice words equal very non-nice results.
Great Power diplomacy of the successful sort depends upon three features: clarity, resolve, and strength. The latter feature includes but most assuredly is not limited to military force. It includes all the instruments of national power including the evident resolve of the American president.
The Guy in the Oval is the Man in the Bully Pulpit. He is seen as being the man in charge by kings, dictators, and presidents of powers great and small. His speech is seen as the functional equivalent of action. When the Guy in the Oval appears to be, as Jimmy Carter was and Barack Obama is, weak, irresolute, and in possession of the faintest of faint hearts, the US is impaired in pursuing its national interests.
Great Powers fail on occasion due to the over-reach of their leaders. Imperial and Nazi Germany are recent examples of this. So too, at least in argument, is the Soviet Union.
The decline and fall of Great Powers comes far more often because leaders have lost faith in their country or themselves. The fitful, rocky slide to oblivion of the Roman Empires, both West and East, stand as prime in this field. The same dynamic can be seen as operating in the case of the UK and France. Now it is self-evident with President Obama, the man whose vision does not include a role for the US as a Great Power.
The question before We the People is not if Mr Obama can see the error of his ways and rectify the already present, pernicious consequences but, can the next American president see and repair the damage before it is truly fatal. As the sidling of Brazil and Turkey to the arms of Iran show, the diminishment of the perceived potency of the US is already being acted upon by second tier countries. Soon it will be acted upon by those of the first rank.
Mr Obama, listen up and listen tight. Regardless of the words imputed to one of your aides, that you were elected, "to preside over the graceful decline of the US," this is not what you were put in the Oval to do. But, it is a very real reason to demand your replacement.
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