The US tried. It failed. Ethiopia tried (with US backing.) It failed. Now it is Kenya's time. The third country up in an attempt to restore some semblance of order to the bloody chaos called "Somalia." Will this effort end as did the two predecessors with failure, humiliating withdrawal, and the leaving of a geographic expression with no real reason to exist as a state in even more of a sanguinary mess?
The US failed as a combination of mission leap, one disastrously ill-planned operation, and the lack of both a policy focus and political will in and around the Oval. When Bill Clinton inherited the "humanitarian" operation initiated by George H.W. Bush, he neglected to define the goal of the force deployed in country. For reasons which escape rational analysis, his administration decided it was necessary to engage in regime change. This was odd as there was no real regime to change but rather a welter of tribal leaders engaged in a robust contest for supremacy. The man on the top at that moment was particularly unpleasant but no threat to the long term prospects for the Somali people.
In a fit of absent mindedness, someone decided--and others farther up the food chain confirmed this choice--to go after the Unpleasant Guy On Top. The result was the loss of nearly two dozen special forces troops, the bodies of whom were depicted being pulled around, naked, in the dirt of the streets by gangs of cheering women. This nauseating vision was displayed on the televisions of Americans with the result that Clinton and Company determined to cut and run rather than take proper action against the Somalis responsible.
This loss of political nerve was not justified and counterproductive, not only in Somalia but all over the Arab and Muslim world. It was this ostentatious failure of testicular and policy fortitude which gave the muscle to Osama bin Laden and his odious outfit as well as other advocates of violent political Islam.
With American support and assistance, the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia in the opening years of this century. They were successful in toppling the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was an effective government albeit given to policies and means antipathetic to American and Western norms. The ICU was speedily replaced by "the Youth" better known as al-Shabaab. This crew was orders of magnitude more dedicated to the cause of austere, violent political Islam than the ICU had been.
The Ethiopians rapidly found out that they had bitten off far more than they (or their now preoccupied American sponsors) could chew and swallow conveniently. For two years the Ethiopians held on, never secure even in their own bases, unable to broker a coalition of Somali tribal leaders willing to take over the burden of freeing their own country from the ever less popular zealots of al-Shabaab. Finally, the Ethiopians tossed in their towel and departed, leaving the field to the victorious "Youth."
From there it has been all down hill not only for the people caught in Somalia but for the West generally. As international diplomats played the game of creating a government and the African Union--well at least two member countries--deployed "peace keeping" forces to the center of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab consolidated its hold on the southern third of the country while pinning the Transitional Federal Government and its AU troops to a few blocks around the presidential palace.
During the same time, ambitious Somalis found a new and very profitable line of work--piracy. Even now with warships of several dozen navies on patrol, the maritime marauders commandeer ships every week with tens, no, hundreds of millions of dollars of ransom collected. The consensus of "experts" around the world is the pirates will not be defeated unless and until there is a functioning government with effective control of the Somali coast.
In recent months, the Gangbangers of Somalia, both landbased and maritime, have expanded their actions to include the kidnapping of Westerners frequenting expensive Kenyan resorts within in a convenient distance of Somalia. This has perturbed the Kenyans mightily. Even more disconcerting to Nairobi has been the tsunami of refugees flowing over the border. The tidal wave has grown since the drought enhanced famine has been worsened by al-Shabaab's stopping of food aid by international agencies.
The hundreds of thousands of Somalis self-dumped on Kenya is an unacceptable economic burden on the country. More, it represents a clear national security threat given Somali claims on the northern portion of Kenya and the large number of al-Shabaab agents living in Nairobi and Mombasa.
Kenya has clear reasons to see the end of al-Shabaab at least in the southern portion of the place. With this in mind, Nairobi aimed at the Somali port city of Kismayo. The port is the major source of al-Shabaab revenue: taxes on trade, particularly charcoal, headed for Yemen. It is also a prime source of pirates.
With its invasion, Kenya is doing a service not only for itself but for the West generally. Al-Shabaab is a threat not only to African states and the sea lines of communication but more broadly. Not only is it "officially" allied with al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab has direct operational links with al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and Nigeria's Boko Haram. Adding al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to the mix is apparently in the works. Given the widespread proliferation of weapons including MANPADS from the old Libyan arsenals, it is to be expected that al-Shabaab's military competence and potential for transnational terror will grow.
The biggest question is simply: Will Kenya succeed where others have failed?
The prognosis is, at best, mixed. The Kenyan armed forces have no real experience with war, even the limited sort of which al-Shabaab is capable. The forces are large, reasonably well equipped and trained, but without combat experience, it is hard to see if these factors are all that important. The launch of the invasion just as the annual rains were scheduled to start (they commenced on time) shows a lack of proper planning. The two thousand men across the border have been bogged down in the mud for some days now with the mechanical transport totally immobilized.
Overall the force (ten thousand at most) seems too small to deal with a highly mobile opponent along with the demands of MOUT--if the Kenyans do reach Kismayo. The Kenyan air dominance will not matter once their ground forces are in close contact with al-Shabaab fighters. The fight will become a slogging match between the mechanized, fire power heavy Kenyans and the more mobile, lightly equipped guerrilla opponents.
At that point, it will be what all asymmetrical wars must be--a contest of political wills. Already there are indications that the Kenyan opinion molding elite lack the stomach for a protracted war, which is exactly what the invasion will become without a game changer.
There is only one game changer which might be available. Not the African Union. Not the other states of the Horn of Africa. Nobody local is capable of altering the nature of the war.
The role of game changer properly belongs to NATO. Fresh off its "victory" in Libya, most of the NATO combatants already have a dog in the fight--the pirates. Certainly NATO ships have been heavily involved in the anti-pirate patrols and have actually killed pirates!
The leaders of France, the UK, the US and perhaps some of the others will be well advised to man up and back the Kenyan play. NATO has the aircraft, the ships, the logistics, the special forces, the intelligence assets necessary to change the game in Somalia quickly and surely. The pirates along with the bloody hands of the brutal killers of al-Shabaab provide more than enough justification for entering the war, even for invoking the doctrine of R2P.
There is no need to invoke the UN. Even the opposition of the AU can be ignored with impunity. The morass of Somalia is intolerable now--and will only get worse should the Kenyans suffer the same fate as did the Americans and Ethiopians. A robust NATO effort will be gratefully acknowledged (even if privately only) and might even silence some of the loud voices criticizing the alliance's efforts in Libya.
Get on with it, Messers Sarkozy, Cameron, Obama--the history books are waiting.
Showing posts with label Somali Pirates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Somali Pirates. Show all posts
Saturday, October 29, 2011
Sunday, April 10, 2011
Is The World's First "No-Sail" Zone Coming Soon?
Last year the seagoing thugs of the Somali coast took and held a record number of mariners hostage--1,016 according to the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center. That is up from 867 the previous year and 815 in 2008.
During the same period of time, the average duration of captivity increased. So also did the ransom demands. And, due to presumed impatience on the part of the pirates, the captive sailors were subjected to ever increasing degrees of deprivation as well as flat out torture.
It should be recalled that over the same stretch of time the naval opposition (to use the term generically only) to the pirates increased greatly. It became such an in thing to do that even Iran dispatched a ship or two to operate against the skiff riding marauders of Somalia.
Despite the occasional success, occasions which have become somewhat more numerous of late largely due to the muscular efforts of some individual navies, such as that of India, the balance of power continues to favor the pirates. There are several reasons for this, but all can be resolved to the lack of resolve on the part of the world's greater maritime powers to be deadly serious about the Somali menace to navigation.
A few weeks ago the Norwegian shipping magnate Jacob Stoll-Nielsen raised a mini-storm of disapproval when he proposed that only a "shoot-on-sight" policy would dissuade the seagoing bandits. It seems that his approach might impair the pirates' human rights. There was a time, not that long ago, when the general principle of law involving pirates was simple, straight forward, and universally accepted: The pirate was defined as the common enemy of mankind to be hunted down without mercy wherever and whenever encountered. There were niceties regarding the specifics of jurisdiction; all seafaring nations were presumed to have equal claim to the pirates' bodies.
The recent tactic employed by the Somalis of using captured ships, usually fishing vessels, as "motherships" has expanded their range as far as the coastal waters of India. This has stretched the defensive forces far beyond any reasonable limit and placed far more ships at risk. It has also nullified the initial excuse offered by pirates and their landlubber apologists, that they were merely simple, unemployed fishermen seeking alternative sources of livelihood. It also puts an end to the later justification: The pirates were really Somali coastguards seeking recompense for illegal foreign fishing and waste dumping.
As shipowners and operators refuse to see that their long-term interests are best served by refusing to play the ransom game and the Deep Thinkers of assorted maritime power government worry about the fine points of jurisdiction and the risks which might attend the use of more robust measures, there is another player in the game as yet unheard from. That so far silent player is the group with the most at risk--the sailors.
An unfortunate reality is the long standing invisibility of the merchant sailor. Even in past years when many merchant mariners were citizens of Western countries, they were ignored in the main, cast into the general darkness of dockside scum, wharf rats, transients without home, hearth, or political influence. Shipowners and operators exploited them without end or mercy. Even governmental bodies with legal responsibilities for their health and safety were more often negligent than attentive.
In recent years the vast majority of merchant marine personnel are from impoverished Third World countries. While officers may hail from more advanced nations, often old components of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the rest, the men who in the days of sail would have been called, "before the mast," are from deeply poor parts of the Third World. This means that nobody, no government, no shipowner, no ship operator, no marine insurance company, no entity of potency and influence is on the side of the guys who take the risks passing through the ever expanding area of Somali pirate hazard.
As the true tales of torture pass through the ranks of merchant sailors, there is an expectable consequence. Men are increasingly unwilling to run the gauntlet of pirates. They are more and more reluctant to spend days with their testicles wrapped around their throats with the fear of pirate seizure ever present. They are most assuredly unwilling to spend months as "guests" of the marauders.
While shipowners and operators willingly, if grudgingly, submit to increased insurance premiums, they are reluctant without exception to pay an equivalent bonus to crew members. This is typical. Historically the owners and operators of ships have done whatever they could to reduce the manning costs of their vessels--even if such put the crew at direct physical risk.
While there may always be men desperate enough to accept any degree of hazard for the less than splendid pay which is the merchant sailor's normal state, the problems of manning vessels transiting the pirate zone are increasing--and will continue to do so. The point is coming in the not too distant future when trade, important, very valuable trade, will be impaired significantly by a lack of crews. The economic costs to both Europe and the Western Hemisphere will be large. Very large if the tankers outbound from the Persian Gulf terminals are hit by crew shortages.
A forward looking policy (which has been long needed and avoided for just as long) must focus on abating the pirates for once and all. The use of the "motherships" has, as one observer put it, "industrialized" the piracy process. This implies that the current naval efforts must be focused upon taking out the "motherships" regardless of risk to the captive crew members on board these unfortunate ships. The identities and locations of the "motherships" is not a mystery to the international flotilla assembled in the vast expanse of threatened ocean. Nor do the assorted warships lack the means necessary to neutralize the offensive nautical vipers nests.
Of course, the pirates should be given the chance to surrender. When they don't (and the probability of peaceful outcome will grow slimmer over time) they must be captured or killed. This means the high probability of innocent victims being killed as well. That must be accepted as unavoidable collateral damage, the same as with civilians caught in the crossfire.
A robust (which is to say, effective) approach also requires the country of the capturing warship has responsibility for providing judicial and incarceration services to the "arrested" pirates. As international law as well as national statutes already provide for this, the only consequence of note is expense. But, that expense must be measured against the commercial detriment of a slow down in seaborne trade.
The adoption of a robust approach should be assessed against such endeavors as the current UN sponsored operations in Libya and the Ivory Coast. In the case of the latter country, even if the present French/UN effort to oust Gbagbo proves successful, the result will be one more failed African state. In Libya, there is no more reason to be optimistic about the outcome in the foreseeable future.
In comparison, the successful neutralization of the pirates of Somalia will be clearcut and favorable. The tipping point will come soon. Either the maritime countries of the world will turn their navies loose to the detriment of the pirates, or the area will become a "no-sail" zone due to the refusal of sailors to sign on to ships transiting the hazard zone.
While the choice is between self-interest and assorted feel good propositions regarding the presumed human rights of Somali gunslingers and should be easy to make, the ground truth of today is simply that Western political leaders are too timid to prefer national interest to fending off the accusations of advocacy groups without any responsibilities or real world constituency. Such is life in the glorious 21st Century!
During the same period of time, the average duration of captivity increased. So also did the ransom demands. And, due to presumed impatience on the part of the pirates, the captive sailors were subjected to ever increasing degrees of deprivation as well as flat out torture.
It should be recalled that over the same stretch of time the naval opposition (to use the term generically only) to the pirates increased greatly. It became such an in thing to do that even Iran dispatched a ship or two to operate against the skiff riding marauders of Somalia.
Despite the occasional success, occasions which have become somewhat more numerous of late largely due to the muscular efforts of some individual navies, such as that of India, the balance of power continues to favor the pirates. There are several reasons for this, but all can be resolved to the lack of resolve on the part of the world's greater maritime powers to be deadly serious about the Somali menace to navigation.
A few weeks ago the Norwegian shipping magnate Jacob Stoll-Nielsen raised a mini-storm of disapproval when he proposed that only a "shoot-on-sight" policy would dissuade the seagoing bandits. It seems that his approach might impair the pirates' human rights. There was a time, not that long ago, when the general principle of law involving pirates was simple, straight forward, and universally accepted: The pirate was defined as the common enemy of mankind to be hunted down without mercy wherever and whenever encountered. There were niceties regarding the specifics of jurisdiction; all seafaring nations were presumed to have equal claim to the pirates' bodies.
The recent tactic employed by the Somalis of using captured ships, usually fishing vessels, as "motherships" has expanded their range as far as the coastal waters of India. This has stretched the defensive forces far beyond any reasonable limit and placed far more ships at risk. It has also nullified the initial excuse offered by pirates and their landlubber apologists, that they were merely simple, unemployed fishermen seeking alternative sources of livelihood. It also puts an end to the later justification: The pirates were really Somali coastguards seeking recompense for illegal foreign fishing and waste dumping.
As shipowners and operators refuse to see that their long-term interests are best served by refusing to play the ransom game and the Deep Thinkers of assorted maritime power government worry about the fine points of jurisdiction and the risks which might attend the use of more robust measures, there is another player in the game as yet unheard from. That so far silent player is the group with the most at risk--the sailors.
An unfortunate reality is the long standing invisibility of the merchant sailor. Even in past years when many merchant mariners were citizens of Western countries, they were ignored in the main, cast into the general darkness of dockside scum, wharf rats, transients without home, hearth, or political influence. Shipowners and operators exploited them without end or mercy. Even governmental bodies with legal responsibilities for their health and safety were more often negligent than attentive.
In recent years the vast majority of merchant marine personnel are from impoverished Third World countries. While officers may hail from more advanced nations, often old components of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the rest, the men who in the days of sail would have been called, "before the mast," are from deeply poor parts of the Third World. This means that nobody, no government, no shipowner, no ship operator, no marine insurance company, no entity of potency and influence is on the side of the guys who take the risks passing through the ever expanding area of Somali pirate hazard.
As the true tales of torture pass through the ranks of merchant sailors, there is an expectable consequence. Men are increasingly unwilling to run the gauntlet of pirates. They are more and more reluctant to spend days with their testicles wrapped around their throats with the fear of pirate seizure ever present. They are most assuredly unwilling to spend months as "guests" of the marauders.
While shipowners and operators willingly, if grudgingly, submit to increased insurance premiums, they are reluctant without exception to pay an equivalent bonus to crew members. This is typical. Historically the owners and operators of ships have done whatever they could to reduce the manning costs of their vessels--even if such put the crew at direct physical risk.
While there may always be men desperate enough to accept any degree of hazard for the less than splendid pay which is the merchant sailor's normal state, the problems of manning vessels transiting the pirate zone are increasing--and will continue to do so. The point is coming in the not too distant future when trade, important, very valuable trade, will be impaired significantly by a lack of crews. The economic costs to both Europe and the Western Hemisphere will be large. Very large if the tankers outbound from the Persian Gulf terminals are hit by crew shortages.
A forward looking policy (which has been long needed and avoided for just as long) must focus on abating the pirates for once and all. The use of the "motherships" has, as one observer put it, "industrialized" the piracy process. This implies that the current naval efforts must be focused upon taking out the "motherships" regardless of risk to the captive crew members on board these unfortunate ships. The identities and locations of the "motherships" is not a mystery to the international flotilla assembled in the vast expanse of threatened ocean. Nor do the assorted warships lack the means necessary to neutralize the offensive nautical vipers nests.
Of course, the pirates should be given the chance to surrender. When they don't (and the probability of peaceful outcome will grow slimmer over time) they must be captured or killed. This means the high probability of innocent victims being killed as well. That must be accepted as unavoidable collateral damage, the same as with civilians caught in the crossfire.
A robust (which is to say, effective) approach also requires the country of the capturing warship has responsibility for providing judicial and incarceration services to the "arrested" pirates. As international law as well as national statutes already provide for this, the only consequence of note is expense. But, that expense must be measured against the commercial detriment of a slow down in seaborne trade.
The adoption of a robust approach should be assessed against such endeavors as the current UN sponsored operations in Libya and the Ivory Coast. In the case of the latter country, even if the present French/UN effort to oust Gbagbo proves successful, the result will be one more failed African state. In Libya, there is no more reason to be optimistic about the outcome in the foreseeable future.
In comparison, the successful neutralization of the pirates of Somalia will be clearcut and favorable. The tipping point will come soon. Either the maritime countries of the world will turn their navies loose to the detriment of the pirates, or the area will become a "no-sail" zone due to the refusal of sailors to sign on to ships transiting the hazard zone.
While the choice is between self-interest and assorted feel good propositions regarding the presumed human rights of Somali gunslingers and should be easy to make, the ground truth of today is simply that Western political leaders are too timid to prefer national interest to fending off the accusations of advocacy groups without any responsibilities or real world constituency. Such is life in the glorious 21st Century!
Monday, February 28, 2011
A Little Fear Would Mean A Great Deal Of Respect
The days when the US was both feared by its enemies and respected by its allies and most of the nonaligned are over. That is a given. It is also self-evident. Equally obvious is the absence of American influence in the councils of states both hostile and friendly.
The reason for this does not reside with the economic catastrophe which started in late 2007 and continues to date. The reason the US is largely irrelevant to the calculations of governments around the world is the failure of the Obama administration, most particularly and importantly the president personally, to develop and consistently implement a foreign policy which is rooted in American norms and values and seeks to foster or protect our national and strategic interests.
Mr Obama is personally responsible for the decline and near fall of the US as a Great Power. He is personally responsible for the simple and sad fact that no country, no dictator, no advocate of violent political Islam, no aggressive, ambitious regime fears us. The wrath of the United States is seen to exist no longer. Without the perception of potential wrath there is no fear. And, without the capacity to engender fear in those who oppose us, there can be no respect in the estimate of those who are favorable in their inclinations to us.
As recently as 2008 the US was seen as a leader. Seen as the Greatest of Great Powers. Seen through the prism of fear by opponents. And viewed with genuine respect by all others.
Whether the motivations are ideological or purely personal or some mixture (a subject more suitable for a practitioner of a discipline other than history), the fact remains that the US has lost its capacity to influence the world. While still a Great Power by all the metrics applicable, the president and his "team" have pretended that we are no different, no better, no more powerful than any small and marginal country anywhere on the face of the Earth. As a result, the states of the world can afford to ignore us and seek leadership elsewhere.
One result of this is implied in a question posed by Nile Gardner in the Daily Telegraph: "Do tyrants fear America anymore?" The answer, of course, is, "no." Gardner places the blame correctly on Mr Obama's timid approach to global politics.
If anything, this interpretation is too kind. The Obama way of dealing with foreign affairs is not merely timid. It is far worse. The Obama approach is a combination of utter indifference, contempt for the past role of the US in world affairs, and ideologically predicated naivete. As a consequence he has been well behind the wave in each and every one of the recent developments in the Mideast. Another result has been that he has alienated allies ranging from the UK to Israel. Still another is the simple fact that both Russia and China can turn a blind eye to American policy entreaties without hesitation--or adverse result.
Obama could learn from history--were he so inclined. He could learn from the example of Ronald Reagan, a man with whom he has compared himself recently. Early in the Reagan presidency the administration directly tackled the problem of low global fear of the US. In carefully calculated moves, the US quickly refurbished its image as a strong and borderline ruthless state by (1) invading Grenada under plausible pretenses and (2) attacking Libya by air with even more plausible pretenses.
Neither operation was really necessary to safeguard directly threatened American interests either national or strategic. Both were utterly essential in rebuilding the respect and fear which had been so completely lost during the disastrous Carter years. Whether the result was fear, respect, or, in the case of the rather anti-American French government, the "crazy American hypothesis," the net consequence was that all, both foe and friend, had to recognize that the US was back as an independent and assertive actor on the world stage.
Should the Clueless Guy in the Oval tire of presiding over the Incredible Shrinking United States, and decide the time had come for a little creative and effective fear engendering, a very good target of Uncle Sam's wrath would be the port havens of the Somali pirates. The recent killing of four Americans gives a good enough plausible reason to forcibly abate the nuisance presented by the pirates of Puntland.
The key to the success of a fear and respect engendering exercise in American power projection is contained in one word--punitive. The goal would not be the creation and building of a nation-state in Somalia. Such is impossible as the disaster in Afghanistan and the near debacle in Iraq have made manifest. The purpose of the exercise would be the liberation of as many hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates, broadly defined as is convenient in the scope of a short duration military raid.
Lest the current administration be inhibited by residual folk memories of "Blackhawk Down," it needs to recalled that the operation was very poorly planned and worse in its execution. It needs to be noted that had the operation been postponed a matter of hours, the Marine light armored vehicles would have been available for ground support. Such a ground component would have militated against any success by the Somali forces even with their numerical advantages.
It is also important, indeed vital, to note that the US has a number of very experienced combat forces in its inventory even with the Afghan war still in progress. We have learned volumes in both Iraq and Afghanistan which is directly transferable to a short duration punitive expedition. Such an operation would not be manpower heavy. Nor can it last more than a matter of a few tens of hours. Combined with air action, an up close and personal raid would not only free captives but kill gun slingers and intimidate potential successors to those who have died for the "cause."
Provided the operation meets the requirements of being hard, fast, violent, and highly lethal, there is no reason the US cannot nor should not mount it unilaterally. After all, it was our citizens who died at the hands of the pirates. Retaliation is a recognized right. It was the right invoked by the Bush/Cheney administration for the invasion of Afghanistan.
Provided the Americans and retrieved international hostages are evacuated fully in a matter of hours, two days at the most, the diplomatic repercussions will be favorable. Yes, there will be cries of horror from the ever-so-sensitive members of the Western European and American elites, but even Mr Obama might be able to ignore the expectable.
Somalia will be no more of a mess afterward than it was before. There might even be some improvement given the deterrent impact of such a punitive raid on the survivors, even those at a distance from the action. The Somali gun thugs have no experience with the high degree of lethality American forces dispose in even limited usage venues. For once, "shock and awe" would have a high degree of applicability.
In a way, the mounting of a punitive expedition on the pirate lairs would give us a chance to replay Afghanistan correctly. This would be good. It would draw a line between that which can be done--punish bad guys--and that which is impossible--construct a modern Western style nation-state from a traditional, tribal Muslim base. It would also be good in that such an operation would put all bad actors on alert as to what might come their way should they get too over the edge.
Most importantly and most beneficially, a quick and dirty raid would show the world, from our allies in Western Europe to our opponents in the Kremlin, Tehran, Beijing, Caracas, and elsewhere that the US was not a potted plant decorating the global arena. And that, bucko, is something the world needs badly right now.
The reason for this does not reside with the economic catastrophe which started in late 2007 and continues to date. The reason the US is largely irrelevant to the calculations of governments around the world is the failure of the Obama administration, most particularly and importantly the president personally, to develop and consistently implement a foreign policy which is rooted in American norms and values and seeks to foster or protect our national and strategic interests.
Mr Obama is personally responsible for the decline and near fall of the US as a Great Power. He is personally responsible for the simple and sad fact that no country, no dictator, no advocate of violent political Islam, no aggressive, ambitious regime fears us. The wrath of the United States is seen to exist no longer. Without the perception of potential wrath there is no fear. And, without the capacity to engender fear in those who oppose us, there can be no respect in the estimate of those who are favorable in their inclinations to us.
As recently as 2008 the US was seen as a leader. Seen as the Greatest of Great Powers. Seen through the prism of fear by opponents. And viewed with genuine respect by all others.
Whether the motivations are ideological or purely personal or some mixture (a subject more suitable for a practitioner of a discipline other than history), the fact remains that the US has lost its capacity to influence the world. While still a Great Power by all the metrics applicable, the president and his "team" have pretended that we are no different, no better, no more powerful than any small and marginal country anywhere on the face of the Earth. As a result, the states of the world can afford to ignore us and seek leadership elsewhere.
One result of this is implied in a question posed by Nile Gardner in the Daily Telegraph: "Do tyrants fear America anymore?" The answer, of course, is, "no." Gardner places the blame correctly on Mr Obama's timid approach to global politics.
If anything, this interpretation is too kind. The Obama way of dealing with foreign affairs is not merely timid. It is far worse. The Obama approach is a combination of utter indifference, contempt for the past role of the US in world affairs, and ideologically predicated naivete. As a consequence he has been well behind the wave in each and every one of the recent developments in the Mideast. Another result has been that he has alienated allies ranging from the UK to Israel. Still another is the simple fact that both Russia and China can turn a blind eye to American policy entreaties without hesitation--or adverse result.
Obama could learn from history--were he so inclined. He could learn from the example of Ronald Reagan, a man with whom he has compared himself recently. Early in the Reagan presidency the administration directly tackled the problem of low global fear of the US. In carefully calculated moves, the US quickly refurbished its image as a strong and borderline ruthless state by (1) invading Grenada under plausible pretenses and (2) attacking Libya by air with even more plausible pretenses.
Neither operation was really necessary to safeguard directly threatened American interests either national or strategic. Both were utterly essential in rebuilding the respect and fear which had been so completely lost during the disastrous Carter years. Whether the result was fear, respect, or, in the case of the rather anti-American French government, the "crazy American hypothesis," the net consequence was that all, both foe and friend, had to recognize that the US was back as an independent and assertive actor on the world stage.
Should the Clueless Guy in the Oval tire of presiding over the Incredible Shrinking United States, and decide the time had come for a little creative and effective fear engendering, a very good target of Uncle Sam's wrath would be the port havens of the Somali pirates. The recent killing of four Americans gives a good enough plausible reason to forcibly abate the nuisance presented by the pirates of Puntland.
The key to the success of a fear and respect engendering exercise in American power projection is contained in one word--punitive. The goal would not be the creation and building of a nation-state in Somalia. Such is impossible as the disaster in Afghanistan and the near debacle in Iraq have made manifest. The purpose of the exercise would be the liberation of as many hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates, broadly defined as is convenient in the scope of a short duration military raid.
Lest the current administration be inhibited by residual folk memories of "Blackhawk Down," it needs to recalled that the operation was very poorly planned and worse in its execution. It needs to be noted that had the operation been postponed a matter of hours, the Marine light armored vehicles would have been available for ground support. Such a ground component would have militated against any success by the Somali forces even with their numerical advantages.
It is also important, indeed vital, to note that the US has a number of very experienced combat forces in its inventory even with the Afghan war still in progress. We have learned volumes in both Iraq and Afghanistan which is directly transferable to a short duration punitive expedition. Such an operation would not be manpower heavy. Nor can it last more than a matter of a few tens of hours. Combined with air action, an up close and personal raid would not only free captives but kill gun slingers and intimidate potential successors to those who have died for the "cause."
Provided the operation meets the requirements of being hard, fast, violent, and highly lethal, there is no reason the US cannot nor should not mount it unilaterally. After all, it was our citizens who died at the hands of the pirates. Retaliation is a recognized right. It was the right invoked by the Bush/Cheney administration for the invasion of Afghanistan.
Provided the Americans and retrieved international hostages are evacuated fully in a matter of hours, two days at the most, the diplomatic repercussions will be favorable. Yes, there will be cries of horror from the ever-so-sensitive members of the Western European and American elites, but even Mr Obama might be able to ignore the expectable.
Somalia will be no more of a mess afterward than it was before. There might even be some improvement given the deterrent impact of such a punitive raid on the survivors, even those at a distance from the action. The Somali gun thugs have no experience with the high degree of lethality American forces dispose in even limited usage venues. For once, "shock and awe" would have a high degree of applicability.
In a way, the mounting of a punitive expedition on the pirate lairs would give us a chance to replay Afghanistan correctly. This would be good. It would draw a line between that which can be done--punish bad guys--and that which is impossible--construct a modern Western style nation-state from a traditional, tribal Muslim base. It would also be good in that such an operation would put all bad actors on alert as to what might come their way should they get too over the edge.
Most importantly and most beneficially, a quick and dirty raid would show the world, from our allies in Western Europe to our opponents in the Kremlin, Tehran, Beijing, Caracas, and elsewhere that the US was not a potted plant decorating the global arena. And that, bucko, is something the world needs badly right now.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Edging Toward "Kill Or Be Killed"
The jolly maritime marauders of the Somali coast may have finally gone a skiff too far. The wanton killing of four wrong-side-of-middle-age American yachters by a temporarily leaderless and faction riven clutch of Somali pirates might serve as a long overdue tipping point in the policy of the US and other countries regarding the self-proclaimed Somali "coast guard."
The deaths of the four Americans being held hostage on the fifty-eight foot sailing vessel Quest has provoked the inevitable insinuations of bungling by the American hostage negotiator, but when stripped to the essentials it was an act of brutality for which the Somali perpetrators alone are responsible. Not even the squid ink spouted by the pirates to the effect that the US Navy fired first--a truly preposterous notion worthy of the mind of someone who has chewed too much khat--alters that.
At root the pirates blundered. Once they saw that they were almost literally surrounded by combatant ships of the American navy, they must have known the gig was blown. Instead of accepting the (overly) generous US offer of the Quest as theirs to take, of course leaving the hostages with the Navy, the chuckleheads turned out to be less than serious. As the American negotiator, reportedly an experienced FBI man, realized he was dealing with an insincere duo he ordered them detained. The pirates were advised to think the matter over.
Whatever passed for cognition among the Brave Muslim Raiders Of The Briney Deep resulted in two salient actions. One of the pirates fired an RPG at the nearby frigate. Others on the seized yacht started shooting. Among those who stopped bullets with fatal result were the four Americans. This gory and tragic part of the story was discovered by the SEAL boarding team which also terminally neutralized two overly zealous Somali "coastguards."
The thirteen surviving members of the once merry band of pirates joined their two fellows in enjoying the comforts of the brig on the aircraft carrier Enterprise which introduced them to their most probable future--sterile bulkheads and locked doors. It also dropped the what-do-we-do-with-them problem in the lap of Attorney General Holder, a man who rather enjoys lecturing Americans on their "cowardice" more than he does enforcing the US Code.
It is not surprising that the Holder Department of Justice has taken a noncommittal "we are considering the options" stance regarding the inconvenient presence of the Somalis in American custody. It is rather like the Holder view of members of the New Black Panther Party waving clubs in the faces of potential voters outside a Philadelphia polling place--a sort of well-the-boys-were-just-acting-out-a-bit approach to clear cut violations of the law.
The immediate problem will be solved. The Somalis will be prosecuted in an American court. There is no other politically viable way to go. The pirates had their chance to walk (or, more accurately, sail) away. They failed to take it and must now take the consequences.
The immediate problem is, of course, the easy one. Far more difficult is the larger one, the reality that the pirates of Somalia are not only still around but ranging ever farther afield. More ships and more cargoes and more crew are at risk today than ever before. This despite the large number of naval vessels from numerous countries dedicated to maintaining safety in the critical sealanes of the region.
The nature of Somalia as a mere geographic expression in which the pathetic excuse for a central government controls very little outside of its official buildings is not going to change in the near future. The recent combined offensive by forces of the African Union peacekeeping force, the Transitional National Government, and the Ethiopian army along with the militias currently fighting on the side of the government has not altered the balance of power in the venue nor extended stability more than a few blocks.
This means the Deep Thinkers who argue there is no solution to the pirate problem until Somalia once more has a stable, effective government are simply kicking the can down a long and dusty street. As the pirate threat extends its shadow over more and more of the key routes to and from the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf, there is a very real menace to the global economic recovery. Additionally, there is an object lesson to other advocates of violent political Islam including those in the environs of the Straits of Malacca showing the power of piracy to hobble the economies of the "infidels" and "apostates" around the world.
Taken in total there is only one response now available to any realistic government. Actually, it is a response with several components. The first is the creation of yet one more special international tribunal with jurisdiction over acts of piracy. The second is a prohibition of ransom payments by ship owners and others. The third is the mandatory formation of convoys in the affected areas. The final consists of the stationing of armed guards--preferably regularly organized units of national navies or marine forces--on board ships transiting the danger zone.
This combination would increase the costs of doing business while reducing the profit potential. While there are alternatives such as armed guards with shoot-to-kill authority and immunity from liability in the (inevitable) incident of misidentification, these are less satisfactory than the full panoply of defensive measures. Admittedly, there will be resistance to the prohibition of ransom payment, but that resistance can be overcome. The same is true with respect to the use of deadly force by shipborne defense forces.
It does not good to excuse the piracy with smooth words about just how the poor Somalis have no chance for honest employment or the removal of some pirates will simply assure that new, younger, and more violent candidates will take their place. Nor does the argument that any robust measures will place the lives of the several hundred hostages currently held in Somali ports at risk deserve genuflection.
The pirates have altered their behavior toward the hostages. Reports of torture and threats have grown significantly in recent months. The day will come soon when hostages are killed in exemplary fashion in order to force faster payment of larger ransoms. The only way this can be defeated is to add a major raid with the objective of freeing as many of the present hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates as might be conveniently accomplished to the defensive mix.
"Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute!" may have been a popular toast of two hundred years ago when the US faced the pirates of Tripoli. It was true then. It is true today. The US eventually prevailed in the long and unpleasant war with the Bey of Tunis and others of his ilk back then. The same may--indeed, must--be true today.
The stakes are higher than a mere cost add-on to international trade. Lives are at risk as shown with the killing of the four Americans. Beyond that, the pirates are a form of maritime jihadist whose acts can threaten the peaceful commerce of much of the world, a threat which can benefit only those who wish the West harm.
It is to be hoped most ardently that the current administration might take a firm grip on the realities of the world including the pirates and what they mean to the US and other civilized states. While this hope may be pious given the record to date of the Obama administration, the reality is too dark to admit of being passed on down the line in the hope that a more reality oriented and more robustly minded president may be in the Oval two years hence.
The deaths of the four Americans being held hostage on the fifty-eight foot sailing vessel Quest has provoked the inevitable insinuations of bungling by the American hostage negotiator, but when stripped to the essentials it was an act of brutality for which the Somali perpetrators alone are responsible. Not even the squid ink spouted by the pirates to the effect that the US Navy fired first--a truly preposterous notion worthy of the mind of someone who has chewed too much khat--alters that.
At root the pirates blundered. Once they saw that they were almost literally surrounded by combatant ships of the American navy, they must have known the gig was blown. Instead of accepting the (overly) generous US offer of the Quest as theirs to take, of course leaving the hostages with the Navy, the chuckleheads turned out to be less than serious. As the American negotiator, reportedly an experienced FBI man, realized he was dealing with an insincere duo he ordered them detained. The pirates were advised to think the matter over.
Whatever passed for cognition among the Brave Muslim Raiders Of The Briney Deep resulted in two salient actions. One of the pirates fired an RPG at the nearby frigate. Others on the seized yacht started shooting. Among those who stopped bullets with fatal result were the four Americans. This gory and tragic part of the story was discovered by the SEAL boarding team which also terminally neutralized two overly zealous Somali "coastguards."
The thirteen surviving members of the once merry band of pirates joined their two fellows in enjoying the comforts of the brig on the aircraft carrier Enterprise which introduced them to their most probable future--sterile bulkheads and locked doors. It also dropped the what-do-we-do-with-them problem in the lap of Attorney General Holder, a man who rather enjoys lecturing Americans on their "cowardice" more than he does enforcing the US Code.
It is not surprising that the Holder Department of Justice has taken a noncommittal "we are considering the options" stance regarding the inconvenient presence of the Somalis in American custody. It is rather like the Holder view of members of the New Black Panther Party waving clubs in the faces of potential voters outside a Philadelphia polling place--a sort of well-the-boys-were-just-acting-out-a-bit approach to clear cut violations of the law.
The immediate problem will be solved. The Somalis will be prosecuted in an American court. There is no other politically viable way to go. The pirates had their chance to walk (or, more accurately, sail) away. They failed to take it and must now take the consequences.
The immediate problem is, of course, the easy one. Far more difficult is the larger one, the reality that the pirates of Somalia are not only still around but ranging ever farther afield. More ships and more cargoes and more crew are at risk today than ever before. This despite the large number of naval vessels from numerous countries dedicated to maintaining safety in the critical sealanes of the region.
The nature of Somalia as a mere geographic expression in which the pathetic excuse for a central government controls very little outside of its official buildings is not going to change in the near future. The recent combined offensive by forces of the African Union peacekeeping force, the Transitional National Government, and the Ethiopian army along with the militias currently fighting on the side of the government has not altered the balance of power in the venue nor extended stability more than a few blocks.
This means the Deep Thinkers who argue there is no solution to the pirate problem until Somalia once more has a stable, effective government are simply kicking the can down a long and dusty street. As the pirate threat extends its shadow over more and more of the key routes to and from the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf, there is a very real menace to the global economic recovery. Additionally, there is an object lesson to other advocates of violent political Islam including those in the environs of the Straits of Malacca showing the power of piracy to hobble the economies of the "infidels" and "apostates" around the world.
Taken in total there is only one response now available to any realistic government. Actually, it is a response with several components. The first is the creation of yet one more special international tribunal with jurisdiction over acts of piracy. The second is a prohibition of ransom payments by ship owners and others. The third is the mandatory formation of convoys in the affected areas. The final consists of the stationing of armed guards--preferably regularly organized units of national navies or marine forces--on board ships transiting the danger zone.
This combination would increase the costs of doing business while reducing the profit potential. While there are alternatives such as armed guards with shoot-to-kill authority and immunity from liability in the (inevitable) incident of misidentification, these are less satisfactory than the full panoply of defensive measures. Admittedly, there will be resistance to the prohibition of ransom payment, but that resistance can be overcome. The same is true with respect to the use of deadly force by shipborne defense forces.
It does not good to excuse the piracy with smooth words about just how the poor Somalis have no chance for honest employment or the removal of some pirates will simply assure that new, younger, and more violent candidates will take their place. Nor does the argument that any robust measures will place the lives of the several hundred hostages currently held in Somali ports at risk deserve genuflection.
The pirates have altered their behavior toward the hostages. Reports of torture and threats have grown significantly in recent months. The day will come soon when hostages are killed in exemplary fashion in order to force faster payment of larger ransoms. The only way this can be defeated is to add a major raid with the objective of freeing as many of the present hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates as might be conveniently accomplished to the defensive mix.
"Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute!" may have been a popular toast of two hundred years ago when the US faced the pirates of Tripoli. It was true then. It is true today. The US eventually prevailed in the long and unpleasant war with the Bey of Tunis and others of his ilk back then. The same may--indeed, must--be true today.
The stakes are higher than a mere cost add-on to international trade. Lives are at risk as shown with the killing of the four Americans. Beyond that, the pirates are a form of maritime jihadist whose acts can threaten the peaceful commerce of much of the world, a threat which can benefit only those who wish the West harm.
It is to be hoped most ardently that the current administration might take a firm grip on the realities of the world including the pirates and what they mean to the US and other civilized states. While this hope may be pious given the record to date of the Obama administration, the reality is too dark to admit of being passed on down the line in the hope that a more reality oriented and more robustly minded president may be in the Oval two years hence.
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