A Little Fear Would Mean A Great Deal Of Respect

The days when the US was both feared by its enemies and respected by its allies and most of the nonaligned are over.  That is a given.  It is also self-evident.  Equally obvious is the absence of American influence in the councils of states both hostile and friendly.

The reason for this does not reside with the economic catastrophe which started in late 2007 and continues to date.  The reason the US is largely irrelevant to the calculations of governments around the world is the failure of the Obama administration, most particularly and importantly the president personally, to develop and consistently implement a foreign policy which is rooted in American norms and values and seeks to foster or protect our national and strategic interests.

Mr Obama is personally responsible for the decline and near fall of the US as a Great Power.  He is personally responsible for the simple and sad fact that no country, no dictator, no advocate of violent political Islam, no aggressive, ambitious regime fears us.  The wrath of the United States is seen to exist no longer.  Without the perception of potential wrath there is no fear.  And, without the capacity to engender fear in those who oppose us, there can be no respect in the estimate of those who are favorable in their inclinations to us.

As recently as 2008 the US was seen as a leader.  Seen as the Greatest of Great Powers.  Seen through the prism of fear by opponents.  And viewed with genuine respect by all others.

Whether the motivations are ideological or purely personal or some mixture (a subject more suitable for a practitioner of a discipline other than history), the fact remains that the US has lost its capacity to influence the world.  While still a Great Power by all the metrics applicable, the president and his "team" have pretended that we are no different, no better, no more powerful than any small and marginal country anywhere on the face of the Earth.  As a result, the states of the world can afford to ignore us and seek leadership elsewhere.

One result of this is implied in a question posed by Nile Gardner in the Daily Telegraph: "Do tyrants fear America anymore?"  The answer, of course, is, "no."  Gardner places the blame correctly on Mr Obama's timid approach to global politics.

If anything, this interpretation is too kind.  The Obama way of dealing with foreign affairs is not merely timid.  It is far worse.  The Obama approach is a combination of utter indifference, contempt for the past role of the US in world affairs, and ideologically predicated naivete.  As a consequence he has been well behind the wave in each and every one of the recent developments in the Mideast.  Another result has been that he has alienated allies ranging from the UK to Israel.  Still another is the simple fact that both Russia and China can turn a blind eye to American policy entreaties without hesitation--or adverse result.

Obama could learn from history--were he so inclined.  He could learn from the example of Ronald Reagan, a man with whom he has compared himself recently.  Early in the Reagan presidency the administration directly tackled the problem of low global fear of the US.  In carefully calculated moves, the US quickly refurbished its image as a strong and borderline ruthless state by (1) invading Grenada under plausible pretenses and (2) attacking Libya by air with even more plausible pretenses.

Neither operation was really necessary to safeguard directly threatened American interests either national or strategic.  Both were utterly essential in rebuilding the respect and fear which had been so completely lost during the disastrous Carter years.  Whether the result was fear, respect, or, in the case of the rather anti-American French government, the "crazy American hypothesis," the net consequence  was that all, both foe and friend, had to recognize that the US was back as an independent and assertive actor on the world stage.

Should the Clueless Guy in the Oval tire of presiding over the Incredible Shrinking United States, and decide the time had come for a little creative and effective fear engendering, a very good target of Uncle Sam's wrath would be the port havens of the Somali pirates.  The recent killing of four Americans gives a good enough plausible reason to forcibly abate the nuisance presented by the pirates of Puntland.

The key to the success of a fear and respect engendering exercise in American power projection is contained in one word--punitive.  The goal would not be the creation and building of a nation-state in Somalia.  Such is impossible as the disaster in Afghanistan and the near debacle in Iraq have made manifest.  The purpose of the exercise would be the liberation of as many hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates, broadly defined as is convenient in the scope of a short duration military raid.

Lest the current administration be inhibited by residual folk memories of "Blackhawk Down," it needs to recalled that the operation was very poorly planned and worse in its execution.  It needs to be noted that had the operation been postponed a matter of hours, the Marine light armored vehicles would have been available for ground support.  Such a ground component would have militated against any success by the Somali forces even with their numerical advantages.

It is also important, indeed vital, to note that the US has a number of very experienced combat forces in its inventory even with the Afghan war still in progress.  We have learned volumes in both Iraq and Afghanistan which is directly transferable to a short duration punitive expedition.  Such an operation would not be manpower heavy.  Nor can it last more than a matter of a few tens of hours.  Combined with air action, an up close and personal raid would not only free captives but kill gun slingers and intimidate potential successors to those who have died for the "cause."

Provided the operation meets the requirements of being hard, fast, violent, and highly lethal, there is no reason the US cannot nor should not mount it unilaterally.  After all, it was our citizens who died at the hands of the pirates.  Retaliation is a recognized right.  It was the right invoked by the Bush/Cheney administration for the invasion of Afghanistan.

Provided the Americans and retrieved international hostages are evacuated fully in a matter of hours, two days at the most, the diplomatic repercussions will be favorable.  Yes, there will be cries of horror from the ever-so-sensitive members of the Western European and American elites, but even Mr Obama might be able to ignore the expectable.

Somalia will be no more of a mess afterward than it was before.  There might even be some improvement given the deterrent impact of such a punitive raid on the survivors, even those at a distance from the action.  The Somali gun thugs have no experience with the high degree of lethality American forces dispose in even limited usage venues.  For once, "shock and awe" would have a high degree of applicability.

In a way, the mounting of a punitive expedition on the pirate lairs would give us a chance to replay Afghanistan correctly.  This would be good.  It would draw a line between that which can be done--punish bad guys--and that which is impossible--construct a modern Western style nation-state from a traditional, tribal Muslim base.  It would also be good in that such an operation would put all bad actors on alert as to what might come their way should they get too over the edge.

Most importantly and most beneficially, a quick and dirty raid would show the world, from our allies in Western Europe to our opponents in the Kremlin, Tehran, Beijing, Caracas, and elsewhere that the US was not a potted plant decorating the global arena.  And that, bucko, is something the world needs badly right now.

Whatever Happened To The Punitive Expedition?

What a great old term--punitive expedition. Kind of makes you think of Queen Victoria's pith helmeted boys heading up some African river or Northwest Frontier canyon to teach some uppity indige types a lesson in proper manners. Or, perhaps the US cavalry riding on out to slap some pesky redskins back onto the reservation.

Of course punitive expeditions, even if not under that quaintly accurate name, are still alive and well today. They have to be. Reality demands that,

What does a nation do when the sanctions don't work? When diplomacy fails? When patience runs out? When the nuisance refuses to abate itself?

Americans shy away from punitive expeditions under any name. Even if the neocon ninnies were not calling the play during the post-9/11 months We the People wouldn't have felt at all comfortable with simply going into Afghanistan on the ground and in the air with the goal of killing as many al-Qaeda leaders and adherents as possible, and, along the way, doing the same to the maximum number of Taliban.

We could have administered what used to be called "condign punishment" to both the al-Qaeda mass murderers and their Taliban protectors. The outrage of 9/11 assured both political will and popular support for a punitive expedition--even one which would have perforce resulted in significant civilian casualties.

Absent the neocons and their strange delusion that fully functioning, pluralistic democracy and free enterprise can be installed via "shock and awe," American sensibilities would have demanded that we do more than simply vanquish the sinner. Our unique view of the world would have required that we raise the prostrate sinner to his feet, dust him off, offer him new clothes and abjure him to go and sin no more.

We the People would have required nation building as the ultimate goal no matter how unrealistic that might be. And, no matter how inappropriate a role for our military it might be.

Thus the neocon ninnies were aided and abetted in their flights of fancy by the moral sensitivities of the American public with the result that we are still in Afghanistan more than six years later. Still in Afghanistan and currently facing defeat. High price to pay for ignoring the plausibility and realism of a purely punitive expedition.

If the crime is great enough as it was on 9/11, a country may prosecute a punitive operation with support by both its domestic population and that of the political elites abroad. If the crime is small--a misdemeanor by international standards--then a country pursues punitive action at great peril to its global reputation and standing.

Israel discovered the reality that the crime must merit the punishment during its ill-considered expedition into Lebanon in summer 2006. The crime was the kidnapping of two IDF members by Hezbollah. Aggravating circumstances were provided by occasional rockets incoming from southern Lebanon.

The Israeli punitive expedition which included massive air strikes on infrastructure targets (what nuclear strategists called "counter-value targeting") meshed with both air and ground operations purportedly directed against Hezbollah arms dumps and personnel but actually rather indiscriminately applied to anyone and everyone in southern Lebanon. With the noteworthy exception of the United States, the global response to the disproportionate Israeli action was condemnation.

The crime did not merit the punishment.

Ultimately Israel suffered the greatest military and diplomatic defeat in its history. Hezbollah emerged as the clear winner by any measure which might be applied. Also winning in the contest were the mullahocracy in Tehran and the hardest hardliners within the Palestinian community and the Arab population generally.

(It should be mentioned that the US was listed, not among the "winners" but along with Israel in the "loser" category.)

We have to get a grip on the concept of punitive expeditions now more than ever since high on the list of foreign policy challenges faceing us is the matter of nuclear proliferation. Not only is Iran on the "path" (to quote Dr ElBaradei) but North Korea is apparently getting back in the plutonium production business.

While the New Hermit Kingdom of the North may further impoverish its citizens by extracting more plutonium from the several thousand fuel rods taken from its (perhaps only temporarily) decommissioned reactor, it can add several more kilos to its store of Pu239. In the mind of Kim jong Il or the minds of North Korea's very hardline military commanders, the risks are far outweighed by the potential benefits.

Six or eight Nagasaki size and type bombs when coupled with North Korea's 1.2 million man army represents a very large diplomatic blackmail potential. Cowing South Korea into compliance with the North's policy dictates might move from the thinkable to the doable.

If anything, a North Korean nuclear threat represents far more of a clear and present danger to US strategic interests than does the potential (within as few as six to twelve months) Iranian Mahidi bomb.

Given the low likelihood of sanctions and diplomatic palaver stimulating a sudden, genuine desire on the part of the Hermit Kingdom of the North to surrender its plutonium to some other, more responsible custodian, what should the US do next? (The Geek recommends that as a question to be posed at the foreign policy debate between Senators McCain and Obama.)

One option is a air delivered punitive expedition. Leaving aside the very real question, "Will it work?" the nature of the crime needs to be explored.

Has Pyongyang's intransigence reached a level such that either world or US domestic opinion would accept a series of strikes which, if successful, carry the risk of liberating a large amount of radioactivity to the environment?

(While considering that question, keep in mind that the jet stream blows from west to east. Then look at a world map.)

Rogue states and trans-national terrorist groups are not going to evaporate simply because we would find that convenient. As a result, the punitive expedition (however one might like to cosmetically cover the harsh term) must and will remain an option for the US and other states. This means we must have a serious conversation about both "crime" and "punishment."

This means in turn that the often criticised Bush Doctrine must be revisited as it was not so much inherently incorrect or unjustified as it was poorly thought through and presented. We must have not only the right of self-defense but also a properly grounded right to abate threats and punish those who threaten.