Good. Very good, even.
While lacking drama the new bureaucratic term has the advantage of being more accurate than the phrase it replaces. True, the Geek being a traditionalist prefers the long passe, Interventionary operations, but, what the hey? It is time for a change.
More change is required than simple alterations in the Official Lexicon. Of these, three stand out as being particularly time sensitive. In order of importance these are:
1.) Deciding just what our operations are directed for or against,
2.) Determining the goal of our contingency operation in Afghanistan,
3.) Assuring that our withdrawal from Iraq is both orderly and effective.
The complication?
As is (or should be) self-evident the three tasks are tightly joined. No single one can be addressed with effect without considering the impact on the other two.
Throughout the past eight years there has been a nearly impenetrable fog surrounding the nature and character of our strategic goals in the two totally disconnected wars we have been waging. That fundamental intellectual and policy flaw has prevented any chance of formulating a unified goal. It has prevented an effective and proper definition of the "enemy" against which our operations are directed.
Of all the mistakes and blunders committed by the W. Bush administration, the largest and most serious was that of falsely linking the punitive expedition against al-Qaeda and its accessory Taliban with the invasion of Iraq. From that flows all the other contradictions, confusions and conundrums of US strategy (if that is the right word) over the past seven plus years.
Since the pressure of high visibility combat operations in Iraq has been removed, the time has come to determine just what the enemy is now. Is the enemy the armed fighters in Afghanistan? Does the enemy include the combatants in Pakistan? Or, as some have argued for years, is the enemy the large and somewhat amorphous mass falling under the term "jihadist?" Does the enemy include all Islamists who pursue the totalistic goal of imposing Sharia in countries where that is not now the case?
How the enemy is defined controls what the political goal toward which the instruments of national power including lethal military capacities will be directed. That in turn serves to define not only "victory" but the markers which help measure progress toward the goal. The definition of the enemy also helps to determine how and where armed force should or must be employed in order to achieve the political goal.
This necessary first step was never undertaken by the previous administration. Now, despite the breather provided by the slackening of combat operations in Iraq, it seems that the Obama administration is too concerned with defining trees to stand back and demarcate the forest.
If this continues there is every possibility that the Obama administration will not see any greater success than did its predecessor. Where the Bush regime saw the seemingly successful end to the Iraq invasion, the Obama crew may see an end to combat operations in Afghanistan. Neither has nor will do anything to insure the long term national security and strategic interests of the US.
If the goal in Afghanistan is, as at least some of the President's remarks seem to indicate, the eradication of any base of terrorist operations in that country, then the US and its allies must focus exclusively on killing al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, commanders and members of its active mass support base. There is no requirement for any "nation-building."
So far, all the effort and money placed into the "nation-building" side of the massive efforts in Afghanistan have not produced a pay off commensurate with the expense. Or, such is the conclusion of the congressionally mandated special inspector-general, Arnold Fields. The thirty-two gigabucks have been in large measure blown away for no useful purpose.
True, in light of the proposed budget the money is not even up to the chump change level. What is important is that its expenditure past, present and proposed underscores the lack of strategic or even tactical focus which has, is and will bedevil our efforts to defeat Taliban et al on the ground.
One solution is to turn over "nation-building" to an amphyctony of the High Minded, kick in our fair share of the money and get on with the key task of militarily defeating Taliban et al. That job is big enough. But, unlike the vision of constructing a nation-state out of the tribal and linguistic morass called Afghanistan, it is achievable.
Arguably, the task of defeating Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be accomplished without defeating Taliban in Pakistan. That contention is explicit in the geographic, demographic and political realities on the ground. There are two ways to include Pakistan in the goals of our "contingency operation" in Afghanistan.
The first is direct. This implies not only continuing with our Predator and Reaper attacks in the FATA (and beyond if necessary) but adding in special operation and American controlled and directed paramilitary units as well. Of course, the direct route has the strong potential of further destabilization of the current Pakistani government. Running that increased risk requires as a foundation a clear definition of who we are fighting--and for what goal.
The second approach to the Pakistani complication is the indirect. At root that means continuing what we have been doing in providing support to the Pakistani government and military but, hopefully, doing this with greater benefit. The state of play in Pakistan whether from a political or a demographic perspective gives no great ground for optimism. No strong reason that the indirect approach will work one whit better in the future than it has in the past.
Pakistan is heavily polluted by Islamist ideology. The Pakistani military, intelligence service, much of the government and many within the population have been, are and will continue to be focused on India. Islam, including the Islamist variant, has always been and will continue to be the single definer of Pakistan in relation to its Sub-continent neighbor. Afghanistan, as the Geek has argued before, constitutes part of Pakistan's strategic depth. So also do the Muslim populated Central Asian Republics.
The notion of an "Islamabad Caliphate" holding sway over these areas makes a great deal of sense to more than a few in the command circles of the Pakistani military, intelligence sevice and government. It would not be an unwelcomed development to the indigeneous Islamists of Swat, the FATA and elsewhere in the state.
This underlying reality is critical to any decision broadening the definition of enemy to include the Islamist jihadists of Pakistan. Still, if the overall national security goal of the US and other countries is the elimination of sanctuaries for those contemplating acts of transnational terror, Pakistan is even more critical than Afghanistan.
Once again the identity of the enemy tells you where, how and why to fight him. It also tells you what the goal and definition of victory must be.
We are at the point of more-or-less declaring "victory" in the unnecessary "contingency operation" in Iraq. The violence is down. Way down.
(Last week the central morgue in Baghdad reported no unidentified corpses were recovered from the city streets for the first time since the US invasion. Two years ago, the daily count reached nearly two hundred.)
There is a government in place. It is functioning--sort of. A number of critical issues of governance, economics and infrastructure are not being addressed with dispatch and effect. The reconstruction effort is far from complete even though the US flooded the place with greenbacks and Iraq floats on an ocean or two of oil.
Still paying the price for the years of Saddamist repression and US sponsored total confusion, Iraqi bureaucrats and technocrats lack the skill or personal authority to make decisions, get projects underway and completed or perform other critical functions. For similar reasons the security situation while greatly improved is still far from one of tranquility.
And, the long shadow of Iran hangs like the smoke of an oilfield fire over Iraq.
The US and Iraq are committed to the extraction of US forces. The exact timing is still unclear given that the Iraqi people are going to vote on the matter in a couple of months. But, in any event the overwhelming bulk of our troops both combat and support will be gone in well under two years.
If we take history as our guide (think South Vietnam after 1973) once our forces leave, they ain't ever coming back. While a frank Iranian attack would be sufficient to assure our return to the area, anything less overt will not pull our national trigger.
As W. Bush finally admitted in the last days of his administration, what will come about in Iraq may not be "all" or even, (the Geek adds) anything of what we hoped for in March 2003. So be it. Short of an outrage such as an Iranian invasion we and the world will be stuck with whatever the Iraqis create in the months and years to come.
That includes the potential of another Islamist jihadist sponsoring regime. This will demand once more that we define the enemy.
Even the most broad definition of enemy does not include Islam per se or Muslims generally. The most expansive definition conceivable in the real world is that the enemy is the Islamist: the Muslim who pursues the goal of establishing Sharia by force, threat of force or political subversion. A more narrow yet still realistic definition of enemy is the jihadist: the persons or groups which seek to employ open or clandestine violence in pursuit of an Islamist goal.
The narrowest definition is that of meeting a specific threat. The enemy is defined simply and solely as the person or group seeking to undertake or which has undertaken a specific action against the domestic peace or strategic interests of the US.
This narrow definition could be further refined by goal. Will our "contingency operation" be preventative in goal? Disruptive? Or will it be reactive, punitive?
The W. Bush administration attempted in a less-than-nuanced form to define the enemy in the narrow sense with an emphasis upon preventative or disruptive efforts. The much maligned "Bush Doctrine" tried without meaningful success to assure the US and those who wished us ill that we would act before we were attacked.
The Obama administration would be very well advised to revisit the Bush Doctrine. Revise it perhaps, reformulate its wording quite possibly, but make a decision on the nature of the enemy. Decide if the enemy was to be the object of an "overseas contingency operation" before he struck. Or, is the US going to adopt a "second strike" policy and wait until the enemy defines himself by an overt act, an attack?
The first principles of national security and the protection of strategic interest demand the administration make a choice. Make a definition. Make it publicly. Make it quickly.
