The Next Ten Years

The US (and a hell of a lot of other countries) is approaching the zero point marking the official start of "The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT.)"  To err on the side of accuracy, the US had already been in a war against advocates of violent political Islam for eight years when the hijacked passenger aircraft were turned into cruise missiles.

Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention.  Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED.  The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression.  The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort.  The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.

The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor.  It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched.  It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.

Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead.  At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states.  The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.

Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11.  Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader.  Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.

As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace.  Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country.  Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the  new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.

The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan.  The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations.  The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.

The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation.  Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.

Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow.  AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure.  Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.

In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance.  AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao,  "a paper tiger."

The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated.  There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.

The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population.  AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs.  Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor.  They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.

The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis.  In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures.  This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed.  Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.

The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen.  Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority.  They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power.  (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)

There is an important caveat to this.  Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly.  This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam.  They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.

Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted.  Neither should they be diminished.  The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces.  The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers.  In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants.  It is OK.  A fact of life.  But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.

When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US.  The winner would be AQAP.

The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen.  In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.

We did this once before.  In Vietnam.  The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.

Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated.  But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.

Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only.  The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP.  Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam.  Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.

Carrying Water And Doublethinking

Leon Panetta is an old Chicago pol.  He came of political age as a cog in the oldest, longest running, smoothest operating machine in the US--the Cook County Democratic Party.  As such, he knows well the primary duty of a machine man--loyalty to the Boss.  By definition the Boss is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Barack Obama.

Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach."  Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.

Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size.  And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well.  If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.

Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11.  In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.

Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated.  Al-Qaeda is not dead.  It is not on some sort of Islamic life support.  It is not even gravely ill.

The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed.  It has changed profoundly from its original form.  Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.

In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system.  It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser.  None of this obtains today.  Nor has it obtained for some time.  Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.

Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam.  Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.

The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises.  Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original.  "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group.  It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.

The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea.  This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.

In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea.  It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct.  The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam.  These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics.  Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West.  Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.

Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda.  Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies.  The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.

Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone.  In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles.  AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat.  AQIM is growing.  Rapidly.

The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe.  This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better.  In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death.  Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.

AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria.  Kidnapping Europeans.  This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy.  In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort.  Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago.  Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe.  There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.

Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say.  Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year.  Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US.  It is one more rapidly growing threat.

Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge.  He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground.  He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today.  Probably on a larger scale geographically.

Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American.  Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits.  When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.

Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI.  That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols.  It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there,  that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US.  If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.

Get A Grip, Mr President--It's A Real War---

And you are in charge of it. You may not like the idea, Mr Obama; it may perturb your tidy little lawyerly mind; it may disrupt even more your visions of transforming the US into a socialist republic, but the world insists--there is a war out there. A war which if lost by the US and the rest of the civilized states means the blackest of dark days will be upon us.

It appears that the al-Shabaab inspired if actually indigenously conducted bombings during the World Cup finals which littered Kampala with blood and body parts has convinced you that al-Qaeda and its ilk have no respect for the "lives of Africans." This particular outrage, unlike all the others perpetrated by practitioners of violent political Islam during your administration's life, has persuaded you that they "do not regard African life as valuable in and of itself."

The spectacle of maimed and murdered black bodies has moved you, Mr President, to violate your own prohibition against naming names and pointing the finger of guilt at those who deserve it--the jihadists, the suicide bombers, the exploders of remote controlled lethal machines, the people who believe above all else that their particular and perverted notions of the Will of Allah both makes right and necessary the killing of any convenient civilian target--provided the killing garners headlines and invokes fear. The innumerable deaths, the countless wounded resulting from other attacks directed against Israelis, Westerners, Arabs, Afghans, Pakistanis, and oh so many others may not have rubbed your nose in the reality of the war declared by the True Warriors of The One True Faith, but this time they went too far--they slaughtered people of black skin.

Well, Mr President, get a firm grip on this ground truth: War is race neutral. The Mighty Men of the Koran are equally willing to kill regardless of race, creed, national origin, age, or any of the other federally recognized categories for defining victims in need of protection. The Always Brave And Victorious Fighters Of Islam know no exempt classes--any who are not of us are against us is their motto.

The devotees of political Islam, regardless of name, place of origin, or specifics of agenda are linked by the web of hatred for any and all who oppose them, any who refuse to submit to the True Faith as they define it. They make no distinctions between Americans and Ugandans, between Africans and non-Africans. For the jihadis, all infidels are equally deserving of death.

(Of course, historically, Arabs, and al-Shabaab is predominantly comprised of Arabs, have shown a particular predilection for holding black Africans in contempt. Black Africans were for many centuries seen only as fit candidates for enslavement. The terrible trade in human flesh was conducted by Arabs for generations before the Europeans arrived. And, there is powerful evidence that the Arab lust for purchasing black Africans as chattel continues to the present day. This gives a real piquancy to your remarks on South African television. African life is of value to Arabs only insofar as it is a marketable commodity.)

The reality which you have yet to admit is that the war being waged against us by the jihadi and those states which harbor, facilitate, and to some extent direct and control their actions is global in nature. It is not limited to Afghanistan. Nor is a simple and necessary extension of the war's area to Pakistan sufficient. Even adding Somalia to the list of war zones is insufficient.

As today's attacks in southern Yemen makes manifest, the new, improved, and renamed al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), has a very real capacity to kill and, by so doing, further destabilize the very fragile country of Yemen. Given the several armed threats confronting the corrupt, inefficient, broke central government of which AQAP is far from the least, there is a great likelihood that Yemen will soon join Somalia in the roster of failed states.

When, not if, that happens, the jihadis will have a stranglehold on the entrance to the Red Sea with the negative implications for global trade that ability brings with it. As a failed state, Yemen will provide a safe haven for the jihadis who hold the House of Saud in the greatest contempt as an apostate regime with a record of truckling to the infidels of the West. This potential is guaranteed to perturb the sleep not only of the Saudi royals but the equally apostate heads of states throughout the Gulf region.

And--need it be written?--as a failed state Yemen will prove a fertile ground for the Iranians. The mullahs have an unsurpassed record in effectively developing proxies. Adding AQAP to the roster would provide a new level of flexibility and horizontal escalation potential to Tehran's quiver.

The dark potentials resident in the collapse of Yemen will demand that some state or group of states intervene. The most directly threatened are Saudi Arabia and other Gulf littoral countries, but, the notion of actually fighting a war, particularly one with the jihadis of AQAP, may be more than the very cautious Saudis can stomach.

The US has not been directly threatened by the imminent success of al-Shabaab in Somalia. It will be only indirectly threatened when Yemen goes down the Islamist tubes. But, as Mr Obama noted in his indignation on South African national television, the US was attacked indirectly when its embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed during the Clinton years. The line between indirect and direct threats in thin, wavy, and hazy.

This implies that the US does have a palpable stake in both Yemen and Somalia. When the responsibility of the US during both the Clinton and W. Bush administrations for the creation of current Somalia is considered, the nature of the stakes is enhanced.

We and the rest of the Civilized States created Somalia in its present form by a combination of ill-considered intervention and even less well advised retraction. The dynamic behind the Somalian mess is essentially identical to that which assured the creation of Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan--robust intervention followed by hasty retraction. In recent months the same pattern has been clearly observable in US policy toward Yemen. The result is virtually foreordained.

Wars--like foreign policy generally--are successful only if there is a clearly stated goal, a definition of success which is organic to the goal, and a resolutely followed consistent focus on orchestrating the instruments of national power to achieve the goal. Hesitation, irresolution, vacillation, the alternating tough words and outreach are each and all guaranteed to assure failure.

The US under several successive administrations has followed the same route--the way of robust entrance and hasty exit, the avenue of tough words and soft deeds. The result has been the creation and strengthening of the advocates of violent political Islam. The consequence has been a war which has deepened and widened until it comprises much of the world.

Unless President Obama is willing to enlarge his personal "teachable moment" and see that the US is engaged in a war which we most assuredly did not seek but absolutely must win, there is no hope of reversing the dangerous trend of the past twenty plus years. While there is little realistic reason to conclude the current man in the Oval will see the light, it must be hoped (prayed?) that he do so as time is not on the side of the good guys in this war to the death.

"The Kids" Are Getting Plumb Dangerous

Al Shabaab, (the youth, if you prefer English) has hit outside its home turf of Somalia for the first time. It was a hard hit. A hard hit which "The Kids" had promised if Uganda did not remove its "occupying" troops from the few blocks which comprise the writ of the Transitional Federal Government.

The High Minded and Lofty Thinking diplomats of the West created the fiction of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and then abandoned the field to the forces of the African Union. The AU is notoriously long on ambition and delusions of adequacy. It is equally short on competence, funding, able armed forces, and consistent political will.

When all the AU promises had been made, only Uganda and Burundi sent peacekeeping forces. Of these, the Ugandans have done the most freight hauling. Uganda has done this for several reasons, none of which are altruistic. In large measure the Ugandan government has kept its presence in Mogadishu as an emblem of its enlarging status on the continent.

With the discovery and proving of significant oil reserves, Uganda has been announcing its ambitions to be a major player in African affairs. New visions of prosperity and the status which such will bring in its wake have been accompanied by apparent success in finally defeating the long running sore caused by the Lords Resistance Army's insurgency. Muscle flexing in Somalia can be seen as a natural extension of these factors as well as a counter to the influx of refugees from Somalia.

The deadly triple bombing during the World Cup final game in Uganda's capital Kampala gives the country's government a stark choice: withdraw from Somalia or enlarge the effort. Neither option is good.

Al Shabaab is riven at present between two major competing factions. One wants to focus on the final elimination of the TFG and the installation of a shariah compliant Islamist regime. The other, the internationalist wing which is aligned with al-Qaeda and numbers hundreds of foreign fighters in its ranks, wants to export the war to other countries in the Horn of Africa including not only Uganda but Kenya as well. The Kampala attack hints that the internationalists are either winning the internecine struggle or are both willing and able to go it alone.

Either of these two alternatives indicates that the very dynamic the US feared when it employed the Ethiopian army as a proxy to eliminate the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) is coming to pass. The ICU was seen by the US as providing another safe haven for violent political Islamists of the al-Qaeda variety. The extirpation of this potential was seen as both necessary and high priority.

The failure of the US and other Western governments to look one day beyond that upon which the ICU was deposed guaranteed that the aftermath would be worse. As Somalia has never been other than a mere geographic expression in which all politics were local and clan based, the avenue of chaos was wide open to any group sufficiently motivated and willing to kill. Of the various groups so oriented, al-Shabaab was the most dedicated and most willing to pile up corpses.

With the exception of former British Somalia, which peeled itself away from the rest of the mess assembled by Western diplomats at the UN a half century earlier, Somalia rapidly fell under the shariah clad heel of al-Shabaab. Resistance to "The Kids" was just enough to ensure the group became more and more extreme, more willing to kill, more dedicated to winning--and more willing to call for outside support.

It was the political equivalent of a person taking just enough antibiotic to assure the weak bacteria were killed and the survivors made stronger, more resistant, and more deadly. Al-Shabaab is comprised of battle tested and slaughter hardened survivors.

These indigenous survivors have been reinforced in recent months by equally battle tested and slaughter hardened fighters from other theaters including Iraq and Afghanistan. They have also been joined by recruits from the twenty plus years of Somalian diaspora. Arabs, Afghans, Uzbeks, returning refugees or the children of refugees, all are united by the ideology of violent political Islam, by the vision of a global caliphate or, at the least, by a deep and abiding hatred of the infidels of the West and all the baggage those infidels carry.

The less than half-hearted measures taken to date by the US and other Western countries to bring, or, to err on the side of accuracy, impose, stability on Somalia have done absolutely nothing useful. All have been counterproductive. From the cut-and-run decision taken by President Clinton in the wake of the killing of nineteen special forces troops in an ill-conceived and worse executed attempt to "arrest" a Somalian warlord nearly twenty years ago to the present time, the actions of the US could not have been more carefully calculated to produce an Islamist victory and the dreaded new safe harbor for al-Qaeda.

The triple bombing in Kampala should serve as a wakeup call not simply for Uganda or the AU but for the US and the West generally. The hope that proxies would provide a low risk, low cost way of preventing an Islamist takeover of Somalia has been proven disastrously wrong. Al-Shabaab has shown a will and ability to engage in significant horizontal escalation of the war. It is no longer an internal matter, resident in Somalia alone.

With the Kampala attack "The Kids" have shown their threats to Kenya and elsewhere must be taken seriously. The Bad Boys Of The True Faith can and will make good on their threats. The proof is in the mangled bodies of those who died, shredded by al-Shabaab's bombs. "The Kids" own the initiative now. They can choose when, where, and how to strike. No country, certainly not Kenya, nor Yemen is safe.

It will not be sufficient to leave the task up to the AU. While the association may want that to be the case, the bitter ground truth is that the Union is not up to the job. Not even a massive influx of foreign money will change that. Only years of careful training backed by shipments of modern equipment can spin up the AU forces to a level of skill which would allow them to undertake either effective stability operations in Somalia or adequately guard against replays of the Kampala attack.

That leaves the usual fall back--the US and the West. Considering that the US is still neck deep in the Big Muddy of Afghanistan, it is not in the cards for Washington to send in the Marines or the airborne. Considering the West is locked in a losing contest of wills with Iran on the rather critical matter of the mullahs getting their Mahdi Bomb, it staggers the imagination to conclude that the European Union or any member state will decide to send troops to Somalia.

To go completely outside the box--how about Russia? That's a non-starter considering that the Kremlin cannot even deal effectively, "clarify and put to order" in the words of Vladimir Putin, the Islamist insurgency in the Caucasus--and that is conveniently close to Russia.

To keep on pushing the envelop of theoretical possibilities--what about China? Well, China always needs more oil and Uganda has oil. Perhaps China can form its version of Blackwater security and contract with Kampala. That would assure one country could be held harmless against "The Kids."

No. The Geek was being jocose. Even as a hedge against the loss of Iranian oil, China is quite pleased to sit back and watch--as it deals with its own homegrown Islamists.

In short, there will be no volunteers from anywhere willing and able to take on "The Kids." Any way the political-military cake is sliced, al-Shabaab looks to get the biggest piece. Worse, the auguries point to the better organized, more resolute, more ambitious internationalist faction winning out over the provincials so as to assure that Somalia will be both the long feared safe haven and a major exporter of both violence and political Islam.

Oh, well, as Allah wills.