What A Difference A Decade Makes

Ten years ago a group of nineteen men primarily from Saudi Arabia were in the last stages of preparing for their dramatic exit from this world.  In the US the major political news revolved around the Social Security "lockbox" and dire warnings of dark conspiracy afoot with Vice-President Cheney's energy task force meeting behind locked doors.  The most recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review was silent on asymmetrical warfare and made little mention of unmanned combat systems (UCS.)  The "Gang of Five Hundred" had reached a quick consensus on George W. Bush being a one-term president.

And, the US was rolling in bucks.  The federal budget was running an embarrassingly large surplus.  There was so much loot in Uncle Sam's pockets that tax cuts were agreed by one and all to be a very good idea.  There was also a wide consensus on the desirability of increased spending on education and health care for senior citizens.  Americans were feeling almost guilty about all that money littering the floors and vaults of the Treasury Department.

The overall American mood was optimistic.  There was a degree of buoyancy within We the People that even the boom days of the early and mid-sixties seemed grey and dismal in comparison.  The "go-go" years of that famed decade paled into dimness compared with the confidence, even exuberance, seen on Wall Street and Main Street alike.  The Summer of '01 was very much a period of "let the good times roll!"

The US was the globe's only superpower.  The economy was booming in all sectors--even housing and real estate.  Jobs were plentiful.  There were no real enemies abroad in the world, only a handful of annoying Arab terrorists such as those who attacked the USS Cole and our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  Hardly enough to worry about, right?

We now know that the Summer of '01 was the last season of the ancien regime.  We know now that the past decade has been the opening period of several rather revolutionary dynamics in national security and foreign affairs.

The concept of asymmetrical warfare has come front and center.  The US and other civilized states now must prepare to deter or defeat opponents at any point on a conflict spectrum which runs from the use of terror to the employment of missile delivered nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

The introduction and very rapid evolution of unmanned combat systems (UCS) whether in the air, on land, or in and under the sea indicates that the new technology bodes well to be a game changer equivalent in impact to the introduction of gunpowder weapons.  There can be no doubt that even in this early stage of development, the UCS far surpasses in impact both current and near term potential of the submarine, the aircraft carrier, or aircraft themselves.

The nation-state which has served to define global politics for the past five hundred years is now threatened on two fronts.  One of these is the supra-national organization.  The other can be best seen as sub-national or, to use a longer term, national entities living uneasily within the confines of a state dominated by a different and larger nation.

Another feature which has come to the center of global politics is the latest restatement of a very long standing conflict.  It is a conflict which has emerged many times over the centuries.  The defining foundation of this very ancient and basic tension is between philosophies of life which center on the individual and views which put the priority upon the community and see the individual as important only insofar as he contributes to the common good of the community.

The tension between individualism and communitarianism dates back to the time when agriculture emerged as a rival to the far more ancient hunting and gathering way of life.  To be successful the agriculture based approach to life requires stable communities in which land and labor can be monitored, controlled, guaranteed.  The hunting and gathering economy depends upon the voluntary cooperation of individuals so that every person's strengths can be utilized and their weaknesses offset.  Agriculture requires both the subordination of the individual to the needs of the community and a hierarchy to assure this subordination.

The individualistically oriented view of life emphasizes the rights of the individual while properly linking these rights with concomitant duties.  The communitarian understanding puts a great weight on the duties of the individual--often to the point of ignoring the concept of "rights" completely.  The polities which tend to the individualistic end of the spectrum are open and democratic to a significant degree.  Polities which lean in the communitarian direction are authoritarian, even autocratic.

In the past, the conflict between the individualistic and communitarian has been seen in the wars between Western democracies and authoritarian ideologically driven states such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.  It was the conflict of world views and understandings which hid under the term, "the Cold War."  Today it exists as the struggle between civilized states and the exponents of violent political Islam.

Running as a connecting thread between all of these several substantial and rapid changes in the practice of global politics is the equally fast and major transformation of the technologies of information transmission and communication.  As a means for facilitating the organization of ad hoc constituencies or as a tool for perception manipulation or as a political force multiplier, the Internet, the cellphone, and their dependencies such as social media have only begun to demonstrate their power and potential quite recently.

Then there is the change in the way in which We the People see ourselves, the world, and our future.  In a very important sense, the change in mood and perception during the past decade is also a revolution.  Perhaps it is the most important revolution of all.  This contention is predicated on a commonplace: The perceptions, attitudes, and, thus, actions of the American public place very real and powerful inducements and constraints on decision and policy makers.    In short, the mood of Americans generally is the context in which all national security and foreign policy actions are taken (or not taken.)

(It has gotten too bloody hot to go on for now--105 degrees F here at the computer. Please indulge the Geek and let him go and cool off secure in the knowledge that he will go on with this "thought piece" on the morrow when it might be a tad cooler.)

Only The Names Change--Not The Reality

In the two decades which have elapsed since the effective end of the Cold War, there have been any number of name changes applied to the old whore, war. We have waded through "Third Generation War," "Asymmetrical Warfare," "Overseas Contingency Operations," and, most recently "Fourth Generation War." Throughout the proliferation of names which neither describe nor distinguish effectively between types or levels of warfare, the old terms of "conventional," "irregular" (Yeech!,) and "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" have soldiered on, brought out on occasion for use by the in-group of defense intellectuals or, for fear producing purposes, the media and politicians.

Behind the forest of terms the reality of war remains the same. It is today what it always has been. The organised application of force to a political goal by a state or a pretender to statehood. That's it. That's all war ever has been. That's all it ever will be. As the coach sez, "Time to get back to the basics."

OK. The Geek acknowledges that there has been one complication emerging with a fair bit of drama in the past twenty or so years. That complication is the existence of ideologically motivated, diffusely commanded, non-state actors whose actions range across the lines on the map called "borders" and whose political goals may be both hazy and overly ambitious.

The complication was seen developing as far back as the Seventies by a few individuals who warned that the increasing use of proxy war by both the US and the Soviet Union would create both the necessary conditions and the experienced, motivated cadre for the development of widespread "quasi-insurgencies" using trans-national terror and similar tactics to pursue political goals within and between established states. The warnings of this potential were ignored in the dynamic of the Cold War. Thus the Law of Unintended Consequences was invoked.

We are dealing with the results today. And, will be for some years to come.

In its Quadrennial Defense Review the Obama administration (or at least the Robert Gates portion of it) has simplified the clearly out-to-lunch "Quad" typology of war. Now, the US will prepare for only three types of war: conventional, irregular (again, Yeech!) and hybrid. This latter overly vague term appears to apply to everything from the old style proxy war to the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear munitions (CBRN) in the context of either of the first two categories.

Simplification is nice. In this case it may carry with it the added benefit of lowering the profile of the WMD's as a threat. Bluntly, the possibility of one of the proliferating bunch of non-state actors whether performing as proxies or on their own hook using CBRN is slim to none.

While the control of WMD proliferation is a proper focus of diplomatic effort and, arguably, the people at the Department of Homeland Security, it is not a major challenge for US forces in the field. Even in the context of homeland security the level of the threat must not be exaggerated.

Yes, it is a really fun game to develop nightmare scenarios involving CBRN employment by Islamist jihadists working for an unfriendly foreign power or on their own initiative. But, while fun, the exercise is far easier to conduct as a thought experiment than it is to execute in the real world. Making killer bugs or toxic gases in the comfort and privacy of your very own terrorist safehouse is easy to imagine--and hard to do.

Obtaining radioactive materials and putting together your very own dirty bomb is another activity that brings frissons of delight to the mind as one imagines just how easy it would be to accomplish. Again there is a (fortunately) large gap between principle and practice, theory and reality.

But, the Geek wanders a bit.

The necessities for waging successful war are well known. To counter an enemy in the field whether that enemy is a state waging conventional war or a guerrilla fighting with the tactics of hit and run, ambush, improvised explosive devices, and suicide attacks on soft targets, the same requisites for success exist.

The necessities are two in number. Here they are in order of importance. Political will. A suitable capacity.

The second category, suitable capacity, can be further sub-divided. One needs a proper doctrine or theory of victory. One must also have relevant material capabilities ranging from weapons to reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, to logistics and support, to command, control and communications. Finally, the training to the doctrine and in the use of the materiel must be both realistic and effective.

For any particular war, whether a conventional clash of firepower heavy forces or a small scale interventionary operation (which includes counterinsurgency, humanitarian operations, peace keeping and other sorts of what is now called "asymmetrical warfare") the doctrine must be tied closely and realistically to two larger, overarching considerations.

The first of these which is joined head and hip to political will. It is the political goal toward which force is being applied.

The second is the definition of victory. Without a definition of victory tied tightly to the political goal of the war, it is impossible to properly estimate whether or not one is succeeding. This is particularly true in the case of interventionary operations where there is an absence of nice, tidy lines on a map.

The doctrine itself must be flexible and capable of change during the war if it shows itself to be the wrong theory of victory. This is difficult, but not impossible as has been demonstrated in Iraq and (at least provisionally) in Afghanistan.

The political goal of the war, its definition of victory, and the theory of victory must be tied into a tightly wrapped unity. The ties that bind are several considerations which demand examination and conclusions before the first boot hits the ground. These strings of coherence are best put forth as a question.

Is our goal, our definition of victory, and our theory of victory as well as the supporting equipment and training internally consistent and coherent, and are they relevant to the human realities on the ground where we propose to operate?

In recent American wars from Vietnam to the early years of Iraq and Afghanistan it is clear that the question was neither asked nor answered. Fortunately, unlike Vietnam, in the more recent wars, the military command level showed itself to be flexible, innovative, and open to change.

As a result the US forces did accomplish the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing" in Iraq. In the same way the recent shift in both definition and theory of victory in Afghanistan bodes more-or-less well to retrieve a semblance of success from the jaws of impending defeat.

American political will has been tested, even severely tested, but not found dangerously wanting during the long years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This stands in sharp contrast to the experience during the Vietnam war.

The reasons for this disparity are various, but the most important are twofold. The body count has been low, even very, very low by the standards of the earlier war. The war is being fought by people who willingly joined the armed forces including the Reserves and National Guard. The absence of draftees from the war should not be underrated as a stiffener of American political will.

Another reason which can be advanced legitimately for the continuation of political will over the past nearly eight years is the behavior of the enemy. The excesses of the Islamists, the Jihadists, must be given credit for maintaining the American backbone. At the same time that martyrdom operations give heart to the jihadists and their Islamist commanders, they have laid a foundation of revulsion and fear in the minds of Americans critical to continued acceptance--if not outright support--of the war.

Whether the Obama administration can continue the success of its predecessor in ignoring anti-war sentiments in the American population as the war continues in Afghanistan and as the first blush of success in Iraq fades under the pressure of renewed ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq to say nothing of the almost inevitable horizontal escalation of the war remains to be seen. This last factor, horizontal escalation, will prove to be the greatest test of American political will.

Since the enemy is a non-state actor capable of accepting covert state support, it has a great capacity to maintain the initiative. Far more than the ponderous organised forces of a state, the jihadists have the capacity to move from a venue where they are losing to one where they can continue the war--perhaps in the next thing to perpetuity.

While immediate attention has been focused on Pakistan and the probability that jihadists will flee the approaching Marines in Helmand crossing the border into the FATA, there are very strong indications that the wannabe martyrs are ranging further afield. Like into Somalia and Yemen. And elsewhere, such as Sudan and areas of North Africa.

The US and its allies will always be behind the curve. Unless, a critical decision is made in the very near future.

The decision?

Whether or not the US will take the initiative and try to get ahead of the jihadists by deploying significant forces to Somalia and, perhaps (questionably so considering internal politics) to Yemen. This is not an action which can be taken either lightly or unilaterally. It is not an action which fits well with the current agenda of the Obama administration or the economic realities surrounding the US.

Nonetheless it is a decision which must be made. How it is made will determine how long and how successfully we will wage the totality of the Forever War against Islamist jihadism. Which ever way the decision goes, its effects will constrain our lives for many, many years to come.

Not pleasant, eh, bucko?

Another Attack Of Sanity At The Pentagon--Good!

In a move that will no doubt cause much tooth gnashing among the High Minded who expected some sort of "Peace Dividend--The Sequel" with the election of Barack Obama, the Pentagon has decided to include China as a baseline component of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR.) This move which is long overdue constitutes a species of victory for the denizens of the Five Sided Wigwam by the banks of the Potomac who have a firm grip on reality.

China has been making massive investments in its military structure. Much, if not most, of the money underwriting the unprecedented defense improvements has come from the United States. This, of course, is the unintended, but easily foreseeable, consequence of the Clinton administion's opening of trade with China. It is proving true that the prime beneficiaries of the neo-liberal Clinton move are not Walmart shoppers but Chinese soldiers, sailors and airmen.

It is not likely that the Men of the Forbidden City are chomping at the bit to challenge the US to a mano a mano war. Rather, they are intending to cast a large, a very large shadow over Asia and the Pacific while simultaneously limiting the ability and credibility of any potential American response.

At the same time the improvements in the Chinese defense establishment will serve the goal of inhibiting the Russians in the Great Game for influence in Central Asia. The same massive restructuring will assure that no viable challenge can emerge from another rapidly developing country with which China has historically had rocky relations. That country is India.

Finally, the Senior Mandarinate of the Middle Kingdom aspire to a global position which will serve to further ambitions for access to both resources and markets throughout the world. A very strong and evident military capacity translates quickly and effectively to the sort of diplomatic leverage which constitutes Great Power status and the accompanying benefits.

China is an ancient, proud, intensely nationalistic country which long ago dropped the self-imposed isolation which had characterised much of the past thousand years. It is recreating the China of a long ago period which saw large Chinese fleets on the coast of Africa acquiring both knowledge and tribute from far away places and potentates. Had the Chinese emperor not willfully abandoned the outward orientation of the empire, China would have emerged as a, perhaps the, major player in the earliest days of European exploration and colonization.

China was not there to oppose the European expansion not because China was backward technologically or politically to the several European states nibbling on the margins of Africa and the Western Hemisphere. China was not there because the government of the day chose to withdraw from the world's stage.

During the reign of Mao the Chinese made tentative steps back to engagement with the larger world. At that time the effort came to little or nothing because the country lacked the necessities of Great Power status. Other than minor encroachments in Albania and Tanzania, the Chinese might as well have stayed home for the benefits their outreach efforts produced.

Thanks to the Neo-liberal economic ideology of the Clinton years and the rush by the High Minded to believe that open, free trade would make conflict between nations impossible, the Chinese now possess the prerequisites of Great Powerdom. They have both the ability and the political will to make their mark on the globe.

In a real sense China, or, more accurately, the American mythology of China, has made the country the bane of our existence. Way back when, a century or so ago, the US declaration of the Open Door made us see ourselves the special protector of China against rapacious colonial powers. That foreign policy delusion set the US on a collision course with the emerging Japanese Empire.

More recently the myth of China as attached hip and shoulder with the Soviet Union in the global Communist menace demanded implacable hostility to Beijing. It also justified sending the troops to South Vietnam among other, lesser, bad foreign policy choices.

Then the US bought into the myth that China had turned both free enterprise and democratic. This belief which might have been true in part but was not accurate overall provided the basis for the New Open Door--a door open to inexpensive Chinese goods flowing one way and US dollars flowing the opposite.

Far from making China our new, best friend or at least a cooperative partner in the march of capitalism, privatization and globalism, this action has allowed the Men of the Forbidden City to become far more effective enemies. Other than maintaining the stability of the US economy, the Beijing regime shares few, if any, national interests with the United States. Even those other interests which might be held in common such as ending Somalian piracy will be pursued by the Chinese in ways and using means not necessarily compatible with those of the US.

In the piracy patrol context it might be noted that the Chinese flotilla liaises with but does not operate with the international force, CTF 151. The Chinese naval vessels confine their direct escort duties to protecting ships carrying cargoes to or from China or flying the Chinese flag. Other than that their anti-piracy acts have been limited. Not so limited are excursions into African ports and waters providing opportunities for showing the flag and giving officers a familiarity with distant waters of interest to Beijing.

As manifested by their espionage efforts, both traditional and cyber based, as well as the lack of overt, enthusiastic cooperation with the US on matters such as nuclear non-proliferation, the Chinese have no great bent toward either accepting American claims of unchallenged Great Power status or failing to challenge these claims whenever and wherever possible. Bluntly, China is not a friend. It is not a partner. It is not an active or potential general purpose ally of the US.

Overall, it would be imprudent in the extreme to leave China out of the QDR. China, along with, or, perhaps even more than, Russia, is a potential armed adversary of the US. In both cases the probability of direct war is very low. In both cases the potential for diplomatic rivalry is high and getting higher.

Whether the High Minded and Lofty Thinking like the idea or not, the credible capacity and political will to use military force in support of diplomacy is a vital component of foreign policy. Unless the American military is seen as capable of waging symmetrical war with China (or Russia) our ability to operate in the world is impaired--perhaps fatally. It is not necessary to become a neocon ninnie of the Bush-Cheney sort to accept that the US will not be perceived as a Great Power, even in a multi-polar world, without a credible full-threat military capacity.

By placing China in the QDR along with failing or failed states, Islamist jihadism, nuclear proliferation and the still willing to growl Russian bear, the Pentagon is trying to assure that the US will not surrender its place in the world. This may (no, more likely, will) stick in the craw of the Blame-America-First crowd, but the effort is necessary.

That President Obama has allowed the inclusion of China in the QDR hints that he may be a closet realist. That he isn't willing to see the US diminished in its global potency--regardless of his somewhat spineless performance during segments of his recent Grand Tour. This possibility undoubtedly will inflame the "progressive" elements in his base.

Only time will tell if Mr Obama has the testicular fortitude to stand up to the High Minded, the "progressives" the The-World-Is-Best-Off-Without-Us crowd. If he fails this test, well, the Geek hopes he personally isn't too old to learn Chinese.