China--"Not A Threat At This Time?"

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is on his way to the Peoples' Republic of China. As ever he is diplomatic, averring that China is not yet a "threat" to the United States. Presumably he spoke with respect to direct military confrontation only.

Why the limitation?

Because China is, has been, and will continue to be a direct threat to US interests generally. In time it will become a greater direct military threat to us as well.

The Chinese regime has shown a limited capacity and willingness to work alongside the United States as in the recent successful negotiations with North Korea. Chinese national interests were directly involved as were those of the other states engaged in the lengthy process with the rogue Korean regime.

In other situations where the physical interests of China are not directly, substantially, and materially involved, China has proven itself to be an obstacle to multi-lateral diplomatic efforts. The most blatant example of this is the Iranian nuclear matter. China (along with Russia) came to the recently concluded London meetings of the P5+1 without any apparent sense of urgency and without any real preparation as to the time line for the third round of sanctions.

In a closely related matter, the Chinese government is selling J-10 fighter-bombers to Iran. These aircraft are the state of the Chinese art. This continues the fine record established many years ago by Beijing as a willing supplier of more-or-less advanced weaponry to international troublemakers.

Of course it helps that Iran has lots of oil for sale and the PRC needs lots of oil--preferably cheap. Domestic demand for petroleum products is growing even faster than Chinese predictions.

China has not been noteworthy for its stance on Burma. While there is no probability that the Chinese are in the running for the Global Human Rights Award, it might still be in Beijing's interest to show a modicum of support for international efforts to reform the Burmese junta's behavior. The Chinese have the economic leverage. The government simply has chosen not to use it.

(The Indian government also has the leverage and has also refrained from using it.)

Even in Northeast Africa where the Chinese also have significant economic leverage, Beijing has shown no willingness whatsoever to cooperate with international efforts in Sudan.

Do we see a pattern here?

The Peoples' Republic of China is not simply nor solely a threat to US diplomatic interests and efforts. No. It's not that simple. The PRC is a threat to international efforts generally. Efforts jointly undertaken by countries with diverse national interests. Efforts undertaken by governments that do not agree in whole or perhaps even in part with the stance(s) of our current administration.

International collaboration on humanitarian, human rights, and nuclear non-proliferation are driven not simply by subjective, self-defined national interest but by a realization that some matters are of such import that mere national considerations must be placed at least temporarily to one side.

The Chinese regime is unwilling to do this. It is unwilling to work effectively with multi-lateral efforts unless direct national interest is at risk.

In this as in the PRC's cavalier attitude toward such matters as export safety, or transparency in military spending, research, and development, Beijing has shown itself an international delinquent. That alone is enough to make them a threat to us--and others.

Then there are some other little matters---

Chinese espionage and cybernage directed against multiple targets both military and industrial here in the US as well as within other countries. The Geek is perfectly well aware that all countries possessing the capability for spying do so. On everybody they can. The status of ally or enemy is not so much a hindrance as an inducement.

The Chinese seem to have been going over the edge in the practice however. Even compared to their nearest rivals in the Great Global Spook Derby, the Russians. Come on, guys! Really, New Zealand? Was that really, really necessary?

How about the Chinese space program? Sure, everyone is talking space now. Even some countries in Africa which should be far more concerned about how they are going to feed their (rapidly expanding) population are bidding to become "Mission Control" of the continent.

The Chinese are serious. And, seriously capable. The technology is readily available to support even their announced, expansive idea of establishing a moon base in the next couple of decades. All it takes is time and money. Beijing has both.

Space programs are inherently military even when run by a civilian agency. All space related technology has immediate, easy direct transferability to military usages. In a real sense, the Chinese efforts in rocketry and space science are a ramp-up of the country's capacity as a military threat.

China may not be a direct military threat to the US right now, today. But the clock is ticking. And, it is not ticking in our favor.

Get a grip on this before you buy the next "Made in China" product.

All sales of such goods helps the Chinese government. Every time we shop at Walmart or a similarly bottom line driven "corporate citizen," our money is helping an international delinquent which has already threatened US national interests. A country so propelled by subjective, self-defined national interests that it is unwilling to collaborate in well-intended, widely supported multilateral measures.

Every dollar flowing to China helps this massive bad boy of the globe develop greater financial muscle to support its pursuit of its national interest.

Remember what Lenin said?

"The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them."

These are words the Chinese government lives by today. Why help them hang us?

The Geek Makes A Fearless Forecast

In the near future, Pakistan will go Islamist. Not Islamic--that's what it is now--but Islamist. You know, like Iran. But, perhaps to an even greater extent.

There are a number of indicators in the open literature that show a continuation and even an increase in trends within Pakistan which extend back at least three decades. These include the recent poll showing limited support for fighting either al-Qaeda or Taliban. Take a look at the details in, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct07/PakAlQaeda_Oct07_quaire.pdf.

Another poll found strong support for the greater inclusion of Sharia (Islamic customary law) in the legal system of Pakistan. According to the poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, seveny-six percent of those questioned favored including Sharia. See the results of last month's poll at http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Pakistan%20Poll%20Report.pdf.

The same sources make it clear that any unilateral US effort at "hot pursuit" of Taliban or its foreign components into Pakistan would be rejected by the majority of the Pakistani population. Any effort by Musharraf or a Musharraf-Bhutto combination to allow US raids into the Tribal Agencies would be particularly fraught with political peril as only a small minority of borderland dwellers go so far as to approve of a purely Pakistani military effort against the guerrillas.

Ready for more unpleasant news from "our key ally" Pakistan?

OK. Here it is. Between a third and a half of the Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of the various groups ranging from al-Qaeda (at the low end of approval) through Taliban (in the middle of the range) to various indigenous Jihadist groups (at the high end.) Put together with the emphasis on customary Islamic law, which is a key component of Islamism's ideology, the approval of Jihadist groups makes clear that the Pakistanis are not inclined to support the American efforts against Islamism/Jihadism.

Regardless of the soothing mood music coming from our State Department (for a Pakistani report of the Muzak from State, see http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?193233), the reality is quite different. Neither the 150 megabucks per month expended by us on Pakistan since 2001 nor the current administration's call for an additional 60 megabucks to be focused at the Tribal Agencies, particularly North Waziristan, has made any measurable difference in the ani-US, pro-Islamist stance of the Pakistani population.

The search for "moderates" in Pakistan reminds the Geek of the similar chasing after mirages during the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-80. There may be "moderates" in Pakistan today as there may have been individuals of similar inclination in Iran twenty-eight years ago.

So what!

"Moderates" in Iran back then or in Pakistan today are utterly irrelevant. If they exist, they are so insignificant in numbers or so unimportant in political or military position that they might as well live on the back side of the moon.

The US State Department may actually believe what its spokesman said the other day that "Pakistan is undergoing a political transition... [including] moderate forces within the Pakistani political system working together for a moderate Pakistan". If the deep thinkers in Foggy Bottom actually think this is the truth, they aren't worth the money we're paying them.

Remember the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency were behind the creation and success of Taliban in Afghanistan. Remember, A.Q. Khan could not have engaged in his wholesale efforts at nuclear proliferation without the knowledge and agreement of the same two organisations. Remember, the performance of the Pakistani Army despite recent small scale successes has been somewhere between poor and inexcusably pathetic.

US pressure may have resulted in the deployment of nearly 100,000 military and para-military personnel into conflict areas. But this pressure cannot make the armed forces perform well nor maintain a will to combat over time. The Times of India reports in detail on some of the losses and difficulties encountered by the Pakistani forces as they reluctantly lumber into action. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Multiple_conflicts_bleed_Pak_army/articleshow/2503763.cms.

The Paks have promised an "all out" military effort to rid the Tribal Agency border region of Taliban and similar "militants." But, they have made the same promise in the past. Repeatedly. Considering the heavy losses and poor morale of the troops, this promise will not last long.

The current administration needs to get a grip on a fundamental reality.

We are not engaged in a "Global War on Terrorism" as it would have us believe. We are actually fighting a total war against Islamism and its armed component, Jihadism. This means simply that the real battlefield is not the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The real battlefield in Pakistan and elsewhere is the minds, the collective worldview of the people. The genuine strategic challenge is to find a way to convince a critical mass of the Pakistani population (as well as the populations of other Islamic countries) that the best future for them does not rest with the cramped Islamist notions but with the melding of Islamic and Western ideas and structures.

The development and application of that type of strategy will not be simple nor fast. All that can be said is that without acknowledgement of the actual enemy in the current struggle, there is no chance of doing it.

We had better do it now and well. Remember, Pakistan is a nuclear power.

We had better shift gears darn fast--Pakistan is like an eighteen wheeler balanced on the edge of a steep cliff. It may tumble tomorrow.

Lessons? From Our Wars

The United States has fought a bunch of wars in the last one hundred years. Some have gone by almost unnoticed--interventions in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Others have undergone intense scrutiny--World Wars I and II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars as well as our current undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq.

From all these wars lessons of a sort have been learned not only by our military but by We the People as well. Some of these lessons have been real, material, and have served to improve both decision making about entering war and our war fighting capability. Other lessons have been misleading, or even down right false.

The Geek thinks it might be time to take a look at some of these lessons, both true and false and see how they can be used to evaluate the American position today. The exercise might help us to more accurately assess probabilities for war in the near term.

The First World War sits astride history as the Great Fault Line, a total discontinuity between that which existed before August 1914 and that which happened after November 1918. That war gave rise to many of the problems bedeviling the world today in the Mideastern wreckage of the Ottoman Empire.

The American public took one great and greatly wrong lesson from World War I. It went by one word--Isolationism. The World War did not deliver a conclusive victory from the American perspective. Neither did it result in a better state of peace, again from the American point of view. The world was not safer for democracy. Russia became the Soviet Union. The seemingly undefeated nature of the German Army gave rise to the "stab in the back" theory which was so important to the rise of National Socialism less than twenty years after the guns fell silent on the Western Front.

The American military did learn some few but valuable lessons. These included the centrality of being ready to go to war before you went there. Not that it mattered. We the People and our representatives assured that this lesson would go for nothing as we hunkered down in an Isolationist "Fortress America."

World War II caught us not only by surprise (although it shouldn't have) but unready for real war against real gun-toting enemies. Hard fighting--and an enormously efficient industrial plant--along with the ability of the Russians to die in great numbers while killing lots of Germans brought victory in Europe. Industrial capacity reinforced by very hard fighting against an opponent inferior in numbers but superior in his willingness to die brought success in the Pacific.

We the People learned a very big--and very misleading--lesson from WW II. To be successful, a war must be total in nature. All restraints must be cast off. Total dedication, total ruthlessness of force application brought total victory. Victory through unconditional surrender.

For us the paradigm of war was established. War was forced on us by an absolutely evil enemy. We mobilized our total capacity and total political will. We fought with the determination to inflict maximum death and destruction upon the enemy at the lowest possible cost in American lives. The enemy was totally defeated, left naked and defenseless. At our mercy.

With our sword at the enemy's throat we Americans said, "Rise. Go hence. Sin no more." Ruthless in war, we were merciful in victory. That was the Good War.

The military learned some long lived lessons from World War II as well. Rapid maneuver so as to bring overwhelming firepower to bear on a single critical point in the enemy's defenses all orchestrated and controlled by effective technologies of command, control, and communication assured the quickest, lowest cost victory possible.

Ever since WW II, the American military and naval forces have emphasized moving, shooting, and communicating so that time and lives might be saved. In a war between opponents having rough parity in technology, industrial capacity, and social/political organisational complexity, this is appropriate.

The question left hanging in the air by both the popular and military lessons learned from WW II is simple: How often has the WW II paradigm been operative? How often in our history before or since WW II has the US engaged in total war of a bloody and decisive nature with the outcome being the unconditional surrender of the enemy?

The overlooked answer to the unasked question is one word--none. Not even the War Between the States qualifies. The end state was not unconditional surrender. Not even the vengeance ridden Republicans such as Thad Stevens could make it so. The reasons are self-evident.

Less than five years after V-J Day we were at war again. In Korea. The war no one wants to remember. The war of false lessons for both We the People and the military.

The Korean War was arguably the most important war we Americans fought in the 20th Century. It, not WW II, represented the true paradigm of war.

The Korean War was a limited war in support of policy. That is the big lesson to take away from the three blood soaked years on the ridges of the Land of Morning Calm.

The US policy goals in Korea were simply to apply the Doctrine of Containment to the Far East and to effectively establish the UN as an instrument for supporting that doctrine. It was not a grand crusade to eradicate communism in Asia despite what some Republicans of the day thought.

Contrary to what Douglas MacArthur (in)famously said, there was a substitute for victory. After the Peoples' Liberation Army rudely cured us of a bad case of "victory disease," the US government, if not We the People, understood that not losing was the best possible substitute for victory.

Specialists in the foreign policy community of the Cold War learned one lesson from Korea. It was that limited wars in support of policy were possible provided they were short in duration, low in casualties, and, most importantly, public support could be maintained.

The military relearned that firepower kills and maneuver in rugged terrain requires air transportation capacities far greater than those possessed in the early Fifties.

Vietnam challenged the lessons of Korea and WW II alike. First of all the war was not "forced" on us. Even in Korea we could assure ourselves that war had been forced upon us by a seemingly unprovoked North Korean invasion. Second, the generation coming of draftable age between 1965 and 1970 was different in several salient respects from earlier cohorts of draftees.

These differences between the Vietnam and earlier wars were not factored into the lessons learned by either We the People or our military. The American public, its government, and to a significant extent our Armed Forces agreed on a slogan, "No More Vietnams!" They disagreed on just what this slogan might mean in practice.

To some it meant simply keep the troops home, or on the Trace facing the Crimson Tide on the yonder side of the Iron Curtain. No more little wars. No more interventions. No more adventures in counterinsurgency.

To others, particularly those in the military, the big lesson of Vietnam was: We Ain't Goin' Nowhere 'Less We Got Two Things!"

The two things?

Monolithic public support and political will was first. The second was simply overwhelming force. Force enough, lethality enough, to assure a quick, decisive, and, above all, cheap victory.

The military gave full form to its lesson learned from the Vietnam experience in the so-called Powell Doctrine prior to Operation Desert Storm. It worked. The war was short, seemingly decisive, and very low cost in American lives.

Overlooked initially was the simple reality that the war had not resulted in a genuine defeat of the Iraqi government. We had accomplished our minimum necessary goal--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Other, more expansive, goals had been quietly forsworn as the US invasion hit its hundredth hour.

Korean War style "not-losing" had taken precedence over WW II model "victory." Prudence prevailed over any crusading impulse.

Move, shoot, communicate in order to find, fix, and destroy the enemy were reinforced in the US armed forces as the sovereign recipe for the kind of war the American public would support. That is a war which is short, bloodless, and appears to be decisive.

Off to one side, the rising generation of neocons, not yet the ninnies they would become, drew their own lesson from Operation Desert Storm as well as a superficial review of the performance of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars. When combined with the WW II paradigm and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, their mis-guided lesson learned would give rise to the "shock and awe" approach to war put into practice in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Remember, the expansive goals enunciated by George H.W. Bush in the run-up to Operation Desert Storm regarding the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and so on were quietly abandoned as the realities of combat in urban areas were considered. It was at least tacitly acknowledged within the Bush Administration and Pentagon that we had no plans and no capabilities for a prolonged occupation of Iraq. The diplomatic, military, and economic resources were simply not there for both a WW II type unconditional surrender by the Iraqis and post-war rebuilding of the country.

On the sidelines over the next eight years, the neocons (now evolving into ninnies) grumbled that the war had not been finished. It would have to be ended--correctly, some day in the future. The nagging increase in terrorist actions by groups typified by al-Qaeda as well as the humiliating spectacle of American troops put to the knife by rag-tag thugs in Somalia boosted the neocon conviction that the Cold War winning US would have to permanently abate the growing nuisances in the Mideast.

A final misleading lesson was learned from the application of air delivered firepower in the Bosnian intervention. Seemingly, a handful of precision guided munitions from American and NATO platforms forced an end to the intransigent regime in Belgrade and brought low-cost democratic peace to the long violent region.

The events of 9/11 met the WW II paradigm. War was forced on the US by a palpably evil enemy. Diplomacy proved useless. Only the military option remained.

If the neocons of the White House and Pentagon had stopped to review the actual as opposed to the ostensible lessons of the American wars of the 20th Century, they would have realised that the WW II paradigm was not actually applicable. The Korean War model was the one to use.

The invasion of Afghanistan was a limited war in support of policy. Our policy goals were twofold. The lesser was the capture or death of Osama bin Laden and others directly associated with the 9/11 attacks. The greater goal was the demonstration that Islamst groups or regimes would not be immune from an American retaliation. In short, the larger goal was deterrence.

By not examining the good and substantial reasons why Operation Desert Storm stopped short of "total victory," and considering what would be required on the days, months, and years following the moment of invasion in Afghanistan, the neocon ninnies assured that not only would victory prove elusive, but that simply "not losing" would be very difficult.

It is true that firepower kills. but killing does not necessarily result in victory. Similarly "shock and awe" may have a very short-term success, but in and of itself does not assure either victory or not losing.

The decision to invade Iraq cannot be attributed to any historical model. The Baghdad regime had not even appeared to "force" war on us. There was no reason for the exercise in regime change. Beyond those self-evident considerations, the current administration gave no apparent considerations to the actual requirements for reconstituting Iraq as a fully functioning state following any successful US invasion.

In Iraq, the neocon ninnies have created something new in American history--a paradigm of how to throw away a war. If they had set out to create a pattern labeled "How to Lose," they could not have done better.

In recent weeks, the American military has been charged with a mission unique in its history--retrieving victory (or at least not losing) from the jaws of defeat. As a policy, the invasion of Iraq richly deserves the failure to which it was plunging only a few months ago. As a nation, we deserve better. The world deserves better of us.

Right now, the military is doing the right things on the ground to give us and the world the better which we deserve. If these efforts bring at least some semblance of success, it will be interesting to see what new lessons We the People, our representatives, and our armed forces learn.

The Worst Enemy Of Islamists? Islamists!

To survive, let alone succeed, Islamists and Jihadists need the support of the Islamic communities in which they are attempting to operate. Wannabe governments, guerrillas, even terrorists, need shelter, support, and assistance.

They need people!

This is particularly true in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan where the Islamist/Jihadist entities are waging war. It's just here, in the war zones, that the Islamists are blowing it the worst.

In North Waziristan the "foreigners," primarily from Uzbekistan, have been hanging around since the US led invasion. At first they were well received by the locals since they were both well armed and well disciplined. More recently as pressure has increased, the Uzbek guerrillas have been making exactions and imposing severe interpretations of Islamic law on the Tribal residents. Now, the foreigners have been given unmistakable notice that they have outworn their welcome. The locals have started shooting them.

Tough luck, boys. Guess you'll have to be moving on. Go north, young Uzbek. NATO and the Americans, to say nothing of the Afghans, are waiting.

In Helmand province, the local Taliban types have backed off from sternly enforcing their dictates on fashion and musical tastes. They still state what they believe is required of good Muslims in these areas of personal life. But, they no longer slit throats or heave stones. This change in behavior may be because they hope to take part in potential peace talks with the central government. It is equally, if not more, likely that the locals were chafing under the restrictive Taliban worldview and were tilting toward more active support of the Kabul government and its outside supporters.

Live long and perhaps prosper, Talibanista.

In Iraq, the popularity of al-Qaeda in Iraq and akin groups has been hitting the tank in recent months. This has been exhibited in the increasing factionation within the al-Qaeda leaning amphyctony. It has been underscored by the recent audio tape issued by Icon-In-Hiding Osama bin Laden bemoaning the fissioning process.

More to the point, the alienation of the population by the zealots of Islamism through such measures as cutting the fingers off people caught smoking and similar condign punishments for equally important violations of Islamic law as interpreted by theological deep thinkers has assured a mighty uptick in the effectiveness of US efforts to recruit local Concerned Citizens ready and willing to dime out the blackhats. This in turn has brought a decrease in enemy initiated actions.

Increased effectiveness by pro-government forces coupled with decreased enemy initiated actions means fewer people are being killed. This means the governmental simulacrum in Baghdad has a (short in all probability) chance to demonstrate that it is a government in fact, not simply in title.

Back during the long, long confrontation between the US and the West on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other, the greatest support for the American cause came from people of the political left. People who had come very close to the flame of communism and had been badly burned for their effort. These individuals, whether in Western Europe or the US, were the best informed and most resolute opponents of Communism.

We have to take a firm grip on that lesson of recent history.

Muslims, particularly those who have come close to the fire of Islamism and have lived to tell of it, are the most important ally in the current struggle against the Islamists and Jihadists. They know and understand from up close and personal experience just what the real life, real world impact of the Islamist worldview is. We must use this powerful aid.

Often during the First Cold War of 1945-1991 Americans made the mistake of ignoring the experiences of ex-communists, of people from the far Left who backed away toward the center. We acted as if they were forever polluted by their experiences. Contaminated. Political lepers.

Or, as was often the case with Europeans of the Left who did not agree with the totality of American policy, we cast them into the category, "Commie!" We didn't simply ignore them or quarantine them. No. We condemned them.

All too often the world for Americans was artificially divided. Them or US. America! Love it or Hate it!

We cannot make that mistake again. The Muslims, particularly those who have lived with or under Islamist domination, are critical assets. We must welcome them as partners in struggle.

We have to let al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the other Islamists commit the blunder of alienating the people without whose support they have no hope of even surviving.

The Geek Makes A Confession--And A Demand

Once upon a time the Geek flirted with being an ant-anti-communist. That was the inevitable result of having come of age in the Sixties after years of anti-communist indoctrination in the public school system.

(Perhaps you remember those days too. Duck and cover. My Weekly Reader with primitive political cartoons showing a red octopus holding the globe in his tentacles. Maybe you even collected the bubble gum cards featuring commie atrocities.)

If you are chronologically disadvantaged, you may have read or heard of the dismal days of the Great American Anti-Communist Crusade, better known as the Era of Great Fear or the Age of McCarthyism. Those were the days of blacklists. The days of loyalty oaths. The time of shrill demands to know, "Are you now or have you ever been...?"

By the time the Vietnam Debacle ended and Nixon left the White House covered in Watergate disgrace, the cause of anti-communism seemed dead. American communists and the wide assortment of fellow-travellers were seen as the victims of the worst sort of political assassination. Anti-communists were lumped together with J. Edgar Hoover and the wacky loonie-tunes Billy James Hargis sort as violators of the First Amendment at best and out and out Hitler clones at worst.

Even the most respectable anti-communists such as Paul Nitze, Norman Podhoeritz, and Alexander Solozhenitsyn were branded as mentally disturbed, neo-conservative warmongers, or throwbacks to the Stone Age of the Cold War.

Anti-anti-communism was one feature of a generation's defining mythology. The spirit of anti-anti-communism merged with other streams to form the current American focus on sensitivity, diversity, and the belief that there are no fixed, absolute ethical standards which apply to all people, all cultures, at all times and places.

This combination of over-sensitivity and fear of seeming to be reactionary has become a barrier to success in the new Cold War forced upon us by the Islamists.

Without standards of conduct, it is impossible for us to know what we are for--as well as what we must oppose in others.

Without real and absolute benchmarks, it is all to easy to fall prey to Islamists or their sympathisers accusing us of false crimes, for example, religious persecution. The cry of "Islamophobia" is hurled at anyone who takes a jaundiced look at the goals and methods of the Islamists and their armed component, Jihadism.

As a current example of this abuse see, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=/Culture/archive/200710/CUL20071031b.html.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has been eager to heave the Islamophobia grenade at any person, organisation, or group in the West which finds some Islamist gambit such as issuing a fatwa of death on the Danish cartoonist who put Mohammad's head on a dog's body objectionable. The OIC has been working the halls and lobbies of the UN long and hard in an attempt to enlist support in its effort to outlaw free speech in the West.

Free speech is a good candidate for an absolute standard. Authoritarian movements and regimes ranging from Nazism to Communism to Islamism are defined in large measure by their need to prohibit free speech. Liberal, democratic nations and peoples are in large part defined by free and open speech (even by their bitter, internal fights over what speech should or should not be protected.)

One of the most objectionable and self-defeating features of the Great American Anti-Communist Crusade was the willingness to curtail free speech in the interests of "protecting" Americans (particularly young ones) against the blandishments of Communism. It is a cliche to assert that the answer to "bad" speech is more speech.

Cliche? Yes. But, like all cliches this one contains a large grain of truth.

There is no Gresham's Law in speech. Bad speech need not automatically drive out good.

It is no wonder that Islamists all the way back to Qtub loath free speech, particularly as practiced in the United States. Freedom of speech leads to any number of other social and political features which are anathema to Islamists as they have been to other authoritarians.

You want some examples? The Geek is happy to oblige. You can add to the list.

The dignity of the individual is one.

Equality is another. (Feel free to add all the ways in which equality can manifest itself.)

Then there are advancement, evolution, and change. (Again the ways in which these can take form are legion.)

This gives some basis for the Geek's contention that freedom of speech is an absolute standard by which we can measure ourselves--and know our enemies.

There are other standards which may be advanced as well. During the Cold War between the US and USSR many were suggested. Political pluralism was one. Another was the freedom of the individual to practice a religion without the permission or hindrance of the state. Still another was the right of private property ownership. Yet another was access to economic opportunity without state interference or the necessity of party authorization. Then there was the right to travel, to move freely within a state, or to emigrate.

Arguably, these are all standards by which a country's or a movement's commitment to the dignity, opportunity, and integrity of the individual might be measured. Some can be defined as absolutes. Others are inherently conditional.

Be that as it may, we Americans--and all of us threatened by Islamism's global goals--must develop and at least tacitly agree on a set of standards. Only by doing this can we advance our cause by knowing what we are for.

Only by doing this, by developing and firmly enunciating a set of absolutes, can we assure that the opposition does not engage in the same successful tactic as did the anti-anti-communists of thirty and more years ago. To succeed against a challenge at least as severe as that posed by the Soviet Union, we must not allow the moral high ground to pulled from under our feet by shrieks of "insensitivity!" or "religious persecution!" or, worst of all, "Islamophobia!"

Only by knowing and declaring what we are for, will we ever know what and who wer're against.

Who's King Abdullah Kidding?

The present head of the House on Sand, King Abdullah, told BBC (through an interpreter, so there's an escape hatch open if things get too hot) that his government(?) informed British intelligence and security organs of the upcoming attack on the London subway system on 7 July 05. His Royalness further averred that the British failed to act on the information.

Yeah. Right.

In the opposite corner is the British Parliament. Last year the House of Commons' Intelligence and Security Committee found no evidence that any specific information existed which could have led to a successful interdiction of the bombings.

Who do you think is more credible?

Parliament, rather like the US Congress in the wake of 9/11, was after scalps more than fixes. If there had been any gripless wallahs in any of the intelligence and security agencies, the Parliamentarians would have wasted no time lifting the offender's hair. The deaths of over fifty British civilians were enough to assure the low likelihood of a whitewash or cover up.

Then there is King Abdullah.

Admittedly, this Grand Panjandrum of the Dunes is seen as the most "liberal," "progressive" of the six Saudi chieftains of modern times. It has been widely reported that he, unlike his predecessors, is working night and day to curb the omnipresent influence of the Wahhabist clergy. It has also been bruited about that this king, again unlike all of those before him, has been really, really trying to bring Saudi Arabia beyond being a medieval patch of sand with oceans of oil below.

Sure. Yeah. Right.

In so far as the jihad promises to come home to roost on the oil, blood, and sand from which it sprang, the Good King is anxious to enlist the self-interested support of the Wahhabists. Stability is the goal as well in the few other "modernising, liberalising, progressive" changes in Saudi economic, political, and social life which Abdullah has sought.

The Geek would advise the King and his consorts to keep four words in mind: actions on the objective.

Actions, my dear kingness, as the cliche runs, speak louder than words.

The following actions seem to be in order. Shut down Saudi support for the oodles of mosques and madrassas in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere which preach the messages of Islamism and Jihadism. Cooperate completely (and as transparently as genuine security needs allow) with the the UK, the US, and others in stopping the flow of money to Islamist/Jihadist groups. Halt the flow of wannabe jihadists from Saudi Arabia.

Those actions would be a necessary beginning. If done, there would be reason to take King Abdullah seriously as a partner in the current confrontation with Islamism. Without actions, Abdullah's words are no more than a hot desert wind.

The Geek Is Getting Rankled!

Previous posts show that the Geek is no cheerleader for the mullahocracy in Tehran. They have also demonstrated that the Geek is no war lover even though he accepts that war has its place in the spectrum of foreign policy.

Most of all, the sum of the Geek's posts underscore his utter contempt for policy decisions that are rooted (if that word is relevant in this context) in the gonads and viscera. Policies decisions that ignore historical trajectories. Policy choices that emerge from a vile combination of hopes or fears and domestic political calculations.

This brings the Geek to Iran. More particularly it brings the Geek to the subject of the Republicans vs the Mullahs.

At the often ignored center of the current confrontation between the Commander Guy on the one side and the Orator-in-Chief on the other is the International Atomic Energy Agency and its present director, Mohammed ElBaradei. The IAEA is charged with the responsibility of assuring member nations abide by the provisions of the treaties governing the peaceful use of atomic energy and nuclear weapon non-proliferation.

Get a grip on this.

The IAEA exists because the United States called it into existence.

"What!" You say.

That's right. Fifty years ago this year, President Dwight Eisenhower, in what many both at the time and later considered his finest speech, called upon the United Nations to create an agency dedicated to bringing atomic energy's potentials for benefit to all the nations of the world. He pledged not only complete American cooperation but even the provision of nuclear knowledge, technology, and materials for use under the agency's supervision.

Ike needed to use massive political arm twisting here at home to force changes in the extremely restrictive American laws governing nuclear matters. He did it. The laws were changed. The IAEA came into existence.

When asked about the IAEA years later, Ike reportedly looked out the window of his Gettysburg home, mused for a moment and answered with his famous smile, "It's working better than I hoped."

Taken as a whole, the IAEA has worked remarkably well over its fifty year life so far. It seems to be working rather well even with the obvious Iranian intransigence right now. Arguably, it would work even better if the current administration let it do its job.

It is reported that Mohammed ElBaradei sees no evidence of the Iranians being anywhere near the possession of an atomic bomb. In a companion remark, the IAEA head shows an appropriate degree of skepticism, "We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization. That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks." (Quote from The International Herald Tribune on-line http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/28/america/NA-GEN-US-Iran.php.)

The skeptical view is well taken. Iran has been playing games from hell over their self-proclaimed peaceful project to produce electricity. Given their record of obfuscation, tergiversation, and flat out lying, anything less would be foolhardy. (Now comes the big, BUT.)

Skepticism is not what the current administration has been exhibiting in recent months and weeks. Instead, the current administration has been acting as if it had proof-positive that the Iranians were not only seeking to obtain nuclear weapons but were on the very verge of doing so.

Unless one wishes to posit that the chest-thumping, crotch-pulling stridency coming from the mouths of the Commander Guy, the Veep, and assorted presidential wannabes is simply a successful attempt to boost oil company profits by driving the spot-market price of crude to record highs, the only explanation for their behavior is cognitive deficiency.

Kind of a "don't bother me with wimpy little facts, I wanna kick some ass" attitude. This sort of orientation might make both the utterer of threats and many of the audience feel good, but it is not the sort of approach that has shown positive results historically.

Get a grip on this--

Outside pressure consolidates the cohesion and political will of the target government and its citizens, (Think about how you make a snowball.)

Yeah, bucko, that's right. Pick up a handful of loose snow. Press it. Press it long enough and hard enough, the flakes become a solid mass. Press on it long enough and hard enough and what happens?

That's right. The snowball becomes an ice ball.

Repeat after the Geek, "Pressure consolidates long before it fractures."

Did that? Good. Now you have a major, basic fact of foreign policy which has totally eluded the current administration.

Our ill-considered approach has had the following negative effects. It has liberated the mullahocracy from much of the domestic unrest which would have been making its life miserable given the current economic condition of Iran and the demographics of the Iranian population. It has given the mullahocracy reason to be even more intransigent than would otherwise have been the case. It has forced the mullahocracy to invest the totality of national prestige and regime legitimacy in the nuclear issue and closely related matters.

Now, get a grip on this.

Our approach to the Iranians has helped two countries hostile to the US: the Peoples' Republic of China and Russia. Apparently the current administration hasn't gotten the word. Anything that diverts the US into unproductive, expensive, and influence draining side tracks hurts the US and helps these two adversaries.

Make no mistake about it. Regardless of the hopes of some Americans such as the "gobalism-will-solve-all" crowd, Walmart, and other business interests, China shares few, if any, national interests with the United States. Again, regardless of the hopes (or fears) of some Americans, Russia has not shed its fundamentally authoritarian inclination nor its historic feeling of inferiority compared to the West. Russians have been asking that most troublesome of all questions, the question which produced European Fascism, the question which underlies Islamism.

The Question?

"We were once great; now we are so small. Why?"

The policies of the current administration have encouraged the Russians to ask the Question. The policies of the current administration regarding Iran are encouraging both Moscow and Beijing to take actions which are best described as a form of diplomatic proxy war.

The new sanctions announced by the current administration are a justified gambit, particularly if the Europeans (perhaps convinced by a re-awakened "Crazy American Hypothesis") prove willing to join them despite economic losses to European businesses.

If so, then the emotional diatribes and not-so-veiled threats coming from the current administration can be rationalised, if not fully justified. Yet, the time for red meat rhetoric has passed. The time has come for some silence from the White House (and the campaign trail.)

If the Republicans (or at least the neocon ninnie component of that party) cannot remember Dwight Eisenhower who both created the IAEA and warned against the creation of a garrison state in pursing the chimera of complete security, they sure ought to remember Theodore Roosevelt. That was the hairy chested president who counseled speaking softly while holding a big stick.

The Geek is no admirer of Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich), the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He's got to give the senator his due. Levin is right when he said it was time to stop the "hot rhetoric."

ElBaradei was even more on target. "My fear is that if we continue to escalate from both sides that we will end up into a precipice, we will end up into an abyss. As I said, the Middle East is in a total mess, to say the least. And we cannot add fuel to the fire."

Bang on!, Mr ElBaradei.

There's always time enough for war. We can wait--at least for awhile.