Tyrants Of Supreme Arrogance (TSA) Versus We The People

The most recent symbol of the ongoing war between the rights of American citizens and the myrmidons of the great fetish, security, is a mild looking software geek named John Turner.  His confrontation, including the utterly asinine threat by a Tyrant to see Turner hit with a ten kilobuck fine, is covered here.  It is a hoot--and a glowing lesson in the disconnect between the TSA and its master, the Heimatsicherheitsamt on the one hand and the majority of the traveling public on the other.

The cause of the San Diego resistance as well as a growing surge of discontent is the increased use of imaging technology which purports to see all through one's clothing as well as its complement, the "enhanced pat down."  The virtual nakedness produced by the microwave or X-ray backscatter machines is objectionable to many people as an unjustifiable invasion of the most intimate of our personal regions.

The objectionable nature of the machines is no way lessened by the lies regarding the capacity of the system to store, retrieve, or transmit images which have been peddled by TSA for months now.  Depending on the mode selected, the system either can or cannot store, retrieve, and transmit images captured from the traveling folks.  The person in the booth being scanned has no way of knowing which mode is operative.  Nor can one be certain, beyond the assurances of TSA, that there is no way a specific identity can be linked to a particular image.

The option of bypassing the scan is available.  Exercise of this requires that the candidate passenger submit to "enhanced pat down."  This involves a rather firm set of very unpleasant encounters between a Tyrant's hand and the upper segment of the groin as well as a tap on the butt rather too robust to be considered anything other than distasteful.  People under arrest or enjoying the hospitality of the corrections industry are well acquainted with the procedure.  Most of the flying public is not.  Nor are most desirous of becoming familiar with the gloved and groping hand of Authority.

Confronted with the choice of being virtually stripped or materially groped, Mr Tyner declined, brusquely but politely.  The Tyrants present objected mightily to the objection raised by the peasant with the effect that reinforcements were called, the local police arrived, and the uppity peasant was ordered to depart, to go hence into the blackness from which he crawled.  Upon doing so, the unworthy mere civilian was threatened with a civil suit and a ten thousand dollar fine.  Fortunately for Mr Tyner and the rest of us, the entire exchange was caught in audio on his cell phone.

The wave of protest regarding the latest TSA outrage has the Tyrants and their sovereign, Janet Napoleon, in full double down mode.  According to the flacks, the intrusions are utterly essential for our collective safety and peace of mind.  And, we are assured, both the grope and the strip are conducted in a "professional" manner by well trained "professionals."  Well, golly gee, that sure makes me feel better; how about you?

First and foremost the claim that the "strip-or-be-groped" approach enhances safety is specious at best.  Even  if the backscatter or microwave virtual strip machines were up to the task of detecting a bomb such as that carried by last December's "Underwear Bomber," they would not have detected the "Anus Bomb" which came within an ace of dispatching the Saudi Arabian head of security several months earlier.

The grope the groin and slap the ass method is no more efficacious.  An anally deployed bomb would slide on by the Tyrants without the slightest risk of being found.  Does this mean the next step will be a drill in three parts: (1) Drop your pants and bend over, (2) Spread your cheeks, (3) Try not to scream as I ream you out.

As the "Anus Bomb" and the "Underwear Bomb" were the products of the same bomb maker, it may be presumed that the Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith are aware of the deeper alternative as well as the ease with which a martyrdom seeker so equipped can pass on through the phalanx of Tyrants.  As the bomb-maker-in-chief of AQAP was willing to use his own brother as the delivery system for the world's first anus bomb, it can be presumed as well that the man is up to the task again.

It also deserves mention that the TSA strip-or-get-groped tactic and the very expensive machines employed for the first option will have no effect in stopping the shipment of bombs as air cargo.  It was only days ago that the same maker of infernal machines attempted that gambit only to be thwarted by Saudi intelligence and quick work by security personnel at two foreign airports.  It might be prudent for TSA to expend the money and manpower on the less glamorous but more exacting task of inspecting cargo of all sorts in lieu of herding and humiliating human passengers.

The Geek has had the opportunity to see the methods of American and foreign passenger screening methods from an up close and personal perspective.  While countries such as the Netherlands and Israel do possess genuinely well trained and quite professional security personnel on frontline duty, such is not the case here.  In airports large and small, crowded, and nearly deserted, the US version of frontline passenger security remains what it has been from the beginning--the preserve of poorly trained, excessively egoed folks some of whom have only the most nodding of acquaintance with standard English.  What they lack in intelligence, education, empathy, or the slightest vestige of any attribute meriting the appellation "professional" they more than compensate for with an inclination toward the temper of the bully.  Apparently unable to make the cut for the job of warder in a backwoods country jail, they have had no recourse for their personality and skills beyond joining the TSA.

In short, the human dimension of security for the domestic air transport system is as flawed as the technological.  The circle-the-wagons attitude exhibited recurrently by the senior management and executives of both TSA and the Department of Homeland Security is an indirect but quite unmistakable indication that the folks topside in both organs are aware that for all the money and all the new hires, they have failed miserably.

The first line of our defense is today what it has been for years--offshore intelligence.  The last line is today what it has been for years and what was exhibited by the desperate heroism high over Pennsylvania farmland or on the approach to Detroit's airport--the passengers.  The very passengers who are seen by TSA as a type of scum to be threatened and humiliated.

Cheers for John Tyner.  And, boos to TSA

The Incontestable Irrelevance Of Military Victories

General Sir David Richards, the new head of Her Majesty's Forces, has opened himself to attack.  The general delivered his view that al-Qaeda and others of the violent political Islam persuasion cannot be defeated in any meaningful sense of the word by military means in a recent interview.  If he becomes the subject of vitriol, he can at least comfort himself with the recognition that he has done nothing but tell it like it is.

Sir David has done something quite difficult for a professional soldier--admitted that military victories can be irrelevant to the solution of larger political conflicts.  As he drew a line between conventional peer-to-peer wars and the sort of asymmetrical and messy affray such as that being waged in Afghanistan, the general has simultaneously underscored the value of his assessment and limited its application appropriately.  History powerfully buttresses the accuracy of his conclusion.

The granddaddy of modern defensive insurgencies, the first war of "national liberation," also known as the War of American Independence, proves Sir David's point.  The British Army won most of the battles, losing only two of any significance, but ended up waving goodbye to the former colonies.  As has been the case in every insurgency whether defensive or offensive in nature, the military, its successes and failures, are merely tools for influencing the political will of the two real contestants--the politically articulate portions of the two opposing populations.

The American War of Independence proved the most central point regarding all insurgencies or insurgency-like asymmetrical  conflicts: The side which can spend time and accept casualties will best the side which seeks to save time and limit casualties.  Additionally, the American War of Independence demonstrated that while a side cannot kill its way to victory, the infliction of casualties without reward will exhaust the political will of the less committed side over time.

The same set of lessons was given to the US during its involvement in the Wars of the Vietnamese.  The US won the overwhelming majority of the company sized and larger engagements.  This was irrelevant over the long---to We the People, overly long--haul.  A sizable segment of the politically articulate American public lost political will to continue the effort.  As had been the case with the British nearly two centuries earlier, the American political structure packed it in, picked up our balls, and went home.

The Algerian War of Independence although more complex in its social, cultural, and racial dimensions shows the same irrelevance of mere military victory to political success.  Overlooked by too many is the simple albeit brutal fact that the French military had the insurgents on the ropes.  The combination of a new operational doctrine in the rural areas and the convincing French success in the Battle of Algiers decimated the insurgent capacity to continue effective military or paramilitary operations.  It didn't matter.  The nature of politics not only in the two antagonistic ethnic groups in Algeria but also in France conspired to offset totally any and all victories by French forces.

General Richards is of the view that the same dynamic exists with respect to al-Qaeda and the other purveyors of violent political Islam.  He is not being pessimistic when he concludes that the very best that can be expected from military means is the containment of the threat.  That is accurate, provided one adds that containment will require punitive expedition employment when a specific threat can be linked to a specific foreign location or governmental facilitator.

Al-Qaeda and the others are ideologically motivated.  Much, if not all, of their ideology is both pernicious and persuasive.  In these factors, the ideology of violent political Islam resembles its precursors of National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism.  The one was defeated by military means solely because its purveyors chose the route of peer-to-peer war as the preferred avenue to global success.  The other, which as a result more closely resembles today's violent political Islam, rejected direct aggression selecting instead indirect, proxy, and other nasty little violent expressions.

As noted in yesterday's post, al-Qaeda has opted for the death-by-a-thousand-paper-cuts method of conflict.  This means, quite simply, that military muscle is not as relevant as so many of hawkish temper have hoped.  There are roles, critical ones, for military force, but none are sovereign remedies for the threat which will be confronting us for at least another generation.

The general demonstrated his firm grip on reality when he recommended "upstream" means to combat the ongoing threat.  As the conflict is primary one of values, norms, world views, in short, ideologies, his view has great merit.  It is unfortunate that all too may policy makers and "decider guys" in the US and elsewhere in the West define "upstream" means as being economic in nature.  Spreading money as opposed to ideas per se is not the answer, rather the countries of the West must employ the full panoply of soft power mechanisms with an emphasis on education in order to head off the next generation of wannabe martyrdom seekers.

The power and appeal of Western values, norms, world views, and ideas should never be underestimated.  Nor should they be deprecated as is so often the case by members of the assorted national "elites."  As was seen in the long running conflict with the ideas and institutions of Marxism-Leninism, the potency of the West intellectually, culturally, politically was enough to spell finish to both the Cold War and Soviet Communism.

Bombs and bullets are far more inherently limited in their effect than are words and ideas.  It may be rare, but it is more than simply welcome to read a correct appreciation made by a very experienced and quite senior military commander.  Hail, Britannia!

"Sword Of Justice"--One Plenty Bad Man

Regardless of how matters play out in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden's presumably as-good-as-on-the-ropes al-Qaeda has brought a new/old and very dangerous player to the global board.  Bin Laden personally named the new operations director, the man in direct operational charge of violent efforts against the West generally and the US in particular.

The man's name may be Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi or Ibrahim Madani.  He has been called Omar al-Somali.  His self-chosen sobriquet is Saif al-Adel.  Translated this comes out as, sword of justice.  Modest, eh what?

Muhammad or Ibrahim or Omar or Saif was born in 1960.  Or, perhaps, 1963.  If you get the idea that there is little extant in the open literature regarding this one time colonel in the Egyptian army, that is correct.  Most of the little that is known comes from the Sword's autobiography written five years ago, and is difficult or impossible to confirm without the resources of CIA (and perhaps not even then.)

The details are less important than the main theme of the man's thinking, his concept of how to wage effective war against the US and the other "infidel, Crusader states."  He has a clear concept that is well rooted in a sound understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of his enemy.

In 1987 Saif al-Adel was a rather impatient person with great ideas of how to reform the apostate government of Egypt.  His notions featured both a truck bomb and the use of a civilian aircraft as a cruise missile.  Both instruments of death and mayhem were to be employed against Egypt's parliament building.  The plans were aborted when security forces rolled up Saif and his fellow plotters of the rather directly albeit unimaginatively named group al-Jihad.   In the slammer Mr Adel became underwhelmed with the views of his fellow advocates of violent political Islam.

No, bucko, it is not as if the future Sword of Justice became disillusioned with the precepts and goals of violent political Islam.  That would have made future life too simple, too peaceful.  Rather the man viewed his fellow travelers as too impatient, too filled with zeal, and too able to underestimate the capacities of the assorted components of the House of War and its apostate tools.

For reasons known only to the heavyweights of Egyptian internal security, the man who would become the Sword of Justice was released.  He decamped to--where else?--Peshawar.  In those hospitable environs he made contact with the new kids of jihad, al-Qaeda.  He spent '91 and '92 in Khost training al-Qaeda trigger pullers and bomb throwers in the basics of military art and science.

Not surprisingly Saif trailed along when Osama bin Laden relocated to Sudan.  As has been attested to by the convicted terrorist, Mohammed Odeh, Saif was engaged at the bin Laden owned Damazine Farm where he whiled away the days teaching.  No, he was not instructing in the area of agricultural science but rather giving tuition in the manufacture and use of explosives.

When not giving helpful hints on how to blow things up and kill people, Saif waxed philosophical.  He was all in favor of moving the jihad to other areas of the world as Taliban was winning in Afghanistan and conditions in Sudan were not suitable to martyrdom operations.  Apparently Saif could forgo the inviting conflict in Bosnia as there is no record of his having accompanied any of the Mideast origin jihadis to that nasty little war.  Instead it appears that the peripatetic Egyptian spent several years traveling around the constellation of training camps in Africa and Asia set up by al-Qaeda and others of the violent political Islam sort.  Reputedly he was involved directly in forming working relations with jihadist groups in Iraq.

Saif was involved in the planning of 9/11.  In the late summer debate over the final execute decision, Adel took sides with Omar in opposing the idea.  The dissent registered by Mullah Omar and seconded by Adel was documented to the satisfaction of the 9/11 Commission.

As the US troops entered Afghanistan, Saif al-Adel left.  He went to Iran where he amused himself by planning and organizing several attacks on US and other foreign troops.  During its transient spasm of fear following the American invasion, the Iranian government authorized the arrest of Adel and other al-Qaeda leadership figures.  He was released a few months later.

The Saif al-Adel of 2005 was a man far different from his younger incarnation, the wannabe bomber of the Egyptian parliament.  The differences are what make the Sword a dangerous, a very dangerous opponent now.

Adel has become a prophet of protracted conflict.  His observations and ruminations had combined to convince him that the US along with the rest of the West could not survive a lengthy siege of terror politically. Operationally this means he supports relatively small, one-off, single actor attacks as opposed to the 9/11 sort.  In his estimate the best method of operation is one which envisions attacks no larger than the 7/7 London bombing or the similar strike on the Madrid subway.  In his mind a slow motion sequence of such attacks carried out over a long enough time primarily by homegrown "martyrdom seekers" would exhaust Western political will such that maximal Islamist demands would be met.

Adel is also convinced that it is essential that the global movement in violent political Islam have no geographic base.  The identification of Afghanistan with al-Qaeda was, he has concluded, a ghastly mistake, bad for both Afghanistan and al-Qaeda.

The Sword seeks a network of facilitators and recruiters even more diffuse than that which has existed in recent years.  He intends to make the "leaderless war" a reality.  The absence of an identifiable and thus targetable geographic center will inhibit, even prohibit, a Western retaliation or will render any retaliation far more provocative than punishing.

In both of these theses Adel is far more right than wrong.  American political will is strengthened mightily by a direct attack on our citizens and our soil.  Even if the butchers' bill is far smaller than that of 9/11, the demand of We the People for retaliation would be loud and long.  Provided there is a place upon which to retaliate, the probability of an American president not doing so is very, very slim at best.

A series of attacks, large or small in effect, but carried out by homegrown operatives gives no target against which to retaliate.  The absence of an identifiable outside figure, foreign group, alien sanctuary would prevent any meaningful American response beyond the judicial (provided the actors survive the act.)  The same dynamic would apply to Western European states.  The combination of Western values, norms, political relations render each and every government a pitiful helpless giant when confronted by domestic actors who have no direct, actionable ties with a foreign puppetmaster.

Adel intends to make an operational doctrine compatible with the political statement of Mullah Omar, who in 2009 explicitly (and belatedly) separated the Taliban in Afghanistan from the violent acts of groups such as al-Qaeda.  Adel like Omar understands that this sort of explicit rhetorical and operational separation serves best the coinciding interests of both states and non-state actors which share a commitment to political Islam.

Bright lad, eh, bucko?

Operational successes under a (distant and discrete) al-Qaeda umbrella when coupled with the current political trajectories in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, North Africa, and portions of sub-Saharan Africa will bode best for the fortunes of resurgent political Islam.  The combination will allow for peace in the "House of Islam" and a better form of war in the "House of War."

In his current thinking Saif al-Adel is putting into practice the idea first broached by the great-grandfather of contemporary violent political Islam, Abul Ali Mawdudi.  More than seventy years ago Mawdudi wrote, "war in the name of Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to change the social and political order of the entire war."

And, so it is.  Now Saif al-Adel gives the ideology a new and far sharper edge.

The G-20 Leaders Must Be Stupid Too.

Since the president of the United States and his supporters generally have delivered themselves of their considered opinion that the reason the US electorate gave the nod overwhelmingly to the Republicans was the sheer inability of We the People to comprehend the brilliant success of the progressive agenda, it will be surprising if the president and his people do not come to the same conclusion regarding the nineteen non-US heads of state assembled in Seoul.  How could it have been anything other than either (1) fear or (2) lack of intellectual horsepower which caused the Other 19 to fail to agree with the Obama assessment that the world needed more stimulus and less deficit reduction.

Since it is apparently impossible for Mr Obama to see that he is swimming upstream while all others are headed downstream,  there can be no rational explanation for the rejection of the stimulus heavy approach espoused by the American administration--and a handful of survivors in Congress.  An akin explanation must apply to the severe questioning not to say cross-examination given Mr Obama regarding the current US policy of cheapening the dollar.

The experience must have been unpleasant for the Nice Young Man From Chicago.  He was no longer the man of the hour, no longer the cynosure of the good, the true, the beautiful, the utopia of hope and change.  He was, it seems, not even first among equals.  The pride of place which has so long and seemingly without effort belonged to the US and its president seemed to have slipped insensibly to a land far, far to the east.

The president's discomfort was all too evident at the press conference where he attempted to claim that he had lost no "clout" simply because the American voters had chosen the way they did a few days earlier.  In the face of reportorial doubt, Mr Obama kept insisting that dealing with the Trolls of Beijing had been just as hard in those now long gone halcyon days of exoatmospheric popularity.  The election, he kept repeating, had done nothing to weaken his hand on the global stage.

Showing a generosity in defeat worthy of tennis at its finest, Mr Obama made nice noises in the direction of Beijing.  There is no doubt but the Trolls bested the (Clueless) Guy in the Oval on the matter of currency revaluation.  There is equally little doubt but the Trolls left Seoul with a bit more swagger than when they arrived.  They were home free on the little issue of artificially low value for the yuan.  And, best of all, no one supported the US demand that change be made.

The president was equally unsuccessful in selling the American policy of "quantitative easing."  The consensus among most of the Other Nineteen was the US sought to displace the real costs of its current and past government borrowing sprees onto the lenders as the net long term effect would be inflation cheapened dollars.  Considering the vast quantity of Treasury notes held by China it isn't too hard to guess what country was most displeased.  Of course, other countries such as Germany which are heavily export dependent as well as being direct competitors with the US may have been rather less worried about the long term value of their holdings than about the short range impact of lower costs for American made merchandise.  (Bad Geek! Only a cynic would think that.)

Regardless of the merits of the positions taken by Mr Obama, the name of the game in Seoul as in all international meetings, multilateral or bilateral, is "power."  And. as the flaccid final communique demonstrated, while the US might have influenced the agenda, it did not have any discernible impact on the results.

The Other Nineteen made the same basic evaluation as had the majority of the voters here just over a week ago.  The determination was simple.  Mr Obama had lost the juice because his policies were as wrong as a cat barking.  The explosive development of the American deficit on Obama's watch coupled with the determination shown by the president to keep on with the same old toss-money-by-the-supertanker-load approach to economic and political life to assure a loss of confidence in the good sense and judgement of the American president.  This conclusion would have been exacerbated in effect by the uncertainty attendant upon the Republican gains in Congress.

There must have been a subtext of genuine apprehension in Seoul regarding the impact of divided government prevailing for the next two years in Washington.  Given the strident ideological tone of the election on the part of both parties, apprehension as to what might play out and how it will effect the American economy and deficit was justified.  It becomes even more justified given the persistent inability of Mr Obama to act the role of decisive leader as opposed to temporizing, academic quasi-intellectual able to see all sides of the same issue.

Had Mr Obama shown any skill at leadership, any willingness to both say "here I stand, I can do no other" and act accordingly, the reluctance of others in the Nineteen to follow an American lead would have been lessened.  Put bluntly, Mr Obama has shown himself non-credible as an international leader.  He has neither the force of personality, the strength of character, or the constancy of action to serve the demands of imposing one's will on the heads of other states, heads which are able, egoistic, and committed to the national interest of their own countries.

In comparison, the Trolls of Beijing are totally credible.  Their policies are consistent, realistic, and serve national interest completely.  The words and deeds of the Trolls coincide.  They are predictable--and predictability is the greatest asset a government can have in international politics.  While there is much to criticize regarding the stance and policies of the Trolls, one is sure as to what they will do.

The same applies to other players both developed and emerging.  The governments of France, Germany, the UK, Russia, India are all predictable.  None are diving off the highest precipices of ideology.  All are pursuing well established, easy to understand national interest.  In short, they are reliable.

When the national interests and consequent policies of each of the G-20 states is examined closely, it is evident the US and its current president are the odd one.  Alone, the US lacks both a congruent foreign and international economic policy schemata.  Alone, the US lacks a clear, readily comprehended, clearly stated set of national interests.  (Slogans regarding the desirability of more American jobs do not count.)

The Other Nineteen individually judged the adequacy of American policies--and the American president.  Both came out wanting.  In short, these leaders and their advisors confirmed the earlier judgement of We the People.  There was nothing stupid about that.

Back To The Old Who-Is-Winning Question Again

The NYT, which as desperately wants to declare defeat in Afghanistan as it did in Iraq, has brought up the issue of just how much in the current estimate of success given by the US military should be believed.  With the upcoming review of American progress or lack thereof in Afghanistan the topic is both timely and important.

The military has a rather positive view of developments such the introduction of more boots on the ground due to the Obama surge approved a year ago.  The intelligence community is not so sure, some of its reporting is at sharp contrast with the military assessments.

This is not new.  The same dynamic occurred during the Vietnam War.  Repeatedly, and, as it turned out, accurately, CIA was the odd man out, the naysayer in the optimist's club.  CIA was so much of a "non-team player" that its reports were shuffled to the bottom of the pile throughout the administration of LBJ.  Not until a new Director of Central Intelligence demanded a "shading" of reports so that they might be read during the years of Nixon did anyone at the highest levels of the US government take a look at the findings of the lads in Langley.

Based on experience the Geek has a tendency to side with the gloomy bunch in the intel shop.  In the world, particularly in the war part of the world, all surprises tend to be bad ones.  Pessimism is a realistic way to view uncertain and highly flexible events.  Certainly the state of play in Afghanistan is filled with potentials for surprise as well as vast numbers of Rumsfeldian "unknowable unknowns."  No responsible intelligence analyst would be given to donning rose colored glasses when taking a dekko at Afghanistan.

Of course, the first order of business is defining what constitutes success.  As the experience in Iraq has made crystalline, success is not easy to define.  If the goal is overly expansive--as American goals tend to be--success will prove illusive or illusionary.  There was--and is--no way that the US or any coalition could succeed if the goal was that of producing a fully functioning Western style nation-state with all the requisite features thereof in either Iraq or Afghanistan.  Even though Iraq was at one time a reasonable facsimile of a modern, authoritarian nation-state with a reasonably advanced and complex economy supported by a similarly advanced technological base, the reality underneath the surface was far different, a fundamentally primitive society based on tribal and religious identifications further riven by decades of unsettled scores.

The best the US could hope to accomplish in Iraq was a temporary imposition of stability sufficient to allow nascent domestic institutions to take shape and root.  This was accomplished.  But it was all that was accomplished.  The later, internally driven political stasis and violence is not the responsibility of the US; it was not an American failure.  Insofar as any outside party is directly involved, it is Iran, and Iran is no ally of stability or peace in Iraq.

The situation is similar but not quite identical in Afghanistan.  The best that can be expected is the US and associated forces will reduce the violence to a point where indigenous institutions might survive and prosper.  Long term success is out of our control.  We cannot make the central government or the local ones legitimate, non-corrupt, and efficient.  Nor can the US and its allies in country assure that the Afghan security forces are fully up to the task of extending and maintaining internal security.  Neither can the US and its partners cleanse the FATA of al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Haqqani network commanders and trigger pullers.

If we define success in seeing Afghanistan a fully functioning nation-state of the Western sort, failure might as well be declared right now.  Given that Afghanistan is tribal in its social and political nature, riven by linguistic, religious, and provincial differences, and considering the evil hand played by Pakistan, there is no way that a mere military defeat short of total obliteration of the jihadists will lead to peace and stabiliity.

It deserves, even requires restatement, that the goal laid out by George W. Bush of "nation-building" in Afghanistan with all that implied was totally unrealistic in all respects.  That goal should not be used in assessing the relative success to date of the new American operational doctrine set forth barely more than a year ago.  Rather the correct base for evaluation is the degree to which the efforts of the US and its partners have neutered the capacity of the assorted groups to wage war effectively and to mount out of country operations.

On the more limited basis the indicators are all positive.  That does not imply success.  The advocates of violent political Islam have demonstrated tactical flexibility and high recuperative powers.  The cross border sanctuaries of the FATA as well as other assistance provided by the Pakistanis have gone a long way in assuring the hydra headed nature of the anti-government groups.

The uncertainties involving the Afghan government, the Afghan National Forces, the role of Pakistan all combine with the basic nature of the Afghan human terrain, its cultural values, and norms; the nature of tribal society and understandings of loyalty; and the deeply divided nature of the polity to make any but the most limited and pessimistic assessments of success the most rational and credible.  While it is possible, even probable, that General Petreaus, a man who is a PR genius but limited as a fighter of wars, has massaged the data: the recent trends in initiative, refugee generation, civilian collateral casualties and enemy tactics as all swinging in the favor of the US and its allies, including Kabul.

The takeaway?  Caution is appropriate as is limited, controlled scepticism but anticipations of American failure to achieve the limited goal, the goal of "not-losing" are way premature.  Much as the NYT and others of that ilk are chomping at the bit to announce one more US defeat, they are not likely to gain that goal.  If the US and its partners can keep on keeping on along the course plotted in recent months, success is far more likely than not--even with continued Pakistani pertinacity.

The Chicago Slicky Boy Makes A Slick Move

In his address to the Indian parliament President Obama made a commitment to India.  Specifically, he gave full US support for the long held Indian goal of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  Because the promise was given in the context of a major reform of the Council, it is a move heavy in symbolism and short on substance.  Altogether a typical move for the rhetorically inclined Mr Obama.

The Indians no doubt understand this.  However, understanding in no way robs the motion of its powerful diplomatic effect.  Infinitely more than the recently concluded Commonwealth Games, the gesture by the American president affirms India's coming of age.  It is a hoped for indicator by the leader of what was once--and may still be, despite the disastrous policies of Mr Obama--the most powerful and influential country on Earth that India is now a global player of the first rank.

In short, nothing could make the Indian government, elite, and opinion molders generally more delighted.  The move builds on the far more practical policy of George W. Bush which brought India into respectability in the area of civilian nuclear power without harming its nuclear weapons program to strengthen the ties between the US and the only potential counterweight to China--or the advocates of violent political Islam in Asia.  This is good for the US, good for India, good for the region, and good for the world.

It is even good for Pakistan.  That is if the government and army of the place can finally break free of the shackles of religion, the tight bindings of long past events.

Pakistan has the potential to be a far more prosperous, and far more important country than it is currently.  The untapped hydrocarbon resources under the barren topography of Baluchistan could give the country a solid economic base from which to grow, develop a diversified economy, and bootstrap the impoverished citizens out of the doldrums, doldrums which otherwise provide fertile recruiting grounds for the proponents of violent political Islam.

The Pakistani government is aware of the resources.  It is also aware of the need for outside money and talent to exploit these,  To that end as well as to wave a threat at the US, Islamabad has made overtures to the Chinese.  The Trolls of Beijing are properly aware of the potentials in Pakistan and have responded both quickly and favorably as with the deal to build another nuclear reactor in Pakistan and start port development efforts on the Baluchi coast.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is no doubt pleased with the early results of the demarche to China.  Longer term potential dangers have been shunted to one side.  Unless the self-satisfied leadership stops and reassesses the situation, they will find that they have mounted a tiger with respect to future freedom of action.  The Chinese are far less easy going than is the US when it comes to single minded pursuit of national interest and will brook no interference with maximum benefits flowing to Beijing.  The very nationalistic Pakistanis will rue this too late when the Chinese boot stomps on their collective face.

The Pakistanis would be far more shrewed and far more successful if they took advantage of India's new status in the world and in the estimate of the US.  Now is the right time to be openly and fully cooperative with India on the subject of terrorism.  Now is the right time to open meaningful negotiations with both India and the Kashmiris regarding the final status of the disputed territories of Kashmir and Jammu.  Now is the right time for the Pakistani army to abandon its hopes for a rematch and get down to the essential business of saving the country from the groups propagating violent political Islam.  Now is the right time for the Directorate of Interservices Intelligence to get out of the terror facilitating racket and nudge their clients such as the Haqqani network to come to the peace talk table.

Of course, since the government, military, and intelligence wallahs of Pakistan have exhibited a remarkable capacity to forget nothing and learn nothing new, none of this is likely to happen.  Rather, it is far more probable that Islamabad will get its collective nose way out of joint and try one more extortion gambit directed against the usual target, the USA.  As the initial results demonstrated clearly, the Pakistanis respond with indignation and vitriol whenever the US seems to be tilting toward India.

The alarming and totally irrational ability of the Pakistani government and elite to take offense over something so minor as the truth was evident in the remarks of President Obama in Mumbai.  In his speech there, Mr Obama made reference to violence, to deaths, to terrorism even but never mentioned that the figure behind the commandos last year, the semi-hidden hand controlling the killers of Mumbai, was Pakistan.  This genuflection before the ultra-thin skin of the Pakistanis was a regrettable necessity, a realistic appraisal that our so-called "allies" in the war against the advocates of violent political Islam is both irrational and given to working both sides of the street.

The real question, however, is not how to get the Pakistani government to be less primitive and unconstructive in its efforts but whether or not the government and army still are actually in full and effective control of their territory and population.  Or, has the real power in the place shifted insensibly to the hands of those wedded to  violent political Islam?  If that is the case--as it appears to be--Pakistan will never be more than a perpetual and lethal thorn in the side of civilized states and their citizens and interests.  It will be a more dangerous version of Iran and a never ending source of instability and danger.

Pakistan is at the cliched crossroads.  Over the next few weeks and months, the response of Islamabad to the presidential initiative in India as well as the ongoing problem of the FATA will tell which way Pakistan is headed.  Right now the ongoing reluctance of the army to move into North Waziristan coupled with the detected shifting of the Haqqani network's center of gravity to an adjacent border area bodes ill for the direction of the country.

Mr Obama--as well as the people in the diplomatic and foreign policy trenches who were behind the president's statement--deserves congratulations for executing a slick piece of diplomatic symbolism.  In one set of words the US has improved its position with a key player, taken a more robust role in the region, and provided a stimulus for Pakistan to openly and conclusively choose a side.  And, it might be mentioned in passing, the president has shown that he may have the capacity to earn his bones in the foreign relations field with considerable implications for an event scheduled for just short of two years hence.

The Universal Argument Is All About, "Who Is In Charge Here?"

Both the results of the midterm election and the confused subtexts brought out in the assorted exit and other polls shows that if there is one unifying theme defining American political discourse today it is the matter of who is or should be in charge of power in the US.

The opponents are well defined.  On the one hand is the self-defined elite, the hoi oligoi of academia, media, and politics with a firm belief in its education and status conferred right to rule (for the good of all, of course.)  On the other is the rest of us, the hoi polloi who lack the arrogance, the utterly delusional sense of self entitlement, the prideful certainty that we are so competent, so blessed by wisdom that we can run anyone's life other than our own.

In this conflict as in the confusion over what government is all about, We the People are  no different from our fellow members of the Order of the Belly Button in Europe.  The same conflict has been extant and growing over there for some years.  Most recently it has culminated--as it has here--in a lurch away from the wholesale commitment to social democracy with its firm conviction that the government is the fountainhead of equality, justice, and security.  As in the US the assorted elites of Europe have been outraged, horrified by the notion that the ungrateful "masses" so repeatedly celebrated in the abstract by the elites have turned the worm against their presumed benefactors.

At root in both Europe and the US, the issue in play is the same.  Who will exercise political authority, that is power over the lives, the choices, the values, the beliefs of the individual citizen?  The short answer, apparent right now, is the citizenry generally in both the US and Western Europe no longer trusts the ability or the motives of the central government and those who closely identify with the central government be they politicians, academics, journalists, pundits, labor leaders, and the rest of the elite legion.

As the line in an old TV ad had it, "Please, mother, I'd rather do it myself."

The contest for power pitting supporters of the state against those who desire (demand?) that the state be either limited or shrunk has been raised in profile and embittered in tone by the exigencies of the great budget crunch.  The crunch would have come sooner or later and is in no way directly dependent upon the effects of the Great Recession.  The crunch is the product of the cold equations of population demographics pure and simple.  But the impact of the Great Recession on national bottom lines accelerated the pace of events, sped up the coming of the crunch.

The rapid coming and blooming of the budget crunch assured that people in the US and Western Europe had the impetus to bring an almost subterranean debate over the nature, role, and extent of governmental authority into the open.  For the moment at least, the Big State is on the defensive, but it is far from becoming an endangered species.

One reason for this is the distrust of international aggregates such as the European Union or the UN is far, far greater among the hoi polloi than with the hoi ollogoi.  There is and has been for many years a belief dear to the hearts of elites here and in Europe that the day of the nation-state was over.  To most of the elite the demise of the nation-state was an unmitigated good.  The complete antipathy held for the nation-state was equaled by a passionate affection for multi-national institutions whether the various precursors to the EU, the UN or, closer to us in the States, the Organization of American States.

All multi-national institutions but particularly the UN were wildly applauded and supported by all members in good standing of the elite here and abroad.  In the US the fact that Uncle Sam was often the designated whipping boy of the globe was seen as a sign of the UN's legitimacy.  How could any body in which the countries of the world had an equal voice be mistaken?

We the People have been reluctant in the extreme to embrace the notion that the US was the source of all global evil, all the problems, inequities, and injustices of the human race.  Few of the hoi polloi have been eager to accept the "We are bad" and "Blame America first" slogans of the elite in its exaltation of the UN or other multi-national bodies.

One reason for this as well as for the innate distrust of multi-national bodies is the intuitive understanding within We the People and our counterparts in Europe that not all people, not all cultures, not all countries have identical or even compatible norms, values, imperatives, and goals.  Regardless of the propaganda offered by the elites, there is and has been a pervasive belief that not all people, not all cultures, not all societies, not all countries are fundamentally interchangeable parts of some mythical human whole.

It is this understanding that is in play with the "Clash of Civilizations" so dramatically evident today.  The CoC pits two world views which are diametrically opposed in many basic features in sharp combat over just who will be in charge of the globe in the decades to come.

It is no more xenophobic or racist or "tribal" for a person in the West to want to see the West continue to be the dominant voice in global affairs than it is to say the same of a Muslim, even an advocate of violent political Islam to wish his world view to triumph.  Rather both are seeking to answer the "who is in charge" question in the way which most benefits the personal preference, the individual loyalty.

When a Western European polity determines to ban minarets or burquas it is neither intolerance at work nor the chimera of "islamophobia."  Rather it is the right of the majority culture, the majority society acting as polity, to determine it and not the stranger in our familiar land who is in charge of today and tomorrow.  It is the assertion of a basic human social right to determine its own identity and destiny--regardless of what the self-selected elite might desire.

Banning symbols of Islamic culture is not an attack on Islam.  Actions in Switzerland, France, or even the US in no way threaten the political integrity of majority Muslim polities.  Muslims have an untrammeled right to stone women, force women into garbage sacks, lop of hands and feet of purported criminals, or engage in the other requirements of their faith--in the areas where they are in charge.

At the same time it is well within the purview of Westerners to dictate the requirements of conduct, the tests of membership in their national communities.  It is not, despite the pronouncements of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an attack on Muslims to assert that they conform to the demands of the nation-states in which they choose to reside.  Nor is it, again regardless of the position adopted by the OIC, for the US or any other Western state to defend itself against the physical attacks mounted by Muslims who advocate violent political Islam.  Neither is it an attack against Islam qua Islam to retaliate when attacked by a Muslim.

The violent aspects of the Clash of Civilizations constitute nothing less than a war.  And, war is nothing but a means of determining just who is in charge.  The Clash, most importantly its violent component, was initiated by Muslims who are strong and fervent believers in violent political Islam.  They sought and continue to seek to be in charge not only in their own, home countries but elsewhere, everywhere if the words of such as Osama bin Laden are to be taken at face value.

We the People and our counterparts throughout the West can be grateful to the advocates of violent political Islam.  Their attacks, their mass murders, their terror has forced us to see just what is abroad in the world.  It has turned out that the danger is not  simply violent political Islam or even the add on of the intrusive Nanny state, but rather the long unchallenged ascendancy of the hoi ollogoi.

For too long we have surrendered power almost without question or protest to those who have proclaimed themselves to be "our betters."  The failure of the self-designated elites to defend our lives and territory against foreign threats gave rise to an increased unwillingness to entrust the elite with power.  As election after election in both Europe and now the US show, the non-elite, the common person, the hoi polloi has belatedly but decisively decided that it is in charge, that it has the power to control its life today and into the future.

And, that, Bucko, is a damn good thing.