Yemen And The Overlooked Chokepoint

Yemen is another one of those pesky artificial states. Created by accident as part of the ongoing British "fits of absentmindedness" during the late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Yemen is a country which has always been wanting to fall apart. It takes only the slightest excuse to do so.

It is in the process of collapse one more time.

So why should we care?

Good question.

Basically there are a couple of reasons. One is quite good--at least for the moment. The other is also adequate, but will take a longer time to properly appreciate.

The good short-term reason is the Bab al Mandab. The "Bab" is the narrow stretch of water at the southern mouth of the Red Sea. Currently four percent of the world's daily production of oil flows through the narrow opening between the coasts of Yemen and Djibouti. Not much, but enough so that any threat to the flow will cause yet another spike in oil futures.

A bit of context wouldn't hurt before looking at today's state of play. The northern portion of today's Yemen, formerly called North Yemen became more or less independent in 1918 following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its dismantlement by the British and French. Great Britain kept a "benevolent" eye on the Shiite majority stretch of semi-barren mountains and desert.

The southern portion of Yemen, formerly the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (aka South Yemen) and before that the British Protectorate of Aden, was cut loose by the UK in 1967. Three years later at the ambiguous conclusion of a form of civil war between it and North Yemen in which Egypt played an open role, Aden changed names to the Peoples Republic.

As the name make clear the PDRY was Communist. Well, sort of hemi-demi-semi Communist.

North and South unified in 1990. Four years later a secessionist movement started in the south. It was officially "subdued" in 2000.

Subdued? Perhaps. Ended? No.

The southern portion of Yemen is relatively richer, better educated (if that term is relevant where only roughly half the population is literate) and possessed of modest oil reserves. It is also Sunni. Sunni of the Wahibist/Salifist persuasion. (No wonder that Osama bin Ladin's ancestry is from the south of Yemen as are the roots of many others in the al-Qaeda organisation.)

The north is Shiite. Strongly so. Let's step back forty-six years. In 1962, North Yemen, under the avuncular eye of Whitehall, became a "republic" after overthrowing the Immamate. This theocratic rule had limped along well enough as long as no one cared who or what was running the show. Regional considerations finally prompted someone to care and, since the sun had not yet set completely on the "lands east of Suez," bidda-bing, bidda-bang, the Immamate was gone and the good republicans in.

The Immamate was gone. But, not forgotten. In recent years it seems that the Shia majority in the north has been pining after the good old days of pure Shia sharia. Helped along by Iranian agents, the pining has taken a more definite shape.

The shape of guns. The shape of suicide bombers. The most recent example of Shia unrest in the north came just the other day as a suicide bomber reported to be fourteen years old blew himself and four others to protoplasm splashes in Sa'ada. There's lots of coverage, this is good and short. (http://www.themedialine.org/news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=22007)

The northern threat is posed to a government which is already overstretched by the presence of the southern separatist movement and (drum roll, please) the never absent al-Qaeda. As if the government did not face enough problems, it is not widely considered to be legitimate due to its policy proximity to both the US and Saudi Arabia.

It has been al-Qaeda in the past which has made most Americans even dimly aware of Yemen's existence. It was in Aden that the USS Cole allowed one small boat too many to come too close.

Since that time the US government and Yemen have had a tenuous relationship. Yemen is an important geographical point in the Great Global War on Terrorism. Not because it was the ancestral home of bin Ladin, or even the place at which the bombing of the Cole announced clearly that the US was in the crosshairs.

Yemen became important because of an event taking place two years after the Cole was holed. A Yemen based al-Qaeda cell attacked the French flagged oil tanker, Limburg. The resultant small and short lived spike in oil prices brought home to those who care just how important the Bab al Mandab is.

Since then al-Qaeda and its affiliates have been quiet. In part this is because the government of president Salih has made important concessions to the jihadists. Prisoners have been allowed to escape, detainees transferred from US custody have been "reeducated" and released. From the US perspective this has made Yemen as less than reliable "ally" in the Great Global War on Terrorism. A good summary of the state of play in this area can be found at the following: http://www.metimes.com/Security/2008/07/02/is_yemen_an_ally_in_the_war_on_terror/5613/

Salih has not been so successful in the north even though he was born in that region and was president of North Yemen before federation. There are currently a minimum of three thousand fighters in the mountains and caves of the north. They are all members of one particular sect of Shia, the Zaidi.

The Geek does not agree with those who argue the northern insurgency is a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While Iran has undoubtedly provided some moral and training support, it is unlikely that it has gone beyond this level.

Adding to the potentially quite destabilizing mixture in Yemen is the presence of an estimated twenty thousand Somali refugees who have arrived in the country this year alone. (See the Doctors Without Borders Estimate at: http://www.alsahwanet.net/view_nnews.asp?sub_no=403_2008_07_05_64460)

Salih has been successful so far in playing region against region, tribe against tribe, sect against sect and the US against bin Ladin. How much longer he can keep his balance and keep Yemen from going the way of Somalia is difficult to judge.

Easy to judge is the impact of a failing Yemen on both the adjacent Bab al Mandab and the global oil markets. Bad at best. Catastrophic if combined with other shocks to the market.

Easy to judge is the impact of a Yemen failure on the Arab Peninsula. The Somaliazation of Yemen would have large, negative effects upon all the Arab oil states. Quite possibly it would be the start of a very unpleasant avalanche.

Incipient crises are always easiest to nip off at their first sign. (Think about what would have been the effect if the French Army had resisted the German reoccupation of the Rhineland.) We have missed that particular opportunity.

Among the many, many foreign policy challenges facing the next administration is how to (note, not "when to," or "if to") intervene effectively in Yemen before it hits the tank along with Somalia.