Jihadists Change The Rules Of The Game--Again

The purpose of terrorism, Lenin once observed, is to terrorise. To terrorise, the terrorist must attract attention--a lot of attention. This means staging spectacular operations that shift the paradigm.

Al-Qaeda shifted the defining paradigm on 9/11. This group pushed the envelop of suicide bombing attacks later in both London and Madrid.

These successes were such because each attack fell outside the limits of previous experience. Put simply, the security and intelligence structures of the US, the UK, and Spain had not foreseen terrorist acts of this nature and quality. Nothing in the recent institutional memory of any of these target countries had sensitised the defenders toward new forms of attack.

In the case of the US there had been a dearth of foreign sponsored attacks delivered against domestic targets. With the exception of the truck bomb attack on the Federal Building in Oklahoma, all of the American experience with terrorism had been limited to low casualty bombings in which only the first attempt on the World Trade Center had generated much national attention.

Attenuating the lessons which might have been learned from the first WTC attack was the speed with which the men responsible were identified, arrested, and convicted. It was a counter-terror slam dunk. When the high-fiving was done, no one bothered to take a closer, harder look at what the bad guys might do next time--or even if there would be a domestic next time.

Admittedly, al-Qaeda helped reinforce the lack of American thinking. The next efforts by the group were off-shore. They were successful, but in a real sense, stereotyped: Surface based attacks using suicide vehicle-borne, improvised explosive devices.

The possibility of an air delivered attack was not considered probable. Neither, the available evidence suggests strongly, was the possibility of a high body-count attack on a CONUS target.

The UK had much experience with terrorism thanks to the lengthy and occasionally creative campaign by Irish organisations. In a real sense, the presence of terror had become part of the urban scene not only in Northern Ireland but throughout the UK. Terror could be and was marginalised because the Irish version had been low in its body count yield, and rarely escalated beyond the small IED variety.

The coordinated attacks on the London subway system on 7 July 2002 marked a genuine paradigm shift in recent British experience. The unsuccessful attempt to emulate the initial set of strikes two weeks later demonstrates that the 7/7 operation was not an anomaly.

The situation in Spain was virtually identical to that in the UK. The Spanish security agencies and public had undergone a long acquaintanceship with terror thanks to ETA. While some of the Basque separatist operations were both high visibility and bloody, most had been ho-hum and relatively lacking in bombs resulting in body parts strewn across the landscape.

The Madrid attacks were something else again. They were sophisticated in timing and very deadly in their consequences. For the Spanish as for the Brits and the Yankees, the rules of the game had been changed.

Over the past six years, particularly in the past two, al-Qaeda has experienced a steady decline from the high point of its fortunes following the shocks of the three paradigm shifting bombings. The largest combat capable component of the al-Qaeda franchise, al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been destroyed as an effective paramilitary formation--ironically in large measure at the hands of Sunni tribesmen whom al-Qaeda had alienated.

Other than in the FATA and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers such as Taliban have enjoyed little success in capturing either the attention of the world or greater support within the Mideast. (OK. To err on the side of accuracy, the emergence of al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa has been a bothersome uptick in the jihadist success quotient.)

Comes now Lshkar e-Tayyeba. If initial indicators which point to this group having been behind the Mumbai are reinforced in coming days, credit can be given to this long standing armed group hailing from Pakistan for shifting the paradigm of terrorism.

The wave of the future may well be more commando type operations involving a small number of well trained, well equipped individuals with excellent reconnaissance, good command, control and communications and, while being willing to die, are not expected to become "martyrs." If this proves to be the case, we will have to spend a lot less time gnashing our teeth over terrorist weapons of mass destruction.

It also means we will have to get a grip on two very unpleasant but historically undeniable facts. The jihadists have the initiative, and small commando units as well as their indigenous "pilot teams" are even harder to detect and defeat in the pre-mission phase than other forms of terror producing activities.

Terrorists, like guerrilla insurgents, enjoy the initiative in comparison with their opponents. As war after war has demonstrated, the asymmetrical contest is decided by the capacity to seize and maintain the initiative. This, in turn, is based on the political wills of the two contestants.

The side with the greater political will ultimately will prevail over the side with the weaker. This has been true in every insurgency over the past four hundred years. It is equally true in a war between non-state actors using terror as their preferred tactic and the states which oppose them.

The Mumbai model has powerful appeals for the terrorist.

First, the men pulling the triggers need be no more eager or ready ot die than any well-trained, well-motivated special forces trooper. This enlarges the recruitment pool. It also conserves expensively developed assets.

Then, consider contemporary technology. Cell phones and social networking sites such as Twitter provide an excellent means of command, control and communication. These and other features of virtual life assure that the impact of the operation will be transmitted instantly and effortlessly around the world without any real chance of target government intervention.

Of course, the results of a meticulously researched and planned operation that is pushed home with vigor and resolve will provide benefits to the attacker--including off-stage sponsors--that greatly exceeds the costs involved.

Check it out. Low risk. Low investment. High payoff. Now, that's a deal.

The greatest part of the investment is time. It takes time to recruit, select, and train the operational personnel. It takes time to properly research the target. It takes time to put the pilot teams in place with appropriate cover. It takes time to infiltrate the trigger pullers.

It takes time to pull off an operation such as that in Mumbai that was more logistically complex than even the 9/11 attacks. Given the initial impact, however, it was time very well used.

Time. To Americans in particular, time is a commodity to be spent efficiently. We hate spending a lot of time on things--particularly unpleasant activities. Like war. War is a very unpleasant matter on which to expend time.

But, history proves beyond a reasonable doubt that in asymmetrical conflict, the side which is more willing to spend time pursuing its goals is the side which will win. Again, it is a matter of political will.

The expenditure of months, even years, on the run up to a major spectacular such as the Mumbai attacks is well worth it from the perspective of the attacker. Making the costs of time and lives even more worthwhile is the high probability that some of the attackers have escaped with an invaluable cargo of lessons-learned.

While the actual number of individuals involved either directly or in support roles is not yet known and probably never will be, it is safe to assert that the the Indian authorities are knowingly lying when it is asserted that only ten men were responsible for the deaths and damage resulting from nearly simultaneous attacks on ten targets.

Lashkar e-Tayyeba appears to have reinvigorated international terrorism as a tactic just as al-Qaeda is fading everywhere but the chaotic areas of FATA and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda's number two capo, al-Zawahiri, released a new (and uncharacteristically rambling) video which carried the same tired messages of his earlier efforts as the Mumbai attack was unfolding.

There might be a deliciously ironic symbolism here. In a way, the juxtaposition of the old jihadist's focus on the Mideast and the blood covered videos from Mumbai show the passing of the old and the coming of the new.

Most importantly, the combination of the old (al-Zawahiri) and the new (Lashkar e-Tayyeba) shows the incoming administration of Barack Obama that an old cliche obtains as he comes into office.

The cliche?

"The more things change, the more thay stay the same."